Legal Ethics (Atty.
Rellin)
CHAPTER III. THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote
or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or
the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite
as law a provision already rendered inoperative by
repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which
has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of
procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.
Hueysuwan v Florido
A.C. No. 5624 (Jan 20, 2004)
FACTS:
Natasha V. Hueysuwan-Florido averred that
she is the legitimate spouse of respondent
Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they
are estranged and living separately from each
other
They have two children namely, Kamille
Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James
Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old
both of whom are in complainant's custody.
Complainant filed a case for the annulment
of her marriage with respondent
Sometime in the middle of December 2001,
respondent went to complainant's residence
and demanded the surrender of the custody of
their two minor children. He showed
complainant a photocopy of an alleged
Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals
which supposedly granted his motion for
temporary child custody.
Complainant called up her lawyer but the
latter informed her that he had not received
any motion for temporary child custody filed
by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the
original copy of the alleged resolution of the
Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to
give it to her. Complainant then examined
the resolution closely and noted that it bore
two dates: November 12, 2001 and
November 29, 2001. Sensing something
amiss, she refused to give custody of their
children to respondent.
In January 15, 2002, while complainant was
with her children in the ABC Learning Center
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by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
respondent, accompanied by armed men,
suddenly arrived and demanded that she
surrender to him the custody of their
children. He threatened to forcefully take
them away with the help of his companions,
whom he claimed to be agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the
assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The
responding policemen subsequently escorted
her to the police station where the matter
could be clarified and settled peacefully.
At the police station, respondent caused to
be entered in the Police Blotter a statement
that he, assisted by agents of the NBI,
formally served on complainant the appellate
court's resolution/order.
In order to diffuse the tension, complainant
agreed to allow the children to sleep with
respondent for one night on condition that
he would not take them away from Tanjay
City.
The next day, complainant received
information that a van arrived at the hotel
where respondent and the children were
staying to take them to Bacolod City.
Complainant rushed to the hotel and took
the children to another room, where they
stayed.
On the same day, respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City,
Branch 31, a verified petition for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right
to custody of the children on the basis of
the alleged Court of Appeals' Resolution.
In the meantime, complainant verified the
authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a
certification from the Court of Appeals
stating that no such resolution ordering
complainant to surrender custody of their
children to respondent had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas
corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did
not appear. Consequently, the petition was
dismissed.
Complainant filed the instant complaint
alleging that respondent violated his
attorney's oath by manufacturing, flaunting
and using a spurious Court of Appeals'
Resolution in and outside a court of law.
Furthermore, respondent abused and
misused the privilege granted to him by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the
country. After respondent answered the
complaint, the matter was referred to the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline for
investigation, report and recommendation
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent can be held
administratively liable for his reliance on and
attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
HELD:
Respondent claims that he acted in good
faith in invoking the Court of Appeals
Resolution which he honestly believed to be
authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact
that he used and presented the spurious
Resolution two times:
first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case
No. 3898, 7 which he filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Dumaguete City;
Second, when he sought the assistance of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay
City to recover custody of his minor children
from complainant. Since it was respondent
who used the spurious Resolution, he is
presumed to have participated in its
fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every
lawyer. (CANON 10 of the CPR)
Moreover, the records show that respondent
used offensive language in his pleadings in
describing complainant and her relative. A
lawyer's language should be forceful but
dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting
an advocate and in keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession
Respondents actions erode the public
perception of the legal profession. They
constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions
for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
(Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor)
Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years.
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park v CA
G.R. No. 123698 (August 5, 1998)
FACTS:
On May 18, 1981 private respondent-spouses
Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a
complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing
Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity) for
quieting of title and for declaration of nullity
of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No.
205942) issued in the name of said
corporation
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the spouses which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals
Legal Ethics (Atty. Rellin)
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by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
Subsequently, private respondents filed an
Urgent Manifestation and Motion for an
Immediate Writ of Possession/Break Open
Order. The motion was opposed by herein
petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation contending that it is not
submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial
court; that it is completely unaware of the
suit between private respondents and Central
Dyeing; that it is the true and registered
owner of the lot having bought the same
from Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer
in good faith.
The trial court granted private respondents
motion. Another Order was issued by the
trial court holding that the judgment was
binding on petitioner (Eternal Gardens), being
the successor-in-interest of defendant Central
Dyeing
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a
petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals
rendered judgment dismissing the petition
and further denied its motion for
reconsideration
On further appeal to this Court, petitioner's
petition for review on certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 109076, was denied in a resolution.
Upon finality of said resolution, this Court
issued Entry of Judgment dated October 21,
1993
Thereafter, private respondents filed another
motion for the issuance of a second writ of
execution before the trial court which was
granted in the Order of July 20, 1994. Not
willing to give up, petitioner sought a
reconsideration
Petitioners motion was initially granted by the
trial court. However, upon motion of private
respondents, the said order was reconsidered
and ultimately the court granted the writ of
execution
Desperately needing a favorable judgment,
petitioner, for the second time, filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals arguing inter alia: that the judgment
cannot be executed against it because it was
not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297; that
the decision of the trial court in said case
never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver
possession of the property to the private
respondents; that certain facts and
circumstances which occurred after the
finality of the judgment will render the
execution highly unjust, illegal and
inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed
writ of execution violates the lot buyers'
freedom of religion and worship; and that
private respondents' title is being questioned
in another case.
