1

The American College of Thessaloniki

EUR 322: External Relations of the European Union

Katerina Rigas

5/12/13
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EU history is nothing but a set of responses to the constant German Question.

Introduction

The German Question, or else what to do with the Germans, has been at the forefront

of European politics ever since Bismarcks attempt to unify the divided German

principalities into a consolidated nation state in 1871. The solution that was preferred

then was that of a Lesser Germany1, excluding the Austrians from the new state, a

situation that Hitler tried to remedy when he annexed Austria to the Third German

Reich. However, both these attempts have been more or less credited with the

outbreak of the two World Wars2, in Germanys effort to become an international

power. The question of Germany, as Henry Kissinger once put it was that it was a

country too big for Europe yet too small for the world3.

At the end of the Second World War, the wartime allies had agreed that Germany

should be rendered powerless. The intent to prevent a repetition of Germanys

aggressiveness led to the draft of several proposals, such as the Morgenthau

Plan,4aiming to deal with the issue of Germany decisively. However, a more mediocre

approach was finally adopted, that advocated the subjugation of German interests to

the European ones, based on the proposals of Winston Churchill.5 The aim of this

1
Veblen, Thorstein, and Joseph Dorfman. Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution. New York: Viking P, 1954.
Print

2
Fischer, Fritz. Griff Nach Der Weltmacht. Dusseldorf: Droste, 2002. Print
3
Andreas Kluth. "The dilemma at the heart of Europe: Germany and the German
question". Juncture. IPPR. 2013. Web. 4/12/2013. < http://www.ippr.org/juncture/171/11201/the-
dilemma-at-the-heart-of-europe-germany-and-the-german-question >
4
Morgnthau Memorandum 1944 http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box31/t297a01.html
5
Winston Churchill, Zurich Speech, The New York Times, September 20,1946 p.2
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essay is to investigate to what extent the European Project, first proposed by Churchill

was a response to the German Question and how that has affected EU history.

The Past

A chronological narration of the steps towards European integration that might have

as a goal Germanys commitment to the European Project, although useful in locating

direct and perhaps less obvious aims, would not be able to define the European Union

as a set of responses to the German issue.

The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 burdened Germany with war guilt and reparations,

which would inevitably lead to another German resurgence6. A repetition of similar

terms, apart from the reparation clause was suggested in the Morgenthau

memorandum, but there were three important developments that had to be considered

before reaching a decision.

Firstly, the great European nation state whose prestige had been severely damaged

after the First World War had been completely destroyed after the Second World War.

The end of the First World War meant the end of the power balance system that held

in check European states during the 19th century7, and whatever power distribution

could be perceived in the interwar years had been totally upset by 1945. Europe no

longer determined world history, but was rather an object of world history.

Secondly, as apparent as it was that Europe was no longer the subject of world history

due to the devastation it suffered during the Second World War, one must not forget

the new international order that had emerged during the interwar years. The US

6
This is not peace. It is an armistice for 20 years. Marshall Ferdinand Foch
7
Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. W. (1950). Principles and problems of international politics:
Selected readings. New York: Knopf. p.103
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involvement in the First World War and the creation of the Soviet Union in 1917

hinted the inevitable bipolar world that would emerge, briefly interrupted by their

wartime alliance against Germany in the Second World War8. While Germany had

acted as a catalyst in consolidating certain interests shared by the great powers,9 at the

same time it provided the battlefront for a possible confrontation between them.

Lastly, the defeat of the nation state and the emergence of US and USSR as the

powers in a bipolar world led to the eventual replacement of the states by blocs with

delineated ideology and politics. The post-war international order was very much

identified by that conflict whose specific attribute was the avoidance of full

escalation, hence the term Cold War10.

Taking into account the Cold War context and the fact that Germany was invaded by

both East and West, the division of Germany into a Western and Eastern state was the

first solution that reflected the interests of US and USSR. The wartime allies were

faced with difficulties in reaching an agreement on the redistribution of power in the

post war world, and the neutralization of Germany seemed achievable only through

this division, as Germany was considered far too important to be part only of one

bloc11.

8
Bracher, Karl D. Turning Points in Modern Times: Essays on German and European History.
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995. Print. P 272
99
Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. W. (1950). Principles and problems of international politics:
Selected readings. New York: Knopf. p.397

10
Bracher, Karl D. Turning Points in Modern Times: Essays on German and European History.
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995. Print. P 272
11 11
Bracher, Karl D. Turning Points in Modern Times: Essays on German and European History.
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995. Print. P 272
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However, Germany had a tradition of nationalism and militarism dating back to the

late 18th century and Frederick II of Prussia, so it was doubtful if the military defeat

that she suffered would render her unable to seek that power again. The very

important dimension of a nation being defeated was introduced with Germanys

defeat in both the First and Second World War. Up until the 19th century where we

have the gradual appearance of mass politics, the individual did not identify with the

states military defeat to such an extent. This forced the world to reconsider the terms

that would be applied to Germany and to structure them towards rehabilitation and not

punishment12.

