Professional Documents
Culture Documents
JACOBSON
TO THE OPINION PIECE OF CLACK ET AL.,
SUBMITTED TO AND ACCEPTED BY PNAS AS A
RESEARCH ARTICLE CONTAINING
DEMONSTRABLY FALSE INFORMATION AND
DATA
MAY 5, 2017
PNAS reviewed the attached Clack et al. opinion piece as a scientific article despite a requirement by
PNAS that articles must contain new science, which Clack et al. does not. The sole content of Clack et
al. is criticism plus false and unbalanced claims and data about the scientific article by Jacobson MZ,
Delucchi MA, Cameron MA, Frew BA (2015). A low-cost solution to the grid reliability problem with
100% penetration of intermittent wind, water, and solar for all purposes. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci 112:
15,060-15,065.
The proper format, according to PNAS guidelines, for such a submission by Clack et al. is a 500-word
letter to the editor, which Jacobson et al. (2015) could respond to. Yet, PNAS allowed this submission as a
manuscript plus supplemental information with zero new science content, maximizing the ability of Clack
et al. to smear and falsify information. PNAS offered only a 500-word response to Jacobson et al., which
Clack et al. could then respond to further according to PNAS rules. Such a format would prevent a line-by-
line response to the over 40 false statements by Clack et al. in the main text alone.
PNAS then failed to adhere to their policy of requiring each author on a paper to make a substantial
contribution, allowing Clack et al. to pile on a total of 22 authors, most of whom made little contribution to
the paper, to maximize the credibility of the Clack et al. document. Yet, many of the authors are not
experts on the subject being criticized. For example, Ken Caldeira acknowledged publicly on February 23,
2016, I am not an energy expert
yet appears on this paper.
PNAS acknowledges that several of the coauthors have had historic financial conflicts of interest in what
they are arguing against by receiving funds from Exxon Mobil, EPRI, and the Deep Decarbonization
Initiative, for example, but still allows the paper to be passed off as a science paper with balance, rather
than an opinion piece written by authors, some of whom have a financial interest in what they are saying.
When PNAS first provided Jacobson et al. (2015) a copy of the Clack et al. paper, after PNAS had accepted
the paper, Jacobson et al. provided a list of around 40 false statements and requested that these be sent to
all the authors for them to correct the paper and for PNAS to withdraw the paper and convert it to a letter, a
reasonable request. PNAS, however, did not appear to provide any of the authors with the comments and
decided to publish the paper as is despite the false and defamatory claims and data listed herein. They then
provided Jacobson et al. with a copy of the article, again with the disproportionate offer of responding in
500 words or less and not guaranteeing that a response would be published side by side.
The refusal of PNAS to address any of the main false and defamatory comments by Clack et al., thereby
leaving fake data, including fake numbers, and information in the document, as illustrated below, leaves us
no choice but to correct the defamation publicly and clearly.
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.XXXXXXXXXX PNAS | May 4, 2017 | vol. XXX | no. XX | 17
NUMBERED RESPONSES IN 12-POINT TYPE BOLD
A large number of analyses and assessments, including those per- investments in new nuclear power plants are currently
formed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the Na- generally not economically attractive within liberalized
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Renew-
able Energy Laboratory, and the International Energy Agency, have
markets,
concluded that deployment of a diverse portfolio of clean energy
technologies makes a transition to a low-carbon-emission energy Similarly Freed et al. (2017, https://medium.com/third-
system both more feasible and less costly than other pathways. way/is-nuclear-too-innovative-a14fb4fef41a#.qag59xnk0),
who are strong nuclear advocates, state,
(1) False. IPCC does not perform
new research; it summarizes other Indeed, there is virtually no history of nuclear
studies, and it suggests the exact construction under the economic and institutional
opposite.
circumstances that prevail throughout much of Europe
and the United States.
IPCC Working Group III, Chapter 7
Section 7.6.1.1. P. 534. high shares of variable As such, the premise of Clack et al. that diverse
RE power, for example, may not be ideally portfolios that include nuclear are less costly is false
complemented by nuclear, CCS, and CHP plants information.
(without heat storage).
(2) Further none of the deep
IPCC further states that nuclear is not decarbonization studies has compared
economically attractive, thus it cannot be less their results with a 100% scenario, such
costly as claimed by Clack et al: as in Jacobson et al. (2015), and it would
be impossible for them to do so because
IPCC Working Group III, Chapter 7, Section every one of these studies, including
7.8.2. P. 542. Potential (nuclear) project and MacDonald et al. (2016), NREL (2012),
financial risks are illustrated by the significant UNDDP (2015), and EMF (2014), etc.
time and cost over-runs of the two novel European failed to account for a (a) reduction in
Pressurized Reactors (EPR) in Finland and power demand of around 13% due to
France. Without support from governments, eliminating energy from mining,
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.XXXXXXXXXX PNAS | May 4, 2017 | vol. XXX | no. XX | 17
clusively on wind, solar and hydroelectric power.
refining, and transporting fossil
fuels and uranium; (b) a reduction (5) False. Jacobson et al. (2015) do not
in power demand of around 23% rely exclusively on wind, solar, and
due to the higher work to energy hydroelectric power. They also relay on
ratio of electricity over combustion geothermal, tidal, wave, water storage,
resulting from electrification and ice storage, rock storage, pumped hydro
providing electricity from clean, storage, CSP storage, hydrogen storage,
renewable energy. short-and-long-distance transmission,
and demand response.
In contrast, Jacobson et al. [Jacobson MZ, Delucchi MA, Energy Systems Modelling | Climate Change | Renewable Energy |
Cameron MA, Frew BA (2015) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA Energy Costs | Grid Stability
112(49):1506015065] argue that it is feasible to provide
A
"low-cost solutions to the grid reliabil- ity problem with
100% penetration of WWS [wind, water and solar
number of studies, including a study by one of us, have
concluded that an 80% decarbonization of the U.S. elec-
tric grid could be achieved at reasonable cost [1, 2].
power] across all energy sectors in the continental United
States be- tween 2050 and 2055", with only electricity
and hydrogen as energy carriers. The high level of decarbonization is facilitated by an optimally config-
ured continental high voltage transmission network. There appears
to be some consensus that substantial amounts of greenhouse gas
(3) False. There are many additional emissions could be avoided with widespread deployment of solar and
studies aside from Jacobson et al. wind electric generation technologies along with supporting
(2015) that find 100% or near-100% infrastructure.
Further, it is not in question that it would be theoretically
clean, renewable energy grid possible to build a reliable energy system while excluding all
scenarios feasible for the electric bioenergy, nuclear energy, and fossil-fuel sources. Given un- limited
power grid or multiple energy resources to build variable energy production facilities, while
expanding the transmission grid and accompanying en- ergy storage
sectors (Mason et al., 2010; Hart and capacity indefinitely, one would eventually be able
Jacobson, 2011, 2012; Connolly et al., 2011;
2014; 2016 Mathiesen et al., 2011; 2015;
Denholm and Hand, 2011; Elliston et al., 2012,
2013, 2015; Rasmussen et al., 2012; Nelson et
al., 2012; Budischak et al., 2013; Steinke et al.,
2013; Connolly and Mathiesen, 2014; Becker et
al., 2014; Bogdanov and Breyer, 2016). In fact
there are many more such studies than deep
decarbonization studies, most of which are not
even grid studies.
Significance Statement
Previous analyses have found that the most feasible route to a
low-carbon energy future is one that adopts a diverse portfolio
(6) False. See Response
of technologies.
(3) for numerous studies that
assume 100% clean, renewable
energy. In contrast, Jacobson et al. (2015) consider
whether the future primary energy sources for the United States
could be narrowed to only wind, solar and hydroelectric power
(7) False. See response (5) and suggest
that this can be done at "low-cost" in a way that supplies all
power with a probability of loss of load "that ex- ceeds
electric-utility-industry standards for reliability". We find that
(8) False. The
their analysis involves errors
authors show no modeling errors. ,
inappropriate methods, and implausible assumptions. Their
*
study does not provide credible evidence for rejecting the
To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: christopher@vibrantcleanenergy.com
conclusions of previous analyses that point to the benefits of
considering a broad portfolio of energy system options. A
policy prescription that over-promises on the benefits of
relying on a narrower portfolio of technologies options could
be counterproductive, seriously impeding the move to a cost
effective decarbonized energy system.
http://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/
GATOR/GATOR-GCMOMHist.pdf
to assure
capacity of several different energy storage systems [11], which Fig. 2. Installed capacity values for 2015 (left column in each pair) and the ref.
collectively allow their model to flexibly reshape energy de- studies [11, 12]. These 100% wind, solar and hydroelectric studies propose installing
mand to match the output of variable electricity generation technologies at a scale equivalent to (or substantially greater than) the entire capacity
technologies. The study [11] assumes a total of 2,604 GW1 of of the existing electricity generation infrastructure. The other category includes coal,
natural gas and nuclear; all of which is removed by 2050.
storage charging capacity, more than double the entire current
1
Table S1 in [11] shows non-UTES storage 1,065 GW; UTES electric storage 1,072 GW; and UTES
thermal storage 467 GW. In ref. [11] there is no description of how LOADMATCH differentiates
Clack et al. PNAS | May 4, 2017 | vol. XXX | no. XX | 3
2
100% conversions [to WWS energy systems] are technically and
economically feasible with little downside. Numerous low-cost solutions
are found, suggesting that maintaining grid reliability upon 100%
conversion to WWS is economically feasible and not a barrier to the
conversion [to a 100% WWS system]. We do not believe a technical or
economic barrier exists to ramping up production of WWS technologies.
Based on the scientific results presented, current barriers to
implementing the [100% WWS] roadmaps are neither technical nor
economic [12]. Our goal is to get to 80 per cent by 2030 and 100 per cent
by 2050. It is certainly technically and economically practical. Mark
Jacobson, Jan 2016 [14]
Fig. 3. Historical and proposed hydroelectric generation per year. The historical data
(31) As shown in Figure S14 of Jacobson et al. (http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=2650) show generation averaging
(2015), a low-cost, zero-load-loss solution was 280.9 TWh per year; generation proposed in [11] is 402.2 TWh, 13% higher than the 25-year
historical maximum of 356.5 TWh (1997) and 85% higher than the historical minimum of 217 TWh
also obtained for 0 hours of demand response. (2001).
Nevertheless, Clack et al. fail to show why
industrial processes need to run during peak To illustrate the implausibility of the assumed increase in
hydroelectric generation in the face of limited water supply, we plot in Fig.
energy times day and cant be subject to demand 3 the last 25 years of generation from hydropower in the U.S. along with
response. the average for the studies in ref. [11, 12]. Average future generation
assumed by ref. [11, 12] is 13% higher than the highest peak year in the last
25 and 85% higher than the minimum year in the last 25.
Similarly, ref. [11] assumes that the capacity factor
(i.e., actual electricity generation divided by the (32) Figure 3 of Clack et al. falsely shows that the
theoretically maxi- mum potential generation obtained by
operating continuously at full nameplate capacity) for Jacobson et al. (2015) hydropower output in 2050 is
existing energy technologies will increase dramatically in 402.2 TWh. In fact, they forgot to multiply by the
the future. As described in Section S2.5 of our SI transmission and distribution efficiency, a mean of 0.925,
Appendix, the authors of ref. [11] anticipate that individual
hydropower facilities are assumed to increase gener- ation by
so it is really 372.035 TWh, much closer to current
over 30%. They explain this by saying, Increasing the output. Regardless, the current hydro output has
capacity factor is feasible because existing dams currently nothing to do with what is possible.
provide much less than their maximum capacity, primarily
So in addition to needing
due to an oversupply of energy available from fossil fuel
3
sources, resulting in less demand for hydroelectricity [12]. See Excel spreadsheets from [11] and [12], Tab EIA capacity factors 2011-2075: http://web.
stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/USStates.xlsx
From [12] it is stated that hydroelectric and geothermal
capacity factors increase because For geothermal and
hydropower, which are less variable on short time scales
than wind and solar, the capacity-factor multipliers in our
analysis are slightly greater than 100% on account of these
being used more steadily in a 100% WWS system than in
the base year. In addition to con- tradicting their statement
that hydropower is used only as a last resort [11], this
explanation demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding
of the operation of electricity markets and the factors
determining hydroelectric supply.
Increa se of
375 ~13 %
356.5 TWh
350
Increas e of Incr ease of
~85% ~43%
250
1,300 GW of peak power from 150 GW of the feasibility of the plan set out in ref. [11] for the United
capacity, there also needs to be an extra 120 States. In Section S2.8 of our SI Appendix, we describe how
TWh of hydroelectric generation on top of the ref. [11] assumes that the U.S. will build out new solar, wind
280 TWh available. Further difficulties in and hydro facilities at a sustained rate that, on a per unit
raising hydropower capacity factors are GDP basis, is 16 times greater than the average deployment
described in our SI Appendix, Section 2.5. rate in Germanys Energiewende initiative during the years
2007 to 2014, and over 6 times greater than Germany
Most of the technologies considered in ref.
achieved in the peak year of 2011 (see our Fig. S4).
[11] have high capital costs but relatively low
operating costs. As a result, the cost of capital is In Fig. 4, we display another metric on the scale of ex-
a primary cost driver in the vision contained in pansion. It shows the rate of installation as Watts per Year
ref. [11]. As discussed in Section S2.7 of our SI per Capita. Using this metric, we can compare the scale of
Appendix, the baseline value for cost of capacity expansion in ref. [11] with historic data. Figure 4
capital in ref. [11] is one-half to one-third of shows that the plans proposed in references [11] and [12] would
that used by most other studies. require a sustained installation rate that is over 14 times the
U.S. average over the last 55 years; and over 6 times the peak
rate. For the sake of comparison, Fig. 4 includes the estimated
(34) False. The only relevant studies are those rate for a solution that decarbonizes the U.S. electric grid by
that are recent and among those, Lazard (10.0) 78% by 2030 [1], historical German data and historical Chinese
(https://www.lazard.com/media/438038/levelized- data. Sustaining public support for this scale of investment
(and this scale of deployment of new wind turbines, power
cost-of-energy-v100.pdf) is the most detailed and lines, etc.) could prove challenging. One of the reasons this
relied upon by the energy industry, and capital buildout may prove difficult, is that the 100% wind, solar and
costs are consistent with that study and other hydroelectric system relies on energy sources with relatively
low areal power density (see Section S2.9 of our SI Appendix
contemporary studies. To the contrary, the costs
for further details). According to NREL, maximum power
from Clack et al. are based on old data and densities achievable in land-based wind farms is about 3 W/m2
inconsistent with facts on the ground. For (although at larger scale, power densities would likely be lower)
example, such studies pretend as if nuclear is [15].
cost competitive whereas, nuclear advocates
acknowlege that the costs for nuclear are (36) False. The NREL study says nothing of the
sort. Section 4.3 of that reference says that the
prohibitive (Freed et al., 2017).
maximum installed power density is 11.2 W/m2,
not 3 W/m2.
The 100% wind, solar and hydroelectric
energy system studies [11, 12] provide little
Even at these high power densities, the scale of wind power
evidence that the low cost of capital assumed in
envisioned in ref. [11] would require nearly 500,000 km2,
their study could be obtained by real investors
in the capital markets. Using more realistic
discount rates of 6 9% per year instead of the 3 (37) False. Clack et al. used an erroneous installed
4.5% in ref. [11] power density thus miscalculated areas by a factor
of 3.5.
(35) False. The Federal Discount rate on May 5,
2017 was 1.50%; the WSJ Prime rate was 4.0%.
which is roughly 6% of the continental U.S. and >1,500 m2
of land for wind turbines for each American. Much of this
could double the estimate of an 11 land could be dual use, but the challenges associated with this
cents/kWh cost of electricity to 22 cents/kWh, level of scale up should not be underestimated. Many energy
even before adding in the unaccounted-for transition proposals require implausible and unprecedented
capital costs described above. One possible
explanation of the lower discount rates used
could be that they forecast lower growth (or
negative) gross domestic product. In the case
of lower growth, there would likely be lower
interest rates; however that lower growth may
also lead to lower energy demand and
investment.