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The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
and denied its motion for reconsideration
Petitioner once again seeks this Court's
intervention reiterating in essence the same
line of arguments espoused in their petition
before the respondent Court of Appeals
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner are
correct and that it should be given favorable
judgment.
HELD:
Once a court renders a final judgment, all
the issues between or among the parties are
deemed resolved and its judicial functions
with respect to any matter related to the
controversy litigated come to an end
Placing private respondents in possession of
the land in question is the necessary and
logical effect or consequence of the decision
declaring them as the rightful owners of the
property. As correctly argued by the private
respondents, they do not have to institute
another action for the purpose of taking
possession of the subject realty.
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for
annulment of titles filed by the Republic
against private respondents will not justify
the suspension of the execution of the
judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so
because the petitioner's title which
originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No.
205942) was already annulled in the
judgment sought to be executed, and which
judgment had long been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus,
even if the trial court will nullify the said
private respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-
11337, as argued by petitioner, the supposed
adverse decision cannot validate TCT No.
205942 and make petitioner the rightful
owner of the subject land. Clearly, the
present petition was instituted merely to
delay the execution of the judgment.
Be that as it may, the petition has been
rendered moot and academic in view of the
fact that the questioned Alias Writ of
Possession and Alias Writ of Execution have
already been implemented by the Sheriff as
shown by the "Sheriff's Return," dated March
31, 1995, with the attached "Turn Over
Premises" indicating therein that private
respondents took possession of the subject
property
A note of caution. This case has again delayed
the execution of a final judgment for
seventeen (17) years to the prejudice of the
private respondent
Legal Ethics (Atty. Rellin)
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by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
We note that while lawyers owe entire
devotion to the interest of their clients and
zeal in the defense of their client's right, they
should not forget that they are officers of
the court, bound to exert every effort to
assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. They should not,
therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to
defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a
case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes
the petition is hereby DENIED
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND
MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND
TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly
attired.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at
court hearings.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the Courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge
motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.
Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against
a Judge to the proper authorities only.
In Re Almacen
G.R. No. L-27654 (February 18, 1970)
FACTS:
This case started in a civil case entitled Virginia
Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero, in which
Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant.
In this case, the trial court, after due hearing,
rendered judgment against his client. Upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals likewise dismissed
the appeal. Upon appeal to the SC for certiorari,
the SC by minute resolution denied the appeal.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave
vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition
to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title,"
through a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory remarks against the Court as well as
its individual members.
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen surrendered his
lawyers certificate in protest against what he
therein asserts is "a great injustice committed
against his client by this Supreme Court."
He said that the SC as a tribunal is "peopled by
men who are calloused to our pleas for justice,
who ignore without reasons their own
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applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity."
He also said that His client who was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has
become "one of the sacrificial victims before the
altar of hypocrisy"
He alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he
ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that
justice as administered by the present members
of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb"
He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in
the people's forum," so that "the people may
know of the silent injustices committed by this
Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs
and injustices that were committed must never
be repeated."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen shall be subject to
disciplinary actions for his contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory remarks against the
Court.
RULING:
The Court ordered that Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from
the practice of law until further orders, the
suspension to take effect immediately.
Every citizen has the right to comment upon and
criticize the actuations of public officers. This
right is not diminished by the fact that the
criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that
it is articulated by a lawyer. Judicial officers, like
other public servants, must answer for their
official actions before the chancery of public
opinion.
But it is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A
wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the
One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and
the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the
duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct
that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
The SC explained elaborately that the lawyer's
duty to render respectful subordination to the
courts is essential to the orderly administration
of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their
clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with
superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their
tempers. The SC enumerates numerous
jurisprudence regarding this doctrine or rule.
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to
remove or suspend has risen above being a
mere inherent or incidental power. It has been
elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of
Court
In this case, the virulence so blatantly evident in
Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral
argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious
language used and the scurrilous innuendoes
they carried far transcend the permissible
Legal Ethics (Atty. Rellin)
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by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never
serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an
irate attorney, attract public attention to
himself and, more important of all, bring; this
Court and its members into disrepute and
destroy public confidence in them to the
detriment of the orderly administration of
justice. Odium of this character and texture
presents no redeeming feature, and completely
negates any pretense of passionate
commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less
than a classic example of gross misconduct,
gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross
transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As
such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The
way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers
is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is
unavoidable
Thus, Atty. Almacen is hereby suspended in the
practice of law for an indefinite time. The merit
of this choice is best shown by the fact that it
will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine
for himself how long or how short that
suspension shall last. For, at any time after the
suspension becomes effective, he may prove to
this Court that he is once again fit to resume the
practice of law.
Wicker v Arcangel
G.R. No. 112869 (January 29, 1996)
FACTS:
It appears that on November 18, 1993, Wickers
counsel, Atty. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the
inhibition of the respondent Judge Arcangel
from the case.
Respondent Judge found offense in the
allegations on the motion for inhibition filed by
complainants. He argued that the motion for
inhibition by Petitioners are malicious,
derogatory and contemptuous. Respondent, in
an order, held them guilty of direct contempt
and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for
five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
which respondent judge denied for lack of merit
in his order of December 17, 1993.
