1
SEPARATION OF POWERS to the people by the provision on initiative and
Essence. In essence, separation of powers means that
legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the executive,
settlement of legal controversies to the judiciary. Each is
prevented from invading the domain of others. (Bernas,
Commentary 656, 2003 ed.)
Division and Assignment. Its starting point is the
assumption of the division of the functions of the
government into three distinct classesthe executive, the
legislative and the judicial. Its essence consists in the
assignment of each class of functions to one of the three
organs of government.
Theory. The theory is that a power definitely assigned by
the Constitution to one department can neither be
surrendered nor delegated by that department, nor vested
by statute in another department or agency.
Reason. The underlying reason of this principle is the
assumption that arbitrary rule and abuse o authority would
inevitably result from the concentration of the three powers
of government in the same person, body of persons or
organ.
B. Implied
More specifically, according to Justice Laurel, the doctrine
of separation of powers is intended to:
1. Secure action
2. To forestall overaction
3. To prevent despotism
4. To obtain efficiency
History. Separation of powers became the pith and core of
the American system of government largely through the
influence of the French political writer Montesquieu. By the
establishment of the American sovereignty in the
Philippines, the principle was introduced as an inseparable
feature of the governmental system organized by the United
States in this country.
Limitations on the Principle
1. System of Checks and Balances
2. Existence of overlapping powers
I. In the Constitution
A. The major departments (Art. VI, VII, and VIII)
Art VI Legislative Department
Art VII Executive Department
Art VIII Judicial Department
B. The constitutional commissions (Art. IX)
Art IX-A Common Provisions
Art IX-B The Civil Service Commission
Art IX-C The Commission on Elections
Art IX-D The Commission on Audit
C. The other independent bodies {e.g. the Electoral
Tribunals [Sec. 17, Art. VI and Sec. 4 (last par), Art.
VII]; the Commission on Appointments (Sec. 18, Art.
VI); the Judicial and Bar Council (Sec. 8, Art. VIII)}
II. Manner of Conferment of Power
A. Express
1. Legislative power to Congress
ART. VI, SEC. 1. The legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved
referendum.
2. Executive power to the President
SECTION 1. The executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines.
3. Judicial power to the SC and the lower courts
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
4. Others (e.g. powers of the independent
constitutional bodies)
1. Doctrine of Necessary Implication: the grant
of express power carries with it the grant of
other powers that can be reasonably inferred
therefrom
2. Examples
i. Power to promulgate rules of procedure by
the Electoral Tribunals (incident to the
power to decide election contests)
CASE:
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil 139
FACTS:
In the election of Sept. 17, 1935, Angara (herein
petitioner) and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo,
Dionision Mayor (Respondents) were candidates
voted to be members of the national assembly (NA)
for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as
member-elect of the NA for the said district. On
November 15,1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled,
passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of
the members of the National Assembly against
whom no protest had thus far been filed.
On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral
Commission (ELECOM) a Motion of Protest
against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the
ELECOM adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed
said date as the last day for the filing of protests
against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the NA.
Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by
virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer
protest (the prescribed period for filing of protests
had already ended on December 3, and the
respondent was late in filing his protest because he
filed the protest after December 3.).
Ynsua claims that there was no constitutional or
legal provision which stated that members of the
NA cannot be contested after confirmation of the
NA. ELECOM denied petitioners motion to dismiss.
Petitioner then files a protest to the Supreme Court
(SC) questioning ELECOMs jurisdiction over the
case. (Petitioner argues that, ELECOM could only

regulate proceedings, that SC has jurisdiction to
pass upon fundamental questions in the issue since
it is an interpretation of the constitution)
The Solicitor General (SolGen) argues that
ELECOM is a constitutional body which has
jurisdiction to try all contested cases, re-elections
and said acts is beyond SC. Further, Res #8 did not
deprive ELECOM of its jurisdiction. Since ELECOM
acquired jurisdiction over the election protest, the
Motion to dismiss filed in ELECOM is not
reviewable by the SC.
ISSUE(S):
1.) Does the SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM
and the controversy?
2. ) If it does, then has ELECOM acted within or
without jurisdiction?
HELD:
1.) The SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM:
separation of powers granted by Constitution
(through separate articles for each branch) but
check and balances maintain coordination among
the branches. When there are conflicts between the
boundaries of powers and functions of each branch,
the Judiciary has the power to review and resolve
these conflicts through Judicial Review (referred to
as Judicial Supremacy). This however is limited to
actual cases and controversies. Judicial supremacy
is but the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate cases and controversies, and is the
power and duty to see that no one branch or
agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
2.) ELECOM acted within its jurisdiction since
ELECOM is recognized as an independent quasi-
judicial body which is not an inferior tribunal, or
corporation, board, or person, and is granted the
powers to be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the NA. The present constitution
granted the ELECOM with all the powers exercised
by the legislature relating to the said function of
ELECOM, and this includes the regulation of the
rules and procedures of election protests. The
confirmation of NA of its members is not required
and does not limit the ELECOM of its power to fix
dates for election protest, or else this would
undermine the power and functions of the
ELECOM.
ii. Power to punish for contempt by the
legislature (incident to the power to conduct
investigations in aid of legislation)
Legislative Contempt. The power of
investigation necessarily includes the
power to punish a contumacious witness for
contempt. (Arnault v. Nazareno)
Acts punished as legislative contempt.
The US Supreme Court in the case of
Marshall v. Gordon mentions:
1. Physical obstruction of the legislative
body in the discharge of its duties.
2. Physical assault upon its members for
action taken or words spoken in the body;
3. Obstruction of its officers in the
performance of their official duties
4. Prevention of members from attending
so that their duties might be performed
CASE:
Arnault vs. Nazareno, 87 Phil 29
I. THE FACTS
The Senate investigated the purchase by the
government of two parcels of land, known as
Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing
question that the Senate sought to resolve was the
apparent irregularity of the governments payment
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to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American
citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his
alleged interest in the two estates that only
amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to
have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate
sought to determine who were responsible for and
who benefited from the transaction at the expense
of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of
Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of
the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its
hearings. In the course of the investigation, the
petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name
of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the
Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the
Senate and was committed to the custody of the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until
he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a
petition for habeas corpus directly with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of his
detention.
II. THE ISSUE
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the
petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the
Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit
petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period
of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right
against self-incrimination?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus
filed by Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish
the petitioner for contempt for refusing to
reveal the name of the person to whom he
gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935]
Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and
exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions as to be implied. In other
words, the power of inquiry with process to
enforce it is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to effect or
change; and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information which is
not infrequently true recourse must be had to
others who do possess it. Experience has shown
that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain
what is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
[W]e find that the question for the refusal to
answer which the petitioner was held in contempt
by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under
inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed.
Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is
not challenged by the petitioner, requires the
Special Committee, among other things, to
determine the parties responsible for the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is
obvious that the name of the person to whom the
witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is
pertinent to that determination it is in fact the
very thing sought to be determined. The
contention is not that the question is impertinent to
the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation
or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have
already indicated that it is not necessary for the
legislative body to show that every question
propounded to a witness is material to any
proposed or possible legislation; what is required

is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under
inquiry.
xxx xxx xxx
If the subject of investigation before the committee
is within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness
called relates to that subject, obedience, to its
process may be enforced by the committee by
imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to
commit petitioner for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the
legislative body to punish for contempt to the end
of every session and not to the end of the last
session terminating the existence of that body.
The very reason for the exercise of the power to
punish for contempt is to enable the legislative
body to perform its constitutional function without
impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions
may be and in practice are performed during
recess by duly constituted committees charged
with the duty of performing investigations or
conducting hearing relative to any proposed
legislation. To deny to such committees the power
of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to
defeat the very purpose for which that the power is
recognized in the legislative body as an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function.
It is but logical to say that the power of self-
preservation is coexistent with the life to be
preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question
was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing
body and which does not cease exist upon the
periodical dissolution of the Congress . . . There is
no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish
for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully
invoke his right against self-incrimination.
Since according to the witness himself the
transaction was legal, and that he gave the
[P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in
compliance with the latters verbal instruction, we
find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that
to reveal the name of that person might
incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities
on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is
privileged is for the determination of the Court. At
least, it is not enough for the witness to say that
the answer will incriminate him as he is not the
sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-
incrimination must appear reasonable and real to
the court, from all the circumstances, and from the
whole case, as well as from his general
conception of the relations of the witness. Upon
the facts thus developed, it is the province of the
court to determine whether a direct answer to a
question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the
testimony of a witness may tend to show that he
has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him
to claim the protection of the constitutional
provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at
the same time liable to prosecution and
punishment for such violation. The witness cannot
assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful
excuse, for protection against an imaginary
danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine
from all the facts and circumstances of the case
whether the witness is justified in refusing to
answer. A witness is not relieved from answering
merely on his own declaration that an answer
might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial
judge to decide that question.
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C. Inherent or incidental
CASES:
In re Dick, 38 Phil 41
Facts:
R. McCulloch Dick, is the editor and proprietor of the
Philippines Free Press, a periodical published weekly in the
city of Manila. There was a publication of certain articles in
that paper which tends to obstruct the Government of the
Philippine Islands in policies inaugurated for the prosecution
of the war between the United States and the German
Empire, and other articles which have tended to create a
feeling of unrest and uneasiness in the community. He is
being detained because the Governor-General of the
Philippines ordered his deportation but before the Governor-
General gave his order, there was an investigation in the
manner and form prescribed in Sec. 69 of the Administrative
Code. Petitioner, filed for a writ of habeas corpus so that he
may be discharged from detention by the acting chief of
police of the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not the Governor General could exercise the
deportation power in the absence of statutory authority?
Held:
Yes, the Governor-General has the power to institute and
maintain deportation proceedings. The discretionary power
to deport "undesirable aliens whose continued presence
in the Philippine Islands is a menace to the peace and
safety of the community," as an act of state, having been
conferred upon the Governor-General, to be exercised by
him upon his own opinion as to whether the facts disclosed
by an investigation had in accord with section 69 of the
Administrative Code justify or necessitate deportation in a
particular case, he is the sole and exclusive judge of the
existence of those facts, and no other tribunal is at liberty to
reexamine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on
which he acted.
In re Sotto, 82 Phil 595
Facts:
Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement2in connection
with the decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo the
statement was published in the Manila Times and other daily
newspapers of the locality. The court required Atty. Sotto to
show cause why he should not be charged with contempt of
court.
Atty. Sotto does not deny having published the statement but
he contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the
power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure, "this Court has no power to impose
correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the
Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by
virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with
the approval of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in
his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his
statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no
intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable
members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion,
erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not
attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any
one.' The other arguments set forth by the respondent in his
defenses observe no consideration.
Issue: WON Atty. Sotto can be punished for contempt of
court?
Held: Yes
Ratio:
Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not
punish as for contempt of court an act which was not
punishable as such under the law and the inherent powers of
the court to punish for contempt
That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle
uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last
resort in the United States, which is applicable in this
jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice
are patterned after those of that country.

Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness,
soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a
pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because
if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to
the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well
taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way,
influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision.
Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or comment on the
decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is
pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel
Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of
this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress,
of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from
eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court
which decided the Parazo case, who according to
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.)
interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel
Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30
days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a
news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High
Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but
that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of
narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the
wake of so many mindedness of the majority deliberately
committed during these last years, I believe that the only
remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce
that one of the first measures, which as its objects the
complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now
constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need
be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear:
the Supreme Court very of today is a far cry from the
impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of
Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and
other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the
Philippine Judiciary. His statement, are incompetent and
narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said
case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice.
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty.
Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not
to promote distrust in the administration of justice. An
attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation
to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the
courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the
roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.
Decision: Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt. Fine of 1,000 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is also
required to show cause why he should not be disbarred.
III. Corollary Concepts
A. Blending (Overlap) of Powers
CASE:
Springer vs. Philippine Islands, 277 US 189
Facts:
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC)
was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it
(Act No. 2822) provides that: The voting power shall be
vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the
Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood)
issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the
Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO
emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in
the Governor-General who is the head of the government
(President at that time was considered the head of state but
does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO
was furnished to the Senate President and the House
Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the
Senate President as well as the House Speaker,
notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the
Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four
others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo
warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed
against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election
into the Board of NCC.
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Issue:
Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House
Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC.
Ruling:
No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine
of separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized
that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing
to do with designating the persons to fill the office.
Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive.
The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation.
It was created by Congress. To extend the power of
Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and
the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is
already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme
Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this
rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public
office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by
the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative
branch this exception is allowable because it does not
weaken the executive branch.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, dissenting.
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish
and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific
of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading
gradually from one extreme to the other.
B. Checks and Balances
The Constitution fixes certain limits on the
independence of each department. In order that
these limits may be observed, the Constitution
gives each department certain powers by which it
may definitely restrain the other from exceeding
their authority. A system of checks and balances is
thus formed.
To carry out the system of checks and balances,
the Constitution provides:
1. The acts of the legislative department have to be
presented to the executive for approval or
disapproval.
2. The executive department may veto the acts of
the legislature if in its judgment they are not in
conformity with the Constitution or are detrimental
to the interests of the people.
3. The courts are authorized to determine the
validity of legislative measures or executive acts.
4. Through its pardoning power, the executive may
modify or set aside the judgments of the courts.
5. The legislature may pass laws that in effect
amend or completely revoke decisions of the
courts if in its judgment they are not in harmony
with its intention or policy which is not contrary to
the Constitution.
6. President must obtain the concurrence of
Congress to complete certain significant acts.
7. Money can be released from the treasury only
by authority of Congress.
a. Lawmaking by Congress, veto by the
President, override of the veto by the
Congress (Sec. 27, Art. VI)
b. Grant of amnesty by the president,
concurrence by the Congress (Sec. 19, Art. VI)
c. Entry into treaty by the president, concurrence
by the Senate (Sec. 20, Art. VII)
d. Conviction by the judiciary, pardon by the
President (Sec. 19, Art. VIII)
e. Jurisdiction of the SC and the lower courts
may be reduced by the Congress (Sec. 2, Art.
VIII)
f. Congress may abolish lower courts (Sec. 1
and 2, Art. VIII)
CASES:
Ocampo vs. Secretary, L-7918, Jan 18, 1955

Facts:
When R.A. No. 1186 took effect on June 19, 1954, the
ten petitioners were presiding different courts of first
instance, some as judges-at-large, others as cadastral
judges. Shortly thereafter, they were notified by the
respondent, Secretary of Justice that had ceased to
hold office by virtue of the provision of section 3 of said
Act declaring, all the existing positions of judges-at-
large and Cadastral Judges are abolished.
The Petitioners filed the petition for declaratory relief
and/or mandamus for a judicial declaration that section
3 of RA No.. 1186 is unconstitutional and void that the
respective positions and offices of the petitioners under
the Judicial Act of a948 still exist, and that they are
entitled to exercise the powers and functions of the said
offices and for a directive against the Secretary of
Justice to permit the petitioners to continue in exercise
of said powers and functions and against the Chief
accounting officer and Judicial officer of DOJ to pay the
petitioners the corresponding compensation beginning
June 20, 1954.
Issue:
Whether or not section 3 of RA No. 1186 be declared
unconstitutional and void.
Ruling:
No.Section 3 of RA No. 1186 is not unconstitutional and
void.
Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides that
"the judicial power shall be vested in the Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as may be established
by law," and section 9 of the same Article provides that
"the Members of the Supreme Court and all judges of
inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior,
until they reach the age of 70 years, or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office."
The power of Congress under section 1 to organize,
reorganize and even abolish courts inferior to the
Supreme Court, is conceded; and the contention
advanced on behalf of the petitioners is merely that
such power is restricted by and may be reconciled with
section 9 in the sense that they should be allowed to
continue holding their offices during good behavior, until
they reach the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated, notwithstanding the reorganization
effected under Republic Act No. 1186 and the express
abolition of their positions by section 3 thereof.
The legislative power to create a court carries with it
the power to abolish it. When the court is abolished any
unexpired termis abolished also. The judge of such a
court takes office with that encumbrance and
knowledge and the legislature has the power to abolish
as well as to create, to diminish as well as to increase,
the number of judicial districts.
The reasons for the above pronouncements are, among
others, that security of tenure is certainly not a personal
privilege of any particularJudge (concurring opinion of
Mr.' Justice Laurel in Zandueta vs. De laCosta, supra);
a public officer, no matter what the department of
thegovernment in which he serves is a public servant,
and while the publicshould deal justly with him, his
individual rights are by no means ofprimary importance
(AIkman vs. Edwards, 30 L.R.A. 149, 55 Kan. 751,42
Pac. 366); the judge's right to his full term and his full
salary arenot dependent alone upon his good conduct,
but also upon the contingency that the legislature may
for the public good, in ordaining andestablishing the
courts, from time to time consider his office
unnecessaryand abolish it (McCulley vs. State, 53 S.W.
134).
Hence,the petition was denied without cost, due to
insufficient votes to invalidate sec. 3 of RA No. 1186
(an Act to amend and repeal certain sections of RA 296
The Judiciary Act of 1948).
De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294
FACTS:
(1) Petitioners sought to bolster their claim by imputing
lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as
an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President his authority to fix the compensation and
allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter
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appointed and the determination of the date when the
reorganization shall be deemed completed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 129 entitled "An act reorganizing the
Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes is constitutional.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas
Pambansa Blg 129 not having been shown, this petition
is dismissed. No costs.
RATIO:
(1) Petitioners have convincingly shown that in their
capacity as tax payers, their standing to sue has been
amply demonstrated.
(2) Confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation
that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no
choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even
worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did not
hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the
extent of its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129. (3) There is no denying, therefore, the need
for "institutional reforms," characterized in the Report as
"both pressing and urgent."
(4) Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. Stress was
laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet
Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of more
efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the
improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the
courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the
easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural
changes introduced in the bill, together with the
reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules
of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to
the exigencies of the present day Philippine society,
and hopefully, of the foreseeable future."
(5) Nothing is bettersettled in our law than that the
abolition of an office within the competence of a
legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity. This conclusion flows from the fundamental
proposition that the legislature may abolish courts
inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may
reorganiz e them territorially or otherwise thereby
necessitating new appointments and commissions.
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts shall hold office
during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme
Courten banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted
thereon.
(6) The challenged statute creates an intermediate
appellate court, regional trial courts, metropolitan trial
courts of the national capital region, and other
metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts in cities,
as well as in municipalities, and municipal circuit trial
courts. There is even less reason then to doubt the fact
that ex isting inferior courts were abolished. For the
Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new
inferior courts was the appropriate response to the
grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution.
Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the
appropriate remedy.
(7) I t is likewise undeniable that the Batasang
Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever
legislation may be necessary to carryout national policy
as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party.
It is understandable then why in Fortun v . Labang it
was stressed that with the provision transferring to the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over the
Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve
unimpaired the independence of the judiciary,
especially so at present, where to all intents and
purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and
the legislative branches."
(8) To be more specific, petitioners contend that the
abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the
security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and
judges under Article X , Section 7 of the Constitution.
Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There
can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. I n case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would

thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment
of security of tenure does not arise
(9) To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly
vested with the authority to re organize inferior courts
and in the process to abolish ex isting ones.
(10) Petitioners would characterize as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President the
grant of authority to fix the compensation and the
allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter
appointed. The language of the statute is quite clear.
The questioned provisions reads as follows:
"Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial
Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial
Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive
such receive such compensation and allowances as
may be authorized by the President along the
guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1597." The existence of a
standard is thus clear.
(11) The challenged legislation is entirely the product of
the efforts of the legislative body. The work of justices
was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to
submitting alternative plan for reorganization. That is
more in the nature of scholarly studies.
C. Delegation of Powers
1. General Rule: potestas delegata non delegari
potest
Doctrine of Non-delegability. The doctrine
rests on the ethical principle that a delegated
power constitutes not only a right but duty to
be performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another.
Rationale of the Doctrine of Non-
delegability:
(1) Based on the separation of powers. (Why
go to the trouble of separating the three
powers of government if they can straightaway
remerge on their own notion?)
(2) Based on due process of law. Such
precludes the transfer of regulatory functions
to private persons.
(3) And, based on the maxim, degelata
potestas non potest delegari meaning what
has been delegated already cannot be further
delegated.
2. Exception: instances of permissible delegation
a. Tariff powers to the president [Sec. 28 (2),
Art. VI]
SECTION 28. (2) The Congress may, by
law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development
program of the Government.
1. Conditions in the delegation of the
power to tax:
(1) Delegation must be made by law
(2) The power granted is to fix tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties and
impost.
(3) The said power is to be exercised
within specified limits and subject to such
6
limitations and restrictions as the
Congress may impose.
(4) The authorization of such power must
be within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
2. Tariff and Customs Code, Flexible
Tariff Clause
The President is given by the Tariff and
Customs Code ample powers to adjust
tariff rates.
Flexible Tariff Clause
The President may fix tariff rates, import
and export quotas, etc. under TCC:
1) To increase, reduce or remove existing
protective rates of import duty (including
any necessary change in classification)
the existing rates may be increased or
decreased to any level on one or several
stages but in no case shall be higher than
a maximum of 100% ad valorem
2) To establish import quota or to ban
imports oany commodity, as may be
necessary
3) To impose an additional duty on all
imports not exceeding 10% ad valorem
whenever necessary
3. Limitation Imposed Regarding the
Flexible Tariff Clause
1) Conduct by the Tariff Commission of an
investigation in a public hearing
The Commissioner shall also hear the
views and recommendations of any
government office, agency or
instrumentality concerned
The NEDA thereafter shall submits its
recommendation to the President
2) The power of the President to increase
or decrease the rates of import duty within
the abovementioned limits fixed in the
Code shall include the modification in the
form of duty.
In such a case the corresponding ad
valorem or specific equivalents of the duty
with respect to the imports from the
principal competing country for the most
recent representative period shall be used
as bases. (Sec 401 TCC)
The Tariff and Customs Code grants such
stand-by powers to the President. In
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA
219, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos.
475 and 478, which levied a special duty
of P0.95 per liter on imported crude oil,
and P1.00 per liter on imported oil
products, as a valid exercise of delegated
legislative authority under the Tariff and
Customs Code. In Philippine Interisland
Shipping Association v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 100481, January 22, 1997, it was
held that the fixing of rates is essentially a
legislative power. When the same is

delegated to the President, he may
exercise it directly, e.g., issuance of the
questioned Executive Order 1088, without
thereby withdrawing an earlier delegation
made to the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA). But when the President directly
exercises the delegated authority, the PPA
may not revise the rates fixed by the
former.
b. Emergency powers to the president [Sec
23 (2), Art. VI]
SECTION 23. (2) In times of war or other
national emergency, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
Delegation of emergency power
A. War power
1. Power to declare existence of a state of
war
2. Rewording of the provision
Section 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of
two-thirds of both Houses in joint session
assembled, voting separately, shall have
the sole power to declare the existence of
a state of war.
1. Power to declare existence of a state of
War: The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of
both Houses in joint session assembled,
voting separately, shall have the sole
power to declare the existence of a state
of war.
2. Rewording of the provision
From 1935 Constitutions power to declare
war to power to declare the existence of a
state of war under 1987.
Bernas: The difference between the two
phraseologies is not substantial but merely
in emphasis. The two phrase were
interchangeable, but the second phrase
emphasizes more the fact that the
Philippines, according to Article II, Section
2, renounces aggressive war as an
instrument of national policy.
Q: May a country engage in war in the
absence of declaration of war?
A: Yes. The actual power to make war is
lodged in the Executive. The executive
when necessary may make war even in
the absence of a declaration of war.
B. Delegation of emergency powers
1. Requisites for Delegation
2. Duration of delegation
3. Powers that may be delegated
4. Withdrawal of powers
Section 23 (2) In times of war or other
national emergency, the Congress may by
law authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
7
such power shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
1. Requisites for the delegation: (1997 Bar
Q)
(1) There must be a war or other national
emergency
(2) Law authorizing the president for a
limited period and subject to such
restrictions as Congress may prescribe
(3) Power to be exercised must be
necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy.
2. Duration of the delegation:
(1) Until withdrawn by resolution of
Congress
(2) Until the next adjournment of Congress
3. Powers that may be delegated
Congress may authorize the President, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy Note
that the nature of delegable power is not
specified. It is submitted that the President
may be given emergency legislative
powers if Congress so desires.
4. Withdrawal of powers
Congress may do it by a mere resolution.
And such resolution does not need
presidential approval.
Emergency Powers to the President, as
provided in Sec. 23(2), Art. VI: In times of
war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject
to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of
the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof.
An example of this is R.A. 6826, approved
on December 20,1989. The President
issued National Emergency Memorandum
Orders (NEMOs) in the exercise of
delegated legislative powers. See:
Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368;
Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil 603.
A distinction has to be made between the
Presidents authority to declare a state of
emergency and to exercise emergency
powers. To the first, since Sec. 18, Art.
VII, grants the President such power, no
legitimate constitutional objection can be
raised. To the second, manifold
constitutional issues arise. The exercise of
emergency powers, such as the taking
over of privately-owned public utilities or
businesses aqffected with public interest,
requires a delegation from Congress. Sec.
17, Art. XII, must be understood as an
aspect of the emergency powers clause.
The taking over of private businesses
affected with public interest is just another
facet of the emergency powers generally
reposed in Congress. Thus, when Sec. 17,
Art. XII, provides that the State may,
during the emergency aqnd under
reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public

utility or business affected with public
interest, the State refers to Congress,
not the President. Whether the President
may exercise such power is dependent on
whether Congress delegates it to the
former pursuant to a law prescribing the
reasonable terms thereof [David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, supra.].
CASES:
Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368
FACTS:
The five cases are consolidated for all of them
present the same fundamental question. Antonio
Araneta is being charged for violating EO 62 which
regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential
buildings. Another case is of Leon Ma. Guerrero
seeking to have a permit issued for the exportation
of his manufactured shoes. Another is of Eulogio
Rodriguez seeking to prohibit the treasury from
disbursing funds pursuant to EO 225, while
another is of Antonio Barredo attacking EO 226
which appropriated funds to hold the national
elections. They all content that CA 671 or the
emergency Powers Act is already inoperative and
that all EOs issued under said Act also ceased
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Emergency Powers Act has
ceased to have any force and effect
HELD:
CA 671 does not fix the duration of its
effectiveness. The intention of the act has to be
sought for in its nature, object to be accomplished,
the purpose to be subserved and its relation to the
Constitution. Article VI of the Constitution provides
that any law passed by virtue thereof should be
for a limited period. It is presumed that CA 671
was approved with this limitation in view. The
opposite theory would make the law repugnant to
the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle
that the legislature is deemed to have full
knowledge of the Constitutional scope of its
power. CA 671 became inoperative when
Congress met in regular session of May 25, 1946,
and that EO Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were
issued without authority of law. In a regular
session, the power if Congress to legislate is not
circumscribed except by the limitations imposed
by the organic law.
Rodriguez vs. Gella, 92 Phil 603
FACTS:
Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate
Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the
first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for
urgent and essential public works, and the second
setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in
the provinces and cities visited by typhoons,
floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and
other calamities. They sought to have Vicente
Gella, then National Treasurer, be enjoined from
releasing funds pursuant to said EOs. These EOs
were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note
that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress
passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671
but the same was vetoed by the President due to
the Korean War and his perception that war is still
subsisting as a fact. Note also that CA 671 was
already declared inoperative by the Supreme
Court in the same case of Araneta vs Dinglasan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the EOs are valid.
HELD:
No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the
EOs issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be
rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke
any actual emergencies or calamities emanating
from the last world war for which CA 671 has been
intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the
president cannot be of merit for the emergency he
feared cannot be attributed to the war
contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president
8
vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress
must be given due weight. For it would be absurd
to contend otherwise. For while Congress might
delegate its power by a simple majority, it might
not be able to recall them except by two-third vote.
In other words, it would be easier for Congress to
delegate its powers than to take them back. This is
not right and is not, and ought not to be the law.
Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract
of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is
necessary only in the sense that he cannot be
compelled to accept the trust, in the same way
that the principal cannot be forced to keep the
relation in eternity or at the will of the agent.
Neither can it be suggested that the agency
created under the Act is coupled with interest.
c. Legislative power to the people at large:
System on initiative and referendum (Sec.
32, Art. VI)
SECTION 32. The Congress shall, as
early as possible, provide for a system of
initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people
can directly propose and enact laws or
approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local
legislative body after the registration of a
petition therefor signed by at least ten per
centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters thereof.
1. Initiative and referendum
The Congress shall as early as possible,
provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom.
Petition. A petition must be signed by at
least 10% of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters thereof. The petition
must then be registered.
RA 6735. The current implementing law is
RA 6735, an Act Providing for System of
Initiative and Referendum.
2. Initiative
The power of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution or to
propose and enact legislation.
Three systems of Initiative:
1. Initiative on the Constitution which
refers to a petition proposing amendments
to the Constitution;
2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a
petition proposing to enact a national
legislation.
3. Initiative on local legislation which refers
to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance.
Local Initiative. Not less than 2,000
registered voters in case of autonomous
regions, 1,000 in case of provinces and
cities, 100 in case of municipalities, and
50 in case of barangays, may file a
petition with the Regional Assembly or
local legislative body, respectively,
proposing the adoption, enactment,
repeal, or amendment, of any law,
ordinance or resolution. (Sec. 13 RA
6735)

Limitations on local initiative:
1. The power of local initiative shall not be
exercised more than once a year;
2. Initiative shall extend only to subjects or
matters which are within the legal matters
which are within the legal powers of the
local legislative bodies to enact;
3. If any time before the initiative is held,
the local legislative body shall adopt in
toto the proposition presented, the
initiative shall be cancelled. However,
those against such action may if they so
desire, apply for intitiative.
Q: Petitioners filed a petition with
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite on their
petition for an initiative to amend the
Constitution by adopting a unicameral-
parliamentary form of government and by
providing for transitory provisions.
A: An initiative to change the Constitution
applies only to an amendment and not
revision. Revision broadly implies a
change that alters basic principle in the
Constitution like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of
checks and balance. The initiative of the
petitioners is a revision and not merely an
amendment. (Lambino v. COMELEC)
d.
3. Referendum
Power of the electorate to approve or
reject legislation through an election called
for the purpose.
Two Classes of Referendum
1. Referendum on statutes which refers to
a petition to approve or reject an act or la,
or part thereof, passed by Congress;
2. Referendum on local laws which refers
to a petition to approve or reject a law,
resolution or ordinance enacted by
regional assemblies and local legislative
bodies. (Sec. 2(c) RA 6735)
Prohibited Measures. The following
cannot be subject of an initiative or
referendum:
1. Petition embracing more than one
subject shall be submitted to the
electorate.
2. Statutes involving emergency
measures, the enactment of which is
specifically vested in Congress by the
Constitution, cannot be subject to
referendum until ninety(90) days after their
effectivity. (Sec. 10 RA 6735)
Q: Is the People Power recognized in the
Constitution? (1987, 2000 and 2003 Bar
Examinations)
A: People power is recognized in the
Constitution, Article III, Section 4 of the
1987 Constitution guarantees the right of
the people peaceable to assemble and
petition the government for redress of
grievances. Article VI, Section 32 of the
1987 Constitution requires Congress to
pass a law allowing the people to directly
propose or reject any act or law or part of
it passed by congress or a local legislative
body.
Article XIII, Section 16 of the 1987
Constitution provides that the right of the
9
people and their organizations to
participate in all levels of social, political,
and economic decision-making shall not
be abridged and that the State shall, by
law, facilitate the establishment of
adequate consultation mechanisms.
Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution provides that subject to the
enactment of an implementing law, the
people may directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through initiative.
Referendum vs. Plebiscite. Referendum
is the power of the electorate to approve
or reject legislation through an election
called for the purpose. It may be of two
classes, namely: referendum on statutes
which refers to a petition to approve or
reject an act or law, or part thereof,
passed by Congress; and referendum on
local law which refers to a petition to
approve or reject a law, resolution or
ordinance enacted by regional assemblies
and local legislative bodies. Plebiscite is
the electoral process by which an initiative
on the Constitution is approved or rejected
by the people [Sec. 2 (c) and (e), Republic
Act No. 6735].
Legislative power to the local government
units (LGUs) (See Sec. 16 and 19 of RA
7160)
SECTION 16. General Welfare. Every
local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support, among other things,
the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-
reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. A local
government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of
eminent domain may not be exercised
unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such
offer was not accepted: Provided, further,
That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon

making a deposit with the proper court of
at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair
market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration of the property to
be expropriated: Provided, finally, That,
the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at
the time of the taking of the property.
Delegation to local government units
(See: R.A. 7160). Such legislation (by
local governments) is not regarded as a
transfer of general legislative power, but
rather as the grant of the authority to
prescribe local regulations, according to
immemorial practice, subject, of course, to
the interposition of the superior in cases of
necessity [Peopje v. Vera, supra.]. This
recognizes the fact that local legislatures
are more knowledgeable than the national
lawmaking body on matters of purely local
concern, and are in a better position to
enact appropriate legislative measures
thereon.
e. Legislative power to administrative bodies
(power of subordinate legislation)
Delegation to Administrative Bodies
The power of subordinate legislation. In
Conference of Maritime Manning
Agencies, Inc., v. POEA, 243 SCRA 666,
POEA Governing Board Resolution No.
01-94, increasing and adjusting the rates
of compensation and other benefits in the
Standard Employment Contract for
Seafarers, was held to be a valid exercise
of delegated legislative authority,
inasmuch as it conforms to the sufficient
and valid standard of fair and equitable
employment practices prescribed in E.O.
797. In Osmena v. Orbos, supra., it was
held that there was no undue delegation of
legislative power in the authority granted
by legislature to the Energy Regulatory
Board to impose additional amounts to
augment the resources of the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund. See also: Tablarin v.
Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730; Eastern
Shipping v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533. But in
Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v.
Garcia, supra., the authority given by
LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a
fare range over and above the existing
authorized fare was held to be illegal for
being an undue delegation of power.
In Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA
569, Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code (authorizing the President to create
municipalities through executive orders)
was declared unconstitutional for being an
undue delegation of legislative power
However, in Municipality of San Narciso
(Quezon) v. Mendez, 239 SCRA 11, E.O
353 creating the Municipal District of San
Andres in 1959 was not declared
unconstitutional because it was only after
almost 30 years that the legality of the
executive order was challenged;
throughout its 30 years of existence, the
municipal district had exercised the
powers and authority of a duly created
local government institution, and the State
had, at various times, recognized its
10
continued existence. Likewise, the Pelaez
ruling was not applied in Municipality of
Candihay, Bohol v. Court of Appeals, 251
SCRA 530, because the municipality had
been in existence for 16 years before the
Pelaez ruling was promulgated, and
various governmental acts throughout the
years all indicate the States recognition
and acknowledgment of the existence of
the municipal corporation, In Municipality
of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental v. Borja,
265 SCRA 182, not only was the
Municipality of Sinacaban in existence for
16 years before the Pelaez ruling, but that
even the State and the Municipality of
Jimenez itself had recognized Sinacabans
corporate existence (by entering into an
agreement concerning common
boundaries, and that Sinacaban had
attained de jure status by virtue of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution apportioning legislative
districts throughout the country which
considered Sinacaban as part of the 2nd
district of Misamis Occidental.
3. Tests of valid delegation: Completeness test
and sufficient standard test
Tests for valid delegation: Both of the following
tests are to becomplied with [Pelaez v. Auditor
General, 15 SCRA 569; Tatad v. Secretary of
Energy, supra.]:
Completeness Test. The law must be
complete in all its essential terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature so
that there will be nothing left for the delegate to
do when it reaches him except to enforce it.
See U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1.
Sufficient standard test. A sufficient standard
is intended to map out the boundaries of the
delegates authority by defining the legislative
policy and indicating the circumstances under
which it is to be pursued and effected. This is
intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative power from the legislature to the
delegate. The standard is usually indicated in
the law delegating legislative power. See Ynot
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra.; de la
Liana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294; Demetria v.
Alba, 148 SCRA 208; Lozano v. Martinez, 146
SCRA 323.
On the challenge relative to the validity of the
provision of R.A. 6734 which authorized the
President to merge, by administrative
determination, the regions remaining after the
establishment of the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao, in Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245
SCRA 253, the Court said that the legislative
standard need not be expressed, it may simply
be gathered or implied; neither should it
always be found in the law challenged,
because it may be found in other statutes on
the same subject. In this case, the standard
was found in R.A. 5435 on the power of the
President to reorganize the Executive
Department to promote simplicity, economy
and to enable it to pursue programs consistent
with national goals for accelerated social and
economic development.
In Tatad v. Secretary, Department of Energy,
supra., even as the Supreme Court found that

