RUBEN C. CORPUZ, REP. BY ATTY.-IN-FACT WENIFREDA C. AGULLANA vs. SPS.

HILARION AGUSTIN AND JUSTA AGUSTIN

G.R. No. 183822, January 18, 2012, J. Carpio

Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass
upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property.
However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of
the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession.

Facts:

Parcels of land subject of the case were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose name
OCT No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said properties to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben
C. Corpuz.

The elder Corpuz allowed Spouses Hilarion and Justa Agustin to occupy subject
properties, the latter being relatives. Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the
premises. Petitioner Ruben filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Agustin.

Ruben says that he has the better right to possess subject property having acquired the
same from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March 15, 1971.
And that the occupation of the Spouses were merely tolerated. Spouses Agustin interposed the
defense that Ruben's father disposed of subject property by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in
their favor.

The Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed at the back of OCT No. O-1717 on 29
October 1976, resulted in the issuance of TCT No. T-12980 in the name of petitioner. The Deed of
Sale executed with respondents was, however, not annotated at the back of OCT No. O-1717 and
remained unregistered.

The MTCC found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint. The RTC affirmed
the MTCCs ruling. The CA dismissed Rubens appeal and noted that his father engaged in a
double sale. The CA also ruled that Ruben had knowledge of the sale of the disputed real
property executed between his father and respondents. The CA concluded that respondents'
possession of the property was not by mere tolerance of its former owner petitioner's father
but was in the exercise of ownership.

Issue:

Who between the parties has the right to possession of the disputed properties
petitioner, who is the registered owner under TCT No. T-12980; or respondents, who have a
notarized yet unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties?

Ruling:

The right of possession belongs to Spouses Agustin since their possession has been
established as one in the concept of ownership.
 In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is entitled to
physical possession of the premises, possession referring to possession de facto, and not
possession de jure. Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to
possess the property. However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of
possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose
of resolving the issue of possession.

Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title holder over the subject properties, he is the
rightful owner and is entitled to possession thereof. However, the lower courts and the appellate
court consistently found that possession of the disputed properties by respondents was in the
nature of ownership, and not by mere tolerance of the elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been in
continuous, open and notorious possession of the property for more than 30 years up to this day.

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Petitioner has not complied with the requirements sufficient to warrant the success of his
unlawful detainer Complaint against respondents.

LEONCIO C. OLIVEROS, represented by his heirs, MOISES DE LA CRUZ, and the HEIRS
OF LUCIO DELA CRUZ, represented by FELIX DELA CRUZ vs. SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION, ET AL.
G.R. No. 173531, February 1, 2012, C.J. Corona

Only holders of valid titles can invoke the principle of indefeasibility of Torrens titles.

Facts:

This case involves a parcel of land known as Lot 1131 (subject property) of the Malinta
Estate located in Barrio Bagbaguin of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Ramitex bought the subject property from co-owners Tomas Soriano (Soriano) and
Concepcion Lozada (Lozada) in 1957. On the basis of such sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan
(Bulacan RD) cancelled the vendors Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 29334 and issued TCT
No. T-18460 on March 6, 1957 in favor of Ramitex.

Lot 1131 is just one of the 17 lots owned by Ramitex within the Malinta Estate. In 1986,
Ramitex consolidated and subdivided its 17 lots within the Malinta Estate into six lots only under
Consolidation Subdivision Plan Pcs-13-000535. Lot 1131, which contains 8,950 square meters, was
consolidated with portions of Lots 1127-A and 1128-B to become consolidated Lot No. 4
(consolidated Lot 4). The consolidated area of Lot 4 is 16,958 square meters. By virtue of this
consolidation, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City (Caloocan RD) cancelled Ramitex
individual title to Lot 1131 (TCT No. T-18460) and issued a new title, TCT No. T-137261, for the
consolidated Lot 4.

Troubles began for Ramitex on February 22, 1989, when Oliveros filed a petition in Branch
172 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela (Valenzuela RTC) for the reconstitution of TCT No.
T-17186, his alleged title over Lot 1131 of the Malinta Estate (reconstitution case). He claimed that
the original copy was destroyed in the fire that gutted the office of the Bulacan RD on March 7,
1987.