Petitioner argues that when a person, impelled
by justifiable apprehension and acting in a
respectful manner, asks a judge to inhibit
himself from hearing his case, he does not
thereby become guilty of contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty for contempt.
HELD:
Petitioners are guilty. However the order of
December 3, 1993 is MODIFIED by DELETING the
sentence of imprisonment for five (5) days and
INCREASING the fine from P100.00 to P200.00
for each of the petitioners.
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The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins
the lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to]
insist on similar conduct by others" and "not [to]
attribute to a Judge motives not supported by
the record or have materiality to the case."
The power to punish for contempt is to be
exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it
be invoked to preserve that respect without
which the administration of justice will fail. The
contempt power ought not to be utilized for the
purpose of merely satisfying an inclination to
strike back at a party for showing less than full
respect for the dignity of the court
In this case, Atty. Rayos claims he merely did
what he had been bidden to do by his client of
whom he was merely a "mouthpiece." He was
just "lawyering" and "he cannot be gagged,"
even if the allegations in the motion for the
inhibition which he prepared and filed were
false since it was his client who verified the
same. Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade
responsibility for the allegations in question.
Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary
to that of his client
The Court sustains Judge Arcangel's finding that
petitioners are guilty of contempt. A reading of
the allegations in petitioners' motion for
inhibition, particularly the following paragraphs
thereof:
2. Meantime, Judge Capulong who had full
grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In
one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not
yet reported to his station and in that set
hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises,
Inc. who must have known that His Honor was
not reporting did not likewise appear while other
counsels were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting
Presiding Judge was personally recruited from
the south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his
wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time
member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against
whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed
Administrative Case No. 3796, and although said
case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs feel
that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-
Santos' relief;
This leads to no other conclusion than that
respondent judge was beholden to the opposing
counsel in the case, Atty. Benjamin Santos, to
whom or to whose wife, the judge owed his
transfer to the RTC of Makati, which
necessitated "easing out" the former judge to
make room for such transfer. These allegations
are derogatory to the integrity and honor of
respondent judge and constitute an
unwarranted criticism of the administration of
justice in this country. They suggest that
lawyers, if they are well connected, can
manipulate the assignment of judges to their
advantage. The truth is that the assignments of
Judges Arcangel and Capulong were made by
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by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
this Court, by virtue of Administrative Order No.
154-93, precisely in the interest of an efficient
administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5
(3), Art. VIII of the Constitution. This is a matter
of record which could have easily been verified
by Atty. Rayos. After all, as he claims, he
deliberated for two months whether or not to
file the offending motion for inhibition as his
client allegedly asked him to do.
Re: Letter of UP Law Faculty
A.M. No. 10-10-4 SC (March 8, 2011)
FACTS:
Sanction awaits a subordinate who misbehaves.
The right to criticize the courts and judicial officers
must be balanced against the equally primordial
concern that the independence of the Judiciary be
protected from due influence or interference. In
cases where the critics are not only citizens but
members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly
affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline
lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and
fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have
exceeded the limits of fair comment and common
decency.
Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court
decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (the Vinuya
decision), the case involving the Filipino comfort
women during the Japanese occupation, the counsel
for the petitioners therein filed, first, a Motion for
Reconsideration reiterating the fundamental
responsibility of states in protecting its citizens
human rights specifically pertaining to jus cogens
norms and, second, a supplement thereto asserting
that the Vinuya decision was plagiarized from
different sources and that the true intents of the
plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente,
Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice del Castillo), to
suit the arguments laid down in said decision.
Vis-a-vis the Courts formation of an ethics
committee tasked to investigate the veracity of the
alleged plagiarism, the authors who were
purportedly plagiarized sent their respective letters
to the Supreme Court, noting the misreading and/or
misrepresentation of their articles. Hence, in their
articles, they argue that the crimes of rape, torture
and sexual slavery can be classified as crimes against
humanity, thus attaining the jus cogens status;
consequently, it shall be obligatory upon the State to
seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens.
However, the Vinuya decision cited them to support
the contrary stand.
In response to this controversy, the faculty of UP
College of Law came up with a statement entitled
Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of
the University of the Philippines College of Law on
the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation
in the Supreme Court (Restoring Integrity
Statement), which statement alleged plagiarism
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against Justice del Castillo, treating the same not
only as an established fact, but as a truth. Said
statement was posted online and at the Colleges
bulletin board and was submitted to the Supreme
Court. The manner in presenting the arguments and
the language used therein, the Court believed, were
inappropriate considering its signatories are lawyers.
Thus, the Supreme Court issued a Show Cause
Resolution directing respondents to show cause why
they should not be disciplined as members of the
Bar for violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Conversely, compliance to such
resolution was unsatisfactory, except for one
respondent.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution denies
respondents their freedom of expression
2. Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution
violates respondents academic freedom as law
professors
HELD:
Petition DENIED.
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny
respondents their freedom of expression
A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will
plainly show that it was neither the fact that
respondents had criticized a decision of the
Court nor that they had charged one of its
members of plagiarism that motivated the said
Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism
and the contumacious language by which
respondents, who are not parties nor counsels
in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion
in favor of the petitioners in the said pending
case for the proper disposition and
consideration of the Court that gave rise to said
Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution
painstakingly enumerated the statements that
the Court considered excessive and uncalled for
under the circumstances surrounding the
issuance, publication, and later submission to
this Court of the UP Law facultys Restoring
Integrity Statement.
