AERIALINCIDENCE(USVBULGARIA,ICJ1959)
theUnitedNations.
FACTS:ThecaseconcerningtheaerialincidentofJuly
27th,1955(Israelv.Bulgaria),wassubmittedtothe
CourtbyanApplicationoftheGovernmentofIsrael,on
October16th,1957,relatingtoadisputewhichhadarisen
withregardtothedestruction,onJuly27th,1955,bythe
Bulgarianantiaircraftdefenceforces,ofanaircraft
belongingtoElAlIsraelAirlinesLtd.TheApplication
invokedArticle36oftheStatuteoftheCourtandthe
acceptanceofthecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheCourtby
Israel,ontheonehandinitsDeclarationof1956
replacingthatof1950,andbyBulgaria,ontheother
hand,in1921.TheBulgarianGovernmenthadfiled
PreliminaryObjectionstothejurisdictionoftheCourt.
TheCourtupheldthefirstoftheseobjections,
accordingtowhichtheDeclarationacceptingthe
compulsoryjurisdictionofthePermanentCourtof
InternationalJusticemadebyBulgariain1921cannot
beregardedasconstitutinganacceptanceofthe
compulsoryjurisdictionoftheInternationalCourtof
Justice.Itthereforedeclareditselftobewithout
jurisdiction.
InitsJudgment,theCourtfirstconsideredtheFirst
PreliminaryObjectionbyBulgaria.
InordertofindthebasisforthejurisdictionoftheCourt,
theGovernmentofIsraelinvokedtheDeclarationof
acceptanceofcompulsoryjurisdictionsignedbyBulgaria
in1921,atthesametimeasProtocolofSignatureofthe
StatuteofthePermanentCourtofInternationalJustice,
andArticle36,paragraph5,oftheStatuteofthe
InternationalCourtofJustice,whichreadsasfollows:
"DeclarationsmadeunderArticle36oftheStatuteofthe
PermanentCourtofInternationalJusticeandwhichare
skillinforceshallbedeemed,asbetweenthepartiesto
thepresentStatute,tobeacceptancesofthecompulsory
jurisdictionoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeforthe
periodwhichtheystillhavetorunandinaccordance
withtheirterms."
Tojustifytheapplicationofthelatterprovisiontothe
BulgarianDeclarationof1921,theGovernmentofIsrael
reliedonthefactthatBulgariabecameapartytothe
StatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeon
December14th,1955,astheresultofitsadmissionto
TheBulgarianGovernmentdeniedthatArticle36,
paragraph5,transferredtheeffectofitsDeclarationto
thejurisdictionoftheInternationalCourtofJustice.
ISSUE:WhetherornotArticle36,Paragraph5
grantsjurisdictionoverBulgaria?
HELD:TheCourtobservesthatatthetimeofthe
adoptionoftheStatuteafundamentaldifferenceexisted
betweenthepositionofthesignatoryStatesandofthe
otherStates,whichmightsubsequentlybeadmittedtothe
UnitedNations.
ThisdifferencederivedfromthesituationwhichArticle
36,paragraph5,wasmeanttoregulate,namely,the
transfertotheInternationalCourtofJusticeof
declarationsrelatingtothePermanentCourt,whichwas
onthepointofdisappearing.
ThequestionwhichthesignatoryStateswereeasilyable
toresolveasbetweenthemselvesatthattimewouldarise
inaquitedifferentforminthefutureasregardstheother
States.
Article36,paragraph5,consideredinitsapplicationto
StatessignatoriesoftheStatute,effectedasimple
operation.Thepositionwouldhavebeenquitedifferent
inrespectofdeclarationsbynonsignatoryStates.Forthe
latter,suchatransfermustnecessarilyinvolvetwo
distinctoperations,whichmightbeseparatedbya
considerableintervaloftime.Ontheonehand,old
declarationswouldhavehadtohavebeenpreservedwith
immediateeffect;ontheotherhand,theywouldhavehad
tobetransferredtothejurisdictionofthenewCourt.In
additiontothisfundamentaldifferenceinrespectofthe
factorsoftheproblem,therewerespecialdifficultiesin
resolvingitinrespectofacceptancesbynonsignatory
States.InthecaseofsignatoryStates,Article36
paragraph5,maintainedanexistingobligationwhile
modifyingitssubjectmatter.Sofarasnonsignatory
Stateswereconcerned,theStatute,intheabsenceof
theirconsent,couldneithermaintainnortransform
theiroriginalobligation.Shortlyaftertheentryinto
forceoftheStatute,thedissolutionofthePermanent
Courtfreedthemfromthatobligation.

Accordingly,thequestionofatransformationofan
existingobligationcouldnolongerarisesofarasthey
wereconcerned;allthatcouldbeenvisagedintheircase
wasthecreationofanewobligationbindinguponthem.
ToextendArticle36,paragraph5,tothoseStateswould
betoallowthatprovisiontodointheircasesomething
quitedifferentfromwhatitdidinthecaseofsignatory
States.
ItistruethattheStatesrepresentedatSanFrancisco
couldhavemadeanofferaddressedtootherStates,
forinstance,anoffertoconsidertheiracceptanceof
thecompulsoryjurisdictionofthePermanentCourt
asanacceptanceofthejurisdictionofthenewCourt,
butthereisnothingofthiskindinArticle36,
paragraph5.
Atthetimeofitsadoption,theimpendingdissolutionof
thePermanentCourtand,inconsequence,thelapsingof
acceptancesofitscompulsoryjurisdictionwerein
contemplation.Ratherthanexpectingthatthesignatory
StatesofthenewStatutewoulddepositnewdeclarations
ofacceptance,itwassoughttoprovideforthistransitory
situationbyatransitionalprovision.Thesituationis
entirelydifferentwhen,theoldCourtandtheacceptance
ofitscompulsoryjurisdictionhavinglongsince
disappeared,aStatebecomespartytotheStatuteofthe
newCourt.TotheextentthattherecordsoftheSan
FranciscoConferenceprovideanyindicationastothe
scopeoftheapplicationofArticle36,paragraph5,they
confirmthatthisparagraphwasintendedtodealwith
declarationsofsignatoryStatesonlyandnotwithaState
inthesituationofBulgaria.
However,theGovernmentofIsraelconstruedArticle
36,paragraph5,ascoveringadeclarationmadebya
StatewhichhadnotparticipatedintheSanFrancisco
Conferenceandwhichonlybecameapartytothe
StatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJusticemuch
later.
TheCourt,consideringthematterfromthisanglealso,
foundthatArticle36,paragraph5,couldnotinanyevent
beoperativeasregardsBulgariauntilthedateofits
admissiontotheUnitedNations,namely,December
14th,1955.Atthatdate,however,theDeclarationof
1921wasnolongerinforceinconsequenceofthe
dissolutionofthePermanentCourtin1946.The
acceptancesetoutinthatDeclarationofthecompulsory
jurisdictionofthePermanentCourtwasdevoidofobject,
sincethatCourtwasnolongerinexistence.Andthereis
nothinginArticle36,paragraph5,torevealany
intentionofpreservingallthedeclarationswhichwere
inexistenceatthetimeofthesignatureorentryinto
forceoftheCharter,regardlessofthemomentwhena
Statehavingmadeadeclarationbecameapartytothe
Statute.
Theprovisiondetermines,inrespectofaStatetowhich
itapplies,thebirthofthecompulsoryjurisdictionofthe
newCourt.Itmakesitsubjecttotwoconditions:(1)that
theStatehavingmadethedeclarationshouldbeapartyto
theStatute,(2)thatthedeclarationofthatStateshould
stillbeinforce.
SincetheBulgarianDeclarationhadlapsedbefore
BulgariawasadmittedtotheUnitedNations,itcannotbe
saidthatatthattimethatDeclarationwasstillinforce.
Thesecondconditionisthereforenotsatisfiedinthe
presentcase.
ThustheCourtfindsthatArticle36,paragraph5,isnot
applicabletotheBulgarianDeclarationof1921.This
viewisconfirmedbythefactthatitwastheclear
intentioninspiringArticle36,paragraph5,topreserve
existingacceptancesandnottorestorelegalforceto
undertakingswhichhadexpired.Ontheotherhand,in
seekingandobtainingadmissiontotheUnitedNations,
BulgariaacceptedalltheprovisionsoftheStatute,
includingArticle36.ButBulgaria'sacceptanceof
Article36,paragraph5,doesnotconstituteconsentto
thecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheCourt,suchconsent
canvalidlybegivenonlyinaccordancewithArticle
36,paragraph2.
Article36,paragraph5,cannotthereforeleadtheCourt
tofindthattheBulgarianDeclarationof1921providesa
basisforitsjurisdictiontodealwiththecase.Inthese
circumstancesitisunnecessaryfortheCourttoproceed
toconsiderationoftheotherBulgarianPreliminary
Objections.
Consequently,theCourtfinds,bytwelvevotestofour,
thatitiswithoutjurisdictiontoadjudicateuponthe
disputebroughtbeforeitbytheApplicationofthe
GovernmentofIsrael.