GLORIA SONDAYON vs. P.J. LHUILLER, INC.
and RICARDO DIAGO, and evidence proved otherwise as said watch was lost on account of a
February 27, 2008
Facts:
Respondent P.J. Lhuillier, Inc. is a domestic corporation that owns and operates
pawnshops under the business name La Cebuana Pawnshop. Respondent
Ricardo Diago acts as manager in one of its pawnshops in Paranaque. Respondent
company contracted the services of the Sultan Security Agency and the agency
assigned Guimad Mantung to guard the La Cebuana Pawnshop in Maywood.
Petitioner Gloria Sondayon, a store manager of Shekinah Jewelry & Boutique, secured
a loan from La Cebuana and pledged her Patek Philippe solid gold watch
worth P250,000. The watch was given to her as part of her commission by the owner of
the shop where she works. She had pawned the watch to La Cebuana a few times in the
past and, each time, she was able to redeem it.
Guimad Mantung, employing force and violence, robbed La Cebuana, resulting in the
deaths of respondent companys appraiser and vault custodian. An information for
Robbery with Homicide was filed against Mantung, and the information alleged
that Mantung divested the pawnshop of P62,000 in cash and several pieces of jewelry
amounting to P5,300,000.
Later, respondent company received a letter from petitioners counsel demanding for the
gold watch that she had pawned. But respondent company failed to comply with the
demand letter because the watch was among the articles of jewelry stolen by Mantung.
Petitioner then, filed a complaint for recovery of possession of personal property with
prayer for preliminary attachment against respondent company and its Maywood branch
manager, Ricardo Diago.
In their Answer, respondents averred that petitioner had no cause of action against them
because the incident was beyond their control.
RTC: The company cannot be held liable for damages, the loss of the thing having
been due to a fortuitous event. The parties are bound by the contract of pledge, among
the terms and conditions of which states that the company should not be held liable if
the thing was lost due to a fortuitous event, said condition not being contrary to law,
morals or public policy should be upheld.
The pertinent portions of the Decision read:
Culled from the testimonies of all the witnesses presented as well as
the pieces of documentary evidence offered, this Court, after a
thorough and careful evaluation and deliberation thereof is of the
honest and firm belief that plaintiff failed to establish a sufficient
cause of action against defendant as to warrant the recovery of the
pledged Patek Philippe Solid Gold Watch which was allegedly
concealed, removed or disposed of by the latter defendants as the facts
robbery with double homicide that happened on August 10, 1996
perpetrated by one Guimad Mantung, the security guard of defendant
employed by Sultan Security Agency as found out by the Court (Exh.
7); thus, defendants were not negligent in the safekeeping of the watch
of plaintiff.
Not only that. The pledge bears the terms and conditions which the
parties should adhere being the law between them pursuant to
Art. 1159 of the New Civil Code.
Paragraph 13 of Exhibits A and B specifically provides:
The pawnee shall not be liable for the loss or
damage of the article pawned due to fortuitous
events or force majeure such as fire, robbery, theft,
hold-ups and other similar acts. When the loss is
due to the fault and/or negligence of the pawnee, the
amount of its liability, if any, shall be limited to the
appraised value appearing on the face hereof.
Said provision is not violative of law, customs, public policy or
tradition, hence, has the force of law between the plaintiff and
defendants, and the incident that happened which led to the loss of the
thing pledged cannot be considered as negligence but more of a
fortuitous event which the defendants could not have foreseen or
which though foreseen, was inevitable. This finds support in Art. 1174
of the Civil Code.
The defendants, therefore, are not bound to return the thing pledged
nor the Court to fix its value. There was no unjustifiable refusal on the
part of the defendants to return the thing pledged because, as testified
by plaintiff herself, she has pawned the watch at least five (5) times
to defendant corporation.
CA: Affirmed RTC ruling.
Issues:
Whether the robbery is a fortuitous event to which the company cannot be held
liable; and
Ruling:
Yes, as discussed by the RTC. The pawnee shall not be liable for loss or damage of
the article pawned due to fortuitous events or force majeure such as fire,
robbery, theft, and other similar acts. When the loss is due to the fault and/or
 negligence of the pawnee, the amount of its liability, if any, shall be limited to
appraised value appearing on the face thereof.
As to the causal connection between respondent companys violation of the legal
obligation to insure the articles pledged and the heist-homicide committed by the
security guard, the answer is simple: had respondent company insured the articles
pledged against burglary, petitioner would have been compensated for the loss from the
burglary. Respondent companys failure to insure the article is, therefore, a contributory
cause to petitioners loss.
Considering, however, that petitioner agreed to a valuation of P15,000 for the article
pledged in case of a loss, the replacement value for failure to insure is likewise limited
to P15,000.
Nevertheless, this Court, taking into account all the circumstances of this case, deems it
fair and just to award exemplary damages against respondent company for its failure to
comply with the rule and regulation requiring it to insure the articles pledged against fire
and burglary, in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000) Pesos.
This Decision is without prejudice to appropriate proceedings to recover any excess
value of the article pledged from amounts that may be or have been awarded payable by
third parties answerable for the loss arising from the robbery.
Petition partly granted. Petitioner awarded P15,000.00 as reimbursement of the watch,
and P25,000.00 as damages.
THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN
YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-53401; November 6, 1989; Paras, J.
Facts:
A strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos
Norte which resulted in flooding. After the typhoon had abated and when the
floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana
Belen, ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero
Street, Laoag City, and proceeded northward towards the direction of the Five Sisters
Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise
therein that might have been damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the
deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also
owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema,
which was partly owned by the deceased.
Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The
two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so because on the spot
where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in
snake-like fashion in the water.
Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio
Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from her he turned
back shouting that the water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek
help from Antonio Yabes at the YJ Cinema building which was four or five blocks away.
When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in law had been
electrocuted, he acted immediately. With his wife Jane, together with Ernesto and one
Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people
of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current.
Then the party waded to the house on Guerrero Street. The floodwater was receding and
the lights inside the house were out indicating that the electric current had been cut off
in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the deceased. The body
was recovered about two meters from an electric post.
Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National Power
Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in their
electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines.
He set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection. On the way, he saw grounded
and disconnected lines. He decided to go to the INELCO Office at the Life Theatre on
Rizal Street by way of Guerrero. As he turned right at the intersection of Guerrero and
Rizal, he saw an electric wire about 30 meters long strung across the street "and the other
end was seeming to play with the current of the water." There was no one in INELCO's
Office the 1st time so he came back the 2nd time for an inspection. Having learned of
the death of Isabel Lao Juan, he passed by the house of the deceased at the corner of
Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets to which the body had been taken. Using the
resuscitator which was a standard equipment in his jeep and employing the skill he
acquired from an in service training on resuscitation, he tried to revive the deceased. His
efforts proved futile.
Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left palm of the deceased, Engr. Juan
noticed a hollow wound. Proceeding to the INELCO Office, he met two linemen on the
way. He told them about the grounded lines of the INELCO. In the afternoon of the same
day, he went on a third inspection trip preparatory to the restoration of power. The
dangling wire he saw on Guerrero was no longer there.
Dr. Castro examined the body. The skin was grayish or, in medical parlance,
cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an
"electrically charged wound" or a first degree burn. About the base of the thumb on the
left hand was a burned wound. The certificate of death prepared by Dr. Castro stated the
cause of' death as ,'circulatory shock electrocution."
In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the testimonies of its officers
and employees, that on and even before June 29, 1967 the electric service system of the
INELCO in the whole franchise area, including Area No. 9 which covered the residence
of Antonio Yabes at No. 18 Guerrero Street, did not suffer from any defect that might
constitute a hazard to life and property. The service lines, devices and other INELCO
equipment in Area No. 9 had been newly-installed prior to the date in question. INELCO
had installed safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to
property in case of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others.
Defendant had 12 linesmen charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-
up of the areas respectively assigned to them. Defendant asserts that only a few known
places in Laoag were reported to have suffered damaged electric lines. Fabico Abijero,
testified that when he passed by the intersection of Rizal and Guerrero Streets to switch
off the street lights in Area No. 9, he did not see any cut or broken wires in or near the
vicinity. What he saw were many people fishing out the body of Isabel Lao Juan.
Dr. Antonio Briones was presented by the defense to show that the deceased
could not have died of electrocution. Without an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim,
no doctor, not even a medicolegal expert, can speculate as to the real cause of death.
Cyanosis could not have been found in the body of the deceased because it appears only
in a live person. The presence of the elongated burn in the left palm of the deceased is
not sufficient to establish her death by electrocution; since burns caused by electricity
are more or less round in shape and with points of entry and exit.
An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was instituted by
the heirs of the deceased with the aforesaid CFI on June 24, 1968. In its Answer (Vide,
Record on Appeal, p. 55, Rollo), petitioner advanced the theory, as a special defense,
that the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to
negligence attributable only to herself and not to petitioner. In this regard, it was pointed
out that the deceased, without petitioner's knowledge, caused the installation of a burglar
deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel
matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on.
Petitioner then conjectures that the switch to said burglar deterrent must have been left
on, hence, causing the deceased's electrocution when she tried to open her gate that early
morning of June 29, 1967. After due trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of petitioner
and dismissed the complaint but awarded to the latter P25,000 in moral damages and
attorney's fees of P45,000. An appeal was filed with the CA which issued the
controverted decision.
In this petition for review the petitioner assigns the following errors committed
by the respondent CA: An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was
instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the aforesaid CFI. CFI found the facts in
favor of the INELCO and dismissed the complaint but awarded to the latter P25,000 in
moral damages and attorney's fees of P45,000. An appeal was filed with the CA which
set aside CFI's decision and ordered the award of damages in favor of the heirs of the
deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not the deceased died of electrocution;
Whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's death;
Held:
By a preponderance of evidence, heirs of deceased were able to show that the
deceased died of electrocution, a conclusion which can be primarily derived from the
photographed burnt wounds on the left palm of the former. Such wounds undoubtedly
point to the fact that the deceased had clutched a live wire of INELCO. This was
corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Jovencio Castro who actually examined the body
of the deceased a few hours after the death and described the said burnt wounds as a
"first degree burn" and that they were "electrically charged." Furthermore, witnesses
Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong added that after the deceased screamed "Ay"
and sank into the water, they tried to render some help but were overcome with fear by
the sight of an electric wire dangling from an electric post, moving in the water in a
snake-like fashion. The nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw
them can lead to no other conclusion than that they were "burns," and there was nothing
else in the street where the victim was wading thru which could cause a burn except the
dangling live wire of defendant company."
While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which
no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the
victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took
place. In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the night
of June 28 until the early hours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires a
supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident
that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that defendant did that. On
the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing
the area, nor even manning its office. Indeed, under the circumstances of the case,
petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public"...
considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required
of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The
duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where
persons have a right to be" (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence
of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing
that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God
combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct
or omission."
"Volenti non fit injuria" finds no application in the case at bar. It has been held
that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a
known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or
if the life or property of another is in peril, or when he seeks to rescue his endangered
property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her
livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the
fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to
INELCO's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, heirs, may
not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's
negligence.
"The finding of the lower court ... was based on what the defendant's employees
were supposed to do, not on what they actually did or failed to do on the date in question,
and not on the occasion of the emergency situation brought about by the typhoon." And
as found by the CA, which We have already reiterated above, petitioner was in fact
negligent. In a like manner, petitioner's denial of ownership of the several wires cannot
stand the logical conclusion reached by the CA when it held that "(t)he nature of the
wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them can lead to no other conclusion
than that they were 'burns', and there was nothing else in the street where the victim was
wading thru which could cause a burn except the dangling live wire of defendant
company."
"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires
prompt efforts to discover and repair broken lines." The fact is that when Engineer
Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation set out in the early morning of June 29,
1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded and disconnected lines hanging from posts
to the ground but did not see any INELCO lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO
office. The foregoing shows that petitioner's duty to exercise extraordinary diligence
under the circumstance was not observed, confirming the negligence of INELCO.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the CA, except for the slight
modification that actual damages be increased to P48,229.45, is hereby AFFIRMED.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI),Petitioner,
vs.ALFONSO VERCHEZ, GRACE VERCHEZ-INFANTE, MARDONIO
INFANTE, ZENAIDA VERCHEZ-CATIBOG, AND FORTUNATO
CATIBOG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 164349 January 31, 2006
FACTS:
On January 21, 1991, Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace) sent a telegram to her sister
Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida) in Quezon City through the Sorsogon Branch of
RCPI, reading: "Send check money Mommy hospital.", as their mother Editha was
rushed to the hospital due to diabetes. After three days without any reply from her sister,
Grace sent another letter, this time through JRS Delivery Service, reprimanding her for
not sending any financial aide. Upon receipt of the letter, Zenaida rushed to Sorsogon
and denied having received the prior telegram.
The telegram was received 25 days later, or on February 15, 1991. Upon inquiry, RCPI
explained that the transmission process, the radio link connecting the points of
communication involved encountered radio noise and interferences such that subject
telegram did not initially register in the receiving teleprinter machine. Thus, a repeat
transmission was made and subsequent delivery was effected.
On April 17, 1992, Editha died. On September 8, 1993, Verchez, filed a complaint
against RCPI before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon for damages, alleging
that, inter alia, the delay in delivering the telegram contributed to the early demise of the
late Editha to their damage and prejudice, for which they prayed for the award of moral
and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
The trial court, observing that "although the delayed delivery of the questioned telegram
was not apparently the proximate cause of the death of Editha," ruled out the presence
of force majeure. Respecting the clause in the telegram relied upon by RCPI, the trial
court held that it partakes of the nature of a contract of adhesion.
The trial court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, holding that the obligation of the
defendant to deliver the telegram to the addressee is of an urgent nature. Its essence is
the early delivery of the telegram to the concerned person. Yet, due to the negligence of
its employees, the defendant failed to discharge of its obligation on time making it liable
for damages under Article 2176. It ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiffs
P100,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence, RCPIs
present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the award of moral damages is proper even if the trial court found that there
was no direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts.
HELD:
YES. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of
contract with regard to Grace (sender of telegram), and on tort with regard to her
co-plaintiffs-herein-co-respondents.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure
of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law,
recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from
liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a
contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured
party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy
serves to preserve the interests of the promissee that may include his "expectation
interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as
good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed, or
his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by
reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had
the contract not been made; or his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having
restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party. Indeed, agreements
can accomplish little, either for their makers or for society, unless they are made the
basis for action. The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make
recompense to the one who has been injured by the failure of another to observe his
contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like proof of his
exercise of due diligence x x x or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him
from his ensuing liability.23(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest possible
time. It took 25 days, however, for RCPI to deliver it.
RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the alleged radio noise and interferences
which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception of the telegraphic message.
Additionally, its messenger claimed he could not locate the address of Zenaida and it
was only on the third attempt that he was able to deliver the telegram.
For the defense of force majeure to prosper,
x x x it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have
occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed
to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. Ones
negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to
another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or
injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is
found to be partly the result of a persons participation whether by active
intervention, neglect or failure to act the whole occurrence is humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from delivering the
telegram at the soonest possible time, it should have at least informed Grace of the non-
transmission and the non-delivery so that she could have taken steps to remedy the
situation. But it did not. There lies the fault or negligence.
Respecting the assailed award of moral damages, a determination of the presence
of the following requisites to justify the award is in order:
x x x firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological
suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually
established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is
predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article
2220 of the Civil Code.
Respecting the first requisite, evidence of suffering by the plaintiffs-herein respondents
was correctly appreciated by the CA. The failure of RCPI to deliver the telegram
containing the message of appellees on time, disturbed their filial tranquillity. Family
members blamed each other for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency that involved
the life of the late Mrs. Verchez, who suffered from diabetes. As reflected in the
foregoing discussions, the second and third requisites are present.
On the fourth requisite, Article 2220 of the Civil Code provides:
Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.
After RCPIs first attempt to deliver the telegram failed, it did not inform Grace of the
non-delivery thereof and waited for 12 days before trying to deliver it again, knowing
as it should know that time is of the essence in the delivery of telegrams. When its
second long-delayed attempt to deliver the telegram again failed, it, again, waited for
another 12 days before making a third attempt. Such nonchalance in performing its
urgent obligation indicates gross negligence amounting to bad faith. The fourth requisite
is thus also present.
In applying the above-quoted Article 2220, this Court has awarded moral damages in
cases of breach of contract where the defendant was guilty of gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation.
As for RCPIs tort-based liability, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides:
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention,
and other relief:
xxxx
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another.
RCPIs negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the
peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the
appellate court, it disrupted the "filial tranquillity" among them as they blamed each
other "for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions
complained of in this case are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26
of the Civil Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict when courts may award
moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

In fine, the award to the plaintiffs-herein respondents of moral damages is in order, as is
the award of attorneys fees, respondents having been compelled to litigate to protect
their rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
CHAN KEEP, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. LEON CHAN GIOCO, ET
AL., defendants-appellants.
G.R. L-No. 4378 August 18, 1909
FACTS:
Plaintiffs Chan Keep et al. claim to have delivered 120 cavanes of rice to defendants
upon a contract for its transportation by boat ( parao) from the port of Luna, in the
Province of La Union, to the port of San Fernando, in the same province, in
consideration of the sum of twenty-five centavos per cavan; the rice, as it is alleged,
having been lost through the negligence, carelessness, and lack of due precaution taken
by the defendants in the management of the boat on which it was being transported, as
result of which the boat sank as she entered the port of San Fernando, on the night of the
8th of April, 1907.
Leon Chan Gioco denied having entered into the transportation contract, as alleged by
the plaintiffs, and the testimony introduced by plaintiffs and defendants as to the
execution of the contract with this defendant is, as stated by the trial court in its decision,
contradictory in the extreme.
The plaintiffs filed an action to recover the value of the cavanes of rice. The CFI ruled
in favour of the plaintiffs.
Counsel for appellants contends that the loss of the rice was due to the sinking of the
boat on which it was loaded, as a result of a strong wind which struck her as she was
entering the port of San Fernando; and that appellants should not be held responsible
therefor, the loss having resulted from an act of God ( fuerza mayor) or an unavoidable
accident (caso fortuto), and without blame upon their part.
In support of this contention, they cite article 1602 of the Civil Code, which is as follows:
"Carriers (by land or sea) are also responsible for looses and damages of the
articles intrusted to them, unless they prove that the loss or damage was the
result of unavoidable accident (caso fortuto) or an act of God ( fuerza mayor)."
ISSUE: Whether the loss was due to the act of God making defendants not liable for the
loss of the goods
HELD: No. The evidence in support of appellants' claim that the loss of the rice was the
result of an act of God or an unavoidable accident is not satisfactorily established; and,
as appears from an examination of the above-cited article of the code, the burden of
proof in this regard rested upon the defendants.
The only evidence in support of this contention is the testimony of the captain and one
of the members of the crew that when the boat laden with rice arrived in front of the
bouy just outside the harbor or port of San Fernando, the wind was blowing strong
( fuerte); that while changing the course to enter the harbor, the wind blew the boat over
on one side so that she shipped so much water that the crew were compelled to strike
sail, cast anchor, and escape to shore by swimming with the aid of the oars; and that,
having been abandoned in that condition, the running of the tide aided the wind in
throwing the boat still further upon one side and swamped her.
Neither of these witnesses pretend that at the time when the disaster occurred there was
a storm raging or that the seas were running dangerously high. Furthermore, the
testimony of the agent of the Weather Bureau stationed at San Fernando, which was
introduced by the plaintiffs, that, while there may have been a strong wind moving on
the night in question, there was no such heavy wind or violent storm blowing as would
unavoidably swamp a boat manned by a capable crew, commanded by a careful
navigator, and properly equipped for sailing the high seas.
