CouldanythingbemoreIntelligiblethanEverydayIntelligibility?

:Reinterpreting

DivisionIofBeingandTimeinthelightofDivisionIIi

HubertL.Dreyfus

Introduction

Ithasalwaysseemedtomethatthetextofathinkerisonlyworthstudyingifreadingit

makesasignificantdifferenceinhowweseetheworldandourselves.Ourjobascommentators

istoclarifythetextandbringoutitsrelevance.Buthowdoesonegoaboutclarifyingand

applyingathinkerlikeHeidegger?SinceHeidegger,unlikecontemporaryanalyticphilosophers

whoattempttogivealogicalanalysisofconcepts,alwaysattemptstoanchorhisdiscussionin

thephenomena,ItrytouseHeideggerstexttodrawattentiontopervasivephenomenathatare

oftenoverlooked,andthenuseanelaborationofthesephenomenatocastexegeticallightonthe

text.Finally,ItestthesignificanceoftheresultbyseekingtoshowtherelevanceofHeideggers

insightstoissuesofcurrentconcern.Thefollowingremarksaremeanttodemonstratethis

approach.

I.AverageversusPrimordialUnderstanding

HeideggersaysthatDivisionIofBeingandTimeprovidesaphenomenologyofaverage

everydaynessandsowillhavetoberevisedinthelightoftheauthenticwayofbeinghe

describesinDivisionII.MyattempttowriteacommentaryexclusivelyonDivisionIiiwas,

therefore,criticizedonthegroundthatIpresentedasHeideggersviewthesesthatweretaken

backinDivisionII.Noneofthecriticalreviewers,however,saidwhatmyexclusive

concentrationofDivisionIledmetogetwrong.And,asfarasIcouldtell,noneoftheclaims

madeinDivisionIweretakenbackinDivisionII.

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 Inowsee,however,thatfocusingexclusivelyonDivisionIdid,indeed,leadmetomake

atleastoneseriousmistake.Ioverlookedwarnings,scatteredaboutinDivisionI,thatthe

averageintelligibilitydescribedtherewouldlaterbeshowntobeaninferiorformof

understanding,incontrasttoarichermoreprimordialkindofunderstandingdescribedin

DivisionII.

InmyCommentary,IspelledoutHeideggersbasicthesesthat(1)peoplehaveskillsfor

copingwithequipment,otherpeople,andthemselves;(2)theirsharedeverydaycopingpractices

conformtonorms;(3)theinterrelatedtotalityofequipment,normsandsocialrolesformawhole

whichHeideggercallssignificance.(4.)Significanceisthebasisofaverageintelligibility,and

(5)thisaverageintelligibilitycanbefurtherarticulatedinlanguage.AsHeideggerputsitWe

havethesamethinginview,becauseitisinthesameaveragenessthatwehaveacommon

understandingofwhatissaid(212).

Inspiteoftheobviousirony,inHeideggersconclusionthatpublicnessprimarily

controlseverywayinwhichtheworldandDaseingetinterpreted,anditisalwaysright(165),I

concludedthat,forbothHeideggerandWittgenstein,thesourceoftheintelligibilityoftheworld

andofDaseinistheaveragepublicpracticesarticulatedinordinarylanguage.

Thisinterpretationstillseemsrighttome,butIwenton,mistakenly,toconcludefromthe

basisofintelligibilityinaverageunderstandingandordinarylanguagethatforHeidegger,asfor

Wittgenstein,therewasnootherkindofintelligibility.InotedHeideggersclaimthatby

publicnesseverythinggetsobscured,andwhathasthusbeencoveredupgetspassedoffas

somethingfamiliarandaccessibletoeveryone(165),butIwenton,nonetheless,toarguethat

therecouldbenohigherintelligibilitythanthepublic,average,intelligibilityprovidedbythe

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socialnormsHeideggercallstheone.Anyhigherintelligibility,likePlato'sideas,Descartes

mathematicalrelationsamongbitsofextension,orHegel'sselftransparentGeist,Iclaimed,

wouldnecessarilybemetaphysical,soHeideggerwouldsurelyhaverejectedanysuchidea.

Likewiseanysortofprivateintelligibilitythatwasnot,atleastinprinciple,shareablewould

seemtobe,forthoseleftout,asortofunintelligibility.Thewholepointofintelligibilityisthatit

besharedoratleastsharable,ifnotbyallrationalcreatures,atleastbythosebroughtupina

givencultureorformoflife.So,IsimplydeniedthatforHeideggertherecouldbeanyhigher

intelligiblythanthatinthepublicpracticesandthelanguagethatarticulatesthem.

IvesincecometoseethatIwaswrong.Heideggerclearlyholdsthatthereisaformof

understanding,ofsituations,ontheonehand,andofDaseinitself,ontheother,thatissuperiorto

everydayunderstanding.Hecallsthissuperiorunderstandingprimordialunderstanding(212).

Istillhold,however,thatthisprimordialunderstandingcannotbesomeradicallydifferentway

ofmakingsenseofthings,since,forHeidegger,thishigherintelligibilitymustsomehowbe

basedonandgrowoutoftheaverageintelligibilityintowhicheveryoneissocialized.So,

althoughsuchhigherintelligibilitymayinfactbeaccessibleonlytothefew,asaformofshared

intelligibilityitmustinprinciplebeavailabletoeveryone.Whatcouldsuchamoreprimordial

formofunderstandingbe?

Togetaclue,ithelpstorecallwhatwelearnfromTedKisielsresearchesintothe

sourcesofBeingandTime.AccordingtoKisiel,thebookgrowsoutofHeideggersworkon

Aristotle:DivisionIelaboratesontechne,everydayskill,andDivisionIIonphronesis,practical

wisdom.SowewouldexpectHeideggertopresenthisownversionofthemasteryofthe

culturalpracticesthat,accordingtoAristotle,enablesthephronemostostraightwaydothe

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appropriatethingattheappropriatetimeintheappropriateway.Butjustwhatphenomenado

AristotleandHeideggerhaveinmindwithtechneandphronesis?Thewaytofindoutistolet

thesephenomenashowthemselvesastheyareinthemselves,soIwilltakeamomenttodescribe,

inaveryabbreviatedway,fourstagesonegoesthroughinacquiringanewskillinanydomain,

aswellaswhatonehaswhenonehasbecomeanexpert,especiallytheexpertinsocial

situations,Aristotlesmanofpracticalwisdom.

II.APhenomenologyofSkillAcquisitioniii

Stage1:Novice

Normally,theinstructionprocessbeginswiththeinstructordecomposingthetask

environmentintocontextfreefeaturesthatthebeginnercanrecognizewithoutthedesiredskill.

Thebeginneristhengivenrulesfordeterminingactionsonthebasisofthesefeatures.

Thestudentautomobiledriverlearnstorecognizesuchdomainindependentfeaturesas

speed(indicatedbyhisspeedometer),andisgiventherule,Shiftwhenthespeedometerneedle

pointsto10.

Thechildwhoissupposedtolearntoactethicallyinhisorherculturemightbegiventhe

rule.Nevertellalie.

Stage2:Advancedbeginner

Asthenovicegainsexperienceactuallycopingwithrealsituations,hebeginstonote,or

aninstructorpointsout,perspicuousexamplesofmeaningfuladditionalcomponentsofthe

situation.Afterseeingasufficientnumberofexamples,thestudentlearnstorecognizethem.

Instructionalmaximscanthenrefertothesenewsituationalaspects.

Ofcourse,ifthebeginnerfollowstherule,Shiftat10milesanhour,thecarwillstall

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onahillorwhenheavilyloaded.Sotheadvancedbeginnerlearnstouse(situational)engine

soundsaswellas(nonsituational)speedindecidingwhentoshift.Helearnsthemaxim:Shift

upwhenthemotorsoundslikeitisracinganddownwhenitssoundslikeitisstraining.

Likewise,thepolicyofnotlyingwillgetachildintofightsandexcludedfromimportant

eventsso,withthecoachingoftheparents,childrenlearntotelltheirfriendswhenleavingtheir

homesthattheyhadagoodtimeregardlessofthetruth.Thusthechildlearnstoreplacetherule

NeverliewiththemaximNeverlieexceptinsituationswhenmakingeveryonefeelgoodis

whatmatters.

Stage3:Competence

Withmoreexperience,thenumberofpotentiallyrelevantelementsthatthelearnerisable

torecognizebecomesoverwhelming.Atthispoint,sinceasenseofwhatisimportantinany

particularsituationismissing,performancebecomesnervewrackingandexhausting,andthe

studentmaywellwonderhowanyoneevermasterstheskill.

Tocopewiththisoverloadandtoachievecompetence,peoplelearnthroughinstruction

orexperience,todeviseaplanorchooseaperspective.Theperspectivethendetermineswhich

elementsofthesituationaretreatedasimportantandwhichonesareignored.Byrestricting

attentiontoonlyafewofthevastnumberofpossiblyrelevantfeaturesandaspects,suchachoice

ofaperspectivemakesdecisionmakingeasier.

Acompetentdriverleavingthefreewayonanofframpcurve,learnstopayattentionto

speedofthecar,notwhethertoshiftgears.Aftertakingintoaccountspeed,surfacecondition,

angleofbank,etc.,thedrivermaydecideheisgoingtoofast.Hethenhastodecidewhetherto

letuponthegaspedal,takehisfootoffthepedalaltogether,orsteponthebrake,andprecisely

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whentoperformanyoftheseactions.Heisrelievedifhegetsthroughthecurvewithoutbeing

honkedat,andshakenifhebeginstogointoaskid.

Ayoungpersonlearnsthattherearesituationsinwhichonemusttellthetruthandothers

inwhichonelies.Althoughthisisdaunting,theadolescentlearnstodecidewhetherthecurrent

situationisoneofbuildingtrust,givingsupport,manipulatingtheotherpersonforhisorherown

good,harmingabrutalantagonist,andsoforth.If,forinstance,trustistheissue,hethenhasto

decidewhenandhowtotellthetruth.

Thecompetentperformer,then,seeksrulesandreasoningprocedurestodecideupona

planorperspective.Butsuchrulesarenotaseasytocomebyasaretherulesandmaximsgiven

beginners.Therearejusttoomanysituationsdifferingfromeachotherintoomanysubtleways.

Moresituations,infact,thanarenamedorpreciselydefined,sonoonecanprepareforthe

learneralistofwhattodoineachsituation.Competentperformers,therefore,mustdecidefor

themselvesineachsituationwhichsortofsituationtheyareinaswellaswhattodo,without

beingsurethattheirunderstandingofthesituationwillbeappropriate.iv

Suchdecisionsarerisky,however,sooneistemptedtoseekthesecurityofstandardsand

rules.Whenariskaversepersonmakesaninappropriatedecisionandconsequentlyfinds

himselfintrouble,hetriestocharacterizehismistakebydescribingacertainclassofdangerous

situationsandthenmakesaruletoavoidtheminthefuture.Totakeanextremeexample,ifa

driverpullingoutofaparkingspaceissideswipedbyanoncomingcarhemistakenlytooktobe

approachingtooslowlytobeadanger,hemaymaketherule,neverpulloutifthereisacar

approaching.Sucharigidresponsewillmakeforsafedrivinginacertainclassofcases,butit

willblockfurtherskillrefinement.Inthiscaseitwillpreventacquiringtheskillofflexibly

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pullingoutofparkingplaces.Ingeneral,ifoneseekstofollowgeneralrulesonewillnotget

beyondcompetence.

Butwithoutguidelines,copingbecomesfrighteningratherthanmerelyexhausting.Prior

tothisstage,iftherulesdonotwork,theperformercanrationalizethathehasnotbeengiven

adequaterulesratherthanfeelremorseforhismistakes.Now,however,thelearnerfeels

responsiblefordisasters.Ofcourse,sometimesthingsworkoutwell,andthecompetent

performerexperiencesakindofelationunknowntothebeginner.Thus,learnersatthisstage

findthemselvesonanemotionalrollercoaster.

Asthecompetentperformerbecomesmoreandmoreemotionallyinvolvedinhistask,it

becomesincreasinglydifficulttodrawbackandtoadoptthedetachedrulefollowingstanceof

thebeginner.Whileitmightseemthatthisinvolvementwouldinterferewithruletestingandso

wouldleadtoirrationaldecisionsandinhibitfurtherskilldevelopment,infactjusttheopposite

seemstobethecase.Ifthedetachedrulefollowingstanceofthenoviceandadvancedbeginner

isreplacedbyinvolvement,oneissetforfurtheradvancement,whileresistancetotheacceptance

ofinvolvementandrisknormallyleadstostagnationandultimatelytoboredomandregression.v

Stage4:Expertise

Withenoughexperiencewithavarietyofsituations,allseenfromthesameperspective

butrequiringdifferenttacticaldecisions,thecompetentperformerseemsgraduallytodecompose

thisclassofsituationsintosubclasses,eachofwhichsharethesamedecision,singleaction,or

tactic.Thisallowsanimmediateintuitiveresponsetoeachsituation.

Theexpertdriver,generallywithoutpayingattention,notonlyfeelsintheseatofhis

pantswhenspeedistheissue;heknowshowtoperformtheappropriateactionwithout

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calculatingandcomparingalternatives.Ontheofframphisfootjustliftsofftheacceleratoror

stepsonthebrake.Whatmustbedone,simplyisdone.

Also,withenoughexperienceandwillingnesstotakerisks,somepeoplegrowuptobe

ethicalexpertswhohavelearnedtotellthetruthorliespontaneously,dependinguponthe

situation,withoutappealtorulesandmaxims.Aristotlewouldsaythatsuchapersonhas

acquiredthevirtueoftruthfulness.Somepeoplegrowuptobeexpertscapableofresponding

appropriatelytoawiderangeofinterpersonalsituationsintheirculture.Suchsocialexperts

couldbecalledvirtuosiinliving.vi

Asaresultofacceptingrisksandacommitmenttobeingbetterthanaverage,thevirtuoso

inliving,developsthecapacitytorespondappropriatelyeveninsituationsinwhichthereare

conflictingconcernsandinwhichthereseemstothoselookingontobenoappropriatewayto

act.PierreBourdieudescribessuchavirtuoso:

Onlyavirtuosowithaperfectcommandofhisartoflivingcanplayonallthe

resourcesinherentintheambiguitiesanduncertaintiesofbehaviorandsituationinorder

toproducetheactionsappropriatetoeachcase,todothatofwhichpeoplewillsay

Therewasnothingelsetobedone,anddoittherightway.vii

ThisisobviouslyAristotle'sphronemos.Ofcourse,theremaybeseveralwiseresponses.

Indeed,onmyaccount,theideaofasinglecorrectresponsemakesnosensesinceothervirtuosi

withdifferentfundsofexperienceswouldseethematterdifferently,andeventhesame

phronemoswouldpresumablyresponddifferentlyoncehehadhadmoreexperienceand

thereforecoulddiscriminatearicherrepertoireofsituations.

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III.ThePhronemosasaSociallyRecognizedVirtuosoversustheHistoryMakerasWorld

TransformingMaster

WecannowgeneralizethisaccountofskillacquisitionandreturntoBeingandTimeto

seewhetherthevirtuososincreasinglyrefinedsenseofthesocialsituationis,indeed,themore

primordialunderstandingHeideggerhasinmind.WecandothisbyseeinghowAristotles

phronemosisrelatedtoHeideggersresoluteDasein.Heideggerisclearthattheaveragewayof

actingistoobeystandardsandrules.HedescribesDaseinslostnessintheone,asfollowing

thetasks,rules,andstandardsofconcernfulandsolicitousbeingintheworld(312).In

contrast,Heideggersresoluteindividualdeviatesfromthebanal,average,publicstandardsto

respondspontaneouslytotheparticularsituation.InHeideggersterms,irresoluteDasein

respondstothegeneralsituation(Lage),whereasresoluteDaseinrespondstotheconcrete

Situation(Situation).AsHeideggerputsit:fortheone...theSituationisessentiallysomething

thathasbeenclosedoff.Theoneknowsonlythegeneralsituation(346),whileresolute

DaseinisintouchwiththeconcreteSituationoftakingaction(349).Thedistinctionbetween

thesetwokindsofsituationseemtocomeoutofnowhereinBeingandTimebuttheyclearly

havetheirorigininHeideggersdetaileddiscussionofphronesisinhisl925SophistLectures.

Therehesays:

Dasein,asactingineachcasenow,isdeterminedbyitssituationinthelargestsense.

Thissituationisineverycasedifferent.Thecircumstances,thegivens,thetimesandthe

peoplevary.Themeaningoftheactionitself,i.e.preciselywhatIwanttodo,variesas

well.ItispreciselytheachievementofphronesistodisclosetherespectiveDaseinas

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 actingnowinthefullsituationwithinwhichitactsandinwhichitisineachcase

different.viii

Giventhephenomenologyofskillacquisition,itshouldbeclearthattheconcrete

Situationdoesnothavesomespecialmetaphysicalorprivatekindofintelligibilitycutofffrom

theeveryday.Rather,intelligibilityforthephronemosistheresultofthegradualrefinementof

responsesthatgrowsoutoflongexperienceactingwithinthesharedculturalpractices.Thus,in

discussingphronesisHeideggerquotesAristotlesremarkthatOnlythroughmuchtimeislife

experiencepossible.ixAndinBeingandTimeheisexplicitthattheintelligibilityofthe

Situationdisclosedbyresoluteactionisarefinementoftheeveryday:

Authenticdisclosednessmodifieswithequalprimordialityboththewaytheworldis

discoveredandthewayinwhichtheDaseinwithothersisdisclosed.Theworldwhich

isavailabledoesnotbecomeanotherinitscontentnordoesthecircleofothersget

exchangedforanewone;butbothbeingtowardtheavailableunderstandinglyand

concernfully,andsolicitousbeingwithothers,arenowgivenadefinitecharacter.

(344).

Thus,Evenresolutionsremaindependentupontheoneanditsworld(345).

Moreover,asAristotlealreadysaw,expertresponseisimmediate,andHeideggeragrees

thatresolutenessdoesnotfirsttakecognizanceoftheSituation;ithasputitselfintothe

Situationalready.Asresolute,Daseinisalreadytakingaction(347).Or,asHeideggeralready

putitinhisl924lectures:inphronesisinamomentaryglance[Augenblick]Isurveythe

concretesituationofaction,outofwhichandinfavorofwhichIresolve[Entschliesse]myself.x

Also,accordingtoAristotle,sincetherearenorulesthatdictatethatwhatthephronemosdoesis

10
thecorrectthingtodointhattypeofsituation,thephronemos,likeanyexpert,cannotexplain

whyhedidwhathedid.Heidegger,ofcourse,agrees:

TheSituationcannotbecalculatedinadvanceorpresentedlikesomethingoccurrent

whichiswaitingforsomeonetograspit.Itonlygetsdisclosedinfreeresolvingwhich

hasnotbeendeterminedbeforehandbutisopentothepossibilityofsuchdetermination.

(355)

SowhenHeideggerasksrhetorically,ButonwhatbasisdoesDaseindiscloseitselfin

resoluteness?heanswers:

Onlytheresolutionitselfcangivetheanswer.Onewouldcompletelymisunderstandthe

phenomenonofresolutenessifoneshouldsupposethatthisconsistssimplyintakingup

possibilitiesthathavebeenproposedandrecommended(345).

Allthevirtuosocandoisstayopenandinvolvedanddrawonhisorherpastexperience.xiThe

resultingresoluteresponsedefinestheSituation.AsHeideggerputsit,TheSituationisonly

throughresolutenessandinit(346).

Likethephronemos,theresoluteindividualpresumablydoeswhatisretroactively

recognizedbyothersasappropriate,butwhathedoesisnotthetakenforgranted,averageright

thingnotwhatonedoesbutwhathispastexperienceleadshimtodointhatparticular

Situation.Moreover,aswehaveseen,sincetheSituationisspecificandthephronemospast

experienceunique,whathedoescannotbetheappropriatething.Itcanonlybeanappropriate

thing.Still,unlikeKierkegaardsKnightofFaithsuspendingtheethical,whocanonlybe

understoodbyhimselfandothersasamadmanoramurderer,Resolutiondoesnotwithdraw

fromactuality,butdiscoversfirstwhatisfacticallypossible;anditdoessobyseizinguponitin

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whateverwayispossibleforitasitsownmostabilitytobeintheone(346).Thus,in

respondingtotheconcreteSituationtheresoluteindividualisrecognizedasamodel;notofwhat

generalthingtodo,butofhowtorespondinanespeciallyappropriateway.Inthisway,when

Daseinisresolute,itcanbecometheconscienceofothers(344).

ItshouldnowbeclearthatKisielsclaimthatHeidegger,inhisaccountofresolute

DaseininDivisionII,isworkingoutAristotlesphenomenologyofpracticalwisdomhelpsmake

senseofHeideggerscrypticremarksabouttheresoluteDaseinsresponsetotheconcrete

Situation.ButKisielsplausiblewayofunderstandingthepassagesinquestioniscomplicated

byanothergroupofinterpreterswhopointoutthatHeideggersaccountofauthenticityisalso

deeplyinfluencedbyhisearlyinterestintheaccountofradicaltransformationinSt.Paul,Luther

andKierkegaard.TheseinterpretersfocusonHeideggersuseofthetermAugenblick.

Wehavealreadyseenthat,indeed,inthe1924HeideggerusesthetermAugenblickto

describethephronemossinstantofinsight.ThisreadingisconfirmedbyBasicProblemswhere

theAugenblickisequatedwithAristotleskairos,themomentofappropriateskillful

intervention.AristotlesawthephenomenonoftheAugenblick,theKairos,Heideggersays.xii

ButAugenblickisalsoLutherstranslationofSt.Paulsmomentinwhichweshallbechangedin

atwinklingofaneye.SoJohnVanBurenclaimsthatHeideggertookthemovementthat

concentratesitselfattheextremepoint(eschaton)ofthekairostobethekairologicaltimethathe

hadalreadydiscoveredinthePaulineeschatology.xiii

Unfortunately,theevidenceVanBurencitesforthisclaimdoesnotseemtoestablishitor

evensuggestit,butrathersuggeststhecontrary,viz.thatHeideggerhereusesKairostorefer,

nottoreligioustime,buttosecularactioninaconcretesituation.

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 InWS192425,HeideggerconnectedkairosinAristotlewiththePaulinethemeof

kairosasthetwinklingofaneye:Phronesisistheglancingatthethistime,atthethis

timenessofthemomentarysituation.Asaisthesis,itistheglanceoftheeye,theAugen

blick,towardtheconcreteattheparticulartime.xiv

VanBurenseeksfurthersupportinapassagefromHeideggerslectures,Phenomenological

InterpretationswithRespecttoAristotle,butthispassagetoosupportstheAristotelianreading.

Phronesisistheilluminationofdealingsthattemporalizeslifeinitsbeing.Theconcrete

interpretationshowshowthisbeing,kairos,isconstituted.Itgoestowardthe

eschaton,theextreme,inwhichthedeterminatelyseenconcretesituationintensifies

itselfattheparticulartime.xv

Althoughthetranslationleavesthingsrathermurky,clearlyHeideggerisheredescribingthe

culturalvirtuososresolutedealingwiththeconcreteSituation,notthemomentofrebirthofthe

Christianinwhichhegetsanewidentity,northemomentofthecomingoftheMessiahwhen

theworldwillbetransformedandthedeadraisedinthetwinklingofaneye.

But,inspiteoftheseblatantmisreadingsofthetexts,theinterpreterswhowanttogive

HeideggersuseofAugenblickaChristianinterpretationareontosomethingimportant.Thereis

asurprisingmomentwhereHeideggerintroducestheAugenblickinawaythatseemsclearlyto

refertothephronemosdailydealingswiththingsandequipment.Hesays:

Totheanticipationwhichgoeswithresoluteness,therebelongaPresentinaccordance

withwhicharesolutiondisclosestheSituation.ThatPresentwecalltheAugenblick

TheAugenblickpermitsustoencounterforthefirsttimewhatcanbeinatimeas

readytohandorpresentathand.(387,388)

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Sofar,thisisnosurprise,butthenHeideggerappendsafootnotesaying,S.Kierkegaardis

probablytheonewhohasseentheexistentiellphenomenonoftheAugenblickwiththemost

penetration(479).Whatcanthismean?

Heideggerseemstowanttodescribethephenomenonoftheresponsetotheconcrete

SituationatalevelofformalitythatcoversanydecisivemomentinwhichDasein,asan

individual,breaksoutofthebanalityoftheoneandtakesoveritssituation,whetherthatbethe

GreekactofseizingtheoccasionortheChristianexperienceofbeingreborn..ForHeidegger,

eithertypeofdecisivemomentisanAugenblick.Inacoursegivenshortlyafterthepublication

ofBeingandTime,theGreekandChristianviews,theirradicaldifference,andtheirformal

similarityarespelledouttogether.HeideggerfirstspeaksingeneraltermsofDaseinsself

resolution(Sichentschliessen)toitselftowhatisgiventohimtobe,thisselfresolutionisthe

Augenblick.xviHethenfillsthisoutinAristotelianterms,explaining,TheAugenblickis

nothingelsethantheglanceofresoluteness,inwhichthefullSituationofanactionopensupand

isheldopen.xviiButhealsosuggeststhatthisAristotelianmomentofdecisiveactionfallsshort

ofthekindofradicaltransformativeAugenblickKierkegaardhadinmind.Whatwehere

indicatewithAugenblickiswhatKierkegaardwasthefirsttoreallygraspinphilosophya

grasping,whichbeginsthepossibilityofacompletelynewepochinphilosophysince

Antiquity.xviii

AlthoughHeideggersviewisdifficulttosortout,ifweholdontothephenomenain

question,wecanbesurethat,HeideggerdidnotsimplyidentifytheGreekunderstandingof

kairoswiththeChristianunderstandingofAugenblick,althoughhedidseeeachasmanifestinga

resolute,i.e.open,wayofbeingwhichwasapreconditionofaspecialmomentofdecisive

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action.Onethingissure,onecantevenbegintomakesenseofHeideggerif,likeKisiel,one

simplyciteslecturetextstoarguethatHeideggersaccountofresoluteDaseininBeingandTime

isanadaptationofAristotlesphronemos,or,likeVanBuren,onecitesotherlecturetextsto

arguethatAugenblickinBeingandTimemustbeunderstoodinthelightofChristian

kairologicaltime.WithoutfirstseeingthatAristotleandSt.Paularedescribingtwogenuine,but

seeminglyirreconcilable,phenomena,thechallengingexegeticalquestionsdonotevenarise.

Oncewefocusonthephenomena,however,wecanseethateachinterpretationhas

somethingrightbuteachmistakenlyclaimstohavethewholestory.Asatisfactoryinterpretation

requiresclearlydistinguishingtwoexperiencesofthesource,nature,andintelligibilityof

decisiveactiontheGreekexperience,arisingfromaprimordialunderstandingofthecurrent

Situation,thatmakespossiblevirtuosocopinginthecurrentworldandtheChristianexperience,

arisingfromaprimordialunderstandingofDaseinitselfthatmakespossibleatransformationof

selfandworld.HeideggerseemstobedistinguishingDaseinsprimordialunderstandingofthe

currentSituationfromDaseinsexperienceofitsmostprimordialwayofbeing,andyettryingto

subsumethembothundertheAugenblickwhenhesays,Daseingetsbroughtbackfromits

lostnessbyaresolutionsothatboththecurrentSituationandtherewiththeprimordiallimit

Situationofbeingtowardsdeath,willbedisclosedasanAugenblickthathasbeenheldon

to.(400)

Atotherplacesinthetext,moreover,itseemsclearthatthetwodifferentformsof

understandingaredisclosedbytwodifferentformsofresoluteness.Thefirstisdiscussedin

Chapter2ofDivisionII.ThereHeideggerdefinesresolutenessasselfprojectionuponones

ownmostbeingguilty,inwhichoneisreadyforanxiety.(343)Thiskindofresoluteness

15
arisesfromfacingonesthrownnessandtheconsequentanxietythatcomeswiththerealization

thatonesaverageunderstandingwithitsrulesandstandardshasnointrinsicauthority.Holding

ontothisanxietymakespossibletheopenness,involvementandwillingnesstotakerisksthat,in

turn,makepossibletheacquisitionofexpertise.Resolutenessthusmakespossiblethevirtuosity

oftheHeideggerianphronemoswho,becausehehasheldontoanxietyandsonolongertakesfor

grantedthebanalpublicinterpretationofevents,canseenewpossibilitiesinthemostambiguous

andconflictedsituationsandsocandosomethingthatallwhosharehisworldwillretroactively

recognizeaswhatwasfacticallypossibleatthetimeSuchapersonsunderstandingofhis

societyisricheranddeeperthantheaverageunderstandingandsoheisgenerallymoreeffective.

Butheisnotyetfullyauthentic.

Besidestheeffectivecopingofthephronemos,madepossiblebyanexpertgraspofthe

concreteSituation,thereisafullyauthenticwayofactingmadepossiblebyDaseins

understandingofitsownwayofbeing.Thisauthenticwayofactingisamorecompleteformof

resolutenessinwhichDaseinnotonlyfacestheanxietyofguilt,viz.thesensethatitsidentity

andsocialnormsarethrownratherthangroundedandsohavenofinalauthority,but,

furthermore,facestheanxietyofdeath,viz.thatDaseinhastobereadyatalltimestodie,i.e.

giveupitsidentityanditsworldaltogether.Insuchanunderstanding,Daseinmanifestsits

authenticityanditstotality(348).

Heideggerseemstobedistinguishingandrankingthetwowaysofholdingontoanxiety

andthekindofresolutenesseachmakespossiblebyholdingthatonlythesecondisauthenticand

whole.InChapterV,whenheturnstotheauthentichistorizingofDasein(434),hesays:

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 Wehavedefinedresolutenessasaprojectingofoneselfononesownmostbeingguilty

.Resolutenessgainsitsauthenticityasanticipatoryresoluteness.Inthis,Dasein

understandsitselfwithregardtoitsabilitytobe,anditdoessoinsuchamannerthatits

willgorightundertheeyesofDeathinorderthustotakeoverinitsthrownnessthat

entitywhichitisitself,andtotakeitoverwholly.(434)xix

Anticipatoryresolutenessmakespossibleanevenmoreprimordialformofintelligibility

thanthepragmaticunderstandingevincedbythephronemosorsocialvirtuoso.xx

Tobeinnovativeinthisstrongsenserequiresanticipatoryresolutenessanxiously

facingbothdeathandguilt.Theresolutephronemosmerelyexperienceshisthrownnessandso

hasthesensethatthesocialnormsarenotrulestoberigidlyfollowed.Hethereforegivesupa

banal,generalunderstandingofsocialnormsandrespondstotheconcreteSituation,buthecan

stillbeunderstoodbyhispeerstohaveeffectivelysolvedasharedproblem.Inanticipatory

resoluteness,however,anxietyinthefaceofdeathhasfreedDaseinevenfromtakingforgranted

theagreeduponcurrentculturalissues.

Repetitionmakesareciprocalrejoindertothepossibilityofexistencethathasbeen

there.Butwhensucharejoinderismadetothispossibilityinaresolution,itismadein

aAugenblick;andassuchitisatthesametimeadisavowalofthatwhichinthetoday,is

workingitselfoutasthepast.(438)

HeretheAugenblickdoesnametheinceptionofanewcreation.Inthemomentof

decisiveaction,then,authenticDaseincantakeupmarginalpracticefromtheculturalheritage.

17
 [Fate]ishowwedesignateDaseinsprimordialhistorizing,whichliesinauthentic

resolutenessandinwhichDaseinhandsitselfdowntoitself,freefordeath,ina

possibilitywhichithasinheritedandyethaschosen.(435)

Daseincanthenactinsuchaswayastotakeoverorrepeatthemarginalpracticesinanewway

andthusshowaformoflifeinwhichthatmarginalpracticeshasbecomecentralandthecentral

practiceshavebecomemarginal.Suchaninnovatorissoradicalthathetransformshis

generationsunderstandingoftheissuefacingthecultureandproducesanewauthenticwe.

Hethusgoesbeyondnotonlythebanalgeneralunderstandingofhispeers,butevenbeyondthe

Situationalunderstandingofthephronemos.Wecouldcallsuchafullyauthentichistory

makingDaseinaculturalmaster.

xxi

IV.EthicalandPoliticalImplications

Thephenomenaofthesocialvirtuosoandtheculturalmasterhaveethicalandpolitical

implications.Forexample,Heideggersaccountoftheresoluteresponsetothefacticalsituation

offersawayoutoftheantinomypresentedbyDworkinsandDerridasaccountoflegaldecision

making.Dworkinholdsthatjudgesmust,sofaraspossible,regardtheexistinglegalpractice

asexpressingacoherentconceptionofjusticeandfairness,andsoarechargedtouncoverthis

conceptionandtomakedecisionsinspecificcasesonthebasisofit.xxiiThus,accordingto

Dworkin,anexplicitsenseoftheprinciplesinvolvedshouldactuallyguideajudgewhenshe

appliesthelawaswellaswhenshejustifiesherdecision.

DerridaisenoughofaHeideggeriantosensethatthereisnotheorybehindajudges

practiceandnosinglerightdecision,soherightlyseesthatthejudgesjustificationcouldnotbe

18
thebasisofherdecisionandmust,thereforebe,atbestarationalization.Thusherejects

Dworkinsrationalism.However,withoutanunderstandingofthephenomenonofskillful

copingbehindHeideggersclaimthataresolutewayofbeingmakespossiblearichermore

primordialkindofunderstanding,Derridawronglyconcludesthatinmakingadecisionthejudge

mustbemakingaleapinthedark.xxiiiIsuspectthat,threedifferentsortsofcasesarelumped

togetherbyDerrida.

(1)Thereisthecaseofextrapolatingthelawtonewsituationsthataresimilarbutnever

identicaltopreviouscasesandforwhichthereisnosetoffeaturesintermsofwhichonecan

justifyonesjudgmentsofsimilarity.HereDerridaisright,therecanbenotheoryofhowto

proceed,butHeideggerwouldpresumablyanalyzeanexpertjudgesdecisionsonthebasisofthe

phenomenonofexpertcopingandsoholdthatthejudge,likeanyresolutephronemos,neither

actsonprinciplenormakesaleapinthedark,butratherstraightwayengagesinthedisclosive

projectionanddeterminationofwhatisfacticallypossibleatthetime(345).Withaneyetothe

phenomenon,wecanseethatthejudgewouldbeactingasasocialvirtuosoledbyherpast

experiencetorespondtothesubtlesimilaritiesbetweenthecurrentsituationandsituationsin

whichshehadalreadymadewhatwererecognizedasappropriateresponses.Evenwhensucha

phronemosreflectsshedoesnotreflectonabstractprinciplesbutstaysinvolvedandreflectson

herexpertsenseoftheconcretesituation.

AsDerridaseesinsuchcasestherecannotbeonerightdecisionasDworkinassumes.

Twodifferentjudgeswithdifferentpastexperienceanddifferentwaysofhavingenteredthe

currentsituationmaywellseethesituationdifferently.Remember,Heideggersays:

19
 TheSituationcannotbepresentedlikesomethingoccurrentwhichiswaitingfor

someonetograspit.Itonlygetsdisclosedinfreeresolving.(355)

Buteventhen,oneiftheseveralpossiblewisedecisionsneednotbechosenarbitrarily.The

virtuosojudgescantalktoeachotheraboutthewaytheyenteredthecurrentsituationandrelate

thesituationtoothersituationsinthehopeofgettingtheircolleaguestoseethingsthewaythey

do.Thismayworktoproduceagreement,butevenifitdoesnot,thechoicebetweenthe

remainingcandidatesisnotthearbitraryimpositionofpower;itisachoicebetweenpossible

wisedecisions.

Still,Derridaisrightthat,sincesimilaritycannotbereducedtocertainsharedfeatures,

anyjustificationthattriedtoexplainthejudgesdecisionintermsofclassesofsituationswould

havetobearationalizationthatdreweitheronprincipleslikethosetheexpertfollowedwhenshe

wasonlycompetentor,atbest,morerefinedprinciplestheexperthadabstractedfrommany

cases.ButHeideggerwouldwanttoadd,Ihope,that,althoughsuchprinciplescouldnot

capturethejudgesexpertise,theyneednotbearbitrary.Thatis,theycouldserveasconvincing

justificationsforacompetentdecisioneventhoughtheycouldnotbeusedtodeterminewhat

countedastherelevantsimilaritiesinthenextcaseandsocouldnotserveasthebasisfora

genuinelywisedecision.

(2)Thereisthedecisionofalegalinnovatorwhobringstobearawholenewwayof

lookingattheroleofthelawinsomedomain.Suchadecisionwouldbeevenfurtherfrombeing

rationalizable,but,ifHeideggerisright,itwouldnotbealeapinthedarkbutamasterful

responsetomarginalpractices.Themarginalpractices,asNietzschesays,makealeapfromthe

wingstocenterstagexxivbuttheinnovativemasterdoesnotmakeablindleapinrespondingto

20
them;rather,thankstohisopenness,hehasasubtlesenseofthemarginalpracticesthatare

movingintothecenter.

(3)ThenearestthingtoaDerridianleapinthedarkoccurswheretherearetwoormore

conflictingsetsofvalues.ThesearethekindsofcasesthatreachtheSupremeCourt.For

example,pornographycasesinwhichthecourtmustdecidebetweenthewellbeingofthe

communityandtherighttofreespeech.Insuchcasestheredoesnotseemtobeanynonarbitrary

wayofdecidingwhichwaytounderstandthesituation.Eachjudgewilldecideonthebasisof

hisorherownsetofvaluesandpastexperiencebutthedecisionwillbeimposedbythemajority.