Ramitex filed its opposition to Oliveros petition asserting that TCT No. T-17186 never
existed in the records of the Bulacan RD and cannot therefore be reconstituted. The State,
through the provincial prosecutor, also opposed on the basis that Oliveros TCT No. T-17186,
which is embodied on a judicial form with Serial Number (Serial No.) 124604, does not come
from official sources. The State submitted a certification from the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) that its Property Section issued the form with Serial No. 124604 to the Register
of Deeds of Davao City (Davao RD), and not to the Bulacan RD, as claimed in Oliveros alleged
title.

In light of Ramitex opposition and ownership claims over Lot 1131, Oliveros filed a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of Ramitex title over Lot 1131 on November 16, 1990
(nullity case). This complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 3232-V-89 and raffled to Branch 172
of the Valenzuela RTC. Oliveros claimed that he bought the subject property sometime in
November 1956 from the spouses Domingo De Leon and Modesta Molina, and pursuant to such
sale, the Bulacan RD issued TCT No. T-17186 in his favor on November 14, 1956.
He was joined in the suit by his alleged overseers to Lot 1131, petitioners Moises and Felix
Dela Cruz, who were judicially ejected by Ramitex from Lot 1127 two years before.

Oliveros and his co-petitioners alleged that Ramitex did not own Lot 1131 and that its
individual title to Lot 1131, TCT No. 18460, was fake and was used by Ramitex to consolidate Lot
1131 with its other properties in the Malinta Estate. They further claimed that the resulting
consolidated Lot 4 is not actually a consolidation of several lots but only contains Lot 1131, which
belongs to Oliveros. Thus, they asked for the nullification as well of Ramitex title to consolidated
Lot 4, insofar as it unlawfully included Lot 1131.

Petitioners contend that the CA erred in holding that it was their burden to prove the
invalidity of SMCs title and that they failed to discharge such burden. They maintain that the
mere existence of a prior title in Oliveros name suffices to create the presumption that SMCs title,
being the later title, is void. With that presumption, it was incumbent upon SMC to prove the
validity of its alleged title.
Issue:

Whether the doctrines of indefeasibility and conclusiveness of title may be applied in the
case at bar.

Ruling:

The doctrines of indefeasibility and conclusiveness of title may not be applied here.

The principle that the earlier title prevails over a subsequent one applies when there are
two apparently valid titles over a single property. The existence of the earlier valid title renders
the subsequent title void because a single property cannot be registered twice. As stated
in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court of Appeals, which petitioners
themselves cite, a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land
had already been registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in existence. Clearly, a mere
allegation of an earlier title will not suffice.

It is elementary that parties have the burden of proving their respective allegations. Since
petitioners allege that they have a title which was issued earlier than SMCs title, it was their
burden to prove the alleged existence and priority of their title. The trial and appellate courts
shared conclusion that petitioners TCT No. T-17186 does not exist in the official records is a
finding of fact that is binding on this Court. Petitioners have not offered a reason or pointed to
evidence that would justify overturning this finding. Neither did they assert that this factual
finding is unsubstantiated by the records. Without a title, petitioners cannot assert priority or
presumptive conclusiveness.

CELERINO E. MERCADO vs. BELEN ESPINOCILLA and FERDINAND ESPINOCILLA

G.R. No. 184109, February 1, 2012, C.J. Corona

Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. In extraordinary

prescription, ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through
uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or of good faith.

Facts:

Doroteo Espinocilla owned a parcel of land, Lot No. 552, (570 sq. m.) at Sorsogon. After he
died, his five children, Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel, Macario, and Dionisia divided it equally among
themselves. Later, Dionisia died (no descendants) and Macario took possession of Dionisias
share. In an affidavit of transfer of real property dated November 1948, Macario claimed that
Dionisia had donated her share to him in May 1945.