The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the
freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised
responsibly, for every right carries with it a
corresponding obligation. Freedom is not
freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. Thus, proscribed are the use of
unnecessary language which jeopardizes high
esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in
judicial administration, or tends necessarily to
undermine the confidence of people in the
integrity of the members of the Court. In other
words, while a lawyer is entitled to present his
case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
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by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
In a long line of cases, the Court has held that
the right to criticize the courts and judicial
officers must be balanced against the equally
primordial concern that the independence of
the Judiciary be protected from due influence or
interference. In cases where the critics are not
only citizens but members of the Bar,
jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the
authority of this Court to discipline lawyers
whose statements regarding the courts and
fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial,
have exceeded the limits of fair comment and
common decency.
The Show Cause Resolution does not violate
respondents academic freedom as law professors
There is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution
that dictates upon respondents the subject
matter they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent
with the principle of academic freedom for this
Court to subject lawyers who teach law to
disciplinary action for contumacious conduct
and speech, coupled with undue intervention in
favor of a party in a pending case, without
observing proper procedure, even if purportedly
done in their capacity as teachers.
Academic freedom cannot be successfully
invoked by respondents in this case. The
constitutional right to freedom of expression of
members of the Bar may be circumscribed by
their ethical duties as lawyers to give due
respect to the courts and to uphold the publics
faith in the legal profession and the justice
system. The Court believes that the reason that
freedom of expression may be so delimited in
the case of lawyers applies with greater force to
the academic freedom of law professors.
The Court reiterates that lawyers when they
teach law are considered engaged in the
practice of law. Unlike professors in other
disciplines and more than lawyers who do not
teach law, respondents are bound by their oath
to uphold the ethical standards of the legal
profession. Thus, their actions as law professors
must be measured against the same canons of
professional responsibility applicable to acts of
members of the Bar as the fact of their being
law professors is inextricably entwined with the
fact that they are lawyers.
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CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT
AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE
SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.
Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless
he has adequately prepared himself on the law and
the facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and
the order of its proferrence. He should also be ready
with the original documents for comparison with the
copies.
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions
arising from the same cause.
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the
same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court
processes.
Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his
witness during a break or recess in the trial, while the
witness is still under examination.
Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a
witness to misrepresent himself or to impersonate
another.
Rule 12.07 - A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or
harass a witness nor needlessly inconvenience him.
Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf
of his client, except:
(a) on formal matters, such as the mailing,
authentication or custody of an instrument, and the
like; or
(b) on substantial matters, in cases where his
testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which
event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial
of the case to another counsel.
Nunez v Atty. Ricafort
A.C. No. 5054 (May 29, 2002)
FACTS:
An administrative complaint was by Soledad
Nuez, a septuagenarian represented by her
attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the
disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the
ground of grave misconduct.
Sometime in October 1982, Soledad authorized
Atty. Ricafort to sell her two parcels of land
located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed
to the lawyer 10% of the price as commission.
Atty. Ricafort succeeded in selling the lots, but
despite Soledads repeated demands, he did not
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by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
turn over the proceeds of the sale. This forced
Soledad to file an action for a sum of money
before the RTC, Quezon City.
The court rendered its decision ordering the
Atty. to pay Soledad the sum of P16,000 as
principal obligation, with at the legal rate from
the date of the commencement of the action.
An appeal to the CA was made. However, the
appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the
required docket fee within the reglementary
period despite notice.
Soledad filed a motion for the issuance of an
alias writ of execution. But it appears that only a
partial satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was
made, leaving P13,800 unsatisfied. In payment
for the latter, Atty. issued four postdated checks
but was dishonored because the account against
which they were drawn was closed.
Hence, Soledad was forced to file four criminal
complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before
the MTC, Quezon City.
In a joint affidavit, Atty. Ricafort admitted
having drawn and issued said four postdated
checks in favor of Soledad. Allegedly believing in
good faith that said checks had already been
encashed by Soledad, he subsequently closed
his checking account in China Banking
Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said four
checks were drawn. He was not notified that the
checks were dishonored. Had he been notified,
he would have made the necessary
arrangements with the bank.
The court required Atty. to comment on the
complaint. But he never did despite the
favorable action on his three motions for
extension of time to file the comment. His
failure to do so compelled Soledad to file a
motion to cite Atty. in contempt on the ground
that his strategy to file piecemeal motions for
extension of time to submit the comment
smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is
unworthy of a member of the bar and a law
dean.
The IBP findings show that the Atty. had no
intention to honor the money judgment
against him. It recommended that Atty. be
declared guilty of misconduct in his dealings
with complainant and be suspended from the
practice of law for at least one year and pay the
amount of the checks issued to the complainant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of
grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant.
HELD:
YES. There is a blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
7

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest
and immoral or deceitful conduct.
By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. diminished
public confidence in the law and the lawyers.
Instead of promoting such confidence and
respect, he miserably failed to live up to the
standards of the legal profession.
His act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of
the alias writ of execution for money judgment
rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt
to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make
good the checks despite demands and the
criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
showed his continued defiance of judicial
processes, which he, as an officer of the court,
was under continuing duty to uphold.
