Rationality and Morality

Reviewed Work(s):
Human Morality by Samuel Scheffler
F. M. Kamm

Nos, Vol. 29, No. 4. (Dec., 1995), pp. 544-555.

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CRITICAL STUDY

Samuel Scheffler's Human Morality (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1992)

Rationality and Morality

F. M. KAMM
New York University

Human Morality is primarily about what Scheffler calls "the potential congruence" of self-
interest and morality, a congruence which is not, Scheffler thinks, conceptually true, but
which can perhaps be achieved either through adjustment in our views about morality or
as a result of changes in social policy. Scheffler considers at least four different ways in
which morality may present less of a threat to self-interest and personal concerns in
general. (1) The scope of morality may be limited, so that certain areas of life are off
limits as subjects of moral judgment. (2) The deliberative role of moral considerations
narrowly construed, for example, the role of thoughts such as "It is my duty.. . ," "It is
forbidden.. . ," "It is permissible.. .," may be very limited. At the same time, there may be
moral relevance to thoughts more likely to be naturally part of one's psychology, e.g., "I
love her," "He's my husband." (3) Morality might not necessarily be overriding when it
conflicts with self-interest. And, (4) The stringency of morality-by which Scheffler
means the demandingness of morality in terms of efforts required or opportunities to be
foregone-may not be great.
My general evaluation is that this is an excellent book-wide-ranging, philosophically
precise, and elegantly crafted. I shall comment on aspects of Scheffler's discussion of
these four approaches to defining the relation between self-interest and morality. One
point that I shall be especially eager to emphasize, but which lies outside the scope of
these four approaches, is the failure to account for the wrongness of acts by pointing to
their irrationality (pp. 49-51).
It is best, however, to start off by making clearer a basic assumption of Scheffler's,
namely that self-interest (in having a good life) and moral demands can conflict. We can
believe that being moral is usually a part of a good life, even if it alone is not sufficient for
a good life. If it were also necessary for a good life, then it might appear that there would
be no conflict between morality and self-interest. But even if morality were necessary for
a good life, it might be that a life which met morality's standards could fail to be good

O 1995 Basil Blackwell, Inc., 238 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA, and 108
Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 lJF, UK.
 SCHEFFLER'S HUMAN MORALITY 545

and, in addition, be worse than another, admittedly not good, life which does not meet
morality's standards. Then there would be a conflict between morality and self-interest
even if morality were necessary for a good life. There are cases which suggest this. Your
child needs an organ transplant to stay alive. She is far back on the waiting line for an
organ and will, therefore, die unless you take advantage of an opportunity in which you
have to cheat by pushing her ahead of her rightful place. Would your life really be worse if
you did the morally wrong thing than if your child died? If the answer is "no," then
Scheffler is right to think a conflict can exist.

I. Scope
It has been argued that some of our acts are beyond the scope of moral evaluation. These
include trivial acts and, on the other hand, acts of enormous significance. For example,
some have argued that if one's wife is drowning, the question whether it is morally
permissible to save her rather than a stranger simply does not arise. At the other extreme,
my brushing my teeth is not subject to the evaluation that it is morally permissible.
Scheffler argues against the scope restriction on moral evaluation. His basic approach is
to consider cases in which those types of acts which in some circumstances could be
considered, on the one hand, trivial, or, on the other hand, all-important, are clearly subject
to moral evaluation in other circumstances. He considers (a) cases in which such acts are not
permissible, and (b) cases in which the failure to do such acts would be impermissible. An
instance of (a): if someone is dying while I am brushing my teeth and I could save him if I
stopped, it would be impermissible to brush my teeth. In this case, the consequences of
brushing one's teeth are different from what they are usually. An instance of (b): if my wife
is drowning and no one else needs to be rescued, it would be morally wrong of me not to
rescue her. Scheffler's claim is that the truth of (a) and (b) shows that moral judgments can
be made about these types of acts in the original contexts. That is, we make a moral
judgment about brushing one's teeth when it has no bad consequences: it is permissible.
And we also judge the act of rescuing one's wife when someone else needs to be rescued as
well: it is permissible. Scheffler's point seems to rest on a version of the argument from the
excluded middle: once a type of act (a subject matter of a certain sort) has been shown to be
subject to a negative moral evaluation in some circumstances when it has certain conse-
quences, this implies that that type of act is subject to a positive moral evaluation in other
circumstances when it has different consequences. Similarly, if failing to do an act in one
circumstance is wrong, it follows that doing the act can be right or at least permissible in
those very circumstances and in others. These arguments seem correct to me, though they
could not be applied to a form of behavior that is never judgeable as a wrong.
Scheffler concludes that moral judgments apply to all acts. Some might go further and
say that emotions and states of mind can also be judged morally. In fact, Scheffler does
say (p. 35) that it could be morally wrong to think in terms of duty when performing an
act, and this commits him to the possibility of morally judging states of mind as well as
behavior.
If morality does not have a scope limit, this implies that there are no unconditional
projects, that is, projects that are beyond moral judgment, even if they are projects about
which engaging in moral judgment would make no sense to the persons involved. Bernard
Williams suggests the contrary when he says1 that one cannot morally judge those projects
without which a person would lose interest in his life and in being moral at all.
 Suppose morality did have a scope limit. Would this really limit the conflict between
morality and self-interest? Not if the area off limits was merely the class of trivial acts. But
it would reduce conflict if acts of enormous importance to one were off limits to judgment,
so long as those things which were of enormous importance to one were related to one's
self-interest, which is not always true.

11. Deliberation
Scheffler believes that the more deliberation of a narrow moral sort is required, the more
morality imposes on our self-interest, or at least on the personal concerns that come to
constitute our self-interest in an extended sense. His discussion of this issue begins with
an interpretation of Bernard Williams's views of the case in which one's wife is drowning
and one must decide between saving her and saving a drowning ~ t r a n g e r According
.~ to
Scheffler, Williams's point about this case (a point which could surely be made about the
case even if it is not Williams's point) is that it is inappropriate to have in mind that
morality permits one to prefer one's wife in these circumstances. Scheffler believes that
our ability to make a moral assessment of the agent's act as permissible does not require
that the agent had this thought in mind. Indeed, it may even be morally wrong for him to
have had this thought in mind. Scheffler suggests that a moral assessment of someone's
conduct may commit us only to the view that "one ought, morally speaking, always to
deliberate in such a way that one is led by more than a mere coincidence to act acceptably
from a moral standpoint" (p. 34). This requirement can be satisfied if certain counterfac-
tuals are true, in particular, if one would not have done the act if it had been wrong.
Scheffler is right to say that the "one thought too many" interpretation of William's
discussion is only one interpretation. It is worth noting another interpretation. Williams
says that "It's my wife" is a sufficient reason for saving my wife rather than a stranger. It is
not necessary to derive this reason from a further reason, such as that utility is maximized
if everyone acts from such personal reasons. Although this could mean that we need not or
should not have a further thought concerned with morality in mind, it could also mean that
there need not be any more general impartial reason from which the validity of the
personal reason derives. This is a claim about the structure and nature of reasons, indepen-
dent of the concern about whether one has this more general reason before one's mind.
Williams's view would then be not about the nature of deliberation, but about whether
personal reasons are basic. Further, if these personal reasons were basic and part of
morality in a broad sense, their sufficiency for coherent deliberation could not be con-
nected to any thesis about there being a scope limit on moral judgment.
Scheffler is willing to dispense with "narrow" moral thinking, and to endorse as broad,
morally relevant considerations such factors as concern for another's pain and complaints
about the efforts needed to do a morally recommended act. These considerations are
allowed to play a large role in moral thinking. But I believe one should stop short of
endorsing what Scheffler merely suggests as a possibility: that it is morally wrong to think
at the time one acts, about what is, in fact, one's moral duty, that it is one's duty, when this
does not in any negative way affect one's performance. Perhaps it is "humanly wrong" to
have this thought, but I do not see that morality could condemn it. If not, then this
suggests that what is humanly correct and what is morally correct are not necessarily the
same.
Furthermore, the claim that any deliberation is morally acceptable that leads to the
 SCHEFFLER'S HUMAN MORALITY 547