August 1977, Macario and his daughters Betty and Saida sold 225 sq. m. to his son Roger, husband
of respondent Belen and father of respondent Ferdinand. March 1985, Roger Espinocilla sold 114
sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. (So in Lot No. 552: Belen Espinocilla= 109 sq. m., Caridad Atienza = 120
sq. m., Caroline Yu = 209 sq. m., and petitioner, Salvacions son = 132 sq. m).
 Petitioner sued the respondents to recover two portions: an area of 28.58 sq. m. which he
bought from Aspren and another 28.5 sq. m. which allegedly belonged to him but was. He claims
it must be returned to him. He avers that he is entitled to own and possess 171 sq. m. having
inherited 142.5 sq. m. from his mother Salvacion (Doroteo= 114sq m + Dionisia 28.5 sq m) and
bought 28.5 sq. m. from his aunt Aspren. He occupies only 132 sq. m., he claims that respondents
encroach on his share by 39 sq. m.

Respondents claim that they rightfully possess the land they occupy by virtue of
acquisitive prescription and that there is no basis for petitioners claim of encroachment.

The RTC held that petitioner is entitled to 171 sq. m. The RTC computed that Salvacion,
Aspren, Isabel and Macario each inherited 114 sq. m. from Doroteo and 28.5 sq. m. from Dionisia.
The RTC also found that Macario was not entitled to 228 sq. m. Thus, respondents must return 39
sq. m. to petitioner who occupies only 132 sq. m.13. Macarios affidavit was declared void, thereby
preventing him from acquiring said shares by prescription. The RTC also partially declared the
nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale by Macario, Betty and Saida to Roger as it affects the portion
or the share belonging to Salvacion.

The CA, on the other hand, reversed the RTC decision and dismissed petitioners
complaint on the ground that extraordinary acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of
respondents since petitioners complaint was filed only on July 13, 2000.

Issue:

Whether petitioners action to recover the subject portion is barred by prescription.

Ruling:

Petitioners action to recover the subject portion is barred by prescription.

Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable
property, is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law,
namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted,
and adverse. Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. In
extraordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired
through uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or of good faith.

Respondents uninterrupted adverse possession for 55 years of 109 sq. m. of Lot No. 552
was established. Macario occupied Dionisias share in 1945 although his claim that Dionisia
donated it to him in 1945 was only made in a 1948 affidavit. We also agree with the CA that
Macarios possession of Dionisias share was public and adverse since his other co-owners, his
three other sisters, also occupied portions of Lot No. 552. Indeed, the 1977 sale made by Macario
and his two daughters in favor of his son Roger confirms the adverse nature of Macarios
possession because said sale of 225 sq. m. was an act of ownership. Roger also exercised an act of
ownership when he sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. It was only in the year 2000, upon receipt
of the summons to answer petitioners complaint, that respondents peaceful possession of the
remaining portion was interrupted. By then, however, extraordinary acquisitive prescription has
already set in in favor of respondents. That the RTC found Macarios 1948 affidavit void is of no
moment. Extraordinary prescription is unconcerned with Macarios title or good faith.

Petitioner himself admits the adverse nature of respondents possession with his assertion
that Macarios fraudulent acquisition of Dionisias share created a constructive trust. Prescription
may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Moreover, the CA correctly
dismissed petitioners complaint as an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in 10 years from the time the right of action accrues( extinctive
prescription), where rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time. Petitioners action for
recovery of possession having been filed 55 years after Macario occupied Dionisias share, it is also
barred by extinctive prescription. The CA while condemning Macarios fraudulent act of depriving
his three sisters of their shares in Dionisias share, equally emphasized the fact that Macarios
sisters wasted their opportunity to question his acts.

SPS. ROMAN PASCUAL and MERCEDITA R. PASCUAL, ET AL. vs. SPS. ANTONIO
BALLESTEROS and LORENZA MELCHOR-BALLESTEROS
G.R. No. 186269, February 15, 2012, J. Carpio

In the absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period under
Article 1623 of the Civil Code within which to exercise the right of redemption cannot begin to run.

Facts:

The instant case involves a 1,539 square meter parcel of land (subject property) situated in
Barangay Sta. Maria, Laoag City and covered by TCT No. T-30375 of the Laoag City registry. The
subject property is owned by the following persons, with the extent of their respective shares over
the same: (1) the spouses Albino and Margarita Corazon Mariano, 330 square meters; (2) Angela
Melchor (Angela), 466.5 square meters; and (3) the spouses Melecio and Victoria Melchor
(Spouses Melchor), 796.5 square meters. Upon the death of the Spouses Melchor, their share in
the subject property was inherited by their daughter Lorenza Melchor Ballesteros (Lorenza).