The proposition to subordinate the German problems to the European ones, where

Germany would be integrated in a community of European nations was viewed as a

solution that might either blunt or sharpen the problem, as long as the East and West

division of Europe existed.13

Winston Churchill astonished everyone when he proposed the creation of a European

family that would be based in the cooperation among France and Germany. 14 The

creation of a European community where all nation states would hold larger loyalties

to Europe was the solution to curb nationalism. Churchill original plan suggested the

integration of Germany with its principalities and not as an entity and he even referred

to the blueprint of the United States of America, according to which the United States

of Europe would be created. Churchill placed the blame for the outbreak of the war

on German nationalistic politics and considered the only remedy to the danger

12
Winston Churchill, Zurich Speech, The New York Times, September 20,1946 p.2
13
Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. W. (1950). Principles and problems of international politics:
Selected readings. New York: Knopf. p.394
14
Winston Churchill, Zurich Speech, The New York Times, September 20,1946 p.2
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presented by a nation state the creation of a European family15.In Churchills Zurich

speech we can trace elements that advocate that regional schemes are complementary

to the global arena, and as such he conceived the creation of the European Union.

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshal Plan are the terms that defined post-war

Europe even before the European Project took off. The Marshall plan aimed at the

consolidation of Western Europe through economics support from the US. The

Truman doctrine was a declaration that aimed to set the borders of Soviet influence in

Europe 16 . Through this was the creation of a union among European states

conceivable. In the cold war context, the reconstruction of Germany was a matter of

political and managerial control. The European Project started reluctantly with the

Coal and Steel Community where France and Germany agreed to pool their resources,

but it wasnt until The Suez Canal Crisis that France was forced to reconsider the

importance of its status and national sovereignty. France was all but defeated in a

conflict that turned to be a Cold War confrontation, and a Soviet threat was suggested

even in Europe. We must consider the possibility that Western Europe united against

the Soviet threat. NATO did provide the military support that the nation states were

reluctant and unable to provide, but as the new order referred to the creation of block

according to their political ideologies; a political union was very much needed.

15
Winston Churchill, Zurich Speech, The New York Times, September 20,1946 p.2

16
Hans Speier: The Future of German Nationalism and Kurt Riezler: Comment,

Social research, vol.14 (December, 1947) pp.421-45, 450-4.

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The Present

Churchill made some remarks for the whole procedure of European integration that

very much described the EU politics up until recent. Firstly, raising the standard of

living in Europe doesnt solve the political problems of Europe. Secondly the political

center of Europe should always be either France or England. Thirdly, there should be

the structures for the eventual reunification of Germany.17

However, the global economic crisis of 2008 confronted Europe and Germany for the

matter with some serious questions. Germany, the most industrially developed and

economically advanced stated of the EU has reluctantly found itself in the position of

leadership. Whereas the economic prosperity was not of hinted until the 1990s, kept

in check by the bipolar division of power, and during the 1990s with the reunification

of Germany, in the 2000s Germany has emerged as the undisputed leader.

Germany has been accused of pursuing too national oriented policies 18 during the

crisis, aiming for tighter fiscal control and an eventual fiscal consolidation that would

be on German terms. Merkel claims that Europe is not only about freedom but also

about prosperity, and that translates into competitiveness that will be accomplished

through the imposition of austerity measures19. That has inevitably raised once again

the German Question, and whereas the fate of EU is based on the desired of Germany.

This must be understood as Germany has no historical experience of a successful

international leadership20. The two attempts at projecting power ended in two world

wars with devastating results. The German post-war economic miracle was induced

17
Winston Churchill, Zurich Speech, The New York Times, September 20,1946 p.2
18
The Merkel Plan; Germany and Europe, The Economist, June 15, 2013
19
The Merkel Plan; Germany and Europe, The Economist, June 15, 2013
20
Europes Reluctant Hegemon. The Economist Jun 15 2013
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under the protection of NATO, that is US military might and basically a neutralized

foreign policy of its own, up until the dissolution of Yugoslavia. A united federal

Europe is not a foreign concept to Germans, as they are accustomed to federalism

domestically. But the most important factor that has always characterized German

politics is the national obsession with price stability 21 and the constant fear of

hyperinflation that originates back to the interwar periods and Germanys collapse.

The Euro crisis has brought these issues into the surface again, the German reluctance

to lead, desire for integration and fear for instability, a reason why Germany has so

resisted to the creation of Eurobonds or otherwise the mutualization of debt.

If the vision in Europe has become too technical and economical that it presides over

the political unification that was preached up until the crisis with its ultimate

manifestation with the creation of the Euro, is a matter that is connected with the

German Question pertains to the fact that European solidarity translates into German

cash. Amidst the crisis, Germany, the country who came to detest nationalism is

perceived to be pursuing oddly national- interest oriented politics. If the subordination

of Germanys interests to the European level has been managed so successfully that

the rest of Europe cannot distinguish, it is to be seen.

21
Europes Reluctant Hegemon. The Economist Jun 15 2013
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Bibliography

1. Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. W. (1950). Principles and problems of

international politics: Selected readings. New York: Knopf.

2. Waltz, K. N. (2001). Man, the state, and war: A theoretical analysis. New

York: Columbia University Press

3. Bracher, Karl D. Turning Points in Modern Times: Essays on German and

European History. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995. Print.

4. Trachtenberg, Marc. The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic

of International Politics. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2012.

Print.

5. Hans Speier: The Future of German Nationalism and Kurt Riezler:

Comment, Social research, vol.14 (December, 1947) pp.421-45, 450-4.

6. Europes Reluctant Hegemon. The Economist Jun 15 2013

7. Winston Churchill, Zurich Speech, The New York Times, September 20,1946

8. The Merkel Plan; Germany and Europe, The Economist, June 15, 2013