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 Plato's Political Analogy:
Fallacy or Analogy?
ROBERT W. HALL

THE INTERPRETATION Of the familiar political analogy between the state and the soul
is crucial to a proper understanding of Plato's conception of the individual and his relation
to the polls. Interpretations which, consciously or not, tend to identify the justice of the
individual with that of the state result either in a subordination of justice of the individual
to that of the state, or in endowing the ordinary citizen with an inferior justice. These
interpretations of the political analogy have beert adequately dealt with? Recently,
Vlastos has stressed what he considers to be the logical or deductive character of the
analogy." He finds defects or fallacies in Plato's logic, which, while not necessarily fatal
to the significance of the analogy, seriously impair its cogency. What is of particular
interest is Vlastos' claim that the primary goal of the analogy is a demonstration, un-
known to most scholars, albeit an unsuccessful one, that the justice of the individual
necessarily instantiates or entails ordinary acts of justice, a Vlastos has thus raised the
question of what kind of approach is most fruitful in unlocking the meaning of the
political analogy. My own conviction is that the political analogy can best be understood
through a careful examination or observation of the two wholes, the state and the in-
dividual, and the character of their relationship. A consideration of the essentials of
Vlastos' outlook on the analogy will be a useful introduction to what may be termed a
"phenomenological" approach. Such a perspective may provide a better understanding
of what Plato is attempting to establish in the analogy, and of how he goes about it.
Vlastos' interpretation of the political analogy is strongly colored by his assessment of
the central concern of the Republic, the proof that justice "pays." By this Vlastos means
that what he terms "psychological justice," the correct, hierarchical arrangement of the
three parts or aspects of the soul, must be proven to result in acts of external justice. It
is this relationship between psychological justice and ordinary or social justice which sets
the problem of logical consistency in Vlastos' account of the political analogy. As the
definition of justice of the individual or psychological justice, Vlastos offers Socrates'
statement, "In the case of each one of us, whoever is such that each of the three [psychic
elements] in him does its own, he is a just man." The social description of justice is:

What we laid down at the start as a general requirement when we were founding the polls
this, or some form of it, is justice. We did lay down, and often stated, if you recall, that
every single person ought to engage in the social f u n c t i o n . . , for which his own nature is

I For exponents of these positions and their critics, cf. my "Plato's Theory of Justice in the
Republic," Bucknell Review, XV, 2 (May, 1967), 60, n. I.
G. Vlastos, "Justice and Psychic Harmony in the Republic," The 1ournal of Philosophy,
LXVI, 16 (August 21, 1969), 505-521. All further references to this article will be by page
number.
s 506, 515.

[419]
420 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

best fitted.uWe did say this.--And indeed that to do one's own and not to be meddlesome
is justice, this we have often heard from many others, and have often said ourselves.--
Wc have said it.--This, then, my friend, if taken in a certain way, appears to be justice:
to do one's own. (433A-B) 4

Vlastos admits that this social description is not really a definition of the justice of the
individual, "that 'doing one's own' was not meant to constitute a definition of the justice
of an individual person. ''~ Nonetheless, this social description functions for him as a
definition of the individual's justice, and plays a prominent role in the supposed fallacy
of equivocation in the meaning of justice. Vlastos argues for this social description on
the grounds that "/or Plato every just man must have the disposition named by the 'doing
one's own' formula. ''e The basis for this claim is Socrates' declaration that "the same
(moral) characters and dispositions [ ~ "~ xM ~j0~] which exist in the polis exist in each
one of us: they could not, surely, have come to it by any other source" (435E). Vlastos
restates this as P(I): " A moral attribute is predicable of a given polls only when, and
exactly because, it is predicable of the persons who compose that polis. ''7 While, accord-
ing to Vlastos, Plato's contemporaries would not have agreed with the social definition
or description of justice, "none would have failed to see that it ["to do one's own"] has
good links with common usage . . . . ,,s To be just both for Plato and apparently for his
contemporaries, according to Vlastos, in the "primary sense," is to "behave justly to
one another. ''9 The psychological definition of justice, however, has "no discernible link
with ordinary usage. ''10 And it is because of its "uncommon" aspect that, according to
Vlastos, Socrates must prove to Glaucon that psychological justice "pays" by necessarily
leading to externally just actiom.
Psychological justice, the correct hierarchical arrangement of the three aspects of the
soul, must be demonstrated to "instantiate" the social definition of justice:

These two specifications [psychological justice and the social definition of justice] are
entirely distinctmso much so that if both were correct and we knew only the former, we
would be able to determine that a man satisfies it without our knowing, or even suspecting,
that he satisfies the latter also, and vice versa. How then do we know that the two must
always be satisfied together? This is what Plato has to show us; else the whole of Socrates'
argument against Glaucon would come to n a u g h t . . , to show Glaucon that it pays to have
the "justice" of a harmonious psyche would do nothing to show him that "justice pays"
unless it were proved that whoever has this "inner" disposition will have too the "outer"
disposition to deal justly with his fellowsJ t

The political analogy, for Vlastos, culminates in the attempt to prove that the psycho-
logical definition instantiates the social description of justice: 12 "In the case of each one

4 508. Passages from the Republic are usually taken from Shorey's translation with occasional
modifications, although Vlastos' own translation is used in the presentation of his position.
5 511.
e 512.
7 512 ("moral" is Vlastos' interpolation; of. below, n. 21).
s 509--510.
518.
lo 507.
11 514-515.
515.
 PLATO'S POLITICAL A N A L O G Y 421