To further demonstrate his very low regard for
the courts and judicial processes, he even had
the temerity of making a mockery of the courts
generosity to him. We granted his three motions
for extension of time to file his comment on the
complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to
file the comment, he as well did not even bother
to explain such failure notwithstanding our
resolution declaring him as having waived the
filing of the comment. To the SC, Atty. openly
showed a high degree of irresponsibility
amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful
orders.
Atty. Ricafort then knowingly and willfully
violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility stating
that:
Lawyers should avoid any action that would
unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes; and that
lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to
file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should not
let the period lapse without submitting the
same or offering an explanation for their failure
to do so.
The SC indefinitely suspended Atty. Ricafort
from the practice of law and directed to pay
Soledad P13,800.
Santiago v Atty. Rafanan
A.C. No. 6252 (October 5, 2004)
FACTS:
Complainant Jonar Santiago, an employee of the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology,
lodged a disbarment complaint against
respondent Atty. Edison Rafanan before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines alleging, inter
alia, that Atty. Rafanan violated Rule 12.07 and
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when the latter
executed an affidavit in favour of his client and
offered the same as evidence in a case where he
Legal Ethics (Atty. Rellin)
8
by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
is actively representing his client. The complaint
also alleged that after the hearing of the case,
respondent accompanied by several persons
waited for Complainant and after confronting
the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and
thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled
threats.
In his answer, respondent denied having
disarmed the complainant and uttered insulting
words nor veiled threats against the latter. He
however admitted that he executed an affidavit
in favour of his client and offered the same as
evidence in a case where he is actively
representing his client but interposed the
defense that lawyers could testify on behalf of
their clients "on substantial matters, in cases
where [their] testimony is essential to the ends
of justice." Complainant charged respondents
clients with attempted murder. Respondent
averred that since they were in his house when
the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is
very essential to the ends of justice.
The IBP, while finding that administrative offense
was committed by respondent for violating the
notarial law, recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for alleged violation of Rule 12.07 and
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for insufficiency of
evidence. Hence, the present action was
commenced.
ISSUE:
May a lawyer testify on substantial matters relative
to the cause of the party which he is actively
representing in a case without violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
HELD:
YES. Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is
not disqualified from being a witness, except
only in certain cases pertaining to privileged
communication arising from an attorney-client
relationship. The reason behind such rule is the
difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of
dissociating their relation to their clients as
witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are
expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In
contradistinction, advocates are partisans --
those who actively plead and defend the cause
of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness
and impartiality of a disinterested witness from
the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of
propriety rather than of competency of the
lawyers who testify for their clients.
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers
from being witnesses and at the same time
counsels for a cause, the preference is for them
to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless
they absolutely have to; and should they do so,
to withdraw from active management of the
case.
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence
of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in
8

favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him
administratively liable for the following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to
assert every remedy and defense that is
authorized by law for the benefit of the client,
especially in a criminal action in which the
latters life and liberty are at stake. Having
undertaken the defense of the accused,
respondent, as defense counsel, was thus
expected to spare no effort to save his clients
from a wrong conviction. The Affidavit executed
by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the
defense of his clients, since it pointed out the
fact that on the alleged date and time of the
incident, his clients were at his residence and
could not have possibly committed the crime
charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit,
complainant does not dispute the statements of
respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08
contemplates a situation in which lawyers give
their testimonies during the trial. In this
instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the
preliminary investigation which, as such, was
merely inquisitorial. Not being a trial of the case
on the merits, a preliminary investigation has
the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent
persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecutions; protecting them from open and
public accusations of crime and from the trouble
as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial;
and protecting the State from useless and
expensive prosecutions. The investigation is
advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be
followed by the trial proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and
remind respondent to refrain from accepting
employment in any matter in which he knows or
has reason to believe that he may be an
essential witness for the prospective client.
Furthermore, in future cases in which his
testimony may become essential to serve the
"ends of justice," the canons of the profession
require him to withdraw from the active
prosecution of these cases.
CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE
MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY
IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR
GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE
COURT.
Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary
attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for
cultivating familiarity with Judges.
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public
statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.
Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite
interference by another branch or agency of the
Legal Ethics (Atty. Rellin)
9
by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
government in the normal course of judicial
proceedings.
Lantoria v Atty. Bunyi
A.C. No. 1769 (June 8, 1992)
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar
L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action against
respondent Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the
Philippine Bar, on the ground that respondent
Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft and
corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming
of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and corruption of the judge and
bribery", in connection with respondent's
handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then
pending before the Municipal Court of
Experanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over by
Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia in which
respondent Bunyi was the counsel of one of the
parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas.
Complainant argued that Argued that
Respondent won the said three (3) cases
involving the ejectment of squatters of
Complainants premises because Respondent
was the one who unethically prepared the
decisions rendered therein, and that the
preparation by respondent of said decisions
warranted disciplinary action against him.
Respondent Bunyi argued that although he
prepared the draft of the decisions in the civil
cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift or
consideration to influence the Judge in allowing
him to prepare the draft decisions. He also
offered his apology to the Court for all the
improprieties which may have resulted from his
preparation of the draft decisions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent is liable for the alleged
act.
HELD:
Respondent is liable. He is suspended for 1 year.