Subsequently, Lorenza and her husband Antonio Ballesteros (respondents) acquired the
share of Angela in the subject property by virtue of an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Absolute Sale dated October 1, 1986. On August 11, 2000, Margarita, then already widowed,
together with her children, sold their share in the subject property to Spouses Pascual and
Francisco. Spouses Pascual and Francisco caused the cancellation of TCT No. 30375 and, thus,
TCT No. T-32522 was then issued in their names together with Angela and Spouses
Melchor.Consequently, the respondents, claiming that they did not receive any written notice of
the said sale in favor of Spouses Pascual and Francisco, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Laoag City a Complaint for legal redemption against the petitioners.

The respondents claimed that they are entitled to redeem the portion of the subject
property sold to Spouses Pascual and Francisco being co-owners of the same.For their part, the
petitioners claimed that there was no co-ownership over the subject property considering that the
shares of the registered owners thereof had been particularized, specified and subdivided and,
hence, the respondents has no right to redeem the portion of the subject property that was sold to
them.
 On January 31, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for legal
redemption filed by the respondents. On the first issue, the RTC held that the respondents and
the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners are co-owners of the subject property considering
that the petitioners failed to adduce any evidence showing that the respective shares of each of
the registered owners thereof were indeed particularized, specified and subdivided. On the
second issue, the RTC ruled that the respondents failed to seasonably exercise their right of
redemption within the 30-day period pursuant to Article 1623 of the Civil Code. Notwithstanding
the lack of a written notice of the sale of a portion of the subject property to Spouses Pascual and
Francisco, the RTC asserted that the respondents had actual notice of the said sale. Failing to
exercise their right of redemption within 30 days from actual notice of the said sale, the RTC
opined that the respondents can no longer seek for the redemption of the property as against the
petitioners.

Issue:

Whether respondents can still exercise their right of redemption.

Ruling:

Respondents can still exercise their right of redemption.

Despite the respondents actual knowledge of the sale to the respondents, a written notice
is still mandatory and indispensable for purposes of the commencement of the 30-day period
within which to exercise the right of redemption as it is based on Art. 1623 of the Civil Code. As it
was explained in our jurisprudence, the court ruled that "[P]etitioner-heirs have not lost their
right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day
period has not even begun to run." The right of the petitioner-heirs to exercise their right of legal
redemption exists, and the running of the period for its exercise has not even been triggered
because they have not been notified in writing of the fact of sale.
Here, it is undisputed that the respondents did not receive a written notice of the sale in
favor of the petitioners. Accordingly, the 30-day period stated under Article 1623 of the Civil Code
within which to exercise their right of redemption has not begun to run. Consequently, the
respondents may still redeem from the petitioners the portion of the subject property that was
sold to the latter.

ROGELIO J. JAKOSALEM and GODOFREDO B. DULFO vs. ROBERTO S. BARANGAN

G.R. No. 175025, February 15, 2012, C.J. Corona

In the absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period under
Article 1623 of the Civil Code within which to exercise the right of redemption cannot begin to run.

Facts:

On August 13, 1966, respondent Col. Roberto S. Barangan (respondent Barangan) entered
into a Land Purchase Agreement with Ireneo S. Labsilica of Citadel Realty Corporation whereby
respondent Barangan agreed to purchase on installment a 300 square meter parcel of land,
located in Antipolo, Rizal. Upon full payment of the purchase price, a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed on August 31, 1976 in his favor. Consequently, the old title was cancelled and a new one
was issued in his name. Since then, he has been dutifully paying real property taxes for the said
property. He was not, however, able to physically occupy the subject property because as a
member of the Philippine Air Force, he was often assigned to various stations in the Philippines.

On December 23, 1993, when he was about to retire from the government service,
respondent Barangan went to visit his property, where he was planning to build a retirement
home. It was only then that he discovered that it was being occupied by petitioner Godofredo
Dulfo (petitioner Dulfo) and his family.

