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In re Laureta and Maravilla v.

IAC (1987)
Summary Cases:
In Re: Wenceslao Laureta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) (Resolution) 148
SCRA 382

Subject:
Contempt of Court, Offense of Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment,
Judicial Independence, Legal Ethics, Duty of Lawyer as Officer of the Court,
Disciplinary Proceedings against Lawyers

Facts:
Eva Maravilla-Ilustre wrote a letter to the Justices of the First Division of the Supreme
Court alleging that the dismissal of her case via a minute resolution was
promulgated unjustly and in violation of the legal and judicial ethics. In her
letter, she threatened that she will hold a press conference regarding the issue and
requested that the judges disclose the extent of their participation in the promulgation of
the minute resolution. She also claims that Justice Yap of the first division was
previously the law partner of Atty. Ordonez, then counsel of the other party, and
now the Solicitor General. The Supreme Court, acting on the letter of Ilustre, explained
that when the resolution was issued, Justice Abad was the presiding justice and Justice
Yap had no knowledge of the fact that Atty. Ordonez was the counsel for the opponent
and that Justice Yap later on inhibited himself from the case. I l u s t r e t h e n
filed a criminal complaint against the Justices before
t h e T a n o d b a y a n f o r k n o w i n g l y rendering an unjust resolution and a
complaint charging Justice Yap and Atty. Ordonez of using their influence in
rendering the said
resolution. Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, counsel of Ilustre, allegedly circulated these complain
ts to the press. Inparticular, the headline in the Daily Express read Ordonez, 8
Justices Face Graft Charges making it appear that the Justices were charged with
Graft and Corruption. The Tanodbayan dismissed the compliant
and subsequently, the Supreme Court charged Atty Laureta and Eva Ilustre
and found them guilty of Contempt. Atty. Laureta claims that the order of
suspension issued without hearing was violative of his constitutional right
to due process of law making said order null and void while Ilustre claims that her
constitutional right to due process was likewise violated for she should have been
given every opportunity to present her side since contempt proceedings are in
the nature of a criminal proceeding.
Part 2

In Re: Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Wenceslao Laureta and Contempt Preoceedings

Against Eva Maravilla Illustre GR No 68635 12 March 1987

POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I



Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M.
Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division.
Ilustre using contemptuous language claimed that members of the court rendered unjust
decision on the case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate Appellate Court.
Ilustre claimed that the Court acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself
from participating when in fact he is a law-partner of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey
Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed the history of the case and
found no reason to take action, stating that Justice Yap inhibited himself from the case and
was only designated as Chairman of First Division on 14 July 1986 after the resolution of
dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again addressed letters to Justices
Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of exposing the case to another forum of justice,
to which she made true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on 16
Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the
press. Tanodbayan dismissed petitioners Complaint

Issue:
Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is
found guilty of grave professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law
until further Orders.
Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak
for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or
inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. The
supremacy of the Supreme Courts judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental
principle of separation of powers and checks and balances under a republican form of
government such that the three co-equal branches of government are each supreme and
independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can interfere with the
performance of the duties of the other.

Part 3

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION


AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635,
entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Before us are 1) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration of the Per Curiam
Resolution of this Court promulgated on March 12, 1987, finding him guilty of grave
professional misconduct and suspending him indefinitely from the practice of law; and 2)
Eva Maravilla-Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration of the same Resolution holding her in
contempt and ordering her to pay a fine of P1,000.00.