R.A. 8180 contained sufficient standards for
the delegation of power to the President to
advance the date of full deregulation (of the oil
industry), Executive Order No. 392 constituted
a misapplication of R.A. 8180, because the
President rewrote the standards set forth in the
law when he considered the extraneous factor
of depletion of OPSF funds.
In Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No.
159796, July 17, 2007, the Court held that the
EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in
relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its
essential terms and conditions, and that it
contains sufficient standards. Provisions of the
EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the
total electrification of the country and the
quality, reliability, security and affordability of
the supply of electric power, and watershed
rehabilitation and management are sufficient
standards, as they provide the limitations on
the Energy Regulatory Commissions power to
formulate the Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
CASES:
US vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1
FACTS:
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special
session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An
Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice,
Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary
circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG)
to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in
regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to
this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive
Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919.
The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be
sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer,
sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of
eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than
that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the
6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was
charged for violation of the said EO. He was found
guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the
sentence countering that there is an undue delegation
of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation to the
Governor General.
HELD:
First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed
because he committed the act prior to the publication of
the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of
the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a
violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the
law when both the law and the order fail to set up an
ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act
wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in
use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all
others without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to matters involving the
exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be
delegated, and without which the act could not possibly
be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms
and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of
the government and nothing must be left to the
judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate
of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a
law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to
take effect in future, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
11
Pp. vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil 328 (public
interest)
FACTS:
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were founders
and shareholders of the ORO Oil Company. Later,
Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty of selling
their shares to individuals without actual tangible
assets. Their shares were merely based on
speculations and future gains. This is in violation of
Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581.
Section 2 provides that every person, partnership,
association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in
the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or
character whatsoever, is under obligation to file
previously with the Insular Treasurer the various
documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay
the required tax of twenty-pesos.
Section 5, on the other hand, provides that whenever
the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied,
either with or without the examination herein provided,
that any person, partnership, association or corporation
is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above
defined and provided for sale in the Philippine Islands,
he shall issue to such person, partnership, association
or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such
person, partnership, association or corporation has
complied with the provisions of this act, and that such
person, partnership, association or corporation, its
brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities
named in said certificate or permit for sale; that said
Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when ever
in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said
certificate or permit, and that an appeal from the
decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the
period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance.
Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional
because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which
can guide said official in determining the cases in which
a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby
making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its
issuance, with the result that, legislative powers being
unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of
power to the Internal Treasurer.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Act
furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer
to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance
or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate

or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the
person, partnership, association or corporation applying
therefor has complied with the provisions of this Act,
and this requirement, construed in relation to the other
provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit
shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the
provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with.
Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular
Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly
conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in
the public interest.
In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581
to protect the public against speculative schemes
which have no more basis than so many feet of blue
sky and against the sale of stock in fly-by-night
concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and
other like fraudulent exploitations, the SC held that
public interest in this case is a sufficient standard to
guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a
matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of
certificates or permits.
Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the
Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is
uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a
mistaken assumption that this is a mere general
reference to public welfare without any standard to
guide determinations. The purpose of the Act, the
requirement it imposes, and the context of the provision
in question show the contrary. . .
Cervantes vs. Auditor General, 91 Phil
359(simplicity, economy, efficiency)
Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil
726(public welfare)
Facts:
In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which
mandates the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on such roads and streets to promote safe transit
upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads, the Director of Public
Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic
Commission, prohibiting the passing of animal drawn
vehicles in certain streets in Manila. Petitioner
12
questioned this as it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power.
Issues:
Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative
power?
Ruling:
There is no undue delegation of legislative power.
Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative
powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority
conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained
of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by
the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote
safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines and to close them
temporarily to any or all classes of traffic whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and
interest.
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon
which the application of said law is to be predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of
national roads and to determine when and how long a
national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend
on the discretion of some other government official to
whom is confided the duty of determining whether the
proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it
cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is
the making of the law.
Hirabayashi vs. US, 320 SCRA 99
Facts:
After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt
issued EO 9066 which was later endorsed by the
Congress thru HR. 1911 authorizing the Secretary of
War to adapt measures in protecting the state against
espionage and espionage.
General Dewitt then issued Public Proclamation No. 1
and 2 defining the military zones. Public Proclamation
No. 3 was released thereafter imposing curfew hours
on all alien Japanese, all alien Germans, and all alien
Italians including all persons of Japanese ancestry, and
that they all be confined within their respective
residences between 8pm- 6am.
Hirabayashi failed twice to adhere to the curfew and
was therefore sentenced to one month and one day
imprisonment.
Issues:
WON EO 9066 is constitutional and that if it violates the
Fifth Amendment as to descriminating citizens as to
their race or ancestry.
Held:
The US supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of
EO 9066 pointing out the necessity to adapt such
measures in time of war to prevent the country from
espionage and sabotage. In addition, the Supreme
Court also upheld the constitutionality of the Congress
delegating its legislative function to another. The
Proclamation No. 3, EO 9066 and HR 1911 should not
be taken individually but is rather each as an affirmation
of the other and that they are all in conformity.
The Court found the President's orders and the
implementation of the curfew to be constitutional. Chief
Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court, took
into account the great importance of military
installations and weapons production that occurred on
the West Coast and the "solidarity" that individuals of
Japanese descent felt with their motherland. He
reasoned that restrictions on Japanese actions served
an important national interest. The Court ducked the
thorny relocation issue and focused solely on the
curfew, which the Court viewed as a necessary

"protective measure." Stone argued that racial
discrimination was justified since "in time of war
residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading
enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of
a different ancestry."
Pp vs. Vera, 65 Phil 56
FACTS:
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a
criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he
filed for probation. The matter was referred to the
Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial
of Cu Unjiengs petition for probation. A hearing was set
by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for
probation. The Prosecution opposed the petition.
Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the
Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court alleging that courts like the Court of
First Instance of Manila (which is presided over by
Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused like
Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act
No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only
meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers;
that the City of Manila is not a province, and that
Manila, even if construed as a province, has no
designated probation officer hence, a Manila court
cannot grant probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the
matter alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it
violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection
of the laws. HSBC averred that the said law makes it
the prerogative of provinces whether or nor to apply the
probation law if a province chooses to apply the
probation law, then it will appoint a probation officer, but
if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed
hence, that makes it violative of the equal protection
clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an
undue delegation of power because it gave the option
to the provincial board to whether or not to apply the
probation law however, the legislature did not provide
guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.
Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an
encroachment of the executives power to grant pardon.
They say that the legislature, by providing for a
probation law, had in effect encroached upon the
executives power to grant pardon. (Ironically, the
Prosecution agreed with the issues raised by HSBC
ironic because their main stance was the non-
applicability of the probation law only in Manila while
recognizing its application in provinces).
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is
that, the Prosecution, representing the State as well as
the People of the Philippines, cannot question the
validity of a law, like Act 4221, which the State itself
created. Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal
of Manila who himself had used the Probation Law in
the past without question but is now questioning the
validity of the said law (estoppel).
ISSUE:
1. May the State question its own laws?
2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its
duly authorized representative, from questioning the
validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the
State even if it had been using an invalid law.
2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is
unconstitutional.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well
taken on this note. There is violation of the equal
protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were
given the option to apply the law by simply providing for
a probation officer. So if a province decides not to
install a probation officer, then the accused within said
province will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the
Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act
4221 provides that it shall only apply to provinces
where the respective provincial boards have provided
13
for a probation officer. But nowhere in the law did it
state as to what standard (sufficient standard test)
should provincial boards follow in determining whether
or not to apply the probation law in their province. This
only creates a roving commission which will act
arbitrarily according to its whims.
Encroachment of Executive Power
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court recognized the power of Congress to provide for
probation. Probation does not encroach upon the
Presidents power to grant pardon. Probation is not
pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress to fix
penalties while pardon is a power of the president to
commute penalties.
Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
FACTS: There had been an existing law which
prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not
only banned the movement of carabaos from
interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef.
On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6
carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged
in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as
unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his
right to due process. He said that the authority provided
by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even
without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court
ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise
of police power in order to promote general welfare so
as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it
indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive.
The movement of carabaos from one area to the other
does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same
would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself
and explain why the carabaos are being transferred
before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the
challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process
is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to
the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.
Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive
orders creating 33 municipalities this was purportedly
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the
boundary of any municipality and may change
the seat of government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a
taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the
auditor general from disbursing funds to be
appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims
that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section
68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section
3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: If
the President, under this new law, cannot even create a
barrio, how can he create a municipality which is
composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal
and that only barrios were barred from being created by
the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar

and that a municipality can be created without creating
barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the
RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create
municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the
power to create barrios to the President by virtue of
Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although
Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such
standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate
such policy, which is the essence of every law; and,
without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of
his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause
as the public welfare may require which would mean
that the President may exercise such power as the
public welfare may require is present, still, such will
not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation
of power. In the first place, what the phrase as the
public welfare may require qualifies is the text which
immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation
is the President may change the seat of government
within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require. Only the seat of
government may be changed by the President when
public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of
municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create
municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
character not administrative (not executive).
D. Role of the Judiciary in the scheme of separation of
powers (Sec. 1, Art. VIII)
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Role of the Judiciary. The judicial power, as
defined in Sec. 1, Art.VIII, includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse, of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
i) Note that when the court mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries or invalidates the
acts of a coordinate body, what it upholds is
not its own superiority but the supremacy of
the Constitution [Angara v. Electoral Commission,
63 Phil 139] Read The Power of Judicial Review,
supra. See also: Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183;
Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792.
ii) The first and safest criterion to determine
whether a given power has been validly exercised
by a particular department is whether or not the
14
power has been constitutionally conferred upon the
department claiming its exercise since the
conferment is usually done expressly. However,
even in the absence of express conferment, the
exercise of the power may be justified under the
doctrine of necessary implication, i.e. that the grant
of an express power carries with it all other powers
that may be reasonably inferred from it. Note also
that there are powers which although not expressly
conferred nor implied therefrom, are inherent or
incidental, e.g., the Presidents power to deport
undesirable aliens which may be exercised
independently of constitutional or statutory
authority, because it is an act of State. See
also: Marcos v. Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760, where
the Supreme Court justified the action of President
Aquino in banning the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines on the basis of the Presidents residual
powers.
CASE:
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139
FACTS:
In the election of Sept. 17, 1935, Angara (herein petitioner)
and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, Dionision Mayor
(Respondents) were candidates voted to be members of the
national assembly (NA) for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas.
On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of
the NA for the said district. On November 15,1935, he took
his oath of office.
On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed
Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of
the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far
been filed.
On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral
Commission (ELECOM) a Motion of Protest against the
election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the ELECOM adopted a
resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for
the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the
previous confirmation made by the NA.
Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the
NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest (the
prescribed period for filing of protests had already ended on
December 3, and the respondent was late in filing his protest
because he filed the protest after December 3.).
Ynsua claims that there was no constitutional or legal
provision which stated that members of the NA
cannot be contested after confirmation of the NA. ELECOM
denied petitioners motion to dismiss. Petitioner then files a
protest to the Supreme Court (SC) questioning ELECOMs
jurisdiction over the case. (Petitioner argues that, ELECOM
could only regulate proceedings, that SC has jurisdiction to
pass upon fundamental questions in the issue since it is an
interpretation of the constitution)
The Solicitor General (SolGen) argues that ELECOM is a
constitutional body which has jurisdiction to try all contested
cases, re-elections and said acts is beyond SC. Further, Res
#8 did not deprive ELECOM of its jurisdiction. Since
ELECOM acquired jurisdiction over the election protest, the
Motion to dismiss filed in ELECOM is not reviewable by the
SC.
ISSUE(S):
1.) Does the SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM and the
controversy?
2. ) If it does, then has ELECOM acted within or without
jurisdiction?
HELD:
1.) The SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM: separation of
powers granted by Constitution (through separate articles
for each branch) but check and balances maintain
coordination among the branches. When there are conflicts
between the boundaries of powers and functions of each
branch, the Judiciary has the power to review and resolve

these conflicts through Judicial Review (referred to as
Judicial Supremacy). This however is limited to actual cases
and controversies. Judicial supremacy is but the power of
judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one
branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
2.) ELECOM acted within its jurisdiction since ELECOM is
recognized as an independent quasi-judicial body which is
not an inferior tribunal, or corporation, board, or person, and
is granted the powers to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the NA. The present constitution granted the
ELECOM with all the powers exercised by the legislature
relating to the said function of ELECOM, and this includes
the regulation of the rules and procedures of election
protests. The confirmation of NA of its members is not
required and does not limit the ELECOM of its power to fix
dates for election protest, or else this would undermine the
power and functions of the ELECOM.
1. Supremacy of the Constitution, not its own:
upheld by the judiciary
2. Justiciable and Political Questions
Political and justiciable questions. A purely
justiciable question implies a given right,
legally demandable and enforceable, an act
or omission violative of such right, and a
remedy granted and sanctioned by law for
said breach of right [Casibang v. Aquino, 92
SCRA 642]. In Tatad v. Secretary of Energy,
supra., the Supreme Court ruled that what the
petitioners raised were justiciable questions,
considering that the statement of facts and
definition of issues clearly show that the
petitioners are assailing R.A. 8180 because its
provisions infringe the Constitution and not
because the law lacks wisdom. In Tanada v.
Angara, supra., the petition seeking the
nullification of the Senate concurrence of the
Presidents ratification of the Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO), was held to present a justiciable
controversy, because where an action is
alleged to infringe the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute.
The term 'political question connotes what
it means in ordinary parlance, namely a
question of policy. It refers to those
questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure [Tanada v.
Cuenco, 100 Phil 1101]. Thus, in Defensor-
Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577,
November 18, 1998, where Senator Defensor-
Santiago questioned the election of Senator
Guingona as Minority Floor Leader, the
Supreme Court said that it has no authority to
interfere and unilaterally intrude into that
exclusive realm, without running afoul of
constitutional principles that it is bound to
protect and uphold --- the very duty that
justifies the Courts being. Constitutional
respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a co-equal branch prevent
this Court from prying into the internal
workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court
will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will
remain steadfast and judicious in upholding
the rule and the majesty of the law. See also
15
Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization,
supra., where it was held that the decision of
PNOC to privatize Petron and the approval of
such by the Committee on Privatization, being
in accordance with Proclamation No. 50,
cannot be reviewed by the Courts, because
such acts are an exercise of executive
functions over which the Court will not pass
judgment nor inquire into the wisdom of. For
further application of the political question
principle, read Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA
333, and Romulo v. Yniguez, 141 SCRA 263.
But remember that the scope of the political
question doctrine has been limited by the
2nd paragraph, Sec. 1, Art. VIII, particularly
the portion which vests in the judiciary the
power to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
CASES:
Tanada vs. Cuenco, 100 Phil 1101
FACTS:
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the
Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the
Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was
Lorenzo Taada who belonged to the Citizens Party.
Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a
senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting
it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior
to a decision the SET would have to choose its
members. It is provided that the SET should be
composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3
justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the
majority party and 3 senators from the minority party.
But since there is only one minority senator the other
two SET members supposed to come from the minority
were filled in by the NP. Taada assailed this process
before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because
he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP
senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party
will not have any chance in his election contest.
Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP)
averred that the Supreme Court cannot take
cognizance of the issue because it is a political
question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the
members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and
the remedy for Taada and Macapagal was not to raise
the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it
before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD:
No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that
the issue is a justiciable question. The term Political
Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question.
The Supreme Court is not being asked by Taada to
decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being
raised by Taada was whether or not the elections of
the 5 NP members to the SET are valid which is a
judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and
independent body from the Senate which does not
perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill
in the supposed seat of the minority members) must not
come from the majority party. In this case, the
Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed
members that would fill in the minority seats (even

though those will come from the majority party). This is
still valid provided the majority members of the SET
(referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the
Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in
situations like this provided such rules comply with the
Constitution.
Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333
Facts:
On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued
Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national
referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other
things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly,
its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the
period of its existence, the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of his present powers.20
days after or on 22 September 1976, the President
issued another related decree,
Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous
Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of
Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of
voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"(Citizens
Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-
plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly,
Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4,
of Presidential Decree 991.On the same date of 22
September 1976, the President issued
Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he
submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on
16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas"
clauses that the people's continued opposition to the
convening of the interim National Assembly evinces
their desire to have such body abolished and replaced
thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new
interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October
16.The Commission on Elections was vested with the
exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976
National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September
1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V.Sanidad, father
and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and conducting
the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare
without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991
and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031,
insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-
Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They
contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise
the constituent power to propose amendments to the
new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal
basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-
44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or
revision of the Constitution during the transition period
is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly
under action 16, ArticleXVII of the Constitution. Still
another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction was filed on 5October 1976 by Raul M.
Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan,
docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of
Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming
Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
Issue:
Whether or not the President may call upon a
referendum for the amendment of the Constitution?
Held:
Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on
Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The
National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a
majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of
calling such a convention to the electorate in an
16
election."Section 2 thereof provides that "Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be
valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than three
months a after the approval of such amendment or
revision." In the present period of transition, the interim
National Assembly instituted in the Transitory
Provisions is conferred with that amending power.
Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The
interim National Assembly, upon special call by the
interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its
Members, propose amendments to this Constitution.
Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in
accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are,
therefore, two periods contemplated in the
constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy
and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the
amending process may be initiated by the proposals of
the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional
Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the
Members of the National Assembly. However the
calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted
to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority
vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In
times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a
majority vote of all the Members of the interim National
Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime
Minister.
The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled
that the incumbent President is vested with that
prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly. The
Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the
President the determination of the time when he shall
initially convene the interim National Assembly,
consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and
order in the country. When the Delegates to the
Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory
Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the
same, the incumbent President was given the discretion
as to when he could convene the interim National
Assembly. The President's decision to defer the
convening of the interim National Assembly soon found
support from the people themselves.
In the plebiscite of January 10 to 15, 1973, at which the
ratification of the 1973Constitution was submitted, the
people voted against the convening of the interim
National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973,
the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their
sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim
National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27
February 1975, the proposed question of whether the
interim National Assembly shall be initially convened
was eliminated, because some of the members of
Congress and delegates of the Constitutional
Convention, who were deemed automatically members
of the interim National Assembly, were against its
inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the
people had already resolved against it. In sensu
striciore, when the legislative arm of the state
undertakes the proposals of amendment to a
Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of
lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the
amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar
power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter
itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in
Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular
National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory
Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While
ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to
legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional
conferment, amending of the Constitution is not
legislative in character. In political science a distinction
is made between constitutional content of an organic
character and that of a legislative character. The
distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such
being the case, approval of the President of any
proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative
of the President to approve or disapprove applies only
to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has
nothing to do with proposition or adoption of
amendments of the Constitution.
Daza vs. Singson, 180 SCRA 496
Facts:

The House of Representatives. Twenty four members
of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party
and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159
and correspondingly reducing their former party to only
17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of
Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat
occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-
formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber
elected a new set of representatives consisting of the
original members except the petitioner and including
therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional
member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to the Supreme Court to challenge
his removal from the Commission on Appointments and
the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting
initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with
preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary
restraining order that same day to prevent both the
petitioner and the respondent from serving in the
Commission on Appointments.
Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he
cannot be removed from the Commission on
Appointments because his election thereto is
permanent. His claim is that the reorganization of the
House representation in the said body is not based on a
permanent political realignment because the LDP is not
a duly registered political party and has not yet attained
political stability.
Issue:
whether the question raised by the petitioner is political
in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court
Held:
No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter
at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of
the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed
by us because it is political in nature. What is involved
here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that
chamber in removing the petitioner from the
Commission on Appointments.
The term political question connotes, in legal
parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, it refers to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Even if we were to assume that the issue presented
before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Tanada vs. Angara, GR No. 118295, May 2,
1997
Facts:
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then
Secretary of The Department of Trade and Industry,
representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Negotiations.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine
Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from
the President of the Philippines, stating among others
17
that "the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted
to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section
21, Article VII of the Constitution".
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine
Senate received another letter from the President of the
Philippines likewise dated August 11, 1994, which
stated among others that "the Uruguay Round Final
Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate
for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of
the Constitution."
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines
certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S.
1083, a resolution entitled "Concurring in the
Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization."
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted
Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is hereby
resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs,
in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization." The text of the WTO Agreement is
written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-
volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations and includes various agreements and
associated legal instruments. On December 16, 1994,
the President of the Philippines signed the Instrument
of Ratification, declaring the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization and the agreements and
associated legal instruments included in Annexes one
(1), two (2) and three (3) ratified and confirmed To
emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the
President of the Philippines is composed of the
Agreement Proper and "the associated legal
instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and
three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts
thereof."
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary
Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and
its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
The Solicitor General describes these two latter
documents as follows:
The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-
five declarations and decisions on matters such as
measures in favor of least developed countries,
notification procedures etc. The Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among
other things, standstill
or limitations and qualifications of commitments to
existing non-conforming measures, market access,
national treatment etc.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed.
The Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due
course to the petition. The court also requested the
Hon. Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the
United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to
submit a paper, hereafter referred to as "Bautista
Paper,", (1) providing a historical background of and (2)
summarizing the said agreements. During the Oral
Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed
the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee
Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the
transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and
the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file
(1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the
Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which
derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of
the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other
documents mentioned in the Final Act.
Issue: W/N the petition presents a justiciable
controversy
Held:
Yes. The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the
matters raised in the petition is clearly set out in the
1987 Constitution, as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.