One of the global leaders of solar PV and
wind energy installation in recent years is
Germany, which through its En- ergiewende is
attempting to shift toward an 80% renewables
energy system. Germany, therefore, presents a
suitable exam- ple against which to benchmark
4 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.XXXXXXXXXX Clack et al.
rates of technology deployment. Most models do not account plant during an assumed planning and construction period for up to 19
for effects of rapid shifts in the economy needed for such large years per nuclear plant4.
scale transitions, and how these shifts might impact energy
prices. For example, increased pressure on materials, elevated (39) False. The emissions are of the background grid,
commodity prices and high demand for wind power instal-
lations produced elevated prices for wind power deployment
not a coal plant. Clack et al. pretends that nuclear does
between 2002 and 2008 [16, 17]. not have planning to operation delays, misleading
PNAS into thinking that Jacobson et al. are stack(ing)
1,200 Historical (US)
the deck when in fact it is Clack et al. who are
100% wind, solar and hydroelectric (US)
misleading the public into thinking nuclear does not
Capacity Additions (W / y / Capita)
800
80% electricity (US)
Historical (China)
US historical
maximum have opportunity cost emissions or costs associated with
600
Coal and Nuclear
Peak Germany
nuclear weapons proliferation or meltdown risk
although the international community knows otherwise:
2nd Nuclear Solar PV Peak > 14x increase
Peak over US
Natural Gas
Germany historical
Peak
400 Wind Peak average
200
IPCC Working Group III, Chapter 7
15%
196%
0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Executive Summary. P. 517. Barriers to and risks
Fig. 4. The historical rate of installed electric generating capacity per Capita associated with an increasing use of nuclear energy
(W/y/Capita) for China (blue), Germany (grey) and the U.S. (black) are shown with
the estimated values for the Jacobson et al. [11, 12] (red) and MacDonald et al. [1]
include operational risks and the associated safety
(green) U.S. proposals. It shows that the 100% wind, solar and hydropower power concerns, uranium mining risks, financial and
plan requires installation of new capacity at a rate more than an order of magnitude
greater than that previously recorded in China, Germany or the United States. The
regulatory risks, unresolved waste management issues,
rate would have to be continued indefinitely due to replacing generation as it aged. nuclear weapons proliferation concerns, and adverse
public opinion (robust evidence, high agreement).
The rejection of many potential sources of low-carbon-
emission energy is based on an analysis presented by Jacobson Added to this, the effects of a nuclear war, which is assumed to
et al. in ref. [18]. A full discussion of that paper is beyond periodically re-occur on a 30-year cycle, is included in the analysis of
the scope of our current evaluation. However, one major flaw emissions and mortality of civilian nuclear power5. In contrast, those
is its failure to rely on the many already published detailed same authors do not consider emissions from coal plants associated with
studies on life-cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, land- permitting delays for offshore wind power.
use requirements and human mortality of energy production
technologies. Rather than relying on the results of the many
detailed studies available from large international bodies such
(40) False. Jacobson (2009) assumed 2-5 years between
as those surveyed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate planning and operation of wind farms. Based on the
Change, ref. [18] presents assessments that in many cases information at the time, that was the best estimate.
differ in method and granularity to produce results that dif-
fer markedly from those generally accepted in scientific and
While there is extensive experience outside of the U.S. with
technical communities.
developing offshore wind resources, very few offshore wind facilities have
been permitted in the U.S. territorial waters. The 100% wind, solar and
(38) False. Reference 18 is consistent with the hydroelectric power system [11] envisions more than 150,000 5-MW
literature, including IPCC, in terms of quantities turbines permitted and built offshore, without delays.
that the literature has to provide. For example,
4
IPCC estimates the range of lifecycle costs of 5
The five sources cited in ref. [12] give construction time estimates of 5-8 years.
In the almost 60 years of civilian nuclear power (two of the assumed war-cycles), there have been no nuclear
nuclear power as 4-110 g-CO2/kWh, which exchanges. The existence of nuclear weapons does not depend on civil power produc- tion from uranium.
14.
V References
15.
16.