Essentially, Atty. Laureta maintains that the Order of suspension without hearing violated
his right to life and due process of law and by reason thereof the Order is null and void;
that the acts of misconduct imputed to him are without basis; that the charge against him
that it was he who had circulated to the press copies of the Complaint filed before the
Tanodbayan is unfounded such that, even in this Court's Resolution, his having
distributed copies to the press is not stated positively; that the banner headline which
appeared In the Daily Express is regrettable but that he was not responsible for such
"misleading headline;" that he "did nothing of the sort" being fully conscious of his
responsibilities as a law practitioner and officer of the Court; that as a former
newspaperman, he would not have been satisfied with merely circulating copies of the
Complaint to the press in envelopes where his name appears; "he himself would have
written stories about the case in a manner that sells newspapers; even a series of juicy
articles perhaps, something that would have further subjected the respondent justices to
far worse publicity;" that, on the contrary, the press conference scheduled by Ilustre was
cancelled through his efforts in order to prevent any further adverse publicity resulting
from the filing of the complaint before the Tanodbayan; that, as a matter of fact, it was
this Court's Resolution that was serialized in the Bulletin Today, which newspaper also
made him the subject of a scathing editorial but that he "understands the cooperation
because after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last
year;" that he considered it "below his dignity to plead for the chance to present his side"
with the Editor, Mr. Ben Rodriguez, "a long-time personal friend" since he "can afford to
be the sacrificial lamb if only to help the Honorable Court uphold its integrity;" that he
was called by a reporter of DZRH and was asked to comment on the case filed before the
Tanodbayan but that his remarks were confined to the filing of the case by Ilustre herself,
and that the judgment of the trial Court had attained its finality long ago; that he is not
Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and did not prepare the complaint filed before it,
his professional services having been terminated upon the final dismissal of Ilustre's case
before this Court; that similarities in the language and phraseology used in the Ilustre
letters, in pleadings before this Court and before the Tanodbayan do not prove his
authorship since other lawyers "even of a mediocre caliber" could very easily have
reproduced them; that the discussions on the merits in the Per Curiam Resolution are
"more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, Justice Raul M. Gonzales being competent
to deal with the case before him;" that he takes exception to the accusation that he has
manifested lack of respect for and exposed to public ridicule the two highest Courts of
the land, all he did having been to call attention to errors or injustice committed in the
promulgation of judgments or orders; that he has "not authorized or assisted and/or
abetted and could not have prevented the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and
malicious charges of Eva Maravilla Ilustre who was no longer his client when these
alleged acts were done; that "he is grateful to this Court for the reminder on the first duty
of a lawyer which is to the Court and not to his client, a duty that he has always
impressed upon his law students;" and finally, that "for the record, he is sorry for the
adverse publicity generated by the filing of the complaint against the Justices before the
Tanodbayan."

In her own Motion for Reconsideration, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre also raises as her main
ground the alleged deprivation of her constitutional right to due process. She maintains
that as contempt proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in nature, the mode of
procedure and rules of evidence in criminal prosecution should be assimilated, as far as
practicable, in this proceeding, and that she should be given every opportunity to present
her side. Additionally, she states that, with some sympathetic lawyers, they made an
"investigation" and learned that the Resolution of the First Division was arrived at
without any deliberation by its members; that Court personnel were "tight-lipped about
the matter, which is shrouded mystery" thereby prompting her to pursue a course which
she thought was legal and peaceful; that there is nothing wrong in making public the
manner of voting by the Justices, and it was for that reason that she addressed Identical
letters to Associate Justices Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani Cruz and
Florentino Feliciano; that "if the lawyers of my opponents were not a Solicitor General,
and member of the Supreme Court and a Division Chairman, respectively, the resolution
of May 14, 1986 would not have aroused my suspicion;" that instead of taking the law
into her own hands or joining any violent movement, she took the legitimate step of
making a peaceful investigation into how her case was decided, and brought her
grievance to the Tanodbayan "in exasperation" against those whom she felt had
committed injustice against her "in an underhanded manner."

We deny reconsideration in both instances.

The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not impressed with merit.
What due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (Tajonera vs.
Lamaroza, et al., 110 SCRA 438 [1981]). The word "hearing" does not necessarily
connote a "trial-type" proceeding. In the show-cause Resolution of this Court, dated
January 29, 1987, Atty. Laureta was given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of
the reasons why he should not be subjected to dispose action. His Answer, wherein he
prayed that the action against him be dismissed, contained twenty-two (22) pages, double
spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was also given a like opportunity to explain her statements,
conduct, acts and charges against the Court and/or the official actions of the Justices
concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that the contempt proceeding
against her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages, double spaced. Both were
afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty. Laureta denied having authored the
letters written by Ilustre, his being her counsel before the Tanodbayan, his having
circularized to the press copies of the complaint filed before said body, and his having
committed acts unworthy of his profession. But the Court believed otherwise and found
that those letters and the charges levelled against the Justices concerned, of themselves
and by themselves, betray not only their malicious and contemptuous character, but also
the lack of respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a complete obliviousness to the
fundamental principle of separation of powers, and a wanton disregard of the cardinal
doctrine of independence of the Judiciary. Res ipsa loquitur. Nothing more needed to
have been said or proven. The necessity to conduct any further evidentially hearing was
obviated (See People vs. Hon. Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. 63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135
SCRA 712). Atty. Laureta and Ilustre were given ample opportunity to be heard, and
were, in fact, heard.

(1)

In his Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Laureta reiterates his allegations in his Answer
to the show-cause Resolution that his professional services were terminated by Ilustre
after the dismissal of the main petition by this Court; that he had nothing to do with the
contemptuous letters to the individual Justices; and that he is not Ilustre's counsel before
the Tanodbayan.
Significantly enough, however, copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution dismissing Ilustre's
Complaint was furnished Atty. Laureta as "counsel for the complainant" at his address of
record. Of note, too, is the fact that it was he who was following up the Complaint before
the Tanodbayan and, after its dismissal, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
dismissal.

Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a process server of this Court, that
after having failed to serve copy of the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 of this
Court on Ilustre personally at her address of record, "101 F. Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon
City," having been informed that she is 6 not a resident of the place," he proceeded to the
residence of Atty. Laureta where the latter's wife "voluntarily received the two copies of
decision for her husband and for Ms. Maravina-Ilustre" (p. 670, Rollo, Vol. 11).

That Ilustre subsequently received copy of this Court's Resolution delivered to Mrs.
Laureta is shown by the fact that she filed, as of March 27, 1987, a "Petition for
Extension of Time to file Motion for Reconsideration" and subsequently the Motion for
Reconsideration. In that Petition Ilustre acknowledged receipt of the Resolution on March
12, 1987, the very same date Mrs. Laureta received copy thereof. If, indeed, the lawyer-
client relationship between her husband and Ilustre had been allegedly completely
severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do was to return to the Sheriff the copy intended for
Ilustre. As it was, however, service on Atty. Laureta proved to be service on Ilustre as
well. The close tie- up between the corespondents is heightened by the fact that three
process servers of this Court failed to serve copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution
on Ilustre personally.

Noteworthy, as well, is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one called by a
"reporter" of DZRH to comment on the Ilustre charges before the Tanodbayan. If, in fact,
he had nothing to do with the complaint, he would not have been pinpointed at all. And if
his disclaimer were the truth, the logical step for him to have taken was to refer the caller
to the lawyer/s allegedly assisting Ilustre, at the very least, out of elementary courtesy and
propriety. But he did nothing of the sort. " He gave his comment with alacrity.

The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again surfaces when he
asserts in his Motion for Reconsideration that he "understands the cooperation" of the
Bulletin Today as manifested in the serialized publication of the Per Curiam Resolution
of this Court and his being subjected to a scathing editorial by the same newspaper
"because after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last
year." The malice lurking in that statement is most unbecoming of an officer of the Court
and is an added reason for denying reconsideration.

Further, Atty. Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits in the Court's
Per Curiam Resolution are more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, forgetting,
however, his own discourse on the merits in his Answer to this Court's Resolution dated
January 29, 1987. He thus incorrigibly insists on subordinating the Judiciary to the
executive notwithstanding the categorical pronouncement in the Per Curiam Resolution
of March 12, 1987, that Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code has no application to the
members of a collegiate Court; that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper; plus the
clear and extended dissertation in the same Per Curiam Resolution on the fundamental
principle of separation of powers and of checks and balances, pursuant to which it is this
Court "entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all
justifiable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its
judgments or declare them 'unjust' upon controlling and irresistible reasons of public
policy and of sound practice."

Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the dignity of
this Court are belied by environmental facts and circumstances. His apologetic stance for
the "adverse publicity" generated by the filing of the charges against the Justices
concerned before the Tanodbayan rings with insincerity. The complaint was calculated
precisely to serve that very purpose. The threat to bring the case to "another forum of
justice" was implemented to the fun. Besides, he misses the heart of the matter. Exposure
to the glare of publicity is an occupational hazard. If he has been visited with disciplinary
sanctions it is because by his conduct, acts and statements, he has, overall, deliberately
sought to destroy the "authenticity, integrity, and conclusiveness of collegiate acts," to
"undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justifiable disputes,"
and to subvert public confidence in the integrity of the Courts and the Justices concerned,
and in the orderly administration of justice.