On February 4, 1994, respondent Barangan sent a letter to petitioner Dulfo demanding

that he and his family vacate the subject property within 30 days. In reply, petitioner Atty. Rogelio
J. Jakosalem (petitioner Jakosalem), the son-in-law of petitioner Dulfo, sent a letter claiming
ownership over the subject property.

On February 19, 1994, respondent Barangan filed with Barangay San Luis, Antipolo, Rizal,
a complaint for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law against
petitioners. No settlement was reached; hence, the complaint was filed before the Prosecutors
Office of Rizal. The case, however, was dismissed because the issue of ownership must first be
resolved in a civil action.

On May 28, 1994, respondent Barangan commissioned Geodetic Engineer Lope C. Jonco
(Engr. Jonco) of J. Surveying Services to conduct a relocation survey of the subject property based
on the technical description appearing on respondent Barangans TCT. The relocation survey
revealed that the property occupied by petitioner Dulfo and his family is the same property
covered by respondent Barangans title.

On November 17, 1994, respondent Barangan filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession
against petitioners Dulfo and Jakosalem with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Antipolo City. Respondent Barangan prayed that petitioners Dulfo and Jakosalem be
ordered to vacate the subject property and pay a monthly rental of P3,000.00 for the use and
occupancy of the subject property from May 1979 until the time the subject property is vacated,
plus moral and exemplary damages and cost of suit.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners Dulfo and Jakosalem claimed that the
subject property was assigned to petitioner Jakosalem by Mr. Nicanor Samson (Samson); that they
have been in possession of the subject property since May 8, 1979; and that the property covered
by respondent Barangans title is not the property occupied by petitioner Dulfo and his family.

Issues:

1. Whether respondent Barangan is entitled to possession of the subject property.

2. Whether prescription/laches may apply in order for petitioner to retain possession of the
subject property.

Ruling:
1. Respondents can still exercise their right of redemption.

Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that [i]n an action to recover, the property must be
identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendants claim. In other words, in order to recover possession, a person must prove (1) the
identity of the land claimed, and (2) his title.

In this case, respondent Barangan was able to prove the identity of the property and his
title. To prove his title to the property, he presented in evidence the following documents: (1)
Land Purchase Agreement; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale; (3) and a Torrens title registered under his
name.

Neither is there any discrepancy between the title number stated in the Land Purchase
Agreement and the Deed of Absolute Sale. As correctly found by the CA, the title stated in the
Deed of Absolute Sale, is the title stated in the Land Purchase Agreement. Hence, both TCTs
pertain to the same property.

2. Laches and prescription do not apply in the instant case. Jurisprudence consistently holds
that prescription and laches cannot apply to registered land covered by the Torrens system
because under the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in derogation to that
of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

JAIME S. PEREZ, both in his personal and official capacity as Chief, Marikina Demolition
Office vs. SPOUSES FORTUNITO L. MADRONA and YOLANDA B. PANTE
G.R. No. 184478, March 21, 2012, C.J. Corona

Summary abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted in cases that do not

involve a nuisance per se.

Facts:

Judge Fortunito and wife Yolanda own a property located at Greenheights Subdivision. In
1989, they built their house thereon and enclosed it with a concrete fence and steel gate. In 1999,
they received a letter from Jaime, the chief of the Marikina Demolition Office, informing them
that the fence they constructed violated several laws and regulations, such as the Building Code,
the sidewalk clearing program, as well as violation of Republic Act 917. He gave them seven days
within which to voluntarily remove the property or else they will be forced to demolish it.

Fortunito replied by way of letter that the letter contained libelous accusations against
them; condemned their property without due process of law; cited legal basis which gave Jaime
authority to demolish the property; and rued the absence of any court order authorizing
demolition. Jaime then wrote back and requested that the spouses proved a copy of their
relocation survey, which the spouses did not oblige as it was tantamount to a fishing expedition.