It not having been otherwise expressly stipulated, it is to be presumed that the owner of
the boat, Leon Chan Gioco, when he contracted to transport the rice in question over the
high seas, obligated himself to furnish a boat suitable for the work which he undertook
to perform, and a capable crew to man her ; and the mere fact that a strong wind was
blowing when the boat changed its course is not in itself sufficient to excuse her owners
for losses incurred as a result of so poor an execution of this maneuver as to result in
sinking her. In the absence of proof of such a violent storm or such an exceptionally high
sea that, despite the proper equipment of the boat and the exercise of due skill and
diligence by the patron and crew, those in charge of the boat were overpowered by the
force of the elements, we do not think that the sinking of the boat can justly be said to
have been the result of an act of God or of an unavoidable accident; the blowing of
strong winds must always be anticipated by men who go down into the sea in ships, and
in the absence of evidence of some unusual intervening cause, we must hold that the
exercise of due diligence in the performance of their duty by the patron and the members
of his crew, had they been reasonably expert as seafaring men, could have and would
have avoided the accident which actually occurred, provided the boat was suited to the
work required of her.
Losses resulting from an accident caused by a sudden and unexpected gust of wind have
under some circumstances been held to be attributable to an act of God (11 Ill., 519; 95
Penn., 287; and the books contain many instances of losses attributed to an act of God
or inevitable accident, other than those resulting from the action of storms and high seas,
but it will be found that in all such cases the evidence introduced at the trial sustains a
finding that the loss was due to exceptional circumstances or conditions, beyond the
control of those who would otherwise be responsible for the loss, notwithstanding the
exercise of due diligence, foresight, pains and care to avoid it; and, as has been said,
mere proof that a strong wind is blowing when a properly manned and equipped sailing
boat tacks its course is not sufficient to sustain such a finding.
The judgment appealed from should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellants.
VIRGINIA REAL v. SISENANDO H. BELO
G.R. NO. 146224, 26 January 2007, THIRD DIVISION (AUSTRIA-
MARTINEZ, J.)
FACTS:
Virginia Real owned and operated the Wasabe Fastfood stall located at the
Food Center of the Philippine Women's University (PWU) along Taft Avenue, Malate,
Manila. Sisenando H. Belo owned and operated the BS Masters fastfood stall, also
located at the Food Center of PWU. A fire broke out at Reals Wasabe Fastfood stall.
The fire spread and gutted other fastfood stalls in the area, including Belo's stall. An
investigation on the cause of the fire by Fire Investigator SFO1 Arnel C. Pinca (Pinca)
revealed that the fire broke out due to the leaking fumes coming from the Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG) stove and tank installed at petitioner's stall. For the loss of his
fastfood stall due to the fire, Belo demanded compensation from Real. However, Real
refused to accede to the demand. Hence, respondent filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Belo alleged that Real failed to
exercise due diligence in the upkeep and maintenance of her cooking equipments, as
well as the selection and supervision of her employees; that Real's negligence was the
proximate cause of the fire that gutted the fastfood stalls. In her Answer. Real denied
liability on the grounds that the fire was a fortuitous event and that she exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees. On appeal, the RTC
affirmed the Decision of the MeTC but increased the amount of temperate damages
awarded to the respondent from P50,000.00 to P80,000.00. Real then filed a Petition for
Review with the CA which issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for being
"procedurally flawed/deficient."
ISSUE:
Is the fire a fortuitous event?
RULING:
NO. Jurisprudence defines the elements of a "fortuitous event" as follows: (a)
the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence must be independent of human
will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito,
or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such
as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible for
a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable.
In other words, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of
injury or loss.
It is established by evidence that the fire originated from leaking fumes from
the LPG stove and tank installed at petitioner's fastfood stall and her employees failed
to prevent the fire from spreading and destroying the other fastfood stalls, including
respondent's fastfood stall. Such circumstances do not support petitioner's theory of
fortuitous event. Petitioner's bare allegation is far from sufficient proof for the Court to
rule in her favor. It is basic in the rule of evidence that bare allegations, unsubstantiated
by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence.
Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another, there
instantly arises a presumptionjuris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision
(culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by
his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing
proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of his employee.
In this case, petitioner not only failed to show that she submitted proof that the
LPG stove and tank in her fastfood stall were maintained in good condition and
periodically checked for defects but she also failed to submit proof that she exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her
employees. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of her cooking
equipment and in the selection and supervision of her employees, the necessary
inference was that petitioner had been negligent.
UCPB vs Basco
Respondent Ruben E. Basco had been
-employed with the petitioner (UCPB) for seventeen (17) years.[3]
-stockholder thereof and owned 804 common shares of stock at the par value of
P1.00.[4]
-maintained a checking account with the bank
Basco was terminated for grave abuse of discretion and authority, and breach of trust in
the conduct of
his job as Bank Operations Manager of its Olongapo Branch.
However, the respondent still frequented the UCPB main office in Makati City to solicit
insurance policies
from the employees thereat.
Ongsiapco, UCPB First Vice-President issued a Memorandum to Jesus Belanio of the
Security
Department, instructed Belanio not to allow the respondent access to all bank
premises.[9]
Basco went to the UCPB Makati Branch to receive a check from Rene Jolo, a bank
employee, and to
deposit money with the bank for a friend.[18]He seated himself on a sofa fronting the
tellers booth[19] where
other people were also seated.
Casil, another employee of the bank motioned to the respondent to get the check. The
latter stood up and The Memorandum even contravenes Article XII, paragraph 4 (4.1 and 4.2) of the Code
proceeded in the direction of Casils workstation. After the respondent had taken about of Ethics issued by
six to seven the petitioner bank itself, which provides that one whose employment had been
paces from the sofa, Caspe and the company guard approached him. The guards politely terminated by the
showed petitioner bank may, nevertheless, be allowed access to bank premises, thus:
Ongsiapcos Memorandum to the respondent and told the latter that he was not allowed 4.1 As a client of the Bank in the transaction of a regular bank-client activity.
to enter the DSD 4.2 When the offending party is on official business concerning his employment with
working area; it was lunch break and no outsider was allowed in that area.[36]The the Bank
respondent looked at For another, the Memorandum, as worded, is contrary to the intention of the petitioners.
the Memorandum and complied. Evidently, the
petitioners did not intend to bar the respondent from access to all bank premises under
ISSUES: all
(a) whether or not the petitioner bank abused its right when it issued, through petitioner circumstances. When he testified, petitioner Ongsiapco admitted that a bank employee
Ongsiapco, whose services
the Memorandum barring the respondent access to all bank premises; had been terminated may be allowed to see an employee of the bank and may be allowed
(b) whether or not petitioner bank is liable for nominal damages in view of the incident access to the
involving its bank premises under certain conditions,
security guard Caspe, who stopped the respondent from proceeding to the working area G.R. No. 191033
of the ATM
section to get the check from Casil; and THE ORCHARD GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., EXEQUIEL D. ROBLES,
CARLO R.H. MAGNO, CONRADO L. BENITEZ II, VICENTE R. SANTOS,
HELD: HENRY CUA LOPING, MARIZA SANTOS-TAN, TOMAS B. CLEMENTE III,
1) On the first issue, the petitioners aver that the petitioner bank has the right to prohibit and FRANCIS C. MONTALLANA, Petitioners,
the respondent vs.
from access to all bank premises under Article 429 of the New Civil Code (doctrine of ERNESTO V. YU and MANUEL C. YUHICO, Respondents. (2016)
self-help) Facts: Respondents went to the Orchard Golf (Orchard) to play a round of golf with
We agree that the petitioner may prohibit non-employees from entering the working area another member of the club. At the last minute, however, that other member informed
of the ATM them that he could not play with them. Due to the "no twosome" policy of the Orchard
section. However, under the said Memorandum, even if the respondent wished to go to contained in the membership handbook prohibiting groups of less than three players
the bank to from teeing off on weekends and public holidays before 1:00 p.m., [respondents]
encash a check drawn and issued to him by a depositor of the petitioner bank in payment requested management to look for another player to join them.
of an
obligation, or to withdraw from his account therein, or to transact business with the said Because [Orchard] were unable to find their third player, Yu tried to convince Francis
bank and Montallana, Orchards assistant golf director, to allow them to play twosome.
exercise his right as a depositor, he could not do so as he was barred from entry into the Montallana refused. Yu then shouted invectives at Montallana, at which point he told
bank. Even if [respondent] Yuhico that they should just tee off anyway, regardless of what
the respondent wanted to go to the petitioner bank to confer with the corporate secretary management's reaction would be. Respondents then teed off, without permission from
in connection Montallana. They were thus able to play, although they did so without securing a tee
with his shares of stock therein, he could not do so, since as stated in the Memorandum time control slip before teeing off, again in disregard of a rule in the handbook. As a
of petitioner result of respondents actions, Montallana filed a report on the same day with the board
Ongsiapco, he would not be allowed access to all the bank premises. The said of directors.
Memorandum, as worded,
violates the right of the respondent as a stockholder or a depositor of the petitioner bank, The respondents claim that they suffered damages as a result of the suspension.
for being
capricious and arbitrary.
Issue: Whether the Golf Club is liable for damages.

Yu acknowledged that there was an offense committed. Similarly, Yuhico admitted that
he was aware or had prior knowledge of the Clubs "no twosome" policy as contained
in the Clubs Membership Handbook and that they teed off without the required tee time
slip. Also, while Yu recognized telling Montallana "kamote ka," Yuhico heard him also
say that he (Montallana) is "gago."
Respondents assert that the "no twosome" policy was relaxed by the management when
a member or player would not be prejudiced or, in the words of Yu, allowed
when "maluwag." Yet a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic records
(TSN) disclosed that such claim is based not on concrete examples. No specific instance
as to when and under what circumstance the supposed relaxation took place was cited.
Lastly, granting, for the sake of argument, that the "no twosome" policy had been relaxed
in the past, Montallana cannot be faulted in exercising his prerogative to disallow
respondents from playing since they made no prior reservation and that there were
standing flights (or reservations) waiting for tee time. Per Report, the day of the incident
was a relatively busy day as it had 200 registered players to accommodate as of 8:00
a.m.