As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as
there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all
in holding that this petition should be given due course
and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and
to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no
equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction
over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom
of the decision of the President and the Senate in
enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the
merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by
said international body. Neither will it rule on the
propriety of the government's economic policy of
reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative
restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it
will only exercise its constitutional duty "to determine
whether or not there had been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"
on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO
Agreement and its three annexes.
Aytona vs. Castillo, 4 SCRA 1
Facts:
Dec. 29, 1961 Pres. Carlos P. Garcia appointed
Dominador R. Aytona as ad interim Governor of the
Central Bank and later on that same day, took the
corresponding oath.
Dec. 30, 1961 Pres. Elect Diosdado Macapagal
assume office by noon
Dec. 31, 1961 Pres. Macapagal issued Admin Order
No. 2, recalling, withdrawing and cancelling all ad
interim appointment made by Pres. Garcia after Dec.
13, 1961 (date when Macapagal was proclaimed
elected by Congress). There were a total of 350,
midnight or last minute appointment made by Pres.
Garcia.
Jan. 1, 1962 - Pres. Macapagal appointed Andres V.
Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank
Jan. 2, 1962 Both Castillo and Aytona exercised the
power of their office which developed to
unpleasantness in the premises of the Central Bank
and Aytona thereafter was definitely prevented from
holding office.
Aytona then instituted a proceeding (quo warranto)
challenging Castillos right to exercise the powers as
Governor of Central Bank and claimed he was validly
appointed and qualified for the post making the
appointment of Castillo void.
Castillos reply was that Aytonas appointment was
revoked by Admin Order No. 2 of Macapagal.
Issue:
WON the 350 midnight appointments of former Pres.
Garcia were valid?
Held:
No. It is common sense to believe that after the
proclamation of the election of President Macapagal,
his was no more than a "care-taker" administration. He
was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority the incoming President, and he should not do
acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or
obstruct the policies of his successor. The filling up
vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced
to afford some assurance of deliberate action and
careful consideration of the need for the appointment
and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be
permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one
night and planned induction of almost all of them a few
hours before the inauguration of the new President
may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an
abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being
apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant
positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions,
and thereby deprive the new administration of an
opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
18
An ad interim appointment is exercised by the president
as hes special prerogative and is bound to be prudent
to insure approval of his selection either previous
consultation with the members of the Commission on
Appointments or by thereafter explaining to them the
reason such selection. It is expected that the President
should exercise double care in extending such
appointments. In the case at bar, it is hard to believe
that in signing 350 appointments in one night, President
Garcia exercised double care; and therefore, such
appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the
constitutional provision granting the Executive authority
to issue ad interim appointments.
The denial of the power to revoke after the appointee
has qualified is his equitable right however that eequity
is doubtful considering the rush conditional
appointments, hurried maneuvers and other
happenings detracting from that degree of good faith,
morality and propriety which form the basic foundation
of claims to equitable relief. The appointees, it might be
argued, wittingly or unwittingly cooperated with the
stratagem to beat the deadline, whatever the resultant
consequences to the dignity and efficiency of the public
service. Needless to say, there are instances wherein
not only strict legality, but also fairness, justice and
righteousness should be taken into account.
WHEREFORE, the Court exercising its judgment
and discretion in the matter, hereby dismiss the
action, without costs.
With regards to separation of power:
CONCEPCION, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
In the present case, we have completely reversed our
stand on the principle of separation of powers. We have
inquired into the motives of the Executive department in
making the appointments in question, although it is well
settled, under the aforementioned principle, that:
"Generally courts cannot inquire into the motive, policy,
wisdom, or expediency of legislation.
The justice, wisdom, policy, necessity, or expediency,
of a law which is within its powers are for the
legislature, and are not open to inquiry by the courts,
except as an aid to proper interpretation." (16 C.J.S.
471-478)."
If this is true as regards the legislative branch of the
government, I can see no valid reason, and none has
been pointed out, why the same norm should not
govern our relations, with the executive department.
However, we have not merely disregarded such norm.
We are, also, in effect, restraining the Commission on
Appointments an organ of a coordinate, co-equal
branch of the Government from acting on the
questioned appointments. What is more, we are
virtually assuming in advance that said body
which has not been organized as yet and whose
membership is still undetermined will not act in
harmony with the spirit of our Constitution.
Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA
33
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the
Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases,
Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to
restrain them from implementing any of the provisions
of the proposed Constitution not found in the present
1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a
Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and
as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens
and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that
the President had announced the immediate
implementation of the new constitution, thru his
Cabinet, respondents including.
Respondents are acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
constitution upon ground the that the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to
create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to
approve proposed constitution; without power to
proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the

proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the
proposed constitution was not a free election, hence
null and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of
Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and
proclamation which have the same import and
objective.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation
No. 1102 is a justiciable or political question, and
therefore non-justiciable.
Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly
conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions.
HELD:
First. To determine whether or not the new constitution
is in force depends upon whether or not the said new
constitution has been ratified in accordance with the
requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled
that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the
constitution should be settled applying the provisions of
the constitution in force at the time of the alleged
ratification of the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has
been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article
XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as
jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we
patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.
Details:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a
justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable,
question?
On the first issue involving the political-question
doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members
of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-
political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did
not vote squarely on this question, but, only
inferentially, in their discussion of the second question.
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that
"inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by
the people, the Court may inquire into the question of
whether or not there has actually been such an
approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep
hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in
negative, the Court may determine from both factual
and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935
Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar,
Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court
hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of
judicial inquiry."
Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or
anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications
and having the disqualifications mentioned in the
Constitution the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render
the proceedings in the Citizens assemblies void.
Proceedings held in such Citizens Assemblies were
fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the
qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the
1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said
Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the
invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be
separated or segregated from those of the qualified
voters, the proceedings in the Citizens Assemblies
must be considered null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is
void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with
the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots not
orally or by raising hands by the persons taking part
in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since
the early years of the American regime, we had
adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major
characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared
and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the
voting, with the advantage of keeping records that
permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the
accuracy of the election returns.
19
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been
conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void.
The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were
held took place without the intervention of the
COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of
the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of
Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein
mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable
means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by
the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is
another patent violation of Article X of the 1935
Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme
set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to
insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the
people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the
Citizens Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the
same are claimed to have ratified the revised
Constitution.
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil 83
Facts:
The petitioner in this original petition for mandamus and
injunction is Jose Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by
the Governor General to represent the 12th Senatorial
District. The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the
Philippine Senate composed of the respondent
Senators, On February 5, 1924,depriving Alejandrino of
all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his
office for the period of 1 yr from 1/24 having been
declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant
violation of the privileges of the Senate for having
treacherously assaulted Sen. de Vera on the occasion
of certain phrases being uttered by the latter in the
course of the debate regarding the credentials of Mr.
Alejandrino. The burden of petitioner's complaint is that
the resolution is unconstitutional and entirely of no
effect.
Issue:
WON the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunction
may annul the suspension of Senator Alejandrino and
compelthe Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his
official position?
Held:
The general rule is that the writ will not lie from one
branch of the gov't to a coordinate branch, for the very
obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.
Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its
members, or its officers, to compel the performance of
duties purely legislative in their character w/c therefore
pertains to their legislative functions and over w/c they
have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action
in this respect without a gross usurpation of power.
Precedents have held that where a member has been
expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no
power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right
or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his
reinstatement
Osmena vs. Pendatun, 109 Phil 863
FACTS:
Based on House Resolution No. 59, on the 23rd day of
June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr.,
Member of the House of Representatives from the
Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor
of this chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a
speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia. In the course of
said speech, the Congressman from the Second District
of Cebu stated the following:
xxx xxx xxx
The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of
ugly reports that under your unpopular administration
the free things they used to get from the government
are now for sale at premium prices. They say that even
pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity
or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always
be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come
across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an
anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of
justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . .
The Charges of the gentleman from the Second District
of Cebu, if made maliciously or recklessly and without
basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious
assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of 37
3 the President, which is the one visible symbol of the
 20

sovereignty of the Filipino people, and would expose jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to
said office to contempt and disrepute. Thus, a special confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government.
committee of 15 members to be appointed by the The theory of separation of powers fastidiously
Speaker is created to investigate the truth of charges observed by this Court, demands in such situation a
against the President of the Philippines made by prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has
Honorable Osmena Jr. in his privilege speech, been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within
authorized to summon Honorable Osmena to appear its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to issue (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
subpoena and/or subpoena ducestecum to require SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. The
attendance of witnesses and/or the production of principle is well established that the courts will not
pertinent papers before it. If ever Honorable Osmena assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an
fails to do so, he is required to show cause why he interference by the judicial department with the
should not be punished by the House. The special legislature since each department is equally
committee shall submit a report of its findings and independent within the power conferred upon it by the
recommendations before the adjournment of the Constitution. . . . .
present special session of the Congress of the
Philippines. The general rule has been applied in other cases to
cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are
In support of his request, Congressman Osmea exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated
alleged; Senate is given the power to example a member, the
court will not review its action or revise even a most
1. The Resolution violated his constitutional absolute arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law,
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.].
House;
2. His words constituted no actionable conduct; and With regard to the declaratory relief, certiorari and
3. After his allegedly objectionable speech and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
words, the House took up other business, and Rule respondents, the Court hereby find it moot and
XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other academic because the Committee performed its task,
business has intervened after the member had uttered reported to the House, and the latter approved the
obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to suspension order. The House had closed it session,
answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the and the Committee has ceased to exist as such.
House.
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 SCRA 192
On July 18, 1960, after giving Congressman Osmea a
chance to defend himself, submitted its reports, finding
Facts:
said congressman guilty of serious disorderly
The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946
behaviour; and acting on such report, the House
to the President and the Congress a report regarding
approved on the same daybefore closing its
the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by
sessionHouse Resolution No. 175, declaring him
reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and
guilty as recommended, and suspending him from
violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga,
office for fifteen months.
Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said
region did not reflect the accurate feedback of the local
There is no question that Congressman Osmea, in a
electorate.
privilege speech delivered before the House, made the
serious imputations of bribery against the President
During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum
which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he
resolution was approved referring to the report ordering
refused to produce before the House Committee
that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero
created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such
who had been included among the 16 candidates for
imputations. There is also no question that for having
senator receiving the highest number of votes and as
made the imputations and for failing to produce
proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections shall not
evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of
be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber,
the House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen
pending the termination of the protest filed against their
months for serious disorderly behaviour.
election.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against
WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and
their colleagues who instituted the resolution, praying
by virtue of Resolution No. 59, adopted on July 8, 1960,
for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their
found Representative Sergio Osmea, Jr., guilty of
seats and to exercise their senatorial duties.
serious disorderly behaviour for making without basis in
Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum
truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious, reckless and
resolution.
irresponsible charges against the President of the
Philippines in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960;
Issue:
and
Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the
jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character
said provinces are valid.
that they affronted and degraded the dignity of the
House of Representative: Now, Therefore, be it
Held:
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That
The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without
Representative Sergio Osmea, Jr., be, as he hereby
a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that
is, declared guilty of serious disorderly behavior.
where a member has been expelled by the legislative
Thus this moved Honorable Osmena to file before this
body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether
court a declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to
preliminary injunction against the defendants from
compel his reinstatement.
acting House Resolution No. 59.
Under our form of government the judicial department
ISSUE:
has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and
Whether or not Congressman Sergio Osmena is guilty
unfair action of the legislative department, or of either
of serious disorderly behavior.
house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power
committed exclusively to that department by the
RULING:
constitution.
The Court believed, however, that the House is the
judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only
Petitioners pray for a writ of prohibition. Under the law,
because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction
prohibition refers only to proceedings of any tribunal,
upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on
corporation, board, or person, exercising functions
factual circumstances of which the House knows best
judicial or ministerial. (Rule 67, section 2, Rules of
but which can not be depicted in black and white for
Court.) As the respondents do not exercise such kind of
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one
functions, theirs being legislative, it is clear the dispute
thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine
falls beyond the scope of such special remedy.
whether Osmea conduct constituted disorderly
behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate

The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the
election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of
the National Assembly. But the power to defer the oath-
taking, until the contests is adjudged, does not belong
to the corresponding Electoral Tribunal, then it must be
held that the House or Senate still retains such
authority, for it has not been transferred to, nor
assumed by, the Electoral Tribunal.
In sum, the Supreme Court refused to intervene, under
the concept of separation of powers, holding that the
case was not a contest, and affirmed that it is the
inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall
be admitted to its membership. Following the powers
assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was
political in nature and therefore not under the juridical
review of the courts
The case is therefore dismissed.
Phil. Bar Association vs. COMELEC, GR
No. 72915, Dec. 20, 1985
FACTS:
11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the
enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national
elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the
offices of President and Vice President of the
Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in
that it allows the President to continue holding office
after the calling of the special election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of
conditional resignation did not create the actual
vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the
Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a
special election for President and Vice President earlier
than the regular elections for such positions in 1987.
The letter states that the President is: irrevocably
vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when
the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed
and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten
(10) days after his proclamation.
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict
compliance with the cited constitutional provision that
the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his
office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang
Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers
have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the
purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They
have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his
office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.
ISSUE:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme
Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the
elections
HELD:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the
prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining
respondents from holding the election on February 7,
1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10
votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as
the Court did not issue any restraining order, have
turned the issue into a political question (from the
purely justiciable issue of the questioned
constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual
vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be truly
decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity
at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more
political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the
way of letting the people decide through their ballot,
either to give the incumbent president a new mandate
or to elect a new president.
De Castro vs. Committee on Justice, GR
No. 71688, Sept 10, 1985
FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt
with the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice
21
Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the
presidential election. On December 22, 2009,
Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio
member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC,
requesting that the process for nominations to the office
of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its
January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a
resolution which stated that they have unanimously
agreed to start the process of filling up the position of
Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the
retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result,
the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for
application or recommendation, and published for that
purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of
February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the
next step of announcing the names of the following
candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn
complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later
than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun
the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice
Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet
decided on when to submit to the President its list of
nominees for the position due to the controversy in this
case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led
to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for
either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist,
mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the
act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a
midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by
the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30,
1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B.
Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City
and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively,
shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by
which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII
prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to
appoint to judicial positions during the period therein
fixed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is
ripe for judicial determination.
HELD:
There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the
petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is
ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the
JBC already commenced the proceedings for the
selection of the nominees to be included in a short list
to be submitted to the President for consideration of
which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the
next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet
vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of
nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although
it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of
nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the
next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial
determination, because the next steps are the public
interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short
list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional
experts, as may be needed. The resolution of the
controversy will surely settle with finality the
nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from
moving on with the process that it already began, or
that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the
rest of the process
Romulo vs. Iniguez, 141 SCRA 263
FACTS:
Petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from
enforcing Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings and
mandamus to compel the Batasan Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall
from the archives and report out the resolution together
with the verified complaint for the impeachment of the
President of the Philippines.
Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all
members of the Batasan, filed with the Batasan on
August 13, 1985 Resolution No. 644 calling for the
impeachment of President Marcos together with a
verified complaint for impeachment. Said resolution and
complaint were referred by the Speaker to the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government. The Committee found the complaint not
sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further

consideration and disapproved Resolution No. 644 and
dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint
attached thereto on August 14, 1985. It then submitted
its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent
to the archives.
On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the
Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the
archives of Resolution No. 644 and the verified
complaint attached thereto. Said motion was
disapproved by the Batasan.
On September 7, 1985, the present petition was filed
with this Court. In said petition, petitioners pray that
after hearing this Court declare Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8
of the Batasan Rules on Impeachment which was
approved by the Batasan on August 16, 1984 by a vote
of 114 in favor and 58 against, unconstitutional, and
Committee Report No. 154 of the Batasan Committee
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government
dismissing Resolution No. 644 and the complaint for
impeachment attached thereto, null and void. They also
pray that this Court issue a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining respondents from enforcing and questioned
provisions of the aforementioned Rules and a Writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the
Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and
Good Government to recall from the archives and
report out the resolution and complaint for
impeachment in order that the impeachment trial can be
conducted forthwith by the Batasan as a body.
In G.R. No. L-71688 filed on August 17, 1985, Arturo M.
de Castro and Perfecto L. Cagampang, claiming to be
members of good standing of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and taxpayers, filed a petition with this Court
for certiorari to annul the resolution of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, the very
same resolution subject of the present petition,
dismissing the complaint for the impeachment of the
President of the Philippines signed by the petitioners in
the present case, and mandamus to compel said
Committee on Justice and the Batasan, represented by
its Speaker, to give due course to said complaint for
impeachment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court have the jurisdiction
in this case?
In denying due course to said petition and dismissing
outright the same, The court HELD:
The l973 Constitution has vested in the Batasan
Pambansa the exclusive power to initiate, try and
decide all cases of impeachment. The action of the
Committee on Justice of the Batasan to whom the
complaint for the impeachment of the President had
been referred dismissing said petition for being
insufficient in form and substance involves a political
question not cognizable by the Courts. The dismissal of
said petition is within the ambit of the powers vested
exclusively in the Batasan by express provision of Sec.
2, Article XIII of the Constitution and it is not within the
competence of this Court to inquire whether in the
exercise of said power the Batasan acted wisely. There
is no allegation in the petition for certiorari that in the
exercise of its powers the Batasan had violated any
provision of the Constitution.
The fact that the Committee on Justice dismissed the
petition on the same day it was filed after deliberating
on it for several hours as reported in the newspapers,
radio and television (which must have been the basis of
petitioners' claim that the Committee had acted with
undue haste in unceremoniously dismissing the
complaint for impeachment) does not provide basis for
concluding that there had been a violation of any
provision of the Constitution which would justify the
Court's intervention to ensure proper observance of
constitutional norms and conduct.
Beyond saying that the Batasan may initiate
impeachment by a vote of at least one-fifth of all its
Members and that no official shall be convicted without
the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
members thereof, the Constitution says no more. It
does not lay down the procedure to be followed in
impeachment proceedings. It is up to the Batasan to
enact its own rules of procedure in said impeachment
proceedings, which it had already done, The
interpretation and application of said rules are beyond
22
the powers of the Court to review. The powers of the
Batasan to dismiss a petition for impeachment which in
its judgment it finds not meritorious or defective in form
and substance are discretionary in nature and,
therefore, not subject to judicial compulsion.
Avelino vs. Cuenco, 83 Phil 17
FACTS:
On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Taada
invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to
formulate charges against the then Senate President
Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the next
session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day
however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session
for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada,
Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other
Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He
however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and
delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his
piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al were being
blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled
Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of
order.
Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due
to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they
requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting.
Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his
chair and he was immediately followed by his followers.
Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked that it
be made of record it was so made that the
deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino,
made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore
Melencio Arranz and the remaining members of the
Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze
the functions of the Senate.
Taada was subsequently recognized to deliver his
speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution
(No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate
President. This was unanimously approved and was
even recognized by the President of the Philippines the
following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter.
Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the
SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the
case.
HELD:
No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot
take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate
of the power to elect its own president, which power
should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because
the selection of the presiding officer affects only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them.
Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable,
the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside,
his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the
Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case,
what will be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under
Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning
session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et
al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other
(Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a
resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.
The answer might be different had the resolution been
approved only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto
was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a
continuation of the morning session (presided by
Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was
there a quorum constituting such session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning
session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the
journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in

session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor).
Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the
Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution
declares that a majority of each House shall constitute
a quorum, the House does not mean all the majority.
members. Even a majority of all the members constitute
the House. There is a difference between a majority of
all the members of the House and a majority of the
House, the latter requiring less number than the first.
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members
of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a
quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at
least, of the absent members; if one had been so
arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and
Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the
same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco,
one against and one abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino
on March 14, 1949)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the
SC take cognizance of the case and that they are
willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC
whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that
there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was
elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are
absentee senators; one being confined and the other
abroad but this does not change the number of
senators nor does it change the majority which if
mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half
of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12
senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there
was no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to
assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of
subsequent events which justify its intervention. The
Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majoritys
pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that,
under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the
constitutional requirement in that regard has become a
mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any
new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos
election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco
group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has
been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing
compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino
group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos
persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional
processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the
Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution and that the majoritys
ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with
the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco
has been legally elected as Senate President and the
petition is dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided
that the majority of all the members of the National
Assembly constitute a quorum to do business and the
fact that said provision was amended in the Constitution
of 1939, so as to read a majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum to do business, shows the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the
majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the
Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents,
and this must be limited to actual members who are not
incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of
death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the
house or for other causes which make attendance of
the member concerned impossible, even through
coercive process which each house is empowered to
issue to compel its members to attend the session in
order to constitute a quorum.
That the amendment was intentional or made for some
purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering
the use of the words of all the members as
unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5)
Title VI of the original Constitution which required
concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the
National Assembly to expel a member was amended
by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so
as to require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of each House. Therefore, as Senator
23
Confesor was in the United States and absent from the
jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the
Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were
twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a
MERALCO vs. Pasay Trans., Co., 57 Phil
825
FACTS:
Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to
any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in
existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the
grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or
corporation shall use such right of way, and the
compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such
other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed
by the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a
board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom
shall be final. Said Act provides that for every franchise
granted, terms as to the usage and compensation to be
paid to the grantee shall be fixed by the members of the
Supreme Court sitting as board of arbitrators, a majority
vote is required and this is final.
Pursuant to said Act, MERALCO filed a petition before
the court requesting the members of the Supreme
Court sitting as board of arbitrators to fix the terms upon
which certain transportation companies shall be
permitted to use the Pasig Bridge of the MERALCO.
Copies were sent to affected transpo company (one of
which is the Pasay Transpo) and to Atty-Gen which
disclaimed any interest.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the members of the Supreme Court can
sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and compensation as
is asked of them in this case
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court represents one of the three
divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power
and judicial power only which is exercised by the
Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the
guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by
implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The
Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot
be required to exercise any power or to perform any
trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or
connected with the administering of judicial functions.
The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise
jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional
jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec.
26).When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of
"jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could not only
mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme
Court acting as a court, and could hardly
mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members
of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators.
A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper
sense of the term, and possesses none of the
jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be
exercised by the Supreme Court. The power conferred
on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be
required or authorized to exercise any other. . . .
Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined in
the organic law of the government, and being all strictly
judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the court
to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or perform
any other duty. Section 11 of Act No. 1446
contravenes the maxims which guide the operation
of a democratic government constitutionally
established, and that it would be improper and illegal for
the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board
of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall
be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric
Company.
Endencia vs. David, GR No. L-6455, Aug 31,
1953
FACTS

Collector of Internal Revenue Saturnino David ordered
the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencias and Justice
Fernando Jugos compensation pursuant to Sec 13 of
RA 590 which states that SEC. 13. No salary
wherever received by any public officer of the Republic
of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from
the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared
not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law. According to Solicitor General
Juan R. Liwanag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro on
behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our
decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was
not received favorably by Congress, because
immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 590. The Solicitor General also
reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion
in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which
became Republic Act No. 590.
ISSUE
Whether Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional or not.
HELD:
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, RA No.
590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial
officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a
clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the
meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office, found in section 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries
of judicial officers.
This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part
thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-
defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the
legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so
as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A
legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not
conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere;
otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial
function in defining a term. The reason behind the
exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the
United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is
to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only
of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose
present membership number more than 990 judicial
officials. The independence of the judges is of far
greater importance than any revenue that could come
from taxing their salaries.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the
case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the
collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer
is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution.
We further hold that the interpretation and application of
the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive
province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and
that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally
provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that
it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby
tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs
counter to a previous interpretation already given in a
case by the highest court of the land.
3. Expanded jurisdiction of the judiciary under the
1987 Constitution [sec. 1 (2nd par.), Art. VIII]
a. Now includes determination of WON there
had been GAD (grave abuse of discretion)
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government
b. Other specific instances
i. Determination of the sufficiency of the
factual basis of Martial Law (Sec. 18,
Art. VII)
SECTION 18 (3). The Supreme Court
may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ
24
or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
ii. Formerly a political question
The duty remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld
[Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183]. The
power is inherent in the Judicial
Department, by virtue of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
CASE:
Aquino vs. Enrile, L-35546,
September 17, 1974
FACTS:
These (9) cases are all petitions for habeas
corpus, the petitioners having been arrested
and detained by the military by virtue of the
Presidents Proclamation No. 1081, dated
September 21, 1972.
It should be explained at this point that when
the Court voted on Dioknos motion to
withdraw his petition he was still under
detention without charges, and continued to
remain so up to the time the separate opinions
of the individual Justices were put in final form
preparatory to their promulgation on
September 12, which was the last day of
Justice Zaldivars tenure in the Court. 2Before
they could be promulgated, however, a major
development supervened: petitioner Diokno
was released by the President in the morning
of September 11, 1974.
The petitioners in the other cases, except
Benigno Aquino, Jr. (G.R. No. L-35546), either
have been permitted to withdraw their petitions
or have been released from detention subject
to certain restrictions.
In the case of Aquino, formal charges of
murder, subversion and illegal possession of
firearms were lodged against him with a
Military Commission on August 11, 1973; and
on the following August 23 he challenged the
jurisdiction of said Commission as well as his
continued detention by virtue of those charges
in a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in
this Court.
The question came up as to whether or not
Aquinos petition for habeas corpus should be
dismissed on the ground that the case as to
him should more appropriately be resolved in
this new petition. Of the twelve Justices,
however, eight voted against such dismissal
and chose to consider the case on the merits.
Juan Ponce Enrile, then the Minister of
National Defense, issued and ordered the
arrest of these individuals including Benigno
Aquino, Jr., in pursuant to General Order No. 2
of the President for being participants or for
having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy
to seize political and state power in the country
and to take over the Government by force.
Hence, Aquino and the others filed a petition
for habeas corpus against Enrile.
The events which form the background of
these nine petitions are related, either briefly
or in great detail, in the separate opinions filed
by the individual Justices. The petitioners were
arrested and held pursuant to General Order
No. 2 of the President (September 22, 1972),
for being participants or for having given aid
and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political
and state power in the country and to take
over the Government by force
General Order No. 2 was issued by the
President in the exercise of the powers he
 25

assumed by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081
(September 21, 1972) placing the entire
country under martial law.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the existence of
conditions claimed to justify the existence of
power to declare martial law subject to judicial
inquiry.
2. Whether or not the detention of the
petitioners is legal in accordance to the
declared Martial Law.
RULING:
ISSUE 1:
The Court ruled that the cases have
become moot and academic due to
constitutional sufficiency of the factual
bases for the proclamation of Martial Law.
Justices have held that the inquiry is of a
political one rather than that of a justiciable
one and thus not subject to legal inquiry.
disappeared, indeed had been exacerbated,
as events shortly before said proclamation
clearly demonstrated. On this Point the Court
is practically unanimous; Justice Teehankee
merely refrained from discussing it.
The argument that while armed hostilities go
on in several provinces in Mindanao there are
none in other regions except in isolated
pockets in Luzon, and that therefore there is
no need to maintain martial law all over the
country, ignores the sophisticated nature and
ramifications of rebellion in a modern setting.
The question of validity of Proclamation No.
1081 has been foreclosed by the transitory
provision of the 1973 Constitution [Art. XVII,
Sec. 3(2)] that all proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated,
issued, or done by the incumbent President
shall be part of the law of the land and shall
remain valid, legal, binding and effective even
after the ratification of this Constitution

Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra,

Fernandez and Aquino hold that the question
is political and therefore its determination is
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
Justice Fernandez adds that as a member of
the Convention that drafted the 1973
Constitution he believes that the Convention
put an imprimatur on the proposition that the
validity of a martial law proclamation and its
continuation is political and non-justiciable in
character.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING AND
FOR THE REASONS STATED BY THE
MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN THEIR
SEPARATE OPINIONS, JUDGMENT IS
HEREBY RENDERED DISMISSING ALL THE
PETITIONS, EXCEPT THOSE WHICH HAVE
BEEN PREVIOUSLY WITHDRAWN BY THE
RESPECTIVE PETITIONERS WITH THE
APPROVAL OF THIS COURT, AS
HEREINABOVE MENTIONED. NO COSTS.

Justice Barredo, on the other hand, believes

that political questions are not per se beyond
the Courts jurisdiction, the judicial power
vested in it by the Constitution being plenary
and all-embracing, but that as a matter of
policy implicit in the Constitution itself the
Court should abstain from interfering with the
Executives Proclamation, dealing as it does
with national security, for which the
responsibility is vested by the charter in him
alone.

ISSUE 2:
It is inherent to the declaration of Martial
Law the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus with respect to persons arrested or
detained for acts related to invasion,
insurrection or rebellion, or to safeguard
the public against imminent danger. Thus,
these cases were dismissed by the
Supreme Court.

Justice Esguerra maintains that the findings of

the President on the existence of the grounds
for the declaration of martial law are final and
conclusive upon the Courts.

He draws a distinction between the power of

the President to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, which was the issue in
Lansang, and his power to proclaim martial
law, calling attention to the fact that while the
Bill of Rights prohibits suspension of the
privilege except in the instances specified
therein, it places no such prohibition or
qualification with respect to the declaration of
martial law.

Justice Antonio, with whom Justices Makasiar,

Fernandez and Aquino concur, finds that there
is no dispute as to the existence of a state of
rebellion in the country, and on that premise
emphasizes the factor of necessity for the
exercise by the President of his power under
the Constitution to declare martial law, holding
that the decision as to whether or not there is
such necessity is wholly confided to him and
therefore is not subject to judicial inquiry, his
responsibility being directly to the people.

The factual bases for the suspension of the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
particularly in regard to the existence of a state
of rebellion in the country, had not

ART. VI: THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
A. Powers in general
A. Express
1. Plenary legislative power (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved
to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
A. Definition of Legislative Power
Legislative power is the authority to make laws
and to alter or repeal them.
B. Where Vested
Legislative power is vested in Congress except
to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
The Congress shall, as early as possible,
provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act
or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body after the
registration of a petition therefor signed by at
least ten per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters thereof
[Sec. 32, Art. VI],
i) In compliance with the constitutional
mandate, Congress passed Republic Act
No. 6735 [approved by President Aquino
on August 4, 1989], known as an Act
Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum.
a) Initiative is the power of the people
to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact
legislation through an election called
for the purpose. There are three
systems of initiative, namely: Initiative
on the Constitution which refers to a
petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution; Initiative on statutes
which refers to a petition proposing to
enact a national legislation; and
Initiative on local legislation which
refers to a petition proposing to enact
a regional, provincial, city, municipal
or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance. Indirect initiative is the
exercise of initiative by the people
through a proposition sent to
Congress or local legislative body for
action [Sec. 2, R. A. 6735],
Referendum is the power of the
electorate to approve or reject
legislation through an election called
for the purpose. It may be of two
classes, namely: Referendum on
statutes which refers to a petition to
approve or reject an act or law, or part
thereof, passed by Congress; and
Referendum on local laws which
refers to a petition to approve or reject
a law, resolution or ordinance enacted
by regional assemblies and local
26
legislative bodies [Sec. 2(c), R. A.
6735].
b) Prohibited measures. The
following cannot be the subject of an
initiative or referendum petition: No
petition embracing more than one
subject shall be submitted to the
electorate; and statutes involving
emergency measures, the enactment
of which is specifically vested in
Congress by the Constitution, cannot
be subject to referendum until ninety
(90) days after their effectivity [Sec.
10, R. A. 6735].
c) Local Initiative. Not less than
2,000 registered voters in case of
autonomous regions, 1,000 in case of
provinces and cities, 100 in case of
municipalities, and 50 in case of
barangays, may file a petition with the
Regional Assembly or local legislative
body, respectively, proposing the
adoption, enactment, repeal, or
amendment, of any law, ordinance or
resolution [Sec. 13, R. A. 6735].
d) Limitations on Local Initiative:
(1) The power of local initiative shall
not be exercised more than once a
year; (2) Initiative shall extend only to
subjects or matters which are within
the legal powers of the local
legislative bodies to enact; and (3) If
at any time before the initiative is held,
the local legislative body shall adopt in
toto the proposition presented, the
initiative shall be cancelled. However,
those against such action may, if they
so desire, apply for initiative.
C. Classification of legislative power
(1) Original legislative power- possessed by
the sovereign people.
(2) Derivative legislative power- that which has
been delegated by the sovereign people to the
legislative bodies. (Kind of power vested in
Congress)
(3) Constituent- The power to amend or revise
the constitution
(4) Ordinary- Power to pass ordinary laws.
Legislative power exercised by the people.
The people, through the amendatory process,
exercise constituent power, and through
initiative and referendum, ordinary legislative
power.
D. Scope of Legislative power.
Congress may legislate on any subject matter.
(Vera v. Avelino) In other words, the legislative
power of Congress is plenary.
E. Limitations on legislative power:
1. Substantive limitations - Refer to the subject
matter of legislation. These are limitations on
the content of laws.
2. Procedural limitations - Formal limitations
refer to the procedural requirements to be
complied with by Congress in the passage of
the bills. (Sinco, Phil. Political Law)
1. Substantive limitations:
a. Express Limitations

i. Bill of Rights :
o No law shall be passed abridging freedom of
speech, of expression etc (art. 3 4)
o No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion (art. 3 5)
o No law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed. (art 3 10)
o No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall
be enacted. (art. 3 22)
ii. On Appropriations:
o Congress cannot increase appropriations by
the President (art. 6 25)
o art. 6 29 (2)
SECTION 29 (2). No bill passed by either
House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in
the Journal.
iii. On Taxation
o art. 6 28 and 29(3)
SECTION 28 (1). The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the
Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious, charitable,
or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be
passed without the concurrence of a majority
of all the Members of the Congress.
SECTION 29 (3). All money collected on any
tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such
purpose only. If the purpose for which a
special fund was created has been fulfilled or
abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be
transferred to the general funds of the
Government.
o art. 14 4(3)
27
SECTION 4 (3). All revenues and assets of
non-stock, non-profit educational institutions
used actually, directly, and exclusively for
educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or
cessation of the corporate existence of such
institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in
the manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including
those cooperatively owned, may likewise be
entitled to such exemptions subject to the
limitations provided by law including
restrictions on dividends and provisions for
reinvestment.
iv. On Constitutional Appellate jurisdiction of
SC
No law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its
advice and concurrence (art. 6 30))
SECTION 30. No law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.
v. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility
shall be enacted (art. 6 31)
SECTION 31. No law granting a title of royalty
or nobility shall be enacted.
b. Implied limitations
i. Congress cannot legislate irrepealable laws
ii. Congress cannot delegate legislative
powers
iii. Non-encroachment on powers of other
departments
2. Procedural limitations:
Prescribes the manner of passing bills in the
form they should take
Limitations provided by Sec 26, Art VI
o Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title
o No bill passed by either house shall become
law unless it has passed 3readings on
separate days
o Printed copies in its final form have been
distributed to its members 3 days before the
passage of the bill
Exception: president certifies to the necessity
of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency
2. Non-Legislative Power
a. Canvass of presidential elections (Sec. 5,
Art. VII)
SECTION 5. Before they enter on the
execution of their office, the President, the
Vice-President, or the Acting President
shall take the following oath or affirmation:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my
duties as President (or Vice-President or
Acting President) of the Philippines,
preserve and defend its Constitution,
execute its laws, do justice to every man,

and consecrate myself to the service of
the Nation. So help me God. (In case of
affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)
b. Declaration of the existence of State of
War [Sec. 23 (2), Art. VI]
SECTION 23 (2). In times of war or other
national emergency, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
c. Confirmation of presidential grant of
amnesty (Sec. 19, Art. VII)
SECTION 19. Except in cases of
impeachment, or as otherwise provided in
this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
d. Confirmation of presidential appointees
(Sec. 16, Art. VII)
SECTION 16. The President shall
nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts,
or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall
be effective only until after disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress.
e. Amendments to and revision of the
constitution (See Art. XVII)
f. Impeachment (See Sec. 3, Art. XI)
B. Implied (e.g. power to punish for contempt during
legislative investigations)
C. Inherent (e.g. determination of rules of
proceedings; discipline of members; exercise of the
inherent powers of police power, taxation, and
eminent domain)
28
(1) Police power
Make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes
and ordinances, as they shall judge for the
good and welfare of the commonwealth and
of the subjects of the same
Includes maintenance of peace and order,
protection of life, liberty and property and the
promotion of general welfare
(2) Power of eminent domain
(3) Power of taxation
(4) District representatives Implied Powers
(Contempt Power)
II. Composition
A. Senate (Sec. 2, Art. VI)
SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed of
twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large
by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may
be provided by law.
Elected at large, reason. By providing for a
membership elected at large by the electorate, this
rule intends to make the Senate a training
ground for national leaders and possibly a
springboard for the Presidency. The feeling is
that the senator, having national rather than only a
district constituency, will have a broader outlook
of the problems of the country instead of being
restricted by parochial viewpoints and narrow
interests. With such a perspective, the Senate is
likely to be more circumspect and broad minded
than the House of Representatives
B. House of Representatives (Sec. 5, Art. VI)
Not more than 250 members, unless otherwise
provided by law, consisting of:
1. District representatives, elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area.
2. Party-list representatives, who shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives, elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.
3. Sectoral representatives. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of the
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.
i) Until a law is passed, the President may fill
by appointment from a list of nominees by the
respective sectors the seats reserved for
sectoral representation [Sec. 7, Art. XVIII,
1987]. These appointments shall be subject to
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments [Quintos-Deles v. Committee on
Constitutional Commissions, Commission on
Appointments, 177 SCRA 259].
Bicameralism v. Unicameralism
The Congress of the Philippines is a bicameral
body composed of a Senate and House of
Representatives, the first being considered as
the upper house and the second the lower
house.

Advantages of Unicameralism.
1. Simplicity of organization resulting in
economy and efficiency
2. Facility in pinpointing responsibility for
legislation
3. Avoidance of duplication.
Advantages of Bicameralism.
1. Allows for a body with a national perspective
to check the parochial tendency of
representatives elected by district.
2. Allows for more careful study of legislation
3. Makes the legislature less susceptible to
control by executive
4. Serves as training ground for national
leaders.
III. Qualifications of Members (Sec. 3 and 6, Art. VI)
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the
day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age,
able to read and write, a registered voter, and a
resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.
SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the
House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the
election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to
read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately
A. Natural-born citizen (See definition in Sec. Sec.
2, Art. IV)
B. Age
Senate: at least 35 y.o.
Congress: at least 25 y.o.
C. Residence
Senate: not less than 2 yrs
Congress: not less than 1 yr.
In Coquilla v. Comelec, G.R.No. 151914, July 31,
2002, the Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner
had not been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar,
for at least one year prior to the May 14, 2001
elections. Although Oras was his domicile of origin,
petitioner lost the same when he became a US
citizen after enlisting in the US Navy. From then
on, until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired
Philippine citizenship through repatriation,
petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in
the Philippines. In Caasi v. Comelec, infra., it was
held that immigration to the US by virtue of the
acquisition of a green card constitutes
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
Domicile
Residence as a qualification means domicile.
Normally a persons domicile is his domicile of
origin.
If a person never loses his or her domicile, the one
year requirement of Section 6 is not of relevance
because he or she is deemed never to have left the
place. (Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC)
A person may lose her domicile by voluntary
abandonment for a new one or by marriage to a
husband (who under the Civil Code dictates the
wifes domicile).
29
Change of domicile
To successfully effect a change of domicile, there
must be:
o Physical Presence-Residence or bodily
presence in the new locality (The change of
residence must be voluntary)
o Animus manendi -Intention to remain in the new
locality (The purpose to remain in or at the domicile
of choice must be for an indefinite period of time)
o Animus non revertendi-Intention to abandon
old domicile
A lease contract does not adequately support a
change of domicile. The lease does not constitute
a clear animus manendi. (Domino v. COMELEC)
However a lease contract coupled with affidavit of
the owner where a person lives, his marriage
certificate, birth certificate of his daughter and
various letter may prove that a person has
changed his residence. (Perez v. COMELEC)
Property Qualification
Property qualifications are contrary to the social
justice provision of the Constitution. Such will also
be adding qualifications provided by the
Constitution.
CASES:
Marcos vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established
her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and
graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938
to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in
St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese
School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to
work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in
his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she
married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a
voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959,
they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered
as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they
lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang
Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative
of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the
same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging
that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation,
wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to
rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March
29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City
as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven
months residency due to the fact that she became a resident
of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1 year residency
requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the
First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election
purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months
residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban
became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when
her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual
removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new
one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile
because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the
same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late
President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin
and merely gained a new home and not domicilium
necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her
marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after
the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her
domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested.
She even kept close ties by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important
milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses
the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7,
May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Aquino vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new (remember: newly created)
Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of
candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the
aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm
Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,
Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo,
Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the
ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than
one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended
the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1
year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a
resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed
Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547
votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the
Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order
suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission
resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections
found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office
for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15
and June 2 orders.
Issue:
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually
connotes domicile to warrant the disqualification of Aquino
from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of
choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the
COC)in the district he was running in.
Held:
1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood
as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous
constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court
cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there
was an attempt to require residence in the place not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
30
What is the Committees concept of residence for the
legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted from
the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was
domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that
resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of
intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be
by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word residence to
have the same meaning of domicile.
The place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers
unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community
from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in
that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing
residence in a given area for meeting election law
requirements, this defeats the essence of representation,
which is to place through assent of voters those most
cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if
a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated
by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the
district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino
should prove that he established a domicile of choice and
not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the
HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the district
in which he seeks election to.
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11,
1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a
registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more
than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate
indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also
showed him to be a registered voter of the same district.
Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to
the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquinos connection to the new Second District of Makati
City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in
the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in
Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit
instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to
be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in
Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila)
indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical
residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but
only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the
Second District of Makati City.
Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile from
Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly
supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully
effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond
with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on
Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent
Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next
highest number of votes in the congressional elections of
Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:

I. Aquinos petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the
disqualification issue involving congressional candidates
after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved
with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction
ceased in the instant case after the elections and the remedy
to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR
Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned decision
despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of
jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming
arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelecs finding of non-compliance with the
residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is
contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and
jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal
impossibility of enforcing the one year residency requirement
of Congressional candidates in newly created political
districts which were only existing for less than a year at the
time of the election and barely four months in the case of
petitioners district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers to
determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining
qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of
the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place
candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate
is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take
advantage of the creation of new political districts by
suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts,
prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking
advantage of existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was
executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by
establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a
oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a
domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be
better.
D. Additional qualifications not allowed
CASE:
Pimentel vs. COMELEC, etc., GR No. 161658,
November 3, 2008
Facts:
Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it mandatory for candidates
for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and
persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, to undergo a drug test.
Hence, Senator Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for
the 2004 synchronized elections, challenged Section 36(g)
of the said law.
Issue:
Is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office
an unconstitutional imposition of additional qualification on
candidates for Senator?
Held:
Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for
public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government undergo a mandatory drug test
is UNCONSITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, an aspiring candidate for Senator needs only to
meet 5 qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration,
(3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. The Congress cannot
validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification
standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the
force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null
and void and has no effect. In the discharge of their defined
31
functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
IV. Term of Office of the Members (Sec. 4, Art. VI, in
relation to Sec. 2, Art. XVIII; Sec. 7, Art. VI)
Senate:
[Sec. 4, Art. VI]: Six years, commencing at noon on the
30th day of June next following their election.
Limitation: No Senator shall serve for more than two
consecutive terms. However, they may serve for more
than two terms provided that the terms are not
consecutive.
Effect of Voluntary Renunciation. Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which elected.
Staggering of Terms. The Senate shall not at any time
be completely dissolved. One-half of the membership is
retained as the other half is replaced or reelected every
three years.
Reason for Staggering. The continuity of the life of the
Senate is intended to encourage the maintenance of
Senate policies as well as guarantee that there will be
experienced members who can help and train
newcomers in the discharge of their duties.
Congress:
[Sec. 7, Art. VI]: Three years, commencing at noon on
the 30th day of June next following their election.
Limitation: Shall not serve for more than three
consecutive terms.
Term v. Tenure. Term refers to the period during which
an official is entitled to hold office. Tenure refers to the
period during which the official actually holds the office.
The term of office of Representatives shall be 3 years.
The term of office of Representatives shall commence
on 12:00noon of June 30 next following their election.
(unless otherwise provided by law)
A Representative may not serve for more than 3
consecutive terms. However, he may serve for more
than 3 terms provided that the terms are not
consecutive. (1996 Bar Question)
Why three years? One purpose in reducing the term
for three years is to synchronize elections, which in the
case of the Senate are held at three year intervals (to
elect one-half of the body) and in the case of the
President and Vice-President every six years.
Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
Abandonment of Dimaporo. The case of Dimaporo v.
Mitra which held that filing of COC for a different
position is a voluntary renunciation has been
abandoned because of the Fair Elections Act.
The filing of COC is not constitutive of voluntary
renunciation. (Farinas v. Executive Secretary; Quinto v.
COMELEC, December 1, 2009)
V. Elections of members of Congress under the 1987
Constitution
A. 1st Elections: 2nd Monday, May 87 (Sec. 1, Art.
XVIII Transitory Provisions)

SECTION 1. The first elections of Members of the
Congress under this Constitution shall be held on
the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to
be determined by the President, which may be
simultaneous with the election of the Members of
the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the
Metropolitan Manila area.
B. 2nd Elections: 2nd Monday, May 92 (Sec. 2, Art.
XVIII)
SECTION 2. The Senators, Members of the House
of Representatives, and the local officials first
elected under this Constitution shall serve until
noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election of 1992, the
first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes
shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve
for three years.
C. Succeeding regular elections: 3-year interval,
every 2nd Monday of May, unless otherwise
provided by law (Sec. 8, Art. VI)
SECTION 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the
regular election of the Senators and the Members
of the House of Representatives shall be held on
the second Monday of May.
Regular election
A person holding office in the House must yield his
or her seat to the person declared by the
COMELEC to be the winner. The Speaker shall
administer the oath to the winner. (Codilla v. De
Venecia)
Disqualified winner
The Court has also clarified the rule on who should
assume the position should the candidate who
received the highest number of votes is
disqualified. The second in rank does not take his
place. The reason is simple: It is of no moment
that there is only a margin of 768 votes between
protestant and protestee. Whether the margin is
ten or ten thousand, it still remains that protestant
did not receive the mandate of the majority during
the elections. Thus, to proclaim him as the duly
elected representative in the stead of protestee
would be anathema to the most basic precepts of
republicanism and democracy as enshrined within
our Constitution (Ocampo v. HRET, G.R. No.
158466. June 15, 2004).
D. Special elections (Sec. 9, Art. VI)
SECTION 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in
the House of Representatives, a special election
may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner
prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of
the House of Representatives thus elected shall
serve only for the unexpired term.
To fill a vacancy, but elected member shall serve
only for the unexpired portion of the term [Sec. 9,
Art. VI]. See R.A. 6645; Lozada v Comelec, 120
SCRA 337.
Special Election (R.A. 6645)
1. No special election will be called if vacancy
occurs:
a. at least eighteen (18) months before the next
regular election for the members of the Senate;
32
b. at least one (1) year before the next regular
election members of Congress
2. The particular House of Congress where
vacancy occurs must pass either a resolution if
Congress is in session or the Senate President or
the Speaker must sign a certification, if Congress is
not in session,
a. declaring the existence of vacancy;
b. calling for a special election to be held within 45
to 90 days from the date of the resolution or
certification.
3. The Senator or representative elected shall
serve only for the unexpired term.
VI. Salaries/Accounts of Members (Sec. 10 and 20, Art. VI)
Salaries:
[Sec. 10, Art. VI - The salaries of Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives shall be
determined by law. No increase in said compensation
shall take effect until ater the expiration of the full term
of all the members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase.] See
Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300; Ligot v. Mathay, 56
SCRA 823.
Accounts:
SECTION 20. The records and books of accounts of
the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the
public in accordance with law, and such books shall be
audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish
annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and
expenses incurred for each Member.
Reason for the delayed effect of increased salary.
Its purpose is to place a legal bar to the legislators
yielding to the natural temptation to increase their
salaries. (PHILCONSA v. Mathay)
Emoluments. Bernas submits that, by appealing to the
spirit of the prohibition, the provision may be read as an
absolute ban on any form of direct or indirect increase
of salary (like emoluments).
Allowances. A member of the Congress may receive
office and necessary travel allowances since
allowances take effect immediately. Nor is there a legal
limit on the amount that may be appropriated. The only
limit is moral, because, according to Section 20, the
books of Congress are audited by the Commission on
Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of
amounts paid and expenses incurred for each Member.
VII. Parliamentary Immunities of the Members (Sec. 11
Art. VI)
SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof.
A. Privilege from arrest
1. Privilege. A member of Congress is privileged
from arrest while Congress is in session in all
offenses (criminal or civil) not punishable by more
than 6 years imprisonment.
2. Purpose. Privilege is intended to ensure
representation of the constituents of the member of
Congress by preventing attempts to keep him from
attending sessions.

4. Scope. Parliamentary immunity only includes
the immunity from arrest, and not of being filed
suit.
4. Limitations on Parliamentary Immunity:
1. Crime has a maximum penalty of not
more than 6 years;
2. Congress is in session, whether regular
or special;
3. Prosecution will continue independent
of arrest;
4. Will be subject to arrest immediately
when Congress adjourns.
While in session. The privilege is available while
the Congress is in session, whether regular or
special and whether or not the legislator is actually
attending a session. Session as here used does
not refer to the day-to-day meetings of the
legislature but to the entire period from its initial
convening until its final adjournment. Hence the
privilege is not available while Congress is in
recess.
Why not available during recess. Since the
purpose of the privilege is to protect the legislator
against harassment which will keep him away from
legislative sessions, there is no point in extending
the privilege to the period when the Congress is
not in session.
5. Privilege is personal. Privilege is personal to
each member of the legislature, and in order that
its benefits may be availed of, it must be asserted
at the proper time and place; otherwise it will be
considered waived.
Privilege not granted to Congress but to its
members. Privilege from arrest is not given to
Congress as a body, but rather one that is granted
particularly to each individual member of it. (Coffin
v. Coffin, 4 Mass 1)
Privilege is reinforced by Article 145 of the Revised
Penal Code-Violation of Parliamentary Immunity.
Note: The provision says privilege from arrest; it
does not say privilege from detention.
Q: Congressman Jalosjos was convicted for rape
and detained in prison, asks that he be allowed to
attend sessions of the House.
A: Members of Congress are not exempt from
detention for crime. They may be arrested, even
when the House in session, for crimes punishable
by a penalty of more than six months.
Q: Congressman X was convicted for a crime with
a punishment of less than 6 years. He asks that he
be allowed to attend sessions of the House
contending that the punishment for the crime for
which he was convicted is less than 6 years.
A: I submit that Congressman X can be detained
even if the punishment imposed is less than 6
years. The provision only speaks of privilege from
arrest. It does not speak of exemption from serving
sentence after conviction. Members of Congress
are not exempt from detention for crime. (by Atty.
Manguera)
Q: Can the Sandiganbayan order the preventive
suspension of a Member of the House of
Representatives being prosecuted criminally for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act?
33
A: Yes. In Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, the Court
held that the accused cannot validly argue that
only his peers in the House of Representatives can
suspend him because the court-ordered
suspension is a preventive measure that is
different and distinct from the suspension ordered
by his peers for disorderly behavior which is a
penalty.
Trillanes Case (June 27, 2008)
In a unanimous decision penned by Justice Carpio
Morales, the SC en banc junked Senator Antonio
Trillanes petition seeking that he be allowed to
perform his duties as a Senator while still under
detention. SC barred Trillanes from attending
Senate hearings while has pending cases,
affirming the decision of Makati Judge Oscar
Pimentel.
The SC reminded Trillanes that election to office
does not obliterate a criminal charge, and that his
electoral victory only signifies that when voters
elected him, they were already fully aware of his
limitations.
The SC did not find merit in Trillanes position that
his case is different from former representative
Romeo Jalosjos, who also sought similar privileges
before when he served as Zamboanga del Norte
congressman even while in detention.
Quoting parts of the decision on Jalosjos, SC said
that allowing accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings
five days or more a week will virtually make him a
free man Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused appellants status to that of a
special class, it would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system.
The SC also did not buy Trillanes argument that
he be given the same liberal treatment accorded to
certain detention prisoners charged with non-
bailable offenses, like former President Joseph
Estrada and former Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) governor Nur Misuari, saying
these emergency or temporary leaves are under
the discretion of the authorities or the courts
handling them.
The SC reminded Trillanes that he also benefited
from these temporary leaves given by the courts
when he was allowed to file his candidacy and
attend his oath-taking as a senator before.
The SC also believes that there is a slight risk
that Trillanes would escape once he is given the
privileges he is asking, citing the Peninsula Manila
incident last November.
B. Privilege of speech and debate
1. Requisites (by Isagani Cruz)
a. Remarks made while Legislature or
committee thereof is functioning
As regards Requirement #1 provided by Cruz,
Bernas Primer provides: to come under the
privilege, it is not essential that the Congress
be in session when the utterance is made.
What is essential is that the utterance must
constitute legislative action.
Libelous remarks not in exercise of
legislative function shall not be under
privilege of speech. To invoke the privilege

of speech, the matter must be oral and
must be proven to be indeed privileged.
b. Remarks made in connection with the
discharge of official functions
Note that the member of Congress may be
held to account for such speech or debate by
the House to which he belongs. See Osmena
v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863; Jimenez v.
Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876.
Purpose. It is intended to leave legislator
unimpeded in the performance of his duties
and free form harassment outside.
Privilege of speech and debate enables the
legislator to express views bearing upon the
public interest without fear of accountability
outside the halls of the legislature for his
inability to support his statements with the
usual evidence required in the court of justice.
In other words, he is given more leeway than
the ordinary citizen in the ventilation of matters
that ought to be divulged for the public good.
To enable and encourage a representative of
the public to discharge his public trust with
firmness and success" for "it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech and that he should be
protected from resentment of every one,
however, powerful, to whom the exercise of
that liberty may occasion offense. (Osmena V.
Pendatun cited in Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago,
2009)
Scope:
(1) The privilege is a protection only against
forums other than the Congress itself.
(Osmena v. Pendatun)
(2) Speech or debate includes utterances
made in the performance of official functions,
such as speeches delivered, statements
made, votes cast, as well as bills introduced
and other acts done in the performance of
official duties. (Jimenez v. Cabangbang)
(3) To come under the privilege, it is not
essential that the Congress be in session
when the utterance is made. What is essential
is that the utterance must constitute legislative
action, that is, it must be part of the
deliberative and communicative process by
which legislators participate in committee or
congressional proceedings in the
consideration of proposed legislation or of
other matters which the Constitution has
placed within the jurisdiction of Congress.
(Gravel v. US)
(4) The privilege extends to agents of
assemblymen provided that the agency
consists precisely in assisting the legislator in
the performance of legislative action (Gravel
v. US)
4. Privilege not absolute. The rule provides
that the legislator may not be questioned in
any other place, which means that he may be
called to account for his remarks by his own
colleagues in the Congress itself and, when
warranted, punished for disorderly behavior.
5. Parliamentary Freedom of Speech v SCs
Power to Discipline
Facts: Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
made this speech on the Senate floor. x x x I
am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the
mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
34
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not
only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in
the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in
another environment but not in the Supreme
Court of idiots x x x. Pobre asks that
disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary
actions be taken against the lady senator.
Issue: May Senator Santiago be disbarred or
be imposed with disciplinary sanction for her
intemperate and highly improper speech made
on the senate floor?
Held: No. A lawyer-senator who has crossed
the limits of decency and good professional
conduct by giving statements which were
intemperate and highly improper in substance
may not be disbarred or be imposed with
disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court.
It is true that parliamentary immunity must not
be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule,
demean, and destroy the reputation of the
Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for
personal wrath and disgust. However, courts
do not interfere with the legislature or its
members in the manner they perform their
functions in the legislative floor or in committee
rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of
the falsity and mala fides of the statement
uttered by the member of the Congress does
not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary
authority of the assembly and the voters, not
the courts, can properly discourage or correct
such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity. (Pobre v. Defensor-
Santiago, 2009)
CASE:
Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876
FACTS:
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the
House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. In November
1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an
open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said
letter alleged that there have been allegedly three
operational plans under serious study by some
ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some
civilian political strategists. That such strategists
have had collusions with communists and that the
Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning
a coup dtat to place him as the president. The
planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez,
among others, under their guise and that Jimenez
et al may or may not be aware that they are being
used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was
said to have been published in newspapers of
general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case
against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages
against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbangs
statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for
the case to be dismissed because he said that as
a member of the lower house, he is immune from
suit and that he is covered by the privileged
communication rule and that the said letter is not
even libelous.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the open letter is covered by
privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress.
HELD:

No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution
provides The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at
the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or
debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any
other place.
The publication of the said letter is not covered by
said expression which refers to utterances made
by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in session as well as
bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is
in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress
and of Congressional Committees duly authorized
to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. Congress
was not in session when the letter was published
and at the same time he, himself, caused the
publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in
thus causing the communication to be so
published, he was not performing his official duty,
either as a member of Congress or as officer of
any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the
finding made by the lower court the said
communication is not absolutely privileged.
c. Significance of the phrase in any other
place
The rule provides that the legislator may
not be questioned in any other place,
which means that he may be called to
account for his remarks by his own
colleagues in the Congress itself and,
when warranted, punished for disorderly
behaviour (Osmena v. Pendatun).
CASE:
Osmena vs. Pendatun, supra
FACTS:
Congressman Osmea took the floor on the one-
hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled A
Message to Garcia wherein said speech
contained serious imputations of bribery against
the President. Being unable to produce evidence
thereof, Osmea was then found to be guilty of
serious disorderly behaviour by the House of
Representatives. Osmea argues that the
Constitution gave him complete parliamentary
immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House,
he ought not to be questioned.
ISSUE:
Whether said disciplinary action by the House is in
violation of Section 15, Article VI of the
Constitution.
RULING:
Said disciplinary action is not in violation of the
Constitution. Section 15, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that for any speech or
debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of
the House of Representative shall not be
questioned in any other place. Although exempt
from prosecution or civil actions for their words
uttered in Congress, the members of Congress
may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress
itself. Observe that they shall not be questioned
in any other place in Congress.
VIII. Conflict of Interest (Sec. 12, Art. VI)
SECTION 12. All members of the Senate and the
House of Representative shall, upon assumption of
35
office, make a full disclosure of their financial and
business interests. They shall notify the House
concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may
arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which
they are authors.
This provision speaks of duty to disclose the following:
(1) Financial and business interest upon assumption
of office
(2) Potential conflict of interest that may arise from
filing of a proposed legislation of which they are
authors.
IX. Incompatible and Forbidden Offices (Sec. 13, Art.
VI)
SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may
have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
Prohibitions:
1) Incompatible Office
Purpose. The purpose of prohibition of incompatible
offices is to prevent him from owing loyalty to another
branch of the government, to the detriment of the
independence of the legislature and the doctrine of
separation of powers.
2 Kinds of Office under Article 13
1) Incompatible office (1st sentence of article 13)
2) Forbidden office (2nd sentence of article 13)
Prohibition not absolute. The prohibition against the
holding of an incompatible office is not absolute; what
is not allowed is the simultaneous holding of that office
and the seat in Congress.
Hence, a member of Congress may resign in order to
accept an appointment in the government before the
expiration of his term.
When office not incompatible. Not every other office
or employment is to be regarded as incompatible with
the legislative position. For, example, membership in
the Electroral Tribunals is permitted by the Constitution
itself. Moreover, if it can be shown that the second
office is an extension of the legislative position or is in
aid of legislative duties, the holding thereof will not
result in the loss of the legislators seat in the
Congress.
2) Forbidden Office.
Purpose. The purpose is to prevent trafficking in public
office. The reasons for excluding persons from office
who have been concerned in creating them or
increasing the emoluments are to take away as far as
possible, any improper bias in the vote of the
representative and to secure to the constituents some
solemn pledge of his disinterestedness.
Scope of prohibition. The provision does not apply to
elective offices, which are filled by the voters
themselves.
The appointment of the member of the Congress to the
forbidden office is not allowed only during the term for

which he was elected, when such office was created or
its emoluments were increased.
After such term, and even if the legislator is reelected,
the disqualification no longer applies and he may
therefore be appointed to the office.
CASE:
Adaza vs. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431
Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of
Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his
oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial
governor on March 3, 1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected
vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the
law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3,
1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of
candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza
followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner
won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost.
Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July
19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said
office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as
governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and
started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984.
Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governors office, Adaza
has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues
that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he
remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires
on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context
of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New
Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he
had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of
Parliament.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the
Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously.
Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can
assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of
succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides
as follows:
Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan
Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his
tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . .
. Pecuniary Benefit. The prohibited pecuniary benefit
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence
Adaza cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot
complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his
holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when
Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a private
citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private
citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by
petitioners election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul
against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the
BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides
that governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or
barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be
considered on forced leave of absence from office. Indubitably,
respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering
that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984
BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code.
X. Inhibitions and Disqualifications (sec. 14, Art. VI)
SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice or before the Electoral
Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary,
during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any
matter before any office of the Government for his
36
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to
act on account of his office.
Prohibition on lawyer legislators.
Purpose. The purpose is to prevent the legislator from
exerting undue influence, deliberately or not, upon the
body where he is appearing.
Not a genuine party to a case. A congressman may not
buy a nominal account of shares in a corporation which
is party to a suit before the SEC and then appear in
intervention. That which the Constitution directly
prohibits may not be done by indirection. (Puyat v. De
Guzman)
Prohibition is personal. It does not apply to law firm
where a lawyer-Congressman may be a member. The
lawyer-legislator may still engage in the practice of his
profession except that when it come to trials and
hearings before the bodies above-mentioned,
appearance may be made not by him but by some
member of his law office.
Pleadings. A congressman cannot sign pleadings [as
counsel for a client] (Villegas case)
Conflict of Interests
Financial Interest
Purpose. This is because of the influence they can
easily exercise in obtaining these concessions. The
idea is to prevent abuses from being committed by the
members of Congress to the prejudice of the public
welfare and particularly of legitimate contractors with
the government who otherwise might be placed at a
disadvantageous position vis- vis the legislator.
Contract. The contracts referred to here are those
involving financial interest, that is, contracts from
which the legislator expects to derive some profit at the
expense of the government.
could be direct or indirect and this would cover
pecuniary benefit for relatives. (Bernas Commentary, p.
710, 10th ed.)
CASE:
Puyat vs. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 33
FACTS:
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as
directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election was
subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyats rival)
claiming that the votes were not properly counted hence he filed
a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the
case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a
member of Aceros group. And during a conference held by SEC
Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to
have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez
entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as
he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear
as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as
the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from
appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion
for Intervention in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a
counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC
Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting
Fernandez leave to intervene.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can
appear and intervene in the SEC case without violating the
constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as
counsel in such courts or bodies?

HELD:
No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the
guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a
stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks
before the litigation took place. During the conference he
presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that
he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented
himself as a party of interest which is clearly a workaround and
is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself
involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not
likewise be done indirectly.
Note: Cite Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of
justice, regardless of rank, composition, or jurisdiction. The
disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and
to all administrative bodies, like the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission.
Courts martial and military tribunals, being administrative
agencies, are included.(From
https://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/terms.asp, accessed
09/17/2014)
XI. Sessions (Sec. 15, Art. VI; See also Sec. 4 and 10, Art.
VII)
XII. Officers [Sec. 16 (1), Art. VI]
XIII. Quorum [Sec. 16 (2), Art. VI]
CASE:
Avelino vs. Cuenco, supra
XIV. Discipline of Members [Sec. 16 (3), Art. VI]
CASE:
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, supra
XV. Journals [Sec. 16 (4), Art. VI]
CASES:
US vs. Pons, 34 Phil 729
Arroyo vs. de Venecia, 277 SCRA 268
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1
FACTS:
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three
senators were suspended by senate due to election
irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take
their seat in the lower House except in the election of the
House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House
Reps were not considered in determining the required vote
(of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing
amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered
as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were
already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a
result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been
otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of
the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said
resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that
the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court
is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at
bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by
Congress.
HELD:
As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both
the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the
Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court
on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the
enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of
37
a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in
section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the
journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and
did not bother itself with considering the effects of an
authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do
what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate,
namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order
to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy
out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict
with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted
between the two documents and the court did not say or so
much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would
give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit
provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of
the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally
passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each,
approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as
amended by Act No. 2210, provides: Official documents may
be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine
Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided
for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of
secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case
of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated
resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict,
the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the
journals.
A. Enrolled Bill doctrine
CASES:
Casco vs. Jimenez, 7 SCRA 374
Tolentino vs. Secretary, 235 SCRA 630
Phil Judges Association vs. Prado, 227 SCRA
703
B. Exception
CASE:
Astorga vs. Villegas, G.R. No. L-23475, April
30, 1974
XVI. Adjournment (Sec. 15, Art. VI)
XVII. The Electoral Tribunals (Sec. 17, Art. VI)
A. When constituted: See also Sec. 19, Art. VI
B. BOTH legislative (political) and judicial
component: required
CASE:
Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166
SCRA 51
C. Exclusive right to promulgate its own rules of
procedure
CASE:
Lazatin vs. HRET, 168 SCRA 391
D. Generally: No appeal of decisions of Electoral
Tribunals
E. Expulsion of its members
CASE:
Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792
XVIII. Commission on Appointments (Sec. 19, Art. VI; See
also Sec. 16, Art. VII)
A. When constituted

B. Meetings: only while Congress is in session
1. Effect of by-passing ad interim presidential
appointments
C. Effect of political realignments in the House
CASE:
Daza vs. Singson, supra
XIX.Specific powers of Congress
A. Power to enact statutes
1. Origin of laws (Sec. 24, Art. VI)
2. Prohibited measures
a. Law granting title of royalty or nobility
(Sec. 31, Art. VI)
b. Law increasing the appellate jurisdiction
of the SC without its consent, Sec. 30,
Art. VI)
c. Law impairing the obligation of contracts
(Sec. 10, Art. III)
d. Ex post facto law or bill of attainder
(Sec. 22, Art. III)
3. Title of bills [Sec. 26 (1), Art. VI]
a. One title, one subject rule
CASES:
Lidasan vs. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496
Philconsa vs. Jimenez, 15 SCRA 479
Tobias vs. Abalos, GR 114783, Dec. 8,
1994
Facts:
Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers
and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a
petition questioning the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An
Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of
the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged
to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is
unconstitutional for violation of three provisions
of the constitution. First, it violates the one
subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the
conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as
the division of congressional district of San Juan
and Mandaluyong into two separate district.
Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of
the Constitution, which provides that the House
of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of
San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
congressional districts increased the members
of the House of Representative beyond that
provided by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of
Article VI also provides that within three years
following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standard
provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the
division was not made pursuant to any census
showing that the minimum population
requirement was attained.
Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one
bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of
the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in
the law show a lack of constitutional
requirement?
Rulings:
The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions
are devoid of merit. With regards to the first
contention of one subject one bill rule, the
creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct
subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a
38
natural and logical consequence. In addition, a
liberal construction of the "one title-one subject"
rule has been invariably adopted by this court
so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the
present limit of the number of representatives,
the provision of the section itself show that the
250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution
clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided
by law. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation mandated by R.A.
No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is
no mention in the assailed law of any census to
show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had
each attained the minimum requirement of
250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation
into two legislative districts, unless otherwise
proved that the requirements were not met, the
said Act enjoys the presumption of having
passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the
members of Congress of the minimum
requirements for the establishment of separate
legislative district
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
4. Formalities of the enactment process [Sec.
26 (2), Art. VI]
a. Rule: 3 readings on separate days;
distribution of printed copies in its final
form 3 days before passage
b. Exception: presidential certification of
the necessity of its immediate
enactment
CASE:
Tolentino vs, Secretary, supra
FACTS:
The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the
sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of
services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross
selling price or gross value in money of goods
or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of
the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of
services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen
the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code.
The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association (CREBA) contends that the
imposition of VAT on sales and leases by virtue
of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of
the law would violate the constitutional provision
of non-impairment of contracts.
ISSUE:
Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional on
ground that it violates the contract clause under
Art. III, sec 10 of the Bill of Rights.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court the contention of
CREBA, that the imposition of the VAT on the
sales and leases of real estate by virtue of
contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of
the law would violate the constitutional provision
of non-impairment of contracts, is only slightly
less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical. It is
enough to say that the parties to a contract
cannot, through the exercise of prophetic
discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing
power of the State. For not only are existing
laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
power is also read into contracts as a basic
postulate of the legal order. The policy of
protecting contracts against impairment
presupposes the maintenance of a government

which retains adequate authority to secure the
peace and good order of society. In truth, the
Contract Clause has never been thought as a
limitation on the exercise of the State's power of
taxation save only where a tax exemption has
been granted for a valid consideration.
Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No.
115852, and the Court does not understand it to
make this claim. Rather, its position, as
discussed above, is that the removal of its tax
exemption cannot be made by a general, but
only by a specific, law.
Further, the Supreme Court held the validity of
Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal and
substantive aspects as this has been raised in
the various cases before it. To sum up, the
Court holds:
(1) That the procedural requirements of the
Constitution have been complied with by
Congress in the enactment of the statute;
(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal
requirements for the enactment of statutes -
beyond those prescribed by the Constitution -
have been observed is precluded by the
principle of separation of powers;
(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of
speech, expression or the press, nor interfere
with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to
any of the parties the right to an education; and
(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual
foundation of record, claims that the law is
regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and
that it violates vested rights protected under the
Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do
not justify the grant of prospective relief by writ
of prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
5. Approval of bills [Sec. 27 (1)]
a. Methods by which a bill becomes a law
i. President signs it
ii. President vetoes the bill, but
Congress overrides the veto
1. Rule: no partial veto
2. Exception: partial veto of an
item/s in an appropriations,
revenue or tariff bill
3. Exception to the exception: no
partial veto on a condition
attached to an approved item
CASE:
Bolinao Electronics vs.
Valencia, 11 SCRA 486
FACTS:
Bolinao Electronics Corporation was
the co-owner and a co-petitioner of
Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc.
(CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting
System Inc. They operate and own
television (channel 9) and radio
stations in the Philippines. They were
summoned by Brigido Valencia, then
Secretary of Communications, for
operating even after their permit has
expired. Valencia claimed that
because of CBNs continued
operation sans license and their
continuing operation had caused
damages to his department.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Valencia is entitled to
claim for damages.
HELD:
The SC ruled in the negative.
Valencia failed to show that any right
39
of his has been violated by the refusal
of CBN to cease operation. Further,
the SC noted that as the records
show, the appropriation to operate the
Philippine Broadcasting Service as
approved by Congress and
incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget
of the Republic of the Philippines
does not allow appropriations for TV
stations particularly in Luzon. Hence,
since there was no appropriation
allotted then there can be no damage;
and if there are expenditures made by
Valencias department they are in fact
in violation of the law and they cannot
claim damages there from. And even
if it is shown that the then president
vetoed this provision of the Budget
Act, such veto is illegal because he
may not legally veto a condition
attached to an appropriation or item in
the appropriation bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executives
veto power does not carry with it the
power to strike out conditions or
restrictions, has been adhered to in
subsequent cases. If the veto is
unconstitutional, it follows that the
same produced no effect whatsoever;
and the restriction imposed by the
appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
iii. President allows the bill to lapse
into a law by not acting on it within
30 days
B. Power of Legislative Inquiry; Question Hour in
pursuit of congressional oversight function (Sec.
21 and 22, Art. VI)
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may
upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House,
as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of
the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. When the security of the
State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.
CASES:
Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,
203 SCRA 767
Facts:
Senator Enrile asks the Senate to look into the matter of
the alleged acquisition of the Lopa Group of the properties
of Kokoy Romualdez which is a subject of sequestration
by the PCGG. Senator Enrile citing probable violations of
Republic Act No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Section 5.
The petitioners representing Ricardo Lopa who passed
away prior the decision of the court issued this petition for
prohibition and an issuance a temporary restraining order
and/or injuctive relief enjoin the Blue Ribbon committee of
compelling them to appear before them.
Issues:
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case,
petitioners contend that:

(1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no
valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of
legislation;
(2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations
is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power
of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and
(3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.
Ruling:
The Supreme court granted the petition. The committee
investigation wanted by Senator Enrile is not in aid of a
legislation, therefore is violative of the separation of
powers between the Senate or Congress and that
Judiciary. The pending civil case of the petitioners under
Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan is where
these issues by the Senate should be discussed.
Saying further that the power of the Senate and Congress
to conduct investigation in aid of legislation is not absolute
or without limitation.
Senate vs. Ermita, GR 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about
the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced.
This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to
investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged
overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate
committee issued invitations to certain department heads
and military officials to speak before the committee as
resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of
the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due
to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP
Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon,
the senate president, excepted the said requests for they
were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made
and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which
took effect immediately. EO 464 basically prohibited
Department heads, Senior officials of executive
departments who in the judgment of the department
heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals
and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine
National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in
the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the
executive privilege; Senior national security officials who
in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are
covered by the executive privilege; and Such other
officers as may be determined by the President, from
appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress
without first securing the presidents approval. The
department heads and the military officers who were
invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to
except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled
hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring
military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s
constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUES:
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry
vested in Congress;
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern; and
HELD:
That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right
essential not only for intelligent public decision-making in
a democratic system, but more especially for sound
legislation is not disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly
stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access
information that is crucial to law-making. Verily, the
Senate, including its individual members, has a
substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the
controversy and is the proper party to assail the
constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are
allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo
(Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino (Bayan Muna), Joel
40
Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis),
Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela)
are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O.
464, the absence of any claim that an investigation called
by the House of Representatives or any of its committees
was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464
notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a claim is made
that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and
duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation
in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.
The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets
the standing requirement as it obtained three seats in the
House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is,
therefore, entitled to participate in the legislative process
consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list
system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties who
lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute to
the formulation and enactment of legislation that will
benefit the nation.
As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have
the standing to file their petitions, passing on the standing
of their co-petitioners Courage and Codal is rendered
unnecessary.
In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which
claims to be an organization of citizens, and the
incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and
the IBP in behalf of its lawyer members, invoke their
constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern, asserting that the right to information, curtailed
and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the effective
exercise of other constitutional rights and to the
maintenance of the balance of power among the three
branches of the government through the principle of
checks and balances.
It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest
of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws,
presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must
be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of
Representatives, this Court held that when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that
he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.
As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is
clothed with legal standing in view of the transcendental
issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to
resolve in order to avert a constitutional crisis. For it to be
accorded standing on the ground of transcendental
importance, however, it must establish (1) the character of
the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the
case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government,
and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and
specific interest in raising the questions being raised. The
first and last determinants not being present as no public
funds or assets are involved and petitioners in G.R. Nos.
169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in
the resolution of the controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is
bereft of standing to file its petition. Its allegation that E.O.
464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and
uncertain, and at best is only a "generalized interest"
which it shares with the rest of the political parties.
Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that
indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to
cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution.
In fine, PDP-Labans alleged interest as a political party
does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing.
ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
The Court finds respondents assertion that the President
has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance
of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the
existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O.
464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require either a
deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition
issuing from the President in order to bar officials from
appearing before Congress.
As the implementation of the challenged order has already
resulted in the absence of officials invited to the hearings
of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no
sense to wait for any further event before considering the
present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be
sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain
from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643,
March 25, 2008

