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Lecture Materials

LATEST JURISPRUDENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW

Prof. Victoria C. Garcia

CRIMINAL INTENT (INTENT TO KILL)

* De Guzman, Jr. vs. People G.R. No. 178512 November 26, 2014

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill
the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a
specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then prove by either direct or
circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed
from the commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the
courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the
time of the assault and immediately thereafter.

In Rivera v. People, we considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent to
kill, namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of
wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. We have also considered as determinative factors
the motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the
victim.
Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present. We concur
with them. Contrary to the petitioners submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were
not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them.
The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records
indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left
chest and the other on the left side of his face. The petitioners attack was unprovoked with the
knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly proving the
presence of intent to kill. There is also to be no doubt about the wound on Alexanders chest
being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical intervention. With the
State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all the acts of execution that
should produce the felony of homicide as a consequence, but did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was
properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.

ARTICLE 5

* Corpuz vs. People G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014

As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this estafa case, the
question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving
property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money
and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the
division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first impression, they
decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several
amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the
matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M.
Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with
Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.

After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the
following: There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that
the courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the
amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this
Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial
legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in
the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be
encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This, however, does not
render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the
framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5,
which reads:

ART. 5 . Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of
any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render
the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal
legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the
execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would
result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the offense.

The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case
which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render
the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise
here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the
court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law
through legislation.

The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already
punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The
remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but
to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be
non-commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief
Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the
current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 . However, it would be
dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the
penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition
of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change,
thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law.

An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that
the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection
Clause. The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined
according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that
of reasonableness, which has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial
distinctions as P10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which
violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa involving
higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a
person who steals P142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone who steals
hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3,
considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated,
conditions that no longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental
penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is
the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime
exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more questions than answers, which
leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to
Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws. Even Dean Diokno was of
the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress.

In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes
which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended. Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to
apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and
that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise
legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or
rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. The Court should
apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the
law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from
encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this
would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of
judicial legislation.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice. Also, let a copy
of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.

ATTEMPTED RAPE vs. ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS

* Cruz vs. People GR#166441 October 8, 2014


The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted
rape and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of
acts of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish the intent to
lie with the female.

However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape
without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the female's vagina.

The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge is
defined simply as the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman, which
explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape. In other
words, rape is consummated once the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touches
the external genitalia of the female. In People v. Campuhan, the Court has defined the extent of
touching by the penis in rape in the following terms:

[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking
or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims
vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that
the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the
external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. xxx Thus, a
grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not
sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of
the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.

The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with
his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively
ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was
his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd
designs towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or
susceptible of double interpretation, as Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, supra, such
that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the
particular injury. Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rape had he been allowed by her to
continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if
he should employ deceit to have her yield to him) could also be ultimate felony.

If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts of
lasciviousness? It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts
of lasciviousness is the offenders intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the
female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted
rape is committed, therefore, when the touching of the vagina by the penis is coupled with
the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the
penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female.
Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.

His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie
with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her
when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his
acts reflected lewdness and lust for her. Pursuant to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the
petitioner, was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape.

CONSPIRACY

* People vs. Morilla G.R. No. 189833 February 5, 2014

The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct. A conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a felony.

Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended is
not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal
transportation of dangerous drugs. This argument is misplaced. In conspiracy, it need not be
shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and
pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime,
usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they
are parts of some complete whole. In this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to
a conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the
dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on convoy
from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the
police operatives. When it was Morillas turn to pass through the checkpoint, he was requested
to open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing white granules scattered on the floor, the
police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy
with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he was with the mayor. His
insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he just obeyed
the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle likewise bears
no merit. Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of
transporting the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles.

* People vs. Dadao, et.al. G.R. No. 201860 January 22, 2014

With regard to appellants assertion that the negative result of the paraffin tests that were
conducted on their persons should be considered as sufficient ground for acquittal, we can only
declare that such a statement is misguided considering that it has been established in
jurisprudence that a paraffin test is not conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. It
should also be noted that, according to the prosecution, only Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi held
firearms which were used in the fatal shooting of Pionio Yacapin while Marcelino Dadao and
Antonio Sulindao purportedly held bolos. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the latter
two tested negative for powder burns because they were never accused of having fired any gun.
Nevertheless, the evidence on record has established that all four accused shared a community
of criminal design. By their concerted action, it is evident that they conspired with one another
to murder Pionio Yacapin and should each suffer the same criminal liability attached to the
aforementioned criminal act regardless of who fired the weapon which delivered the fatal
wounds that ended the life of the victim.

In People v. Nelmida, we elaborated on the principle of criminal conspiracy and its ramifications
in this manner:
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters
agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once
established, each and every one of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime
actually committed by any one of them. In the absence of any direct proof, the agreement to
commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense
or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community
of interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors
incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of all.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the lower court appreciated treachery, which
was alleged in the information, as an aggravating circumstance which qualified the offense to
murder. This is proper considering that, even if abuse of superior strength was properly alleged
and proven in court, it cannot serve to qualify or aggravate the felony at issue since it is
jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with
treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.

Time and again, we have declared that treachery is present when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Furthermore, we have also held that the
essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or escape. In the case at bar, the manner by which Pionio Yacapin was killed carried all
the indubitable hallmarks of treachery.

SELF-DEFENSE

* Dela Cruz vs. People G.R. No. 189405 November 19, 2014
There is no question that petitioner authored the death of the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. What is
left for determination by this Court is whether the elements of self-defense exist to exculpate
petitioner from the criminal liability for Homicide.

The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. In
other words, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the
life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by
employing reasonable means to resist the attack. Considering that self-defense totally
exonerates the accused from any criminal liability, it is well settled that when he invokes the
same, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he
indeed acted in defense of himself. Measured against this criteria, we find that petitioner's
defense is sorely wanting. Hence, his petition must be denied.

First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful aggression
was employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him. Unlawful aggression is the most
essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent
danger not merely threatening and intimidating action. There is aggression, only when the
one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life. The peril sought to be avoided must be
imminent and actual, not merely speculative. In the case at bar, other than petitioners
testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly
responded to petitioners questions or initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident;
that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed an assault
which may have caused petitioner to fear for his life. Even assuming arguendo that the gun
originated from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired, and therefore, danger may have in fact
existed, theimminence of that danger had already ceased the moment petitionerdisarmed
Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter. After petitioner had successfully seized it, there was
no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill
Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC, petitioner had every opportunity to run away from the
scene and seek help but refused to do so, thus:

In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. Accused admitted that
he wrested the gun from the victim. From that point in time until the victim shouted guard,
guard, then took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful aggression coming from the
victim. Accused had the opportunity to run away. Therefore, even assuming that the aggression
with use of the gun initially came from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased when the gun
was wrested away by the accused from the victim. It is settled that when unlawful aggression
ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise,
retaliation and not self-defense is committed (Peo Vs. Tagana, 424 SCRA 620). A person making
a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased
(People vs. Pateo, 430 SCRA 609).

In addition, there was no proof evincing that Jeffrey aimed and intended to smash the big fire
extinguisher on petitioners head. The prosecution witnesses maintained an impression that
Jeffrey used the same to shield himself from petitioner who was then in possession of the gun,
a deadly weapon.

Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the deceased victim,
Jeffrey, the means employed by petitioner was not reasonably commensurate to the nature
and extent of the alleged attack, which he sought to avert. As held by the Court in People v.
Obordo:

Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, accused-
appellant likewise failed to prove that the means he employed to repel Homer's punch was
reasonable. The means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational
equivalence between the means of attack and the defense. Accused appellant claimed that
the victim punched him and was trying to get something from his waist, so he (accused-
appellant) stabbed the victim with his hunting knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer and
inflicting a wound on a vital part of the victim's body was unreasonable and unnecessary
considering that, as alleged by accused-appellant himself, the victim used his bare fist in
throwing a punch at him. Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense
must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.

The opposite was, however, employed by petitioner, as correctly pointed out by the RTC, thus:
The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The gun and
the discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the alleged aggression
with the use of fire extinguisher. The rule is that the means employed by the person invoking
self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense
(Peo vs. Obordo, 382 SCRA 98). It was the accused who was in a vantage position as he was
armed with a gun, as against the victim who was armed, so to speak, with a fire extinguisher,
which is not a deadly weapon. Under the circumstances, accuseds alleged fear was unfounded.
If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he should have just run,
despite any obstruction, considering that he was already in possession of the gun. He could
have also immediately sought help from the people around him, specifically the guard stationed
at the floor where the shooting incident happened.

We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of tussling and hassling with
Jeffrey, and in the end, shooting the latter on the forehead, not only once, but four times, the
last shot finally killing him, if he had no intention to hurt Jeffrey. Thus: with regard to the
appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

* Guevarra vs. People G.R. No. 170462 February 5, 2014

By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts for
which they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated
them. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to show that the
killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were attended by the following
circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the persons resorting to self-defense. Of all the burdens the petitioners carried,
the most important of all is the element of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an
actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. The
element of unlawful aggression must be proven first in order for self-defense to be successfully
pleaded. There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had
committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.
As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and David were just passing by
the petitioners' compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was suddenly
attacked by Joey while Erwin was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took place outside,
not inside, the petitioners' compound, as evidenced by the way the petitioners' gate was
destroyed. The manner by which the wooden gate post was broken coincided with Erwin's
testimony that his brother David, who was then clinging onto the gate, was dragged into the
petitioners' compound. These circumstances, coupled with the nature and number of wounds
sustained by the victims, clearly show that the petitioners did not act in self-defense in killing
David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in fact, the real aggressors.

* People vs. Sevillano G.R. No. 200800 February 9, 2015

By invoking self-defense, appellant in effect, admits to having inflicted the stab wounds which
killed the victim. The burden was, therefore, shifted on him to prove that the killing was done in
self-defense. In Razon v. People, this Court held that where an accused admits the killing, he
assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise,
conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim.

Under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the following elements must be present in order that
a plea of self-defense may be validly considered in absolving a person from criminal liability:

First. Unlawful Aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Appellants version that it was the victim who was armed with a knife and threatened to stab
him was found by the lower court to be untenable. We agree with the lower courts conclusion.
Assuming arguendo that there was indeed unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the
imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment appellant was able to wrestle the
knife from him. Thus, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would
justify the need for him to kill the victim or the former aggressor. This Court has ruled that if an
accused still persists in attacking his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. The fact that the victim suffered many stab wounds in the body
that caused his demise, and the nature and location of the wound also belies and negates the
claim of self-defense. It demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.

TREACHERY

* People vs. Feliciano, Jr., et.al. G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014

As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, the offense committed against
Dennis Venturina was committed by a group that took advantage of its superior strength and
with the aid of armed men. The appellate court, however, incorrectly ruled out the presence of
treachery in the commission of the offense.

It has been stated previously by this court that: [T]reachery is present when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that
the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner,
affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For
treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of
execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate;
and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.

The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused -appellants, ruled that contrary
to the findings of the trial court, there was no treachery involved. In particular, they ruled that
although the attack was sudden and unexpected, [i]t was done in broad daylight with a lot of
people who could see them and that there was a possibility for the victims to have fought
back or that the people in the canteen could have helped the victims. This reasoning is clearly
erroneous.

The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at a place where they
would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men. The
victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only way
they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unarmed and
outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack
also happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders
being able to help them until after the incident. The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack
gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery,
therefore, was present in this case.

xxx xxx xxx

It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was conspiracy among the
accused-appellants and the appellate court sustained this finding. Conspiracy, once proven, has
the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of their degree of participation,
thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the
commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by
reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual
degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime.

The liabilities of the accused-appellants in this case arose from a single incident wherein the
accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the
highest amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and take cover,
but the others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill was already
present at the moment of attack and that intent was shared by all of the accused-appellants
alike when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish
between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective
liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result
of that intent to kill and whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances
that can be appreciated.

* People vs. Daniel Matibag G.R. No. 206381 March 15, 2015

The Court upholds Matibags conviction for the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, as
charged. Matibag is charged with the crime of Murder, which is defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the RPC, as amended. In order to warrant a conviction, the prosecution must
establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed
him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing is not Parricide or Infanticide.

Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. In People v. Tan, the Court explained that the essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of
the person attacked. In People v. Perez, it was explained that a frontal attack does not
necessarily rule out treachery. The qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if the attack
was so sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his or her
defense.

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Matibag, who was armed with a gun,
confronted Duhan, and without any provocation, punched and shot him on the chest. Although
the attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which it was made rendered it
impossible for Duhan to defend himself, adding too that he was unarmed. Matibag also failed
to prove that a heated exchange of words preceded the incident so as to forewarn Duhan
against any impending attack from his assailant. The deliberateness of Matibags act is further
evinced from his disposition preceding the moment of execution. As the RTC aptly pointed out,
Matibag was ready and destined to effect such dastardly act, considering that he had an axe to
grind when he confronted Duhan, coupled with the fact that he did so, armed with a loaded
handgun. Based on these findings, the Court concludes that treachery was correctly
appreciated.

* People vs. Joel Aquino G.R. No. 201092 January 15, 2014

According to jurisprudence, to be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a


person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; the killing was with the attendance of any of the
qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither
constitutes parricide nor infanticide.

Contrary to appellants assertion, the qualifying circumstance of treachery did attend the killing
of Jesus. We have consistently held that treachery is present when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. On this point, we quote with approval the Court
of Appeals discussion of this aspect of the case, to wit:

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an
unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even when the victim
was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is
decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself
or to retaliate. Records disclose that Jesus was stabbed by the group on the lateral part of his
body while he was under the impression that they were simply leaving the place where they
had [a] shabu session. Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle driver is seated on the
motorcycle, his head is usually higher or at the level of the roof of the side car which leaves his
torso exposed to the passengers who are seated in the side car. Hence, there was no way for
Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended stabbing of his body both from the people seated
in the side car and those seated behind him. Thus, the trial courts finding of treachery should
be affirmed.
However, in contrast to the pronouncements of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
we cannot consider abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance in this case. As
per jurisprudence, when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery,
the former is absorbed in the latter. Since there is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
present, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, in accordance with Article 63 paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code, it being the lesser penalty between the two indivisible penalties for the
felony of murder which is reclusion perpetua to death.

TREACHERY & ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

* Fantastico & Villanueva vs. Malicse, Sr. & People G.R. No. 190912 January 12, 2015

In this particular case, there was no treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack
comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be
considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives
the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. From the facts proven by the prosecution,
the incident was spontaneous, thus, the second element of treachery is wanting. The incident,
which happened at the spur of the moment, negates the possibility that the petitioners
consciously adopted means to execute the crime committed. There is no treachery where the
attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the sudden
infuriation on the part of the accused because of the provocative act of the victim.

The RTC, however, was correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, thus: In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish that Salvador Iguiron hit
Elpidio Malicsi, Sr. twice on the head as he was entered (sic) the house of the former. Gary
Fantastico hit the victim on the right side of the head with an axe or tomahawk. The evidence
also show that Rolando Rolly Villanueva hit the victim on the head with a lead pipe. And
outside while the victim was lying down, Gary hit the legs of the victim with the tomahawk.
lvador also hit the victim with the rattan stick on the thighs, legs and knees. And Titus Iguiron
hit the victim's private organ with a piece of wood. The said injuries inflicted on the
complainant after he went back to his sister Isabelita's house. When he kicked the door, the
melee began. And the sequence of the injuries is proven by victim's testimony. But it was a
lopsided attack as the victim was unarmed, while his attackers were all armed (rattan stick,
tomahawk and lead pipe). And the victim was also drunk. This establishes the element of abuse
of superior strength.

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces


between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime." "The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does
not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being
no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim." The evidence must establish
that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to
use this advantage. "To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive
force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked." The
appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the
parties.

DEATH OF THE ACCUSED

* People vs. Consorte G.R. No. 194068 November 26, 2014

For the resolution of the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated 9 July
2014,2 which affirmed the conviction of accused appellant Benjie Consorte y Franco for the
murder of Elizabeth Palmar. in a Letter dated 21 September 2014, the Officer-in- Charge of the
New Bilibid Prison (NBP) informed the Court that accused-appellant died on 14 July 2014, as
evidenced by the attached Death Certificate issued by NBP Medical Officer III Ruth B. Algones,
M.D. Owing to this development, the Court now addresses the effect of death pending accused-
appellants appeal with regard to his criminal and civil liabilities.
Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is illuminating:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

(1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;

xxxx

In People v. Brillantes, the Court, citing People v. Bayotas, clarified that:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore." In the case at bar, accused-appellant died before final judgment, as
in fact, his motion for reconsideration is still pending resolution by the Court. As such, it
therefore becomes necessary for us to declare his criminal liability as well as his civil liability ex
delicto to have been extinguished by his death prior to final judgment.

ARTICLE 100

* Lumantas vs. Calapiz GR#163753 January 15, 2014

It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Nevertheless,
the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability.
In Manantan v. Court of Appeals, the Court elucidates on the two kinds of acquittal recognized
by our law as well as on the different effects of acquittal on the civil liability of the accused, viz:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held
liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he
is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.

The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the
act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an accused does not prevent a
judgment from still being rendered against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case unless
the court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

Although it found the Prosecutions evidence insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction


against the petitioner for the crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining and adjudging
his civil liability for the same act complained of based on mere preponderance of evidence. In
this connection, the Court reminds that the acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did not
require that the complainants recovery of civil liability should be through the institution of a
separate civil action for that purpose.

* Daluraya vs. Oliva G.R. No. 210148 December 8, 2014


The sole issue advanced for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA was correct in
finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Olivas death despite his acquittal in the criminal case
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of the
crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v. CA,
the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law and their concomitant
effects on the civil liability of the accused, as follows:

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held
liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court.

The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In
this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Dayap v.
Sendiong, the Court explained further:

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the
civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction
of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance
of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c)
the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or
omission imputed to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right
to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. In case of an acquittal, the Rules
of Court requires that the judgment state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist.

A punctilious examination of the MeTCs Order, which the RTC sustained, will show that
Dalurayas acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to establish that he was
the author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the
MeTC declared that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in material
details and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused precisely committed the crime
charged against him.

Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC,
that Dalurayas acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily call for a
remand of the case to the court a quo for the reception of Dalurayas evidence on the civil
aspect. Records disclose that Dalurayas acquittal was based on the fact that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist in view of the failure of the
prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him.
Consequently, his civil liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such
acquittal.

VIOLATION OF DOMICILE

* Geroche vs. People G.R. No. 179080 November 26, 2014

The Court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the CA. In their testimony before
the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither Geroche denied that he was a
barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU members. In holding such
positions, they are considered as public officers/employees.

As to the penalty imposed by the CA, however, We modify the same. Under Article 128 of the
RPC, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (two [2]
years, four [4] months and one [1] day to six [6] years) if Violation of Domicile be committed at
nighttime or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned
immediately after the search made by the offender. In this case, petitioners barged in the
house of Baleriano while they were sleeping at night and, in addition, they took away with
them his airgun.

DIRECT ASSAULT with MURDER

* People vs. Estonilo G.R. No. 201565 October 13, 2014

On the offense committed by accused-appellants, the RTC correctly concluded that they should
be held accountable for the complex crime of direct assault with murder. There are two modes
of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under Article 148 of the Revised
Penal Code. Accused-appellants committed the second form of assault, the elements of which
are that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a
person in authority or his agent; the assault was made when the said person was performing his
duties or on the occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a
person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend,
injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority.

In this case, Floro was the duly appointed District Supervisor of Public Schools, Placer, Masbate,
thus, was a person in authority. But contrary to the statement of the RTC that there was direct
assault just because Floro was a person in authority, this Court clarifies that the finding of direct
assault is based on the fact that the attack or assault on Floro was, in reality, made by reason of
the performance of his duty as the District Supervisor. When the assault results in the killing of
that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arises the complex crime of direct
assault with murder or homicide.
ARTICLE 218: FAILURE TO RENDER AN ACCOUNT

* Lumauig vs. People G.R. No. 166680 July 7, 2014

The central aspect of petitioners next argument is that he was not reminded of his
unliquidated cash advances. The Office of the Special Prosecutor countered that Article 218
does not require the COA or the provincial auditor to first make a demand before the public
officer should render an account. It is sufficient that there is a law or regulation requiring him to
render an account.

The elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code are:

(1) That the offender is a public officer whether in the service or separated therefrom;

(2) That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;

(3) That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial
auditor; and,

(4) That he fails to do so for a period of two months after such account should be rendered.

The question has been settled in Manlangit v. Sandiganbayan where we ruled that prior
demand to liquidate is not necessary to hold an accountable officer liable for violation of Article
218 of the Revised Penal Code. Since petitioner received the subject cash advance sometime in
1994, he was, thus, required to liquidate the same on or before January 20, 1995. Further, to
avoid liability under Article 218, he should have liquidated the cash advance within two months
from the time it was due, or on or before March 20, 1995. In the case at bar, petitioner
liquidated the subject cash advance only on June 4, 2001. Hence, as correctly found by the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner was liable for violation of Article 218 because it took him over six
years before settling his accounts.

xxx xxx xxx

In malversation of public funds, the payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of the funds


misappropriated may be considered a mitigating circumstance being analogous to voluntary
surrender. Although this case does not involve malversation of public funds under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code but rather failure to render an account under Article 218 (i.e., the
succeeding Article found in the same Chapter), the same reasoning may be applied to the
return or full restitution of the funds that were previously unliquidated in considering the same
as a mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner.

RAPE OF A MENTAL RETARDATE

* People vs. Cataytay G.R. No. 196315 October 22, 2014

In People v. Caoile, we differentiated the terms deprived of reason and demented, as


follows: The term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of
deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual's former
intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the
phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b) has been interpreted to include those
suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically
diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is deprived of
reason, and not one who is demented.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxxx

10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

Since the accused-appellants knowledge of AAAs mental retardation was alleged in the
Information and admitted by the former during the trial, the above special qualifying
circumstance is applicable, and the penalty of death should have been imposed. With the
passage, however, of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall instead be imposed.

RAPE COMMITTED BY A RELATIVE

* People vs. Joson G.R. No. 206393 January 21, 2015

The prosecutions evidence is based on the sole testimony of the victim. AAA lives with
appellant and his common-law partner. AAA testified that at around 1:00 in the morning of 14
May 2009, and while appellants wife was away, AAA was awakened by appellant undressing
her. AAA tried to struggle but appellant was tightly holding her arms. After undressing her,
appellant kissed and mounted her. Appellant was able to insert his penis into her vagina. AAA
felt pain in her genitalia. Thereafter, appellant went back to sleep leaving AAA crying. At about
6:00 or 7:00 in the morning, appellant left AAA with a letter apologizing for what happened and
begging her not to tell on his wife. The letter reads:

Ne! Sorry Ne. Patawarin mo ko. Dala lang ng kalasingan kaya ko nagawa ang ganung bagay.
Sana po wala ng ibang makaalam nito lalu na si Ate Cindy mo. Ayokong masira na naman ang
pamilya ko at mga buhay natin. Paki tapon muna to pag tapos mong basahin.

SC Ruling:
Upon a careful evaluation of the case, we find her testimony has established all the elements of
rape required under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. First, appellant had carnal
knowledge of the victim. AAA positively identified her own brother as the assailant. She was
likewise unwavering in her narration that appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Second,
appellant employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. At this juncture, we quote
with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals on this point:

The Supreme Court has, time and again, ruled that the force or violence that is required in rape
cases is relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible. That it enables the
offender to consummate his purpose is enough. The parties relative age, size and strength
should be taken into account in evaluating the existence of the element of force in the crime of
rape. The degree of force which may not suffice when the victim is an adult may be more than
enough if employed against a person of tender age.

In the case at bench, the accused-appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to
consummate the rape. It must be stressed that, at the time of the incident, AAA was only 14
years old. Considering the tender years of the offended party as compared to the accused-
appellant who was in the prime of his life, the act of the accused-appellant in pinning the arms
of AAA to avoid any form of resistance from her suffices. Force or intimidation is not limited to
physical force. As long as it is present and brings the desired result, all consideration of whether
it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.

MARITAL RAPE

* People vs. Jumawan G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

More particular to the present case, and perhaps the laws most progressive proviso is the 2nd
paragraph of Section 266-C thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing its
perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. In case it is the legal husband who is
the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty
shall not be abated if the marriage is void abinitio.

Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term man in defining
rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapists
legal relationship with his victim. Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual
violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against
her will commit sexual violence upon her.

As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as
traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the
perpetrators own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the
law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a
marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their husband and those raped
by any other man alike.

RAPE through SEXUAL ASSAULT in relation to RA 7610

* Ricalde vs. People G.R. No. 211002 January 21, 2015

Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as instrument or object rape,
gender-free rape, or homosexual rape. The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is the
insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into another persons genital or anal orifice.

Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal
orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice. This contradicts
petitioners earlier statement in his appellants brief that [a]lthough it is true that the Supreme
Court, in a long line of cases, did not rule out the possibility of rape in cases where the victim
remained physically intact at the time she or he was physically examined, still, it bears stressing
that in the instant case, the private complainant testified that the accused-appellants penis
fully penetrated his anus. The trial court also quoted portions of the transcript of XXXs
testimony in that he felt something was inserted in [his] anus.

In People v. Soria, this court discussed that a victim need not identify what was inserted into his
or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was
committed:

We find it inconsequential that AAA could not specifically identify the particular instrument or
object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed
something was inserted into her vagina. To require AAA to identify the instrument or object
that was inserted into her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process.

xxx xxx xxx

People v. Bonaagua considers a womans private organ since most if not all existing
jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by
analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to the victims anal orifice
consummates the crime of rape through sexual assault. The gravamen of the crime is the
violation of the victims dignity. The degree of penetration is not important. Rape is an assault
on human dignity.

KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM with HOMICIDE

* People vs. Dionaldo G.R. No. 207949 July 23, 2014

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is, however, constrained to modify the ruling of the
RTC and the CA, as the crime the accused-appellants have committed does not, as the records
obviously bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the
special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the victims
(i.e., Edwins) death, which was (a) specifically charged in the Information, and (b) clearly
established during the trial of this case.

Notably, while this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, the same should
nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal case, an appeal,
as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can
correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.

After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article 267
of the same Code now provides:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days;

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made;

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected
to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

The Court further elucidated in People v. Mercado:

In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping
for ransom and murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this
Court modified the ruling and found the accused guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said: x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal
statutes the concept of special complex crime of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It
effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing
of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of
the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the
rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of
whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and
murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate
crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267,
as amended by RA No. 7659.

Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom, accused-appellants conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide,
which carries the penalty of death.

ROBBERY with HOMICIDE


* People vs. Balute G.R. No. 212932 January 21, 2015

In People v. Ibaez, the Court exhaustively explained that [a] special complex crime of robbery
with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion,
of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove
the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent
to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or
by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed.

A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and [the] objective of the
malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede
the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it
was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the
possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery;
or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.

In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTCs finding that the prosecution was able to
establish the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latters mobile phone,
and thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite surgical and medical intervention.

* People vs. Orosco G.R. No. 209227 March 25, 2015

Robbery with homicide is defined under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
which provides in part:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any person
guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.

The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of personal property is
committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to
another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the
occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed.

Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if it is


committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the
possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery;
or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the commission of the crime.

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit
robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or
after the robbery.

Here, the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery as appellant
and John Doe had to kill Yap to accomplish their main objective of stealing her money. The
earlier verbal tussle where the two pretended to have paid a greater amount and asked for the
correct change was just a ploy to get inside the store where the victim kept her earnings. To
verify whether the cash payment was indeed a P500 or P100 bill, the victim let them enter the
store but once inside they got hold of her and stabbed her.

Appellant, however, argues that if he had committed any offense, it was only robbery since
Arca testified that it was John Doe, whom he described as a thin man, who stabbed the victim.

We disagree.
The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly showed that appellant acted in conspiracy
with his co-accused. Appellant and John Doe first engaged the unsuspecting victim in a verbal
altercation until she allowed them to enter the store. Upon getting inside, they held the victim
with John Doe wrapping his arm around her neck while appellant held her hands at the back.
With the victim pressed between the two of them, John Doe stabbed her once in her chest
before releasing her. Once she fell down, appellant quickly took the money placed at the altar
inside the store and fled together with John Doe and the two lookouts outside the store. All the
foregoing indicate the presence of conspiracy between appellant and his co-accused in the
perpetration of robbery and killing of the victim.

It must be stressed that appellant played a crucial role in the killing of the victim to facilitate the
robbery. He was behind the victim holding her hands while John Doe grabbed her at the neck.
His act contributed in rendering the victim without any means of defending herself when John
Doe stabbed her frontally in the chest. Having acted in conspiracy with his co-accused,
appellant is equally liable for the killing of Yap. As we held in People v. Baron: The concerted
manner in which the appellant and his companions perpetrated the crime showed beyond
reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a homicide takes place by reason of or on
the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof
that there was an endeavor to prevent the killing.

There was no evidence adduced in this case that the appellant attempted to prevent the killing.
Thus, regardless of the acts individually performed by the appellant and his co-accused, and
applying the basic principle in conspiracy that the act of one is the act of all, the appellant is
guilty as a co-conspirator. As a result, the criminal liabilities of the appellant and his co-accused
are one and the same. In sum, the CA did not err in affirming the conviction of appellant for
robbery with homicide.

QUALIFIED THEFT

* People vs. Nielles G.R. No. 200308 February 23, 2015


We concur with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the prosecution
satisfactorily established all the elements of qualified theft, to wit: 1) taking of personal
property; 2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the said taking was done with intent
to gain; 4) that it was done without the owners consent; 5) that it was accomplished without
the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things; and 6) that it was
done with grave abuse of confidence.

As correctly found by the appellate court: Private complainant testified that Accused-appellant
took the amount of P640,353.86 from her without her consent by failing to turn over the
amount she collected from the formers sub-guarantors. Instead, she issued fifteen (15)
personal checks and deposited the same to Private Complainants account which however, all
bounced for the reason account closed. The taking of the amount collected by Accused-
appellant was obviously done with intent to gain as she failed to remit the same to Private
Complainant. Intent to gain is presumed from the act of unlawful taking. Further, the unlawful
act was accomplished by Accused-appellant without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, [or] of force upon things as the payment to her of the said amount was voluntarily
handed to her by the sub-guarantors as she was known to be entrusted with the collection of
payments.

The circumstance of grave abuse of confidence that made the same as qualified theft was also
proven. Accused-appellant herself testified that as a cashier, her functions and responsibilities
include billings and collections from their agents and making of deposits and withdrawals in
behalf of Private Complainant. Moreover, when the payment for the purchase orders or gift
checks becomes due, she would fill up the four (4) blank checks given by the sub-guarantor with
the knowledge and consent of Private Complainant. It is beyond doubt that an employee like a
cashier who comes into possession of the monies she collected enjoys the confidence reposed
in her by her employer, as in the instant case.

ESTAFA under ARTICLE 315(2)(a) & SYNDICATED ESTAFA

* People vs. Tibayan G.R. No. 209655 January 14, 2015


The Court sustains the convictions of accused-appellants. Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of
the RPC provides:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar
deceits.

xxxx

The elements of Estafa by means of deceit under this provision are the following: (a) that there
must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or
fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act,
or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a
result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

In relation thereto, Section 1 of PD 1689 defines Syndicated Estafa as follows:


Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling as
defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by
life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of
five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act,
transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of
moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, samahang
nayon(s), or farmers associations, or funds solicited by corporations/associations from the
general public.

Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in
Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a
syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of
moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, samahang
nayon(s), or farmers associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the
general public.

In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICIs modus operandi of inducing the
public to invest in it on the undertaking that their investment would be returned with a very
high monthly interest rate ranging from three to five and a half percent (3%-5.5%).43 Under
such lucrative promise, the investing public are enticed to infuse funds into TGICI. However, as
the directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from the start that TGICI is operating without any
paid-up capital and has no clear trade by which it can pay the assured profits to its investors,
they cannot comply with their guarantee and had to simply abscond with their investors
money. Thus, the CA correctly held that accused-appellants, along with the other accused who
are still at large, used TGICI to engage in a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the defraudation of the
TGICI investors.

To be sure, a Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of
purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Its organizers
often solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate
high returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators focus on attracting
new money to make promised payments to earlier-stage investors to create the false
appearance that investors are profiting from a legitimate business. It is not an investment
strategy but a gullibility scheme, which works only as long as there is an ever increasing number
of new investors joining the scheme. It is difficult to sustain the scheme over a long period of
time because the operator needs an ever larger pool of later investors to continue paying the
promised profits to early investors. The idea behind this type of swindle is that the con-man
collects his money from his second or third round of investors and then absconds before
anyone else shows up to collect. Necessarily, Ponzi schemes only last weeks, or months at the
most.

In this light, it is clear that all the elements of Syndicated Estffa, committed through a Ponzi
scheme, are present in this case, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI
comprising more than five (5) people, including herein accused-appellants, made false
pretenses and representations to the investing public - in this case, the private complainants -
regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity with TGICI in order to solicit money
from them; ( b) the said false pretenses and representations were made prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private complainants
invested their hard earned money into TGICI; and (d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI
ended up running away with the private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's
prejudice.

ESTAFA under ARTICLE 315(2)(d)

* People vs. Villanueva G.R. No. 163662 February 25, 2015

We affirm the conviction.

Article 315, paragraph 2( d), of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa) - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow xx x:

xx xx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

xx xx

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had
no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder
that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

The estafa charged in the information may be committed, therefore, when: ( 1) the offender
has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the
postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has
no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check;
and (3) the payee has been defrauded. The deceit should be the efficient cause of the
defraudation, and should either be prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of the fraud.

All the elements of estafa were present. The first element was admitted by Villanueva, who
confirmed that she had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had
purchased. There is no question that Madarang accepted the checks upon the assurance of
Villanueva that they would be funded upon presentment. It is clear that Madarang would not
have parted with and entrusted the pieces of valuable jewelry to Villanueva whom she barely
knew unless Villanueva gave such assurance to her. The second element was likewise
established because the checks were dishonored upon presentment due to insufficiency of
funds or because the account was already closed. The third element was also proved by the
showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure to collect from Villanueva the balance
of P995,000.00.

BIGAMY
* Santos vs. Santos G.R. No. 187061 October 8, 2014

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is
an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when
the person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.

Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Courts judgment, order, or
resolution has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds
for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years,
coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already
dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another
marriage. The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being
terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. Thus:

Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there
is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any
interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without
prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
(Emphasis supplied)

In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of
terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance. The filing of an affidavit of
reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the
present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead. A
subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration
of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is already
dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted
prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and
void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law. Therefore, the
party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action
to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage still applies.

ARTICLE 365: RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE

* Gonzaga vs. People G.R. No. 195671 January 21, 2015

Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

In order to establish a motorists liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be
shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be
something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle a willful and
wanton disregard of the consequences is required. Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the
safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a
conscious choice of a course of action which injures another, either with knowledge of serious
danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any
reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to
the consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere
negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law, without regard to whether
the private offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault.
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelios act of driving very fast
on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the death of
Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the road where
the incident occurred was a curve sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos
were bound and descending towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed,
the very fact of speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior.
Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that a driver slows down before negotiating a curve
as it may be reasonably anticipated that another vehicle may appear from the opposite
direction at any moment. Consequently, the Court finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and
imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the
curve where the incident happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, as well as civilly
accountable for the material damages resulting therefrom.

Nonetheless, while the CA and the RTC concurred that the proximate cause of the collision was
Rogelios reckless driving, the CA Decision made no mention as to the presence or absence of
the limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty
next higher in degree upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties
such help as may be in his hands to give.

Based on case law, the obligation under this paragraph: (a) is dependent on the means in the
hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance that he/she, at the time and place
of the incident, is capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate proof.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court has perused the records and found contradictory testimonies presented by the
prosecution and the defense on this matter. Considering however, that Cherry herself admitted
that the victims were first loaded on the Land Cruiser before they were transferred to Kgd.
Dadivass vehicle, the Court is inclined to sustain Rogelios claim that he tried to extend help to
the victims, but when he started the engine with the intention to go to the hospital, he
discovered that the vehicle had no brakes. Hence, in imposing the proper penalty on the
accused, the qualifying circumstance under the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC should
not be considered.

Here, Rogelio was charged with the offense of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with
Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to Article
263 of the RPC, a complex crime. Article 48 of the RPC provides that when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime, in this case, Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.

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