It was averred that respondents teed off without the required tee time slip based on the
thinking that it was no longer necessary since Santos, the Clubs Manager, allowed them
by waving his hands when Yuhicos caddie tried to pick up the slip in the registration
office. Such excuse is flimsy because it ignored the reality that Santos, a mere
subordinate of Montallana who already earned the ire of Yu, was practically more
helpless to contain the stubborn insistence of respondents.
Definitely, the contentions that respondents were not stopped by the management when
they teed off and that they did not cause harm to other members playing golf at the time
for absence of any complaints are completely immaterial to the fact that transgressions
to existing Club rules and regulations were committed. It is highly probable that they
were tolerated so as to restore the peace and avoid further confrontation and
inconvenience to the parties involved as well as to the Club members in general.
On the claim for damages
With regard to the purported damages they incurred, respondents testified during the
trial to support their respective allegations. Yuhico stated that he distanced himself from
his usual group (the "Alabang Boys") and that he became the butt of jokes of fellow
golfers. On the other hand, Yu represented that some of his friends in the business like
Freddy Lim, a certain Atty. Benjie, and Jun Ramos started to evade or refuse to have
dealings with him after his suspension.
Records reveal that respondents were given due notice and opportunity to be heard
before the Board of Directors imposed the penalty of suspension as Club members.
Respondent Yu was served with the May 31, 2000 letter signed by then Acting General
Manager Tomas B. Clemente III informing that he violated the "no twosome" policy,
teed off without the required tee time slip, and uttered derogatory remarks to Montallana
in front of another member and the caddies. In response, Yus counsel asked for a copy
of Montallanas report and a formal hearing to confront the complainant and all the
witnesses.Subsequently, on June 13, 2000, Yu, through counsel, submitted his
explanation that included an admission of the "no twosome" policy. Finally, on
September 15, 2000, Yu was advised of the Board resolution to give him another
opportunity to present his side in a meeting supposed to be held on September 20,
2000. It appears, however, that Yu refused to attend. Likewise, respondent Yuhico was
given by Clemente a letter dated May 31, 2000 informing him of violating the "no
twosome" policy and teeing off without the required tee time slip. After receiving the
same, Yuhico called up Clemente to hear his side. 45 Like Yu, however, Yuhico later
refused to attend a meeting with the Board. Ultimately, due process was accorded to the
respondents.
Respondents were suspended in accordance with the procedure set forth in the Clubs
By-laws. There is no merit on their insistence that their suspension is invalid on the
ground that the affirmative vote of eight (8) members is required to support a decision
suspending or expelling a Club member. Both the provisions of Articles of Incorporation
and By-Laws of the Club expressly limit the number of directors to seven (7); hence, the
provision on suspension and expulsion of a member which requires the affirmative vote
of eight (8) members is obviously a result of an oversight.
Way different from the trial courts findings, there is, therefore, no factual and legal
basis to grant moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit in favor
of respondents. The damages suffered, if there are any, partake of the nature of
a damnum absque injuria. As elaborated in Spouses Custodio v. CA:
x x x [T]he mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right
to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a
right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting
to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does
not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy
allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the
injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains,
he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant
owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by
the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise
that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the
breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages
may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely
because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which
cause damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person,
and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury
or wrong.
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that
act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an
action will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right
has been invaded. One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose
and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action
arises in the latters favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum
absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual
resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by lawful means.
"One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Qui jure suo utitur nullum
damnum facit. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum
absque injuria." In this case, respondents failed to prove by preponderance of
evidence that there is fault or negligence on the part of petitioners in order to oblige
them to pay for the alleged damage sustained as a result of their suspension as Club
members. Certainly, membership in the Club is a privilege. Regular members are
entitled to use all the facilities and privileges of the Club, subject to its rules and
regulations. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the mental anguish respondents
experienced, assuming to be true, was brought upon them by themselves for deliberately
and consciously violating the rules and regulations of the Club. Considering that
respondents were validly suspended, there is no reason for the Club to compensate them.
Indeed, the penalty of suspension provided for in Section 1, Article XIV of the By-Laws
is a means to protect and preserve the interest and purposes of the Club. This being so,
the suspension of respondents does not fall under any of the provisions of the Civil Code
pertaining to the grant of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation
costs.
L. S. MOON & CO., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
Honorable FRANCIS BURTON HARRISON, Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands,
Honorable DIONISIO JAKOSALEM, Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, and Honorable JUSTO LUKBAN, Mayor of the city of Manila,
defendants-appellees.
Francis Burton Harrison was the governor general of the Philippines. Hon. Jakosalem is
the duly appointed, qualified and acting secretary of Commerce and Communications
and the official designated by executive order of the said Govern-General as the
executive in charged of rice, its sale and distribution in the Philippine Islands; that the
said Justo Lukban is the duly appointed, qualified and acting Mayor of the city of Manila,
and, as such, designated by the said Governor-General and Secretary of Commerce and
Communications as their assistant in charge for the city of Manila of rice, its sale and
distribution.
Moon & co. Was the owner of 2330.5 cavans of rice, at 26.32 per cavan, no. 1 quality
imported from Siam and 150 cavans of glutinous rice imported from Hongkong. The
defendants however seized the rice of plaintiff and deprived him of it for the purpose of
distribution to the public. No compensation was paid although there was a promise to
pay but in a price which is unreasonable, 16.25, which does not constitute just
compensation.
Plaintiff alleged that Act No. 2868, fixing an arbitrary maximum selling price for rice
and corn is unconstitutional and void as being in contravention of the Constitution of the
United States and the Jones Bill, in so far as they guarantee to individuals the right to
own and dispose of lawful property as they please and guarantee that the same may not
be taken without due process of law and just compensation.
The complaint prays "that the defendants, their subordinates, agents, attorneys and
employees be enjoined from further seizure of rice stocks.
Issue: WON the governor-general is liable for the damages by Moon & co. in enforcing
the law.
Held: NO. There is a legal presumption that any law enacted by the Legislature is valid,
and the Governor-General had a legal right to assume that Act No. 2868 was valid. It
was neither his official province nor duty to say whether the Act was or was not
constitutional.
By the organic law, it is the duty of the legislature to make the law; of the executive to
enforce; and of the courts to construe the law. The courts only have the power to declare
a law unconstitutional. In the very nature of things, it is not the duty of the Governor to
say whether a law is or is not constitutional. It is his duty to enforce the law until such
time as it has legally been declared unconstitutional. To hold an executive personally
liable in an action for damages for the performance or nonperformance of official duty,
in legal effect, would make him a judge as to when a law is or is not constitutional.
If it is the duty of the executive to both construe and enforce the law, and he is personally
liable in damages for a wrongful construction of the law, very few laws would be enforce,
and no reputable and responsible man would accept the office of Governor.
In their learned and exhausting brief, counsel for appellant have not cited any authority,
and none will ever be found, holding a governor personally liable in an action for
damages, for the enforcement of any law before it has legally been declared
unconstitutional.

In the instant case, Act No. 2868 was enacted by the Legislature. By its terms and
provisions, certain duties were thrust upon the Governor-General. He had a legal right
to assume that the law was valid, and in the exercise of his discretion, he undertook to
enforce the law and to carry out its terms and provisions, and it is that of which the
plaintiff complains.
McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court
FACTS: It was the 8th of January in 1977, at around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning,
somewhere between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving
his daughter, Araceli Koh McKee, and her minor children, Christopher, George, and
Kim, as well as Kims babysitter, Loida Bondoc, from San Fernando, Pampanga in the
direction of Angeles City (northward) in aFord Escort. Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned
by Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Ruben Galang, was headed in
theopposite direction, from Angeles City to San Fernando (southward), going to Manila.
The cargo truck was considerable in size as itwas carrying 200 hundred cavans of rice,
which weighed 10 metric tons. As the Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge from
the southern portion, 2 boys suddenly ran from the right side ofthe road into the Escorts
lane. As the boys were going back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way or
turn back, Jose blew his horn. He was then forced to swerve left and into the lane
Galang was driving in. Jose switched his headlights on, appliedhis brakes, and
attempted to return to his lane. However, he failed to get back into the right lane, and
collided with the cargo truck.
The collision occurred on the bridge. The collision resulted in the deaths of the driver,
Jose, the one-year-old, Kim, and her babysitter, Loida, on whose lap she was sitting.
Loida was seated in the passenger seat. Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were
sitting in the back of the Escort,received physical injuries from the collision. An
information was filed against Ruben Galang, charging him for reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property.
He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges in the information. The
conviction was affirmed by the CA and achieved finality after the denial by the CA of
his MR and the denial by the SC of his Petition for Review.Two civil cases were filed.
The first one, by the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the second one by Araceli and
herhusband for the death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other children. The
respondents were impleaded against as the employers of Ruben Galang Galang was
not included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict. These cases were eventually
consolidated. The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the respondents
damages and attorneys fees. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the
dismissal was reversed. This was based on its finding that it was Galangs
inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the accident. However, upon filing
by the respondents of an MR, the IAC set aside its original decision and upheld that of
the trial court because the fact that Kohs car invaded the lane of the truck and the
collision occurred while still in Galangs lane gave rise to the presumption that Koh was
negligent.
ISSUE: Was the IAC correct in reversing their original decision?
HELD: NO. The petition has merit
NO. The petition has merit. Procedural (not important): Given the circumstances, the
cases (civil and criminal) should have been consolidated to prevent separate appreciation
of the evidence. To be fair, the petitioners did move to adopt the testimonies of the
witnesses in the criminal case but the motion was denied. The non-consolidation resulted
in two conflicting decisions. In any case, the guilty verdict of Galang was deemed by
the Court as irrelevant to the case at bar. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the
appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose Kohs negligence that was the
immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the
evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the trucks lane
because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two boys darted across the road
from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. Aracelis testimony was pretty much
what was stated in the facts plus the fact that when Jose swerved to the left, the truck
was immediately noticed. This is why he switched his headlights on to warn the
trucks s driver to slow down and let the Escort return to its lane. When asked as to
how she could tell that the truck did not slow down, Araceli said that the truck just kept
on coming, indicating that it didnt reduce its speed. She posited that if it did, there
wouldnt have been a collision. Her testimony remained intact, even upon cross-
examination that Joses entry into Galangs lane was necessary to avoid what was, in his
mind at the time, a greater perils death or injury to the two idiots.
