Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Henri Feron
1
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
and gas imports. These two factors triggered a A barrage of sanctions also seriously disrupted
cataclysmic chain reaction that severely and continues to disrupt the DPRK's ability to
dislocated the Korean economy. conduct international trade, making it even more
difficult for the country to get back on its feet.
Perhaps the most dramatic aspect of the disaster
Besides the unilateral sanctions regimes that the
was the collapse of food production. The sudden
US and its allies have put in place since the early
shortages of fuel, fertilizer and machinery,
days of the Cold War7, the country also has had
compounded by a series of severe natural
to face a series of multilateral sanctions imposed
disasters from 1995 to 1997 , made the DPRK
4
2
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
Macanese government from Ernst & Young sanctions were ostensibly designed to prevent
found the bank to be clean of any major DPRK imports of nuclear, missile or weapons-
violations 9 , but the US Treasury nonetheless related goods and technology, in practice they
blacklisted BDA in 2007, triggering suspicions had the effect of blocking DPRK imports of a
that it was simply trying to make an example of whole range of goods and technology that are
the bank10. Whatever the case, the blacklisting classified as "dual-use," which means that their
effectively prevented BDA from conducting civilian use could potentially be adapted for
transactions in US dollars or maintaining ties military purposes. The result is that the "dual-
with US entities, and caused two dozen banks use" lists prohibit imports of equipment,
(including institutions in China, Japan, Mongolia, machinery and materials that are in practice
Vietnam and Singapore) to sever ties with the essential for the development of a modern
DPRK for fear of suffering a similar fate . Veiled economy, impeding the development of a broad
11
possibly had an indirect influence on other major Korea, Swiss businessman Felix Abt explained,
Chinese banks cessation of all cross-border cash for instance, how a $20 million project to renew
transfers with the DPRK (regardless of the nature Pyongyangs water supply and drainage system
of the business) . As we can see, financial
13
fell through, simply because the Kuwaiti investor
sanctions effectively contribute to making the was concerned that importing the software
DPRK an "untouchable" in the world of money, needed for the project could run afoul of US
greatly affecting its ability to earn foreign dual-use sanctions against the DPRK 16 . Abt
currency by conducting legitimate international further recalls the role UN sanctions played in
trade or attracting foreign direct investment. preventing his pharmaceutical company from
Obviously, shortages of such foreign currency importing the chemicals it needed for a
have grave developmental consequences, healthcare project in the DPRK countryside17.
because they limit vital and urgently needed
Given the formidable obstacles, the international
imports of fuel, food, machinery, medicine, and
press has drawn the conclusion (1) that the DPRK
so on, "stunting" both the economy and the
is one of the poorest countries in the world18. But
general population14.
it has also concluded (2) that its misery is almost
Trade sanctions also have a more disruptive entirely the result of systematic
effect than their wording suggests. Although the mismanagement , and (3) that it will go from
19
3
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
bad to worse as long as it refuses to implement billion for the past ten years. And according to
liberal reforms . Yet, these assertions, which BOK estimates, the DPRK's GDP has been
20
have been repeated throughout the period of six growing at an average of roughly 1% per year in
decades of sanctions, are rarely supported by the ten years from 2003 to 2012 . These figures
24
hard data. On the contrary, they run counter to alone cannot prove recession, they would have to
the little reliable evidence available. be combined with evidence of high inflation
rates. This, again, is easier said than done, in the
The "Black Hole"
absence of access to something like a yearly and
If statistics on the DPRK economy are mentioned holistic consumer price index (CPI) figure.
government. The most commonly used of those 3.8 -1.1 (-1.0) -2.3 (-1.2) 3.7 (3.1) -0.9 -0.5 0.8 1.3
First, the numbers are equivocal. CIA numbers BOK report for 2008, and those from 2009 to 2012
do present the DPRK as comparatively poor in are drawn from the report for 2012. Figures in
terms of PPP-based GDP per capita. The $1800 parentheses represent those from the 2012 report
figure from 2011 would place it 197 th of 229 that conflict with those from the 2008 report25.