Thisdoesseemtobeacase,ifnotofaleapinthedark,atleastofanarbitraryimpositionof

power.

OnlythisthirdtypeofcasefitsDerridasanalysis,butDerridasmistakenlyholdsthatall

decisionsthatextrapolatetoanewsituationhavethearbitrarinessfoundonlyintypethreecases.

Heclaimsthateitheradecisionisguidedbycognitiverailsandsoismechanicalbut

uninteresting,orelseitisarbitrary,thusmissingtherelevanceofthetwotypesofprimordial

understandingthatHeideggerdescribes.Byineffectdenyingthewayaresolutepersonspast

experiencecanfeedintoasenseofwhatisfacticallypossibleandthusmakepossibleawiseor

evenaninnovativedecisionthatisnotdictatedbyprinciplebutisnotarbitraryeither,Derrida

givessupporttothenihilismofthelegalrealists.

Conclusion

Insummary,accordingtoDivisionIIofBeingandTime,public,average,everyday

understandingisnecessarilygeneralandbanal.Nonetheless,thisleveledaverageunderstanding

isnecessarybothasthebackgroundforallintelligibilityandintheearlystagesofacquiring

21
expertise,andsoitisbothontologicallyandgeneticallypriortoanymoreprimordial

understanding.Once,however,anexperthasbrokenoutofthebanalthankstotheanxious

realizationofhisthrownnessand,byrepeatedriskyexperienceintheeverydayworld,has

masteredthediscriminationsthatconstitutehisskill,hecanrespondtothesituationinamore

subtlewaythananonexpertcan.ThisprimordialunderstandingoftheconcreteSituationhasno

specialcontentnosourceofintelligibilityotherthaneverydayintelligibilitybutit,

nonetheless,makespossiblethesocialvirusssuccessfulresponsestothemostdifficultsocial

situations.Furthermore,byfacingtheanxietyofdeathandsoseeingthattheissuesofhis

cultureandevenhisownidentitycouldberadicallychanged,afullyauthenticDaseincan

manifestanevenhigherkindofprimordialunderstanding.Asaculturalmasterhecantakeup

marginalpossibilitiesinhisculturespastinwaythatenableshimtochangethestyleofawhole

generationandtherebydiscloseanewworld.

22
iThispaperwaspresentedattheInauguralMeetingofthe

InternationalSocietyforPhenomenologicalStudies,Asilomar,California,

July1923,1999.Iwouldliketothanktheparticipantsfortheirhelpfulsuggestions.Iwouldalsolike
tothankWallaceMatsonforhishelpinsortingouttheNewTestamentGreek.

iiHubertL.Dreyfus,BeingintheWorld:ACommentaryonHeideggers BeingandTime
,DivisionI,
MITPress,l991.
TheodoreKisiel,TheGenesisofHeideggersBeingandTime,Kisielsays:TheprojectofBTthus
takesshapeinl92l24againstthebackdropoftheunrelentingexegesisofAristotlestextsfrom
whichthepretheoreticalmodelsforthetwoDivisionsofBT,thetechneofpoesis,fortheFirst,andthe
phronesisofpraxisfortheSecond,arederived.9.
iiiForamoredetailedaccountsee,HubertL.andStuartE.Dreyfus,MindoverMachine,FreePress,
1988.
ivSuchadecisionastowhatmattersinthecurrentsituation,i.e.whatsortofsituationitis,requires
thatonesharethesensibilityofthecultureandhavetheabilitytorespondtothesimilaritiesrecognized
byonesfellows.
vPatriciaBennerhasdescribedthisphenomenoninFromNovicetoExpert:ExcellenceandPowerin
ClinicalNursingPractice,AddisonWesley,l984,164.
viThisdescriptionposesaproblem.Howcomemanypeoplegownuptobeexpertdriversbutonlya
fewbecomesocialvirtuosi?Theanswerseemstobethatthereareatleasttwokindsofskills:Simple
skills,likecrossingthestreetanddriving,andsubtleskillslikemusic,sportsandsubtlesocial
interaction.Itmakeslittlesensetospeakofavirtuosoeverydaydriver,whereasonecanbeavirtuoso
musicianorachampioninsomesport.Acquiringsimpleskillsrequiresonlythatonefacerisksand
uncertaintywithoutfallingbackonrulesorfleeingintodetachment,whereasacquiringhardskills
requires,inaddition,amotivationcontinuallytoimprovethen,oneneedsboththewillingnesstotake
risksandacommitmenttoexcellencethatmanifestsitselfinpersistenceandinhighstandardsforwhat
countsashavingdonesomethingright.Onealsomustbesensitivetothedistinctionsintherelevant
domain.(Suchsensitivityinanextremeforminmusicisperfectpitch.)Suchsensitivityisa
componentofwhatwecalltalent.Talentinthissenseisanecessaryconditionforbecomingavirtuoso
inanyfield.
viiPierreBourdieu,OutlineofaTheoryofPractice,CambridgeUniversityPress,1977,8.
viiiMartinHeidegger,PlatosSophist,IndianaUniversityPress,l997,101.