This is hardly negligent behavior. Her testimony was corroborated by one Eugenio
Tanhueco1, who was an impartial eyewitness. He said that the truck, moving at 50 to
60kph, only stopped upon collision. Also, when the police investigated the scene of the
collision, they found skid marks under the truck instead of behind it. This indicated that
Galang only applied the brakes moments before the collision. While Galang claimed
that he had stopped when the Escort was within 10 meters of the truck but this only
served to substantiate Tanhuecos statement that he stopped only upon collision,
considering the speed at which he was going.
On the basis of the definition and the test of negligence, no negligence can be imputed
to Koh.
Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the
two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean
entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course
to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away
and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the
oncoming car.
THE EMERGENCY RULE: one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and
is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid
the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in
which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Jose Koh adopted the
best means possible in the given situation. This means he cannot be considered negligent.
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT JOSE WAS NEGLIGENT, THE COLLISION
STILL WOULD NOT BE IMPUTED TO HIM BECAUSE:
1. Proximate Cause: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred. Galangs negligent act of not slowing down or stopping and allowing
the Escort to return to the right lane was the sufficient intervening cause and the actual
cause of the tragedy (failure to take the necessary measures and the degree of care
necessary to avoid the collision). The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would
not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by
the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane.
Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper
precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full
speed towards the car. The truck drivers negligence becomes more apparent in view of
the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the
truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side
by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. Furthermore, the bridge has a level
sidewalk, which could have partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man
finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting
it head-on. Negligence of Galang apparent in the records: He himself said that his truck
was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum
speed allowed by law on a bridge52 is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185
of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
2. Last Clear Chance Doctrine: A doctrine in the law of torts which states that the
contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is
shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have
avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the
person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences thereof. A person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent
or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible
for the consequences of the accident. The doctrine applies only in a situation where the
plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last
fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the
consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
Basically, the last clear chance was with Galang, as can be gleaned from the evidence
presented therefore, respondents are found, under Article 2180, directly and primarily
responsible for the acts of their employee. Their negligence flows from the negligence
of their employee. Such presumption is juris tantum (rebuttable) and not juris et de jure
(conclusive). They did not present evidence that showed that the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee
LBC AIR CARGO, INC. FERNANDO M. YU and JAIME TANO, petitioners, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Fourth Division, SHERWIN MONTEROLA y
OYON-OYON, represented by PATROCENIA GRONDIANO y MONTEROLA,
and PATROCENIA GRONDIANO y MONTEROLA, respondents.
Facts:
At about 11:30 in the morning of November 15, 1987, Rogelio Monterola, a
licensed driver, was traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle towards Mangagoy on the
right lane along a dusty national road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time,
a cargo van of the LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, driven by Jaime Tano, Jr., was coming
from the opposite direction on its way to the Bislig Airport. When Tano was approaching
the vicinity of the airport road entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against
each other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped his vehicle and waited for the two
racing vehicles to pass by. The stirred cloud of dust made visibility extremely bad.
However, instead of waiting for the dust to settled, Tano started to make a sharp left turn
towards the airport road. When he was about to reach the center of the right lane, the
motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-on
against the right side of the LBC van. Monterola died from the severe injuries he
sustained.
 A criminal case for "homicide thru reckless imprudence" was filed against Tano.
A civil suit was likewise instituted by the heirs of deceased Monterola against Tano,
along with LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, for the recovery of damages.
The trial court dismissed both cases on the ground that the proximate cause of
the "accident" was the negligence of deceased Rogelio Monterola. Private respondent
appealed the dismissal of the civil case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
reversed the court a quo which held that Tano should be held liable for damages along
with LBC Air Cargo ruling that Tano was the one negligent.
Issue:
Whether the proximate cause of the accident was Monterola's negligence in the
driving of his motorcycle in a very fast speed and thus hitting the LBC's cargo van.
Ruling:
NO. From every indication, the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of Tano who, despite extremely poor visibility, hastily executed a left turn
(towards the Bislig airport road entrance) without first waiting for the dust to settle. It
was this negligent act of Tano, which had placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on the
path of the motorcycle coming from the opposite direction, that almost instantaneously
caused the collision to occur. Simple prudence required him not to attempt to cross the
other lane until after it would have been safe from and clear of any oncoming vehicle.
Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to as
"supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the
effect that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably
later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity
to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences
thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a
person does not preclude the recovery of damages for supervening negligence of, or bar
a defense against the liability sought by, another if the latter, who had the last fair chance,
could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
In the case at bench, the victim was traveling along the lane where he was rightly
supposed to be. The incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable time had elapsed,
from the moment Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact; that could have afforded
the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.
It is true however, that the deceased was not all that free from negligence in
evidently speeding too closely behind the vehicle he was following. The Supreme Court,
therefore, agree with the CA that there indeed was contributory negligence on the
victim's part that could warrant a mitigation of petitioners liability for damages.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U.
CARBONEL, petitioners, vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO
DIONISIO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
Statement of the Facts: In the early morning of November 15, 1975, after a cocktail and
dinner party he attended, Leonardo Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car when it
collided with a parked dump truck owned by Phoenix Construction. Said dump truck
was parked by Armando Carbonel, its regular driver and for the purpose of using it early
in the following morning to carry out a business. Dionisio alleged that his headlights
suddenly failed and that he tried switching it to bright, only to see that a Ford dump truck
parked askew on the right side of the road (same side Dionisio was traversing) is looming
in front of his car. He then tried to swerve to the left but it was too late. Dionisio
commenced an action for damages in the CFI of Makati against Carbonel, claiming that
the latter was negligent in parking the dump truck and that such negligence was the legal
and proximate cause of his injuries which include: permanent facial scars, the loss of
two gold bridge dentures and a nervous breakdown. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the
other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor,
without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish
that it had exercised due rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
Statement of the Case: The CFI of Makati ordered Phoenix and Carbonel to pay Dionisio
P15,000 for hospital bills, P150,000 as loss of expected income, P100,000 as moral
damages, P10,000 for their wanton disregard in settling amicably with plaintiff, and to
pay P4,500 as attorneys fees.
On appeal, the IAC affirmed the CFI decision but modified the award of damages:
P6,460.71 as compensatory damages, P100,000 as loss of expected income, P50,000 as
moral damages, and the award for exemplary damages and attorneys fees were affirmed.
Issue:
1) Whether Dionisio was negligent at the time of the accident.
2) Whether the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case.
Ruling:
1) Dionisio, based on the factual findings, is indeed negligent, however his negligence
is merely a contributory one. The immediate and proximate cause of the collision is the
negligence of the driver in parking the dump truck askew without any warning lights or
reflector device. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk
of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this
risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. Dionisio's negligence, although later in
point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was
not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
2) The doctrine of last clear chance is inapplicable. Said doctrine of the common law
was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter for debate
whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness
of another common law doctrine or rule that of contributory negligence. The common
law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was
also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with
the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear
chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent
provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to
do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear
chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been
rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Carbonel is liable for being negligent and failing to foresee the risk of injury when he
parked the car carelessly. Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption
of negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix in supervising its employees properly
and adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our opinion,
that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance
that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever
there was work to be done early the following morning, when coupled with the failure
to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump
truck is parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa
in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is
modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected
income and moral damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such
amount. Costs against the petitioners.
PANTRACO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., petitioner, vs. MARICAR BASCOS
BAESA, thru her personal guardian FRANCISCA O. BASCOS, FE O. ICO, in her
behalf and in behalf of her minor children, namely ERWIN, OLIVE, EDMUNDO
and SHARON ICO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 79050-51. November 14, 1989. 179 SCRA 384.
THIRD DIVISION. CORTES, J.
Facts: The spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim,
Marcelino and Maricar, together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son
Erwin Ico and seven other persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney driven by, and
registered in the name of, David Ico. They were on their way to Malalam River, Ilagan,
Isabela for a picnic to celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn
Baesa.
On their way to Malalam River, a speeding bus of the Pantranco North Express,
Inc. (petitioner), hereinafter referred to as the Pantranco bus, coming from Aparri, on its
regular route to Manila, encroached on the jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and
collided with it. As a result, David Ico, spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and two of
their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died while the rest of the passengers
suffered injuries.
All of the victims and/or their surviving heirs except herein respondents settled
the case amicably. Respondents filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-
delict against petitioner. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents. On appeal, The
appellate court ruled in favor of respondents, but modified the judgment with respect to
the award of damages.
Before the Supreme Court (Court), petitioner now contends that the appellate
court erred in not applying the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance in the present case.
Issue/s: Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance finds application in
the case at bar.
Ruling: No. The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance means that the negligence of
a claimant does not preclude recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears
that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior
or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the
accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff. The subsequent
negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff
becomes the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes between
the accident and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant
liable to the plaintiff.
Contrary to the petitioners contention, the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds
no application in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that
the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the
existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One
cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have
known the existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney
driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the
approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the
jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver
will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite
direction. As held by the Court in the case of Vda. De Bonifacio v. BLTB, G.R. No. L-
26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618, a motorist who is properly proceeding on his
own side of the highway is generally entitled to assume that an approaching vehicle
coming towards him on the wrong side, will return to his proper lane of traffic. There
was nothing to indicate to David Ico that the bus could not return to its own lane or was
prevented from returning to the proper lane by anything beyond the control of its driver.
Leo Marantan, an alternate driver of the Pantranco bus who was seated beside the driver
Ramirez at the time of the accident, testified that Ramirez had no choice but to swerve
the steering wheel to the left and encroach on the jeepneys lane because there was a
steep precipice on the right. However, this is belied by the evidence on record which
clearly shows that there was enough space to swerve the bus back to its own lane without
any danger.
Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time
of the accident the Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. By the time David Ico
must have realized that the bus was not returning to its own lane, it was already too late
to swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. The speed at which the
approaching bus was running prevented David Ico from swerving the jeepney to the
right shoulder of the road in time to avoid the collision. Thus, even assuming that the
jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual collision, he had no
opportunity to avoid it. The Court has held in a case that the last clear chance doctrine
"can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and
if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the
peril is or should have been discovered."
Petitioner likewise insists that David Ico was negligent in failing to observe
Section 43 (c), Article III Chapter IV of Republic Act No. 4136 * which provides that
the driver of a vehicle entering a through highway or a stop intersection shall yield the
right of way to all vehicles approaching in either direction on such through highway.
Petitioners misplaced reliance on the aforesaid law is readily apparent in this
case. The cited law itself provides that it applies only to vehicles entering a through
highway or a stop intersection. At the time of the accident, the jeepney had already
crossed the intersection and was on its way to Malalam River. Petitioner itself cited Fe
Icos testimony that the accident occurred after the jeepney had travelled a distance of
about two (2) meters from the point of intersection. In fact, even the witness for the
petitioner, Leo Marantan, testified that both vehicles were coming from opposite
directions, clearly indicating that the jeepney had already crossed the intersection.
GREGORIO ANURAN, MARIA MALIGAYA, LAPAZ LARO, ET AL, vs.
PEPITO BUO, PEDRO GAHOL, LUISA ALCANTARA, GUILLERMO
RAZON, ANSELMO MALIGAYA and CEFERINA ARO,
Topic: When will doctrine of last clear chance not apply?
FACTS:
A passenger jeepney owned by Pedro Gahol and Luisa Alcantara and driven by Pepito
Buo overloaded with (14-16 passengers) was parked on the road to Taal, Batangas
when a speeding water truck owned by Anselmo Maligaya and Ceferina Aro driven by
Guillermo Razon negligently bumped it from behind, with such violence that three
passengers died and two others suffered injuries.
Before the collision occurred, it is admitted that the jeepney driven by Buno crossed the
bridge separating Barrios Mahabang Ludlud and Balisong, Taal, Batangas, and the fact
remains that the vehicle was overloaded with passengers which at the time 11 passengers
including the driver is the capacity.
After crossing the bridge, Buo stopped his vehicle in order to allow one of his
passengers to alight but he parked his jeepney in such a way that one-half of the jeep
was on the asphalted pavement of the road. Five minutes later, a speeding water truck
owned by defendant spouses Anselmo Maligaya and Ceferina Aro, then being driven by
Guillermo Razon, violently smashed against the parked jeepney from behind, causing it
to turn turtle into a nearby ditch.
Suits were then instituted by the representatives of the dead and of the injured, to recover
damages against the driver and the owners of the truck and also against the driver and
the owners of the jeepney.
The CFI of Batangas absolved the driver of the jeepney and its owners but it required
the truck driver and owners for the compensation. Thereafter, the CA affirmed the
exoneration of the jeepney driver and its owners explaining that although the driver of
the jeepney was not free from fault, it considered the driver of truck guilty of greater
negligence which was the efficient cause of the collision. The CA applied the doctrine
of last clear chance and ordered that the owner of the truck be solidarily liable with its
driver.
ISSUE:
Whether the doctrine of last clear chance may be applied when a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligation.
RULING:
The CA committed an error in absolving the jeepney driver. The presumption against
common carriers still apply unless they prove they have observed extraordinary
diligence, which is not present in this case.
Furthermore, the principle about the "last clear chance" would call for application in a
suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where
a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.
For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners
on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
GLAN PEOPLE'S LUMBER AND HARDWARE, GEORGE LIM, FABIO S.
AGAD, FELIX LIM and PAUL ZACARIAS y INFANTE, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, CECILIA ALFEREZ VDA. DE CALIBO, Minors
ROYCE STEPHEN, JOYCE JOAN, JANISE MARIE, JACQUELINE
BRIGITTE JOCELINE CORAZON, JULIET GERALDINE, JENNIFER JILL,
all surnamed CALIBO, represented by their mother, CECILIA A. VDA. DE
CALIBO, .
Facts
Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and Maximo Patos were on the jeep
owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it
approached from the South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City in
the afternoon of July 4,1979. At about that time, the cargo track, loaded with cement
bags, GI sheets, plywood, driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants, coming from the
opposite direction of Davao City and bound for Glan, South Cotabato, had just crossed
said bridge. The cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer
Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt.
As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left
side of the jeep, including its fender and hood, was extensively damaged. After the
impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the
rear of the truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road.
An instant case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late
Engineer Calibo who are residents of Tagbilaran City against the driver and owners of
the cargo truck.
The defendants' answer however alleged that the lumber and hardware business was
exclusively owned by George Y. Lim, this being evidenced by the Certificate of
Registration issued by the Bureau of Domestic Trade.
LOWER COURT ruled in favor of DEFENDANTS, reasoning that the plaintiffs failed
to establish by preponderance of evidence the negligence, and thus the liability, of the
defendants." Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint (and defendants'
counterclaim) "for insufficiency of evidence."
The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the lower court, reasoning that:
"the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep when the collision
occurred,' and although Zacarias saw the jeep from a distance of about 150 meters, he
"did not drive his truck back to his lane in order to avoid collision with the oncoming
jeep. Furthermore, the truck driver suddenly applied his brakes even as he knew that he
was still within the lane of the jeep; had both vehicles stayed in their respective lanes,
the collision would never have occurred, they would have passed "along side each other
safely;"
In addition, Zacarias had no license at the time; what he handed to Pfc. Esparcia, on the
latter's demand, was the 'driver's license of his co-driver Leonardo Baricuatro;"
The Appellate Court opined that Zacarias' negligence "gave rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of his employer, and their liability is both primary and solidary."
Hence this appeal by certiorari by the defendants George Lim, Felix Lim, Fabio S. Agad
and Paul Zacarias
ISSUE: WON ZACARIAS WAS NEGLIGENT IN DRIVING THE CARGO TRUCK
HELD
SC REVERSED CAs ruling.
The finding that "the truck driven by defendant Paul Zacarias occupied the lane of the
jeep when the collision occurred" is a loose one, based on nothing more than the showing
that at the time of the accident, the truck driven by Zacarias had edged over the painted
center line of the road into the opposite lane by a width of twenty-five (25) centimeters.
It ignores the fact that by the uncontradicted evidence, the actual center line of the road
was not that indicated by the painted stripe but, according to measurements made and
testified by Patrolman Juanita Dimaano, one of the two officers who investigated the
accident, correctly lay thirty-six (36) centimeters farther to the left of the truck's side of
said stripe.
Nor was the Appellate Court correct in finding that Paulino Zacarias had acted
negligently in applying his brakes instead of getting back inside his lane upon
qqqespying the approaching jeep. Being well within his own lane, as has already been
explained, he had no duty to swerve out of the jeep's way as said Court would have had
him do. And even supposing that he was in fact partly inside the opposite lane, coming
to a full stop with the jeep still thirty (30) meters away cannot be considered an unsafe
or imprudent action, there also being uncontradicted evidence that the jeep was
"zigzagging" and hence no way of telling in which direction it would go as it approached
the truck.
Also clearly erroneous is the finding of the Intermediate Appellate Court that Zacarias
had no driver's license at the time. The traffic accident report attests to the proven fact
that Zacarias voluntarily surrendered to the investigating officers his driver's license,
valid for 1979, that had been renewed just the day before the accident, on July 3,
1979. The Court was apparently misled by the circumstance that when said driver was
first asked to show his license by the investigators at the scene of the collision, he had
first inadvertently produced the license of a fellow driver, Leonardo Baricuatro, who
had left said license in Davao City and had asked Zacarias to bring it back to him in
Glan, Cotabato.
The evidence not only acquits Zacarias of any negligence in the matter; there are
also quite a few significant indicators that it was rather Engineer Calibo's
negligence that was the proximate cause of the accident. Zacarias had told Patrolman
Dimaano at the scene of the collision and later confirmed in his written statement at the
police headquarters that the jeep had been "zigzagging," which is to say that it was
travelling or being driven erratically at the time. The other investigator, Patrolman Jose
Esparcia, also testified that eyewitnesses to the accident had remarked on the jeep's
"zigzagging." There is moreover more than a suggestion that Calibo had been drinking
shortly before the accident. The decision of the Trial Court adverts to further testimony
of Esparcia to the effect that three of Calibo's companions at the beach party he was
driving home from when the collision occurred, who, having left ahead of him went to
the scene when they heard about the accident, had said that there had been a drinking
spree at the party and, referring to Calibo, had remarked: "Sabi na huag nang mag
drive . . . . pumipilit," (loosely translated, "He was advised not to drive, but he insisted.")
It was Calibo whose driver's license could not be found on his person at the scene of the
accident, and was reported by his companions in the jeep as having been lost with his
wallet at said scene, according to the traffic accident report, Exhibit "J". Said license
unexplainedly found its way into the record some two years later.
Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each other's vehicle
from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles were travelling at a speed of
approximately thirty kilometers per hour. The private respondents have admitted that
the truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into it. And they have not seen
fit to deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also admitted the truck had been
brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. From these facts the logical
conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has
appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that
distance of thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep
away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a
speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize
that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect, as the
Appellate Court would have it, the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.
Since the said doctrine of last clear chance applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and
his employer (and co-petitioner) George Lim, an inquiry into whether or not the
evidence supports the latter's additional defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of said driver is no longer necessary and wig not be undertaken. The fact is
that there is such evidence in the record which has not been controverted.
In conclusion, it must also be stated that there is no doubt of this Court's power to review
the assailed decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court under the authority of
precedents recognizing exceptions to the familiar rule binding it to observe and respect
the latter's findings of fact. Many of those exceptions may be cited to support the review
here undertaken, but only the most obvious that said findings directly conflict with
those of the Trial Court will suffice. In the opinion of this Court and after a careful
review of the record, the evidence singularly fails to support the findings of the
Intermediate Appellate Court which, for all that appears, seem to have been prompted
rather by sympathy for the heirs of the deceased Engineer Calibo than by an objective
appraisal of the proofs and a correct application of the law to the established facts.