4
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Third, these numbers are actually little more than Illustration 2: A student working in a computer lab at Kim
Il-Sung University, Pyongyang, on January 8, 2013. The
wild guesses. Both institutions admit that they DPRK literacy rate is one of the highest in the world (100%
according to the CIA Factbook, 2008 est.). Photo: David
have far too little data to work with to provide Guttenfelder / AP Photo.
5
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
central bank's figures imply that the are collected on an economy that has
North Korean economy has barely no convertible currency and that
grown at all 3 2 .As for the CIA treats even the smallest piece of
numbers, suffice to say that they information as a state secret .
35
6
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Like all reports on North Korea, According to the latest CFSAR, the food
theCFSARsare by no means perfect, production for the year 2012 to 2013 was 5.07
but we have come a long way from mMT of grain equivalent. This corresponds to
the 1990s when for most reports, 95% of the estimated grain requirement of the
any precision after the first digit DPRK for that year . Note that this figure does
38
represented a wild guess. While not mean malnutrition has been fully eradicated,
there are certainly errors in the especially among vulnerable groups. The
estimates, the reports have benefited estimate refers solely to an average grain
from the use of a consistent requirement of 1640 kcal/day per person (174 kg
methodology over many years and of grain equivalent per year), excluding 400
improved cooperation from DPRK kcal/day and other nutrient needs (e.g. protein)
authorities. Moreover, since 2011, to be covered with non-cereal food sources 39 .
the assessment teams have included Moreover, the figure does not address the issue
international Korean-speaking of distribution. But even though these are
members, and since last year, they important caveats, seeing self-sufficiency within
have been able to take sample crop grasp remains a major cause of optimism,
cuttings from selected fields as a especially when the current 5.07 mMT figure is
cross check against farm production compared to the 3 mMT of the late 1990s.
reports. [...] The mission used Provided that appropriate reforms are made and
official data provided by the effectively implemented, it may be only a matter
government, but adjusted those data of time before the DPRK returns to the 6 million
based on ground observations and tons plateau it reported for the late 1980s.
satellite information .
36
7
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Pyongyang and trade with Seoul 41. Reliability while the IMF and the UN covered dealings with
thus also depends to a certain extent on the good 111 to 136 countries . KOTRA tends to be much
45
judgment of the database compilers, especially more critical than the IMF and the UN
since many statistics are likely to be simply concerning figures reported by national customs
mirrored from other sources. Finally, it must be offices, often preferring to ignore them rather
kept in mind that sanctions on the DPRK might than run the risk of including errors46. The result,
force it to conduct a substantial part of its trade according to Marumoto, is that while IMF and
covertly 42 , and that a considerable amount of UN figures may be overvalued for recording
smuggling might be conducted outside the certain erroneous figures, the KOTRA data are
purview of the State, meaning that officially almost certainly overly conservative, for example
reported trade figures are actually heavily by ignoring trade with the entire South American
undervalued compared to the real amount of continent 4 7 . Despite all those caveats and
trade conducted by DPRK entities and differences, the trade data nonetheless remain
individuals. useful in providing a certain sense of scale.
are still important differences between the separate, "inter-Korean" trade category. The
respective figures they report for the DPRK. In statistics of international organizations like the
2006, says Marumoto, the aggregate trade IMF and UN cannot reflect these subtleties, and
volume figures varied from $2.9 billion for the thus simply record that inter-Korean trade is
KOTRA, to $4.3 billion for the IMF and to $4.4 extremely low (e.g. $36 million in 2005) or even
billion for the UN database 44 . According to non-existent, when Seoul is in fact Pyongyang's
Marumoto, the discrepancy is largely explainable second-most important trade partner after
by differences in the number of countries covered Beijing, with volumes standing at about $1.8
and the conservativeness with which the data is billion in 200749. Since KOTRA does not include
appraised. From 1997 to 2007, the KOTRA inter-Korean trade volumes, and since the IMF
surveyed trade with only 50 to 60 countries, and UN numbers are unusable for this, we have
8
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
to use the separate data of the southern Ministry numbers for international trade in tandem with
of Unification (MOU). Unfortunately, what the the MOU numbers for inter-Korean trade (except
MOU counts as "trade" includes transactions that where otherwise specified), bearing in mind that
are in fact classified as "non-commercial" and that they are respectively under- and over-valued.
