G.R. No.

1719 January 23, 1907

M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

A. D. Gibbs for appellant.

F. G. Waite, & Thimas Kepner for appellee.

TRACEY, J.:

This is an action for damages. The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment
of the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's
yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The
defendant has proved that there were two immediately following one another, upon which were
piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two
crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from
slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or
at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a
certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset,
the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about
the knee.

This first point for the plaintiff to establish was that the accident happened through the negligence of
the defendant. The detailed description by the defendant's witnesses of the construction and quality
of the track proves that if was up to the general stranded of tramways of that character, the
foundation consisting on land of blocks or crosspieces of wood, by 8 inches thick and from 8 to 10 feet
long laid, on the surface of the ground, upon which at a right angle rested stringers of the same
thickness, but from 24 to 30 feet in length. On the across the stringers the parallel with the blocks
were the ties to which the tracks were fastened. After the road reached the water's edge, the blocks
or crosspieces were replaced with pilling, capped by timbers extending from one side to the other.
The tracks were each about 2 feet wide and the two inside rails of the parallel tracks about 18 inches
apart. It was admitted that there were no side pieces or guards on the car; that where no ends of the
rails of the track met each other and also where the stringers joined, there were no fish plates. the
defendant has not effectually overcome the plaintiff's proof that the joints between the rails were
immediately above the joints between the underlying stringers.

The cause of the sagging of the tracks and the breaking of the tie, which was the immediate occasion
of the accident, is not clear in the evidence, but is found by the trial court and is admitted in the briefs
and in the argument to have been the dislodging of the crosspiece or piling under the stringer by the
water of the bay raised by a recent typhoon. The superintendent of the company attributed it to the
giving way of the block laid in the sand. No effort was made to repair the injury at the time of the
occurrence. According to plaintiffs witnesses, a depression of the track, varying from one half inch to
one inch and a half, was therafter apparent to the eye, and a fellow workman of the plaintiff swears
that the day before the accident he called the attention of McKenna, the foreman, to it and asked by
simply straightening out the crosspiece, resetting the block under the stringer and renewing the tie,
but otherwise leaving the very same timbers as before. It has not proven that the company inspected
the track after the typhoon or had any proper system of inspection.

In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to show a breach of duty on its
part in failing either to properly secure the load on iron to vehicles transporting it, or to skillfully build
the tramway or to maintain it in proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect and repair the roadway as
soon as the depression in it became visible. It is upon the failure of the defendant to repair the
weakened track, after notice of its condition, that the judge below based his judgment.

This case presents many important matters for our decision, and first among them is the standard of
duty which we shall establish in our jurisprudence on the part of employees toward employees.

The lack or the harshness of legal rules on this subject has led many countries to enact designed to
put these relations on a fair basis in the form of compensation or liability laws or the institution of
insurance. In the absence of special legislation we find no difficulty in so applying the general
principles of our law as to work out a just result.

Article 1092 of the Civil Code provides:

Civil obligations, arising from crimes or misdemeanors, shall be governed by the provisions of the
Penal Code.

And article 568 of the latter code provides:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that if done with malice would constitute a
grave crime, shall be punished.

And article 590 provides that the following shall be punished:

4. Those who by simple imprudence or negligence, without committing any infraction of

regulations, shall cause an injury which, had malice intervened, would have constituted a crime or
misdemeanor.

And finally by articles 19 and 20, the liability of owners and employers for the faults of their servants
and representatives is declared to be civil and subsidiary in its character.
It is contented by the defendant, as its first defense to the action, that the necessary conclusion from
these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action in
which the official criminally responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only
subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the
representative of the company accountable for not repairing the tract, and on his prosecution a
suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.

This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of the Civil
Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law, subject to the
provisions of Chapter 11 of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:

A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall
be obliged to repair the damage so done.

SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal
acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors
who live with them.

xxx xxx xxx

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or in the
performance of their duties.

xxx xxx xxx

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damages.

As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out that
nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe
appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one "not punished by the law " and falls under
civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We should be
reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific codes, such as is
proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants
their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection
for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict
rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a
construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of
the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though n ever in
actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111
of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but
while the penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action
once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party
injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone
was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced by only on private complaint, the penal
action thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23
and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.

An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citations of these articles suffices
to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be
suspended thereby, except as expressly provided by law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a
negligent act or omission, it is not required that the inured party should seek out a third person
criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil
right.

Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as subsidiary in
respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are process of prosecution, or in so
far as they determinate the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation
under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by election of
the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not
affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this
subsidiary civil liability in penal actions survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated
by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.

The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the briefs
before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not
punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of
the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his
employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law,
within the meaning of articles 1092 and 1093. More than this, however, it can not be said to fall
within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequences of which are regulated by articles
1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be
those and growing out of preexisting duties of the parties to one another. But were relations already
formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those
duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104, of the same code. A typical application of the
distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery
supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment,
that to the passengers out of the contract for passage. while that to that injured bystander would
originate in the negligent act itself. This distinction is thus clearly set forth by Manresa in his
commentary on article 1093.

We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two
difference senses; either as culpa, substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises
in an obligation between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in
the performance of an obligation; or as already existed, which can not be presumed to exist without
the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already exiting obligation.
Of these two species of culpa the first one mentioned, existing by itself, may be also considered as a
real source of an independent obligation, and, as chapter 2, title 16 of this book of the code is
devoted to it, it is logical to presume that the reference contained in article 1093 is limited thereto
and that it does not extend to those provisions relating to the other species of culpa (negligence), the
nature of which we will discuss later. (Vol. 8, p. 29.)

And in his commentary on articles 1102 and 1104 he says that these two species of negligence may be
somewhat inexactly described as contractual and extra-contractual, the letter being the culpa
aquiliana of the Roman law and not entailing so strict an obligation as the former. This terminology is
unreservedly accepted by Sanchez-Roman (Derecho Civil, fourth section, Chapter XI, Article II, No. 12),
and the principle stated is supported be decisions of the supreme court of Spain, among them those
of November 20, 1896 (80 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 151), and June 27, 1894 (75 Jurisprudencia Civil,
No. 182). The contract is one for hire and not one of mandate. (March 10, 1897, 81 Jurisprudencia
Civil, No. 107.)

Spanish Jurisprudencia prior to the adoption of the Working Men's Accident Law of January 30, 1900,
throws uncertain light on the relation between master and workman. Moved by the quick industrial
development of their people, the courts of France early applied to the subject the principles common
to the law of both countries, which are lucidly discussed by the leading French commentators.

The original French theory, resting the responsibility of owners of industrial enterprises upon articles
1382, 1383, and 1384 of the Code Napoleon, corresponding in scope to articles 1902 and 1903 of the
Spanish Code, soon yielded to the principle that the true basis is the contractual obligation of the
employer and employee. (See 18 Dalloz, 196, Title Travail, 331.)

Later the hardships resulting from special exemptions inserted in contracts for employment led to the
discovery of a third basis for liability in an article of he French Code making the possessor of any
object answerable for damage done by it while in his charge. Our law having no counterpart of this
article, applicable to every kind of object, we need consider neither the theory growing out of it nor
that of "professional risk" more recently imposed by express legislation, but rather adopting the
interpretation of our Civil Code above given, find a rule for this case in the contractual obligation. This
contractual obligation, implied from the relation and perhaps so inherent in its nature to be invariable
by the parties, binds the employer to provide safe appliances for the use of the employee, thus
closely corresponding to English and American Law. On these principles it was the duty of the
defendant to build and to maintain its track in reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its
workingmen from unnecessary danger. It is plain that in one respect or the other it failed in its duty,
otherwise the accident could not have occurred; consequently the negligence of the defendant is
established.

Another contention of the defense is that the injury resulted to the plaintiff as a risk incident to his
employment and, as such, one assumed by him. It is evident that this can not be the case if the
occurrence was due to the failure to repair the track or to duly inspect, it for the employee is not
presumed to have stipulated that the employer might neglect his legal duty. Nor may it be excused
upon the ground that the negligence leading to the accident was that of a fellow-servant of the
injured man. It is not apparent to us that the intervention of a third person can relieve the defendant
from the performance of its duty nor impose upon the plaintiff the consequences of an act or
omission not his own. Sua cuique culpa nocet. This doctrine, known as "the fellow-servant, rule," we
are not disposed to introduce into our jurisprudence. Adopted in England by Lord Abinger in the case
of Prescott vs. Fowler (3 Meeson & Welsby, 1) in 1837, it has since been effectually abrogated by "the
Employers' Liability Acts" and the "Compensation Law." The American States which applied it appear
to be gradually getting rid of it; for instance, the New York State legislature of 1906 did away with it in
respect to railroad companies, and had in hand a scheme for its total abolition. It has never found
place in the civil law of continental Europe. (Dalloz, vol. 39, 1858, Title Responsibilite, 630, and vol. 15,
1895, same title, 804. Also more recent instances in Fuzier-Herman, Title Responsibilite Civile, 710.)

The French Cour de Cassation clearly laid down the contrary principle in its judgment of June 28, 1841,
in the case of Reygasse, and has since adhered to it.

The most controverted question in the case is that of the negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to
the accident, to what extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars
is he charged with carelessness:

First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and

Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards,
either before or behind it.

As to the first point, the depression in the track night indicate either a serious or a rival difficulty.
There is nothing in the evidence to show that the plaintiff did or could see the displaced timber
underneath the sleeper. The claim that he must have done so is a conclusion drawn from what is
assumed to have been a probable condition of things not before us, rather than a fair inference from
the testimony. While the method of construction may have been known to the men who had helped
build the road, it was otherwise with the plaintiff who had worked at this job less than two days. A
man may easily walk along a railway without perceiving a displacement of the underlying timbers. The
foreman testified that he knew the state of the track on the day of the accident and that it was then
in good condition, and one Danridge, a witness for the defendant, working on the same job, swore
that he never noticed the depression in the track and never saw any bad place in it. The sagging of the
track this plaintiff did perceive, but that was reported in his hearing to the foreman who neither
promised nor refused to repair it. His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight
depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery
under the severe American rule. On this point we accept the conclusion of the trial judge who found
as facts that "the plaintiff did not know the cause of the one rail being lower than then other" and "it
does not appear in this case that the plaintiff knew before the accident occurred that the stringers
and rails joined in the same place."

Were we not disposed to agree with these findings they would, nevertheless, be binding upon us,
because not "plainly and manifestly against the weight of evidence," as those words of section 497,
paragraph 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure were interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the De la Rama case (201 U. S., 303).
In respect of the second charge of negligence against the plaintiff, the judgment below is not so
specific. While the judge remarks that the evidence does not justify the finding that the car was pulled
by means of a rope attached to the front end or to the rails upon it, and further that the
circumstances in evidence make it clear that the persons necessary to operate the car could not walk
upon the plank between the rails and that, therefore, it was necessary for the employees moving it to
get hold upon it as best they could, there is no specific finding upon the instruction given by the
defendant to its employees to walk only upon the planks, nor upon the necessity of the plaintiff
putting himself upon the ties at the side in order to get hold upon the car. Therefore the findings of
the judge below leave the conduct of the plaintiff in walking along the side of the loaded car, upon
the open ties, over the depressed track, free to our inquiry.

While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this
way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three
of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang
against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition
before the starting of this particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the
preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being
made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger
contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause. This
conclusion presents sharply the question, What effect is to be given such an act of contributory
negligence? Does it defeat a recovery, according to the American rule, or is it to be taken only in
reduction of damages?

While a few of the American States have adopted to a greater or less extent the doctrine of
comparative negligence, allowing a recovery by a plaintiff whose own act contributed to his injury,
provided his negligence was slight as compared with that of the defendant, and some others have
accepted the theory of proportional damages, reducing the award to a plaintiff in proportion to his
responsibility for the accident, yet the overwhelming weight of adjudication establishes the principle
in American jurisprudence that any negligence, however slight, on the part of the person injured
which is one of the causes proximately contributing to his injury, bars his recovery. (English and
American Encyclopedia of law, Titles "Comparative Negligence" and Contributory Negligence.")

In Grant Trunk Railway Company vs. Ives (144 U. S., 408, at page 429) the Supreme Court of the
United States thus authoritatively states the present rule of law:

Although the defendant's' negligence may have been the primary cause of the injury complained of,
yet an action for such injury can not be maintained if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury
can be traced to the want of ordinary care and caution in the person injured; subject to this
qualification, which has grown up in recent years (having been first enunciated in Davies vs. Mann, 10
M. & W., 546) that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be
shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the injured party's negligence.

There are may cases in the supreme court of Spain in which the defendant was exonerated, but when
analyzed they prove to have been decided either upon the point that he was not negligent or that the
negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate cause of the casualty or that the accident was due to
casus fortuitus. Of the first class in the decision of January 26, 1887 (38 Jurisprudencia Criminal, No.
70), in which a railway employee, standing on a car, was thrown therefrom and killed by the shock
following the backing up of the engine. It was held that the management of the train and engine
being in conformity with proper rules of the company, showed no fault on its part.

Of the second class are the decision of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of
March, 1902, stated in Alcubilla's Index of that year; and of the third class the decision of the 4th of
June, 1888 (64 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 1), in which the breaking down of plaintiff's dam by the logs of
the defendant impelled against it by the Tajo River, was held due to a freshet as a fortuitous cause.

The decision of the 7th of March, 1902, on which stress has been laid, rested on two bases, one, that
the defendant was not negligent, because expressly relieved by royal order from the common
obligation imposed by the police law of maintaining a guard at the road crossing; the other, because
the act of the deceased in driving over level ground with unobstructed view in front of a train running
at speed, with the engine whistle blowing was the determining cause of the accident. It is plain that
the train was doing nothing but what it had a right to do and that the only fault lay with the injured
man. His negligence was not contributory, it was sole, and was of such an efficient nature that
without it no catastrophe could have happened.

On the other hand, there are many cases reported in which it seems plain that the plaintiff sustaining
damages was not free from contributory negligence; for instance, the decision of the 14th of
December, 1894 (76 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 134), in which the owner of a building was held liable for
not furnishing protection to workmen engaged in hanging out flags, when the latter must have
perceived beforehand the danger attending the work.

None of those cases define the effect to be given the negligence of a plaintiff which contributed to his
injury as one of its causes, though not the principal one, and we are left to seek the theory of the civil
law in the practice of other countries.

In France in the case of Marquant, August 20, 1879, the cour de cassation held that the carelessness
of the victim did not civilly relieve the person without whose fault the accident could not have
happened, but that the contributory negligence of the injured man had the effect only of reducing the
damages. The same principle was applied in the case of Recullet, November 10, 1888. and that of
Laugier of the 11th of November, 1896. (Fuzier-Herman, Title Responsibilite Cirile, 411, 412.) Of like
tenor are citations in Dalloz (vol. 18, 1806, Title Trail, 363, 364, and vol. 15, 1895, Title Responsibilite,
193, 198).

In the Canadian Province of Quebee, which has retained for the most part the French Civil Law, now
embodied in a code following the Code Napoleon, a practice in accord with that of France is laid down
in many cases collected in the annotations to article 1053 of the code edited by Beauchamps, 1904.
One of these is Luttrell vs. Trottier, reported in La Revue de Jurisprudence, volume 6, page 90, in
which the court of Kings bench, otherwise known as the court of appeals, the highest authority in the
Dominion of Canada on points of French law, held that contributory negligence did not exonerate the
defendants whose fault had been the immediate cause of the accident, but entitled him to a
reduction of damages. Other similar cases in the provincial courts have been overruled by appellate
tribunals made up of common law judges drawn from other provinces, who have preferred to impose
uniformally throughout the Dominion the English theory of contributory negligence. Such decisions
throw no light upon the doctrines of the civil law. Elsewhere we find this practice embodied in
legislation; for instance, section 2 of article 2398 of the Code of Portugal reads as follows:

If in the case of damage there was fault or negligence on the part of the person injured or in the part
of some one else, the indemnification shall be reduced in the first case, and in the second case it shall
be appropriated in proportion to such fault or negligence as provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of section
2372.

And in article 1304 of the Austrian Code provides that the victim who is partly changeable with the
accident shall stand his damages in proportion to his fault, but when that proportion is incapable of
ascertainment, he shall share the liability equally with the person principally responsible. The
principle of proportional damages appears to be also adopted in article 51 of the Swiss Code. Even in
the United States in admirality jurisdictions, whose principles are derived from the civil law, common
fault in cases of collision have been disposed of not on the ground of contradictor negligence, but on
that of equal loss, the fault of the one part being offset against that of the other. (Ralli vs. Troop, 157
U. S. 386; 97.)

The damage of both being added together and the sum equally divided, a decree is entered in favor of
the vessel sustaining the greater loss against the other for the excess of her damages over one-half of
the aggregate sum. (The Manitoba, 122 U. S., 97)

Exceptional practice appears to prevail in maritime law in other jurisdictions. The Spanish Code of
Commerce, article 827, makes each vessel for its own damage when both are the fault; this provision
restricted to a single class of the maritime accidents, falls for short of a recognition of the principle of
contributory negligence as understood in American Law, with which, indeed, it has little in common.
This is a plain from other articles of the same code; for instance, article 829, referring to articles 826,
827, and 828, which provides: "In the cases above mentioned the civil action of the owner against the
person liable for the damage is reserved, as well as the criminal liability which may appear."

The rule of the common law, a hard and fast one, not adjustable with respects of the faults of the
parties, appears to have grown out the original method of trial by jury, which rendered difficult a nice
balancing of responsibilities and which demanded an inflexible standard as a safeguard against too
ready symphaty for the injured. It was assumed that an exact measure of several concurring faults
was unattainable.

The reason why, in cases of mutual concurring negligence, neither party can maintain an action
against the other, is, not the wrong of the one is set off against the wrong of the other; it that the law
can not measure how much of the damage suffered is attributable to the plaintiff's own fault. If he
were allowed to recover, it might be that he would obtain from the other party compensation for hiss
own misconduct. (Heil vs. Glanding, 42 Penn. St. Rep., 493, 499.)
The parties being mutually in fault, there can be no appointment of damages. The law has no scales to
determine in such cases whose wrongdoing weighed most in the compound that occasioned the
mischief. (Railroad vs. Norton, 24 Penn. St. 565, 469.)

Experience with jury trials in negligence cases has brought American courts to review to relax the
vigor of the rule by freely exercising the power of setting aside verdicts deemed excessive, through
the device of granting new trials, unless reduced damages are stipulated for, amounting to a partial
revision of damages by the courts. It appears to us that the control by the court of the subject matter
may be secured on a moral logical basis and its judgment adjusted with greater nicety to the merits of
the litigants through the practice of offsetting their respective responsibilities. In the civil law system
the desirable end is not deemed beyond the capacity of its tribunals.

Whatever may prove to be the doctrine finally adopted in Spain or in other countries under the stress
and counter stress of novel schemers of legislation, we find the theory of damages laid down in the
judgment the most consistent with the history and the principals of our law in these Islands and with
its logical development.

Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered
immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be between the accident and
the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts
of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for
damages that is, the shinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of
the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the
damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his
act of omission of duty, the last would have been one of the determining causes of the event or
accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the
occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his
own imprudence.

Accepting, though with some hesitation, the judgment of the trial court, fixing the damage incurred
by the plaintiff at 5,000 pesos, the equivalent of 2,500 dollars, United States money, we deduct
therefrom 2,500 pesos, the amount fairly attributable to his negligence, and direct judgment to be
entered in favor of the plaintiff for the resulting sum of 2,500 pesos, with cost of both instances, and
ten days hereafter let the case be remanded to the court below for proper action. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J. Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
WILLARD, J., dissenting:

The knowledge which the plaintiff had in regard to the condition of the track is indicated by his own
evidence. He testified, among other things, as follows:

Q. Now, describe the best you can the character of the track that ran from the place where
you loaded the irons from the barge up to the point where you unloaded them on the ground.

A. Well, it was pretty bad character.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And you were familiar with the track before that its construction?

A. Familiar with what?

Q. Well, you have described it here to the court.

A. Oh, yes; I knew the condition of the track.

Q. You knew its conditions as you have described it here at the time you were working around
there?

A. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And while operating it from the side it was necessary for you to step from board to board
on the cross-ties which extended out over the stringers?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And these were very of irregular shape, were they not?

A. They were in pretty bad condition.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And it was not safe to walk along on the outside of these crosspieces?

A. It was safe if the car stayed on the track. We didn't try to hold the load on. We tried to hold
the car back, keep it from going too fast, because we knew the track was in bad condition just here,
and going down too fast we could be liable to run off most any time.

Q. You knew the track was in bad condition when you got hold?

A. Sure, it was in bad condition.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And the accident took place at that point where you believed it to be so dangerous?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But you knew it was dangerous?

A. Why certainly, anybody could see it; but a workingman had to work in those days or get
arrested for a vag here in Manila.

The court below, while it found that the plaintiff knew in a general way of the bad condition of the
track, found that he was not informed of the exact cause of the accident, namely, the washing away
of the large crosspiece laid upon the ground or placed upon the posts as the foundation upon which
the stripers rested. This finding of fact to my mind is plainly and manifestly against the weight of the
evidence. Ellis, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that on the morning of the accident he called the
attention of McKenna, the foreman, to the defective condition of the track at his precise point where
the accident happened. His testimony in part is as follows:

A. I called Mr. McKenna. I showed him the track and told him I didn't think it was safe working,
and that if he didn't fix it he was liable to have an accident; I told him I thought if he put fish plates on
it would it. He said, you keep on fishing around here for fish plates and you will be fishing for another
job the first thing you know." He says, "You see to much."
xxx xxx xxx

Q. Who else was present at the time you had this conversation with Mr. McKenna?

A. Well, at that conversation as far as I can remember, we were all walking down the track
and I know that McCoy and Mr. Blakes was along at the time. I remember them two, but we were all
walking down the track in a bunch, but I disremember them.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Was that the exact language that you used, that you wanted some fish plates put on?

A. No, sir: I told him to look at that track. I says get some fish plates. I says if there was any
fish plates we would fix that.

Q. What did the fish plates have to do with that?

A. It would have strengthened that joint.

Q. Why didn't you put the 8 by 8 which was washed crossways in place?

A. That would have been taken the raising of the track and digging out along this upright piece and
then putting it up again.

The plaintiff himself testified that he was present with Ellis at the time this conversation was had with
McKenna. It thus appears that on the morning in question the plaintiff and McKenna were standing
directly over the place where the accident happened later in the day. The accident was caused, as the
court below found, by the washing away or displacement of the large 8 by 8 piece of timber. This
track was constructed as all other tracks are, all of it open work, with no floor over the ties, and of
course see the ground and the entire construction of the road, including these large 8 by 8 pieces, the
long stringers placed thereon, the ties placed on these stringers, and the rails placed on the ties. The
plaintiff himself must have seen that the 8 by 8 piece of timber was out of place.

If the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses is to be believed, the displacement was more markedly
apparent even than it would appear from the testimony of the defendant's witnesses. According to
the plaintiff's witnesses, the water at high tide reached the place in question and these 8 by 8 pieces
were therefore not laid upon the ground but were placed upon posts driven into the ground, the
height of the posts at this particular place being, according to the testimony of the plaintiff's
witnesses, from a foot to two feet and a half. As has been said, Ellis testified that the reason why they
did not put the 8 by 8 back in its place was because that would have required the raising up of the
track and digging out along this upright piece and then putting it up again.

It conclusively appears from the evidence that the plaintiff, before the accident happened, knew the
exact condition of the track and was informed and knew of the defect which caused the accident.
There was no promise on the part of McKenna to repair the track.

Under the circumstances the plaintiff was negligent in placing himself on the side of the car where he
knew that he would be injured by the falling of the rails from the car when they reached this point in
the track where the two stringers were without any support of their ends. He either should have
refused to work at all or he should have placed himself behind the car, on the other side of it, or in
front of it, drawing it with a rope. He was guilty of contributory negligence and is not entitled to
recover.

It is, said however, that contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in a case like this is no
defense under the law in force in these Islands. To this proposition I can not agree. The liability of the
defendant is based in the majority opinion upon articles 1101 and 1103 of the Civil Code.

In order to impose such liability upon the defendant, it must appear that its negligence caused the
accident. The reason why contradictory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is a defense in this class
of cases is that the negligence of the defendant did not alone cause the accident. If nothing but that
negligence had existed, the accident would not have happened and, as I understand it, in every case
in which contradictory negligence is a defense it is made so because the negligence of the plaintiff is
the cause of the accident, to this extent, that if the plaintiff had not been negligent the accident
would not have happened, although the defendant was also negligent. In other words, the negligence
of the defendant is not alone sufficient to cause the accident. It requires also the negligence of the
plaintiff.

There is, so far as I know, nothing in the Civil Code relating to contributory negligence. The rule of the
Roman law was: "Quod quis ex culap sua damnum sentit, no intelligitur damnum sentire." (Digest,
book, 50, tit. 17, rule 203.)

The partidas contain the following provisions:

The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and
that he can not demand reparation therefor from another. (Law 25, tit. 5, partida 3.)

And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own acts, the grievance should be
against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7, partida 2.)
In several cases in the supreme court of Spain the fact has been negligence that the plaintiff was
himself guilty of negligence, as in the civil judgments of the 4th of June, 1888, and of the 20th of
February, 1887, and in the criminal judgments of the 20th of February 1888, the 90th of March, 1876,
and the 6th of October, 1882. These cases do not throw much light upon the subject. The judgment of
the 7th of March, 1902 (93 Jurisprudencia Civil, 391), is, however, directly in point. In that case the
supreme court of Spain said:

According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence is a source of
obligation when between such negligence and the injury thereby caused there exists the relation of
cause and effect; but in the injury caused should not be the result of acts or omissions of a third party,
the latter has no obligation to repair the same, even though such acts or omissions were imprudent or
unlawful, and much less when it is shown that the immediate cause of the injury was the negligence
of the injured person party himself.

Found the reasons above stated, and the court below having found that the death of the deceased
was due to his own imprudence, and not therefore due to the absence of a guard at the grade
crossing where the accident occurred, it seems clear that court in acquitting the railroad company of
the complaint filed by the widow did not violate the provisions of the aforesaid article of the Civil
Code.

For the same reason, although the authority granted to the railroad company to open the grade
crossing without a special guard was nullified by the subsequent promulgation of the railroad police
law and the regulations for the execution of the same, the result would be identical, leaving one of
the grounds upon which the judgment of acquittal is based, to wit, that the accident was caused by
the imprudence of the injured party himself, unaffected.

It appears that the accident in this case took place at a grade crossing where, according to the claim
of the plaintiff, it was the duty of the railroad company to maintain husband was injured by a train at
this crossing, his negligence contributing to the injury according to the ruling of the court below. This
judgment, then, amounts to a holding that a contributory negligence is a defense according to the law
of Spain. (See also judgment of the 21st of October, 1903, vol. 96 p. 400, Jurisprudencia Civil.)

Although in the Civil Code there is no express provision upon the subject, in the Code of Commerce
there is found a distinct declaration upon it in reference to damages caused by collission at sea.
Article 827 of the Code of Commerce is as follows:

If both vessels may be blamed for the collission, each one shall for liable for his own damages, and
both shall jointly responsible for the loss and damages suffered to their cargoes.

That article is an express recognition of the fact that in collision cases contributory negligence is a
defense,
I do not think that this court is justified in view of the Roman law, of the provisions of the Partidas, of
the judgment of March 7, 1902, of article 827 of the Code of Commerce, and in the absence of any
declaration upon the subject in the Civil Code, in saying that it was the intention rule announced in
the majority opinion, a rule dimetrically opposed to that put in force by the Code of Commerce.

The chief, is not the only, reason stated in the opinion for adopting the rule that contradictory
negligence is not a defense seems to be that such is the holding of the later French decisions.

As to whether, if any liability existed in this case, it would be necessary in accordance with the
provisions of the Penal Code, or primary, in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code, I express
no opinion.

The judgment should, I think, be reversed and the defendant acquitted of the complaint.

Carson, J., concurs.

G.R. No. L-21512 August 31, 1966

PROSPERO SABIDO and ASER LAGUNDA, petitioners,

vs.

CARLOS CUSTODIO, BELEN MAKABUHAY CUSTODIO and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.

Sabido, Sabido and Associates for petitioners.

Ernesto S. Tengco for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Prospero Sabido and Aser Lagunda seek the review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, sentencing the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co., Nicasio
Mudales, and herein petitioners. Prospero Sabido and Aser Lagunda, to jointly and severally
indemnify Belen Makabuhay Custodio and her son, Agripino Custodio Jr., in the sum of P6,000 and to
pay the costs of the suit.

The facts are set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals from which we quote:

Upon a careful study and judicious examining of the evidence on record, we are inclined to concur in
the findings made by the trial court. Here is how the Court a quo analyzed the facts of this case:

"In Barrio Halang, Municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, two trucks, one driven by Nicasio
Mudales and belonging to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Aser Lagunda and
owned by Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve. Agripino
Custodia a passenger of LTB bus, who was hanging on the left side as truck was full of passengers was
sideswiped by the track driven by Aser Lagunda. As a result, Agripino Custodio was injured and died
(Exhibit A).

"It appears clear from the evidence that Agripino Custodio was hanging on the left side of the LTB bus.
Otherwise, were he sitting inside the truck, he could not have been struck by the six by six truck
driven by Aser Lagunda. This fact alone, of allowing Agripino Custodio to hang on the side of the truck,
makes the defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company liable for damages. For certainly its employees,
who are the driver and conductor were negligent. They should not have allowed Agripino Custodio to
ride their truck in that manner.

"To avoid any liability, Aser Lagunda and Prospero Sabido throw all the blame on Nicasio Mudales.
From the testimony, however, of Belen Makabuhay, Agripino Custodio's widow, we can deduce that
Aser Lagunda was equally negligent as Nicasio Mudales. Belen testified that the 6 x 6 truck was
running fast when it met the LTB Bus. And Aser Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the
mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks never collided with
each other. By simply swerving to the right side of the road, the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting
Agripino Custodio. It is incredible that the LTB was running on the middle of the road when passing a
curve. He knows it is dangerous to do so. We are rather of the belief that both trucks did not keep
close to the right side of the road so they sideswiped each other and thus Agripino Custodio was
injured and died. In other words, both drivers must have drive in their trucks not in the proper lane
and are, therefore, both reckless and negligent.

"We might state by way of additional observations that the sideswiping of the deceased and his two
fellow passengers took place on broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9, 1955 when the
LTB bus with full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding downward a
slope, whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with no cargoes or passengers on board but for
three helpers, owner Sabido and driver Lagunda (tsn. 308-309, Mendoza). Under the above-stated
condition, there exists strong persuasion to accept what Belen Makabuhay and Sofia Mesina, LTB
passengers, had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck was running at a fast rate of speed
(tsn. 15, 74, 175 Mendoza). From the lips of no less than driver Lagunda himself come the testimonial
admission that the presence of three hanging passengers located at the left side of the bus was noted
when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus, and yet despite the existence of
a shallow canal on the right side of the road which he could pass over with ease, Lagunda did not care
to exercise prudence to avert the accident simply because to use his own language the canal "is not a
passage of trucks."

Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court of Appeals concluded that
the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. hereinafter referred to as the carrier and its driver Nicasio Mudales
(none of whom has appealed), had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio, whereas
petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of which all of them were held
solidarity liable in the manner above indicated.

Petitioners now maintain: (1) that the death of Agripino Custodio was due exclusively to the
negligence of the carrier and its driver; (2) that petitioners were not guilty of negligence in connection
with the matter under consideration; (3) that petitioners cannot be held solidarily liable with the
carrier and its driver; and (4) that the complaint against petitioners herein should be dismissed.

With respect to the first two (2) points, which are interrelated, it is urged that the carrier and its
driver were clearly guilty of negligence for having allowed Agripino Custodio to ride on the running
board of the bus, in violation of Section 42 of Act No. 3992, and that this negligence was the
proximate cause of Agripino's death. It should be noted, however, that the lower court had, likewise,
found the petitioners guilty of contributory negligence, which was as much a proximate cause of the
accident as the carrier's negligence, for petitioners' truck was running at a considerable speed,
despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its right side of
the road, said truck was driven on its middle portion and so near the passenger bus coming from the
opposite direction as to sideswipe a passenger riding on its running board.1wph1.t

The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its location at the time of the
accident are in the nature of findings of fact, which we cannot disturb in a petition for review by
certiorari, such as the one at bar. At any rate, the correctness of said findings is borne out by the very
testimony of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding on the running board
of the bus while the same was still five (5) or seven (7) meters away from the truck driven by him.
Indeed, the distance between the two (2) vehicles was such that he could have avoided sideswiping
said passengers if his truck were not running at a great speed.

Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its execution, of the negligence
of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of the death of
Agripino Custodio. In fact, the negligence of the first two (2) would not have produced this result
without the negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners' negligence was the last, in
point of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners'
truck came from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear
chance.

Petitioners contend that they should not be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver,
because the latter's liability arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the former springs from
a quasi delict. The rule is, however, that

According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination,
the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in
what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even
though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have
resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor ... . (38 Am. Jur. 946, 947.)

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners herein.
It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Regala, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-40570 January 30, 1976

TEODORO C. UMALI, petitioner,

vs.

HON. ANGEL BACANI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan and FIDEL H. SAYNES, respondents.

Julia M. Armas for petitioner.

Antonio de los Reyes for private respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan Branch IX, in
Civil Case No. U2412, entitled, "Fidel H. Saynes, plaintiff-appellee versus Teodoro C. Umali,
defendant-appellant", which found the death by electrocution of Manuel Saynes, a boy of 3 years and
8 months, as "due to the fault or negligence of the defendant (Umali) as owner and manager of the
Alcala Electric Plant", although the liability of defendant is mitigated by the contributory negligence of
the parents of the boy "in not providing for the proper and delegate supervision and control over
their son The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows:

Wherefore, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff by ordering the defendant to
pay to the plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for the death of his son, Manuel
Saynes; the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) for actual expenses for and in
connection with the burial of said deceased child, and the further sum of Three Thousand Pesos
(P3,000.00) for moral damages and Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos as reasonable attorney's fee, or a
total of Nine Thousand Seven Hundred (P9,700.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs of this suit. It Is So
Ordered.

Undisputed facts appearing of record are:

On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan, which started
from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon and lasted up to about midnight of the same day. During the storm,
the banana plants standing on an elevated ground along the barrio road in San Pedro Ili of said
municipality and near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fell on
the electric wire. As a result, the live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the
electric post and the other fell to the ground under the fallen banana plants.
On the following morning, at about 9:00 o'clock barrio captain Luciano Bueno of San Pedro Iii who
was passing by saw the broken electric wire and so he warned the people in the place not to go near
the wire for they might get hurt. He also saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the Alcala Electric Plant
near the place and notified him right then and there of the broken line and asked him to fix it, but the
latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to
fix it.

Sometime after the barrio captain and Cipriano Baldomero had left the place, a small boy of 3 years
and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the
road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was
electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution of Manuel Saynes that the
broken wire was fixed at about 10:00 o'clock on the same morning by the lineman of the electric
plant.

Petitioner claims that he could not be liable under the concept of quasi-delict or tort as owner and
manager of the Alcala Electric Plant because the proximate cause of the boy's death electrocution
could not be due to any negligence on his part, but rather to a fortuitous event-the storm that caused
the banana plants to fall and cut the electric line-pointing out the absence of negligence on the part
of his employee Cipriano Baldomero who tried to have the line repaired and the presence of
negligence of the parents of the child in allowing him to leave his house during that time.

A careful examination of the record convinces Us that a series of negligence on the part of
defendants' employees in the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution.
First, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall banana plants at the place of the
incident standing on an elevated ground which were about 30 feet high and which were higher than
the electric post supporting the electric line, and yet the employees of the defendant who, with
ordinary foresight, could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would
be endangered by banana plants being blown down, did not even take the necessary precaution to
eliminate that source of danger to the electric line. Second, even after the employees of the Alcala
Electric Plant were already aware of the possible damage the storm of May 14, 1972, could have
caused their electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and property, they did not cut off
from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily done pending
inspection of the wires to see if they had been cut. Third, employee Cipriano Baldomero was
negligent on the morning of the incident because even if he was already made aware of the live cut
wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that the same posed a danger to life and property, and
that he should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the live
wire; instead Baldomero left the premises because what was foremost in his mind was the repair of
the line, obviously forgetting that if left unattended to it could endanger life and property.

On defendants' argument that the proximate cause of the victim's death could be attributed to the
parents' negligence in allowing a child of tender age to go out of the house alone, We could readily
see that because of the aforementioned series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees
resulting in a live wire lying on the premises without any visible warning of its lethal character,
anybody, even a responsible grown up or not necessarily an innocent child, could have met the same
fate that befell the victim. It may be true, as the lower Court found out, that the contributory
negligence of the victim's parents in not properly taking care of the child, which enabled him to leave
the house alone on the morning of the incident and go to a nearby place cut wire was very near the
house (where victim was living) where the fatal fallen wire electrocuted him, might mitigate
respondent's liability, but we cannot agree with petitioner's theory that the parents' negligence
constituted the proximate cause of the victim's death because the real proximate cause was the fallen
live wire which posed a threat to life and property on that morning due to the series of negligence
adverted to above committed by defendants' employees and which could have killed any other
person who might by accident get into contact with it. Stated otherwise, even if the child was allowed
to leave the house unattended due to the parents' negligence, he would not have died that morning
where it not for the cut live wire he accidentally touched.

Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this
case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants'
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability.
Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article
2180 of the Civil Code, which states:

The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on tile
occasion of their functions.

The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the
employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This liability of the
employer is primary and direct (Standard Vacuum Oil Co. vs. Tan and Court of Appeals, 107 Phil. 109).
In fact the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to prove that he
exercised, the diligence of the good father of the family to prevent damage not only in the selection
of his employees but also in adequately supervising them over their work. This defense was not
adequately proven as found by the trial Court, and We do not find any sufficient reason to deviate
from its finding.

Notwithstanding diligent efforts, we fail to fired any reversible error committed by the trial Court in
this case, either in its appreciation of the evidence on questions of facts or on the interpretation and
application of laws government quasi-delicts and liabilities emanating therefrom. The inevitable
conclusion is that no error amounting to grave abuse of discretion was committed and the decision
must be left untouched.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court dated June 27, 1974 is affirmed.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 133179 March 27, 2008

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.

LIM SIO WAN, METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., and PRODUCERS BANK, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

To ingratiate themselves to their valued depositors, some banks at times bend over backwards that
they unwittingly expose themselves to great risks.

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals (CAs)
Decision promulgated on March 18, 19981 in CA-G.R. CV No. 46290 entitled Lim Sio Wan v. Allied
Banking Corporation, et al. The CA Decision modified the Decision dated November 15, 19932 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 in Makati City rendered in Civil Case No. 6757.

The Facts

The facts as found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA are as follows:

On November 14, 1983, respondent Lim Sio Wan deposited with petitioner Allied Banking
Corporation (Allied) at its Quintin Paredes Branch in Manila a money market placement of PhP
1,152,597.35 for a term of 31 days to mature on December 15, 1983,3 as evidenced by Provisional
Receipt No. 1356 dated November 14, 1983.4

On December 5, 1983, a person claiming to be Lim Sio Wan called up Cristina So, an officer of Allied,
and instructed the latter to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wans money market placement, to issue a
managers check representing the proceeds of the placement, and to give the check to one Deborah
Dee Santos who would pick up the check.5 Lim Sio Wan described the appearance of Santos so that
So could easily identify her.6

Later, Santos arrived at the bank and signed the application form for a managers check to be issued.7
The bank issued Managers Check No. 035669 for PhP 1,158,648.49, representing the proceeds of Lim
Sio Wans money market placement in the name of Lim Sio Wan, as payee.8 The check was
cross-checked "For Payees Account Only" and given to Santos.9

Thereafter, the managers check was deposited in the account of Filipinas Cement Corporation (FCC)
at respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank),10 with the forged signature of Lim Sio
Wan as indorser.11

Earlier, on September 21, 1983, FCC had deposited a money market placement for PhP 2 million with
respondent Producers Bank. Santos was the money market trader assigned to handle FCCs
account.12 Such deposit is evidenced by Official Receipt No. 31756813 and a Letter dated September
21, 1983 of Santos addressed to Angie Lazo of FCC, acknowledging receipt of the placement.14 The
placement matured on October 25, 1983 and was rolled-over until December 5, 1983 as evidenced by
a Letter dated October 25, 1983.15 When the placement matured, FCC demanded the payment of the
proceeds of the placement.16 On December 5, 1983, the same date that So received the phone call
instructing her to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wans placement, the managers check in the name of Lim Sio
Wan was deposited in the account of FCC, purportedly representing the proceeds of FCCs money
market placement with Producers Bank.17 In other words, the Allied check was deposited with
Metrobank in the account of FCC as Producers Banks payment of its obligation to FCC.

To clear the check and in compliance with the requirements of the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation (PCHC) Rules and Regulations, Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check, which reads:
"All prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed."18

The check was sent to Allied through the PCHC. Upon the presentment of the check, Allied funded the
check even without checking the authenticity of Lim Sio Wans purported indorsement. Thus, the
amount on the face of the check was credited to the account of FCC.19

On December 9, 1983, Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied a second money market placement to
mature on January 9, 1984.20

On December 14, 1983, upon the maturity date of the first money market placement, Lim Sio Wan
went to Allied to withdraw it.21 She was then informed that the placement had been pre-terminated
upon her instructions. She denied giving any instructions and receiving the proceeds thereof. She
desisted from further complaints when she was assured by the banks manager that her money would
be recovered.22

When Lim Sio Wans second placement matured on January 9, 1984, So called Lim Sio Wan to ask for
the latters instructions on the second placement. Lim Sio Wan instructed So to roll-over the
placement for another 30 days.23 On January 24, 1984, Lim Sio Wan, realizing that the promise that
her money would be recovered would not materialize, sent a demand letter to Allied asking for the
payment of the first placement.24 Allied refused to pay Lim Sio Wan, claiming that the latter had
authorized the pre-termination of the placement and its subsequent release to Santos.25
Consequently, Lim Sio Wan filed with the RTC a Complaint dated February 13, 198426 docketed as
Civil Case No. 6757 against Allied to recover the proceeds of her first money market placement.
Sometime in February 1984, she withdrew her second placement from Allied.

Allied filed a third party complaint27 against Metrobank and Santos. In turn, Metrobank filed a fourth
party complaint28 against FCC. FCC for its part filed a fifth party complaint29 against Producers Bank.
Summonses were duly served upon all the parties except for Santos, who was no longer connected
with Producers Bank.30

On May 15, 1984, or more than six (6) months after funding the check, Allied informed Metrobank
that the signature on the check was forged.31 Thus, Metrobank withheld the amount represented by
the check from FCC. Later on, Metrobank agreed to release the amount to FCC after the latter
executed an Undertaking, promising to indemnify Metrobank in case it was made to reimburse the
amount.32

Lim Sio Wan thereafter filed an amended complaint to include Metrobank as a party-defendant, along
with Allied.33 The RTC admitted the amended complaint despite the opposition of Metrobank.34
Consequently, Allieds third party complaint against Metrobank was converted into a cross-claim and
the latters fourth party complaint against FCC was converted into a third party complaint.35

After trial, the RTC issued its Decision, holding as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering defendant Allied Banking Corporation to pay plaintiff the amount of P1,158,648.49 plus
12% interest per annum from March 16, 1984 until fully paid;

2. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00 by way of moral
damages;

3. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay plaintiff the amount of P173,792.20 by way of attorneys
fees; and,

4. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay the costs of suit.

Defendant Allied Banks cross-claim against defendant Metrobank is DISMISSED.

Likewise defendant Metrobanks third-party complaint as against Filipinas Cement Corporation is

DISMISSED.
Filipinas Cement Corporations fourth-party complaint against Producers Bank is also DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.36

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

Allied appealed to the CA, which in turn issued the assailed Decision on March 18, 1998, modifying
the RTC Decision, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Judgment is rendered
ordering and sentencing defendant-appellant Allied Banking Corporation to pay sixty (60%) percent
and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company forty (40%) of the amount of
P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per annum from March 16, 1984 until fully paid. The moral damages,
attorneys fees and costs of suit adjudged shall likewise be paid by defendant-appellant Allied Banking
Corporation and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the same proportion
of 60-40. Except as thus modified, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.37

Hence, Allied filed the instant petition.

The Issues

Allied raises the following issues for our consideration:

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Lim Sio Wan did not authorize [Allied] to
pre-terminate the initial placement and to deliver the check to Deborah Santos.

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in absolving Producers Bank of any liability for the
reimbursement of amount adjudged demandable.

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding [Allied] liable to the extent of 60% of amount
adjudged demandable in clear disregard to the ultimate liability of Metrobank as guarantor of all
endorsement on the check, it being the collecting bank.38

The petition is partly meritorious.

A Question of Fact

Allied questions the finding of both the trial and appellate courts that Allied was not authorized to
release the proceeds of Lim Sio Wans money market placement to Santos. Allied clearly raises a
question of fact. When the CA affirms the findings of fact of the RTC, the factual findings of both
courts are binding on this Court.39

We also agree with the CA when it said that it could not disturb the trial courts findings on the
credibility of witness So inasmuch as it was the trial court that heard the witness and had the
opportunity to observe closely her deportment and manner of testifying. Unless the trial court had
plainly overlooked facts of substance or value, which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case,40 we find it best to defer to the trial court on matters pertaining to credibility of witnesses.

Additionally, this Court has held that the matter of negligence is also a factual question.41 Thus, the
finding of the RTC, affirmed by the CA, that the respective parties were negligent in the exercise of
their obligations is also conclusive upon this Court.

The Liability of the Parties

As to the liability of the parties, we find that Allied is liable to Lim Sio Wan. Fundamental and familiar
is the doctrine that the relationship between a bank and a client is one of debtor-creditor.

Articles 1953 and 1980 of the Civil Code provide:

Art. 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership
thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.

Art. 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be
governed by the provisions concerning simple loan.

Thus, we have ruled in a line of cases that a bank deposit is in the nature of a simple loan or
mutuum.42 More succinctly, in Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) v. Sabeniano, this
Court ruled that a money market placement is a simple loan or mutuum.43 Further, we defined a
money market in Cebu International Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, as follows:

[A] money market is a market dealing in standardized short-term credit instruments (involving large
amounts) where lenders and borrowers do not deal directly with each other but through a middle
man or dealer in open market. In a money market transaction, the investor is a lender who loans his
money to a borrower through a middleman or dealer.
In the case at bar, the money market transaction between the petitioner and the private respondent
is in the nature of a loan.44

Lim Sio Wan, as creditor of the bank for her money market placement, is entitled to payment upon
her request, or upon maturity of the placement, or until the bank is released from its obligation as
debtor. Until any such event, the obligation of Allied to Lim Sio Wan remains unextinguished.

Art. 1231 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when obligations are considered extinguished,
thus:

Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:

(1) By payment or performance;

(2) By the loss of the thing due;

(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;

(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;

(5) By compensation;

(6) By novation.

Other causes of extinguishment of obligations, such as annulment, rescission, fulfillment of a

resolutory condition, and prescription, are governed elsewhere in this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts that Lim Sio Wan did not authorize the
release of her money market placement to Santos and the bank had been negligent in so doing, there
is no question that the obligation of Allied to pay Lim Sio Wan had not been extinguished. Art. 1240 of
the Code states that "payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been
constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it." As commented by
Arturo Tolentino:

Payment made by the debtor to a wrong party does not extinguish the obligation as to the creditor, if
there is no fault or negligence which can be imputed to the latter. Even when the debtor acted in
utmost good faith and by mistake as to the person of his creditor, or through error induced by the
fraud of a third person, the payment to one who is not in fact his creditor, or authorized to receive
such payment, is void, except as provided in Article 1241. Such payment does not prejudice the
creditor, and accrual of interest is not suspended by it.45 (Emphasis supplied.)

Since there was no effective payment of Lim Sio Wans money market placement, the bank still has an
obligation to pay her at six percent (6%) interest from March 16, 1984 until the payment thereof.

We cannot, however, say outright that Allied is solely liable to Lim Sio Wan.

Allied claims that Metrobank is the proximate cause of the loss of Lim Sio Wans money. It points out
that Metrobank guaranteed all prior indorsements inscribed on the managers check, and without
Metrobanks guarantee, the present controversy would never have occurred. According to Allied:

Failure on the part of the collecting bank to ensure that the proceeds of the check is paid to the
proper party is, aside from being an efficient intervening cause, also the last negligent act, x x x
contributory to the injury caused in the present case, which thereby leads to the conclusion that it is
the collecting bank, Metrobank that is the proximate cause of the alleged loss of the plaintiff in the
instant case.46

We are not persuaded.

Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred."47
Thus, there is an efficient supervening event if the event breaks the sequence leading from the cause
to the ultimate result. To determine the proximate cause of a controversy, the question that needs to
be asked is: If the event did not happen, would the injury have resulted? If the answer is NO, then the
event is the proximate cause.

In the instant case, Allied avers that even if it had not issued the check payment, the money
represented by the check would still be lost because of Metrobanks negligence in indorsing the check
without verifying the genuineness of the indorsement thereon.

Section 66 in relation to Sec. 65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides:

Section 66. Liability of general indorser.Every indorser who indorses without qualification, warrants
to all subsequent holders in due course;

a) The matters and things mentioned in subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of the next preceding section; and
b) That the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting;

And in addition, he engages that on due presentment, it shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the
case may be according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on
dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent indorser
who may be compelled to pay it.

Section 65. Warranty where negotiation by delivery, so forth.Every person negotiating an

instrument by delivery or by a qualified indorsement, warrants:

a) That the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be;

b) That he has a good title of it;

c) That all prior parties had capacity to contract;

d) That he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity of the instrument or render it
valueless.

But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the warranty extends in favor of no holder other than
the immediate transferee.

The provisions of subdivision (c) of this section do not apply to persons negotiating public or
corporation securities, other than bills and notes. (Emphasis supplied.)

The warranty "that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be" covers all the
defects in the instrument affecting the validity thereof, including a forged indorsement. Thus, the last
indorser will be liable for the amount indicated in the negotiable instrument even if a previous
indorsement was forged. We held in a line of cases that "a collecting bank which indorses a check
bearing a forged indorsement and presents it to the drawee bank guarantees all prior indorsements,
including the forged indorsement itself, and ultimately should be held liable therefor."48

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions. One such exception is when the issuance of the
check itself was attended with negligence. Thus, in the cases cited above where the collecting bank is
generally held liable, in two of the cases where the checks were negligently issued, this Court held the
institution issuing the check just as liable as or more liable than the collecting bank.

In isolated cases where the checks were deposited in an account other than that of the payees on the
strength of forged indorsements, we held the collecting bank solely liable for the whole amount of
the checks involved for having indorsed the same. In Republic Bank v. Ebrada,49 the check was
properly issued by the Bureau of Treasury. While in Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco
de Oro) v. Equitable Banking Corporation,50 Banco de Oro admittedly issued the checks in the name
of the correct payees. And in Traders Royal Bank v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc.,51 the checks
were issued at the request of Radio Philippines Network, Inc. from Traders Royal Bank.1avvphi1

However, in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, we said that the drawee bank is liable
for 60% of the amount on the face of the negotiable instrument and the collecting bank is liable for
40%. We also noted the relative negligence exhibited by two banks, to wit:

Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the
encashment of the forged checks by an impostor. Both banks were not able to overcome the
presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. It was the gross
negligence of the employees of both banks which resulted in the fraud and the subsequent loss.
While it is true that petitioner BPIs negligence may have been the proximate cause of the loss,
respondent CBCs negligence contributed equally to the success of the impostor in encashing the
proceeds of the forged checks. Under these circumstances, we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code to
the effect that while respondent CBC may recover its losses, such losses are subject to mitigation by
the courts. (See Phoenix Construction Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Courts, 148 SCRA 353 [1987]).

Considering the comparative negligence of the two (2) banks, we rule that the demands of substantial
justice are satisfied by allocating the loss of P2,413,215.16 and the costs of the arbitration proceeding
in the amount of P7,250.00 and the cost of litigation on a 60-40 ratio.52

Similarly, we ruled in Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals that the issuing institution and the
collecting bank should equally share the liability for the loss of amount represented by the checks
concerned due to the negligence of both parties:

The Court finds as reasonable, the proportionate sharing of fifty percent-fifty percent (50%-50%). Due
to the negligence of the Province of Tarlac in releasing the checks to an unauthorized person (Fausto
Pangilinan), in allowing the retired hospital cashier to receive the checks for the payee hospital for a
period close to three years and in not properly ascertaining why the retired hospital cashier was
collecting checks for the payee hospital in addition to the hospitals real cashier, respondent Province
contributed to the loss amounting to P203,300.00 and shall be liable to the PNB for fifty (50%)
percent thereof. In effect, the Province of Tarlac can only recover fifty percent (50%) of P203,300.00
from PNB.

The collecting bank, Associated Bank, shall be liable to PNB for fifty (50%) percent of P203,300.00. It is
liable on its warranties as indorser of the checks which were deposited by Fausto Pangilinan, having
guaranteed the genuineness of all prior indorsements, including that of the chief of the payee hospital,
Dr. Adena Canlas. Associated Bank was also remiss in its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the
payees indorsement.53
A reading of the facts of the two immediately preceding cases would reveal that the reason why the
bank or institution which issued the check was held partially liable for the amount of the check was
because of the negligence of these parties which resulted in the issuance of the checks.

In the instant case, the trial court correctly found Allied negligent in issuing the managers check and
in transmitting it to Santos without even a written authorization.54 In fact, Allied did not even ask for
the certificate evidencing the money market placement or call up Lim Sio Wan at her residence or
office to confirm her instructions. Both actions could have prevented the whole fraudulent
transaction from unfolding. Allieds negligence must be considered as the proximate cause of the
resulting loss.

To reiterate, had Allied exercised the diligence due from a financial institution, the check would not
have been issued and no loss of funds would have resulted. In fact, there would have been no
issuance of indorsement had there been no check in the first place.

The liability of Allied, however, is concurrent with that of Metrobank as the last indorser of the check.
When Metrobank indorsed the check in compliance with the PCHC Rules and Regulations55 without
verifying the authenticity of Lim Sio Wans indorsement and when it accepted the check despite the
fact that it was cross-checked payable to payees account only,56 its negligent and cavalier
indorsement contributed to the easier release of Lim Sio Wans money and perpetuation of the fraud.
Given the relative participation of Allied and Metrobank to the instant case, both banks cannot be
adjudged as equally liable. Hence, the 60:40 ratio of the liabilities of Allied and Metrobank, as ruled by
the CA, must be upheld.

FCC, having no participation in the negotiation of the check and in the forgery of Lim Sio Wans
indorsement, can raise the real defense of forgery as against both banks.57

As to Producers Bank, Allied Banks argument that Producers Bank must be held liable as employer of
Santos under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is erroneous. Art. 2180 pertains to the vicarious liability of an
employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply to
civil liability arising from delict.

One also cannot apply the principle of subsidiary liability in Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code in the
instant case. Such liability on the part of the employer for the civil aspect of the criminal act of the
employee is based on the conviction of the employee for a crime. Here, there has been no conviction
for any crime.

As to the claim that there was unjust enrichment on the part of Producers Bank, the same is correct.
Allied correctly claims in its petition that Producers Bank should reimburse Allied for whatever
judgment that may be rendered against it pursuant to Art. 22 of the Civil Code, which provides: "Every
person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just cause or legal ground, shall return
the same to him."1avvphi1
The above provision of law was clarified in Reyes v. Lim, where we ruled that "[t]here is unjust
enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience."58

In Tamio v. Ticson, we further clarified the principle of unjust enrichment, thus: "Under Article 22 of
the Civil Code, there is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit
is derived at the expense of or with damages to another."59

In the instant case, Lim Sio Wans money market placement in Allied Bank was pre-terminated and
withdrawn without her consent. Moreover, the proceeds of the placement were deposited in
Producers Banks account in Metrobank without any justification. In other words, there is no reason
that the proceeds of Lim Sio Wans placement should be deposited in FCCs account purportedly as
payment for FCCs money market placement and interest in Producers Bank.lavvphil With such
payment, Producers Banks indebtedness to FCC was extinguished, thereby benefitting the former.
Clearly, Producers Bank was unjustly enriched at the expense of Lim Sio Wan. Based on the facts and
circumstances of the case, Producers Bank should reimburse Allied and Metrobank for the amounts
the two latter banks are ordered to pay Lim Sio Wan.

It cannot be validly claimed that FCC, and not Producers Bank, should be considered as having been
unjustly enriched. It must be remembered that FCCs money market placement with Producers Bank
was already due and demandable; thus, Producers Banks payment thereof was justified. FCC was
entitled to such payment. As earlier stated, the fact that the indorsement on the check was forged
cannot be raised against FCC which was not a part in any stage of the negotiation of the check. FCC
was not unjustly enriched.

From the facts of the instant case, we see that Santos could be the architect of the entire controversy.
Unfortunately, since summons had not been served on Santos, the courts have not acquired
jurisdiction over her.60 We, therefore, cannot ascribe to her liability in the instant case.

Clearly, Producers Bank must be held liable to Allied and Metrobank for the amount of the check plus
12% interest per annum, moral damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit which Allied and
Metrobank are adjudged to pay Lim Sio Wan based on a proportion of 60:40.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The March 18, 1998 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
46290 and the November 15, 1993 RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 6757 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.

Thus, the CA Decision is AFFIRMED, the fallo of which is reproduced, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Judgment is rendered
ordering and sentencing defendant-appellant Allied Banking Corporation to pay sixty (60%) percent
and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company forty (40%) of the amount of
P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per annum from March 16, 1984 until fully paid. The moral damages,
attorneys fees and costs of suit adjudged shall likewise be paid by defendant-appellant Allied Banking
Corporation and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the same proportion
of 60-40. Except as thus modified, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Additionally and by way of MODIFICATION, Producers Bank is hereby ordered to pay Allied and
Metrobank the aforementioned amounts. The liabilities of the parties are concurrent and
independent of each other.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ANTONIO ESTEBAN and GLORIA
ESTEBAN, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

This case had its inception in an action for damages instituted in the former Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental 1 by private respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they sustained in the
evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench,
an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit
system. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open
trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any
warning light or signs. As a result of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly
sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while
the respondent husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was
shattered. 2

PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by
respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which
should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte, for short), an
independent contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole and the conduit
system. 3 Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging that, under the
terms of their agreement, PLDT should in no manner be answerable for any accident or
injuries arising from the negligence or carelessness of Barte or any of its employees. 4 In
answer thereto, Barte claimed that it was not aware nor was it notified of the accident involving
respondent spouses and that it had complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT by
installing the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work site, with
barricades at both ends of the excavation and with red lights at night along the excavated area
to warn the traveling public of the presence of excavations. 5

On October 1, 1974, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, the
decretal part of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING considerations the defendant Philippine Long Distance

Telephone Company is hereby ordered (A) to pay the plaintiff Gloria Esteban the sum of
P20,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 exemplary damages; to plaintiff Antonio
Esteban the sum of P2,000.00 as moral damages and P500.00 as exemplary damages,
with legal rate of interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid. The
defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees.

(B) The third-party defendant is hereby ordered to reimburse whatever amount the
defendant-third party plaintiff has paid to the plaintiff. With costs against the defendant. 6

From this decision both PLDT and private respondents appealed, the latter appealing only
as to the amount of damages. Third-party defendant Barte did not appeal.
On September 25, 1979, the Special Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision in said appealed case, with Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava
as ponente, reversing the decision of the lower court and dismissing the complaint of
respondent spouses. It held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and
consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the claim for damages. 7 A copy of this
decision was received by private respondents on October 10, 1979. 8 On October 25, 1979,
said respondents filed a motion for reconsideration dated October 24, 1979. 9 On January 24,
1980, the Special Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals denied said motion for
reconsideration.10 This resolution was received by respondent spouses on February 22,
1980. 11

On February 29, 1980, respondent Court of Appeals received private respondents' motion
for leave of court to file a second motion for reconsideration, dated February 27,
1980. 12 On March 11, 1980, respondent court, in a resolution likewise penned by Justice
Agrava, allowed respondents to file a second motion for reconsideration, within ten (10) days
from notice thereof. 13 Said resolution was received by private respondents on April 1, 1980
but prior thereto, private respondents had already filed their second motion for reconsideration
on March 7, 1980. 14

On April 30,1980 petitioner PLDT filed an opposition to and/or motion to dismiss said
second motion for reconsideration. 15 The Court of Appeals, in view of the divergent opinions
on the resolution of the second motion for reconsideration, designated two additional justices
to form a division of five. 16 On September 3, 1980, said division of five promulgated its
resolution, penned by Justice Mariano A. Zosa, setting aside the decision dated September 25,
1979, as well as the resolution dated, January 24,1980, and affirming in toto the decision of
the lower court. 17

On September 19, 1980, petitioner PLDT filed a motion to set aside and/or for
reconsideration of the resolution of September 3, 1980, contending that the second
motion for reconsideration of private respondent spouses was filed out of time and that the
decision of September 25, 1979 penned by Justice Agrava was already final. It further
submitted therein that the relationship of Barte and petitioner PLDT should be viewed in
the light of the contract between them and, under the independent contractor rule, PLDT
is not liable for the acts of an independent contractor. 18 On May 11, 1981, respondent Court
of Appeals promulgated its resolution denying said motion to set aside and/or for
reconsideration and affirming in toto the decision of the lower court dated October 1, 1974. 19

Coming to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assigns the following
errors:

1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not denying private respondents' second motion
for reconsideration on the ground that the decision of the Special Second Division, dated
September 25, 1979, and the resolution of the Special Ninth Division, dated January 24,
1980, are already final, and on the additional ground that said second motion for
reconsideration is pro forma.

2. Respondent court erred in reversing the aforesaid decision and resolution and in
misapplying the independent contractor rule in holding PLDT liable to respondent Esteban
spouses.

A convenient resume of the relevant proceedings in the respondent court, as shown by

the records and admitted by both parties, may be graphically presented as follows:
(a) September 25, 1979, a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals with Justice
Agrava as ponente;

(b) October 10, 1979, a copy of said decision was received by private respondents;

(c) October 25, 1979, a motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondents;

(d) January 24, 1980, a resolution was issued denying said motion for reconsideration;

(e) February 22, 1980, a copy of said denial resolution was received by private
respondents;

(f) February 29, 1980, a motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration was
filed by private respondents

(g) March 7, 1980, a second motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondents;

(h) March 11, 1980, a resolution was issued allowing respondents to file a second motion
for reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt; and

(i) September 3, 1980, a resolution was issued, penned by Justice Zosa, reversing the
original decision dated September 25, 1979 and setting aside the resolution dated
January 24, 1980.

From the foregoing chronology, we are convinced that both the motion for leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration and, consequently, said second motion for
reconsideration itself were filed out of time.

Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, which had procedural governance at the time,
provided that a second motion for reconsideration may be presented within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion has
been pending. 20 Private respondents having filed their first motion for reconsideration on the
last day of the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days within which to do so, they had only one
(1) day from receipt of the order denying said motion to file, with leave of court, a second
motion for reconsideration. 21 In the present case, after their receipt on February 22, 1980 of
the resolution denying their first motion for reconsideration, private respondents had two
remedial options. On February 23, 1980, the remaining one (1) day of the aforesaid
reglementary period, they could have filed a motion for leave of court to file a second motion
for reconsideration, conceivably with a prayer for the extension of the period within which to do
so. On the other hand, they could have appealed through a petition for review on certiorari to
this Court within fifteen (15) days from February 23, 1980. 22 Instead, they filed a motion for
leave to file a second motion 'for reconsideration on February 29, 1980, and said second
motion for reconsideration on March 7, 1980, both of which motions were by then time-barred.

Consequently, after the expiration on February 24, 1980 of the original fifteen (15) day
period, the running of which was suspended during the pendency of the first motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals could no longer validly take further proceedings on
the merits of the case, much less to alter, modify or reconsider its aforesaid decision
and/or resolution. The filing of the motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration by herein respondents on February 29, 1980 and the subsequent filing of
the motion itself on March 7, 1980, after the expiration of the reglementary period to file
the same, produced no legal effects. Only a motion for re-hearing or reconsideration filed
in time shall stay the final order or judgment sought to be re-examined. 23
The consequential result is that the resolution of respondent court of March 11, 1980
granting private respondents' aforesaid motion for leave and, giving them an extension of
ten (10) days to file a second motion for reconsideration, is null and void. The period for
filing a second motion for reconsideration had already expired when private respondents
sought leave to file the same, and respondent court no longer had the power to entertain
or grant the said motion. The aforesaid extension of ten (10) days for private respondents
to file their second motion for reconsideration was of no legal consequence since it was
given when there was no more period to extend. It is an elementary rule that an
application for extension of time must be filed prior to the expiration of the period sought to
be extended. 24 Necessarily, the discretion of respondent court to grant said extension for
filing a second motion for reconsideration is conditioned upon the timeliness of the motion
seeking the same.

No appeal having been taken seasonably, the respondent court's decision, dated
September 25, 1979, became final and executory on March 9, 1980. The subsequent
resolutions of respondent court, dated March 11, 1980 and September 3, 1980, allowing
private respondents to file a second motion for reconsideration and reversing the original
decision are null and void and cannot disturb the finality of the judgment nor restore
jurisdiction to respondent court. This is but in line with the accepted rule that once a
decision has become final and executory it is removed from the power and jurisdiction of
the court which rendered it to further alter or amend, much less revoke it. 25 The decision
rendered anew is null and void. 26 The court's inherent power to correct its own errors should
be exercised before the finality of the decision or order sought to be corrected, otherwise
litigation will be endless and no question could be considered finally settled. Although the
granting or denial of a motion for reconsideration involves the exercise of discretion, 27 the
same should not be exercised whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, but prudently in
conformity with law, justice, reason and equity. 28

Prescinding from the aforesaid procedural lapses into the substantive merits of the case,
we find no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision that the
accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent
Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner
PLDT. Such findings were reached after an exhaustive assessment and evaluation of the
evidence on record, as evidenced by the respondent court's resolution of January 24,
1980 which we quote with approval:

First. Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had remained
on that inside lane, it would not have hit the ACCIDENT MOUND.

Exhibit B shows, through the tiremarks, that the ACCIDENT MOUND was hit by the jeep
swerving from the left that is, swerving from the inside lane. What caused the swerving is
not disclosed; but, as the cause of the accident, defendant cannot be made liable for the
damages suffered by plaintiffs. The accident was not due to the absence of warning signs,
but to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane. That may explain
plaintiff-husband's insistence that he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND for which
reason he ran into it.

Second. That plaintiff's jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the ACCIDENT
MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of
the ACCIDENT MOUND.

It has been stated that the ditches along Lacson Street had already been covered except
the 3 or 4 meters where the ACCIDENT MOUND was located. Exhibit B-1 shows that the
ditches on Lacson Street north of the ACCIDENT MOUND had already been covered, but
not in such a way as to allow the outer lane to be freely and conveniently passable to
vehicles. The situation could have been worse to the south of the ACCIDENT MOUND for
which reason no picture of the ACCIDENT MOUND facing south was taken.

Third. Plaintiff's jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff-husband

claimed. At that speed, he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the
ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep would not have climbed the ACCIDENT MOUND several
feet as indicated by the tiremarks in Exhibit B. The jeep must have been running quite fast.
If the jeep had been braked at 25 kilometers an hour, plaintiff's would not have been
thrown against the windshield and they would not have suffered their injuries.

Fourth. If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast on the
inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to
climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND, then plaintiff-husband had not exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run
on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should have made him see
the ACCIDENT MOUND in time. If he was running on the outside lane at 25 kilometers an
hour, even on dim lights, his failure to see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to brake the car
was negligence on his part. The ACCIDENT MOUND was relatively big and visible, being
2 to 3 feet high and 1-1/2 feet wide. If he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time, he
would not have seen any warning sign either. He knew of the existence and location of the
ACCIDENT MOUND, having seen it many previous times. With ordinary precaution, he
should have driven his jeep on the night of the accident so as to avoid hitting the
ACCIDENT MOUND. 29

The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was
not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the
occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their
right to recover damages. 30 The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and
assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, respondent
Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even
assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of petitioner.

The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only
purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on
the site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was
not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to
fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside
lane towards the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a
duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the
proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the
injury. 31 It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their
own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal
norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own
protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity
to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a
resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the
presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his
wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.

Moreover, we also sustain the findings of respondent Court of Appeals in its original
decision that there was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT.
We have for consideration only the self-serving testimony of respondent Antonio Esteban
and the unverified photograph of merely a portion of the scene of the accident. The
absence of a police report of the incident and the non-submission of a medical report from
the hospital where private respondents were allegedly treated have not even been
satisfactorily explained.

As aptly observed by respondent court in its aforecited extended resolution of January 24,
1980

(a) There was no third party eyewitness of the accident. As to how the accident occurred,
the Court can only rely on the testimonial evidence of plaintiffs themselves, and such
evidence should be very carefully evaluated, with defendant, as the party being charged,
being given the benefit of any doubt. Definitely without ascribing the same motivation to
plaintiffs, another person could have deliberately engineered a similar accident in the
hope and expectation that the Court can grant him substantial moral and exemplary
damages from the big corporation that defendant is. The statement is made only to stress
the disadvantageous position of defendant which would have extreme difficulty in
contesting such person's claim. If there were no witness or record available from the
police department of Bacolod, defendant would not be able to determine for itself which of
the conflicting testimonies of plaintiffs is correct as to the report or non-report of the
accident to the police department. 32

A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the
existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. 33 Whosoever relies
on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the
existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.

WHEREFORE, the resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals, dated March 11, 1980
and September 3,1980, are hereby SET ASIDE. Its original decision, promulgated on
September 25,1979, is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002

ST. MARY'S ACADEMY, petitioner,

vs.

WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL,
SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals as well as the resolution
denying reconsideration, holding petitioner liable for damages arising from an accident that resulted
in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public schools in Dipolog City to
solicit enrollment.

The Facts

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

"Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos
and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel
Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.

"On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner:

1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William
Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following sums of money:

a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S. Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages incurred by plaintiffs for burial and related
expenses;

c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorneys fees;

d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral damages; and to pay costs.

2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are hereby
ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of damages above-stated in the event of insolvency of
principal obligor St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City;

3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort and who was
under special parental authority of defendant St. Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED from paying the
above-stated damages, same being adjudged against defendants St. Marys Academy, and subsidiarily,
against his parents;

4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim not being in
order as earlier discussed in this decision, is hereby DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED." (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206)."

"From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Marys
Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the
enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying.
As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group.
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a
Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School,
Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the
same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned
turtle.

"Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident."2

In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.3

On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages to
P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto.4
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys Academy filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.5

Hence, this appeal.6

The Issues

1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos.

2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages against the
petitioner.

The Courts Ruling

We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos
under Articles 2187 and 2198 of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in
allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and
teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental
authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises
of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips,
excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever
authorized by the school or its teachers.9

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special
parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of
the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.10

However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident.11

"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for
which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection
between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury.
For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the
proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."12

In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause
of the death of the victim.

Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was
not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep.

In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the
documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II
but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses
Carpitanos, parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of
the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering
wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle.

Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence,
the respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that "those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused
by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor" was unfounded.

Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the
jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed
James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.

Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily.
The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between
the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

"The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."13
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had
no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for
the death resulting from such accident.

Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages in the amount
of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.14 In this case, the proximate cause of
the accident was not attributable to petitioner.

For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of the Court of
Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted.
Moreover, the grant of attorneys fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the rule.15 The
power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual,
legal and equitable justification.16 Thus, the grant of attorneys fees against the petitioner is likewise
deleted.

Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent
Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact.1wphi1 We have held that the registered
owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public
or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or
streets."17 Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent
Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals18 and that of
the trial court.19 The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of
defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys Academy, Dipolog City.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152133 February 9, 2006

ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner Rollie
Calimutan prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306,
dated 29 August 2001,1 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, of
Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998,2 finding petitioner
Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code.

The Information3 filed with the RTC charged petitioner Calimutan with the crime of homicide,
allegedly committed as follows

That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio Capsay, Barangay Panique,
Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and throw a stone at PHILIP CANTRE, hitting him at the back left portion of
his body, resulting in laceration of spleen due to impact which caused his death a day after.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996.

Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December 1996, a warrant4 for the arrest of petitioner Calimutan.
On 09 January 1997, however, he was provisionally released5 after posting sufficient bailbond.6
During the arraignment on 21 May 1997, petitioner Calimutan pleaded not guilty to the crime of
homicide charged against him.7

In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Ronaldo B.
Mendez, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); (2) Belen B.
Cantre, mother of the victim, Philip Cantre; and (3) Rene L. Saano, companion of the victim Cantre
when the alleged crime took place. Their testimonies are collectively summarized below.
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness Saano, together with two
other companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy,
Masbate. From the videoke bar, the victim Cantre and witness Saano proceeded to go home to their
respective houses, but along the way, they crossed paths with petitioner Calimutan and a certain
Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as
the culprit responsible for throwing stones at the Cantres house on a previous night. Thus, upon
seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner
Calimutan dashed towards the backs of victim Cantre and witness Saano. Petitioner Calimutan then
picked up a stone, as big as a mans fist, which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of
his back. When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back. Witness
Saano put himself between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan, and attempted to pacify the
two, even convincing petitioner Calimutan to put down another stone he was already holding. He also
urged victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan to just go home. Witness Saano accompanied victim
Cantre to the latters house, and on the way, victim Cantre complained of the pain in the left side of
his back hit by the stone. They arrived at the Cantres house at around 12:00 noon, and witness
Saano left victim Cantre to the care of the latters mother, Belen.8

Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the stoning incident involving petitioner
Calimutan. He again complained of backache and also of stomachache, and was unable to eat. By
nighttime, victim Cantre was alternately feeling cold and then warm. He was sweating profusely and
his entire body felt numb. His family would have wanted to bring him to a doctor but they had no
vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of the following day, 05 February 1996, Belen was wiping his son with a
piece of cloth, when victim Cantre asked for some food. He was able to eat a little, but he also later
vomited whatever he ate. For the last time, he complained of backache and stomachache, and shortly
thereafter, he died.9

Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the Municipal Health
Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem Examination Report10 and Certification of Death,11
issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre was
cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. The body of victim Cantre was
subsequently embalmed and buried on 13 February 1996.

Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the Cantre family, with the help of the Lingkod
Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, requested for an exhumation and autopsy of
the body of the victim Cantre by the NBI. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim
Cantre was conducted by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez on 15 April 1996,12 after which, he reported the
following findings

Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial autopsy; clad in white Barong Tagalog and blue pants
placed inside a wooden golden-brown coffin and buried in a concrete niche.

Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest wall, left side.

Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-line.

Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic].

Laceration, spleen.

Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed.

Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid and other partially digested food particles.

xxxx

CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE ABDOMEN.

In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his exhumation and autopsy
report. He explained that the victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was
massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen. The laceration of
the spleen can be caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the
possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned to death by petitioner Calimutan.13

To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense presented the sole testimony of the accused,
herein petitioner, Calimutan.

According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00 p.m. on 04 February 1996, he was walking with his
house helper, Michael Bulalacao, on their way to Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate, when
they met with the victim Cantre and witness Saano. The victim Cantre took hold of Bulalacao and
punched him several times. Petitioner Calimutan attempted to pacify the victim Cantre but the latter
refused to calm down, pulling out from his waist an eight-inch Batangas knife and uttering that he
was looking for trouble, either "to kill or be killed." At this point, petitioner Calimutan was about ten
meters away from the victim Cantre and was too frightened to move any closer for fear that the
enraged man would turn on him; he still had a family to take care of. When he saw that the victim
Cantre was about to stab Bulalacao, petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone, which he described as
approximately one-inch in diameter, and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the victim
Cantre on his right buttock. Petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao then started to run away, and victim
Cantre chased after them, but witness Saano was able to pacify the victim Cantre. Petitioner
Calimutan allegedly reported the incident to a kagawad of Barangay Panique and to the police
authorities and sought their help in settling the dispute between Bulalacao and the victim Cantre.
Bulalacao, meanwhile, refused to seek medical help despite the advice of petitioner Calimutan and,
instead, chose to go back to his hometown.14

Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had happened to the victim Cantre after the
stoning incident on 04 February 1996. Some of his friends told him that they still saw the victim
Cantre drinking at a videoke bar on the night of 04 February 1996. As far as he knew, the victim
Cantre died the following day, on 05 February 1996, because of food poisoning. Petitioner Calimutan
maintained that he had no personal grudge against the victim Cantre previous to the stoning
incident.15

On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision,16 essentially adopting the prosecutions
account of the incident on 04 February 1996, and pronouncing that

It cannot be legally contended that the throwing of the stone by the accused was in defense of his
companion, a stranger, because after the boxing Michael was able to run. While it appears that the
victim was the unlawful aggressor at the beginning, but the aggression already ceased after Michael
was able to run and there was no more need for throwing a stone. The throwing of the stone to the
victim which was a retaliatory act can be considered unlawful, hence the accused can be held
criminally liable under paragraph 1 of Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left side was a
treacherous one and the accused committed a felony causing physical injuries to the victim. The
physical injury of hematoma as a result of the impact of the stone resulted in the laceration of the
spleen causing the death of the victim. The accused is criminally liable for all the direct and natural
consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been intended. (Art. 4, Par. 1,
Revised Penal Code; People vs. Narciso, CA-G.R. No. 03532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964)

One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of ones illegal acts merely
because one does not intend to produce such consequences (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310).

The crime committed is Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that accused ROLLIE CALIMUTAN is GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal
Code with no mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
hereby imposes the penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor as minimum, to
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs
of Philip Cantre the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as compensatory damages and the sum
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals,
in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001,17 sustained the conviction of homicide rendered by the RTC
against petitioner Calimutan, ratiocinating thus

The prosecution has sufficiently established that the serious internal injury sustained by the victim
was caused by the stone thrown at the victim by the accused which, the accused-appellant does not
deny. It was likewise shown that the internal injury sustained by the victim was the result of the
impact of the stone that hit the victim. It resulted to a traumatic injury of the abdomen causing the
laceration of the victims spleen.

This is clearly shown by the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, a Senior Medico Legal
Officer of the NBI after the exhumation of the victims cadaver

The Court cannot give credence to the post mortem report prepared by Municipal Health Officer Dr.
Conchita Ulanday stating that the cause of the victims death was food poisoning. Dr. Ulanday was not
even presented to testify in court hence she was not even able to identify and/or affirm the contents
of her report. She was not made available for cross-examination on the accuracy and correctness of
her findings.

Dr. Conchita Ulandays post mortem report cannot prevail over the autopsy report (Exh. "C") of the
Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who testified and was cross-examined by the defense.

Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that the victim indeed died of food poisoning, as
reported by Dr. Conchita Ulanday, why did they not present her as their witness to belie the report of
the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.

The trial courts evaluation of the testimony of Dr. Mendez is accorded the highest respect because it
had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of said witness.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch 46,
finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide is hereby
AFFIRMED.

The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15 January 2002,18 denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner Calimutan for lack of merit since the issues raised therein had
already been passed and ruled upon in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001.

Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking (1)
the reversal of the Decisions of the RTC, dated 19 November 1998, and of the Court of Appeals, dated
29 August 2001, convicting him of the crime of homicide; and, (2) consequently, his acquittal of the
said crime based on reasonable doubt.

Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence of the two autopsy reports, with dissimilar findings
on the cause of death of the victim Cantre, constituted reasonable doubt as to the liability of
petitioner Calimutan for the said death, arguing that
x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate was the first
physician of the government who conducted an examination on the cadaver of the victim Philip
Cantre whose findings was that the cause of his death was due to food poisoning while the second
government physician NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ronaldo Mendez whose findings was that the
cause of the death was due to a traumatic injury of the abdomen caused by a lacerated spleen and
with these findings of two (2) government physicians whose findings are at variance with each other
materially, it is humbly contended that the same issue raised a reasonable doubt on the culpability of
the petitioner.

As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of the evidence for the prosecution in the case at bar, it
suffices to reaise [sic] reasonable doubt as to the petitioners guilt and therefore, he is entitled to
acquittal (People vs. Delmendo, G.R. No. 32146, November 23, 1981).19

In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if his or her guilt is established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does not demand
absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error.20

In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to hold petitioner
Calimutan liable for the death of the victim Cantre.

Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy report and the personal testimony before the RTC of
prosecution witness, NBI Senior Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Mendez, are vital pieces of evidence against
petitioner Calimutan. Dr. Mendez determined that the victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage or
bleeding due to the laceration of his spleen. In his testimony, Dr. Mendez clearly and consistently
explained that the spleen could be lacerated or ruptured when the abdominal area was hit with a
blunt object, such as the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre.

It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution as an expert witness, whose
"competency and academic qualification and background" was admitted by the defense itself.21 As a
Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, Dr. Mendez is presumed to possess sufficient knowledge of
pathology, surgery, gynecology, toxicology, and such other branches of medicine germane to the
issues involved in a case.22

Dr. Mendezs testimony as an expert witness is evidence,23 and although it does not necessarily bind
the courts, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had properly accorded it great weight and
probative value. Having testified as to matters undeniably within his area of expertise, and having
performed a thorough autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre, his findings as to the cause of death
of the victim Cantre are more than just the mere speculations of an ordinary person. They may
sufficiently establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by the petitioner Calimutan
and the lacerated spleen of the victim Cantre which, subsequently, resulted in the latters death. With
no apparent mistake or irregularity, whether in the manner by which Dr. Mendez performed the
autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre or in his findings, then his report and testimony must be
seriously considered by this Court.
Moreover, reference to other resource materials on abdominal injuries would also support the
conclusion of Dr. Mendez that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan caused the death of the
victim Cantre.

One source explains the nature of abdominal injuries24 in the following manner

The skin may remain unmarked inspite of extensive internal injuries with bleeding and disruption of
the internal organs. The areas most vulnerable are the point of attachment of internal organs,
especially at the source of its blood supply and at the point where blood vessels change direction.

The area in the middle superior half of the abdomen, forming a triangle bounded by the ribs on the
two sides and a line drawn horizontally through the umbilicus forming its base is vulnerable to trauma
applied from any direction. In this triangle are found several blood vessels changing direction,
particularly the celiac trunk, its branches (the hepatic, splenic and gastric arteries) as well as the
accompanying veins. The loop of the duodenum, the ligament of Treitz and the pancreas are in the
retroperitoneal space, and the stomach and transverse colon are in the triangle, located in the
peritoneal cavity. Compression or blow on the area may cause detachment, laceration, stretch-stress,
contusion of the organs (Legal Medicine 1980, Cyril H. Wecht et., p. 41).

As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the same source expounds that

The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture resulting from the impact of a fall or blow from the
crushing and grinding effects of wheels of motor vehicles. Although the organ is protected at its upper
portion by the ribs and also by the air-containing visceral organs, yet on account of its superficiality
and fragility, it is usually affected by trauma. x x x.

Certainly, there are some terms in the above-quoted paragraphs difficult to comprehend for people
without medical backgrounds. Nevertheless, there are some points that can be plainly derived
therefrom: (1) Contrary to common perception, the abdominal area is more than just the waist area.
The entire abdominal area is divided into different triangles, and the spleen is located in the upper
triangle, bounded by the rib cage; (2) The spleen and all internal organs in the same triangle are
vulnerable to trauma from all directions. Therefore, the stone need not hit the victim Cantre from the
front. Even impact from a stone hitting the back of the victim Cantre, in the area of the
afore-mentioned triangle, could rupture the spleen; and (3) Although the spleen had already been
ruptured or lacerated, there may not always be a perceptible external injury to the victim. Injury to
the spleen cannot, at all times, be attributed to an obvious, external injury such as a cut or bruise. The
laceration of the victim Cantres spleen can be caused by a stone thrown hard enough, which qualifies
as a nonpenetrating trauma26

Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or in combination with other viscera, is the most
frequently injured organ following blunt trauma to the abdomen or the lower thoracic cage.
Automobile accidents provide the predominating cause, while falls, sledding and bicycle injuries, and
blows incurred during contact sports are frequently implicated in children. x x x
The sheer impact of the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre could
rupture or lacerate the spleen an organ described as vulnerable, superficial, and fragile even
without causing any other external physical injury. Accordingly, the findings of Dr. Mendez that the
victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage from his lacerated spleen, and the cause of the laceration
of the spleen was the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre, does not
necessarily contradict his testimony before the RTC that none of the external injuries of the victim
Cantre were fatal.

Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was able to establish that the proximate cause of
the death of the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Proximate cause
has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."27

The two other witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely Saano and Belen Cantre, had
adequately recounted the events that transpired on 04 February 1996 to 05 February 1996. Between
the two of them, the said witnesses accounted for the whereabouts, actions, and physical condition
of the victim Cantre during the said period. Before the encounter with petitioner Calimutan and
Bulalacao, the victim Cantre seemed to be physically fine. However, after being hit at the back by the
stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, the victim Cantre had continuously complained of
backache. Subsequently, his physical condition rapidly deteriorated, until finally, he died. Other than
being stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was no other instance when the victim Cantre may have
been hit by another blunt instrument which could have caused the laceration of his spleen.

Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the victim Cantre died from a lacerated spleen, an injury
sustained after being hit by a stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Not even the
post-mortem report of Dr. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer who first examined the body of the
victim Cantre, can raise reasonable doubt as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre. Invoking Dr.
Ulandays post-mortem report, the defense insisted on the possibility that the victim Cantre died of
food poisoning. The post-mortem report, though, cannot be given much weight and probative value
for the following reasons

First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr. Ulanday in her post-mortem report, as well as in the
death certificate of the victim Cantre, reveals that although she suspected food poisoning as the
cause of death, she held back from making a categorical statement that it was so. In the post-mortem
report, 28 she found that "x x x the provable (sic) cause of death was due to cardio-respiratory arrest.
Food poisoning must be confirm (sic) by laboratory e(x)am." In the death certificate of the victim
Cantre, 29 she wrote that the immediate cause of death was "Cardio-Respiratory Arrest" and the
antecedent cause was "Food Poisoning Suspect." There was no showing that further laboratory tests
were indeed conducted to confirm Dr. Ulandays suspicion that the victim Cantre suffered from food
poisoning, and without such confirmation, her suspicion as to the cause of death remains just that a
suspicion.

Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a sworn statement30 in which she had explained her
findings in the post-mortem report, to wit
05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his cadaver?

A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by the NBI Medico-legal.

06. Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding your certification on the death of PHILIP B. CANTRE?

A: I stated in the certification and even in the Death Certificate about "Food Poisoning". What I stated
in the Death Certificate was that CANTRE was a SUSPECTED victim of food poisoning. I didnt state
that he was a case of food poisoning. And in the Certification, I even recommended that an
examination be done to confirm that suspicion.

07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of poisoning?

A: As there were no external signs of fatal injuries except that of the contusion or abrasion, measuring
as that size of a 25 centavo coin, I based my suspicion from the history of the victim and from the
police investigation.

08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification that there was no internal hemorrhage in the cadaver.
Did you open the body of the cadaver?

A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct an exhaustive autopsy. I made an incision on the
abdomen and I explored the internal organs of the cadaver with my hand in search for any clotting
inside. But I found none. I did not open the body of the cadaver.

09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you have observed on the cadaver. Where was it located?

A: On the left portion of his back, sir.

10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit by a hard object on that part of his body, his SPLEEN
could be injured?

A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong or forceful the impact was.

In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his testimony before the RTC31 how he conducted the autopsy
of the body of the victim Cantre, as follows
Q What specific procedure did you do in connection with the exhumation of the body of the victim in
this case?

A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen.

Q That was part of the autopsy you have conducted?

A Yes, sir.

Q Aside from opening the head as well as the body of the victim Philip Cantre, what other matters did
you do in connection therewith?

A We examined the internal organs.

Q What in particular internal organs you have examined?

A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas plus the intestines.

xxxx

Q The cause of death as you have listed here in your findings is listed as traumatic injury of the
abdomen, will you kindly tell us Doctor what is the significance of this medical term traumatic injury
of the abdomen?

A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI dont do what other doctors do as they make causes of death
as internal hemorrhage we particularly point to the injury of the body like this particular case the
injury was at the abdomen of the victim.

Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion of the abdomen of the victim this traumatic injury is
located?

A Along the midline but the damaged organ was at the left.

Q What particular organ are you referring to?

A The spleen, sir.

The difference in the extent of the examinations conducted by the two doctors of the body of the
victim Cantre provides an adequate explanation for their apparent inconsistent findings as to the
cause of death. Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed
suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy performed by
Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as the cause of death of the victim Cantre,
then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence by the courts.

Third, that the prosecution no longer presented Dr. Ulanday before the RTC despite being included in
its list of witnesses did not amount to a willful suppression of evidence that would give rise to the
presumption that her testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if produced.32 As this Court
already expounded in the case of People v. Jumamoy33

The prosecution's failure to present the other witnesses listed in the information did not constitute,
contrary to the contention of the accused, suppression of evidence. The prosecutor has the exclusive
prerogative to determine the witnesses to be presented for the prosecution. If the prosecution has
several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, the prosecutor need not present all of them but only as
many as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with
for being merely corroborative in nature. This Court has ruled that the non-presentation of
corroborative witnesses would not constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the
prosecution's case. Besides, there is no showing that the eyewitnesses who were not presented in
court as witnesses were not available to the accused. We reiterate the rule that the adverse
presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is not willful;
(2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at
the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if the
accused believed that the failure to present the other witnesses was because their testimonies would
be unfavorable to the prosecution, he should have compelled their appearance, by compulsory
process, to testify as his own witnesses or even as hostile witnesses.

It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no longer present Dr. Ulanday before the RTC, perhaps
believing that it had already presented sufficient evidence to merit the conviction of petitioner
Calimutan even without her testimony. There was nothing, however, preventing the defense from
calling on, or even compelling, with the appropriate court processes, Dr. Ulanday to testify in court as
its witness if it truly believed that her testimony would be adverse to the case presented by the
prosecution.

While this Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals and affirms
that there is ample evidence proving that the death of the victim Cantre was caused by his lacerated
spleen, an injury which resulted from being hit by the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan,
this Court, nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC and the Court of Appeals as to the determination
of the appropriate crime or offense for which the petitioner should have been convicted for.

Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they are
committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two types of
felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the
offender

In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the
act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing the act or in
incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or
omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is
"unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice." (People vs.
Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill.34

In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner Calimutan any
malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this
Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as
rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner
Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for the definition of reckless imprudence

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

There are several circumstances, discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, that demonstrate petitioner
Calimutans lack of intent to kill the victim Cantre, and conversely, that substantiate the view of this
Court that the death of victim Cantre was a result of petitioner Calimutans reckless imprudence. The
RTC and the Court of Appeals may have failed to appreciate, or had completely overlooked, the
significance of such circumstances.

It should be remembered that the meeting of the victim Cantre and witness Saano, on the one hand,
and petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao, on the other, was a chance encounter as the two
parties were on their way to different destinations. The victim Cantre and witness Saano were on
their way home from a drinking spree in Crossing Capsay, while petitioner Calimutan and his helper
Bulalacao were walking from the market to Crossing Capsay. While the evidence on record suggests
that a running grudge existed between the victim Cantre and Bulalacao, it did not establish that there
was likewise an existing animosity between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan.1avvphil.net

In both versions of the events of 04 February 1996 submitted by the prosecution and the defense, it
was the victim Cantre who was the initial aggressor. He suddenly punched Bulalacao, the helper and
companion of petitioner Calimutan, when they met on the road. The attack of the victim Cantre was
swift and unprovoked, which spurred petitioner Calimutan into responsive action. Given that this
Court dismisses the claim of petitioner Calimutan that the victim Cantre was holding a knife, it does
take into account that the victim Cantre was considerably older and bigger, at 26 years of age and
with a height of five feet and nine inches, compared to Bulalacao, the boy he attacked, who was only
15 years old and stood at about five feet. Even with his bare hands, the victim Cantre could have hurt
Bulalacao. Petitioner Calimutan sought only to protect Bulalacao and to stop the assault of the victim
Cantre against the latter when he picked up a stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. The stone was
readily available as a weapon to petitioner Calimutan since the incident took place on a road. That he
threw the stone at the back of the victim Cantre does not automatically imply treachery on the part of
petitioner Calimutan as it is highly probable that in the midst of the fray, he threw the stone rashly
and impulsively, with no regard as to the position of the victim Cantre. When the victim Cantre
stopped his aggression after being hit by the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan, the latter also
desisted from any other act of violence against the victim Cantre.

The above-described incident could not have taken more than just a few minutes. It was a very brief
scuffle, in which the parties involved would hardly have the time to ponder upon the most
appropriate course of action to take. With this in mind, this Court cannot concur in the declaration
made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre as a
retaliatory act. It was evidently a swift and spontaneous reaction to an unexpected and unprovoked
attack by the victim Cantre on Bulalacao. That Bulalacao was already able to run away from the victim
Cantre may have escaped the notice of the petitioner Calimutan who, under the pressure of the
circumstances, was forced to act as quickly as possible.

The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre with
the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to this
Court was petitioner Calimutans intention to drive away the attacker who was, at that point, the
victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier described, much younger and
smaller in built than the victim Cantre.35

Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawful objective when he threw the stone at the
victim Cantre, his act was committed with inexcusable lack of precaution. He failed to consider that a
stone the size of a mans fist could inflict substantial injury on someone. He also miscalculated his
own strength, perhaps unaware, or even completely disbelieving, that he could throw a stone with
such force as to seriously injure, or worse, kill someone, at a quite lengthy distance of ten meters.

Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre was the
proximate cause of the latters death, despite being done with reckless imprudence rather than with
malicious intent, petitioner Calimutan remains civilly liable for such death. This Court, therefore,
retains the reward made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals to the heirs of the victim Cantre of the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and another P50,000.00 as moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29 August
2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998, is hereby
MODIFIED. Petitioner Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly sentenced to
imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum period of two years
and one day of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the
victim Cantre the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latters death and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice
AMADOR CORPUZ and ROMEO GONZALES, P e t i t i o n e r s,

- versus -

EDISON LUGUE and CATHERINE BALUYOT,

R e s p o n d e n t s.

G.R. No. 137772

Present:

PUNO,

Chairman,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR.,

TINGA, and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:

July 29, 2005

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision[1] affirming the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) decision[2] finding herein petitioners liable for the injuries suffered by
respondent Edison Lugue as a result of an accident involving four (4) vehicles, one of which was then
driven by petitioner Romeo Gonzales and owned by petitioner Amador Corpuz.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

On 14 September 1984, at around 7:15 in the morning, while an Isuzu KC-20 passenger jeep (KC-20),
then being driven by Jimmy Basilio, was traversing the right side of the Roman Highway in Barangay
Pias, Orion, Bataan, it collided with a tanker truck driven by Gerardo Lim, which was then moving
from the right shoulder of the highway. As a result of the collision, the KC-20 was thrown towards the
left lane of the highway where it was bumped by a Mazda minibus (minibus) being driven by herein
petitioner Gonzales who was then trying to overtake the KC-20. At that point, the KC-20 spun and
bumped a Transcon service truck parked on the left side of the highway. As a result of the impact, the
KC-20 was thrown across the highway where it was again hit by the minibus pushing the former
towards a deep portion on the left side of the road. As a consequence of the accident, passengers of
the KC-20, including respondent Lugue, suffered physical injuries.

To summarize, the parties involved in the vehicular accident are as follows:

VEHICLE

OWNER

DRIVER

Isuzu KC-20

Ricardo Santiago

Jimmy Basilio

Tanker truck

Oscar Jaring

Gerardo Lim

Mazda minibus

Amador Corpuz

Romeo Gonzales
Respondent Lugue then filed an action for damages arising from the vehicular incident before the
Balanga, Bataan RTC, Branch 2, against herein petitioners Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales,
owner and driver of the minibus, respectively, and Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim, owner and driver of
the tanker truck, respectively. Therein defendants filed a third-party complaint against Ricardo
Santiago and Jimmy Basilio, owner/operator and driver of the KC-20, respectively.

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision holding jointly and severally liable Ricardo Santiago,
Jimmy Basilio, Oscar Jaring, Gerardo Lim, Amador Corpuz, and Romeo Gonzales. The appurtenant
portions of the decision read:

There are two (2) versions of the accident in question respectively espoused by the several parties in
the instant case. One version is that put forth by plaintiff Edison Lugue (including his witness Remigio
Gervacio) and also by defendants and third-party plaintiffs Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales. The
other version is that advanced by defendants and third-party plaintiffs Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim.

These two versions shall be discussed and their respective merits analyzed. Whichever version is
found to be plausible shall determine the proximate cause earlier mentioned.

(1) The Lugue-Corpuz version:

The Isuzu KC-20 Edison Lugue was riding on the date in question was being driven by third-party
defendant Jimmy Basilio on the center of the right lane of the national highway headed toward
Lamao, Limay, Bataan. When said KC-20 was about 25 to 30 meters from the tanker truck owned by
defendant Oscar Jaring, which tanker truck was then just beginning to make a headstart from its
former parked position on the right shoulder of said highway, the portion on the left headlight of the
tanker truck bumped the KC-20 on its middle portion of the right side. As a result, the KC-20 was
thrown to the left side of the highway facing Mariveles and, immediately thereafter, it was bumped
by the Mazda minibus owned by defendant Amador Corpuz and then driven by defendant Romeo
Gonzales. As a result of such second bumping of the KC-20, it spun and bumped a service truck of the
Transcon which was parked on the left side of the highway facing Mariveles. Finally, the KC-20 fell
crumpled on the left concrete lane of the road facing Balanga.

(2) The Jaring-Lim version:

While third-party plaintiff Oscar Jarings tanker truck was parked on the asphalted shoulder on the
right side of the highway near the Caltex at Barangay Pias, Townsite, Limay, Bataan, on the date in
question, and he was having some invoices recorded by Caltex employees at the guardhouse, which
was some ten and a half (10-1/2) meters away from said tanker truck, he was not looking at said truck
and the KC-20. But just the same he testified that the right fender of the KC-20 hit the left front
portion of the fender of the tanker truck. As a result, the KC-20 went to the other side of the road,
where it was bumped by the minibus behind it. Then the KC-20 hit the rear portion of the Transcon
service truck. The minibus bumped the KC-20 again, after which the latter continued on toward
Mariveles for about 100 meters until it finally fell into a deep portion of the road.

...

It will be noted that the Lugue-Corpuz version was testified to by at least four (4) witnesses Edison
Lugue, Remigio Gervacio, Patrocinio Carillo and Romeo Gonzales, whereas the Jaring-Lim version was
testified to by only one (1) witness Ricardo Puno. Oscar Jaring himself did not testify to having
witnessed the incident. On the other hand, the driver of the tanker truck defendant Gerardo Lim,
admitted expressly in his oral testimony that he was at the guardhouse at the time the accident
happened, because he was having some invoices recorded by the Caltex employees. Clearly, therefore,
he did not witness the accident involving the KC-20 and the tanker truck because he was not looking
at said two vehicles. Whatever version he testified to of the subject accident could not have been
otherwise than pure hearsay.

From the foregoing discussion of the respective two versions of the subject accident and the evidence
adduced, it would appear that

(1) The tanker truck owned by defendant Oscar Jaring, whose authorized driver at the time of the
accident was defendant Gerardo Lim, was not actually parked completely (if it was parked at all) on
the right shoulder of the national highway where the accident took place, witness Ricardo Puno
testified or as defendant Jarings photographed marked as Exhibits 1, 1-A and 1-B would tend to show.
If it was parked at all, the plausible likelihood was that it was so parked that while its right front and
rear wheels were touching the right asphalted shoulder of that highway, however its left front and
rear wheels were actually on the concrete right lane of said highway, with its left front fender and
bumper protruding well into said right lane, thus constituting a stumbling block to vehicles traveling
on such right lane facing the direction where plaintiff Edison Lugue was going then.

This conclusion is bolstered by the obvious fact that from said photograph Exhibit 1 it can be seen that
the right bumper of the tanker truck appears to have detached from its former connection to the left
front portion of the tanker truck and such left end now appears to have been bent forward. The
fender of the same truck also appears to have been damaged on the same left side, with a vertical
long portion cut from said fender.

If said tanker truck was thus parked as posted in the two foregoing paragraphs, then it had been
parked in a negligent manner by its driver, who thereby did not exercise ordinary or simple human
prudence or foresight to avoid any portion of said truck from obstructing the way of any oncoming
motor vehicle being driven on said right or proper lane of the highway. Any normal or average human
being, especially a motor vehicle driver, ought to know that the concrete lanes of highways are
intended to be traversed by motor vehicles and are not intended to be used as parking areas. Even in
case of emergency, only the shoulders of such highways may be used for parking purposes.
(3) There was also the possibility testified to by plaintiff Edison Lugue, his witness Remigio Gervacio
and defendant Romeo Gonzales to the effect that the tanker truck was not actually parked but was
actually already moving or being driven from its former parked position and its left front wheel (and
perhaps even the left rear wheels) had occupied a portion of the concrete right lane of the highway
which was also being traversed then by the KC-20.

This possibility is silently corroborated by the condition of the front bumper and fender of the tanker
truck depicted in the photograph marked as Exhibit 1, as already described hereinbefore, having in
mind the fact that not a single witness testified to having seen the Isuzu KC-20 leave the concrete
right lane and occupy the asphalted shoulder.

On the plane of logic, this version is also supported by the undisputed fact testified by practically all
the witnesses who testified that after the physical contact between the tanker truck and the KC-20,
the latter vehicle was shoved from its proper right lane to the left lane as a result of the impact. Such
resulting shoving effect could have been the consequence of the push it got from the tanker truck
which was already moving then toward the concrete right lane.

(4) On the other hand, neither may the Lugue-Corpuz version on the physical contact between the
KC-20 and the tanker truck be swallowed or considered as entirely correct. This version attempts to
show that the tanker truck, while being initially driven away from the right asphalted shoulder of the
highway into the concrete right lane of said highway, bumped with its left side the right middle
portion of the body of said KC-20, thus causing the latter to be shoved to the left concrete lane of said
highway, where it was bumped by the passing or overtaking Mazda minibus.

Plaintiff Edison Lugue himself testified on direct examination that the first time he saw the tanker
truck was when the KC-20 was about 25 to 30 meters from said truck. At that time, he said, the truck
was just beginning to make a headstart and was still on the asphalted shoulder of the highway. On
cross-examination, he modified that distance between the two vehicles the first time he saw them to
from 20 to 35 meters. He also stated that at that distance from the truck, the KC-20 did not slow
down until it was bumped by the truck; and that all of the four wheels of the truck were originally
occupying the shoulder of the highway.

If all of the wheels of the tanker truck had originally been occupying the asphalted shoulder of the
highway and said vehicle was just beginning to make a headstart toward the right concrete lane of the
highway, then the most probable course or direction of said truck could have been forward but
slightly oblique toward its left. Very likely, the truck was still running on first gear, which means it was
still going very slowly. Even plaintiff Edison Lugue and driver Romeo Gonzales of the Mazda minibus
following the KC-20 did not say that the tanker truck was being driven squarely across the right lane
of the highway.

If defendant driver Jimmy Basilio of the KC-20 had seen the tanker truck while at a distance of 20 to
35 meters away from it, if he had been prudent and careful he could still avoid having his vehicle get
in physical contact with said truck. That distance was still adequate for him to swerve the steering
wheel slightly to the left so as to avoid such truck getting in contact with his KC-20. But there is no
showing whatsoever that he did that. A number of possibilities present themselves.

(a) Because Jimmy Basilio was driving the KC-20 fast, as Lugue stated, he must have calculated that it
could already safely pass the truck without the need of swerving the steering wheel even slightly to
the left.

(b) Basilio might have had in mind the Mazda minibus which was trailing the KC-20 and which was
going through the motions of passing or overtaking such KC-20. He may have calculated that if he
would swerve the KC-20 even slightly to the left, it might go directly on the path of the minibus. So he
avoided swerving the KC-20 and went steadily forward, hoping to safely pass the tanker truck at the
fast rate of speed he was then driving. Plaintiff Lugue testified that the KC-20 he was riding in did not
change course or position on the right lane of the highway just before the bumping occurred. In other
words, the KC-20 did not change course nor relax its speed before the actual physical contact
between the tanker truck and the KC-20.

In such a situation, wherein there was a truck starting to crawl on the right lane traversed by the
KC-20 and there was a minibus trailing it, and in the process of passing or overtaking the KC-20, the
driver of the minibus (sic) was expected to exercise caution and prudence to avoid hitting or being hit
by either or both other motor vehicles before it or trailing it, the fact that the driver of the KC-20 did
not either slacken his speed or even swerve his steering wheel, however slightly, to avoid hitting or
being hit by the tanker truck bespeaks reckless imprudence on the part of third-party defendant
Jimmy Basilio as driver of said KC-20. Had he even only slackened the speed of the KC-20, he could
have avoided any contact between it and the tanker truck, given that distance of 25 to 35 meters
from said truck when the latter was first seen. He chose not to do so.

Reckless imprudence consists in the doing or failing to do an act, voluntarily, but without malice, from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
(Art. 365, Revised Penal Code)

(3) Defendant Gerardo Lim, as driver of the subject tanker truck with Plate No. CVC-563 Phil. 84 on
the date in question, has been shown to have been grossly negligent in either (a) improperly parking
his said truck on the right lane of the national highway instead of totally on the asphalted shoulder of
said highway, or (b) driving said tanker truck from said shoulder of the highway into the right lane of
said highway without previously carefully observing and making sure that no other vehicle was
coming from the rear of his vehicle so as to avoid any possible accident from such direction, which
gross negligence constituted the proximate cause of the accident in question.

Otherwise stated, had he not parked his truck improperly, or had he made sure that there was no
oncoming vehicle from the direction of the rear of his truck, the initial bumping between the said
tanker truck and the Isuzu KC-20 would not have taken place and the subsequent bumpings by and
among the other vehicles involved in the subject accident would not have occurred.
He is also liable due to culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, under the provisions of Articles 2176 to 2194,
inclusive, of the same Code.

(4) As far as defendant Amador Corpuz is concerned, who is the owner-operator of the Mazda
minibus with Plate No. CVC-563-Phil. 84 being driven by defendant Romeo Gonzales on the date in
question, he failed to prove that he had observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage sustained by plaintiff Lugue as a consequence of the proven negligence of his
said driver Romeo Gonzales.

He is liable for quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana under the provisions of Articles 1733 or 1766, inclusive
of the same code.

(5) With respect to defendant and third-party plaintiff Oscar Jaring, as owner-operator of the subject
tanker truck driven by defendant and third-party plaintiff Gerardo Lim, he failed to prove that he had
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage sustained by plaintiff
Lugue as a consequence of the proven negligence of his said driver Gerardo Lim.

He is liable for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict under the provisions of Articles 1733 to 1766, inclusive,
of the same Civil Code.

(6) Concerning defendant Romeo Gonzales, driver of the subject Mazda minibus with Plate No.
CVC-563-Phil. 84 on the date of the accident in question, he has been shown to have been grossly
negligent in the manner he drove or operated the said motor vehicle, which gross negligence
constituted an intervening cause for the accident which occurred and which resulted in the injuries
sustained by plaintiff Edison Lugue.

He is liable for quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, provided for under Articles 1733 to 1766, inclusive, of
the same Code.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against all the defendants
and third-party defendants

(a) Declaring third-party defendants Ricardo Santiago and Jimmy Basilio liable for culpa contractual
and for culpa aquiliana and to plaintiff Edison Lugue in respect to the accident subject of the instant
action and ordering them to pay jointly to said plaintiff (1) Nineteen Thousand Nine Hundred
Forty-Eight Pesos and Ninety Centavos (P19,948.90), Philippine Currency, as actual or compensatory
damages; (2) Actual or compensatory damages in the sum of Two Thousand Eleven Pesos (P2,011.00)
every month from 14 September 1985, representing the diminution in the monthly salary of plaintiff
Edison Lugue as a result of the physical injuries sustained by him arising from the subject accident, or
Twenty-Four Thousand One Hundred Thirty-Two Pesos (P24,132.00) every calendar year from the
aforementioned year, until he shall have been fully paid; and (3) Moral damages in the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);

(b) Declaring defendants Amador Corpuz, Romeo Gonzales, Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim solidarily
liable for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict to Edison Lugue in connection with the same accident and
ordering them to pay jointly and severally to said plaintiff the various damages enumerated in Nos. (1)
to (3), inclusive, in the foregoing subparagraph (a).

In no case shall said plaintiff be allowed to recover twice from the aforementioned defendants the
aforestated damages.

Plaintiffs having instituted the present action as paupers-litigants, the docket and other fees that they
were exempted from paying shall constitute a lien on any amount that they may collect under this
decision.[3]

Aggrieved by said decision of the trial court, Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim, owner and driver of the
tanker truck respectively, and Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales, owner and driver of the minibus
respectively, filed an appeal before the appellate court. Third-party defendants Santiago and Basilio,
owner and driver of the KC-20 respectively, did not interpose an appeal.

On 09 March 1999, the Court of Appeals granted the appeal of Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim, while it
dismissed that of plaintiffs Santiago and Basilio in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is MODIFIED as follows:

1.) Defendants Ricardo Santiago and Jimmy Basilio are declared jointly and severally liable
with defendants-appellants Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales; and

2.) Defendants-appellants Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim are absolved from liability and the
Complaint as against them is DISMISSED.

In all other respects, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.[4]

Hence, the instant petition by Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales.

Petitioners arguments can be summarized in one issue: whether or not the appellate court erred in
holding them liable for damages based on the findings of facts adduced by the trial court. Petitioners
emphasize that nowhere in the trial courts 43-page decision was there any finding that would
remotely support the court a quos conclusion that petitioners are liable for the injuries suffered by
respondent Lugue.
We find merit in the petition.

A careful perusal of the lower courts decision will show that the following were established during
trial through the testimonies of petitioners witnesses:

I. According to the testimony of witness Remigio

Gervacio during the direct examination, who was then seated on the middle right portion of the
minibus, the minibus he was riding was following a KC-20 which was being driven on the right lane of
the highway facing Mariveles, while the minibus was occupying the left portion of the road facing the
same direction, a little beyond the center line. Then a tanker truck bumped the KC-20, which was
thrown to the left portion of the road facing Mariveles. Because the minibus was then already near to
the KC-20, it bumped the KC-20.[5]

II. Petitioner Gonzales, on direct examination,

stated that the minibus he was driving on the concrete highway was following a KC-20 vehicle. Then
he made a signal to overtake the KC-20 because the way was clear. When the minibus was about ten
(10) meters from the KC-20, about to overtake the latter, all of a sudden a gasoline tanker entered the
road. While doing so, the tanker bumped the KC-20, as a result of which the latter moved to a
position blocking the way of the minibus, the left lane facing Mariveles. He did everything to avoid the
KC-20. He pressed the brake fully. But the tanker was already too close to the minibus, that was why
the latter hit the KC-20.[6]

III. Witness Patrocinio Carillo, a passenger of the

minibus seated beside his wife who was seated on the front seat beside the driver, maintained that
the minibus had been running on the superhighway trailing an Isuzu KC-20. When the minibus was
right in front of the Caltex place, it attempted to pass or overtake the KC-20 it had been following by
swerving to the left lane facing Mariveles. At that moment, the front of the minibus was about eight
(8) meters behind the rear portion of the KC-20, the latter was suddenly thrown to the left and thus it
blocked the path of the Mazda minibus. As a result, the minibus bumped the left rear portion of the
KC-20. This bumping happened when both vehicles were already on the left lane of the highway
facing Mariveles.[7]

From the foregoing testimonies, as well as the discussion of the trial court earlier quoted, it is clear
that the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by respondent Lugue was the collision between the
KC-20 and the tanker truck. As correctly pointed out by the lower court, proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible
for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.[8]
Having stated such, it now becomes the trial courts responsibility to adjudge who between the drivers
of the two colliding vehicles was negligent and thus liable for damages brought about by the injuries
suffered by Edison Lugue. This issue was settled by the court a quo in this wise:

In such a situation, wherein there was a truck starting to crawl on the right lane traversed by the
KC-20 and there was a minibus trailing it, and in the process of passing or overtaking the KC-20, the
driver of the minibus (sic) was expected to exercise caution and prudence to avoid hitting or being hit
by either or both other motor vehicles before it or trailing it, the fact that the driver of the KC-20 did
not either slacken his speed or even swerve his steering wheel, however slightly, to avoid hitting or
being hit by the tanker truck bespeaks reckless imprudence on the part of third-party defendant
Jimmy Basilio as driver of said KC-20. Had he even only slackened the speed of the KC-20, he could
have avoided any contact between it and the tanker truck, given that distance of 25 to 35 meters
from said truck when the latter was first seen. He chose not to do so.[9] [Emphasis ours]

Therefore, it is clear that it was the reckless imprudence of the driver of the KC-20, Jimmy Basilio, that
set the other events in motion which eventually led to the passengers of the KC-20 sustaining physical
injuries.

Nonetheless, in a single paragraph of its ten-page Decision, the Court of Appeals discussed the alleged
negligence of Romeo Gonzales, and thus attributed liability to the latter, the driver of the minibus, to
wit:

We however find no merit in the appeal of Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales. Faced with the
situation where the truck parked on the side was at a headstart in crawling towards the cemented
portion of the highway, still the Mazda mini bus recklessly proceeded in attempting to overtake the
Isuzu passenger jeep unmindful of the spatial limitations of the road. Defendant-driver Romeo
Gonzales was clearly negligent.[10]

This conclusion of the appellate court of recklessness on the part of petitioner Gonzales is, however,
unwarranted. Based on the unchallenged testimony of petitioner Gonzales, he signaled to overtake
the KC-20 because the way was clear.[11] That despite his best effort to do everything to avoid hitting
the KC-20, petitioner failed to do so because the KC-20 had moved to a position blocking the way of
the minibus as a result of the tanker bumping the KC-20.[12] Furthermore, based on the unrebutted
testimony of both Remigio Gervacio[13] and Patrocinio Carillo,[14] at the time when the minibus hit
the KC-20, the former was already moving towards the middle portion of the highway, occupying the
left portion of the road, a little beyond the center line. Certainly, even assuming that petitioner
Gonzales had a few seconds before actual collision, he no longer had any opportunity to avoid it.[15]
Petitioner Gonzales cannot be deemed negligent for failing to prevent the collision even after
applying all means available to him within the few instants when he had discovered the impending
peril.[16]

In a similar case where a jeepney bound for Isabela collided with a bus on its regular route to Manila
when the latter encroached upon the jeepneys lane while it was negotiating a curve, the Court
declared that:

[E]ven assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual
collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it. This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine can
never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.[17]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37085, finding petitioners Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales liable, is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In all other respects, the Court of Appeals Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

Chairman