The complaint is granted
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility
16 a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is
rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule
13.01, which read:
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of
his cause and refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.
Rule 13.01 A lawyer shall not extend
extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.
9

In this case, the subject letters indeed indicate
that respondent had previous communication
with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of
the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and
88, and which he in fact prepared. Although
nothing in the records would show that
respondent got the trial court judge's consent to
the said preparation for a favor or
consideration, the acts of respondent
nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of
a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
Estrada v Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 159486-88 (November 25, 2003)
FACTS:
Attorney Alan F. Paguia, as counsel for Estrada,
averred that the respondent justices have
violated Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct by attending the EDSA 2 Rally and by
authorizing the assumption of Vice-President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in
violation of the 1987 Constitution.
Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain
personal views on political questions. But to
avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge
shall not make political speeches, contribute to
party funds, publicly endorse candidates for
political office or participate in other partisan
political activities.
Also, petitioner contended that the justices have
prejudged a case that would assail the legality of
the act taken by President Arroyo. The
subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v.
Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is,
petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice
and due process.
According to Atty. Paguia, during the hearing of
his Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon on 11 June
2003, the three justices of the Special Division of
the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias
and partiality against his client.
Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V.
Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and
disrespectful language when she blurted
out, Magmumukha naman kaming
gago, (Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice Teresita
Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as
insignificant even before the prosecution could
file its comments or opposition thereto, (Rollo,
p. 12.) remarking in open court that to grant
Estradas motion would result in chaos and
disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged bias
and partial attitude of the Sandiganbayan
Legal Ethics (Atty. Rellin)
10
by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a
motion for their disqualification.
The petitioner also asked the Court to include in
its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of
Chief Justice Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001
in:
a) Going to EDSA 2;
b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President
Arroyo as President on the ground of
permanent disability even without proof of
compliance with the corresponding
constitutional conditions, e.g., written
declaration by either the President or majority
of his cabinet; and
c) Actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on
that same ground of permanent disability.
In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he has
demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum
shopping, for several advisory opinions on
matters pending before the Sandiganbayan.
Subsequently, the court ruled that the instant
petition assailing the foregoing orders must be
DISMISSED for gross insufficiency in substance
and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan
committed no grave abuse of discretion, an
indispensable requirement to warrant a
recourse to the extraordinary relief of petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure.
In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, the Court
strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain
of disciplinary sanction, to desist from further
making, directly or indirectly, similar
submissions to this Court or to its Members.
Unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him
by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist
on end. In fact, on the 7th September 2003 issue
of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say -
What is the legal effect of that violation of
President Estradas right to due process of law?
It renders the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo
unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair
play were not observed. There was no fair play
since it appears that when President Estrada
filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his
fellow justices had already committed to the
other party - GMA - with a judgment already
made and waiting to be formalized after the
litigants shall have undergone the charade of a
10

formal hearing. After the justices had
authorized the proclamation of GMA as
president, can they be expected to voluntarily
admit the unconstitutionality of their own act?
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Paguia committed a violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Criticism or comment made in good faith on the
correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would
be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction
can enlighten the court and contribute to the
correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto,
82 Phil 595.) However, Attorney Paguia has not
limited his discussions to the merits of his
clients case within the judicial forum. Indeed,
he has repeated his assault on the Court in both
broadcast and print media.
Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar from
making such public statements on any pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked
the fires of public dissension and posed a potentially
dangerous threat to the administration of justice.
It should be clear that the phrase partisan
political activities, in its statutory context,
relates to acts designed to cause the success or
the defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates who have filed certificates of
candidacy to a public office in an election. The
taking of an oath of office by any incoming
President of the Republic before the Chief
Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official
function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed
presence of other justices of the Court at such
an event could be no different from their
appearance in such other official functions as
attending the Annual State of the Nation
Address by the President of
the Philippines before the Legislative
Department.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility;
but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor
allow the erosion of our peoples faith in the
judicial system, let alone, by those who have
been privileged by it to practice law in the
Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should
observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should
insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally
imputing sinister and devious motives and
questioning the impartiality, integrity, and
authority of the members of the Court, Atty.
Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede,
obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
Legal Ethics (Atty. Rellin)
11
by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on
pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful
of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as
an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has
chosen not to at all take heed.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law,
effective upon his receipt hereof, for conduct
unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the
Court.
CHAPTER IV. THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT
CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS
SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.
Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a
person solely on account of the latter's race, sex.
creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion
regarding the guilt of said person.
Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for
serious and sufficient cause, an appointment as
counsel de officio or as amicus curiae, or a request
from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of
its chapters for rendition of free legal aid.
Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept
representation of an indigent client if:
(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work
effectively or competently;
(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him
and the prospective client or between a present
client and the prospective client.
Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a
person unable to pay his professional fees shall
observe the same standard of conduct governing his
relations with paying clients.
Santiago v Fojas
A.C. No. 4103 (September 7, 1995)
FACTS:
An expulsion case was faced by the
complainants contending that they have illegally
removed from the union (FEUFA) membership
Mr. Paulino Salvador.
The lower court resolved in favor of Salvador
and ordered the complainants to pay, jointly
and severally, Mr. Salvador. The case was then
elevated to the Court of Appeals.