includegoods related to humanitarianaid,as well Southern research databases like the Information
associal and cultural cooperation System for Resources on North Korea (i-RENK)
projects 50 .Moreover, the trade figures may be generally followthese figures and compile their
further inflated by the way in which the MOU graphs accordingly52. Both KOTRA and the MOU
records transit of goods in and out of the are, after all, South Korean governmental
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), a joint organizations.
economic zone in the North that accounts for the
According to i-RENK, the great majority of
bulk of inter-Korean trade. By counting
DPRK trade is conducted between the Koreas
southern KIC inputs as exports and northern
($1.97billionin 2012) and with China
KIC outputs as imports, the MOU is actually
($5.93billionin 2012).Trade with the rest of the
deviating from standard accounting practice,
world was evaluated by KOTRA at around $427
insofar as it should only be counting as imports
million in 2012, from which tradewith
the value added by processing in the KIC. Both of
theEuropean Unionaccounted forabout $100
these points suggest that the MOU numbers are
million,according to the EU's Directorate-General
overvalued, but we simply have no alternative
for Trade . According to the CIA Factbook, the
53
ones to use.
DPRK primarily imports petroleum, coking coal,
machinery and equipment, textiles and grain;it
exports minerals, metallurgical products,
manufactures (including armaments), textiles,
agricultural and fishery products54.Interestingly,
even ROKfigures clearly indicate that the DPRK
is going through an unexpected trade boom,
beginning, of course, from low levels of trade.
Figure 3: KOTRA and IMF DOTS presentations of the ratio AggregateKOTRAand MOU figures indicate
of Sino-Korean trade to total DPRK trade 1990-2010. Graph
by Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland51. thatthe total volumes have nearly quintupled
from $1.8 billion in 1999 to $8.8 billion in
For the sake of simplicity, rather than quote a
201255.This directly contradicts suggestions that
multitude of sources every time for international
theDPRKis going "from bad to worse."
trade figures, we will simply use the KOTRA
9
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
A further observation that can be made is that 200556. The politicization of inter-Korean trade by
Pyongyang is much less dependent on inter- Seoul predictably led to a shift towards Beijing,
Korean trade as a source of foreign currency than and Sino-Korean trade volumes soared up to six
Seoul apparently believed. It is probable that the times ($6.54billion in 2013) above inter-Korean
57
KOTRA methodology contributed to create this ones. "South Korea," as one commentator bluntly
false impression as its statistics systematically concludes, "has lost the North to China58." Tokyo
ignore most of the developing world. At any rate, similarly wasted its influence when it first
when hawkish conservatives came to power in banned all imports from the DPRK and then all
Seoul in 2008, they decided to pressure exports to it to express its displeasure with
Pyongyang by using inter-Korean trade as a Pyongyangs nuclear tests in 2006 and 200959. The
carrot to control it . This strategy turned out to be DPRK is left with nothing else to lose, and has
grossly miscalculated. Pyongyang simply turned continued its nuclear tests in 2013 regardless of
to Beijing, and trade volumes with China soon Japans now almost toothless protests.
left those with South Korea far behind. Instead of
increasing Seoul's influence in Pyongyang, the
confrontational move drastically reduced it,
wasting a decade of trust-building efforts by
South Korean doves.
10
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the change would be extraordinary, given what the Iraq War or the DPRK's first nuclear test in
the DPRK went through in the 1990s and 2006. Interestingly, Frank notes a "relatively
continued obstacles such as US-led sanctions. high" coefficient of correlation of the SPA budget
figures with the BOK's GDP growth estimates of
Before drawing any conclusions, however, we
the DPRK, leading him to conclude that
must examine the reliability of those numbers, as
"although both sides seem to differ about the
we did for our other sources. Critics point out
amount of growth, at least there is some
that the published sheets are full of blanks, and
moderately strong agreement about its general
only reveal relative rather than absolute
direction65."
numbers . Moreover, the achievements cannot
61
11
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Interestingly, however, the two trajectories in 2009 67 , making imports of both much more
diverge after this. BOK values from 2008 (+3.1%) affordable for the DPRK.
to 2012 estimate a dip in 2009 (-0.9%) and a timid
recovery up until 2012 (+1.3%). SPA values,
however, accelerate by almost a full percentage
point per year from 2008 (+6%) to 2013 (+10.1%).