In fine, we discern nothing in Atty. Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration that would call
for a modification, much less a reversal, of our finding that he is guilty of grave
professional misconduct that renders him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to an attorney and officer of the Court.

(2)

Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She has turned deaf ears
to any reason or clarification. She and her counsel have refused to accept the untenability
of their case and the inevitability of losing in Court. They have allowed suspicion alone
to blind their actions and in so doing degraded the administration of justice.
"Investigation" was utterly uncalled for. All conclusions and judgments of the Court, be
they en banc or by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation. The fact that no dissent
was indicated in the Minutes of the proceedings held on May 14, 1986 showed that the
members of the Division voted unanimously. Court personnel are not in a position to
know the voting in any case because all deliberations are held behind closed doors
without any one of them being present. No malicious inferences should have been drawn
from their inability to furnish the information Ilustre and Atty. Laureta desired The
personality of the Solicitor General never came into the picture. It was Justice Abad
Santos, and not Justice Yap, who was Chairman of the First Division when the
Resolution of May 14, 1986 denying the Petition was rendered. Thereafter Justice Yap
inhibited himself from any participation. The fact that the Court en banc upheld the
challenged Resolutions of the First Division emphasizes the irrespective of Ilustre's case
irrespective of the personalities involved.

Additionally, Ilustre has been trifling with this Court. She has given our process servers
the run-around. Three of them failed to serve on her personally her copy of this Court's
Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 at her address of record. Mrs. Laureta
informed process server Lorenzo C. Bardel that Ilustre was residing at 17-D, Quezon St.,
Tondo, Manila. Romeo C. Regala, another process server, went to that address to serve
copy of the Resolution but he reported:

4. That inspite of diligent efforts to locate the address of ms.Eva Maravilla-


Ilustre, said address could not be located;

5. That I even asked the occupants (Cerdan Family) of No. 17 Quezon


Street, Tondo, Manila, and they informed that there is no such Ms. Eva
Maravilla-Ilustre in the neighborhood and/or in the vicinity; ... (p. 672,
Rollo, Vol. 11).

The third process server, Nelson C. Cabesuela, was also unable to serve copy of this
Court's Resolution on Ilustre. He reported:

2. On March 17, 1987, at about 9:30 A.M., I arrived at the house in the
address furnished at; the notice of judgment (101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao,
Quezon City), and was received by an elderly woman who admitted to be
the owner of the house but vehemently refused to be Identified, and told me
that she does not know the addressee Maravilla, and told me further that she
always meets different persons looking for Miss Maravilla because the
latter always gives the address of her house;

3. That, I was reminded of an incident that I also experienced in the same


place trying to serve a resolution to Miss Maravilla which was returned
unserved because she is not known in the place; ... (p. 674, Rollo, Vol. II).

And yet, in her Petition for Extension of Time and in her Motion for Reconsideration she
persists in giving that address at 101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City, where our
process servers were told that she was not a resident of and that she was unknown thereat.
If for her contumacious elusiveness and lack of candor alone, Ilustre deserves no further
standing before this Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao G.
Laureta for the setting aside of the order suspending him from the practice of law, and of
Eva Maravilla Ilustre for the lifting of the penalty for contempt are DENIED, and this
denial is FINAL. Eva Maravilla Ilustre shall pay the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on her
within ten (10) days from notice, or, suffer imprisonment for ten (10) days upon failure to
pay said fine within the stipulated period.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,


Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Yap, J., * took no part.

Footnotes

* As in the past, Justice Pedro L. Yap took no part.


2nd CASES AGUIRRE VS RANA

EN BANC

[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite
moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral
integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The
practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate
who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed


the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar
during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine
International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent
could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge
against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date
but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and
grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a
lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before
the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon,
Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a
pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this
pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for
George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a
municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act
as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant
accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George
Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant
claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation
of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to
take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys
until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the
Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific
assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains,
however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself
as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent
claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly
accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of
Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor
Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically
motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre,
the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that
the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the
Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment
and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC
was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on
19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as
counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as
counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two
grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was
an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is
motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as
counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC
proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC
believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents
unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice
of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission
to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law
which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan
while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and
his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan
to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the
records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May
2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for
the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed ascounsel
for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent
stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC
on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to
represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained
respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao
informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the
said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily
Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the
MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate
for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a
member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, the Court elucidated that:
[1]