right act, and would lead one to refrain from the wrong act, seems to place too weak a
requirement on motivation. Scheffler himself allows (pp. 34-35) that factors other than
the possibility of making verdictive moral judgments might necessitate that certain
thoughts enter into deliberation in order for the act to be right. The broad account of
morally acceptable deliberation is appealing as an explanation of, for example, the moral
acceptability of someone's acting from love, not duty, when he or she would not do the act
in question if it conflicted with duty. But the account fails as a general thesis, because it
allows that it is, in general, morally appropriate to do the right act for the wrong reason, so
long as one would not do the act if it were wrong. This would imply that there is nothing
morally wrong with the shopkeeper who, for consciously held reasons of prudence, does
not lie to a young customer, so long as he would not lie even if it were in his self-interest
to do so. But, I believe, we might condemn someone morally for even thinking of
prudence as a possible reason in these circumstances.
Finally, while denying that morality requires us to think of grand moral theory in the
course of acting, Scheffler claims that grand moral theory is still worth doing, for it
provides us with an abstract model of salient factors. However, he says, contrary to what
some have claimed, appreciating the value of such a model does not conflict with thinking
that sensitivity and perceptiveness are important traits in a morally good person. For
without such sensitivity one cannot be aware of the presence in the actual circumstances of
the theoretically significant morally salient features. But it is important to recognize3 that
those (like contemporary Aristotelians) who wish to emphasize the importance of sensi-
tivity and perceptiveness in moral judgment will not be fully satisfied by the role Scheffler
provides for these capacities. For Scheffler believes that moral theory can tell us what the
answer to a problem should be by determining the appropriate weight to be given to salient
features, and sensitivity will tell us whether the factors the theory says are dispositive are
actually present. But some (e.g., Aristotelians) wish to argue that we cannot know what
the answer to a problem should be without sensitivity; there is no theory that tells us what
weight to give to salient features-for this sensitivity is needed. There are then two
different roles for sensitivity, and Scheffler's is the weaker.

111. Overridingness

A . As a matter of necessity
The claim that morality is overriding is the claim that there is always most reason to do
what morality demands. Scheffler equates this claim with the claim that what morality
forbids, it can never be rational knowingly to d o (p. 53). Schemer thinks that some
arguments against this claim are not very good, since they typically rely on a narrow
conception of morality which does not make room for the moral relevance of such factors
as the size of personal efforts needed to promote a good state of affairs. But if morality is
not stringent, then it might seem that there will not be any cases in which one would not
have most reason to do what morality requires. Once we see, Scheffler says, that morality
does not conflict with what is humanly correct, because it is not stringent, we shall
eliminate many cases in which we would be tempted to say that morality is not overriding
(p. 60). (Here we have Scheffler arguing against those who rely on the undefended
assumption that morality is not humanly correct.)
Yet, even while suggesting that morality may be humanly correct and dealing with
what he thinks are bad arguments against the view that morality is overriding, Scheffler
himself believes that the overridingness claim is so strong that it is probably not true. Here
he disagrees with Thomas Nagel who believes that there is always most reason to do what
morality demands, once the demands of morality are made "humanly correct" (e.g., not
overly stringent). This suggests that morality may not always be humanly correct after all,
and not what one has most reason to do. Surprisingly, Scheffler does not give any
particular cases in which morality fails to be overriding, though he provides us with clues
to how he might construct some cases. For example, Scheffler's reason for thinking
everyone does not ttave the most reason always to d o what (even a nonstringent) morality
demands is that the rationality of morality is dependent on factors that are variable among
(not true of all) rational beings (p. 136). This, I believe, is a form of internalism. For
example, Scheffler thinks that the authoritative character of morality, the fact that it makes
demands on us independent of our desires, can be given a naturalistic explanation by
understanding it to be a function of the psychoanalytic superego. Although the superego
makes demands independent of desires, its content is not necessarily given by what we
know as morality (even nonstringent morality), nor is its content necessarily the same in
all rational beings. Now, if the particular superego one has does not issue a certain
command, or if one's psychology is such that one doesn't much care about morality, then,
I believe, Scheffler would say that one will not have most reason to do what morality
demands. Hence, the claim of overridingness would be false.
Others have tried to offer specific examples where morality, while not truly strenuous,
is still not overriding. For example, Susan Wolf4 gives the following cases: ( 1 ) I am
planning a party in secret. To prevent someone from finding out about it, I must tell a lie;
(2) I have office hours on Wednesday, but a favorite philosopher is in town to give a lecture
and I cannot both keep my office hours and hear the philosopher. Usually no one comes to
my office hours, but someone might. In both cases, Wolf thinks that if I take morality
seriously, I will not lie and I will keep my office hours; but, she thinks, I have more reason
not to do what morality says.
Indeed, it could be argued5 that there at least appears to be an argument from within
morality to the effect that morality is not overriding when it conflicts with self-interest: If
morality is not stringent, then personal goals may often take precedence over promoting
the best state of affairs, and so promoting the best state of affairs would become super-
erogatory. Furthermore, sometimes it is permissible to fail to do one's duty in order to do a
supererogatory act. But these two claims seem to imply that one's personal goals may
sometimes take precedence over doing what morality requires (e.g., one's duty). That is,
when "P" = personal goal, "S" = supererogatory act, "D" = duty, and ">" = may take
precedence over, P > S, and S > D, seem to imply that P > D. If this transitivity
argument were correct, it would imply that morality is not overriding. However, I do not,
in fact, believe that the argument is correct6
Regardless of whether we have evidence against overridingness, Scheffler claims, it
does not matter very much whether morality is overriding. If there is always most reason
to do what morality says, this is not terribly important, since it does not imply that people
will do what morality says, nor does it imply that people who act immorally are irrational
in the sense of being insane. They may have good reasons, e.g., self-interest, for their
actions, even if they do not have the best reasons for their actions. On the other hand, if
morality is not overriding, it will still, Scheffler claims, have a widespread influence on
persons, primarily because giving it up would mean giving up much of the emotional and
 SCHEFFLER'S HUMAN MORALITY 549

social relations central to our lives. For example, we would not be entitled to feel
resentment-only anger-at injustices.'
I believe Scheffler's position on the unimportance of the truth or falsity of the over-
ridingness claim is questionable. He seems to have a strong consequentialist theory of the
value of the truth of a proposition: if it doesn't make people act better, what use is it? But
its truth would allow us to be justified in criticizing those who do not subordinate self-
interest to morality, and this means that we need not think that we are trying to impose
what are merely our own strong sentiments on others. It also means that we can justify to
ourselves subordinating self-interest to morality in our own case. Furthermore, the fact
that a person who acts suboptimally is not totally irrational in doing so does not mean that
he isn't clearly irrational. In the case of prudence, someone who acts on a reason that is
even slightly less good than the alternative can be extremely irrational. Consider the
person who always acts on his second strongest d e ~ i r e . ~
To my mind, Scheffler fails to deal with the most puzzling aspect of the view that
morality is a form of optimal rationality, namely the fact that our outrage at someone's
behaving immorally is not at all in proportion to the irrationality of his act. That is, the
wrongness of his act is not accounted for or constituted by its irrationality. Nor is the
moral goodness of an act accounted for by its rationality. For example, someone's choos-
ing always to satisfy his weaker desire seems far more irrational than someone's cheating
on his income tax return for reasons of self-interest. Likewise, making certain basic errors
in logical reasoning is more irrational than cheating on one's incomes taxes. Yet, the latter
is more strongly to be condemned than the former in both cases. This provides one further
reason beyond those Scheffler points to for doubting that having the right to criticize
someone for his irrationality in acting wrongly is very significant. It is not very significant
if this criticism does not correlate with our degree of outrage at his behavior and so does
not account for the significance of his wrongdoing.
It may be suggested that it is rationality and irrationality about a certain important
subject matter, e.g., interpersonal relations, that awakens greater outrage than, for exam-
ple, irrationality about mathematical objects or self-interest. Suppose this is true. Is it true
that irrationality about what is most important is a higher degree of irrationality than
irrationality about what is less important? There are really two questions here: (1) Given
the same degree of formal irrationality (x) about a less important (m) and a more important
(n) subject matter, does (x)(n) necessarily involve more irrationality than (x)(m)? (2)
Given a less important (m) and a more important (n) subject matter, will any degree of
irrationality about (n) involve more irrationality than any degree of irrationality about
(m)? I believe the answer to (2) is clearly "No." Being irrational about what matters most
does not necessarily involve the most irrationality.
Conduct that is immoral may be said to be (in part) irrationality about interpersonal
relations between rational beings, and this may be what matters most. Here we introduce
concern with rationality into morality in another way: In identifying what is most impor-
tant with how we treat rational beings or even how we treat rationality in rational beings,
we pick rationality as the subject towards which morality is concerned to promote appro-
priate behavior. Furthermore, it may be said that it is irrational not to care most about how
we treat rational beings, though, again, from this we cannot conclude that not caring about
rational beings is the highest degree of irrationality.
In making these points about the role of rationality in accounting for what makes an act
immoral, we seem to have mimicked the progression from the first to the second formula-
tion of the Categorical Imperative. If we ask what is wrong with lying, for example, a
certain sort of Kantian may tell us that it is an act whose maxim cannot be universalized
without contradiction in conception. Hence, we would be irrational in acting on it, both
because we would be irrational if we did not act on universalizable maxims, and defeated
in our attempt to universalize this maxim by an irrationality. Why should these irra-
tionalities arouse moral outrage when other irrational behavior does not? Suppose univer-
salizing is required because we are irrational if we fail to treat like cases alike. Why is this
failure more serious than failure in nonmoral cases where we do not treat like cases alike?
Perhaps because we fail to treat all rational beings alike, in not permitting them to do what
we would do and this is disrespectful of them-what we call unfairness? We must bring in
a description of the subject matter of the irrationality to explain our extreme concern with
it. If we merely focus on a formal irrationality (such as a contradiction in conception, or
not treating like cases alike), we may find grounds for saying a certain course of conduct is
not justified rationally, but this is not enough to justify moral outrage or explain its
immorality. There is a big explanatory difference between (1) saying that avoiding contra-
diction is important because a contradiction is a sign of a disrespectful (not rationally
sanctioned) attitude to rational humanity in one's conduct, and (2) saying that not involv-
ing oneself in contradiction is our highest goal.
But we may object to lying not because it is impossible to do except if we do not permit
others to do it, but because of what we are doing to rational humanity if we lie to them.
This is the point of the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative (the Principle of
Humanity). The failure to respect the rationality of another person is contrary to reason if
reason gives us as an end respect for rational beings. Yet, if we want to be able to say that
the failure to respect rational humanity is always rationally suboptimal conduct, we still
do not want to say that its immorality, and our concern with it, is its failure to be optimally
rational. Disrespect is rationally unjustified behavior toward a rational being. It is this
complex whole that we object to. Even more precisely, it is the absence of what reason
says is most important, i.e., treating rational beings in a certain way, that is outrageous,
not the fact that reason qua reason was not heeded. It is not the disobedience of reason qua
reason that reason tells us is so important; what reason says is important is that one's
conduct be rationally justified when one is acting towards rational beings.
Phillipa Foot9 argues that it is enough to say that something is immoral without
characterizing it as irrational; for it is not because it is a species of irrationality that we are
condemning it anyway. Foot denies that morality is rationally required. By contrast, I have
assumed that morality is rationally required, and also claimed that it is important to be able to
say whether or not reason justifies a course of action. Yet I have wanted to deny that this
commits one to the claim that one's concern with morality is a concern with reason for
reason's sake, unless this is interpreted as a concern with how rational beings are to be
treated. Warren Quinn makes a similar point when he argues1 that practical rationality is
concerned with discovering what is good and the pursuit of something is rational because it is
good, but this does not mean that its goodness just consists in its rationality.
But notice that Scheffler may also go astray in speaking interchangeably of "optimal
rationality" and "what one has the most reason to do." For example, suppose I must
decide whether to defend my friend against a charge of dishonesty. The evidence is against
him. It seems appropriate to say that optimal rationality dictates that I not defend him, but
nevertheless it also seems appropriate to say that what I have most reason to do is defend
him.ll
 SCHEFFLER'S HUMAN MORALITY 55 1

If there is a difference between optimal rationality and what I have most reason to do, it
seems most promising (even if not correct) to identify morality with the latter rather than
with the former. Perhaps, then, doing the morally wrong thing leaves one open to the
criticism that one is extremely unreasonable if not extremely irrational.12 Would this
criticism correlate better with our concern over immorality, and so would it be more
significant if we would be justified in making this criticism of someone? Or are there other
behaviors which we think even more unreasonable than immorality, but about which we
are not as concerned? Is its admitted unreasonableness the most important thing about a
wrong act, or are other features which it has, and that are grounds for saying it defies
reason to do it, the most important characteristics of the wrong act?

B. Overridingness as an achievable outcome

Scheffler thinks that the overridingness of morality can be made to occur, to the extent that
we need not have reason to reject what morality requires. This is not because if a conflict
ever occurred, we would always have most reason to choose morality, but rather because
we can reduce conflicts (without denying that morality and self-interest could, theoreti-
cally, conflict). We can also strengthen the motive for being moral. Scheffler says that it is
both morally required and in our self-interest to bring about a "potential congruence"
between morality and self-interest, which is a good part of what he means by calling for us
to make morality overriding. This, I think, amounts to the claim that it is in one's self-
interest, and also morally required, to form personal projects on which one's happiness
depends in the light of morality and to make morality as easy and pleasant as possible by
making it dovetail with these projects. [Scheffler distinguishes between (1) its being in
one's self-interest to bring it about that morality and self-interest are congruent, and (2) its
being rational always to choose self-interest when they do conflict. He rejects the latter
view.] Two reasons why congruence could be in our self-interest is that we would then not
feel guilty if we did not do what morality requires (guilt being a personal cost), and we
would avoid personal losses when we would have most reason to side with morality if it
did conflict with self-interest.
Eliminating (or at least reducing) conflicts could involve reducing the severity of
conflicts or their frequency. If we reduce the severity, will there be a greater tendency to
do what morality requires? Yes, if we can stand to suffer a smaller rather than a larger
infringement of self-interest for morality's sake. If we reduce the frequency, will there be
a greater tendency to do what morality requires? If we must make a big sacrifice, but only
occasionally, we might be more likely to make it than if such sacrifices were demanded
constantly.
The way to reduce conflicts, Scheffler thinks, is to make society just; so, in his view, it
is both in our self-interest and morally required that we make society just. (Given that
Scheffler thinks that morality is not stringent, this could be required only if the cost to us
of bringing about a just society was not too great.) Why would there be fewer conflicts
between self-interest and morality in a just society? Scheffler suggests that in a just society
there are more morally acceptable ways of life open to individuals. We are less likely to
have to engage in immoral conduct in order to avoid personal losses. (By contrast, in a
slave society, one might have to engage in owning slaves in order to avoid economic
deprivation.) Also, one's character, if formed in a just society, will be constituted by
interests and desires consistent with justice, and the satisfaction of these desires will
constitute one's self-interest, so there is less likelihood of conflict between self-interest
and morality. [Scheffler, however, gives reasons to think that conflict will not be totally
eliminated (p. 131).] We might add that in a just society, burdens will tend to be fairly
distributed, so no one person will often be called upon to make too great a sacrifice for
morality's sake.
Yet, there is some reason to doubt that conflicts will necessarily be reduced as society
becomes more just. First, it all depends on how we conceive of a just society. If it is
defined as one in which there is not too much imposition on individual self-interest, then
the conclusion will be a matter of conceptual truth. I do not think Scheffler intends this. If
there is no guarantee via conceptual truth, then why is it not possible, for example, that
justice will demand strict egalitarianism (going beyond the difference principle) and this,
in turn, will reduce productivity to the point that each individual has many fewer resources
with which to satisfy his self-interest than in an unjust society? (A Rawlsian could argue
that this society could not be the most just, since it would not be preferred behind a veil of
ignorance to a less egalitarian but wealthier society. But is this analysis correct?)
Second, it could happen that fewer acts of injustice are necessary for self-interest to be
satisfied in a more unjust society than in a less unjust society. For example, in a very
unjust society, the government, run by a few people, greatly oppresses some people.
Individuals who are not in the government do very little to produce this oppression by
their individual acts, and their self-interest would not be affected if oppression did not
occur. It is true, however, that in omitting to overthrow the regime, they fail to eliminate
the injustice, and this omission may occur because revolutionary action conflicts greatly
with self-interest. (It might be said that if morality is not stringent, as Scheffler claims,
then their being governed by self-interest in failing to suffer great losses in a revolt does
not conflict with the demands of morality.I3 But presumably, Scheffler wants there to be a
sense of "conflict between morality and self-interest" which does not erase the fact that
injustice violates the demands of morality, even when one is not morally required to
overthrow it.) In a less unjust society-for example, a laissez faire, capitalist society-
many more individuals may perform many more acts of injustice, if it is true that
unregulated private ownership of the means of production is exploitative. Their omitting
these acts would be in conflict with their self-interest. This suggests that there could
perhaps be more conflict between self-interest and morality in the less unjust society.
However, Scheffler, I believe, is right to emphasize that in an unjust society those who
are the victims of injustice face fewer conflicts between their self-interest and the demands
of morality. Most everything they do to help themselves is also a step toward making the
society more just. l4
Third, the fact that one's personal interests and desires are more likely to be formed in
accordance with justice in a just society does not necessarily mean that the creation and
satisfaction of these personal concerns really serves the self-interest of individuals.
(Scheffler does not deny this.) The fact that someone comes to desire something, and is
personally interested in it, does not show that it is, even in an extended sense, goodfor
him that he desires it. For example, one may be raised to love the Fuehrer or want nothing
more than to serve one's family, and it may be bad for one that one has these desires.
Most importantly, is it true, as Scheffler suggests, that morality itself is concerned with
reducing conflicts between self-interest and morality so as to make morality easy on
people? What would such a concern imply? Suppose I must raise money for charity.
Consistent with collecting the same amount for the victims the charity helps, I could either
(a) merely ask people for individual contributions, or (b) have a charity ball to which
 SCHEFFLER'S HUMAN MORALITY 553

individuals would come at least in part (and perhaps totally) because they would enjoy
themselves. In option (a), there will be some conflict for donors between self-interest and
morality; in option (b), there will not be. Does morality itselfrequire that I select option
(b), out of concern for the individuals who will have to act morally (rather than for the
victims whom the charity helps)? I do not believe morality does make this demand,
though it is not immoral to follow option (b). Morality is concerned with making people
into decent people (at minimum). Perhaps it is also concerned with their not suffering in
order to be decent. Yet, morality requires us to do a lot to avoid harming people, even
though this conflicts with our self-interest. This suggests that the mere fact that it would
conflict with self-interest to require us to aid people is not what accounts for the fact that
we are not required to make great efforts, in general, to aid. Nevertheless, it may be
morally bad if people have to make big sacrifices in order not to have to harm people when
those sacrifices could have been avoided. It is also a bad thing if people suffer greatly
when they are not aided. Thus, morality may demand that we make small sacrifices so that
people do not have to make large sacrifices to avoid harming and do not have to suffer
greatly through not being aided.
Still, I doubt that morality is concerned with our enjoying morality, other than as its
own reward. and enjoying morality is what the elimination of conflicts between morality
and self-interest may come down to. Furthermore, the reason morality may not have this
concern is that it is important that decency prevail even if circumstances are unfavorable
and it is hard to be moral. Morality is not satisfied with merely fair-weather friends. On
Scheffler's proposal, if we can justifiably call people in Canada "decent" because they
fulfill easily satisfied demands of morality, this would give us no reason to think that most
Canadians would have behaved better in Nazi Germany than most Germans did. Of
course, it is possible to have two aims: make morality easy when this is possible, but still
require obedience when the going gets tough. But, it may be that cushioning the blows too
much does not build the character that is needed in harder times. In these matters, morality
may follow a maximin policy: do in good circumstances what will produce decency in the
bad circumstances.

IV. Stringency
I have already referred several times to Scheffler's claim that morality is nonstringent, and
that it is this factor that may help make it overriding. We now come to a fuller examination
of this aspect of his discussion. After first arguing that nothing about a noncontroversial
concept of morality implies that morality is stringent, Scheffler presents a positive argu-
ment for the conception of morality as nonstringent. He contrasts two ideals, one of
which, he believes, is more attractive, and that ideal implies nonstringency: there is the
Ideal of Purity and the Ideal of Humanity. According to Scheffler, the first ideal requires
self-transcendence and leads to a stringent, impersonal morality; the second ideal aims to
integrate the personal and the impartial points of view which are both part of human life,
and leads to a nonstringent morality. (This gives the personal point of view, which values
things out of proportion to and independent of their value from the impersonal point of
view, a foundational role.) Scheffler favors the second ideal and believes that morality is
about the integration of the two points of view.
This sounds similar to the view that Thomas Nagel presents,15 but in fact there is a
difference which Scheffler himself insists upon (p. 125). Nagel thinks that morality begins
with the impartial point of view, but involves a compromise, "a bargain whereby the 'prior
claims of impersonal morality' are modified to accommodate the 'normal limitations of
human nature."'16 Scheffler insists that the Ideal of Humanity does not represent a com-
promise with human nature: " . . . morality is addressed from the outset to human beings
as they are. It affords them the prospect of integrating two different motivational tenden-
cies, and it has no 'prior' content that must be 'reduced' or 'modified' when it is brought
into contact with human nature."" That is why it is an Ideal of Humanity, he says.
This Ideal of Humanity, Scheffler suggests, also has some of the appeal of the Ideal of
Purity, insofar as it praises, though it does not require, self-transcendence in supereroga-
tory acts.
Do either of the ideals Scheffler discusses do justice to morality? Although an Ideal of
Purity may imply an impersonal morality, it does not seem that impersonal morality as we
know it (e.g., utilitarianism) is grounded in an Ideal of Purity involving transcendence of
a personal point of view, at least not motivationally. Bentham, for example, thought that
persons were pursuers of their own individual happiness, and did not require them to give
up this frame of mind. He simply hoped to arrange rewards and punishments to individu-
als so as to maximize utility from an impersonal point of view. It seems odd to describe
this as an ideal of purity and self-transcendence.
On the other hand, the Ideal of Humanity seems too earthbound to be an ideal at all.
Part of the reason for this is that Scheffler may claim too much for it. For he believes it
allows us to praise but not require self-transcendent acts as supererogatory. But if the Ideal
of Humanity really presents as an ideal the integration of the personal and the impersonal,
how can it praise acts that are totally self-denying any more than acts that are completely
egoistic? Each violates an ideal of integration as much as the other. (Nagel's view, by
contrast, accounts for praising the supererogatory, since it insists that we compromise
away from the impersonal ideal, and the supererogatory takes us back to a higher level.) It
may be that some individuals in doing supererogatory acts derive the only satisfaction
their personalities allow, and in this sense they integrate the personal and the impersonal.
But since this personality structure may be overall bad for them to have as a matter of self-
interest, this still does not speak directly to whether such people have integrated self-
interest (even in a broad sense) and an impersonal point of view. It is this that Scheffler
should presumably be concerned about given the main project of his book. Furthermore,
not all supererogators do derive personal satisfaction in acting as they do.
But there seems to be a more fundamental reason why the Ideal of Humanity fails as an
ideal. Its wholehearted acceptance of human nature as it is makes it excessively apologetic
and a posteriori. Scheffler means to focus on the personal perspective as deeply charac-
teristic of human nature; but how does he distinguish embracing this perspective from
embracing other characteristics that may also prove to be deeply ingrained in human
nature, such as irrational violence, sexual hierarchy, etc.? Presumably, we wish for an a
priori ideal, i.e., one that allows us to conceive of good and bad so that we can criticize
and change possibly even humanity's essential characteristics, if need be. l s
Furthermore, Scheffler's view that morality is about the integration of the personal and
impersonal standpoints makes it seem as though there would be no morality for a race of
creatures that had only an impersonal point of view. This is implausible. Nor should we
adopt a view of morality that implies that if some creatures had only personal points of
view, we should not design punishments and rewards that lead them to behave toward each
other (and us) as morality dictates. If morality could demand different things from differ-
ent creatures, then perhaps there is some high order (meta-) morality from whose dictates
we can determine why the demands for different creatures differ, if they do.
 SCHEFFLER'S HUMAN MORALITY 555

Notes
Acknowledgements. Work on this article was made possible by a New York University Research
Challenge Fund Grant. I am grateful to Samuel Scheffler for clarifications.
'Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," (1981).
*In Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," (1981). The case was originally raised by
Charles Fried in Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978).
%s John McDowell has in his discussion of Aristotle (presentation at New York University, April
2, 1994).
41n Wolf, "Above and Below the Line of Duty," (1986).
5And has been by Wolf, "Above and Below the Line of Duty," (1986) and by me in "Supereroga-
tion and Obligation," (1985).
6For more on this, see "Supererogation and Obligation," (1985) and Chapter 12 of my Morality,
Mortality, vol. 11, (1995b).
7Scheffler says (p. 77) "it is not clear why those sympathetic to morality should take much
comfort from the suggestion that its authority rests exclusively on the possibility of charging wrong-
doers with this kind of cognitive misdemeanor."
%eana Shiffrin provided this case.

'In "Morality As a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," (1978).

I0Quinn in "Putting Rationality in Its Place," (1993).

"This example I owe to Rogers Albritton.

'2Rawls distinguishes between the reasonable and the rational, and Thomas Scanlon attends to a

similar distinction in his work.

I3If Scheffler accepted an actionlomission distinction he could still argue that suffering greatly
rather than cause injustice (e.g., by being a slaveowner) is required, even if suffering greatly to
overthrow oppression is not required.
141 make a similar point in criticizing Thomas Nagel's analysis of the relation between the
personal and impersonal perspectives (which he provides in his Equalitv and Partiality (1990). See
my "High Theory, Low Theory, and the Demands of Morality," (1995a), where I claim that the
personal and impersonal views may coincide for the worst off.
I5In The View from Nowhere (1986).

"Scheffler (p. 125) quoting Nagel (p. 202).

'7Scheffler, p. 125.

IXFormore on this issue, see my "High Theory, Low Theory, and the Demands of Morality,"

( 1995a).

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