Why does the BOK estimate growth to be so
weak and erratic when the SPA reports it to be so
strong and sustained? There seems to be a world
of a difference between the southern narrative of Figure 6: WTI and Brent crude oil prices 2002-2011
near stagnation and the northern picture of
double-digit growth. Of course, we should not Second, trade and financial sanctions against the
get too caught up in the detail of numbers that DPRK were tightened by Security Council
are little more than wild guesses on the one side Resolution 1874 on June 12, in response to a new
and that are unverifiable on the other. But nuclear test by the DPRK. However, there was
analysing the credibility of each version may give not much more that could be tightened after the
us useful hints on the DPRKs actual rate of 2006 sanctions, besides lengthening the lists of
Consider 2009, when the BOK estimated a sharp Third, meteorological stations recorded
dip (from +3.1% to -0.9%) and the SPA presented "unusually intense rainstorms" in August to
steadily accelerating growth (from +6% to +7%). September 2009 and an "unusually severe and
There are a number of major events that could prolonged68" winter for 2009/2010, affecting the
help us determine which of these trajectories is country's agriculture. Unfortunately, the FAO
most plausible. did not draw up an annual report for crop and
food security assessment (CFSAR) in 2009,
First of all, oil and food prices fell markedly on
leaving us to rely on information collected for the
the world market that year, following the
2010 CFSAR.
financial crisis. The price of Brent crude oil nose-
dived from nearly $140 per barrel in 2008 to Fourth, a major currency revaluation came into
about $40-80 in 2009, and the FAO food price force on the 30thNovember 2009, when citizens
index fell down from 201.4 points in 2008 to 160.3 were given a certain time window to exchange
12
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
old currency for new currency at a rate of 100:1, So, how is possible to justify negative economic
with an exchange cap eventually set at 500,000 growth based on those events? From the BOK
oldwon69. Remaining oldwonwere to be deposited perspective, the 2009 dip is due to "decreased
in a state bank, but deposits in excess of a million agricultural production due to damage from
were to come with proof of a legal source of particularly severe cold weather" and "sluggish
earning 7 0 . This was meant to multiply the manufacturing production owing to a lack of raw
spending power of ordinary citizens (wages in materials and electricity 74 ." Accordingly, the
newwoncoupled with price controls in the public agriculture, forestry & fisheries sectorand the
distribution system) while wiping out the stashes manufacturing sector were said to be down by
of thenouveaux riches
who had been involved in respectively -1 and -3%, compared with 2008.
the shadow economy and who could not prove a Based on satellite images, the BOK estimated
legal source of earning, like smugglers and cereal production to have slowed from 4.3
corrupt officials . On a macroeconomic level, it
71
million metric tons of grain equivalent in 200875to
would allow the state to reassert control over the 4.1 mMT in 2009 76 . Lack of raw materials and
currency (curb inflation and reduce currency electricity, for its part, could be explained by the
substitution) and over the economy (discourage difficulty of securing imports because of
imports, stimulate domestic production and tightening sanctions and because of the
replenish bank capital available for investment) depreciation of thewoncompared to other
72
Outside observers, however, feared that the blow currencies in the wake of the reform. The
to private savings and the shadow economy revaluation was also reported in the Western and
could dislocate the main economy and lead to a South Korean press to have wreaked havoc in the
devastating food crisis, as much food economy, as the crackdown on smugglers and
consumption was reportedly drawn from private private traders reduced the supply of a range of
markets73. Last but not least, it must be noted that goods and thereby allegedly triggered "runaway
the publication of the BOK estimates for the inflation77."
