2015 The Philosophical Forum, Inc.

LOOKING FOR SPINOZAS MISSING MEDIATE INFINITE

MODE OF THOUGHT

ULYSSES PINHEIRO

INTRODUCTION

Spinoza gives us only one example of an infinite modification of God in the

Ethics: In Proposition 21, Part I, he says that the idea of God in thought could be
taken (if it is granted that thought is one of Gods attributes, which is not proven
until Part II of the book) as an infinite immediate mode, that is, one that is
immediately deduced from the absolute nature of thought. The implicit reasoning
here seems to be as follows: While absolute thought can be modified in many
ways (e.g., as desires, acts of will, feelings such as love, etc.), all these ways pre-
suppose the idea of the object desired, willed, etc., which must be, for this reason,
an immediate modification of God considered as a res cogitans. Spinoza does not
say a word about what would be a mediate infinite mode in the Ethics, but in a letter
to Schuller he provides examples both of immediate infinite modes of thought and
extension and of a mediate infinite mode of extension, remaining silent only about
the correspondent mediate infinite mode of thought. In this paper, I will briefly
describe some of the more influential attempts to fill in the gap left by Spinoza in his
enumeration of infinite modes (section 1). Then, I will consider a candidate to play
the role of the mediate infinite mode of thought, namely, the formal essences of
complex mental individuals1 (section 2). Of course, both the explanation for

1
After having finished writing this text, I found out that Christopher P. Martin had already proposed
(roughly) the same candidate before, since he concludes that formal essences are mediate infinite
modes. But, as we will see, both the reasons he presents for this conclusion and the consequences he
derives from it are not the same as mine; moreover, he does not make the restriction I do, following
which only the formal essences of complex individuals are mediate infinite modes. Martin, Chris-
topher P. The Framework of Essences in Spinozas Ethics. British Journal for the History of
Philosophy 16.3 (2008): 489509.

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Spinozas silence and the attempt to fill it in with a positive answer will remain
inconclusive until some new and yet unknown textual evidence is found.
Before we can proceed toward this conclusion, the problem itself must be clearly
formulated. One of Spinozas most acute disciples, the German mathematician
Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus, perceived the importance of a systematic
exemplification of infinite modes for a full understanding of the Ethics. At the time,
the book was not yet published, circulating only among the restricted ranks of
Spinozas inner circle. Tschirnhaus once charged his friend G. H. Schuller, another
of Spinozas disciples, to ask Spinoza for examples of such entities. Spinoza
answered Schuller in a letter written July 29, 1675, which cryptically sketches the
examples of the two kinds of infinite modes not put forward in the Ethics:

Lastly, the examples you ask for of the first kind [viz., of immediate modes] are, in thought,
absolutely infinite understanding; in extension, motion and rest; an example of the second kind [viz.,
of mediate modes] is the figure of the whole universe [facies totius universi], which, though it varies
in infinite modes, yet remains always the same. Cf. scholium to Ethics, part II, Lemma vii before
prop. 14.2

What is particularly remarkable about this answer is its striking incompleteness:

Even if we assume that there are in total only four infinite modes in each of the two
known attributes (two in each attribute, one of them immediate, and the other
mediate), Spinoza mentions only three of such modifications: He does not com-
municate an example of the mediate infinite mode of thought. But we know, by the
parallelism thesisand Tschirnhaus should have been aware of thisthat there
has to be a mediate infinite mode of thought corresponding to the corporeal facies
totius universi, the infinite corporeal individual containing in itself all finite
corporeal individuals. If this omission were a didactical device to educate his
disciples, stimulating them to reach the right conclusions by their own devices, we
have reason to suspect he failed in this intent.

2
Denique exempla, quae petis, primi generis sunt in Cogitatione, intellectus absolute infinitus; in
Extensione autem motus & quies; secundi autem, facies totius Universi, quae quamvis infinitis modis
variet, manet tamen semper eadem, de quo vide Schol. 7. Lemmatis ante Prop. 14. p. 2, ed.
Gebhardt, iv, 277, Ep. LXIV. Generally, I will follow Shirleys and Curleys translations of the Ethics
(Spinoza Opera, 4 vols. Ed. C. Gebhardt. Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1925), but occasionally I will
propose my own translation instead. From now on, I will use the following abbreviations to refer to
passages of the Ethics: E4P35 = Part IV, Proposition 35. References to the Demonstrations, Scholia,
Corollaries, Definitions, and Axioms of each Part and/or Proposition take the following form: D, S,
C, Def, A (so, for example, the Scholium of Proposition 3, Part II will be referred to as E2P3S). Cf.
Spinoza, The Collected Works of Spinoza. Translated and Ed. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1985) and Complete Works. Trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publish-
ing Company, 1992).

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1. SOME CLASSICAL AND RECENT INTERPRETATIONS

Spinozas elusive answer has prompted many interpretations among scholars.

They vary from the thesis that the missing mediate infinite mode is to be identified
with the facies totius universi, as it is expressed in the attribute of thought, to the
thesis that this missing mode is not to be supplemented at all in the realm of
thought, existing only in extension (obviously, this last position can be defended
only at the expense of falsifying the universality of the parallelism thesis). For
some interpreters, the answer to the problem of the missing mode is an easy one:
Even if Spinoza did not mention it in the letter to Schuller, they say, he gave us
sufficient clues in other texts to discover it. To others, though, the answer is not
merely difficult, but impossible: The problem reveals an insurmountable internal
tension within Spinozas philosophy. Finally, for some the answer is easy, but
unimportantthe problem of the missing mode is, in fact, a pseudo-problem.
I will not pursue in detail here the various interpretations of this topic of
Spinozas scholarship.3 But there are three that are worth mentioning before I
advance my own interpretation, namely, those provided by Martial Gueroult,
Jean-Marie Beyssade, and Tad Schmaltz. In general lines, Gueroult proposes that,
while the immediate mode of thought is the infinite set of essences thought of by
Gods eternal ideas, the mediate mode of thought is the infinite set of existent
ideas in time, the exact correspondent of the facies totius universi in the attribute
of thought. Qualitatively, the infinite mediate mode corresponds to existent ideas
representing existent bodies. Since Natura Naturata as a whole is the infinite set
of finite individuals as well as an individual on its own, the infinite mediate mode
of thought can be identified with the tendency4 of the infinite individual idea to
persevere in existencein sum, it is the infinite will that comprehends all finite
wills in itself.5 Quantitatively, Gueroult sustains the thesis that there can only be
two infinite modes per attribute, one of them immediate and the other mediate,
precisely because the immediate expresses the essence and the mediate expresses
the existence of divine infinite modifications. Since reality divides itself exhaus-
tively between the level of essences and the level of existences, we should

3
For a brief history of these interpretations, see Tad Schmaltz Spinozas Mediate Infinite Mode.
Journal of the History of Philosophy 35.2 (1997): 199235.
4
Even if Gueroult does not say so, it is worth noticing that the infinite individual cannot strive for
its own existence, since there is no external individual that could prevent it from existing. Never-
theless, it is legitimate to apply to it the concept of an infinite will, because it has an internal force
or power to actualize its own essence in time.
5
[. . .] la volont infinie comprenant linfinit des volonts finies (Martial Gueroult, Spinoza, vol. I:
Dieu (Ethique, I) [Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1968], 318.). In this sense, Gueroult can precisely locate
the missing infinite mediate mode of thought in the text of the Ethics, viz. in E1P32.

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conclude that the very infinity of the modes excludes any numerical multiplication
either on the level of essences or on the level of existences.6
Almost 30 years after Gueroults book, Beyssade7 criticized his solution and
claimed to have solved the mystery of the missing mode of thoughtin fact, he
claimed that there is no mystery to be solved at all. According to Beyssade,
Gueroult was unable to find the adequate textual support to correctly dispel the
puzzle because his structural method barred any appeal to ulterior texts in order to
illuminate previous ones: The order of reasons adopted by Gueroult forced him
to look for the missing mode in Part I of the Ethics, when all he would have had
to do was to look further for it, in Part V. Being more sensitive to the subtleties and
contingencies of the history of ideas, Beyssade asserted that he was able to provide
a clear and straightforward textual basis in the Ethics (more precisely, in E5P36)
to positively identify the missing mode of thought.
He begins by presenting the general reason why Gueroults solution cannot be
accepted: In E2P49C, Spinoza proves that the will of God is not modally distinct
from its intellecton the contrary, the two are characterized here as one and the
same thing. This is not the case, says Beyssade, with the infinite love God directs
to itself and to men, a concept that will not be developed until E5, the only place
in the whole book that satisfies the necessity of identifying a clear relation of
dependence between immediate and mediate modes. Indeed, if a thing is loved,
the lover must have an idea of the loved object, but it is possible to have an idea
of this same object without any affect of love (or without any affect whatsoever)
toward it in the mind of the perceiver.8 There is only one place in the Ethics where
a partwhole relation in the realm of thought distinct from the one existing
between the infinite intellect and its ideas is explicitly stated by Spinoza: at
E5P36, where it is said that the infinite love through which God loves itself has
as its parts the intellectual love of the mind towards God.9
Even if Beyssades candidate to occupy the place of the missing mode has some
strong textual support, this does not mean that it is free from conceptual problems.
In a paper published three years after Beyssades, Schmalz10 argues that his
predecessors solution fails to explain in what sense the parallelism between
thought and extension is to be maintained. This particular failure, adds Schmaltz,

6
Gueroult (1968), 319.
7
Jean-Marie Beyssade, Sur le mode infini mdiat dans lattribut de la pense. Du problme (lettre
64) une solution (thique V, 36). In: Revue Philosophique de la France et de ltranger, 2326.
119e Anne, Tome CLXXXIV, 1994, no 1, janvier-mars.
8
This mental law, following Beyssade, is stated at E2A3 and is valid both for finite and infinite minds.
9
The last sentence of E5P36 states explicitly this relation: Mentis erga Deum Amor intellectualis
pars est infiniti amoris, quo Deus se ipsum amat.
10
Schmaltz (1997).

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is only an instance of a more general problem affecting all possible solutions to the
problem of the missing mode of thought. In the particular case of Beyssades
interpretation, this problem assumes the form of an important omission, namely,
the absence of any positive explanation of how Spinoza could claim that the
relation between the infinite Love of God and the Idea of God corresponds to the
relation between the infinite corporeal individual and motion-and-rest.11
But the problem, says Schmaltz, is even more profound than the lack of a
positive explanation. He believes there is a deep conceptual problemindeed, an
insoluble tensionwithin Spinozas system that has passed unnoticed by all
commentators. If Schmaltz is right, the long tradition of looking for the missing
mode of thought is simply misguided12: Instead of looking for one new candidate
after another to fill in the gap left by Spinoza, we should take a step back in order
to understand that his omission in the letter to Schuller is a symptom of a profound
impasse in the rest of his thought. Following Schmaltz, the theory of infinite
modes is simultaneously a necessary step for Spinozas aim to connect the finite
realm of objects with the infinite nature of God and an obstacle to the coherence
of his philosophical project. The impasse pointed out by Schmaltz can be formu-
lated as follows: The only plausible candidate to occupy the place of the mediate
infinite mode of thought is the idea of the idea of God. In E2P21, Spinoza affirms
that each idea necessarily generates an idea of itself, and this idea of an idea, in
turn, necessarily generates an idea of itself, and so on ad infinitum. Since this is a
universal demonstration, it can also validly be applied to the idea of God, which
Spinoza explicitly identifies with the infinite intellect of God (i.e., as the imme-
diate infinite mode of thought exemplified in the letter to Schuller). Therefore, the
mediate infinite mode of thought should be an infinite idea of the idea of God,
modally distinguished from the idea of God. The problem, says Schmaltz, is that
Spinoza, at the Scholium of the very E2P21 mentioned above, deduces, from the
nature of thought, that there can only be a mere distinction of reason between idea
and idea of idea. From all these theses taken together, he says, one must conclude
that it is impossible to separate the immediate infinite mode of thought from the
mediate one, at the very moment we recognize that the parallelism thesis demands
this separation to be done.

2. ANOTHER CANDIDATE

I do not think, though, that there is an insurmountable difficulty for Spinoza to

face regarding his theory of infinite modes. I propose we can seek the newand

11
Schmaltz (1997), 225, note 113.
12
Schmaltz (1997), 223.

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hopefully the lastcandidate in an unsuspected place: in a context in which

Spinoza does not deal directly with the distinction between immediate and
mediate infinite modes, but with the nature of essences. More precisely, we can
find it in a suggestion recently made by Don Garrett,13 in his interpretation of
Spinozas concept of the essence of singular things.
The main purpose of Garretts paper is to explain the relation Spinoza estab-
lishes between the essence of the human body and the part of the mind that is
eternal. In order to do this, Garrett must first propose an understanding of the
concept of the essence of singular things in the Ethics. The locus where an
investigation on the nature of essence must begin is, obviously enough, the
Definition of Essence in the opening of E2. But, as Garrett notices,14 E2D2 has
an ambiguous formulation. In fact, given that there are two uses of the word
essence in the Ethicsdistinguished by two distinct qualifiersnamely,
the formal essence [essentia formalis] and the actual essence [essentia
actualis]it is not clear in which of these two senses the term is being defined at
E2D2. One way to avoid this ambiguity is to approach E2D2 with what we learn
about essences from other parts of the book. On one side, we know from E3P7 that
the striving [conatus] of a thing to temporally exist coincides exactly with its
actual existencein other words, there is nothing more in a singular existent thing
than an existing essence. On the other side, we also know from E1P25 and E5P36
that the formal essence of a singular thing is ontologically distinct from its
temporal existence: Formal essences are eternal and derive from Gods attributes
without the mediation of an infinite chain of finite transitive causes, as is the case
with actual essences. According to Garrett, if we keep in mind this double sense
of the word essence, E2D2 is ambiguous in a non-harmful sense, since it allows
the two uses of the term to be accommodated within its general formula. E2D2
reads as follows:

To the essence of any thing belongs that which, being given, the thing is necessarily posited and
which, being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken away, or that without which the thing can
neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor be conceived without the thing.15

At first sight, we should be led to think that this definition fits better with the kind
of essence qualified above as actual, since it states the equivalence between the

13
Don Garrett, Spinoza on the Essence of the Body and the Part of the Mind That is Eternal. In: The
Cambridge Companion to Spinozas Ethics, Ed. Olli Koistinen (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 284302.
14
Garrett (2009), 286.
15
Ad essentiam alicujus rei id pertin ere dico, quo dato res necessari ponitur, & quo sublato res
necessari tollitur; vel id, sine quo res, & vice versa quod sine re nec esse, nec concipi potest.

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thing and its essence. But Garrett16 calls our attention to the fact that the verbs
given (dato) and posited (ponitur) have more than one reading: They could
indicate either the relation of instantiation, in which case a formal essence is
posited as an actual essence in time, or the mere possibility of the thing, in
which case the formal essence is given as an eternal entity that grounds the
possible temporal existence of the thing. The discrimination of these two mean-
ings renders E2D2 consistent with both uses of the word essence.17
But Garrett is not yet content with this move, since it seems to be inconsistent
with Spinozas necessitarianism.18 The problem identified by him seems to affect
only the concept of formal essence, because the concept of actual essence is not
interpreted through the notion of unrealized possibilities. Garretts task is then
directed toward an adequate characterization of the ontological status of formal
essences. In particular, he has to show how we can distinguish the kind of
existence proper to formal essences from the kind of existence proper to finite
things instantiating these essences. I will not examine in detail how this distinction
enables Garrett to compatibilize the notion of formal essence with necessitarian-
ism19; for my purpose here, it will be enough to sketch in general lines the distinct
properties of these two kinds of existence discriminated by Spinoza, since this
distinction is the sole premise I will need to deduce the nature of the mediate
infinite mode of thought.
Garretts argument at this point assumes the form of two disjunctive syllogisms;
the first is as follows:

P1: all existent things are either a substance or modes of a substance (E1A4);
P2: formal essences are not substances (E1P14: only God is a substance);
C: therefore, they are modes of a substance.

16
Garrett (2009), 286.
17
It is important to notice that the word actual itself has two meanings discriminated by Spinoza in
the Ethics: The first one points to temporal existences and the second to eternal existences. Garretts
opposition between actual and formal deals with the first temporal meaning of the word, but we
can easily infer that all formal essences are actual in the second meaning of the termthat is,
that they are eternally existent items outside time. About this second distinction, see E2P45S and
specially E5P29S.
18
That is, the thesis that all possibilities are realized or, put another way, that there is only one possible
world, viz. the actual world. See Don Garrett, Spinozas Necessitarianism. In: God and Nature:
Spinozas Metaphysics. Papers presented at the First Jerusalem Conference (Ethica I), Ed.
Yirmiyahu Yovel (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 191218.
19
For his solution, see Garrett (2009), 291.

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The second step of the argument is formulated in this way:

P1: modes are either infinite or finite (E1P2128);

P2: formal essences are not finite modes, since they exist eternally (E2P8 and
E5P23S);
C: therefore, they are infinite modes of the only existing (and possible) substance.

One could object to this last conclusion by arguing like this: Given that there are
many (infinite) essences of singular things, it seems to follow from the definition
of a finite thing at E1D2 (Ea res dicitur in suo genere finita, qu ali ejusdem
natur terminari potest) that formal essences of singular things must be finite
modes of God, because one essence of some attribute is necessarily limited by
an infinite number of other essences of the same attribute (namely, by all the
logically possible ones). Garrett avoids this conclusion by specifying a precise
sense in which formal essences are unlimited:

The infinity of infinite modes lies not in there being no other modes of the same attribute (because
there obviously are), but rather in there being (as E1P21D puts it in application to the attribute of
thought) no Thought that does not constitute the infinite modethat is, in its pertaining perva-
sively to all of the attribute in question at all times, wherever it is found.20

The only question left unanswered by Garretts interpretation is whether formal

essences of singular things are immediate or mediate infinite modes of God. Even
if Garrett himself does not give this further step,21 the question can be easily settled
by an extra disjunctive syllogism having the following form:

P1: all infinite modes of God are either immediate or mediate (E1P2122);
P2: essences of singular things are not infinite immediate modes of God (textual
argument: only the infinite intellect of God and motion and rest are, among the
known attributes, infinite immediate modes of God);

20
Garrett (2009), 289. This explanation also avoids a possible objection by Schmaltz, following which
essences of finite things are themselves finite items. See Schmaltz (1997), 226.
21
At least, not explicitlybut it seems implied by certain passages of his article. See for example, his
final characterization of the formal essence as the omnipresent aspect of an attribute of God that
consists in the attributes general capacity to accommodatethrough the general laws of its nature
as an attributethe actual existence of a singular thing [. . .] (Garrett 2009, 290). Since these
general laws are also infinite modes (Ibid, 291), it is implied by Garretts reading that formal
essences are the resulting effect of some more immediate modification of Gods attributesnamely,
the laws of nature. Therefore, formal essences must be mediate infinite modifications of God. Even
if Garretts conclusion could be implicitly found in his text, rendering it explicit will demand from
us some considerable additional work, in order to make it compatible with the main presuppositions
and implications of a comprehensive theory on finite and infinite modes of God.

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C: therefore, formal essences of singular things are mediate infinite modes of

God.
The problematic step of this last syllogism is P2, since its only justification was
given by a textual argument that can be variously interpreted. More precisely, if
P2 were interpreted as implying that there is an infinite number of infinite
formal essences (one eternal essence corresponding to each of the infinite
individual things temporally existing in Nature), then it could be denied (as in
fact it was denied by all the commentators we have examined above) on the
basis that it is implicitly stated by E1P22 that there can be but one mediate infinite
mode in each attribute. Nevertheless, no such statement is in fact implied by E1P22.
On the contrary, because every being has to produce some effect, the mediate
infinite modes must produce an infinite number of other mediate modes (all of them
infinite and eternal by its proximate cause).22 Therefore, the above mentioned
critique of the third syllogism must be rejected. Once we admit that the formal
essences of singular things are infinite modes of God, we must also accept that there
is an infinite number of such modes. All essences of complex singular things are
mediate infinite modes of God insofar as God is modified by immediate infinite
modes.23

22
This conclusion was drawn by Yitzhak Melamed in a recent text (Y. Melamed, Spinozas Infinite
Modes, Ch. 4 of Spinozas Metaphysics of Substance and Thought, 2013. (Available at: http://
johnshopkins.academia.edu/YitzhakMelamed/Papers. Accessed: December 22, 2013).
23
As I said above (cf. supra, note 1), Martin (2008) had already arrived at this same conclusion some
time ago. But the ways we both establish the conclusion are considerably distinctand so are the
consequences we derive from it. To give only a hint of our different approaches, I can point to some
of Martins characterizations of formal essences that are in direct opposition to the way I describe
them. Firstly, Martins conclusion depends on his denial that formal essences limit one another,
while I believe there is a perfectly clear sense in which they do limit one another (I follow Garret
in this pointsee Garrett (2009), 289, note 12). Moreover, Martin proposes that formal essences are
identical with Laws of Nature that are capable of being simultaneously identically exemplified
in numerous finite modes (Martin (2008), 505); in my interpretation (as well as in Garrettscf.
Garrett (2009), 291, note 16), formal essences are sharply distinguished from natural lawsin fact,
I propose that there is a distinct and separate formal essence to each singular complex thing (in other
words, formal essences do not fall under a specieist interpretation, following Martins expression,
but exemplify instead the standard, only-unique-essences approach [Martin (2008), 490]). Finally,
Martin opposes formal essences of extension to objective essences of thought, even if this term
(essentia objectiva) does not occur in the Ethics, but only in the Treatise of the Emendation of the
Intellect and in the Short Treatise. For me, both extension and thought have formal essencesand,
if one could still talk of objective essences in the Ethics, it would only be in the sense that modes
of thought have, besides formal essences, also objective realities (cf. Garrett (2009), 287, note 4).
At the time Martin wrote his paper, Garretts text was cited by him only as an unpublished
manuscript (Martin (2008), 490, note 3). I believe the interpretation of formal essences as mediate
infinite modes can be better expressed and defended in my version of it.

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Following (at least to a certain point24) a Neo-Platonic trend, Spinoza pictures

reality as an infinite emanation from (or rather an immanent modification of) the
most perfect (perfectissimus) being to less perfect ones.25 This quantitative
(gradual) aspect of infinite modes allows us to understand the causal antecedence
not only of immediate over mediate modifications, but also among mediate
modifications themselves, since, as Melamed emphasizes, this infinite chain of
being causally relates its elements to one another: Each item in this chain is the
immanent cause of the following item.26 Regarding the qualitative aspect of
mediate infinite modes, we already know that, in the attribute of extension, it is
identified with the infinite Individual constituting the whole material Nature:
Spinoza himself provides this example to Schuller. Since the infinite Individual
contains in itself not only the totality of temporal finite individuals, but also their
respective infinite formal essences, we can conclude that each formal essence of
a complex individual body is contained in and derived from the nature of the
infinite Individual, following different degrees of perfection. In the attribute of
thought, the mediate infinite mode must beby the parallelism thesisthe idea
of this infinite bodily Individual, from which are derived the ideas of each
complex individual body contained in it and also their respective infinite formal
essences.
But why should we exclude the simple bodies and their ideas from the realm of
mediate modes, relegating them instead to the realm of immediate ones? The
reason lies in the fact that the identification of mediate infinite modes with formal
essences of complex individuals is the only way both to explain the quantitative
and the qualitative properties of them and to maintain the parallelism thesis. Lets
examine closely this reasoning. (1) In the attribute of extension, the distinction
between (a) the immediate infinite mode and (b) the mediate infinite mode should
be understood as the distinction between (a) extension affected only by motion

24
Precisely to the point where Spinoza abandoned the Neo-Platonism contained in the earlier versions
of his philosophyespecially in the Short Treatiseand expressed it in the Geometrical order,
from 1662 on. Perhaps the Neo-Platonic model still survived throughout the Ethics, but now under
the form of a radical immanent ontology, following which all the modifications of God are not to be
understood through the concept of emanation anymore, but rather through the idea of monism. On
the subject of the Platonism in the Ethics, see Michael Ayers, Spinoza, Platonism and Natural-
ism. In: Rationalism, Platonism, and God. Ed. Michael Ayers (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008), 5378.
25
Cf. E2P13S: [. . .] ideas inter se, ut ipsa objecta, differre, unamque ali prstantiorem esse,
plusque realitatis continere, prout objectum unius objecto alterius prstantius est, plusque
realitatis continent.
26
Melamed (2013), 15. One should add an important caveat to Melameds interpretation at this point:
This infinite chain of causes is not to be interpreted as if there were, in Spinozas metaphysics,
modifications of modifications: All modes are, in the same sense, modes of God (Deus quatenus).

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and rest (i.e., by the production of simple bodies, which are distinct of each other
only by the quantity of motion and rest, quickness and slowness27) and (b)
extension affected not only by motion and rest, but also by individual (formal)
essences of complex bodies (i.e., of bodies composed of many individuals of
different natures, whose formal essences are given by a certain ratio of motion and
rest). Therefore, the formal essences of individual complex bodies (i.e., of singular
bodies other than the simplest bodies) are comprehended in Gods attribute of
extension as mediate infinite modes thereof.28 (2) In the attribute of thought, the
distinction between (a) the immediate infinite mode and (b) the mediate infinite
mode should be understood as the distinction between (a) a pure thought affected
by the representation of the formal essence of extension modified by motion and
rest (i.e., the infinite intellect of God as far as it includes not only the represen-
tation of extension modified by motion and rest, but also the representation of the
cause of its objecti.e., the essence of God itself conceived under the attribute of
extensionand the representation of the cause of its own being [since it neces-
sarily produces an idea of itself, and this idea produces another idea of itself, and
so on ad infinitum]that is to say, the essence of God conceived under the
attribute of thought29) and (b) a thought affected by individual (formal) essences
of the ideas of complex bodies (i.e., the infinite intellect of God as far as it includes
not only the representation of complex bodies, but also the representation of the
cause of its objectthat is to say, the essence of God conceived under the attribute
of extensionand the representation of the cause of its own being [since it
necessarily produces an idea of itself, and this idea produces another idea of itself,
and so on ad infinitum]that is to say, the essence of God conceived under the
attribute of thought). The relation between (2a) and (2b) is to be understood as a
partwhole relationship: All the formal essences of the ideas of complex individu-
als are comprehended in and causally derived from the more primitive idea of the
formal essence of extension modified by motion and rest (i.e., from the immediate
infinite mode of thought, the intellect of God itself). There is no mystery at all in
the compatibilization of this relation of derivation with the thesis following which
the idea of God is unique (E2P4), since the uniqueness of the intellect of God does
not preclude the fact that it is composed by an infinity of ideas modally distinct of
each other. Formal essences of individual complex ideas are comprehended in
Gods attribute of thought as mediate infinite modes thereof. For sure, these

27
Scholium of Lemma 7 after E2P13.
28
See E2P8. At this point, I follow Schmaltzs interpretation (against Gueroults), following which the
infinite mediate mode is the locus of individual essences of complex individuals (Schmaltz
(1997), 21819).
29
And, of course, of all the other infinite number of attributes that exist.

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essences are themselves the objects of the intellect of God, but they are its objects
only insofar as they are produced by it through the idea of extension modified by
motion and rest.30
The qualitative identification of the mediate infinite mode of thought with the
formal essences of the ideas of complex individual things is informative enough to
avoid simply assimilating it to essences in general, which would render it trivially
false, since everything (including the absolute substance) has a formal essence,
and certainly the essence of God is not contained in or derived from a
modification of God. In other words, this identification is informative because it
excludes from the domains of the mediate infinite modes not only the essence of
God and the essence of its immediate infinite modes (motion and rest and the idea
of God), but also the actual (temporal) essences of all finite things in Nature. If we
accept Schmaltzs interpretation, we can infer that both the essence and the
existence of the infinite Individual that contains in itself all other complex indi-
viduals are to be understood as constituting the mediate infinite modes of God, and
that both of them are inseparable from each other (not by themselves, but because
of their cause).31 Since both the formal and the actual essence of the infinite
Individual are mediate modes of God, we can conclude that, for the special case
of the infinite Individual, there is no distinction between formal and actual
essences (as Spinoza says to Schuler, the facies totius universi varies in infinite
modes, yet remains always the same). Therefore, the qualitative aspect of
mediate infinite mode in the attribute of extension is identified with the infinite
Individual constituting the whole material Nature. Since this infinite Individual
contains in itself not only the totality of temporal finite complex individuals, but
also their respective infinite formal essences, we can conclude that each formal
essence of a complex singular body is contained in and derived from the formal
essence of the infinite Individual, following different degrees of perfectionthat
is, each of them is also a mediate infinite mode of extension. In the attribute of

30
In E1P17 and E1P29, Spinoza criticizes the traditional theological doctrine following which the
intellect of God is the archetype from which all things are created. Against this thesis, he tries to
prove that the intellect of God is part of the Natura Naturata. Therefore, when we said above that
the formal essences of the ideas of individuals are produced by God, this statement must be
understood as expressing a relation between two things (more specifically, between two modes)
existing in Natura Naturata.
31
Following Schmaltz, the immediate infinite mode of extension has as its parts only the simple bodies
mentioned in the Lemmas that follow E2P13, whose identity derives simply from their being
affected by motion and rest, while the parts that compose the mediate infinite mode of extension are
finite individuals, whose identity depends on a certain ratio of motion and rest: Both motion-and-
rest and the infinite corporeal individual are infinite modes that have a sempiternal existence in
virtue of the fact that they have an eternal form or essence that involves Gods infinite power
(Schmaltz (1997), 213, 233).

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thought, the mediate infinite mode must beby the parallelism thesisthe idea of
this infinite bodily Individual, an idea that has itself a formal essence inseparable
(not by itself, but by its cause) from its actual essence. From this single idea
(E2P4) are derived the ideas of the infinite formal essences of each complex
individual body contained in it.
Is there any textual evidence to support this interpretation? The evidence is
scarce, but there are some indirect hints of them in the Ethics. The first can be
found in the appendix of Part I, the only place in the book where the three
Propositions (E1P2123) that introduce the concept of infinite mode are referred
together. They are mentioned in the context of the critique against the doctrine of
a final cause; among the three ways of reverting [evertere] Nature implied by
this doctrine (1it takes what is really a cause as an effect, and vice versa; 2it
makes that which is by nature first to be last; and finally 3it renders that which
is highest and most perfect [supremum and perfectissimo] to be most imperfect),
E1P2123 are used to criticize only the third, since the critiques against 1 and 2
are, says Spinoza, self-evident [per se manifesta sunt]. Here is how he presents his
critique:

It is plain from Propositions xxi, xxii, xxiii that the effect is most perfect which is produced
immediately by God, and the more intermediate causes a thing requires for its production, more
imperfect it is. Now if those things which were made immediately by God were made to enable God
to attain his end, then the things which come after, for the sake of which the first were made, are
necessarily the most excellent [prstantissim] of all.

In the context of our discussion, what is important to retain in this reductio

formulated by Spinoza is the discrimination of an indefinite number of degrees of
perfection, which seems to be intended to apply only to infinite modes. If there is
a distinction of the degrees of perfection among different individual existent
beings, this is due to their respective essences, since the duration of each one in
time does not add perfection to it.32 While it is true that God produces both
existences and essences of things (E1P25), Spinoza seems to be referring, in the
appendix of Part I, only to the last ones, that is, to formal essences.
Another text that could be used to ground my interpretation appears in the last
words Spinoza writes about our blessedness in the Ethics33 (i.e., E5P40S).
E1P21 is the last Proposition to which he refers the reader:

32
In the Preface to E4, where what is at stake are the degrees of perfection of each thing (horses, men,
insects), Spinoza explicitly attributes them only to essences: per perfectionem in genere realitatem,
uti dixi, intelligam, hoc est, rei cujuscunque essentiam, quatenus certo modo existit, & operator,
null ipsius durationis habit ratione.
33
E5P4142 do not concern to the part of the mind that is eternal and are not, therefore, the object
of the third kind of knowledge. The Ethics, in a sense, ends at E5P40S.

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 ULYSSES PINHEIRO

Such are the things which I had purposed to set forth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded
without relation to the body; whence, as also from Prop. xxi, p. I and others, it is plain that our mind,
in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking [ternus cogitandi modus], which is
determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to infinity; so
that all taken together at once constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God.

It is not sure that, by the expression from Prop. xxi, p. I and others, Spinoza
intends to refer only to E2P2223, but it certainly does not exclude them. Now, in
this context, an eternal mode of thinking can only be the formal essence of the
mind. If it is said to be eternal, it is in the same sense that, in E1P21, the infinite
modes are characterized as eternal and infinitethat is, they are eternal by their
cause (be these causes God itself or other infinite, less mediated modes). There-
fore, when Spinoza states, in E5P40S, that all ideas are contained in the infinite
intellect of God, we can understand this statement as saying that the formal
essences of the ideas of complex individual things (bodies and ideas)34 are parts of
the infinite immediate mode of thought in the sense that they are mediate infinite
modes of thought existing in the infinite intellect of God. In other words, the
intellect of God is the single infinite idea of everything (E2P4), from which the
formal essences of ideas derive.

3. CONCLUSION

If the interpretation above is indeed the best explanation of Spinozas theory on

mediate infinite modes, why did he not formulate it when Schuller asked him to?
The reason can only assume a speculative character: Maybe he did not explicitly
mention the formal essences of complex individuals in his letter35 because the
parallelism thesis is sufficient to deduce itand maybe for the additional and
more prosaic reason that he could not enumerate all the mediate infinite modes
because, being in an infinite number, they are innumerable. The task of looking for
the mediate infinite mode of thought would then be vain not because it would be
impossible to point to a candidate to occupy its place, but instead because there are
infinite candidates waiting to be named.

Federal University of Rio de Janeiro/CNPq

34
And also, of course, the formal essences of the ideas of the simplest bodies.
35
But he indirectly points to them, by a means of a privileged example: the facies totius universi.

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