InPlatosSophist,HeideggerhasnotyetmadeacleardistinctionbetweenLageandSituation.Inthis
lecturecourse,heusesbothtermsinterchangeablytorefertotheconcretesituation.See,forexample,
page102:"outoftheconstantregardtowardthatwhichIhaveresolved,thesituation[Situation]should
becometransparent.Fromthepointofviewoftheproaireton,theconcretesituation[konkrete
Lage]...iscoveredover.
ixIbid.97.
xIbid.,114
xiImfollowingHeideggerinreadingEntschlossenheitasopennessnotdetermination.See,The
OriginoftheWorkofArt,inPoetry,Language,Thought,HarperandRow,l971.Theresoluteness
(Entschlossenheit)intendedinBeingandTimeisnotthedeliberateactionofasubject,buttheopening
upofhumanbeingtotheopennessofbeing.67
xiiMartinHeidegger,BasicProblemsofPhenomenology,IndianaUniversityPress,1982,288.
xiiiJohnVanBuren,TheYoungHeidegger,IndianaUniversityPress,l994,231.Thewholediscussion
ofKairosandAugenblickishardtofollowsince,asIunderstandit,thetermKairosisneverusedin
NewTestamentGreektomeanthetimeoftransformationthatlatercametobecalledKairological
time.ThetermtranslatedAugenblickoccursinCorinthiansI,15:52todescribewhatwillhappenwhen
weareraisedfromthedead:Weshallallbechangedinamoment(atomos),inthetwinklingofan
eye.(ripeienophthalmou).ButthetermgetsextendedbyKierkegaardtocoverallthewaysthat
onesidentityandworldaresuddenlyandradicallytransformed.Kierkegaardgoesevenfurther.The
GreekforwhatisnormallytranslatedbythefullnessoftimewhenJesusreturnstotransformthe
worldispltroma,whilethetermforthetransformationinwhichtheChristianisrebornasanew
creationismetanoia,butbothcrucialmomentsaresubsumedbyKierkegaardunderthenotionofan
Augenblickasthemomentofadecisivetransformation.Thus,nottoosurprisingly,allthetermsthat
refertoatotaltransformationofidentityand/orworldgetlumpedtogetherandidentifiedwiththe
GreekmomentofdecisiveactionorKairos.Whatissurprisingisthatthoseconcernedwiththeuseof
thesetermsinHeideggerdonotbothertosortoutthevariousphenomenatowhichtheyrefer.For
example,VanBurenblursalldistinctionswhenhetellsusthat,FollowingSt.Paul,aswellas
Aristotle,Heideggerstressesthatparticularkairoi,situations,arealwaysnewcreationsthatcome
likeathiefinthenight.283.
xivIbid.,229.(NoteagaintheconcreteSituation.)
xvIbid.,231Myitalics.Unfortunately,VanBurendoesnotgiveapagereferencetothesourceofthis
quotation.
WhichKierkegaardcallsbecominganewcreation,seeSrenKierkegaard,FearandTrembling,
Penguin,l985,70.
xviMartinHeidegger,Gesamtausgabe,29/30,VittorioKlostermann,l983,224.
xviiIbid.
xviiiIbid.(Myitalics.)
xixItishardtoreconcilethisclaimthatonlyanticipatoryresolutenessrevealsDaseinauthenticallyand
fullywiththeclaimintheearlierdiscussionoftheresolutenessoffacingguiltthatwehavenow
arrivedatthattruthofDaseinwhichismostprimordialbecauseitisauthentic.(343)IthinkHeidegger
wassimplyconfusedastohowhewantedtorelatethetwokindsofresoluteness.Generally,hesticks
totheviewthatauthenticresolutenessisthemostcompletekindofresolutenessbecauseitinvolves
facingdeath.
xxHeideggersensedthatsuchaauthenticDaseinsreinterpretationofwhathisgenerationstandsfor
howthesharedsocialpracticeshangtogetherandhaveapointallowshimtotransformhisculture,
butinBeingandTimeHeideggercouldnotyetseehowradicallyaculturecouldbetransformed.Only
whenhehadunderstoodthatthestyleofacultureitswholeunderstandingofbeingcouldchange,
couldhefullygraspwhatitwouldbelikeforaculturalmastertodiscloseanewworld.Heidegger
presumablywouldincludesuchculturalmastersamongthestatesmen,gods,andphilosopherswho
disclosenewworlds.Theyareallinstancesoftruthestablishingitself.SeeTheOriginoftheWork
ofArt,61,62.
Thephenomenonofworlddisclosingisdescribedandillustratedin,CharlesSpinosa,Fernando
Flores,andHubertL.Dreyfus,DisclosingNewWorlds,TheMITPress,l997.
xxiThemostextremeformofthetransformationsuchahistorymakingDaseinbringsaboutisa

culturalversionoftheAugenblickofChristianconversion.This,forKierkegaard,istheAugenblickas

thefullnessoftime.Thewholecultureisrebornintoanewworld.Sincethenewworldhasnew
standardsofintelligibility,theculturalmaster,likeKierkegaardsAbraham,cannotexplainhimselfand

socannot,likethephronemos,berecognizedbyhispeersashavingdonesomethingappropriate.But,

unlikeAbrahamsuspendingtheethical,whoistotallyrepulsivetohiscontemporariesandeven

himself,thehistorymaker,becausehedrawsonasharedheritage,isnottotallyunintelligible.Heisa

charismaticfigurewhocanshowanewstyleandsobefollowed,likeJesuswasfollowedbyhis

disciples,eventhoughtheydidnotunderstandthemeaningofwhattheyweredoing.Hewillnotbe

fullyintelligibletotheothermembersoftheculture,however,untilhisnewwayofcoordinatingthe

practicesisarticulatedinanewlanguageandpreservedinnewinstitutions.

Theseaccountsofthespecialwaythesocialvirtuosocanseizethemomentandthewaythe

historicalinnovatorcantransformthecultureseemtobecorrelatedwithHeideggerstwodifferent

accountsofthepresentdimensionofnonsuccessivetemporality.Primordialtemporalitymakes

possibleworldtimeandthusthephronemosexperienceofbeingsolicited,onthebasisofpast

successes,torespondtothecurrentSituationsoastoopenupnewpossibilitiesfordealingwith

availableandoccurrententities.(Heideggersaccountofhowprimordialtemporalitymakespossible

pragmatictemporalityhasbeenanalyzedbyWilliamD.Blattnerinhisexcellentbook,Heideggers

TemporalIdealism,CambridgeUniversityPress,l999

Authentictemporality,bycontrast,isasecularizationoftheKierkegaardianaccountofChristian
temporalityinTheConceptofAnxietyinwhichthetemporalstructuremakespossiblethedecisive
instantofindividualconversionandworldtransformation.Heideggerseemstohavewantedtorecover
boththeGreekandtheChristianunderstandingoftemporaltransformation,butdidnothavetimeto
workouthowthetwokindsofnonsuccessivetemporality(primordialtemporalityandauthentic
temporality)wererelatedtoeachotherandtohisontologicalproject.
xxiiSeeGeraldJ.Postema,ProtestantInterpretationandSocialPractices,LawandPhilosophy6
(1987)283319.PostemapresentsacritiqueofDworkinbasedonBourdieuandWittgensteinwhichis
similartotheoneIamsuggestinghere.
xxiiiJacquesDerrida,ForceofLaw:TheMysticalFoundationofAuthority,CardozoLawReview,
11,56(1990),9201045.
xxivMichelFoucault,Nietzsche,Genealogy,HistoryinLanguage,countermemory,practice.
DonaldF.Bouchard,ed.CornellU.Press.150.