of us, whosoever is such that each of the three kinds [of elements] in him does its own,
he is a just man and a man who does h/s own (441D-E)." This is, of course, the same
as the earlier description of psychological justice; the italicized words for Vlastos signify
the social definition, and constitute Socrates' attempt to show that the psychological
definition instantiates the social definition. Vlastos contends that such instantiation is
impossible because a necessary premise, "that a man is just in the same way in which
the polis is just," is equivocal. TM
The principle which Vlastos thinks is violated is his P(II), which he presents a "little
more formally" as a statement: "If the same predicate is predicable of any two things,
then, however they may differ in other ways, they must be exactly alike in the respect
in which it is predicable of each. 'n4
Justice of the po//s, justice in a secondary sense, Vlastos contends, is a one-place
predicate, and is derived in accordance with P(I), from the justice of the citizens who are
just in what is, for Vlastos, the primary or relational sense of justice. There is an equiv-
ocation in the meaning of justice. The required conclusion, that a man in whom the three
aspects of soul are in their proper hierarchical order is also one "who does his own,"
who also does externally just actions, does not follow. From this equivocation it follows
that Socrates cannot establish what is crucial to the argument that psychological justice
instantiates the social description of justice. Vlastos expresses this as the failure of the
"deduction" that "in the case of each one of us, whosoever is such that each of the three
kinds [of elements] in him does its own, he is a just man and a man who does his own"
(441D5-E2)) 5 For Vlastos the phrase "does his own" is really an expression of the
social description of the justice of the individual. Hence Socrates has not been able to
prove what Vlastos considers the central problem of the proof that justice of the in-
dividual pays, i.e., results in the doing of just acts.
Vlastos' claim that the fundamental purpose of the political analogy is to "prove" to
Glaueon that "psychological justice" instantiates the social description of justice misses
the real point of the analogy which is to show to Glaueon and Adeimantus that justice of
the individual is valuable for its own sake. In his interpretation of the analogy, Vlastos
finds Plato's arguments laced with equivocations, premises explicit and implied, con-
clusions, necessary propositions, and even a bieonditional. TM All this within the context
of an analogy which Vlastos admits is rather "loose. ''aT The problem raised by Vlastos
of the mutual instantiation of the psychological definition and the purpose andsocial
description of justice is, as my discussion of the analogy will reveal, not a real one. His
trealment muddies the basic purpose and outlines of the analogy, and raises serious
problems of interpretation. Examination of Plato's argument should be careful, logical,
la 517-518.
~4 516. It is very doubtful if the text sustains Vlastos' claim of logical necessity in his P(ID:
"If you call a thing by the same [ ~ x 6 v ] name whether it is big or little, is it unlike in the way
in which it is called the same or like [~otov]? (435A).
In the course of the discussion here, it becomes apparent that in the political analogy and its
development, little approaching the necessity and certainty of knowledge or dialectic can be ex-
pected on the basis of the Republic's text. On the contrary, the text suggests directly and by
implication, as I show later, that only probable results and conclusions can be expected from the
analogy. This, however, in no way invalidates Plato's insights or conclusions, since he was aware
of the limits of what the political analogy could establish.
15 517.
le 511.
a7 520.
422 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

and precise, but Aristotle's injunction not to expect more precision and exactitude than
the nature of the subject matter permits should not be forgotten.TM The net effect of
Vlastos' argument, it seems to me, is to blur the revolutionary and innovative character
of Socrates' discussion of justice begun only under the prodding of Glaucon and Adeiman-
tus. Vlastos' evident reluctance to give psychological justice the pre-eminence appropriate
to it in the text stems, in part at least, from his conccm to see Plato's thought in agree-
ment with contemporary views.
The goal of the analogy, then, is not the demonstration that psychological justice
entails the doing of ordinarily just acts, but the showing of the value of the justice of the
individual for itself, apart from all consequences, as a break with tradition.
Are not Glaneon and his brother Adeimantus speaking out against the "establishment"
view of justice and pleading with Socrates not to give them the same "old stuff" about
justice, but something new, something which would justify their own conviction that
justice is valuable not primarily for its consequences but for itself?

How strange it is that of all you self-styled advocates of justice, from the heroes of old
whose discourses survive to the present day, no one has ever censured injustice or com-
mended justice, other than in respect of the repute, the honours, the gifts that accrue from
each. But what each one of them is in itself, by its own inherent force, when it is within
the soul of the possessor and escapes the eyes of both gods and men, no one has ever ad-
equately set forth in poetry or prose--the proof that the one is the greatest of all evils that
the soul contains within itself, while justice is the greatest good. For if you had all spoken
in this way from the beginning and from our youth up had sought to convince us, we
should not now be guarding against one another's injustice, but each would be his own
best guardian, for fear lest by working injustice he should dwell in communion with the
greatest of evils. (366E-367A)

In this moving passage Adeimantus rejects any "links with ordinary usage" in his plea
that justice be shown to be valuable for its own sake, not for its consequences. Adeiman-
tus, sharing Glaucon's impatience with what Vlastos calls "the constraints of morality
and law," points out that a clever, unscrupulous man may have the reality of injustice
and the appearance of justice in his actions, thereby gaining the benefits of both the
worlds of justice and injustice (365A ff.).lO
Vlastos' preoccupation with the supposed problem of the instantiation of the social
description of justice by the psychological definition of justice leads him to ignore the
central aspect of the plea Plato's brothers made to Socrates, to show the intrinsic value
of justice apart from any consequences. Vlastos' interpretation that Socrates must show
that psychological justice pays, i.e., results in the performance of just acts or behaving
iustly towards others, retains the idea that justice must be valued for its consequences.
Surely the doing of externally just acts must be proven to be, according to Vlastos, a
necessary consequence of psychological justice. And without proving to Glaucon that
such consequences are its re.suit, psychological justice would have to be, according to
Vlastos, of little value. But this contradicts the avowed demand of Glaucon and Adeiman-
ms that Socrates establish the inherent value of psychological justice.
What Glaucon requires of Socrates, then, is that he explain what Glaucon already has
as a sort of pre-understanding of justice, its intrinsic worth apart from external conse-

is Nicornachean Ethics, 1094B12-15.

it 508.
 PLATO'S POLITICAL ANALOGY 423

quences. Just actions and their justification recede into the background. External aspects
of actions are seen by gods and men and can be rewarded or punished accordingly.
Furthermore, as Glancon stresses, the "seeming" of the just man can be of injustice and
that of the unjust man of justice (361A-C). Hence, he and Adeimantus suggest an in-
ward turn in the search for justice, the search for its effect on the soul of the individual
apart from any consideration of consequences. The problem as presented by Glaueon
and Adeimantus is to "not m e r e l y . . , show us by argument that justice is superior to
injustice, but make clear to us what each in and of itself [crUz/1 St' a6rilv] does to its
possessor, whereby the one is evil and the other good" (367B).
I think that it is this "making clear" the nature of justice in the inward sense that is the
principal task of the fast four books of the Republic. The definition of the justice of the
po//s clarifies the e/dos or character of justice of the individual. It helps to show the
nature of the justice of the individual because, upon investigation, the individual is an-
alogous to the state, and the same principle or eidos of iustice applies to the in~vidual.
Socrates succinctly states the essential aspects of the analogy:

The inquiry we are undertaking is no easy one but calls for keen vision [6~b 15X~no~og],
as it seems to me. So, since we are not clever persons, I think we should employ the method
of search that we should use if we, with not very keen vision [6~b f3;~:touotv],were bidden
to read small letters from a distance, and then someone had observed that these same
letters exist elsewhere larger and on a larger surface. We should have accounted it a god-
send, I fancy, to be allowed to read those letters first, and then examine the smaller, if
they are the same. "Quite so," said Adeimantus; "but what analogy to this do you detect
in the inquiry about justice?" There is a justice of one man, we say, and also of an entire
city? Is not the city larger than the man? "It is larger," he said. Then, perhaps, there would
be more justice in the larger object and so more easy to apprehend [xaxctlaxt0stvl. If it
please you, then, let us first look for its quality [tn~fioco~svnot6v] in states, and then only
examine it also in the individual looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the
less. (368C-369A)

Even a cursory glance shows that nothing in the way of a demonstration or inference is
intended by Socrates. The imagery of the analogy is primarily visual. The method of
search to be used, that of analogy or going from the larger to the smaller, is for those
who do not have "keen vision" [67~b iS~.~ovTo;]. Certainly, within the confines of the
analogy, Socrates intends to make rough, inexact, but meaningful comparisons based on
viewing the two wholes, state and individual, rather than sharp, precise logically inapee-
cable inferences.
The value of looking at the justice of the poUs first is that, being larger, its justice will
be easier to apprehend [xct~a~tct0Eiv] than the justice of the individual. Mter arriving at
the quality [:to~6v] of the justice of the polis, Socrates suggests that he and his friends
consider justice in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the lesser. The
procedure to be followed by Socrates and his companions, then, is that of examining and
comparing two different sized wholes, which initially have some elements of congruence,
the polis being the individual "writ large." Because of such congruence, the larger whole
may display a quality contained also in the smaller whole. But finding the desired quality
in the polir, the larger whole will not automatically establish its presence in the smaller,
the individual. The smaller whole must also be carefully examined to see in what sense
the quality discerned in the polls would apply to it.
424 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

What is clear in the course of the analogy is that the individual with which the polls is
compared is everyman, not merely the philosopher.
Before the statement of the political analogy, Socrates advances a preliminary defini-
tion of justice of the individual. Noting that the distinctive function of the soul, the
"work [~Ou which you couldn't accomplish with anything else in the world," is man-
agement ( ~ o 0 a 0 , rule (~0X~tv), deliberation ( ~ o v ) ~ o 0 a 0 , and the like, Socrates
asks "is there anything else than soul to which you could rightly assign these and say that
they were its peculiar work [~ta tx~[v~;]?" (353D) 2~ Excellence in the performance
of such activity constitutes justice (353E). Although Socrates ironically confesses that he
has not yet hit upon a definition of justice, he has anticipated the definition of justice of
the individual in Book IV (443D-444A). He has emphasized the primarily inward
character of justice with its emphasis on rational self-control of the soul. The "pecufiar
work" of the soul applies to every soul with the implication that any man can acquire
the excellence of justice through performing well his peculiar or unique function as a
man. The concept of function clearly implies that it is the defining property of a class
as Socrates' previous examples of the defining function of such diverse classes as eyes,
ears, and knives show (353B-C). The distinctive function of a class is described as "the
work of a thing which it only or it better than anything else can perform" (353B). The
defining function of the individual, any individual, then, is the capacity to act in a manner
in which he may achieve the distinctive human excellence or justice. It is this concept of
a distinctive function of man which underlies the justice of the individual in Book IV.
The analogous principle which undergirds the justice of the po//s is stated in a similarly
anticipatory, but ti~ificant, fashion by Socrates: "'It occurs to me myself that, to begin
with, our several natures are not all alike but di~erent. One man is naturally fitted for
one task, and another for another" (370B).
The individual, then, can be viewed from two aspects. As a man he is equal to all
other men in his capacity to acquire justice, since justice is the excellence of the function
which uniquely determines the class of men. As a citizen the individual is unequal with
regard to his natural, social abilities. These two aspects are complementary, rather than
contradictory. They refer to different tides of the same individual, as a man, and as a
citizen.
This principle of the division of labor stemming from differences in the natural
capabilities of the citizens is the basis of the justice of the po//s. For the observance of
the division of labor principle not only produces the most effective use of the economic
abilities of the citizens, but also brings about the justice of the po//s: "The proper func-
tioning of the money-maklng class, the helpers, and the guardians, each doing its own
work on the s t a t e . . , would be justice and would render the city just" (434C).
After coming to the definition of justice of the/,o//s, Socrates restates the purpose of
the analogy, bringing out again its visual quality: "Now let us work out the inquiry in

20 I have discussed the implications of this concept of function for the equality of all individ-
uals potentially to achieve justice in my Plato and the Individual O~he Hague, 1963), pp. 162-175.
Some (cf. Shorey's edition of the Republic [London, 1953], I, 100, n.e.) have contended that
Socrates' statement at 359D9, "what about life; do we not say that is the function of the soul?"
is equivocal because r6 tSlv merely means biological existence. I have contended in more detail
elsewhere ("~JX~ as a Differentiated Unity," Phronesis. VIII, 1963, 70, n. 1) that "management,
rule, deliberation" specify a moral connotation to ~6 ~lv. For, after all, if Socrates is concerned
with what is distinctive to man, certainly he realizes that life in the sense of biological existence
is not. But living in the sense of managemmt, rule, etc., is unique to man.
 PLATO'S P O L I T I C A L A N A L O G Y 425

which we supposed that, if we found some larger thing that contained justice and viewed
[0e&rcto0cxL] it there, we should more easily discover its nature in the individual man"
(434D). What is of particular importance is the transition from the discussion of the state
to that of the individual.

If you call a thing by the same name whether it is big or little, is it unlike in the way in
which it is called the same [x~bv] or like [8~OLOV]?Like, he said. Then a just man too
will not differ at all from a just city in respect of the very form [~tSo~] of justice, but will
be like it . . . . But now the city was thought to be just because three natural kinds existing
in it performed each its own function, and again it was sober, brave, and wise because of
certain other affections and habits of these three kinds. (435A-B)

The basis for this transition is the fact that the classes of the state personify those char-
acters or natural kinds (y~vlq) and generic parts or forms (~I5lq) which are also to be
found in the individual, since the state is the individual "writ large." The assumption of
435, to be examined later in detail by Socrates and his friends, is that the individual
human soul does exhibit three characters or generic parts like those displayed in the
three "classes" of the state.
In 435 Socrates appears to be taking the commonsense position that, as nothing more
than the aggregate of citizens, the polis reflects their characteristics. Socrates is concerned
to show this presumed relationship between the characteristics of the polls and those of
the individual by establishing that the individual soul has generic parts which correspond
to those of the polis. Underscoring this purpose is Socrates' ironic comment on the "ease"
of the inquiry on which he is embarking: "Here is another trifling inquiry into which we
have plunged, whether the soul really contains these three forms or generic parts [TO~a
eIS~] in itself or not" (435C).
Although Socrates does go on later to establish that there are three different aspects
of soul which display the different characters, he admits that the present discussion on
the problem of whether the soul has these generic parts cannot be definitive and certain:
"In my opinion we shall never apprehend this matter accurately from such methods
[~e068c0v] as we are now employing in discussion, for there is another longer and harder
way that conduces to this. Yet we may perhaps discuss it on the level of our previous
statements and inquiry" (435C-D).
The "shorter way" which Socrates and his friends are already traversing fails short of
the certainty and the truth that is won by the knowledge of the longer way, the way of
knowledge of the forms in Book V I I ? 1 Valuable insights into the nature of the justice

21 Indeed, as Shorey suggests in his edition of the Republic, I, 378, this lack of certainty might
well apply to the "whole question of the definition of the virtues, and so ultimately to the whole
of the ethical and political philosophy." The uncertainty even extends to whether the generic parts
and classes are derived in the first instance from the state or from the individual. Cornford in his
still valuable "Psychology and Social Structure in the Republic of Plato," Classical Quarterly, VI
(1912), 246, argues the reverse of the common view: "Whereas it is commonly asserted . . . that
Plato arrived first at the triple division of the soul, and then built up his State in three correspond-
ing stages, it is more probable that he began with the social structure, and then, being convinced
that the microcosm of the soul must be reflected on a large scale in the 'natural' State, adapted
his tripartite psychology to the framework of society." Frutiger in Les Mythea de Platen (Pads,
1930), pp. 96-97, includes the entire section, 434E-441C, among those passages in the Platonic
philosophy which he considers mythic. Myth for Frutiger arrives only at probability and lacks the
fixed certainty of loges (cf. pp. 11-25). In his recent Plato's Psychology (Toronto, 1970), p. 42, T.
426 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

of the individual and their interrelationship can be expected here, but the "shorter w a y "
does caution us against expecting the necessary deduction and demonstration of knowl-
edge. But what does seem compatible with the "shorter w a y " is the derivation of the
generic parts of the polis f r o m those of the individual, and the probability that the in-
dividual soul has three aspects. But the derivation of justice and the other virtues of the
state from those of the individual seems less probable because such a derivation requires
more evidence than the text provides.
Socrates' concern to establish characters o r generic parts within the individual soul is
carried through at 4 3 5 E (the p r o b l e m of whether these parts are three is taken up at
4 3 7 A 8 ) : "Is it not, then, impossible for us to avoid admitting this much, that the same
forms or qualities or the same generic parts and characteristics [el/Srl x~ x a l r are to
be found in each one of us that are in the state?" (435E)
I t is c o m m o n l y held, according to this passage, that the virtues of the polis are de-
rived from those of the individual. Despite the frequent use of ~10o.r in a moral sense, I
think that at 4 3 5 E the context clearly indicates a non-moral interpretation72 A s the

R. Robinson thinks that Plato was aware that the argument concerning the three aspects of the
soul is "non-conclusive." Robinson leans towards Cornford's view and maintains that the tri-
partite soul was "the one most amenable to political analogy."
It seems, then, that in the course of the political analogy and the development of the nature of
the individual soul and its justice, that we must lower our sights and be content with probability
rather than with logical necessi~, especially along the lines of Vlastos' PCI) and PfII).
Translation by Vlastcs and others of ~ as the "same [moral] characters" is questionable
(512). "Character" in the sense of human character is not the usual lexical meaning of eidos. It
can be used to mean a particular kind of nature or type, such as the "character of Greek civiliza-
tion," but does not ordinarily refer to the different characters of, let us say, Tom, Dick, and
Harry. "Character" in this latter sense could be understood as implied in the passage under con-
sideration as Chambry does in the Bud6 translation, "lea m~,mes espbx~ de caract~res." Plato,
however, does have an expression for different .types of human character that he uses at 544D:
r z06ne~v. But the meaning would be repetitive since ~th~ in the same phrase already has
that connotation. Both Shorey and Apelt in their translations keep to the primary meaning of
~id~, Shorev translating it as "forms" (not, of course, in the sense of the theory of forms), and
Apelt as "Grundformen." Later (516). Vlastos translates eidos as character, but uses it in some-
thing like its more conventional meanin~ of type or kind. More important for the course of
Vlastos' interpretation of the principle of derivation, there seems to be no lexical justification for
giving a moral connotation to eidos.
More plausible is the predication of a moral connotation to ~the. But there are non-moral uses
of the term. In doubtful cases, the moral or non-moral uses of ~th~ can be best determined by the
context. No ambiguity exists at 375C where ~th~'s non-moral connotation is obvious in Socrates'
characterization of do~s as havin~ the natural disposition (~0o~) to be gentle towards those whom
they recognize. Equally obvious is the moral use of ethe at 604E2 where Socrates proclaims the
difficulty of imitating the intelligent and moral disposition (~0or But ambiguous as, for example,
the use o f ~th~, at 548D is, are all the ~,th~"which it would be impractical to put forth moral or
non-moral? Shorey's translation of Z,th~ as "customs and qualities of men" rightly, I think, sug-
gests a non-moral meaning. For it is these qualities of human nature, taken as the three aspects
of the soul, which are the basis for both the virtues and the vices. Apelt and Chambry also agree
with Shorey's interpretation of the non-moral meaning of ~,th#, Apelt translating it as "mensch-
lichen Charaktere" and Chambry as "chaque caract~re," terms of disposition or character devoid
of any ethical meaning without suitable modifiers, l~th~, in the passage under consideration (435E)
is used in a morally neutral sense akin to its usage in 548D. Chambry does so when he translates
~,thg, as "les m~mes moeurs7 which can suggest morals, but usually connotes custom, habits, and
traditions apart from any distinctive moral quality. Apelt for ~th# at 435E uses "Verhaltungs-
weisen" which signifies ways of behavior, customs, or conduct with no necessary moral connota-
tion.
Much the same can be said of the use of ~,th~,in 544D-E. Its meaning is the characteristics or
dispositions of the citizens, rather than their virtues.
 PLATO'S POLITICAL A N A L O G Y 427

passages immediately preceding 435E have indicated, if there is any sort of derivation
from the individual to the state, it is the characteristics or generic parts of the state that
are derived from the corresponding characteristics or generic parts of the individual.
Socrates holds that the virtues are a result of "certain other affections and habits of these
three kinds [the generic parts or characters]." In other words, the virtues of the polis
come about because of the proper functioning of its generic parts or characters, just as
the virtues of the individual, Socrates later shows, come from the right functioning of the
generic parts of his soul. The virtues of the polis, then, are the direct effect of its generic
parts, the "classes" of the society; presumably the same, by analogy, would be true of
the individual soul if it can be shown to have similar generic parts or characters.
These generic parts or characters are not virtues although they are the basis for the
virtues. In the first place, no analysis has been made, as yet, of the virtues or morality of
the individuals making up the polis from which the virtues of the polis could be derived.
Socrates has yet to establish that there are three "parts" or aspects of the soul paralleling
the three classes of the polis. What should not be forgotten, however, is that even when
established, the justice of the individual as the well-functioning of the three aspects of
the soul is, in content, quite different from the justice of the poIis. The virtues of the polis
could not be directly derived from the virtues of the individual.
Secondly, since the nature of the justice of the individual is yet to be considered, the
possibility exists that justice of the polis will not lead to that of the individual (434E).
Strange, then, the attempt to derive the justice of the polls from the not yet established
justice or morality of the individual.
But, thirdly, it does make sense to take E~I ~ xa[ ii0q as characteristics or dispositions
of a non-moral sort of the polis which are derived from all or most of its citizens. In the
context of this passage Socrates notes how absurd it would be to assume that "the element
of high spirit in states was not derived from citizens who possessed this quality" (435E).
Similarly, he deems it foolish that love of knowledge is not to be attributed to the region
where Socrates and his companions dwell, or that the love of money found in Egypt or
Phoenicia is not to be derived from its citizens. Some might contend that the example of
the Egyptians' love of money is intended in a morally pejorative sense, rather than as a
morally neutral characteristic. 2s But, in the same breath, Socrates attributes the love of
knowledge to the land in which he dwells. Yet, surely he would not admit that con-
temporary Athens enjoyed the wisdom that he later would attribute to the ideal polis.
These examples, then, merely show that the state reflects the non-moral characteristics
of most of its citizens.
Finally, the implication of the principle of derivation is that the virtues of the polis
come equally from all of its members. Perhaps the justice and temperance of the polis
can be explained in this way. But problems arise with explaining how wisdom and
courage are to be derived from all of the citizens, since these virtues of the state are
manifested in the smaller classes. If the wisdom and the courage of the polis arise from
only a relatively small number of citizens, as is clearly the case, then the principle of
derivation is inconsistently applied. It is more plausible to hold that the wisdom and
courage of the polis come from the effective use of the rational and spirited capacities
with which some citizens of the polis are endowed in greater measures than their fellows.

2s Undoubtedly Plato thought love of money a bad thing, as at Laws, 747, but I think it possi-
ble to distinguish between, on the one hand, the descriptive fact that if all, or most, of the citizens
have a love of money, the state itself will have a love of money and, on the other hand, the moral
condemnation of such love. In the passage under consideration, Plato is simply affirming the
descriptive fact, not passing a moral judgment.
428 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Temperance of the polis stems from all of the citizens agreeing in who shall rule and who
shall be ruled, and justice, from all of the citizens faflfilling their natural social functions
for the good of the whole society. The rational, spirited, and appetitive characteristics,
or generic parts of the state, come from individuals whose natural capacities for social
tasks are unequal, and are the basis for their belonging to one of the three "classes" of
the state.
Once Socrates has established that the soul does have the three aspects similar to those
of the polis (436A-441C), he applies the insights he received from finding the nature of
the justice of the polls to the justice of the individual. Of the eidos or form of justice
Socrates noted, "if this form [~tSo;] when applied to the individual man is accepted
there also as a definition of justice," then the goal of the inquiry will have been secured
(434D). Although Socrates expects there to be some sort of identity between the justice
of the po//s and that of the individual, si~ificant differences do exist. For the justice of
the po//s is not identical with that of the individual. Socrates himself noted, in the state-
ment of the analogy, this likeness--rather than identity--between the two sorts of justice:
"Let us first look for its quality [~o~6v] in states, and then only examine it in the individ-
ual, looking for the likeness [61xot~vrlzct] of the greater in the less" (369A).
The link between the justice of the po//s and that of the individual is the form or eidos
of justice: "Then a just m a n . . , will not differ at all from a just city in respect of the very
form [~15or of justice, but will be like it" (435A-B).
But here, of course, eidos does not mean content. Socrates, surely, does not mean that
the justice of the individual is the same as that of the polis, each citizen doing his appropri-
ate social function. "Eidos" also means "form" or "shape." Socrates notes this when he
remarks that the just man will be like (5~oto0, not identical, with the just polis. Now the
e/dos or character of the justice of the po//s and of the individual taken as "form" or
"shape" is the same, "the doing of one's own" (r6 T& ,~To0 X0~tTr~LV),but it does not
follow that two wholes are identical because they have the same shape or form. This
identity of form or e/dos is the principle of the specialization of ftmcdon. Both wholes,
that of the polls and that of the individual, have the same eidos in that the generic parts or
aspects of the whole are arranged in their natural, hierarchical order with the rational
aspect ruling the whole. It is in this way that "the just man will not differ in any way from
the just polis in respect of the very character [eidos] of justice." The remainder of 435B
1-2, "but will be like" (5~tor shows that the just individual and the just pol/s are not
identical, but like or ~milar. For the generic parts or aspects of the individual soul are
only like those of the po//s, they are intra-individual; those of the polis are inter-individual.
As justice of the individual arranges the aspects of the soul in their proper order and
relationship, so justice of the polis attains the proper functioning of the three aspects or
classes of the polls. But, as I have emphasized, the "parts" of the soul are not the same
as the "parts" or classes of the polis.
Temperance of the state and of the individual occurs when the generic, appetitive part
of the individual and the generic, appetitive "part" of the polis, the artisan class, are each
"doing its own" under the guidance of their respective rational generic parts, to
logistikon, and each of the philosopher rulers, with the assistance of the spirited parts, is
likewise "doing its own." In doing its own, each appetitive aspect (of the state and of the
individual) agrees to be ruled by the rational and spirited aspects, and "in doing its own"
each rational aspect (of the state and of the individual) agrees to rule the whole. This
harmony or agreement between the rational (and spirited) part and the appetitive part
constitutes the identity of the eidos of the temperance of the soul and of the state. The
 PLATO'S POLITICAL A N A L O G Y 429

di~erences between the individual and the state account for the different content in the
temperance of the individual and that of the state. The rational part of the individual
rules over the appetites which contribute to the satisfaction of his different individual
needs, the philosopher rulers direct the activities of the appetitive class in meeting the
economic needs of the whole society.
The virtue of wisdom displays a similar identity of form and difference of content
when applied to the individual and to the state. The eidos or form of wisdom is the r,ling
of the whole by the rational part, with reason ordering inwardly the whole of which it is
a part, and directing its internal and external activities. This eidos or form of wisdom is
identical in both state and individual. The difference in content, again, is due to the dif-
ference of the medium in which the eidos of wisdom is applied. Applied to the polls,
such wisdom requires the philosophers and their specialized knowledge of the forms;
applied to the individual, living within the ideal polis, wisdom concerning the direction
of his internal and external affairs can be acquired through what I call "educated" right
opinion.~4
The same sort of analysis could, of course, be given to courage, based on the iso-
morphism of the polis and individual and the resulting identity of the eidos of courage in
state and individual. Plato is not drawing inferences from one whole to the other; rather,
he is presenting us with two analogous wholes side by side. The whole constituting the
individual is fashioned after the model of the polis with the same eidos of justice ordering
its parts and its inter-relationships. The founding of the polis and the definition of its
justice serve as a model which can be viewed for what assistance they may throw on the
nature of the individual soul:

We supposed that, if we found some larger thing that contained justice and viewed
[0edocto0ttt] it there, we should more easily discover its nature in the individual man. And
we agreed that this larger thing is the city, and so we constructed the best city in our
power, well knowing that in the good city it would of course be found. What, then, we
thought we saw there we must refer back to the individual and, if it is confirmed, all will
be well. (434D--E)

The identical principle seemed to apply in the search for both the definition of the
justice of the polis and of the individual; this principle is, of course, that of the special-
ization of function of the parts within the whole of the polis and of the soul of the in-
dividual of each part "doing its own." Although introduced initially as an economic
principle of the division of labor as one of the prerequisites for society, this principle of
the specialization of function developed as the underlying principle of the justice of the
polis, and from that, to the principle of the justice of the individual. Arriving at a defini-
tion of the justice of the polls, Socrates acknowledged that this would be a successful
definition only if the form (elSo;) of the definition applied to the individual: "But if this
form [etSo~] when applied to the individual man is accepted there also as a definition of
justice, we will then concede the point. But if not, then we will look for something else"
(434D).
It is this eidos or form of the proper functioning of the three parts of the whole which
is applied to justice of the individual. The principle of the division of labor, "doing one's
own," applied initially to the economy of the polis, is extended to the whole state, and,

~4 Cf. my Plato and the Individual, pp. 176-186.

430 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

finally, in an inward sense, to the individual. The primary application of the e/dos of
justice is to the individual, since the inquiry which led to the political analogy was con-
cerned with the justice of the individual: "What, then, we thought we saw there [in the
discussion concerning the poh's] we must refer back to the individual and, if it is con-
fumed, all will be well" (434E).
The primary sense of justice which Socrates is seeking, then, is that of the individual.
Justice of the individual has the same e/dos as that of the polls. Plato's argument does not
rest on an inference from the justice of the polls to that of the individual or vice-versa.
The relation is one of comparing two wholes with a common principle or character; the
use of e/dos emphasizes the aspect of looking or contemplating rather than of drawing
inferences. The individual human soul was shown to have three generic parts or aspects
analogous to the three "classes" of the polls. Once shown that the individual soul is a
whole composed of three generic parts--the rational, spirited, and appetitive---the
hierarchical arrangement of the three generic parts, with reason ruling the entire soul
under the principle of justice, is almost a foregone conclusion. Because of the isomorphic
relation between po//s and individual, those relations applying to the whole constituting
the polls necessarily apply to the individual. Such necessity is more intuitive or perceptual
than logical. Socrates proceeds on the assumption that the polis is the individual "writ
large" and later shows that the individual is the polls "writ small."
Once the justice of the polls has been found, the problem is really not one of proving
that justice of the polls "instantiates" justice of the individual, but of showing that the
soul is truly isomorphic with the polls. It becomes a question of showing how the aspects
of the whole are arranged, and that the arrangement has the same character or e/dos of
justice as in the polls. "Let us first seek its quality in states and then only look for the
likeness of the greater in the form [[b[cq of the less." (369A). What I have earlier termed
the visual aspect of e/dos (here, idea) as "that which is seen," the form or shape, etc., fits
in well here with the looking suggested by Socrates, which entails a viewing of two wholes
to see if the same principle or e/dos of justice present in the polls is also present in the
newly constructed whole of the individual soul with its three aspects.
Eidos or quality as being seen or viewed appears also in the account of the procedure
and aims of the analogy, portions of which I have already referred to:

If this/orm [etSog] when applied to the individual man, is accepted as a definition of

justice, we will then concede the point . . . . But if not, then we will look for something
else. But now let us work out the inquiry in which we supposed that, if we found some
larger thing that contained justice and viewed [0~cioao0o~] it there, we should more easily
perceive [xctxLSrtv]its nature in the individual man. And we agreed that this larger thing
is the polls, and so we constructed the best polls in our power knowing that in the good
polls it would be found. What, then, we thought we saw there we must refer back to the
individual and, if it is confirmed, all will be well. But ff something different manifests
[~aq~as itself in the individual, we will return to the polls and test it there and it may
be that, by examining them side by side and rubbing them against one another, as it were
from fire-sticks, we may cause justice to [lash forth [~x).dt~x0o~],and when it is thus revealed
[q~ctw0&v] confirm it in our own minds. (434C-435D; italics added.)

The italicized words surely empba~iTe the visible, palpable, discernible aspect of the
e/dos of justice. The purpose of the construction of the just city was to find the nature
of the e/dos of justice by seeing or viewing. What was seen there as the nature of justice
 PLATO'S POLITICAL A N A L O G Y 431

could be applied to the individual. Happily, it turns out that the eidos of the justice of the
state could be successfully applied to the individual.
Significant, even though unused, is Socrates' sketch of the procedure to be used in case
the initial attempt to refer the justice of the individual to that of the polis failed. For the
alternate approach emphasizes again the visual character of the analogy. We are to return
to a viewing of the justice of the po!is, and to "test" (~aoavtoa3ttev) the justice of the in-
dividual, not logically or through demonstration, but by examining, side by side, the
justice of the po//s and of the individual. Socrates then would "examine," seeing or
looking at the two wholes, the state and the individual, side by side, not by drawing in-
ferences from one to the other. Moreover, such examination, should it take place, would
entai/rubbing the two wholes together like "fire-sticks" so that the justice might "flash
forth" (~xT~gt~tapat).Not only does the use of metaphor attest to the probability of the
argument, but the highly visual character of the metaphorical language strongly suggests,
if not an intuitive, a perceptual grasp of the justice of the individual. Mental confirmation
depends completely on the perceptual apprehension of the spark of justice being revealed
through "flashing forth." The continuity of this procedure with the initial statement of the
analogy is important, attesting again to its predominantly phenomenological and non-
inferential character.
The successful (to Socrates and his companions) conclusion of the inquiry into the
nature of the justice of the individual highlights two significant points: the identity of the
eidos of justice applied to both the state and to the individual as "doing one's own"
(x6 r& a~oa3 n0~tx~Etv) and the visual character of the showing of the nature of the justice
of the individual: "But surely, now, a man is just by that which and in the way we have
so often described [as doing one's own] . . . . Has our idea of justice in any way lost the
edge of its contour [&na~t~ka3vemt] so as to look like [bo anything else than precisely
what it showed [~q~fiv~q]itself to be in the state?" (442D)
Significantly Socrates completes his analysis of the justice of the polis and of the
individual by a sort of review of the process from the definition of the justice of the polls
to that of the individual.

Finished, then, is our dream and perfected--the surmise we spoke of, that, by some
Providence, at the very beginning of our foundation of the state, we chanced to hit upon
the original principle and a sort or type [xa)nov]of justice. . . . It really w a s . . , which is
why it helps, a sort of image or symbol [e~8~.6,~] of justice, this principle that it is right
for the cobbler by nature to cobble and occupy himself with nothing else, and the carpenter
to practice carpentry, and similarly all others. But the truth of the matter was, as it seems,
that justice is indeed something of this kind, yet not in regard to the doing of one's own
business externally, but with regard to that which is within and in the true sense concerns
one's self, and the things of one's self--it means that a man must not suffer the principles
in his soul to do each the work of some other and interfere with one another, but that he
should dispose well of what is in the true sense of the word properly his own. (443C--D)

In this final summation on the problem of justice Socrates shows how the eidos o[
justice, the doing of one's own in relation to the whole, when applied to the polis, is an
image or symbol (e~c0~6v) of the justice of the individual. The "truth of the matter," the
justice of the individual, is like the justice of the polis, but different, in that the "doing
of one's own," as a man, is internal, not external, and "concerns oneself, and the things
of oneself." By the use of eidolon, Socrates does not mean that justice of the polls is any
432 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

the less real than that of the individual. Just as the polis, because of its f ~ , is the in-
dividual "writ large" and enabled us to find the eidos of justice, so the justice of the polls,
with its emphasis on doing one's own in some external way as a citizen in the visible
context of the po/b is a symbol or image of the justice of the individual. Since the inquiry
which brought on the political analogy concerns the nature of the justice of the individual,
the "truth of the matter" is that the "doing of one's own" as a man is not with regard to
one's social function, which is of course the "truth of the matter" for the justice of the
polis and for the citizen, but with regard to "oneself and the things of oneself."
Vl~tos' attempt to show the equivocation between the justice of the polb and justice
of the individual rests on the assumption that there/s a social definition of justice which
applies to the individual as a man. He attempts to justify this social description by con-
tending, as we have already seen, that the justice of the polls can come only from the
justice of the citizens. He argues in accordance with his P(I), presented above, that "if a
po//s is just, it is so only in so far as its people are just persons: only their justice could
make it just . . . . ,,~5 Vlastos overlooks the circularity in this contention. When every
citizen does his own in the sense of his social task, justice of the polis results. But the
doing of one's own is not the same as the justice of the polls. What the individual can
have is, as shown below, psychological justice which, however, refers to the inward order-
ing of the soul, not to the doing of one's own in the social sense clearly meant by Vlastos.
Vlastos attempts to give the social description of justice equal status with the psycho-
logical definition, although he realizes the latter's "privileged status." Nonetheless,
Vlastos, as we have seen, contends that the social description is the primary sense of
justice. It is odd, though understandable for the outcome of his argument, that Vlastcs
in~sts on "doing one's own" socially or externally as a description of the justice of the
individual. Vlastos chiefly relies on his P(I), the supposed derivation of the virtues of the
polls from those of the individual, for the usage of this formula--a derivation which is
questionable, as I have already shown. The attempt to make what is the formula of the
justice of the po//s--doing one's own social function--apply to the individual as a descrip-
tion of his justice as a man cannot be upheld in the face of the evidence that the justice
of the individual is, for Plato, primarily inward,ee
"To do one's own" is clearly ambiguous. Whether it refers to the doing of one's social
function or doing what is truly one's own--the inward ordering of the soul--depends on
the context. As far as the individual is concerned, Socrates unequivocally means that
justice, as we have already seen, is not the doing of one's own "external" business, but
the doing of one's "inward" business "with regard to that which is within and in the true
sense concerns oneself and the things of oneself" (443D). The section concluding the
quest into the nature of justice leaves no doubt that justice of the individual is primarily
the inward ordering of the aspects of the soul. "Is n o t . . , the production of justice in the
soul to establish its principles in the natural relation of controlling and being controlled
by one another, while injustice is tO cause the one to rule or to be ruled by the other
contrary to nature?" (444D) V'Lrtue or justice, Socrates concludes, seems to be a "kind
25 512.
2e Vlastm, 511, n. 21, recognizes his error in an earlier paper ("The Argument in the Republic
That "Justice Pays'," The Journal of Philosophy, LXV, 21 [Nov. 7, 1968], 666) of not distingni~-
ing between the justice of the polls and the "psychologicaljustice" of the individual, but predicat-
ing both as definitions of the justice of the individual. Yet he now attempts virtually the same
manoeuver by arguing that the social description of justice, 'doing one's own', in a social sense
is the primary meaning of justice and is applied to the individual as the primary and true sense
of justice; cf. esp. 518, 520.
 PLATO'S POLITICAL ANALOGY 433

of health and beauty and good condition of the soul" (444E). The justification which
Glaucon had sought, that the truly just man had an inherent value regardless of external
conditions and adversity, was established at least to his satisfaction.
Not only is Vlastos' argument for the social description of justice as applied to the
individual unconvincing, but his P(II), his "little more formally" expressed rendering of
435A5 ("if the same predicate is predicable of any two things, then, however they may
differ in other ways, they must be exactly alike in the respect in which it is predicable of
each") is too rigid, turning what was a loose similarity between two things into being
"exactly alike" with regard to that point of similarity. Psychological justice, it will be
recalled, could not instantiate the social description of justice because of the different
logical status of justice as applied to the individual and to the polis. Applied to the in-
dividual, justice as the social description is a relational predicate; applied to the polls, it
is a one-place predicate. Vlastos' P(II) is, on his account, violated.
But, contends Vlastos, P(II) does apply consistently in a "vital" way to wisdom. 27
Apart from obvious differences, wisdom of the polis and of the individual are identical in
their functioning as one-place predicates. But Socrates' definition of the wisdom of the
polls obviously makes "wisdom" relational. The one science which makes the polls "well
advised and wise" (~f~ov~ov xa~ x(o ~v~t ooq~v) "does not take counsel about some par-
titular thing in the city but about the city as a whole and the betterment of its relations
with itself and other states" (428C-D).

2~ 519. Mention should be made of the difficulties in Vlastos' P(II) as a restatement of 435A5-7.
What Vlastos has done is to modify the meaning of Socrates' statement so that two things to
which the same predicate is applied are not similar or like, but "exactly alike." What Socrates
deems a likeness or similarity between two things called by the same name Vlastos changes into
an identity. Vlastos' references (516) to the Euthyphro (5DI-5, 6D9-E6), and the Meno (72A ft.)
are not a convincing justification for his P(II). For in these passages the same predicate is applied
to members of a class; presumably the "predicate" is something like a de/iniens: "Call to mind
that this is not what I asked you, to tell me one or two of the many holy acts, but to tell the
essential aspect, by which all holy acts are holy; for you said that all unholy acts were unholy
and all holy ones holy by one aspect. (Euthyphro, 6D9-E6)
Obviously here Socrates has in mind the characteristic of holiness that would constitute its
definition. The same is true of the passages in the Meno. Asks Socrates: "Tell m e . . . what is the
quality in which they do not differ, but are all alike [xm',~Sv] . . . . And so of the virtues, however
many and different they may be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and
on this he who would answer the question, 'What is virtue' would do well to have his eye fixed . . . .
And again there is one virtue of a man, another of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does
this apply only to virtue or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength?" (Meno,
72B-D). PCII) does very much apply to the passages under discussion Vlastos cites from the
Euthyphro and Meno, but not to the passage (435A5-7) in the Republic. Members of the same
class do indeed have the same predicate, a defining predicate, which applies to all members of
the class. This hardly allows us to say that "If two things, one greater, the other smaller, are called
the same, will they be similar or dissimilar in the respect in which they are called the same?" is
the same kind of proposition as in these passages from the Euthyphro and Meno. If P(II) is a
"fundamental Platonic principle" (516), it should have support from dialogues other than the
early Euthyphro and Meno. Even if P(II) should be a basic Platonic principle, its application to
435A5-7 cannot be maintained on the strength of any kinship with the passages cited above. They
apply to characteristics of the members of a class; 435A5-7 refer to similar characteristics of two
differem wholes, the class of men and the class of poleis.
Vlastos' subsequent remarks on P(II) are puzzling. P(II) is his rendering of 435A5-7 (a strained
interpretation as I have indicated), and the use of the passages from the Meno to support his
reading is his, not Plato's. Yet Vlastos remarks (519) that Plato was misled by his P(II) and his
reliance on Meno, 72B.-C (519, n. 46).
434 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Wisdom of the polis, then, is relational; it takes counsel not only about bettering its
internal relations but its external relations with other poleis. Assuming Vlastos' predica-
tion of wisdom to the individual as a one-place predicate, we can fred the same fallacy
of equivocation, which Vlastos discovered in his interpretation of Socrates' use of justice,
in Vlastos' account of wisdom.
The strategy of discerning the virtues of the individual and of the polis as being con-
sistent or inconsistent in their logical status as one-place or relational predicates is not so
much wrong as irrelevant to the argument of the political analogy. What occurs in the
analogy, as I have already explained, is a comparison of the roles played by each of the
parts or aspects of the two wholes, the individual and the polis. When each aspect does its
function, and does it well, the appropriate virtue is attained. Obvious differences do exist
between the parts of the two wholes. But an identity of eidos or form exists between the
similarly designated parts of both wholes.
Vlastos begs the question in setting up the supposed equivocation in the meaning of
"just." The vital step in his analysis is his interpretation of Socrates' assertion, "And we
shall say, o Glaucon, that a man is just in the same way in which the polis is just."
Vlastos contends that applied to man "just" is to be understood in its primary relational
sense, "the way in which he habitually relates himself to persons or groups of persons in
his conduct." Applied to the polis, "just" is derivative and "functions as a one-place
group predicate." The condition for such usage of "just" as a predicate of a group like the
polis is that its "members, or sub-groups are just in the primary sense, i.e., behave justly
to one another." It may be true that "just is a relational virtue both in its ordinary con-
notation and as understood by Plato's contemporaries. ''2s But in terms of the Republic's
quest for the meaning of justice of the individual, the relational sense of justice is irrel-
evant. The just man, of course, necessarily does act justly towards others. But justice
in the relational sense is not included in the Republic's connotation of justice of the
individual. Vlastos himself has conceded the "privileged status of the psychological
formula for the defin fion of the individual's justice," which concerns the inward arrange-
ment of the parts of the soul. The social definition or description of justice as developed
by Vlastos is, as we have seen, an illusory interpretation and hardly contrasts with the
psychological definition of the individual. If there is a contrast in the Republic it is "be-
tween personal justice tout court and the collective justice of the state. ''2~ Both kinds of
justice are one-place predicates.
Essential to the elucidation of the justice of the individual, then, is the clear separation
of the justice of the individual and the justice of the polis. Only if each citizen keeps to
his particular class and does his alloted social function can justice of the polis be secured.
The proper performance of one's social function can only be done by one who has al-
ready secured inward justice, so that there is a logical primacy of inward justice over
justice of the polis (443E). Justice of the polis, however, has a temporal priority. To be
just inwardly the individual must be educated and nurtured in the just polis.
From Glaucon's and Adeimantus' exhortations to Socrates to show the intrinsic value
of justice to the Myth of Er's prophetic "virtue has no master over her, and each shall
have more or less of her as he honours her or does her despite" (617E), the focus is on
the inward justice of the soul, its nature, and how it is to be realized, its realization calling

2s 509-510, 517.
20 R. G. Mulgan, "Individual and Collective Virtues in the Republic," Phronesis, XIII, 2 (1968),
85.
 PLATO'S POLITICAL A N A L O G Y 435

for the rule of the philosophers and their well-known capabilities for knowledge. Psy-
chological justice, the inward justice of the individual, is the primary sort of justice for
Plato; by way of consideration of all relevant factors the individual is "able to make a
reasoned choice between the better and the worse life, with his eyes fixed on the nature
of his soul, naming the worse life that which will tend to make it more unjust and the
better that which will make it more just" (618D-E). The final significance of justice
refers to the immortal existence of the soul, an existence where the social description of
justice would have no application. The "'privileged" position of "psychological justice"
as treated by Vlastos does not bring out dearly enough that this is the individual's true
aret~.
Much that Socrates has said on the origin and decline of the polis, education, and on
the theory of forms has intrinsic value, but the primary goal is the disclosing of the nature
of the justice of the individual and the social means whereby it can be implemented and
maintained.
For this purpose, the discussion of the justice of the polis is admirably suited. Through
the definition of its justice, Socrates is able to make clear the similar justice of the in-
dividual; through an analysis of its social structure, its religion and art, and above all the
education of the rulers, Socrates is able to show the necessary conditions of attaining
such justice. In a fundamental sense, then, justice of the individual is primary; justice of
the polis is secondary, the one refers to the individual, the other to the conditions within
which the individual's justice is secured. No fundamental flaw exists in the relation be-
tween the justice of the individual and that of the polis; if we are consistent with the terms
of the analogy between soul and polis, then we can see that one is "imaged" or seen in
the other, not inferred, and that the "privileged" definition of justice of the individual is
with its account of the intrinsic value of justice a break with much previous and con-
temporary thought on the nature and value of justice.

University o~ Vermont