The complainants lost in their petition at the
Court of Appeals due to abandonment, failure to
act accordingly, or serious neglect of their
counsel, Atty. Fojas to answer the civil
complaint on an expulsion case.
Atty. Fojas assured them that everything was in
order and he had already answered the
complaint. However, the appellants soon
discovered that he never answered it after all
11
 Legal Ethics (Atty. Rellin)
12
by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes

because, according to him, he was a very busy should have seasonably informed the
man. Atty. Fojas admitted his mistake in complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of
failing to file an answer for the expulsion case, the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly
but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a provides: A lawyer, when advising his client,
motion for reconsideration. However, such shall give a candid and honest opinion on the
motion for reconsideration was denied. Atty. merits and probable results of the clients case,
Fojas defended his negligence with the reason neither overstating nor understanding the
that the case was a losing cause after all. Atty. prospects of the case.
Fojas also asserts that he was about to appeal
the said decision to this Court, but his services
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
as counsel for the complainants and for the
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
union were illegally and unilaterally terminated
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
by complainant. Complainants then filed for a
disbarment case.
Rule 15.01. - A lawyer, in conferring with a
ISSUE:
prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as
Whether the respondent committed culpable
practicable whether the matter would involve a
negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in
conflict with another client or his own interest, and if
failing to file for the complainants an answer
so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
HELD:
Rule 15.02. - A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld Canon 14 of the
privilege communication in respect of matters
Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he
disclosed to him by a prospective client.
agrees to take up the cause of a client, the
lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
always be mindful of the trust and confidence interests except by written consent of all concerned
reposed in him. This means that his client is given after a full disclosure of the facts.
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy
and defense that is authorized by the law of the Rule 15.04. - A lawyer may, with the written consent
land and he may expect his lawyer to assert of all concerned, act as mediator, conciliator or
every such remedy or defense. In his motion for arbitrator in settling disputes.
reconsideration of the default order, the
Rule 15.05. - A lawyer when advising his client, shall
respondent explained his non-filing of the
give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
required answer by impliedly invoking
probable results of the client's case, neither
forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and
overstating nor understating the prospects of the
pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in
case.
this case he attributes it to honest mistake and
excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he
question the denial order of the trial court. is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
Whether it be the first or the second ground, legislative body.
the fact remains that the respondent did not
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client
comply with his duty to file an answer.
compliance with the laws and the principles of
Pressure and large volume of legal work provide
fairness.
no excuse for the respondents inability to
exercise due diligence in the performance of his Rule 15.08. - A lawyer who is engaged in another
duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer profession or occupation concurrently with the
accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, practice of law shall make clear to his client whether
skill, and competence, regardless of its he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee
or for free. Furthermore, a breach of Canon 18 Northwestern Univ, Inc. v Arquillo
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which A.C. No. 6632 (August 2, 2005)
requires him to serve his clients, the
FACTS:
complainants herein, with diligence and, more
Herein complainants filed a letter complaint
specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides:
with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
charging respondent of engaging in conflicting
entrusted to him, and his negligence in
interest in a case before the National Labor
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration
Atty. Fojass negligence is not excused by his
Branch in San Fernando, La Union.
claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a
Complainant materially averred that, in a NLRC
losing cause. The Supreme Court held that he
consolidated cases, respondent appeared and

12

acted as counsels for complainants. In the very
same consolidated case, respondent was also a
counsel of one of the respondents, Jose G.
Castro.
As evidence to the same, complainant
submitted the Motion to Dismiss filed by Jose
Castro represented by Atty. Arquillo. On the
other hand, despite several notices sent by the
IBP-CBD, respondent failed to answer to the
complaint and appear in any of the scheduled
hearings. Consequently, his right to participate
in the proceedings has deemed waived.
Thereafter, complainants were ordered to
submit their verified position paper with
supporting documents for decision. In their
manifestation, complainant said that they would
no longer file a position paper. Hence, said
letter-complaint is the basis for decision.
Herein, complainants accuse Atty. Arquillo of
deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and/or
violation of his oath as attorney by representing
conflicting interests.
The case was filed with the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline which found Atty. Arquillo guilty
of the charge and recommended a penalty of
suspension for 6 months. The governors of the
IBP increased the penalty for 2 years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of Arquillo merits his
suspension from the practice of law.
HELD:
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires
lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty
in all their dealings and transactions with their
clients. Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall not
represent conflicting interests, except with all
the concerned clients written consent, given
after a full disclosure of the facts. When a
lawyer represents two or more opposing
parties, there is a conflict of interests, the
existence of which is determined by three
separate tests: (1) when, in representation of
one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an
issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose
it for another client; (2) when the acceptance of
the new retainer will require an attorney to
perform an act that may injuriously affect the
first client or, when called upon in a new
relation, to use against the first one any
knowledge acquired through their professional
connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a
new relation would prevent the full discharge of
an attorneys duty to give undivided fidelity and
loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance of that duty.
An attorney cannot represent adverse interests.
It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public
Legal Ethics (Atty. Rellin)
13
by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes
policy that a lawyers representation of both
sides of an issue is highly improper. The
proscription applies when the conflicting
interests arise with respect to the same general
matter, however slight such conflict may be. It
applies even when the attorney acts from
honest intentions or in good faith.
Artezuela v. Maderazo
A.C. No. 4354 (April 22, 2002)
FACTS:
Echavia crashed the car he is driving which is
owned by Kiyami, but was registered in the
name of Villapez. The car rammed into a small
carinderia owned by Artezuela. The destruction
of the carinderia caused the cessation its
operation, resulting to her financial dislocation.
Artezuela incurred debts from her relatives and
due to financial constraints, stopped sending
her two children tocollege. Artezuela hired
Maderazo in filing a damage suit against
Echavia, Villapez and Kiyami. For his services,
Artezuela paid Maderazo 10,000 as attorneys
fees and 2,000 as filing fee. However, the case
was dismissed, allegedly upon the instance of
the Artezuela and her husband. Because of the
dismissal of the case, Artezuela filed a civil case
for damages against the Maderazo. The case
was dismissed.
Artezuela filed for disbarment against the
Maderazo. Artezuela argues that Maderazo
engaged in activities inimical to her interests.
While acting as her counsel, Maderazo prepared
Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint.
The said document was even printed in
Maderazos office. Artezuela further averred
that it was Maderazo who sought the dismissal
of the case, misleading the trial court into
thinking that the dismissal was with her
consent. Maderazo denied Artezuelas
allegations. However, he admitted that
Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint
was printed in his office but denied having
prepared the document and having acted as
counsel of Echavia.
Case was referred to IBP. IBP investigated the
case. IBP found Maderazo guilty of representing
conflicting interests, in violation of Canon 15
and Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, as well as, of
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether Maderazo violated Canon 15 and Rule
15.03 (conflict of interest) of the Code
of Professional Responsibility
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 Legal Ethics (Atty. Rellin)
14
by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes

(2) Whether Maderazo had a direct hand in the Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is
preparation of Echavias Answer to the Amended one of the Senior Partners.
Complaint. Respondent, argues that he appeared as counsel
for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the
HELD:
execution pending appeal of the RTC decision.
YES to both.
He alleged that he did not participate in the
Maderazo was actually giving advice to Echavias litigation of the case before the trial court
but he was not the counsel of record. Maderazo
Respondent argues, with respect to the case of
does not have to publicly hold himself as the
the Almeda spouses, that he never appeared as
counsel of the adverse party, nor make his
counsel for them. He contended that while the
efforts to advance the adverse partys
law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is
conflicting interests of record. It is enough that
designated as counsel of record, the case is
the counsel of one party had a hand in the
actually handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer.
preparation of the pleading of the other party,
Respondent averred that he did not enter into a
claiming adverse and conflicting interests with
general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor
that of his original client. To require that he also
with the other lawyers named therein. They are
be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would
only using the aforesaid name to designate a
punish only the most obvious form of deceit and
law firm maintained by lawyers, who although
reward, with impunity, the highest form of
not partners, maintain one office as well as one
disloyalty.
clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them
An attorney owes his client undivided handles their own cases independently and
allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary individually receives the revenues therefrom
nature of the attorney-client relationship, sound which are not shared among them
public policy dictates that a lawyer be
prohibited from representing conflicting ISSUE:
interests or discharging inconsistent duties. Whether or not Respondent is guilty for the alleged
Good faith and honest intention on the part of act.
the erring lawyer does not make this rule
HELD:
inoperative. The lawyer is an officer of the court
Respondent is guilty. He is suspended for 3
and his actions are governed by the
years. The complaint is granted
uncompromising rules of professional ethics.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting
PNB v. Cedo interests, except by express conflicting consent
A.M. No. 3701 (March 28, 1995) of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a
FACTS:
lawyer represents conflicting interest when, in
Complainant, PNB filed a complaint against
behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend for
respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst.
that which duty to another client requires him
Vice-President of the Asset Management Group
to oppose.
of Complainant bank with violation of Canon 6,
Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility: A lawyer shall not, after leaving
Responsibility.
government service, accept engagement or
Complainant argues that while respondent was
employment in connection with any matter in
still in its employ, he participated in arranging
which he had intervened while in said service.
the sale of steel sheets in favor of Milagros Ong
In this case, Respondent's averment that the law
Siy. When a civil action arose out of this
firm handling the case of the Almeda spouses is
transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and
not a partnership deserves scant consideration
complainant bank respondent who had since
in the light of the attestation of complainant's
left the employ of complainant bank, appeared
counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the
as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
hearings of the Almeda spouses' case,
Complainant argues that while respondent was
respondent attended the same with his partner
still the Asst. Vice President of complainants
Atty. Ferrer, and although he did not enter his
Asset Management Group, he intervened in the
appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty.
handling of the loan account of the spouses
Ferrer what to say and argue before the court.
Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant
Furthermore, during the hearing of the
bank by writing demand letters to the couple.
application for a writ of injunction in the same
When a civil action ensued between
case, respondent impliedly admitted being the
complainant bank and the Almeda spouses as a
partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of
result of this loan account, the latter were
record that respondent was working in the same
represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer,
office as Atty. Ferrer.

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 Legal Ethics (Atty. Rellin)
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by: Ybarita, Julius Reyes

Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the

alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in itself a
violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the clients
secrets and confidential records and information
are exposed to the other lawyers and staff
members at all times.
Having been an executive of complainant bank,
respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for
the opposite side, a case against his former
employer involving a transaction which he
formerly handled while still an employee of
complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics on adverse
influence and conflicting interests.

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