Compassion for the plight of those whom an accident has robbed of the love and support
of a husband and father is an entirely natural and understandable sentiment. It should
not, however, be allowed to stand in the way of, much less to influence, a just verdict in
a suit at law.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby
REVERSED, and the complaint against herein petitioners in Civil Case No. 3283 of the
Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch IV, is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
LADECO v. Angala, G.R. No. 153076, June 21, 2007.
Facts:
On May 4, 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a Datsun crewcab driven by Apolonio Deocampo
bumped into a 1958 Chevy pick-up owned by Michael Raymond Angala and driven by
Bernulfo Borres. Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation (LADECO) owned
the crewcab which was assigned to its manager Manuel Mendez. Deocampo was the
driver and bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were running along Rafael Castillo St.,
Agdao, Davao City heading north towards Lanang, Davao City. The left door, front left
fender, and part of the front bumper of the pick-up were damaged.
Respondent Angala filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, and Attorneys fees
against LADECO, its administrative officer Henry Berenguel and Deocampo.
Respondent alleged that his pick-up was slowing down to about five to ten kilometers
per hour (kph) and was making a left turn preparatory to turning south when it was
bumped from behind by the crewcab which was running at around 60 to 70 kph. The
crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. Respondent alleged that he heard
a screeching sound before the impact. Respondent was seated beside the driver and was
looking at the speedometer when the accident took place. Respondent testified that
Borres made a signal because he noticed a blinking light while looking at the
speedometer.
Respondent sent a demand letter to LADEDO for the payment of the damages he
incurred because of the accident but he did not receive any reply. Thus, respondent filed
the case against LADECO, Berenguel, and Deocampo.
The Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15 ruled in favor of respondent and
ordered LADECO and Deocampo to solidarily pay the damages. The trial court found
that Berenguel was not liable because he was not the owner of the crewcab. LADECO
and Deocampo filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court
affirmed in toto the trial courts decision. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition was filed
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the doctrine of last clear chance applies in the case at bar.
RULING: Yes.
Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible
to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who has the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss.
In this case, Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since Deocampo
was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position
to observe the vehicle in front of him. Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding
bumping the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid
skidding and overturning, compared to running straight ahead. Deocampo could have
avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while following the pick-up.
Deocampo was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes
even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision.
(Decision of the RTC and CA AFFIRMED).
FRANCISCO ESCUETA vs. EUTIQUIANO FANDIALAN
November 29, 1974
Facts:
The complaint alleged that defendant inflicted several physical injuries on the person of
plaintiff for which he was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide but was
convicted of slight physical injuries by the CFI of Laguna, which judgment was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals on August 31, 1955.
Plaintiff reserved his right to institute a separate civil action. He filed with the CFI a
complaint to enforce defendant's civil liability under Article 100 of the RPC but the same
was dismissed for lack of interest; and that despite the lapse of several years and the
attempt on plaintiff's part to enforce the said civil liability, defendant failed to settle the
same, compelling plaintiff to refile the case. The court dismissed the complaint on the
ground of prescription, since "the instant action has been barred by the Statute of
Limitations because the crime of physical injuries was committed by defendant on July
2, 1952and this case was filed on July 5, 1968, or after the lapse of 16 years, the period
of prescription applicable being 4 years according to Art. 1146 (1) of the Civil Code.
Issues:
When is the date of accrual of the cause of action?
Was the dismissal of the lower court, based on prescription, correct?
Ruling:
The Court finds that the lower court correctly sustained defendant's contention that
plaintiff's cause of action for damages accrued on July 2, 1952 when the
physical injuries were inflicted; as against plaintiff's contention that his cause
of action accrued three years later on August 31, 1955 when the judgment of
conviction for physical injuries against defendant as accused in the criminal
case became final.
Here, plaintiff's civil action for recovery of civil liability and damages from defendant
would have been implicitly instituted with the criminal action, but plaintiff expressly
reserved his right to institute the civil action separately. Under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, even without such reservation, he could prosecute his civil action for damages
from the physical injuries separately and independently of the criminal action and would
require only a preponderance of evidence to support his action. Such separate and
independent civil action under the cited codal article proceeds to trial and final judgment
irrespective of the result of the criminal action.
Manifestly, then, plaintiff's civil action for damages does not fall under that category of
civil actions based upon a criminal offense which are suspended to await the outcome
of the criminal case under Rule 111, section 3 of the Rules of Court. Being a case of
physical injuries under Article 33 of the Civil Code, plaintiffs civil action for damages
did not arise from nor depend upon the result of the criminal action but from defendant's
act of infliction of physical injuries. Hence, plaintiff's cause of action clearly accrued
from July 2, 1952 the date that the physical injuries were inflicted on him. As of that
date, he had the right to file and maintain his civil action for damages and the period of
prescription started to run.
The Court holds that the lower court correctly ruled that the applicable prescriptive
period is four years under Article 1146 (1) of the Civil Code as against
plaintiff's contention that it should be ten years under Article 1144 (3) which
provides for such ten-year prescriptive for actions based "upon a judgment."
Plaintiffs civil suit for damages arising from physical injuries is clearly one based upon
an injury to his rights, for which Article 1146 (1) provides a prescriptive period of four
years. Plaintiff's contention that his prescriptive period should be ten years based upon
the judgment of defendant's conviction for physical injuries in the criminal case is
untenable. No civil liability was adjudged in the criminal case since plaintiff expressly
reserved the right of filing a separate civil action. Hence, he had no standing in the
criminal action as an offended party and the verdict of conviction excluded any civil
liability.
Plaintiffs invocation of Article 1144 (3) would be tenable only if he had not reserved the
filing of a separate civil action and if defendant's civil liability had been determined and
adjudged in the criminal case. In such case, as in other-civil actions where judgment has
obtained, the action to enforce the judgment would prescribe only after ten years, with
the judgment being enforceable by mere motion within the first five years.

REYNALDA GATCHALIAN, petitioner, vs. ARSENIO DELIM and the HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-56487; October 21, 1991; Feliciano, J.
Facts:
Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, Delim's "Thames" mini
bus at a point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang, La Union. On the
way, while the bus was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, Union,
"a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the
vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned
turtle and fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including Gatchalian, were injured. They
were promptly taken to the hospital. Upon medical examination, Gatchalian was found
to have sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead.
Wife of Delim, visited them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical
expenses and gave Gatchalian P12.00 with which to pay her transportation expense in
going home from the hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured
passengers, including Gatchalian, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit stating that
they are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver
and owner of the said Thames, because it was an accident and the said driver and owner
of the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries.
Notwithstanding this document, Gathalian filed an action extra contractu to
recover compensatory and moral damages. She alleged in the complaint that her injuries
sustained from the vehicular mishap had left her with a conspicuous white scar
measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead, generating mental suffering and an inferiority
complex on her part; and that as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away
from her friends. She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived
her of opportunities for employment.
In defense, Delin averred that the vehicular mishap was due to force majeure,
and that Gatchalian had already been paid and moreover had waived any right to institute
any action against him and his driver, when Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit.
CFI dismissed the complaint upon the ground that when Gatchalian signed
the Joint Affidavit, she relinquished any right of action (whether criminal or civil) that
she may have had against Delim and the driver of the mini-bus.
CA reversed the trial court's conclusion that there had been a valid waiver, but
affirmed the dismissal of the case.
Issue: Whether a valid waiver of cause of action was made by Gatchalian
Held: No valid waiver of her cause of action had been made by Gatchalian.
A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear
and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a
right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed
to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to
abandon a right vested in such person.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for
injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must
exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most
strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not
be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver
of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those
exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary
diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard
unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.
A duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in protecting the safety of its
passengers is imposed upon a common carrier. In case of death or injuries to passengers,
a statutory presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault or had acted
negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed
in Articles 1733 and 1755." In fact, because of this statutory presumption, it has been
held that a court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the
part of the common carrier in order to hold it liable. To overcome this presumption, the
common carrier must slow to the court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to
prevent the injuries. The standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon common
carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence, i.e., the
diligence of a good paterfamilias established in respect of the ordinary relations between
members of society. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely" as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, with due regard to all the circumstances."
The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that
respondent had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. Curiously,
respondent did not even attempt, during the trial before the court a quo, to prove that he
had indeed exercised the requisite extraordinary diligence. Respondent did try to
exculpate himself from liability by alleging that the mishap was the result of force
majeure. But allegation is not proof and here again, respondent utterly failed to
substantiate his defense of force majeure. To exempt a common carrier from liability for
death or physical injuries to passengers upon the ground of force majeure, the carrier
must clearly show not only that the efficient cause of the casualty was entirely
independent of the human will, but also that it was impossible to avoid. Any
participation by the common carrier in the occurrence of the injury will defeat the
defense of force majeure.
The record yields affirmative evidence of fault or negligence on the part of
respondent common carrier. The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong
with the bus. Moreover, the driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same "snapping
sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This could only mean that the
bus had not been checked physically or mechanically to determine what was causing the
"snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten
accustomed to it. Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating
condition, and even a modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that
the bus be checked and repaired. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look
after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect
to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of
alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of
the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.
Gatchalian's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her
forehead, is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her
body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual
or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as
nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one
on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation
of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante.
If the scar is relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the victim, the cost of
surgery may be expected to be correspondingly modest.
Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the
common carrier is shown. Since we have earlier concluded that respondent common
carrier and his driver had been grossly negligent in connection with the bus mishap
which had injured petitioner and other passengers, and recalling the aggressive
manuevers of respondent, through his wife, to get the victims to waive their right to
recover damages even as they were still hospitalized for their injuries, petitioner must
be held entitled to such moral damages. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which
petitioner must have suffered as a result of her physical injuries including the permanent
scar on her forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable
award. Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as atttorney's fees is in fact even more modest.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 October 1980,
as well as the decision of the then Court of First Instance of La Union dated 4 December
1975 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Respondent is hereby ORDERED to pay
petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian the following sums: 1) P15,000.00 as actual or
compensatory damages to cover the cost of plastic surgery for the removal of the scar
on petitioner's forehead; 2) P30,000.00 as moral damages; and 3) P1,000.00 as attorney's
fees, the aggregate amount to bear interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum counting
from the promulgation of this decision until full payment thereof. Costs against private
respondent.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CRISPIN BILLABER y
MATBANUA, appellant
G.R. Nos. 114967-68. January 26, 2004
FACTS:
Private complainant Elizabeth Genteroy was introduced to accused Crispin Billaber by
her friends. The accused told Genteroy that he could help her acquire the necessary
papers and find her a job abroad. Genteroy introduced the accused to Raul Durano. The
accused offered Durano a job as his personal driver in the U.S. Durano and Genteroy
paid the accused and asked for receipt, but the accused said that it was not necessary
since they will leave together.