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law,incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments,where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5
Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that practice of law means any
[2]

activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal


procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared
in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without
license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized
practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he
was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing
that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral
unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. [3]

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a


privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment,
and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate
[4]

does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission
had practiced law without a license. [5]

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran,


Jr. v. Abad, a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his
[6]

oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. [7]

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential
[8]

requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers
oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.[9]

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does
not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or
administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of
law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice-
mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that
he was resigning effective upon your acceptance. Vice-Mayor Relox
[10]

accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001. Thus, the[11]

evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a
client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence
shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his
counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the
Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ.,concur
Cont. AGURRE vs RANA

EN BANC

[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite
moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral
integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The
practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate
who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed


the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar
during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine
International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent
could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge
against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date
but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and
grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a
lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before
the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon,
Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a
pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this
pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for
George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a
municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act
as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant
accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George
Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant
claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation
of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to
take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys
until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the
Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific
assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains,
however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself
as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent
claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly
accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of
Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor
Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically
motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre,
the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that
the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the
Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment
and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC
was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on
19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as
counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as
counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two
grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was
an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is
motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as
counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC
proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC
believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents
unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice
of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission
to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law
which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan
while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and
his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan
to represent him before the MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the
records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May
2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for
the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed ascounsel
for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent
stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC
on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to
represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained
respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao
informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the
said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily
Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the
MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate
for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a
member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, the Court elucidated that:
[1]

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law,incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments,where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5
Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that practice of law means any
[2]

activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal


procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared
in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without
license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized
practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he
was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing
that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral
unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. [3]

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a


privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment,
and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate
[4]

does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission
had practiced law without a license. [5]

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran,


Jr. v. Abad, a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his
[6]

oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. [7]

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential
[8]

requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers
oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.[9]

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does
not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or
administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of
law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice-
mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that
he was resigning effective upon your acceptance. Vice-Mayor Relox
[10]

accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001. Thus, the [11]

evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a
client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence
shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his
counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the
Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ.,concur
CONT. AGUIRRE vs RANA

AGUIRRE vs. RANA


B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003

FACTS:
Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000Bar
Examinations. Respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel f o r a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of
Election canvassers of Mandaon, Masbate and filed with the MBE! a pleading
dated 1May 2001 entitled
f o r m a l o b j e c t i o n t o t h e ' i n c l u s i o n i n t h e canvassing of votes in
some precincts for the office of Vice Mayor. In this pleading, respondent
represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of
Vice Mayoralty candidate, George Bunan,
a n d s i g n e d t h e p l e a d i n g a s counsel for George Bunan. Furthermore,
respondent also signed as counsel for Emily Estipona - Hao on 1 May 2001 in the
petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona - Hao as
the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. On 21 May 2001, one day
before the scheduled mass oath taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a petition for
denial of admission to the Bar. On 22 May 2001, respondent was allowed to take the
lawyers oath but was disallowed from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of
the charges against him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent shall be denied Admission to the Bar.

RULING:
Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared
in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings,
without
license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel
knowing fully well that h e w a s n o t a m e m b e r o f t h e B a r . H a v i n g
h e l d h i m s e l f o u t a s c o u n s e l knowing that he had no authority to
p r a c t i c e l a w , r e s p o n d e n t h a s s h o w n moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege.It is limited to persons of good moral character with
s p e c i a l qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this
privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
e d u c a t i o n a l attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the
court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by
passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be with held
even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking
admission had practiced law without a license. True, respondent here passed the 2000
Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the
Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial.
Passingt h e b a r i s n o t t h e o n l y q u a l i f i c a t i o n t o b e c o m e a n a t
t o r n e y - a t - l a w . Respondent should know that two essential requisites for
becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely; his lawyers oath to be
administered by this court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

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