ARTICLE 2 ENGLISH RULE vs.
FRENCH RULE THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee
ISSUE:
Whether not the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over
crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant
vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters.
FACTS:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer
presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case
and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked
opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality
while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles
from the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower
court, which so held and dismissed the case.
RULLING: YES
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in
accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in
connection with International Law; to wit, the French rule, according
to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should
not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose
territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission
affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule,
based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States,
according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances
are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they
were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in
this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence
prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the
Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
Mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held
by this court not triable by or court. Its mere possession in such a
ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the
said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding.
Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the
public order. But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even
though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the
public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce
its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the
purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute.
vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over
crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant
vessels in transit.
FACTS:
The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, stated that he "carried, kept, possessed and had in
his possession and control, 96 kilogrammes of opium," and that "he
had been surprised in the act of selling 1,000 pesos worth prepared
opium."
The defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds, the
second of which was the more than one crime was charged in the
complaint. The demurrer was sustained, as the court found that the
complaint contained two charges, one, for the unlawful possession
of opium, and the other, for the unlawful sale of opium, and,
consequence of that ruling, it ordered that the fiscal should separate
one charge from the other and file a complaint for each violation;
this, the fiscal did, and this cause concerns only the unlawful
possession of opium.
Between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on the present month (stated as
August 19, 1909), several persons, among them Messrs. Jacks and
Milliron, chief of the department of the port of Cebu and internal-
revenue agent of Cebu, went abroad the steamship Erroll to inspect
and search its cargo, and found, first in a cabin near the saloon, one
sack (Exhibit A) and in the hold, another sack (Exhibit B). Exhibit A
contained 49 cans of opium, and Exhibit B, the larger sack, contained
several cans of the same substance. The hold was under the
defendant's control, who moreover, freely and of his own will and
accord admitted that this sack, as well as the other referred to in
Exhibit B and found in the cabin, belonged to him.
Defendant stated, freely and voluntarily, that he had bought these
sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as
contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had already
been searched several times for opium, he ordered two other
Chinamen to keep the sack. The two sacks of opium properly
constitute the corpus delicti. Moreover, another lot of four cans of
opium, Exhibit C, was the subject matter of investigation at the trial.
The chief of the department of the port of Cebu testified that they
were found in the part of the ship where the firemen habitually sleep
and that they were delivered to the first officer of the ship to be
returned to the said firemen after the vessel should have left the
Philippines, because the firemen and crew of foreign vessels,
pursuant to the instructions he had from the Manila custom-house,
were permitted to retain certain amounts of opium, always provided
it should not be taken shore.
Another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is also corpus delicti . The
internal-revenue agent testified it is can opium which was bought
from the defendant by a secret-service agent and taken to the office
of the governor to prove that the accused had opium in his
possession to sell.
On motion by the defense, the court ruled that this answer might be
stricken out "because it refers to a sale., the chief of the department
of customs had already given this testimony, The internal-revenue
agent came to my office and said that a party brought him a sample
of opium and that the same party knew that there was more opium
on board the steamer, and the agent asked that the vessel be
searched.
The defense moved that this testimony be rejected, its being hearsay
evidence, the part thereof "that there was more opium, on board the
vessel" be stricken out.
According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent, the
defendant stated to him, , that the opium seized in the vessel had
been bought by him in Hongkong, at three pesos for each round can
and five pesos for each one of the others, for the purpose of selling
it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz; that on the
15th the vessel arrived at Cebu, and on the same day he sold opium;
that he had tried to sell opium for P16 a can; that he had a contract
to sell an amount of the value of about P500; that the opium found
in the room of the other two Chinamen prosecuted in another cause,
was his, and that he had left it in their stateroom to avoid its being
found in his room, which had already been searched many times; and
that, according to the defendant, the contents of the large sack was
80 cans of opium, and of the small one, 49, and the total number,
129.
The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that
the court had no jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned
therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal, at the conclusion of his
argument, asked that the maximum penalty of the law be imposed
upon the defendant, in view of the considerable amount of opium
seized. The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as
the crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of
Cebu.
The defendant appealed to this court.
RULLING: YES
The court sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment, to
pay a fine of P10,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, though not to exceed one third of the principal
penalty, and to the payment of the costs
Although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does
not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this
country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension
of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article,
whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present
case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil,
thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with
respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the
place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in
that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an
agreement under an international treaty.
That, even admitting that the quantity of the drug seized, the subject
matter of the present case, was considerable, it does not appear that,
on such account, the two penalties fixed by the law on the subject,
should be imposed in the maximum degree.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH SING, defendant-appellant.
Antonio Sanz for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over
crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant
vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 4 of Act No.
2381 (the Opium Law), and sentencing him to two years
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the
steamship Shun Chang. The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer which
arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct
from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of opium
in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and
had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When
the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the
authorities on making a search found the eight cans of opium above
mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's
engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of this
opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess,
however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that
it was his intention to import the prohibited drug into the Philippine
Islands. No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the
intention of the accused was to import illegally this opium into the
Philippine Islands, was introduced.
RULLING: YES
The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt as charged and the sentence of the trial court being
within the limits provided by law, it results that the judgment must
be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
In the case of United States vs. Look Chaw
Although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does
not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this
country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension
of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article,
whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present
case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil,
thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with
respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the
place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in
the said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an
agreement under an international treaty
The difference between the Look Chaw case and the case at bar was
the present case the charge as illegal importation of opium, the
foreign vessel was not in transit and there is no question but what
the opium came from Saigon to Cebu.
The importation was complete, to say the least, when the ship
carrying it anchored in Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the opium
discharged or that it be taken from the ship. It was sufficient that the
opium was brought into the waters of the Philippine Islands on a boat
destined for a Philippine port and which subsequently anchored in a
port of the Philippine Islands with intent to discharge its cargo.
It is to be noted that section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person
who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the
Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The
Federal Courts of the United States have held that the mere act of
going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of
importation. Importation is merely the bringing them into port; and
the importation is complete before entry of the Custom House.
As applied to the Opium Law, Any person unlawfully imports or
brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the
prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel
which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the
jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands.
Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurd to think that the
accused was merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon
and Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be
impossible to conceive that the accused needed so large an amount
of opium for his personal use. No better explanation being possible,
the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium to be
brought into the Philippine Islands.
ARTICLE 3 FELONIES / MALA IN SE vs MALA PROHIBITA
ALEXANDER PADILLA, complainant,
vs.
THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City Branch 113, respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross
incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in rendering the
decision in question.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed by the
then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, against
respondent Baltazar R. Dizon, RTC Judge, for rendering a manifestly
erroneous decision due, at the very least, to gross incompetence and
gross ignorance of the law
Required by the Court to answer the complaint, the respondent
judge filed an Answer, dated October 6, 1987, reciting his
"commendable record as a fearless prosecutor. He was reappointed
to his present position; that his length of service as prosecutor and
judge is "tangible proof that would negate the allegations of the
petitioner", the latter did not last long in the service for reasons only
known to him; that the decision involved in the complaint was
promulgated by respondent on September 29, 1986, but the
complaint against him was filed only on August 6, 1987, a clear
indication of malice and ill-will of the complainant to subject
respondent to harassment, humiliation and vindictiveness; that his
decision is based on "fundamental principles and the foundation of
rights and justice" and that if there are mistakes or errors in the
questioned decision, they are committed in good faith. Respondent
prays for the dismissal of the petition.
The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of acquittal
involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught by a Customs guard at
the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign
currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country. Lo Chi
Fai, was apprehended by a customs guard and two PAFSECOM
officers while on board Flight PR 300 of the Philippine Air Lines bound
for Hongkong. He was found carrying with him foreign currency and
foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces) amounting to US$
355,349.57, in various currency denominations, to wit: Japanese Yen,
Swiss Franc, Australian Dollar, Singapore Dollar, HFL Guilder, French
Franc, U.S. Dollar, English Pound, Malaysian Dollar, Deutsche Mark,
Canadian Dollar and Hongkong Dollar, without any authority. At the
time the accused was apprehended, he was able to exhibit two
currency declarations which he was supposed to have accomplished
upon his arrival in Manila in previous trips, namely, CB Currency
Declaration No. 05048, dated May 4, 1986 for US$39,600.00 and
Japanese Yen 4,000,000.00, and CB Currency Declaration No. 06346,
dated June 29, 1986 for Japanese Yen 6,600,000.00.
Was filed against Lo Chi Fai, with the RTC of Pasay City for violation
of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960, Mr. LO CHI FAI, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to take out of the
Philippines through the Manila International Airport the following
foreign currencies in cash and in checks without authority from
Central bank, contrary to law.
The case was raffled to Branch 113, presided by herein respondent
Judge Baltazar A. Dizon.
At the trial, the accused tried to establish that he was a businessman
from Kowloon, Hongkong, engaged in the garment business, in which
he had invested 4 to 5 million Hongkong Dollars; that he had come to
the Philippines 9 to 1 0 times, although the only dates he could
remember were April 2, 1986, May 4, 1986, June 28,1986, and July
8, 1986; that the reason for his coming to the Philippines was to
invest in business in the Philippines and also to play in the casino; that
he had a group of business associates who decided to invest in
business with him, namely: Wakita Noboyuki, Kobayashi Nabuo, Lee
Shiang Pin, Lee Chin and Cze Kai Kwan, who had their own businesses
in Japan and Hongkong; that when he came to the Philippines on April
2,1986, he brought US$50,000.00 and 8,500,000.00 Japanese Yen
which he tried to declare but the Central Bank representative refused
to accept his declaration, until he could get a confirmation as to the
source of the money, for which reason he contacted his bank in
Hongkong and a telex was sent to him on April 3,1986. He also
brought in with him US$39,000.00 and 4,000,000.00 Japanese Yen
when he arrived on May 4,1986 which he declared . Again, he
declared 8,600,000.00 Japanese Yen when he arrived on June 28,
1986. He also testified that his business associates, started putting
their money for this purpose in a common fund, hence, every time
anyone of them came to the Philippines, they would declare the
money they were bringing in, and all declarations were handed to
and kept by him; these currency declarations were presented at the
trial as exhibits for the defense.
When asked by the court why he did not present all of these
declarations when he was apprehended at the airport, his answer
was that he was not asked to present the declaration papers of his
associates, and besides, he does not understand English and he was
not told to do so. The reason he was going back to Hongkong bringing
with him all the money intended to be invested in the Philippines was
because of the fear of his group that the "revolution" taking place in
Manila might become widespread.
The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused stating;
This Court is persuaded to accept the explanation of the defense that
the currencies confiscated and/or seized from the accused belong to
him and his business associates above named. All of currencies in
question came from abroad and not from the local source which is
what is being prohibited by the government.
The currency declarations, therefore, is already (sic) intended to
serve as a guideline for the Customs authorities to determine the
amounts actually brought in by them to correspond to the amounts
that could be allowed to be taken out.
RULLING: YES
The court hereby ordered that the Respondent Judge be DISMISSED
from the service. All leave and retirement benefits and privileges to
which he may be entitled are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his
being reinstated in any branch of government service, including
government-owned and/or controlled agencies or corporations.
The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross
ignorance of the law in holding that to convict the accused for
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must
establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.
The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate
intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special laws,
which are mala prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the
respondent has by his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot
free. The accused at the time of his apprehension at the Manila
International Airport had in his possession the amount of
US$355,349.57 in assorted foreign currencies and foreign exchange
instruments (380 pieces), without any specific authority from the
Central Bank as required by law. At the time of his apprehension, he
was able to exhibit only two foreign currency declarations in his
possession. These were old declarations made by him on the
occasion of his previous trips to the Philippines.
Although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense in a case
for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the respondent
nonetheless chose to exonerate the accused based on his defense.
Such fantastic tale, although totally irrelevant to the matter of the
criminal liability of the accused under the information, was
swallowed by the respondent-judge "hook, line and sinker." It did not
matter to the respondent that the foreign currency and foreign
currency instruments found in the possession of the accused when
he was apprehended at the airport-380 pieces in all-and the amounts
of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency
declarations presented by the accused at the trial. It did not matter
to the respondent that the accused by his own story admitted, in
effect, that he was a carrier" of foreign currency for other people.
The respondent closed his eyes to the fact that the very substantial
amounts of foreign exchange found in the possession of the accused
at the time of his apprehension consisted of personal checks of other
people, as well as cash in various currency denominations (12 kinds
of currency in all), which clearly belied the claim of the accused that
they were part of the funds which he and his supposed associates
had brought in and kept in the Philippines for the purpose of
investing in some business ventures. The respondent ignored the fact
that most of the CB Currency declarations presented by the defense
at the trial were declarations belonging to other people which could
not be utilized by the accused to justify his having the foreign
exchange in his possession.
In invoking the provisions of CB Circular No. 960 to justify the release
of US$ 3,000.00 to the accused, the respondent judge again
displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. There
is nothing in the said CB Circular which could be taken as authority
for the trial court to release the said amount of U.S. Currency to the
accused. CB Circular No. 960 merely provides that for the purpose of
establishing the amount of foreign currency brought in or out of the
Philippines, a tourist upon arrival is required to declare any foreign
exchange he is bringing in at the time of his arrival, if the same
exceeds the amount of US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies. There is nothing in said circular that would justify
returning to him the amount of at least US$3,000.00, if he is caught
attempting to bring out foreign exchange in excess of said amount
without specific authority from the Central Bank.
ARTICLE 3 - MISTAKE OF FACT (IGNORANTIA FACTI EXCUSAT)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibaez and Assistant Attorney Torres for
appellee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta is
guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence
FACTS:
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod,
Constabulary Provincial at Cabanatuan, received from Major Guido a
telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped
convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get
him dead or alive. Monsod called for his first sergeant and asked that
he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and
privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon
order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial
Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted
telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas.
They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to
follow the instruction contained in the telegram.Same was given to
the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial
Inspector. When asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he
answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. . The
Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with
defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the
route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly
living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached
one Brigida Mallare and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida
indicated the place also said that Irene was sleeping with her
paramour. Brigida trembling, returned to her own room which was
very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants
Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a
man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were,
simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45
caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her
paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots
came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. It turned out later
that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal
Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio
Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the
killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the
deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We
two, sir. Multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber
revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.
According to Appellant Galanta, Oanis asked Brigida where Irene's
room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to
the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was
sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated
and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are
Balagtas, stand up." Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned
towards the door, and Oanis shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta
then fired at Tecson. Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while
the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was
awakened by a noise. He testified that he fired at Tecson, the
supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis
assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on
bed.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the
curtain covering the door and after having said, "if you are Balagtas
stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas,
while the latter was still lying on bed until he had exhausted his
bullets: thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing
the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and
picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
According to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was
shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed
by both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations.
According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in
bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis
assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in
bed.
RULING: YES
Appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating
circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision correctional to
fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the
law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and
severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake
of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488.
The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the
mistake is committed without fault or carelessness
In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed
was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out
twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the
intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again,
"If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he
was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and
believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife
and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his
room-mate.
In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances
cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them
to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep,
appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity
without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless
arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the
victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the
only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the
victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas
at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if
resistance or aggression is offered by him.
An officer he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in
treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous
means when the arrest could be effected otherwise. ). The doctrine
is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or
unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person
arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary
for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer
cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary
force or violence in making an arrest It may be true that Anselmo
Balagtas was a notorious criminal, but these facts alone constitute no
justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no
resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is
asleep.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence,
the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it
being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
Once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence
(People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and
where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of
the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is
murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. Article 11, No.
5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a
person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two
requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying
one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance
of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the
instance case, only the first requisite is present appellants have
acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting
for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence
of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas
or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are
overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their
desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of
such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas
without any resistance from him and without making any previous
inquiry as to his identity.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not one can be held criminally responsible who, by
reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would
be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed
them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the
time when he committed the act.
FACTS:
Defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters,
No. 27 and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was
employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27"
No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly
occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of
which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the
building, by which communication was had with the other part of the
house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its
entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished
with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of
security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door,
and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means
of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there
was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the
porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other
openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant
was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the
room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard
no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was
being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the
room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch,
the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder
was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter
the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above
the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the
door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the
blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open,
whom he supposed to be a burglar. Seizing a common kitchen knife
which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the
intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a
desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who
immediately recognized him in the moonlight.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to
the date of the incident just described, one of which took place in a
house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as
defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he
kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who
appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal
incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night,
he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his
identity.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his
roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual
was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping
room, despite defendant's warnings.
RULING: NO
We hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability,
provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not
due to negligence or bad faith.
Ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is
sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a
necessary ingredient of the offense charged "cancels the
presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases
where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal
provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under
the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily
committing a crime or misdemeanor incurs criminal liability for any
wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that
which he intended to commit
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime,
any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have
proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the
actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or
negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of
the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to
him." That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good
faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the
time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the
surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on
his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or otherwise, upon which he
acted.
With reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite
harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently
sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions
apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is
justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault
or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself
correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law
will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was
really no occassion for the extreme measures
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar
convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow
alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who
forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose
assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property
and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the
defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or
criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than
exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been
as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from
criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to
have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness
in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by
him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the property under his
charge.
ARTICLE 4 A. PROXIMATE CAUSE
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI, defendant-appellant.
Angel Roco for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Feria for appellee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was only guilty of the offense of inflicting
serious physical injuries, or at most of frustrated homicide.
FACTS:
At about noon, on November 29, 1919, while the interisland
steamer Vigan was anchored in the Pasig River a short distance from
the lighthouse and not far from where the river debouches into the
Manila Bay, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor. The crew
of this boat consisted of the accused, Calixto Valdez y Quiri, and six
others among whom was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel. The
accused was in charge of the men and stood at the stern of the boat,
acting as helmsman, while Venancio Gargantel was at the bow.
The work raising the anchor seems to have proceeded too slowly to
satisfy the accused, began to abuse the men with offensive epithets.
Venancio Gargantel remonstrated, saying that it would be better, and
they would work better, if he would not insult them. The accused
took this remonstrance as a display of insubordination; moved
towards Venancio, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him.
Veneracio, evidently believing himself in great and immediate peril,
threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to
be seen no more.
The failure of Venancio Gargantel to rise to the surface conclusively
shows that, owing to his possible inability to swim or the strength of
the current, he was borne down into the water and was drowned.
Two witnesses who were on the boat state that, immediately after
Venancio leaped into the water, the accused told the remaining
members of the crew to keep quiet or he would kill them.
Venancio has not returned to his lodging in Manila, where he lived as
a bachelor in the house of an acquaintance; and his personal
belongings have been delivered to a representative of his mother
who lives in the Province of Iloilo. His friends and relatives, it is
needless to say, take it for granted that he is dead.
RULING:
The accused be considered the responsible author of the death of
Venancio Gargantel, and he was properly convicted of the offense of
homicide.
The circumstances narrated are such in our opinion as to exclude all
reasonable possibility that Venancio Gargantel may have survived;
and we think that the trial judge did not err in holding that he is dead
and that he came to his death by drowning under the circumstances
stated.
As was once said by a British court, "If a man creates in another man's
mind an immediate sense of dander which causes such person to try
to escape, and in so doing he injuries himself, the person who creates
such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result."
The Supreme Court, disallowing the appeal, enunciated the following
doctrine: "That even though the death of the injured person should
not be considered as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very
grave wound which almost completely severed his axillary artery,
occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the
circumstances in which that person was placed, nevertheless as the
persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his
adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act
which the accused forcibly compelled the injured person to do after
having inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him and as the
aggressor by said attack manifested a determined resolution to cause
the death of the deceased, by depriving him of all possible help and
putting him in the very serious situation narrated in the decision
appealed from, the trial court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as
consummated homicide, did not commit any error of law, as the
death of the injured person was due to the act of the accused." (II
Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, p. 183.)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. PURIFICACION ALMONTE, defendant- appellant.
Teodosio R. Dio for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused shall be held responsible for the death
of the offended party as the direct and immediate consequence of
the wound inflicted by her.
FACTS:
Week before the crime, the accused lived maritally with the
Chinaman Felix Te Sue who was a married man. One Miguela Dawal,
with whom he had also lived maritally, threatened to bring suit
against him unless he rejoined her, the Chinaman and the accused
voluntarily agreed to separate. From that time on Te Sue lived in the
barrio of Guinlajon, municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon,
together with the said Miguela Dawal. The accused visited her former
paramour and on entering the house, found him with Miguela. When
Te Sue saw her, he approached and told her to go away at once
because her new paramour might get jealous and do her harm. The
accused insisted upon remaining, and on being pushed by Te Sue and
Miguela, feeling that she was being unjustly treated, took hold of a
small penknife she carried and stabbed the man in the abdomen.
Horrified, she fled to the street, leaving the blade sticking in her
victim's abdomen, and, taking the first bus that chanced to pass,
finally went home. The injured man was at once taken to the
provincial hospital where he was given first aid treatment. It was not
serious, according to the doctor, and might be healed in a week; but
on the sixth day the patient succumbed to complications which we
shall treat of later on. The relatives of the deceased paid a little over
P200 for the hospital treatment and the expenses of his last illness.
After the operation Doctor Ortega admonished him to keep quiet
because any movement he might make would change his
pathological state for the worse and bring about dangerous
complication; that in spite of this admonition the deceased moved
about, sitting up in bed, getting up and pacing about the room; that
because of this, the internal vessels, already congested because of
the wound, bled, and the hemorrhage thus produced caused his
death.
RULINGS: YES
The judgment appealed from is modified and the appellant is
sentenced to eight years and one day of prision mayor, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P500, to suffer the
accessory penalties of article 61 of the Penal Code, and to pay the
costs of both instances.
The defense alleged that the trial court erred in holding the accused
responsible for the death of the offended party as the direct and
immediate consequence of the wound inflicted by the accused.
We cannot agree, in view of the evidence, that the real cause of said
death was not the wound inflicted upon the victim. Carefully
analyzing Doctor Ortega's testimony, we reach the inevitable
conclusion that the internal veins were congested from the beginning
because of the force of the blow which produced the wound, for that
is what the doctor means when he says that "the wound was caused
by a certain blow, because the penknife was not very sharp, the force
of the blow which introduced the knife into the flesh produced a
secondary congestion of the internal organ so that an unnecessary
movement on the patient's part would cause congestion of the veins,
or would make them more congested, causing them to bleed"; and
that what really impelled the patient to violate the doctor's orders,
by sitting up in bed and pacing about the room, was not, as the
defense insinuates, a desire to aggravate the criminal liability of the
accused, but simply his nervous condition, which was noted from the
moment he entered the provincial hospital. It was not the warmth of
the bed or his not being used to it that made the patient act as he
did, but the pathological state created by the illness brought on by
the wound from which he was suffering. We are convinced that
under normal conditions, if the patient had not been ill, he would not
have violated the doctor's orders, knowing, as he did, that the
slightest movement might occasion a complication or internal
hemorrhage capable of causing death.
In United States vs. Montes (6 Phil., 443), we also held that "Where a
person voluntarily and with intent of injuring another commits an act
which is notoriously unlawful, he shall be held responsible for the
consequences of his criminal action, even though when such
wrongful act constitutes the crime of homicide it appears that he had
no intention of killing the deceased."
The same doctrine was laid down in United States vs. Monasterial (14
Phil., 391). Here it was held among other things, "persons who are
responsible for an act constituting a crime are also liable for all the
consequences arising therefrom and inherent therein, other than
those due to incidents entirely foreign to the act executed, or which
originate through the fault or carelessness of the injured person,
which are exceptions to the rule not arising in the present case.
The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of not
having intended to commit so serious a crime as that committed, and
of having acted with passion and obfuscation. The first is shown by
the fact that she made use of a small penknife, and the second, by
the fact that before the attack she had been pushed out of the room
where the victim was, and that she considered such treatment as an
offense or abuse. The penalty must therefore be reduced one degree
or to prision mayor.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y
ROVERO, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor
Dominador L. Quiroz for plaintiff-appellee.
Santiago F. Alidio as counsel de oficio for defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives of
Barrio Nenita. They are illiterate farmers tilling their own lands. They
were forty-eight years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour older than
Jose. Being twins, they look alike very much. However, Antonio has a
distinguishing cut in his ear.
Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a
laundrywoman since September, 1964. Jose's three children one girl
and two boys, had stayed in Manila also since 1964.
Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora
telling him that she would give him money. To have money for his
expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for
sixty pesos. Jose decided to go with Antonio in order to see his
children. He was able to raise eighty-five pesos for his expenses. The
twins left Barrio Nenita and took a bus to Allen. It was their first trip
to the big city.
Leonora gave her father fifty pesos. Sencio Rubis Antonio's grandson,
gave him thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right
pocket of his pants.
Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The twins
returned to the agency where they ate their lunch at Juan's expense.
Juan took the twins to the Tutuban railroad station that same day,
January 8th, for their homeward trip.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol express train
at about five o'clock in the afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that
evening.
The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear of
the dining car. Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed,
Antonio stood up and with a pair of scissors stabbed the man sitting
directly in front of him. The victim stood up but soon collapsed on his
seat. For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife the sleeping old woman
who was seated opposite him. She was not able to get up anymore.
Amanda Mapa, with her baby, attempted to leave her seat, but
before she could escape Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her right
hand with which she was supporting her child. Fortunately, the child
was not injured. Most of the passengers scurried away for safety but
the twins, who had run amuck, stabbed everyone whom they
encountered inside the coach.
Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary Sergeant
Vicente Z. Rayel, a train escort who, on that occasion, was not on
duty. He was taking his wife and children to Calauag, Quezon. He was
going to the dining car to drink coffee when someone informed him
that there was a stabbing inside the coach where he had come from.
He immediately proceeded to return to coach No. 9. Upon reaching
coach 8, he saw a dead man sprawled on the floor near the toilet. At
a distance he saw a man on the platform separating coaches Nos. 8
and 9, holding a knife between the thumb and index finger of his right
hand, with its blade pointed outward. He shouted to the man that he
(Rayel) was a Constabularyman and a person in authority and Rayel
ordered him to lay down his knife upon the count of three, or he
would be shot.
The man changed his hold on the knife by clutching it between his
palm and little finger (with the blade pointed inward) and, in a
suicidal impulse, stabbed himself on his left breast. He slowly sank to
the floor and was prostrate thereon. Near the platform where he had
fallen, Rayel saw another man holding a pair of scissors. He retreated
to the steps near the platform when he saw Rayel armed with a pistol.
Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her was
stabbed to death.
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. He was in
the dining car when he received the information that there were
killings in the third coach. He immediately went there and, while at
the rear of the coach, he met Mrs. Mapa who was wounded. He saw
Antonio stabbing with his scissors two women and a small girl and a
woman who was later identified as Teresita B. Escanan. Antonio was
not wounded. Those victims were prostrate on the seats of the coach
and on the aisle.
Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a thrust
at him with the scissors. When Antonio was about to stab another
person, Aldea stood on a seat and repeatedly struck Antonio on the
head with the butt of his pistol, knocking him down. Aldea then
jumped and stepped on Antonio's buttocks and wrested the scissors
away from him. Antonio offered resistance despite the blows
administered to him.
When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four Constabulary
soldiers escorted the twins from the train and turned them over to
the custody of the Calamba police.
Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was
stabbed by a person "from the station" who wanted to get his money.
He retaliated by stabbing his assailant. He said that he stabbed
somebody "who might have died and others that might not". He
clarified that in the train four persons were asking money from him.
He stabbed one of them. "It was a hold-up".
He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob him,
he stabbed other persons because, inasmuch as he "was already
bound to die", he wanted "to kill everybody
Jose Toling, he was wounded because he was stabbed by a person
"from Camarines" who was taking his money. He retaliated by
stabbing his assailant with the scissors. He said that he stabbed two
persons who were demanding money from him and who were armed
with knives and iron bars.
When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due to the
stabbing, he commented that everybody was trying "to kill each
other.
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in his
pocket and stabbed him in the back with the scissors and then
escaped. Antonio allegedly pulled out the scissors from his back, gave
them to him and told him to avenge himself with the scissors.
Constabulary sergeant filed against the Toling brothers in the
municipal court of Cabuyao, Laguna a criminal complaint for multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder. The case was elevated to the
Court of First Instance of Laguna where the Provincial Fiscal on March
10, 1965 filed against the Toling brothers an information for multiple
murder (nine victims), multiple frustrated murder (six victims) and
triple homicide (as to three persons who died after jumping from the
running train to avoid being stabbed).
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel de
oficio pleaded not guilty. After trial, Judge Arsenio Naawa
rendered the judgment of conviction already mentioned. The Toling
brothers appealed.
In this appeal, appellants' counsel de oficio assails the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses, argues that the appellants acted in self-
defense and contends, in the alternative, that their criminal liability
was only for two homicides and for physical injuries.
The two brothers noticed that four men at some distance
from them were allegedly observing them, whispering
among themselves and making signs. The twins suspected
that the four men harbored evil intentions towards them.
When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed
them. They were facing the twins.
The man sitting near the aisle allegedly stood up,
approached Antonio and pointed a balisong knife at his
throat while the other man who was sitting near the window
and who was holding also a balisong knife attempted to pick
Antonio's right pocket, threatening him with death if he
would not hand over the money. Antonio answered that he
would give only one-half of his money provided the man
would not hurt him, adding that his (Antonio's) place was
still very far.
 When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly
drew out his hunting knife or small bolo and stabbed the
man with it, causing him to fall to the floor with his balisong.
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with
the scissors the man who had wounded his brother. Jose
hit the man in the abdomen. Jose was stabbed in the back
by somebody. Jose stabbed also that assailant in the
middle part of the abdomen, inflicting a deep wound.
RULING:
The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for Jose
and vice-versa does not detract from their credibility. The controlling
fact is that those witnesses confirmed the admission of the twins that
they stabbed several passengers.
The twins' theory of self-defense is highly incredible. In that crowded
coach No. 9, which was lighted, it was improbable that two or more
persons could have held up the twins without being readily perceived
by the other passengers. The twins would have made an outcry had
there really been an attempt to rob them. The injuries, which they
sustained, could be attributed to the blows which the other
passengers inflicted on them to stop their murderous rampage.
Appellants' view is that they should be held liable only for two
homicides, because they admittedly killed Antonio B. Mabisa and
Isabelo S. Dando, and for physical injuries because they did not deny
that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs. Mapa. We have to reject that view.
Confronted as we are with the grave task of passing judgment on the
aberrant behavior of two yokels from the Samar hinterland who
reached manhood without coming into contact with the mainstream
of civilization in urban areas, we exercised utmost care and solicitude
in reviewing the evidence. We are convinced that the record
conclusively establishes appellants' responsibility for the eight
killings.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended". The
presumption is that "a person intends the ordinary consequences of
his voluntary act".
The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate
sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so
doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind
is responsible for the injuries which result"
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from the
train of the four victims already named precludes the imputation of
criminal responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly deaths of the
said victims.
The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the other
victims. The charge of multiple frustrated murder based on the
injuries suffered by Cipriano Pantoja, Dinna Nosal, Corazon Bernal
and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to D-5) was dismissed by the trial
court for lack of evidence. Unlike Mrs. Mapa, the offended parties
involved did not testify on the injuries inflicted on them.
The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as
separate crimes of murder and attempted murder qualified be
treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). The
unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated by the twins upon their co-
passengers, who did not anticipate that the twins would act
like juramentados and who were unable to defend themselves (even
if some of them might have had weapons on their persons) was a
mode of execution that insured the consummation of the twins'
diabolical objective to butcher their co-passengers. The conduct of
the twins evinced conspiracy and community of design.
The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by
means of different acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as
constituting a complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code which refers to cases where "a single act constitutes two or
more grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other".
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BENJAMINORTEGA, JR. y CONJE, MANUEL GARCIA y RIVERA
and JOHN DOE, accused, BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE and
MANUEL GARCIA y RIVERA, accused-appellants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benjamin and Manuel should be liable for murder.
FACTS:
Diosdado Quitlong substantially testified that on October 15, 1992 at
about 5:30 in the afternoon, he, the victim Andre Mar Masangkay,
Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres were having a
drinking spree in the compound near the house of Benjamin Ortega,
Jr.That while they were drinking, accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and
Manuel Garcia who were [already] drunk arrived and joined
them. Andre Mar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went
to the back portion of the house. Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed him
and later heard the victim Andre Mar shouted, Dont, help me! He and
Ariel Caranto ran towards the back portion of the house and [saw
accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., on top of Andre Mar Masangkay who
was lying down in a canal with his face up and stabbing the latter with
a long bladed weapon. He [Quitlong] went to Romeo Ortega in the
place where they were having the drinking session [for the latter] to
pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr. Romeo Ortega went to the place of
the stabbing and together with Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel
Garcia lifted Andre Mar Masangkay from the canal and brought
Andre Mar to the well and dropped the latter inside the well. Romeo
Ortega, Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia then dropped stones
inside the well. Romeo Ortega warned him [Quitlong] not to tell
anybody of what he saw. His conscience bothered him and he told
his mother what he witnessed. That he went to the residence of Col.
Leonardo Orig and reported the matter.
Quitlong testified:
He said that he did not talk to the lawyer before he was
presented as witness in this case.
He narrated the incident to his mother on the night he
witnessed the killing.
 He knows that Andre Mar Masangkay was courting Raquel
Ortega.
Raquel Ortega asked permission from Andre Mar
Masangkay when she left between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m.
There was no trouble that occurred during the drinking
session.
PNP Superintendent Leonardo testified:
After the stones were removed, the body of the victim was
found inside the well.
The body has several stab wounds.
NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ludivico J. Lagat testified:
The cause of death is multiple stab wounds, contributory,
asphyxia by submersion in water.
The large airway is filled with muddy particles indicating
that the victim was alive when the victim inhaled the muddy
particles.
Appellant Manuel Garcia testified:
His wife came and asked him to go home because their
daughter was still sick.
He remained at home and attended to his sick daughter. He
then fell asleep but was awakened by police officers at six o
clock in the morning of the following day.
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. story:
Between eleven and twelve o clock in the evening,
Masangkay left the drinking session. He also left to urinate.
He went behind the house where he saw Masangkay
peeping through the room of his sister Raquel. Latter asked
him were Raquel was and when he answered he didnt
know he was punched in the mouth , caused him to fall on
his back. Masangkay drew a knife and stabbed him, thereby
immobilizing him. Ortega shouted for help. Quitlong
cameand was able to wrest the knife from Masangkay and,
with it, he stabbed Masangkay ten (10) times successively.
Quitlong chased Masangkay who ran towards the direction
of the well. Thereafter, Ortega went home and treated his
injuries and slept.
RTC convicted accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia, Jr. and
one Romeo Ortega of murder. The accused appealed to this court.
RULING:
We find the appeal partly meritorious. Appellant Ortega is guilty
only of homicide. Appellant Garcia deserves acquittal.
First Issue: Liability of Appellant Ortega
Prosecution eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appeared and sounded
credible and his credibility is reinforced by the fact that he has no
reason to testify falsely against the accused. It was Diosdado
Quitlong who reported the stabbing incident to the police
authorities. If Quitlong stabbed and killed the victim Masangkay, he
will keep away from the police authorities and will go in hiding.
Appellant Ortega claimed that after he was able to free himself from
Masangkays grip, he went home, treated his injuries and slept.[22] This
is not the ordinary reaction of a person assaulted. If Ortegas version
of the assault was true, he should have immediately reported the
matter to the police authorities, if only out of gratitude to Quitlong
who came to his rescue.
Murder or Homicide?
We disagree with the trial courts finding. Abuse of superior strength
requires deliberate intent on the part of the accused to take
advantage of such superiority. It must be shown that the accused
purposely used excessive force that was manifestly out of proportion
to the means available to the victims defense.
In his testimony, Witness Dominador Quitlong mentioned nothing
about Appellant Ortegas availment of force excessively out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the victim to defend
himself.
There was no testimony as to how the attack was initiated. The
accused and the victim were already grappling when Quitlong
arrived. Nothing in the foregoing testimony and circumstances can
be interpreted as abuse of superior strength.Hence, Ortega is liable
only for homicide, not murder.
Second Issue: Liability of Appellant Manuel Garcia
Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The
essential requisites for the application of this provision are that (a)
the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony;
and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by
the actors wrongful acts.
In assisting Appellant Ortega, Jr. carry the body of Masangkay to the
well, Appellant Garcia was committing a felony. The offense was that
of concealing the body of the crime to prevent its discovery, i.e. that
of being an accessory in the crime of homicide.
In spite of the evidence showing that Appellant Garcia could be held
liable as principal in the crime of homicide, there are, however, two
legal obstacles barring his conviction, even as an accessory as
prayed for by appellants counsel himself.
The prosecutions evidence itself shows that Garcia had
nothing to do with the stabbing which was solely
perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His responsibility relates
only to the attempted concealment of the crime and the
resulting drowning of Victim Masangkay. The hornbook
doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be
convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the
complaint or information.
 By parity of reasoning, Appellant Garcia cannot be
convicted of homicide through drowning in an information
that charges murder by means of stabbing.

Although the prosecution was able to prove that Appellant

Garcia assisted in concealing x x x the body of the crime, he
can neither be convicted as an accessory after the fact
defined under Article 19, par. 2, of the Revised Penal
Code. The records show that Appellant Garcia is a brother-
in-law of Appellant Ortega,[38] the latters sister, Maritess,
being his wife
ART. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal
liability. -- The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not
be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their
spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and
adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within
the same degrees with the single exception of accessories
falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article.
Appellant Garcia, being a covered relative by affinity of the
principal accused, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., is legally entitled
to the aforequoted exempting provision of the Revised
Penal Code.This Court is thus mandated by law to acquit
him.