DPRK's GDP growth in 2009 were published just
That being said, there are reasonable grounds to
a month after hawks in Seoul called a halt to all
challenge this pessimistic analysis. Concerning
inter-Korean trade and investment outside of a
the agricultural sector, there are obviously limits
designated special economic zone, the Kaesong
to the accuracy of satellite-based estimates. The
Industrial Complex. As we will see below, there
slashing of oil prices on the world market would
are reasonable grounds to believe that those
instead suggest a rise in agricultural production,
estimates have been affected by the drama of
given the greater affordability of fuel and
domestic politics unfolding at the time.
13
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
fertilizer. And while the FAO confirms harsh market(making it unattractivevis--visthe public
weather reports and appears to report figures distribution system was the whole point, after
similar to those of the BOK78, the fact that it did all). Western beliefs that the shadow economy
not draw up a separate report for 2009 indicates was so big that any attack on it would dislocate
that it did not enter the country that year, and the main economy appear to have been proved
that it might therefore just be mirroring BOK wrong in retrospect asprices and exchange rates
estimates. This means that, once more, we are stabilized after a short period of transition 82 .
confronted with unverifiable figures. Concerning Keeping in mind that, in all likelihood, the
access to imports, it is hard to imagine the 2009 reform partly aimed at freeing up capital and
sanctions could have seriously hurt the economy, stimulating domestic production, we would have
given that the country had by this time found a to compare nationwide production figures in all
range of ways to evade these sanctions and there sectors before and after the reform to establish
79
was not much more to tighten compared to 2006. whether it actually had a positive or negative
Instead, again, the tumbling of food and oil impact on the main economy. Since we don't
prices on the world market suggests that the have these figures, we cannot really pass a
DPRK's two most crucial imports could be verdict on the reform's legacy. But note that
secured at more affordable prices, allowing the according to Jin Meihua, a research scholar on
redirecting of reserves for other needed imports. Northeast Asian Studies at the Jilin Academy of
Social Sciences writing thirteen months after the
As for the currency revaluation, the surprise
revaluation, exchange rates with the Chinese
announcement arguably came too late
yuan, prices of rationed rice and prices of rice on
(30 November) to have seriously impacted 2009
th
14
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15
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
conservative president in fifteen years assumed To sum up, too little data is available to solve the
power in Seoul in 2008. But it was not until May 2009 riddle with absolute certainty. We do have
2010 that Seoul really cut ties, by halting all inter- reasonable grounds to believe, though, that the
Korean trade and investment outside the economy continued to grow during that year,
Kaesong Industrial Complex. The precise following a trajectory more in line with the SPA
justification for these "May 24 measures" was the than the BOK assessment. Agriculture may have
Cheonanincident, the sinking of a southern suffered from the weather, but probably
corvette that hawks in Seoul have blamed on benefited from low oil prices. The currency
Pyongyang. A summary of the report coming to reform arguably came too late to substantially
this controversial conclusion had been released drag down figures for 2009, and it turns out that
on May 20 th , with the full report only made the doomsday reporting that surrounded it at the
available to the public in mid-September. time was mostly exaggerated. The new wave of
Ultimately, Seoul's accusations failed to convince sanctions was foreseeable and probably added
enough nations internationally to produce only limited pressure compared to what was
unified action . But in the South, the hawks were already in place. Reported trade, though
88
cracking down heavily on dissent, silencing sluggish, slowed less than expected, and this
growing suspicions among doves that it may all sluggishness was likely offset by low food and oil
have been a false flag operation designed to prices, as well as unreported trade. In any case, if
discredit the opposition. Why else release only a lethargic trade could really throw the DPRK into
"summary" just when campaigning started for a recession, it is hard to see why the BOK would
the June 2 nd local elections? The government continue to report recession and mediocre
seemed to do everything in its power to control growth in 2010 and 2011, when trade was
public discourse on the incident, invoking skyrocketing. There thus seems to be no
national security to prosecute public critics of the convincing empirical evidence to warrant the
report (or even the skepticism voiced by a former BOK's pessimism. Worse, the atmosphere in
presidential secretary) as libel or "pro-North" Seoul at the time the estimates were published
propaganda89. In these circumstances, it seems gives rise to concerns that the BOK may have
almost too convenient for the hawks that the been manipulated for domestic political
BOK estimates a weakening of the northern purposes.If the SPA's numbers turn out to be
economy, less than a month after doves accurate, and the trajectory in 2010 and 2011
registered surprising successes in local elections seems to suggest so, then the DPRK's growth rate
by drumming up support against the trade ban90. ranks among the fastest in the world in these
years.
16
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
The evidence suggests that the high growth antennas, cars in front of farmers houses, shops,
17
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
The DPRK, however, has a trump card that may to operate below 30 percent of capacity because
spare it the fate of the GDR a vast and still of lack of capital, antiquated infrastructure and
largely untapped mineral wealth. The country regular energy shortages 101. And although the
has literally been called a "gold mine, "and there DPRK has expressed interest in joint ventures to
96
is in fact not just gold, but a whole range of develop its mining industry, foreign companies
extremely valuable mineral resources in the appear concerned about the legal guarantees and
mountains of Korea. According to Choi Kyung- the general investing environment that the
soo, President of the North Korea Resources country can offer102.
Institute in Seoul:
18
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
Chinese and Vietnamese experiences, SEZs are Given this potential as well as the wider
segregated areas with a favorable legal and fiscal evidence presented in this paper it makes little
framework specially designed to attract foreign sense to continue to insist that the DPRK is
investment. Following establishment of the heading towards economic collapse. If collapse
Rason SEZ as a model, the government has ever threatened the DPRK, it was twenty years
announced plans for new SEZs all over the ago, not now. This also means that there is just as
country. Besides the construction of the little sense in continuing to strangle the Korean
Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa islands SEZs on people through sanctions and diplomatic
the Sino-Korean border 1 0 5 , it has also been isolation. These have failed to fulfil any
actively setting up fourteen new provincial substantial objectives to date, be it regime change
SEZs106, as well as a "Green Development Zone" or nuclear non-proliferation, and will be even
in Kangryong and a "Science and Technology less likely to fulfil them in the future, if the
Development Zone" in Umjong 107
. Reports country continues to grow.
indicate that, besides these, even further SEZ
In these circumstances, continued sanctions and
plans may be in the works . A new SEZ law has
108
19
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
at henri.feron@gmail.com
Economy: Current Issues and Prospects,
(http://apjjf.org/mailto:henri.feron@gmail.com)
(http://www.carleton.ca/economics/wp-conten
Recommended citation: Henri Feron, "Doom and
t/uploads/cep04-05.pdf?origin=publication_deta
Gloom or Economic Boom? The Myth of the 'North
il) Department of Economics, Carleton University
Korean Collapse'",The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. (2004). Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
12, Issue 18, No. 3, May 5, 2014.
World Food Programme. Office of Evaluation,
4
20
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
10
See Ronda Hauben, "Behind the Blacklisting of
Food Programme,Crop and Food Security
Banco Delta Asia,"
Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's
Republic of K o r e a (http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/arti
(http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/wf cle_view.asp?no=362192&rel_no=1)Ohmynews,
p-DPRK-report-2012-11.pdf), November 12, 2012, May 25, 2007. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; John
21
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
September 12, 2006. Retrieved on April 10, 2014. ristian Today, March 31, 2009. Retrieved on April
10, 2014; Harry de Quetteville, "Enjoy your stay...
12
Simon Rabinovitch and Simon Mundy, China
at North Korean Embassy,"
reduces banking lifeline to North Korea,
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews
(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a7154272-b702-11
/1584026/Enjoy-your-stay...-at-North-Korean-
e2-a249-00144feabdc0.html#axzz309NOoTp0)
embassy.html)Telegraph, April 5, 2008. Retrieved
Financial Times, May 7, 2013. Retrieved on April
on April 10, 2014.
10, 2014.
See, e.g.," Where the sun sinks in the east,"
19
13
Simon Rabinovitch, China banks rein in
(http://www.economist.com/node/21560305)Th
support for North Korea,
e Economist, August 11, 2012 (print edition).
(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9bb568b0-bba0-1
Retrieved on April 10, 2014; Nicholas Eberstadt,
1e2-82df-00144feab7de.html#axzz309NOoTp0)
"The economics of state failure in North Korea,"
Financial Times, May 13, 2013. Retrieved on
(http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defens
April 10, 2014.
e-policy/regional/asia/the-economics-of-state-
14
SeeRdiger Frank, "The Political Economy of failure-in-north-korea/)American Enterprise
Sanctions against North Korea," Institute, May 23, 2012. Retrieved on April 10,
(http://apjjf.org/data/frank.sanctions.pdf)Asian 2014.
15
Ibid.
Peoples Republic of Korea Economic Statistics Project
16
Chad OCaroll, How Sanctions Stop (http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/upload
February 18, 2013. Retrieved on April 10, 2014 at: December 2008), Presented to Korea
2014.
North Korea 'very bad',"
(http://www.christiantoday.com/article/living. 22
United States Central Intelligence Agency,
conditions.in.north.korea.very.bad/22953.htm)Ch "North Korea"
22
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
E s t i m a t e s f o r N o r t h K o r e a i n 2 0 1 2 (http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/report
(http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/B s/259/hdr_1998_en_complete_nostats.pdf), at 20.
(http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/gd 3/07/the_black_hole_of_north_korea),Foreign
Noland, supranote 32
34
CIA, supranote 22
27
35
Frank, supranote 1
Marumoto,supranote 21, at 48
28
29
Ibid., at 58-63. Farming: New Information from the UN Crop
Assessment Report,"
30
CIA,supranote 22 (http://38north.org/2013/12/rireson121813/)38
North, Washington, D.C.: U.S.-Korea Institute at
The DPRK does not now participate in global
31
23
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
(http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/al982e/al982 Ibid.
50
(http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/aq118e/aq11
(http://www.irenk.net/) database. Retrieved on
8e.pdf), November 28, 2013. Retrieved on April
April 10, 2014 (Korean only).
10, 2014.
CIA,supranote 22
54
Ibid.
45
46
Ibid. $6.45 bln in 2013,"
(http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2
Ibid.
47
014/02/01/4/0401000000AEN2014020100080031
5F.html)Yonhap News Agency
, February 1, 2014.
Ibid, at 67-69.
48
Ibid.
49
24
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
(http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f8fca490-9a2
67
S e et a b l e s on the FAO website
3-11e3-
(http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodp
a407-00144feab7de.html#axzz2xuAG3UNk) Finan
ricesindex/en/). Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
cial Times, February 20, 2014.
61
Aidan Foster-Carter, "Budget Blanks and 71
Alexandre Mansourov, North Korea: Changing
Blues," but Stable
(http://38north.org/2012/06/afostercarter06271 (http://38north.org/2010/05/north-korea-chang
2/)38 North, Washington, D.C.: U.S.-Korea Institute ing-but-stable/),38 North,Washington, D.C.: U.S.-
June 26, 2012.
at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, Korea Institute at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University,
Retrieved on April 10, 2014. May 1, 2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
Frank,supranote 1
62 72
Ibid.
63
Ibid. 73
Blaine Harden, North Korea revalues
currency, destroying personal savings,
Ibid.
64
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con
65
Ibid. tent/article/2009/12/01/AR2009120101841.html
25
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
Korea in 2009 80
"N.Korea Climbs Down Over Anti-Market
(http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/bo Reforms,"
k-dprk-gdp-2009.pdf). Retrieved on April 10, (http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir
2014. /2010/02/11/2010021100735.html)The Chosun
Ilbo, February 11, 2010. Retrieved on April 10,
75
Bank of Korea,Gross Domestic Product of North
2014.