After a year, Jaime again wrote the spouses another letter, reiterating his earlier
allegations in the first letter and again requiring the spouses to voluntarily demolish their
property.
 The spouses thus filed a complaint for injunction against Jaime before the Regional Trial
Court. According to the spouses, the acts of Jaime constitute a real and imminent threat to them
and their property, not having any legal basis and Jaime without authority to demolish their
fence. They are entitled to peaceful possession of their property. They asked for moral damages
and attorneys fees, since Jaime acted beyond the scope of his authority. They also prayed for
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin Jaime from proceeding with any demolition.

The RTC issued the TRO and served summons to Jaime, who asked for extension of time
to file answer but was not able to file any aster after all, hence he was declared in default. After
several months, Jaime, with a new counsel, asked again for extension of time to file counsel, citing
heavy workload of his former counsel who was the only legal officer of the city. The RTC denied
the motion, hence, Jaime elevated the case to Court of Appeals, which also dismissed his petition
for lack of merit. After a year, the RTC dismissed the injunction complaint for alleged lack of
interest. On motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and allowed the spouses to
present evidence ex parte.

Issue:

Whether respondents fence is a nuisance per se.

Ruling:

Respondents fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health
or comfort of the community. It was built primarily to secure the property of respondents and
prevent intruders from entering it. And as correctly pointed out by respondents, the sidewalk still
exists. If petitioner believes that respondents fence indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be
so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a
nuisance per accidens, its summary abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted.

HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO and ARACELI TANYAG, namely ARTURO TANYAG, AIDA T.

JOCSON and ZENAID T. VELOSO vs. SALOME E. GABRIEL, ET AL.
G.R. No. 175763, April 11, 2012, C.J. Corona

Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

To successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person
who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed;
and second, his title thereto.

Facts:

Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land located at Ruhale, Barangay
Calzada, Municipality of Taguig. The first parcel (Lot 1) with an area of 686 square meters was
originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel, while the second parcel (Lot 2) consisting of 147
square meters was originally declared in the name of Agueda Dinguinbayan. For several years,
these lands lined with bamboo plants remained undeveloped and uninhabited.

Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister of Jose Gabriel, as part of
her inheritance as declared by her in a 1944 notarized instrument (Affidavit of Sale) whereby she
sold the said property to spouses Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga.

Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriels own daughter, Florencia
Gabriel Sulit, when her father-in-law Gabriel Sulit gave it to her as part of inheritance of his son,
Eliseo Sulit who was Florencias husband. Florencia Sulit sold the same lot to Bienvenido S.
Tanyag, father of petitioners, as evidenced by a notarized deed of sale dated October 14,
1964. Petitioners then took possession of the property, paid the real estate taxes due on the land
and declared the same for tax purposes issued in 1969 in the name of Bienvenidos wife, Araceli C.
Tanyag.

As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda Dinguinbayan to Araceli Tanyag
under Deed of Sale executed on October 22, 1968. Thereupon, petitioners took possession of said
property and declared the same for tax purposes. Petitioners claimed to have continuously,
publicly, notoriously and adversely occupied both Lots 1 and 2 through their caretaker Juana
Quinones; they fenced the premises and introduced improvements on the land.

Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured in his name Lot 1 indicating
therein an increased area of 1,763 square meters.

On March 20, 2000, petitioners instituted a civil case alleging that respondents never
occupied the whole 686 square meters of Lot 1 and fraudulently caused the inclusion of Lot 2 in
such that Lot 1 consisting of 686 square meters originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel was
increased to 1,763 square meters. They contended that the issuance of OCT No. 1035 on October
28, 1998 over the subject land in the name of respondents heirs of Jose Gabriel was null and void
from the beginning.

On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no cause of action against
them for they have not established their ownership over the subject property covered by a
Torrens title in respondents name. They further argued that OCT No. 1035 had become
unassailable one year after its issuance and petitioners failed to establish that it was irregularly or
unlawfully procured.

Issue:

Whether petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive prescription.

Ruling:

Petitioners acquired part of the property (Lot 1) through acquisitive prescription.

Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the

requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an
owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not
intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over
the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of
the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.

Article 1137 of the Civil Code provides that ownership and other real rights over
immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith. Here, petitioners have been in continuous, public and
adverse possession of the subject land for 31 years. Having possessed the property for such period
and in the character required by law as sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive prescription,
petitioners have indeed acquired ownership over the subject property. Such right cannot be
defeated by respondents acts of declaring again the property for tax purposes in 1979 and
obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in their name in 1998.

Petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents adverse possession since 1962. Civil
interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor and not by filing of a
mere Notice of Adverse Claim. In this case, while there was a Notice of Adverse Claim, such cannot
take the place of the judicial summons required for under the law.

Petitioners right as owner, however, does not extend to Lot 2 because they failed to
substantiate their claim over the same by virtue of a deed of sale from the original declared owner,
Dinguinbayan.

Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover the
ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2)
things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto. In regard to the first
requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right to the
property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area and
boundaries thereof. In this case, petitioners failed to identify Lot 2 by providing evidence of the
metes and bounds thereof, so that the same may be compared with the technical description
contained in OCT No. 1035. The testimony of Dinguinbayans son would not suffice because said
he merely stated the boundary owners as indicated in the 1966 and 1967 tax declarations of his
mother. Arturo Tayag claimed that he had the lots surveyed in the 1970s in preparation for the
consolidation of the two parcels. However, no such plan was presented in court.

ANICETO BANGIS, substituted by his heirs, namely RODOLFO B. BANGIS, ET AL. vs.
HEIRS OF SERAFIN and SALUD ADOLFO, namely: LUZ A. BANNIESTER, ET AL.
G.R. No. 190875, June 13, 2012, J. Peralta

No title in derogation of that of the registered owner can be acquired by prescription or

adverse possession.

Facts:
 The spouses Serafin, Sr. and Saludada Adolfo were the original registered owners of a
126,622 square meter lot. This property was mortgaged to the then Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation and upon default in the payment of the loan obligation, was foreclosed and
ownership was consolidated in DBP's name. Serafin Adolfo, Sr., however, repurchased the same.
Sometime in 1975, Serafin Adolfo, Sr. (Adolfo) allegedly mortgaged the subject property for the
sum of P12,500.00 to Aniceto Bangis (Bangis) who immediately took possession of the land. The
said transaction was, however, not reduced into writing.

When Adolfo died, his heirs, namely, Luz Adolfo Bannister, Serafin Adolfo, Jr. and
Eleuterio Adolfo (Heirs of Adolfo), executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition covering the
property. Thereafter the Heirs of Adolfo expressed their intention to redeem the mortgaged
property from Bangis but the latter refused, claiming that the transaction between him and
Adolfo was one of sale. Amicable settlement failed so a full blown trial ensued. The claim of the
Heirs of Bangis was that since they have been in possession of the subject land since 1972 or for 28
years, then the present action has prescribed.

Issue:

Whether the action has prescribed.

Ruling:

The action has not prescribed.

The court ruled that the claim of the Heirs of Bangis that they have been in possession of
the subject land since 1972, or for 28 years, is untenable. While Bangis indeed took possession of
the land upon its alleged mortgage, the certificate of title (TCT No. 6313) remained with Adolfo
and upon his demise, transferred to his heirs, thereby negating any contemplated transfer of
ownership.

Settled is the rule that no title in derogation of that of the registered owner can be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, even if acquisitive prescription can be
appreciated in this case, the Heirs of Bangis possession being in bad faith is two years shy of the
requisite 30-year uninterrupted adverse possession required under Article 1137 of the Civil Code.

Consequently, the Heirs of Bangis cannot validly claim the rights of a builder in good faith
as provided for under Article 449 in relation to Article 448 of the Civil Code. Thus, the order for
them to surrender the possession of the disputed land together with all its improvements was
properly made.

NATIONAL SPIRITUAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BAHA'IS OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by

its Secretary General vs. ALFREDO S. PASCUAL, in his capacity as the Regional Executive
Director, Department of Environmental and Natural Resources, Regional Office No. 32
G.R. No. 169272, July 11, 2012, J. Carpio

Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, there are two (2) indispensable requisites in an
action to quiet title: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that a deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding is claimed to be casting cloud on his title.

Facts:

Petitioner National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of the Philippines alleged that it is
the lawful and absolute owner of two (2) parcels of land. It claimed that it had been in open,
continuous and adverse possession for a period of more than thirty (30) years, and a cloud exists
on its title because of an invalid December 4, 1985 Decision of the Bureau of Lands.

The alleged invalid Decision rejected the miscellaneous sales applications of the
petitioners predecessors-in-interest for the lots, and ordered all those in privity with them
(specifically including the petitioner) to vacate the lots and to remove their improvements
thereon. Because of such cloud, petitioner filed an action to quiet the title of the property.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action but the RTC
dismissed the motion. The CA later reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether petitioners complaint for quieting of title should be dismissed for failure to state
a cause of action.

Ruling:

Petitioners complaint for quieting of title should be dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action.

Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, there are two (2) indispensable requisites in
an action to quiet title: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that a deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding is claimed to be casting cloud on his title.

The petitioners status as possessor and owner of the lots had been settled in the final and
executory December 4, 1985 Decision of the Bureau of Lands that the DENR Secretary and the OP
affirmed on appeal. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership of the
lots.

Jurisprudence teaches us that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, such as
the Bureau of Lands, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, upon finality, have the
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MICHAEL C. SANTOS, VANNESSA C. SANTOS,

MICHELLE C. SANTOS and DELFIN SANTOS, all represented by DELFIN C. SANTOS,
Attorney-in-Fact
G.R. No. 180027, July 18, 2012, J. Perez
Facts:

October 1997, respondents purchased three (3) parcels of unregistered land situated in
Barangay Carasuchi, Indang, Cavite. The 3 parcels of land were previously owned by one Generosa
Asuncion (Generosa), one Teresita Sernal (Teresita) and by the spouses Jimmy and Imelda
Antona, respectively.

Sometime after the said purchase, respondents caused the survey and consolidation of the
parcels of land. Hence, per the consolidation/subdivision plan Ccs-04-003949-D, the 3 parcels
were consolidated into a single lot"Lot 3"with a determined total area of nine thousand five
hundred seventy-seven (9,577) square meters.

Respondents filed with the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Lot 3. The
petitioner opposed on the ground that that their predecessors-in-interest i.e., the previous owners
of the parcels of land making up Lot 3, have been in "continuous, uninterrupted, open, public and
adverse" possession of the said parcels "since time immemorial. It is by virtue of such lengthy
possession, tacked with their own, that respondents now hinge their claim of title over Lot 3.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondents and granted their application for original
registration of Lot 3. The CA later affirmed the RTCs decision.

Issue:

Whether respondents are entitled to the original registration of Lot 3 in their favor.

Ruling:

Respondents are not entitled to the original registration of Lot 3 in their favor.

Under the Jura Regalia and the Property Registration Decree, the State is the original
proprietor of all lands and, as such, is the general source of all private titles. Thus, pursuant to this
principle, all claims of private title to land, save those acquired from native title, must be traced
from some grant, whether express or implied, from the State. Absent a clear showing that land
had been let into private ownership through the States imprimatur, such land is presumed to
belong to the State.

Being an unregistered land, Lot 3 is therefore presumed as land belonging to the State. It
is basic that those who seek the entry of such land into the Torrens system of registration must
first establish that it has acquired valid title thereto as against the State, in accordance with law.
In this connection, original registration of title to land is allowed by Section 14 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, or otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The said section
provides:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
 (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right
of accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Basing from the allegations of the respondents in their application for land registration
and subsequent pleadings, it appears that they seek the registration of Lot 3 under either the first
or the second paragraph of the quoted section. However, after perusing the records of this case, as
well as the laws and jurisprudence relevant thereto, neither of the above-quoted paragraphs
(paragraphs 1 & 2) justifies registration in favor of the respondents.

Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141 specify identical requirements for the judicial confirmation of "imperfect" titles, to wit:

1. That the subject land forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain;

2. That the applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership, and;

3. That such possession and occupation must be since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

In this case, the respondents were not able to satisfy the third requisite, i.e., that the
respondents failed to establish that they or their predecessors-in-interest, have been in possession
and occupation of Lot 3 "since June 12, 1945 or earlier." An examination of the evidence on record
reveals so.