Facts:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with
Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $
329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of
China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the
NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de
Venecia III testified that several high executive officials
and power brokers were using their influence to push the
approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before
the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing
wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which
he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him
with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN
project. He further narrated that he informed President
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed
about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on: (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c)
whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita
sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged
and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vsErmita
be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent
committees and an order for his arrest and detention until
such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Issue:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3)
questions covered by executive privilege?
Ruling:
The communications are covered by executive privilege.
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and
employees to follow and abide by the Constitution,
existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others,
the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to
legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any
way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is
because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in
cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under
our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers, the information relating to these
powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of
presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and
received by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must
be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a
qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought likely
contains important evidence and by the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised
his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall
under conversation and correspondence between the
President and public officials necessary in her executive
and policy decision-making process and, that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on
matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed,
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a quintessential and
non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to
41
enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature
has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received
by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational
proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet.
And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling
need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of
petitioners claim of executive privilege violates the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. We might have
agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear
before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to
them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more
questions from the Senators, with the exception only of
those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is
subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides: The
right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law
Notes:
Executive Privilege. It has been defined as the right of
the President and high-level executive branch officials to
withhold information from Congress, the courts, and
ultimately, the public. Thus, presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door
Cabinet meetings, like the internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive
sessions of either House of Congress, are recognized as
confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open
by a co-equal branch of government [Senate v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006], The claim of executive
privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject
of the inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the
Constitution to the President, such as in the area of
military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the
President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,
appointing, pardoning and diplomatic powers. Consistent
with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality
than others [Neri v. Senate Committees, G.R. No. 180843,
March 25, 2008],
i) However, the privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information (in
this case to Congress), the necessity for withholding the
information must be of such a high degree as to outweigh
the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case. In light of this highly exceptional nature of
the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the
President (and to the Executive Secretary, by order of the
President) the power to invoke the privilege [Senate v.
Ermita, supra.].
ii) In Neri, a majority of the members of the Supreme
Court upheld the refusal of the petitioner to answer the
three questions asked during the Senate inquiry because
the information sought by the three questions are properly
covered by the presidential communications privilege, and
executive privilege w,as validly claimed by the President,
through the Executive Secretary. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-
delegable power (the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries) of the President; second,
the communications were received by a close advisor of
the President, Secretary Neri being a member of the
Cabinet and by virtue of the proximity test, he is covered
by executive privilege; and third, there was no adequate
showing by the respondents of the compelling need for
the information as to justify the limitation of the privilege,
nor was there a showing of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
C. Power of Appropriation (Sec. 25 and 29, Art. VI)

Power of Appropriation. In Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra., on
the issue of whether the power given to
members of Congress (under the 1994 GM) to
propose and identify the projects to be funded by
the Countrywide Development Fund was an
encroachment by the legislature on executive
power, the Supreme Court stated: The spending
power, called the power of the purse, belongs
to Congress, subject only to the veto power of
the President. While it is the President who
proposes the budget, still, the final say on the
matter of appropriation is lodged in Congress.
The power of appropriation carries with it the
power to specify the project or activity to be
funded under the appropriation law. It can be as
detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to
be.
a) Need for appropriation. [Sec. 29 (1), Art. VI:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.] In Comelec v. Judge Quijano-Padilla and
Photokina Marketing, G.R. No. 151992,
September 18, 2002, the Supreme Court said
that the existence of appropriations and the
availability of funds are indispensable requisites
to, or conditions sine qua non for, the execution
of government contracts. The import of the
constitutional requirement for an appropriation is
to require the various agencies to limit their
expenditure within the appropriations made by
law for each fiscal year. In this case, since the
bid of Phokokina (P6.588B) was way beyond the
amount appropriated by law (P1B) or funds
certified to tbe available (P1.2B), there is no way
the Comelec should enter into the contract. The
Bids and Awards Committee of the Comelec
should have rejected the bid of Photokina for
being excessive.
b) Appropriation law, defined. A statute the
primary and specific purpose of which is to
authorize the release of public funds from the
Treasury.
c) Classification:
i) General appropriation law: passed
annually, intended to provide for the financial
operations of the entire government during one
fiscal period.
ii) Special appropriation law: designed for
a specific purpose.
d) Implied [extra-constitutional] limitations on
appropriation measures:
i) Appropriation must be devoted to a
public purpose. See Pascual v. Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, 110 Phil
331.
ii) The sum authorized to be released
must be determinate, or at least determinable.
See Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221,
where the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the automatic appropriation
for debt service under the 1990 General
Appropriations Act. According to the Court, the
legislative intent in R.A. 4860, Sec. 31, P.D.
1177, and P.D. 1967, is that the amount needed
should be automatically set aside in order to
enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the
principal, interest, taxes and other normal
42
banking charges on the loans, credit,
indebtedness x x x when they become due
without the need to enact a separate law
appropriating funds therefor as the need arises,
x x x Although the decrees do not state the
specific amounts to be paid x x x the amounts
nevertheless are made certain by the legislative
parameters provided in the decrees x x x The
mandate is to pay only the principal, interest,
taxes and other normal banking charges x x x
when they shall become due. No uncertainty
arises in executive implementation as the limit
will be the exact amounts as shown by the books
in the Treasury.
e) Constitutional limitations on special
appropriation measures:
i) Must specify the public purpose for
which the sum is
intended
.
ii) Must be supported by funds actually
available as certified to by the National
Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding
revenue proposal included therein [Sec. 25(4),
Art. VI].
f) Constitutional mles on general appropriations
law [Sec. 25, Art. VI]:
i) Congress may not increase the
appropriations recommended by the President
for the operation of the Government as specified
in the budget.
ii) The form, content, and manner of
preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by
law.
iii) No provision or enactment shall be
embraced unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein. Any such
provision or enactment shall be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
This is intended to prevent riders, or irrelevant
provisions included in the bill to ensure its
approval. See Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 520.
iv) Procedure for approving appropriations
for Congress shallstnctly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments
and agencies. This is intended to prevent sub
rosa appropriation by Congress.
v) Prohibition against transfer of
appropriations. [Sec. 25 (5)-Wo law shall be
passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations- however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriation law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective
appropriations. ] See Demetria v. Alba, 148
SCRA 209, on the unconstitutionality of certain
provisions of P.D. 1177.
v.a.) On the constitutionality of a Special
Provision in the 1994 GAA which allows a
member of Congress to realign his allocation for
operation expenses to any other expense
category, the Supreme Court, in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra., said
that the members of Congress only determine
the necessity of the realignment of savings in the

allotments for their operational expenses,
because they are in the best position to do so,
being knowledgeable of the savings available in
some items of the operational expenses, and
which items need augmentation However it is the
Senate President or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
approve the realignment. Hence, the special
provision adverted to is not unconstitutional.
v.b.) ln the same case, the Supreme Court
upheld the Presidential veto of a provision (in the
appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity
Fund, 1994 GAA) which authorized the Chief of
Staff to use savings to augment the pension
fund, on the ground that under Sec. 25 (5), Art VI
such right must and can be exercised only by the
President of the Philippines
vi) Prohibition against appropriations for
sectarian benefit [Sec 29(2), Art. VI: No public
money or property shall be appropriated, applied
paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion or of any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher, or dignitary, as such
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to
any penal institution, or government orphanaqe
or leprosarium]. See Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 SCRA
201; Garces v Estenzo 104 SCRA 510. In
Manosca v. Court of Appeals, supra., the
expropriation of the birthplace of Felix Manalo,
founder of Iglesia ni Cristo, was deemed not
violative of the provision. The Supreme Court
said that the attempt to give some religious
perspective to the case deserves little
consideration, for what should be significant is
the principal objective of, not the casual
consequences that might follow from, the
exercise of the power. The practical reality that
greater benefit may be derived by members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could
well be true, but such peculiar advantage still
remains to be merely incidental and secondary in
nature.
vii) Automatic reappropriation [Sec. 25 (7),
Art. VI: If, by the end of any fiscal year, the
Congress shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the
general appropriations law for the preceding
fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall
remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress]..
g) Impoundment. The refusal by the President for
whatever reason to spend funds made available
by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate
budget authority of any type [Philconsa v.
Enriquez, supra.]. This power of the President is
derived from Sec. 38 of the Administrative Code
of 1987 on suspension.
h) Appropriation reserves. Sec. 37 of the
Administrative Code authorizes the Budget
Secretary to establish reserves against
appropriations to provide for contingencies and
emergencies which may arise during the year.
This is merely expenditure deferral, not
suspension, since the agencies concerned can
still draw on the reserves if the fiscal outlook
improves.
1. Appropriation defined
43
2. Limitations of Congressional power of
appropriation
a. Implied: public purpose; sum must be
determinate or at least determinable
b. Express
i. Originates in House of
Representatives (Sec. 24, Art. VI)
CASES:
Tolentino vs. Secretary, supra
Abakada Guro vs. Ermita, GR No.
168056, Sept 1, 2005 (decision);
Oct 18, 2005 (resolution of MR)
Facts:
Motions for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List
Officer and et al.,insist that the bicameral
conference committee should not even
have acted on the no pass-on provisions
since there is no disagreement between
House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one
hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the
other, with regard to the no pass-on
provision for the sale of service for power
generation because both the Senate and
the House were in agreement that the VAT
burden for the sale of such service shall
not be passed on to the end-consumer. As
to the no pass-on provision for sale of
petroleum products, petitioners argue that
the fact that the presence of such a no
pass-on provision in the House version
and the absence thereof in the Senate Bill
means there is no conflict because a
House provision cannot be in conflict with
something that does not exist.Escudero,
et. al., also contend that Republic Act No.
9337 grossly violates the constitutional
imperative on exclusive origination of
revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI
of the Constitution when the Senate
introduced amendments not connected
with VAT. Petitioners Escudero, et al., also
reiterate that R.A. No. 9337s stand- by
authority to the Executive to increase the
VAT rate, especially on account of the
recommendatory power granted to the
Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue
delegation of legislative power. They
submit that the recommendatory power
given to the Secretary of Finance in regard
to the occurrence of either of two events
using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
as a benchmark necessarily and inherently
required extended analysis and evaluation,
as well as policy making. Petitioners also
reiterate their argument that the input tax is
a property or a property right. Petitioners
also contend that even if the right to credit
the input VAT is merely a statutory
privilege, it has already evolved into a
vested right that the State cannot remove.
Issue:
Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the
Vat Reform Act is constitutional?
Held:
Yes. The R.A No. 9337 is constitutional.
The Court is not persuaded. Article VI,
Section 24 of the Constitution provides that
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.
The Court reiterates that in making his
recommendation to the President on the
existence of either of the two conditions,
the Secretary of Finance is not acting as
the alter ego of the President or even her
subordinate. He is acting as the agent of
the legislative department, to determine

and declare the event upon which its
expressed will is to take effect. The
Secretary of Finance becomes the means
or tool by which legislative policy is
determined and implemented, considering
that he possesses all the facilities to gather
data and information and has a much
broader perspective to properly evaluate
them. His function is to gather and collate
statistical data and other pertinent
information and verify if any of the two
conditions laid out by Congress is present.
In the same breath, the Court reiterates its
finding that it is not a property or a property
right, and a VAT-registered persons
entitlement to the creditable input tax is a
mere statutory privilege. As the Court
stated in its Decision, the right to credit the
input tax is a mere creation of law. More
importantly, the assailed provisions of R.A.
No. 9337 already involve legislative policy
and wisdom. So long as there is a public
end for which R.A. No. 9337 was passed,
the means through which such end shall
be accomplished is for the legislature to
choose so long as it is within constitutional
bounds.
The Motions for Reconsideration are
hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY. The
temporary restraining order issued by the
Court is LIFTED
Therefore, the R.A No. 9337 is
Constitutional.
ii. Recommendations of the president
in the General Appropriations Act:
mat not be increased by Congress
[Sec. 25 (1)], but may be
decreased, EXCEPT the budget for
judiciary (Sec. 3, Art. VIII)
iii. Prohibition on riders [Sec. 25(2)]
CASE:
Garcia vs. Mata, 65 SCRA 520
Facts:
The donation of the property to the
government to make the property public
does not cure the constitutional defect. The
fact that the law was passed when the said
property was still a private property cannot
be ignored. In accordance with the rule
that the taxing power must be exercised for
public purposes only, money raised by
taxation can be expanded only for public
purposes and not for the advantage of
private individuals. Inasmuch as the land
on which the projected feeder roads were
to be constructed belonged then to
Zulueta, the result is that said
appropriation sought a private purpose,
and, hence, was null and void.
Issue:
Whether RA 1600 is valid. Does it contain
rider in an appropriation bill?
Held:
The incongruity and irrelevancy are
already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600
fails to disclose the relevance to any
appropriation item. RA 1600 is an
appropriation law for the operation of
government while Section 11 refers to a
fundamental governmental policy of calling
to active duty and the reversion of inactive
statute of reserve officers in the AFP.
Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION
ITEM INSERTED IN AN
APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation
of the constitutional prohibition against
RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It
was indeed a new and completely
unrelated provision attached to the GAA.
It also violates the rule on one-bill, one
subject. The subject to be considered must
be expressed in the title of the act. When
44
an act contains provisions which are
clearly not embraced in the subject of the
act, as expressed in the title, such
provisions are void, inoperative and
without effect.
SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia
cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.
iv. Approval of appropriations for
Congress: follow procedure for
other departments [Sec. 25 (3), Art.
VI]
v. Specify purpose of special
appropriations [Sec 25 (4), ART. VI]
vi. No transfer of appropriations;
Exception [Sec. 25 (5), Art. VI]
vii. Public purpose of discretionary
funds [Sec. 25 (6), Art. VI]
3. Appropriations for sectarian purposes [Sec.
29 (2), Art. VI]
a. Read also Sec. 5, Art. III (on freedom of
religion); and Sec. 6, Art. II (on
separation of church and state)
CASES:
Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil 20
*If Sectarian individual is administering
for the government then it does not
violate Sec 29 (2).
Garces vs. Estenzo, 105 SCRA 510
4. Automatic re-appropriation [Sec. 25 (7),
ART. VI]
5. Special funds [Sec. 29 (3), Art. VI]
D. Power of Taxation [Sec. 28 (1), (3), and (4), Art.
VI]
a) Limitations:
i) Rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. Congress shall evolve a progressive
system of taxation.
ii) Charitable institutions, etc., and all
lands, building and improvements actually,
directly and exclusively used for religious,
charitable or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation [Sec. 28(3), Art. VI]. See
Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 14
SCRA 292; Province of Abra v. Hernando, 107
SCRA 104.
iii) All revenues and assets of non-stock,
non-profit educational institutions used actually,
directly and exclusively for educational purposes
shall be exempt from taxes and duties [Sec. 4(3),
Art. XIV]. See Abra Valley College v. Aquino,
162 SCRA 106.
iv) Law granting tax exemption shall be
passed only with the concurrence of the majority
of all the members of Congress [Sec. 29(4), Art.
VI].
1. General rule in taxation [Sec. 28 (1)]
SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall
be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
2. Exemptions granted to religious, charitable,
and educational institutions [Sec. 28 (3)]
SECTION 28 (3) Charitable institutions,
churches and parsonages or convents
 45

appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit if the gift or donation is in the form of subsidies
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and granted by the government.
improvements, actually, directly, and 2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its
educational purposes shall be exempt from real properties as well as the building constructed
taxation. thereon.
The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI
of the Constitution of the property taxes only. This
CASES:
provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA
7160.which provides that in order to be entitled to the
Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal exemption, the lung center must be able to prove
Revenue, 14 SCRA 292 that: it is a charitable institution and; its real
properties are actually, directly and exclusively used
Facts: for charitable purpose. Accordingly, the portions
In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated occupied by the hospital used for its patients are
P10,000 in cash to the parish priest of Victorias, exempt from real property taxes while those leased
Negros Occidental; the amount spent for the to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.
construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality,
as intended. In1958, MB Estate filed the donors gift 3. Legislative grant of tax exemptions: needs
tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued an concurrence of (absolute) majority of
assessment for donees gift tax against the parish. Congress [Sec. 28 (4)]
The priest lodged a protest to the assessment and
requested the withdrawal thereof.
E. Power of Concurrence
Issue: 1. To a grant of amnesty by the President (Sec.
Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt. 19, Art. VII)
2. To a treaty or international agreement entered
Held:
into by the President (Sec. 21, Art. VII)
The phrase exempt from taxation should not be
interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of
taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of F. The War Powers [Sec. 23 (1), Art. VI]
taxes assessed on such properties as property taxes
as contradistinguished from excise taxes. A donees
gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax
imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift
inter vivos. It does not rest upon general ownership,
but an excise upon the use made of the properties,
upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the
properties. The imposition of such excise tax on
property used for religious purpose do not constitute
an impairment of the Constitution.
The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not
extend to excise taxes.

Notes:
In relation to real property taxes

Lung Center vs. Quezon City, GR No.

144104, June 29, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established
by virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks exemption from real
property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax
Declarations for the land and the hospital building.
Petitioner predicted on its claim that it is a charitable
institution. The request was denied, and a petition
hereafter filed before the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for reversal of
the resolution of the City Assessor. Petitioner alleged
that as a charitable institution, is exempted from real
property taxes under Sec 28(3) Art VI of the
Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the petition and
the decision was likewise affirmed on appeal by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon
City. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
the CBAA.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution
within the context of PD 1823 and the 1973 and 1987
Constitution and Section 234(b) of RA 7160.

2. Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real

property taxes.

RULING:
1. Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a
charitable institution within the context of the 1973
and 1987 Constitution. Under PD 1823, the petitioner
is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which,
subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be
administered by the Office of the President with the
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human
Settlements. The purpose for which it was created
was to render medical services to the public in
general including those who are poor and also the
rich, and become a subject of charity. Under PD
1823, petitioner is entitled to receive donations, even