Korea in 2008
(http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/gd 81
SeeChaos in North Korea Coverage,
p_of_north_korea_in_2008.pdf). Retrieved on (http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/
April 10, 2014. 06/38north_SR_Media.pdf)38 North, U.S.-Korea
Institute at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, June
Bank of Korea,supranote 74
76
FAO,supranote 68
Jingmao Gaikuang
Patrick Worsnip, "North Korea maneuvers to
79
(http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cekp/chn/cxgk/
evade U.N. sanctions: experts," cxjj/t718090.htm), July 20, 2010. Retrieved on
(http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/18/u April 10, 2014 (Chinese only)
26
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
Note that this has lead the i-RENK database to Korea Naval Ship 'Cheonan'"
86
(http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bic
This is neither the time nor the place to review
88
ode=040000&biid=2010050896608),The Dong-A
the truth behind the sinking, but suffice to say
Ilbo, May 8, 2008. Retrieved on April 10, 2014;
that Pyongyang proposed to prove its innocence
John M. Glionna,"South Korea security law is
by sending a team to review the evidence (Seoul
used to silence dissent, critics say,"
refused), that Moscow concluded in its own
(http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/05/world
report that a stray mine was a more plausible
/la-fg-south-korea-bookseller-20120205)Los
cause, and that the UN Security Council found
, February 5, 2012. Retrieved on
Angeles Times
Seoul's version too inconclusive to point any
April 10, 2014; Ronda Hauben, "Netizens
fingers.See"N.Koreas reinvestigation proposal
question cause of Cheonan tragedy,"
alters Cheonan situation"
(http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/arti
(http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_
cle_view.asp?no=386108&rel_no=1) Ohmynews,
national/421857.html),The Hankyoreh
, May 21,
June 8, 2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; "Russias
Cheonan investigation suspects that the sinking Blaine Harden, "President's party takes hits in
90
Cheonan ship was caused by a mine in water" South Korean midterm elections,"
(http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/ (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con
e_northkorea/432232.html),The Hankyoreh
, July tent/article/2010/06/02/AR2010060201249.html
27, 2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; )Washington Post
, June 3, 2010. Retrieved on April
"Presidential Statement: Attack on Republic of 10, 2014; Donald Kirk, "At polls, South Korea
27
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
10, 2014.
Development Situation of Mineral Resources in North
92
Jack Kim and James Pearson, "Insight: Kim Korea(2009), xii. As cited in Choi, supranote 97.
Jong-Un, North Korea's Master Builder,"
99
"N.K. mineral resources may be worth $9.7tr,"
(http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/23/u
(http://nwww.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=
s-korea-north-kim-insight-
20120826000070)The Korea Herald
, August 26,
idUSBRE9AM0CF20131123)Reuters, November
2012. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; "N. Korea
23, 2014. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
possess 6,986 tln won worth of mineral resources:
93
Rdiger Frank, "Exhausting Its Reserves? report"
Sources of Finance for North Korea's (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/y
'Improvement of People's Living'," onhap-news-agency/130918/n-korea-
(http://38north.org/2013/12/rfrank121213/)38 possess-6986-tln-won-worth-mineral-resources-
North, Washington, D.C.: U.S.-Korea Institute at report),Global Post, September 19, 2013. Retrieved
December 12, 2013.
SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, on April 10, 2014.
Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
Frik Els, "Largest known rare earth deposit
100
arth-deposit-discovered-in-north-
96
Leonid A. Petrov, "Rare Earth Metals: korea-86139/),Mining.com, December 5, 2013.
Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
28
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
here
zones in DPRK,"Xinhua,August 14, 2012.
(http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201311/ne
Available here
ws21/20131121-24ee.html). As cited in
(http://english.sina.com/china/p/2012/0814/4
NCNK,supranote 105
96494.html). As cited in The National Committee
on North Korea,Special Economic Zones in the 107 State Economic Development Committee
DPRK
Promotional Video, as cited by Bradley O.
(http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/
Babson, "North Korea's Push for Special
NCNK_Issue_Brief_DPRK_SEZ.pdf), January 14,
Enterprise Zones: Fantasy or Opportunity?,"
2014. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
(http://38north.org/2013/12/bbabson121213/)
38 North, Washington, D.C.: U.S.-Korea Institute at
The zones are the North Pyongan Provincial
106
29
APJ | JF 12 | 18 | 3
30