Meanwhile, Genteroy introduced the accused to Tersina Onza and offered a job abroad.
Thereafter, the accused instructed the three private complainants, Genteroy, Durano and
Onza to meet him at the airport on the agreed date, however, the accused failed to show
up.
Durano chanced upon the accused at the canteen. A commotion ensued when Durano
tried to stop the accused from leaving. A police officer brought both Durano and the
accused to the PNP station. The prosecution offered in evidence a certificate from the
POEA stating that the accused was not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for
employment abroad. The accused denied receiving money from private complainants
and interposed a defense of frame-up and extortion against Durano.
The accused was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa and was
thereafter convicted of the aforesaid charges by the RTC of Manila, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 92-108577, this Court finds the accused, Crispin
Billaber y Matbanua, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment
in large scale and sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P100,000.00, plus the costs. The accused is further ordered to pay actual
damages to the complainants, Raul Durano, Elizabeth Genteroy and Tesina Onza the
sums of P18,000.00, P10,000.00 and P10,000.00, respectively, with interest thereon at
the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing these criminal cases, July 27,
1992, until the amount shall have been fully paid.
In Criminal Case No. 92-108578, this Court also finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Article 315, subdivision Nos. 2 and 3, of
the Penal Code (as regards Complainant Raul Durano), and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional as maximum and to pay the costs.
ISSUE:
Whether there was double recovery of damages.
HELD:
YES. The trial court erred in awarding private complainants Genteroy and Onza the
amount of P10,000.00 each as actual damages in the illegal recruitment case (Crim. Case
No. 92-108577). Previously, the MeTC in the estafa cases Genteroy and Onza filed
(Case Nos. 286919-20) ordered appellant to pay private complainants the same
amounts. Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that, In no case may
the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
accused.
The rate of six percent (6%) per annum as interest imposed on the actual damages
of P18,000.00 awarded to private complainant Durano is also erroneous. As the amount
of P18,000.00 given by Durano in consideration of his placement constitutes a loan or
forbearance of money, the rate of interest should be twelve percent (12%) per annum in
line with this Courts pronouncement in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual
or compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual
thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in
the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that
which may have been stipulated in
writing.Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn
legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand
under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of
the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 92-108577, appellant Crispin
Billaber y Matbanua is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale under Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended, and sentences
him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00, plus the
costs. Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay to private complainant Raul Durano
the sum of P18,000.00 as actual damages, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum from July 27, 1992, the date of filing of this criminal case, until the amount shall
have been fully paid.
In Criminal Case No. 92-108578, appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of estafa under Article 315 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum and to pay the costs.
G.R. No. 167363 December 15, 2010
SEALOADER SHIPPING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
GRAND CEMENT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, JOYCE LAUNCH &
TUG CO., INC., ROMULO DIANTAN & JOHNNY PONCE, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177466
TAIHEIYO CEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC. (Formerly Grand Cement
Manufacturing Corporation), Petitioner,
vs.
SEALOADER SHIPPING CORPORATION, JOYCE LAUNCH & TUG CO.,
INC., ROMULO DIANTAN & JOHNNY PONCE, Respondents.
FACTS:
Sealoader executed a Time Charter Party Aggrement with Joyce Launch for the
chartering of MT Viper in order to tow its unpropelled barges for a minimum of 15 days.
Sealoder entered into a contract with Grand Cement for the loading of cement clinkers
and the delivery thereof to Manila. On March 31, 1994, Sealoders barge arrived at the
wharf of Grand Cement tugged by MT Viper. It was not immediately loaded as the
employees of Grand Cement were loaded another vessel.
On April 4, typhoon Bising struck Cebu area. The barge was still docked at the wharf of
Grand Cement. As it became stronger, MT Viper tried to tow the barge away but it was
unsuccessful because the towing line connecting the vessels snapped since the mooring
lines were not cast off, which is the ultimate cause. Hence, the barge rammed the wharf
causing significant damage.
Grand Cement filed a complaint for damages (P2.4M) since Sealoader ignored its
demands. They allege that Sealoader was negligent when it ignored its employees
advice to move the vessels after it had received weather updates. Sealoader filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that Joyce Launch is the one liable since it was the
owner of MT Viper, whos employees were manning the vessel. Sealoader filed a cross-
claim against Joyce Launch. Joyce maintains that the damages were due to force majeure
and faulted Grand Cements employees for abandoning the wharf leaving them helpless
and for not warning them early on.
Upon testimonies, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Grand Cement holding the
two companies liable since there was complete disregard of the storm signal, the captain
of the vessel was not present and the vessel was not equipped with a radio or any
navigational facility, which is mandatory. Joyce launch did not appeal.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision but on MR, it partly reversed its decision
finding Grand Cement to be guilty of contributory negligence since it was found that it
was still loading the other vessel at the last minute just before the storm hit, hence
Sealodersvessel did not move. Damages were reduced to 50%. Hence, petition for
review to SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sealoader should be liable for damage sustained by the wharf of
Grand Cement?
HELD: Yes, Sealoader is liable for its negligence. First because it was not equipped with
a radio or a navigational facility and it failed to monitor the prevailing weather
conditions. Second, it cannot pass the responsibility of casting off the mooring lines
because the people at the wharf could not just cast off the mooring lines without any
instructions from the crew of the vessel. It should have taken the initiative to cast off the
mooring lines early on.
With regard to Grand Cements contributory negligence, the court found that it was not
guilty thereof. It had timely informed the barge of the impending typhoon and directed
the vessels to move to a safer place. Sealoader had the responsibility to inform itself of
the prevailing weather conditions in the areas where its vessel was to sail. It cannot
merely rely on other vessels for weather updates and warnings on approaching storms.
For to do so would be to gamble with the safety of its own vessel, putting the lives of its
crew under the mercy of the sea, as well as running the risk of causing damage to
property of third parties for which it would necessarily be liable.
DAVID TAYLOR v. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT
COMPANY
G.R. No. L-4977, 22 March 1910, EN BANC (CARSON, J.)
FACTS:
The Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company is a foreign corporation
engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in the city of
Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River
within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be
reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end
of the island. David Taylor was at the time when he received the injuries complained of,
15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of
his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. Taylor, with a boy
named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del
Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who
and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that
Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity
and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent
some time in wandering about the company's premises. After watching the operation of
the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across the open
space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and
ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps
scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of
small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which
it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion
of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power.
After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the
boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and
carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie
Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The
boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires
into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with
a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they
opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish
substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted
match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to
all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had
his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of
the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the
necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
ISSUE:
Was there contributory negligence on the part of Taylor?
RULING:
YES. No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to
prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended,
when they felt disposed so to do. As admitted in defendant counsel's brief, "it is
undoubtedly true that children in their play sometimes crossed the foot bridge to the
islands;" and, we may add, roamed about at will on the uninclosed premises of the
defendant, in the neighborhood of the place where the caps were found. There is
evidence that any effort ever was made to forbid these children from visiting the
defendant company's premises, although it must be assumed that the company or its
employees were aware of the fact that they not infrequently did so.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property
without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant
from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part,
if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that
under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the
plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of
the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting
open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the
explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant,
therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth
of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had
been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty
days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was
exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no
room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive
character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made
by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was
present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of
electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final
success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of
the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable
doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of
the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put
the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and
understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the
match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his
experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of
that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own
deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct
and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that
these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant
in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non
intelligitur sentire.
And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which
expressly lays down the law touching contributory negligence in this jurisdiction,
nevertheless, the interpretation placed upon its provisions by the supreme court of Spain,
and by this court in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep.,
359), clearly deny to the plaintiff in the case at bar the right to recover damages from
the defendant, in whole or in part, for the injuries sustained by him.
The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902
(93 Jurisprudencia Civil, 391), is directly in point. In that case the court said:
According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or
negligence is a source of obligation when between such negligence and the
injury there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the injury produced
should not be the result of acts or omissions of a third party, the latter has no
obligation to repair the same, although such acts or omission were imprudent
or unlawful, and much less when it is shown that the immediate cause of the
injury was the negligence of the injured party himself.
We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate
cause of the explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own
act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover."
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 130150 October, 1998
Facts:
M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company
(FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila
International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino, who was assigned by the Appellant
Manila Pilots' Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe berthing,
boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with
the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by
Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the
quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm
and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark,
one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was
already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov
relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2)
shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed
of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. After
Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern.
Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the
pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter
gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be
dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable
damage to the pier as well as the vessel.
Issues:
(1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the
damage caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?;
(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the
concurrent negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory
pilotage?
Held:
(1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the
command and navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters
connected with her navigation. He becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all
directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and the like.
And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his
duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to decline to act as pilot. Under
certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is
deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the
navigation even in localities where pilotage is compulsory. It is quite common for states
and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted
requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots
duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of seamen
thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and
thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation. Upon assuming such office
as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of
care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge
in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends superior
to and more to be trusted than that of the master. He is not held to the highest possible
degree of skill and care, but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded
by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his profession. Under
extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care. In this case, Capt.
Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care and diligence required of
pilots in the performance of their duties. As pilot, he should have made sure that his
directions were promptly and strictly followed.

(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less
responsible for the allision. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding
the presence of a pilot. A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that
he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire
docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this
risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts
of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory
pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however,
by the provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must
be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from
liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause
of the injury, but the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners
are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does not release the pilot from the
consequences of his own negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of
responsibility with respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except
insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are
liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those
in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control
of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to
persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation.