Cayetano vs.

Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman
of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides
in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating
an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC
chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the
foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

Ulep vs. Legal Clinic A.C. No. L-533

Topics:

A lawyer, making known his legal services shall only use true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts.Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility

A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications for legal services.Rule 3.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility

Facts of the Case:

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales, was to move
toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms.

Atty. Ulep files a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of its advertisements which states undignified
phrases like-- Secret Marriage? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Information on DIVORCE, ANNULMENT, ABSENCE,
VISA. The Legal Clinic, Inc. Please call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041 8:30am to 6:00pm 7 th Floor Victoria Bldg. UN
Avenue, Manila.

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal Problems in The Philippine Star
because it is composed of specialists that can take care of a clients situation no matter how complicated it is,
especially on marriage problems like the Sharon and Gabby situation.

Citing John Bates vs. The State Bar of Arizona, Atty. Nogales said that it should be allowed based on this American
Jurisprudence. According to him, there is nothing wrong with making known the legal services his Legal Clinic has
to offer.

Issue:

Whether or not such advertisement may be allowed.

Court Ruling:

The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals, which is undoubtedly beyond the domain of the paralegals. As
stated in a previous jurisprudence, practice of law is only reserved for the members of the Philippine bar, and not
to paralegals. As with the Legal Clinics advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer in making known his legal services must use only honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts.

A lawyer cannot advertise his talents in a manner that a merchant advertise his goods. The Legal Clinic promotes
divorce, secret marriages, bigamous marriages which are undoubtedly contrary to law.

The only allowed form of advertisements would be: (1.) Citing your involvement in a reputable law list, (2.) An
ordinary professional card (3.) Phone directory listing without designation to a lawyers specialization.

Lichauco et al Vs. Alejandrino

JOHNSON, J.:

On the 16th of July, 1908, the plaintiffs commenced an action against the defendants, in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, for the purpose of recovering the sum of P1,657.75, with interest at 12 per cent from the
said 16th of July, 1908.

To this complaint the defendants demurred, which demurrer was, on the 23d of November, 1908, sustained
by the Hon. Julio Llorente, judge. On the same day (the 23d of November, 1908) the plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint against the defendants. The complaint was accompanied by Exhibits A, B, C, and D,

Later the defendants presented a demurrer which was overruled. On the 2d of July, 1909, the defendants
presented a general and special answer, in which they prayed to be relieved from all liability under the
complaint, with costs against the plaintiffs.

After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause; die Hon. Julio Llorente, judge, on the 10th of
February, 1910, rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants for the sum of
P610.22 Philippine currency, with interest at 6 per cent from the 16th of July, 1908, with the provision that if
the defendants failed to pay the said amount, the plaintiffs were entitled to sell at public auction one-sixth
part of the land mortgaged under and by virtue of a contract between Mariano Alejandrino and Cornelia
Laochangco, dated the 30th of July, 1886. (See Exhibit A.) Mariano Alejandrino was the father of the
defendant,. Ana Alejandrino, and Cornelia Laochangco was the mother of the plaintiffs. Mariano Alejandrino
and Cornelia Laochangco are both dead.

From the judgment of the lower court the plaintiffs appealed.

From an examination of the record, the following facts seem to be true:

First. That on the 30th of July, 1886, the said Mariano Alejandrino borrowed from the said Cornelia Laochangco
the sum of P6,000 Mex., under certain conditions mentioned in the said contract. (See Exhibit A.)

Second. That on the 15th of August, 1895, the said Mariano Alejandrino and Cornelia Laochangco liquidated the
amount due under the said contract, Exhibit A, and it was found on that date that there was still due under the
said contract the sum of P4,115.75. On the same day (August 15,1895) the said Mariano Alejandrino borrowed
from Cornelia Laochangco the additional sum of P234.25, making a total amount due of 4,350 pesos
Mex. (Exhibits B.)

Third. That later, the exact date not appearing of record, the said Mariano Alejandrino died, leaving six children,
the defendant herein, Ana Alejandrino, being one of them.

Fourth. That on the 15th of December, 1906, all of the children of the said Mariano Alejandrino, except the
defendant herein, Ana Alejandrino, entered into a contract, by the terms of which they obligated
themselves to pay to the plaintiffs the balance due from their father, Mariano Alejandrino. (See Exhibit D.)

Fifth. That on the 23d of April, 1898, the amount due on the said contract of July 30,1886, was again liquidated
and it was found that there was remaining due and unpaid on the said contract, the sum of P4,465. (See
Exhibit C.)

Under the provisions of Exhibit B (the contract which was entered into by all of the heirs of Mariano Alejandrino,
except the defendant herein, Ana Alejandrino), they obligated themselves to pay their
proportional amount of the indebtedness of their father, together with 12 per cent interest, the plaintiffs
claim that the amount due on the contract of July 30, 1886, at the time of the commencement of the present
action (the 15th of July, 1908), together with the interest amounted to the sum of P9,946.50, and that the
defendant herein, Ana Alejandrino, was liable for one-sixth part of said sum, or the sum of P1,657.75.

The defendant, Ana Alejandrino, was not a party to the contract represented by Exhibit D. She did not agree
to pay 12 per cent interest on the amount remaining due on the 23rd of April, 1898, of the debt between her
father and the plaintiffs herein. There is no proof in the record that any demand was ever made upon her for
the payment of her aliquot part of the balance found to be due on the 23rd of April, 1898, either judicially or
extra judicially. She was, therefore, not liable to pay interest on her aliquot part of the said amount. The lower
court correctly held, however, that she was liable for the payment of one-sixth part of said amount by
virtue of her having accepted her proportional part of the property involved and covered by the original
contract between her father and the mother of the plaintiffs, bearing date of July 30, 1886, or for the sum of
744.16 pesos Mex., which, reduced to conant, amounted to P610.22, the amount for which the lower
court rendered judgment, with 6 per cent from the 16th of July, 1908. While we have not discussed the
assignments of error in detail, we believe that we have answered each of them in effect. We have
discussed the questions upon their merits as they are presented in the record. There is a question of
parties, however, which has not been presented, which we can not overlook.

It will be noted that Faustino Lichauco has brought this action for himself and in representation of his
co-heirs. So far as the record shows, the co-heirs have no knowledge of the pendency of the
action. Faustino Lichauco shows no authority for representing his co-heirs, except the mere
allegation in the title of his complaint. He speaks 'of himself as the plaintiff. The attorney signs himself as
attorney for the plaintiff not for the plaintiffs. Faustino Lichauco represents himself and his co-heirs, and
the attorney-at-law, who signs the complaint, represents as he alleges "the plaintiff." There is nothing in
the record which shows that the co-heirs are not capable of representing themselves. There is nothing in
the record which shows that they ever gave their consent to the commencement of the present action. It
may be assumed that they did, but this is not sufficient. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides that
in Courts of First Instance a party may conduct his litigation personally or by the aid of a lawyer, and his
appearance must be either personal or by the aid of a duly authorized member of the bar. (Sec. 34, Act
No. 190.) In the present case the co-heirs are neither in court personally nor by a duly authorized member of
the bar. Therefore they are not in court at all, and any judgment which we might render in the present case,
with reference to the heirs, either pro or con, would in no way be binding upon
them. (Espiritu vs. Crossfield and Vicente Guasch, No. 5313).[1]

The present case seems to have been tried in the lower court upon the theory that all of the interested
parties were present, and for that reason we have discussed the case upon its merits, believing that the
parties would deem further litigation unnecessary, once being informed of the views of this court upon the
facts presented. This assumption, however, is based upon the ground that even though the co-heirs had been
represented in the trial of the cause, in accordance with law, no other or different evidence would have
been adduced.

Therefore, following the decision of this court in the case of Lichauco vs. Limjuco (19 Phil. Rep., 12), the
judgment of the lower court is hereby set aside, unless the coheirs of Faustino Lichauco, .within a period of ten
days from notification of this decision, shall appear personally or by attorney in the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Pampanga, either as plaintiffs or defendants, and in writing indicate their
full conformance with the proceedings had in the present cause. In which case, the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Pampanga is hereby directed to enter a judgment confirming the judgment
heretofore rendered by said couit on the 10th day of February, 1910.

Tan vs. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473 (1992)

DOCTRINES:

The practice of law is not a matter of right.

No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.
FACTS:

Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was denied to take his oath in view of the finding of
the Court that he was guilty of unauthorized practice of law. Since then, he had filed numerous petitions for him
to be allowed to take his lawyer's oath.

Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province where Sabandal is domiciled to
submit a comment on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. In compliance therewith, the
executive judge stated in his comment that he is not aware of any acts committed by the respondent as would
disqualify him to from admission to the Bar. However, he added that respondent has a pending civil case before
his court for cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which respondent, then working as Land Investigator of the
Bureau of Lands, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which,
upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and
which he later mortgaged to the bank. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land subsequently sold at
public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land since then.

The case was however been settled through amicable settlement. The said amicable settlement canceled the OCT
under Free Patent in the name of Sabandal and his mortgage in the bank; provided for the surrender of the
certificate of title to the RD for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the
aforesaid certificate of title with respondent refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over the
said land. Respondent also paid the bank a certain sum for the loan and interest.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law considering that he already submitted three (3)
testimonials regarding his good moral character, and his pending civil case has been terminated.

HELD:

His petition must be denied.

Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.

It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment
facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over the property which he could not but have known was a
public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation
of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which cannot be erased by the termination of the case and where
no determination of guilt or innocence was made because the suit has been compromised. This is a sad reflection
of his sense of honor and fair dealings.

Moreover, his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during
the period that he was submitting several petitions and motions for reconsiderations reveal his lack of candor
and truthfulness.
Although, the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least
common dishonesty." It has also been held that no moral qualification for membership is more important than
truthfulness or candor.

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 100643 October 30, 1992

FACTS:

In a resolution of the Supreme Court, Atty Dacanay was required to show cause why he should not be disc
iplinary dealt with by intercalating a material fact in the quoted judgment of the Court of Appeals, insertin
g without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty when in fact it did not make such
finding.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Dacanay, by inserting phrase which is in fact not true, should be disbarred.

RULING:

YES. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that the inserted phase without notice to the actual occu
pants of the property, Adez Realty, was just the right phrase intercalated at the right place, making it hig
hly improbable to be unintentionally, making it appear that respondent Court of Appeals found that no not
ice was given to the occupants of subject property when in fact it did not make such a finding
is a clear indication not merely of carelessness in lifting a portion of the assailed decision but a maliciou
s attempt to gain undue advantage in the sporting arena of fairplay and, more importantly, to deceive and
misguide this Court, which is the final arbiter of litigations.

He then violated Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility which directs
that [a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provisio
n already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been prove
d

Assuming it was the carelessness of his secretary,it is the duty of lawyers to check, review and recheck the
allegation in their pleadings, more particularly the quoted portions, and ensure that the statements therei
n are accurate and the reproductions faithful, down to the last word and even punctuation mark. The legal
profession demands that lawyers thoroughly go over pleadings, motions and other documents dictated or
prepared by them, type or transcribed by their secretaries or clerks, before filing them with the court. If a
client is bound by the acts of his counsel, with more reason should counsel be bound the acts of his secre
tary who merely follow his orders.

BURBE Vs. MaGULTA

Facts: Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money against a creditor.
Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not successful and so the former intimated
that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts for
the filing of the case.

A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the status of his case.
Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyers office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the case has
already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case.
Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutors office while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of
Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was
absent that day.

Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of court to see for
himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed.

Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused
by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the
complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease petitioners
feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the
amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively.

Issue: Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP as follows: It is
evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the
Regwill complaint. With complainants deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding
obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame
contemplated by his client. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees
deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a
member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money
deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said
funds.

IN RE CUNANAN

94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, An
Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-195170%
1952 .71%

1953..72%

1954..73%

1955..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed
to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general
average in subsequent bar examinations.

ISSUE:

Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As
per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to
take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was
declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate
preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;

The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of
law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules
laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of
the court on who can practice law; and

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void.
Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court
resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to
Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
EN BANC A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011 RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING
INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE
ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"

With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in
the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law that:

(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in
breach of the high standards of moral conduct and judicial and professional competence expected of the
Supreme Court;

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire Supreme Court and
undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the
establishment of legal precedents through dubious means;

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of
the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein;

(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity
of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign
his position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;

(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which it conducts research, prepares
drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and
concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in
pleadings, practice, and adjudication.

Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.

WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be
satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan,
Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway,
Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera,
Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J.
Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo,
Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo,
Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina
D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty,
under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to
refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to
denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.

(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 is found
UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer
of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court
and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these proceedings. However, he is
reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of
responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.
(5) Finally, respondents requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied
for lack of merit.

People Vs. Villanueva

Facts: The complainant in the case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City after securing
permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition for his appearance as such was that every time he would
appear at trial of the case he would be considered on leave of absence and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. Such appearance was questioned by herein respondents counsel.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Fule should be allowed to appear on behalf of the complainant

Held: The court ruled in the affirmative. The court held that in appearing as private prosecutor in the case, the
isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and
contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to
the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion
is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. Essentially, the word private
practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the
legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. Furthermore Atty. Fule was given the permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice.