POINTERS FOR AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION | FINALS
RA 8282: Social Security Law Project employees
Jurisdiction; dacion en pago implementation
SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. (a) Any dispute arising under this Act
with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon
or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the
Commission, and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by
the Commission, or any of its members, or by hearing officers duly
authorized by the Commission and decided within the mandatory period
of twenty (20) days after the submission of the evidence. The filing,
determination and settlement of disputes shall be governed by the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Commission.
SSS vs. Atlantic Gulf
Atlantic Gulf filed a case for specific performance against the SSS before
the RTC in order to enforce a Deed of Assignment through a dacion en
pago to answer to Atlantic Gulfs liability.
Which body has jurisdiction to entertain a controversy arising from the
non-implementation of a dacion en pago?
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts challenged
order, granted private respondents appeal and ordered the trial court to
proceed with the civil case with dispatch. From the averments in their
complaint, the appellate court observed that private respondents are
seeking to implement the Deed of Assignment which they had drafted
and submitted to SSS sometime in July 2001, pursuant to SSSs letter
addressed to AG& P dated 23 April 2001 approving AG&P and
SEMIRARAS delinquencies through dacion en pago, which as of 31
March 2001, amounted to P29,261,902.45. The appellate court thus
held that the subject of the complaint is no longer the payment of the
premium and loan amortization delinquencies, as well as the penalties
appurtenant thereto, but the enforcement of the dacion en
pago pursuant to SSS Resolution No. 270. The action then is one for
specific performance which case law holds is an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court.
Weekly stipends or excess in service surplus; employee-employer
relationship
Republic vs. Asiapro
In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the
following elements are considered: (1) the selection and engagement of
the workers; (2) the payment of wages by whatever means; (3) the
power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the workers conduct,
with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. The most
important element is the employers control of the employees
conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be done, but also
as to the means and methods to accomplish. The power of control
refers to the existence of the power and not necessarily to the actual
exercise thereof. It is not essential for the employer to actually supervise
the performance of duties of the employee; it is enough that the
employer has the right to wield that power. All the aforesaid elements
are present in this case.
Wages are defined as remuneration or earnings, however
designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether
fixed or ascertained, on a time, task, piece or commission basis, or other
method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to
an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment
for work done or to be done, or for service rendered or to be
rendered. In this case, the weekly stipends or the so-called shares in
the service surplus given by the respondent cooperative to its owners-
members were in reality wages, as the same were equivalent to an
amount not lower than that prescribed by existing labor laws, rules and
regulations, including the wage order applicable to the area and industry;
or the same shall not be lower than the prevailing rates of wages. It
cannot be doubted then that those stipends or shares in the service
surplus are indeed wages, because these are given to the owners-
members as compensation in rendering services to respondent
cooperatives client, Stanfilco.
Chua v CA
Petitioner contends that the respondents are not regular employees and
are thus, not included in the mandatory coverage of the SSS.
Petitioner himself admitted that they worked in his construction projects,
although the period of their employment was allegedly co-terminus with
their phase of work. Even without such admission from petitioner, the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties
can easily be determined by the application of the "control test." Suffice
it to say that regardless of the nature of their employment, whether it is
regular or project, private respondents are subject of the compulsory
coverage under the SSS Law, their employment not falling under the
exceptions provided by the law. This rule is in accord with the Court's
ruling in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. SSS to the effect that all
employees, regardless of tenure, would qualify for compulsory
membership in the SSS, except those classes of employees
contemplated in Section 8(j) of the Social Security Act.
Despite the insistence of petitioner that they were project employees,
the facts show that as masons, carpenters and fine graders in
petitioner's various construction projects, they performed work which
was usually necessary and desirable to petitioner's business which
involves construction of roads and bridges. It is not enough that an
employee is hired for a specific project or phase of work to be called a
project employee. There must also be a determination of, or a clear
agreement on, the completion or termination of the project at the time
the employee was engaged if the objectives of Article 280 are to be
achieved. This second requirement was not met in this case.
Moreover, while it may be true that private respondents were initially
hired for specific projects or undertakings, the repeated re-hiring and
continuing need for their services over a long span of time the
shortest being two years and the longest being eight have undeniably
made them regular employees. This Court has held that an employment
ceases to be co-terminus with specific projects when the employee is
continuously rehired due to the demands of the employer's business and
re-engaged for many more projects without interruption.
Lastly, in the proceedings before the SSC and the Court of Appeals,
petitioner was unable to show that private respondents were appraised
of the project nature of their employment, the specific projects
themselves or any phase thereof undertaken by petitioner and for which
private respondents were hired. He failed to show any document such
as private respondents' employment contracts and employment records
that would indicate the dates of hiring and termination in relation to the
particular construction project or phases in which they were employed.
Farm workers, Employee-Employer Relationship
Gapayao v Fulo
Farm workers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees.
We have consistently held that seasonal employees may be considered
as regular employees. Regular seasonal employees are those called to
work from time to time. The nature of their relationship with the employer
is such that during the off season, they are temporarily laid off; but
reemployed during the summer season or when their services may be
needed. They are in regular employment because of the nature of their
job, and not because of the length of time they have worked.
The rule, however, is not absolute. In Hacienda Fatima v. National
Federation of Sugarcane Workers-Food & General Trade, the Court
held that seasonal workers who have worked for one season only may
not be considered regular employees. Similarly, in Mercado, Sr. v.
NLRC, it was held that when seasonal employees are free to contract
their services with other farm owners, then the former are not regular
employees.
For regular employees to be considered as such, the primary standard
used is the reasonable connection between the particular activity they
perform and the usual trade or business of the employer.
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Taxi driver engaged on boundary basis
Even-if the driver is getting income through boundary, this does not
negate the existence of employee-employer relationship.
Labor-only contracting
Labor-only contracting is prohibited.
Labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the
contractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job,
work or service for the principal, and the following elements are present:
1. The contractor does not have substantial capital or
investments in the form of tools, equipment, machines, work
premises, among others, and the employees recruited and
placed are performing activities that are usually necessary or
desirable to the operation of the company, or directly related
to the main business of the principal within a definite or
predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work
or service is to be performed within or outside the premises of
the principal; or
2. The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the
performance of the work of the employee
Employment services not covered: purely casual
1. Purely casual employment and not for the purpose of occupation
or business of the employer;
2. Service performed on or in connection with an alien vessel by an
employee if he is employed when such vessel is outside the
Philippines;
3. Service performed in the employ of the Philippine Government or
instrumentality or agency thereof;
4. Service performed in the employ of a foreign government or
international organization, or their wholly-owned instrumentality,
unless, there is an agreement with the Philippine Government for
the inclusion of such employee in the SSS
5. Such other services performed by temporary and other employees
which may be excluded by regulation of the Commission.
Employees of bona fide independent contractors shall not be
deemed employees of the employer engaging the services of said
contractors.
Mansal v Go-Checo
In a sawmill, for example, if a power unit running the mill gets out of
order and a mechanic is contracted to fix the engine, the work of the
mechanic would be considered as purely casual, because the reparation
of the mill is not the actual work or business of the sawmill but the sawing
of lumber. But the piling up of lumber is work directly connected with the
business of a lumber yard. Lumber must be sorted and piled up in
groups according to sizes to facilitate handling and sale. The piling up
of lumber is, therefore, an ordinary part of the work in a lumber yard.
Employer
Section 8. Employer Any person, natural or juridical, domestic or
foreign, who carries on in the Philippines any trade, business, industry,
undertaking or activity of any kind and uses the services of another
person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the
Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the
Government: Provided, That a self-employed person shall be both
employee and employer at the same time.
Sickness benefit number of days that can be paid
A daily cash allowance paid for the number of days a member is unable
to work due to sickness or injury. The amount is equivalent to 90% of
the members average daily salary credit.
Requirements:
1. He is unable to work due to sickness or injury and confined
either in a hospital or at home for at least 4 days;
2. He has paid at least 3 months of contributions within the 12-
month period immediately before the semester of
sickness/injury
3. He has used up all company sick leaves with pay; and
4. He has notified the employer or SSS, if separated, voluntary
or self-employed.
Notify employer within 5 calendar days after start of
sickness/injury and employer must notify SSS within 5
days after receipt of notification. Notice is not required it
members confinement is in hospital or member got sick
while working or within company premises.
In computing, exclude the semester of sickness. A semester refers to
two consecutive quarters ending in the quarter of sickness. A quarter
refers to three consecutive months ending March, June, September, or
December.
For example: SSS member gets sick in October 2006 for 20 days.
a. The semester of sickness would be from July 2006 to
December 2006.
b. The 12-month period would be from July 2005 to June 2006
(where the six highest monthly salary credits will be chosen)
In no case shall the daily sickness benefit be paid longer than one
hundred twenty (120) days in one (1) calendar year, nor shall any
unused portion of the one hundred twenty (120) days of sickness benefit
granted under this section be carried forward and added to the total
number of compensable days allowable in the subsequent year
Maternity leave benefit
A daily cash allowance granted to female members who was unable to
work due to childbirth or miscarriage. It is equivalent to 100% of
members average daily salary credit multiplied by 60 days for normal
delivery or miscarriage, 78 days for caesarian section delivery.
Qualifications for entitlement:
a. She has paid at least three (3) monthly contributions in the
twelve-month period immediately preceding the semester of
her childbirth or miscarriage
b. She has notified her employer of her pregnancy through her
employer, if employed, or to SSS id separated, voluntary or
self-employed.
Deliveries covered: Only for the first four deliveries or miscarriages.
Notice required: As soon as pregnancy is confirmed, member must
notify immediately his employer or SSS, as the case may be, and
probable date of childbirth at least 60 days from the date of conception.
Employer must in turn notify SSS after receipt of notification. Failure to
observe this rule may result in denial.
Can a member apply for sickness benefit if she has been paid maternity
benefit? No. No member can be entitled to two benefits for the same
period.
Who determines e-e?
The question on the existence of an employer-employee relationship for
the purpose of determining the coverage of the Social Security
System is explicitly excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC and falls
within the jurisdiction of the SSC which is primarily charged with the duty
of settling disputes arising under the Social Security Law of 1997.
(Asiapro case)
Effect of final judgment at NLRC on Employee-Employer
Relationship: Conclusiveness of Judgment
Co vs. People
Facts: Petitioner was charged criminally by claimed employees for
violation of SS Law for non-remittance of contributions. Prior to the
criminal case, a final decision of NLRC held that the claimed employees
were independent contractors and not employees. Petitioner filed a
motion to quash.
Ruling: Well-settled is the rule that the mandatory coverage of RA 1161,
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as amended, is premised on the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. A final and executory NLRC decision (to the effect that
respondent spouses were not the employees of petitioner) was
binding on the criminal case for violation of RA 1161, as amended.
Accordingly, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
refused to grant petitioner's motion to quash the Information. Simply
said, any conviction for violation of the SSS law based on the erroneous
premise of the existence of an employer-employee relationship would
be a transgression of petitioner's constitutional rights.
SSC vs. Rizal Poultry
Issue: Whether res judicata applies so as to preclude the SSC from
resolving anew the existence of employer-employee relationship, which
issue was previously determined in the NLRC case?
Ruling: Res judicata in the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment"
applies. The judgment in the NLRC case pertaining to a finding of an
absence of employer-employee relationship between Angeles and
respondents is conclusive on the SSC case.
Contingencies covered; benefits where employer advances
Contingency The retirement, death, disability, injury or sickness, and
maternity of the member.
The benefits which the employer advances are sickness benefit and
maternity leave benefit.
Other benefits:
A. Retirement It is a cash benefit either in monthly pension or
lump sum paid to a member who can no longer work due to
old age.
Who may qualify?
1. A member who is 60 years old, separated from employment
or ceased to be self-employed, and has paid at least 120
monthly contributions prior to the semester of retirement
2. A member who us 65 years old whether employed or not and
has paid at least 120 monthly contributions prior to the
semester of retirement.
When may underground mineworkers qualify for retirement benefit?
1. Has reached the age of 55 years old and is an underground
mineworker for at least 5 years (either continuous or
accumulated) prior to the semester of retirement but whose
actual date of retirement is not earlier than March 13, 1998;
separated from employment or in the case of self-employed,
has ceased self-employment, and has paid at least 120
monthly contributions prior to the semester of retirement
2. Has reached the age of 60 years old whether employed or not
and has paid at least 120 monthly contributions prior to the
semester of retirement
B. Disability
Who is qualified? A member who suffers partial or total permanent
disability with at least one month contribution paid to the SSS prior to
the semester of contingency
Some partial permanent disabilities:
One thumb One foot
One index finger One leg
One middle finger One ear
One ring finger Both ears
One little finger Hearing of one ear
One big toe Hearing of both ears
One hand Sight of one eye
One arm
Some total permanent disabilities:
1. Complete loss of sight of both eyes;
2. Loss of two limbs at or above the ankle or wrists;
3. Permanent complete paralysis of two limbs;
4. Brain injury resulting to incurable imbecility or insanity; and
5. Such cases as determined and approved by the SSS.
Prescriptive period in filing a disability claim: 10 years from the date
of occurrence of disability
C. Death it is a cash benefit either in monthly pension or lump
sum paid to the beneficiaries of a deceased member
Beneficiaries:
Primary: 1) Legitimate dependent spouse until the person remarries; 2)
dependent legitimated or legally adopted and illegitimate children who
are not yet 21 years old
Secondary: In the absence of primary beneficiaries, dependent parents.
In the absence of dependent parents, any other person designated by
member in record.
Claims under Labor Code vis--vis SSS
Ortega v SSC
Claims under the Labor Code for compensation and under the Social
Security Law for benefits are not the same as to their nature and
purpose. On the one hand, the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code
govern compensability of work-related disabilities or when there is loss
of income due to work-connected or work-aggravated injury or illness.
On the other hand, the benefits under the Social Security Law are
intended to provide insurance or protection against the hazards or risks
of disability, sickness, old age or death, inter alia, irrespective of whether
they arose from or in the course of the employment. And unlike under
the Social Security Law, a disability is total and permanent under the
Labor Code if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable
to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120
days regardless of whether he loses the use of any of his body parts.
Compulsory coverage; when effective
Coverage of Employees:
a. A private employee who is not over 60 years old.
b. A household helper earning at least P1,000 a month.
- A household helper is any person who renders domestic
or household services exclusively to a household
employer such as a driver, gardener, cook, governess
and other similar occupations.
c. A Filipino seafarer upon the signing of the standard contract
or employment between the seafarer and the manning agency
which, together with the foreign ship owner, act as employers
d. An employee of a foreign government, international
organization or their wholly-owned instrumentality based in
the Philippines, which entered into an administrative
agreement with the SSS for the coverage of its Filipino
workers
Coverage of Employers:
a. An employer, or any person who uses the services of another
person in business, trade, industry or any undertaking. A
social, civil, professional, charitable and other non-profit
organization which hire the services of employees are
considered employers
b. A foreign government, international organization or its wholly-
owned instrumentality such as an embassy in the Philippines,
may enter into an administrative agreement with the SSS for
the coverage of its Filipino employees
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Effective Date of Coverage. Compulsory coverage of the employer
shall take effect on the first day of his operation and that of the employee
on the day of his employment: Provided, That the compulsory coverage
of the self-employed person shall take effect upon his registration with
the SSS
Appeal from SSC
(b) Appeal to Courts. Any decision of the Commission, in the absence
of an appeal therefrom as herein provided, shall become final and
executory fifteen (15) days after the date of notification, and judicial
review thereof shall be permitted only after any party claiming to be
aggrieved thereby has exhausted his remedies before the Commission.
The Commission shall be deemed to be a party to any judicial action
involving any such decision and may be represented by an attorney
employed by the Commission, or when requested by the Commission,
by the Solicitor General or any public prosecutor.
(c) Court Review. The decision of the Commission upon any disputed
matter may be reviewed both upon the law and the facts by the Court of
Appeals. For the purpose of such review the procedure concerning
appeals from the Regional Trial Court shall be followed as far as
practicable and consistent with the purposes of this Act. Appeal from a
decision of the Commission must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notification of such decision. If the decision of the Commission involves
only questions of law, the same shall be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
No appeal bond shall be required. The case shall be heard in a summary
manner, and shall take precedence over all cases, except that in the
Supreme Court, criminal cases wherein life imprisonment or death has
been imposed by the trial court shall take precedence. No appeal
shall act as a supersedeas or a stay of the order of the Commission
unless the Commission itself, or the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court, shall so order.
Beneficiaries; Primary beneficiaries
Beneficiaries The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the
dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate
children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the
member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be
entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated
or legally adopted children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the
dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children of the
member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one
hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent
parents who shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the
absence of all of the foregoing, any other person designated by the
member as his/her secondary beneficiary.
SSC v Azote
The existence of two Form E-4s designating, on two different dates, two
different women as his spouse is already an indication that only one of
them can be the legal spouse. As can be gleaned from the certification
issued by the NSO, there is no doubt that Edgardo married Rosemarie
in 1982. Edna cannot be considered as the legal spouse of Edgardo as
their marriage took place during the existence of a previously contracted
marriage. For said reason, the denial of Edna's claim by the SSC was
correct. It should be emphasized that the SSC determined Edna's
eligibility on the basis of available statistical data and documents on their
database as expressly permitted by Section 4 (b) (7) of R.A. No. 8282.
Extent of the required dependency
Section 8 (e). Dependents The dependents shall be the following:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the
member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate
child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached
twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of
age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally;
and
(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
Although a husband and wife are obliged to support each other,
whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other
cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone. (SSS vs.
Alguas)
Further, Alguas pointed out that a wife who left her family until her
husband died and lived with other men, was not dependent upon
her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during the
pendency of the period.
Signey v. SSS
Facts: Kuya, the one who died here, had three wives (wowz) who
claimed his death benefits. The SSC determined that it was Ginas
(second common law wife) illegitimate children who was entitled to the
benefits.
Ruling: Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law
should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Since
petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and because the deceased
has no legitimate child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor
children of the deceased shall be entitled to the death benefits as
primary beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that for a minor child to
qualify as a "dependent, the only requirements are that he/she must be
below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully employed.
In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were
born on 13 April 1996 and 20 April 2000, respectively. Had the legitimate
child of the deceased and Editha survived and qualified as a dependent
under the SSS Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a
share equivalent to only 50% of the share of the said legitimate child.
Since the legitimate child of the deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn
and Rodelyn, as the only qualified primary beneficiaries of the deceased,
are entitled to 100% of the benefits.
SSS v. Delos Santos
Facts: After Gloria (respondent) left Antonio twice, he amended his SSS
entries from Mrs. Margarita de los Santos to Cirila de los Santos 9the
second wife); from Gloria de los Santos to May-Ann de los Santos; and
from Erlinda de los Santos to Armine de los Santos. Thus, upon the
death of Antonio, Cirilia applied and began receiving his SSS pension
benefit. On the same month, Gloria filed a claim for Antonio's death
benefits with the SSS Cubao Branch. Her claim was denied because
she was not a qualified beneficiary of Antonio. In the letter, the SSS said
that she was not qualified due to the fact that she had obtained a divorce
against the member and she had already remarried. But contrary to
findings of the SSC, the CA found that being the legal wife, Gloria was
entitled by law to receive support from her husband.
The Court reminded us of the case of Dycaico vs. SSS which declared
as unconstitutional the proviso as of the date of his retirement to qualify
the term of primary beneficiaries. Thus, the reckoning point in
determining the beneficiaries of the deceased Antonio should be at the
time of his death. Although respondent was the legal spouse of the
deceased (because the divorce obtained by respondents was not valid),
we find that she is still disqualified to be his primary beneficiary under
the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the requirement of dependency upon her
deceased husband Antonio. AN ESTRANGED wife who was not
dependent upon her deceased husband for support is not qualified to be
his beneficiary.
SSC v. Favila
Teresa averred that when Florante died on February 1, 1997, his
pension benefits under the SSS were given to their only minor child at
that time, Florante II, but only until his emancipation at age 21. Believing
that as the surviving legal wife she is likewise entitled to receive
Florante's pension benefits, Teresa subsequently filed her claim for said
benefits before the SSS. The SSS, however, denied the claim.
Is Teresa a primary beneficiary in contemplation of the Social Security
Law as to be entitled to death benefits accruing from the death of
Florante?
According to the SS Law, it is plain that for a spouse to qualif y as a
primary beneficiary under paragraph (k) thereof, he/she must not only
be a legitimate spouse but also a dependent as defined under paragraph
(e), that is, one who is dependent upon the member for support. Here,
there is no question that Teresa was Florante's legal wife. What is at
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point, however, is whether Teresa is dependent upon Florante for
support in order for her to fall under the term "dependent spouse" under
Section 8 (k) of RA 1161. Aside from Teresa's bare allegation that she
was dependent upon her husband for support and her misplaced
reliance on the presumption of dependency by reason of her valid and
then subsisting marriage with Florante, Teresa has not presented
sufficient evidence to discharge her burden of proving that she was
dependent upon her husband for support at the time of his death.
"dependent" - "one who derives his or her main support from another
[or] relying on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist
or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power or aid
of someone else."
Consent of SSS on filing of criminal action
Is the consent of SSS required before any criminal case may be filed?
No, because Section 28 (i) states that a criminal action arising from a
violation of the provisions of this Act may be commenced by the SSS or
the employee concerned either under this Act or in appropriate cases
under the Revised Penal Code.
Lack of criminal intent and good faith as defenses
Tan vs. Ballena
Furthermore, the appellate court held that the defense of the petitioners
of good faith and lack of criminal intent should not have been
considered, in as much as the offense charged were violations of a
special law and are therefore characterized as mala prohibita, in which
intent to commit is immaterial.
Only inquiry is, has the law been violated? Thus, the petitioners
admission in the instant cases of their violations of the provisions of the
SSS Law is more than enough to establish the existence of probable
cause to prosecute them for the same.
Prescriptive period
The right to institute the necessary action against the employer may be
commenced within twenty (20) years from the time the delinquency is
known or the assessment is made by the SSS, or from the time the
benefit accrues, as the case may be.
[Note: Not sure if this is what Sir means about this. LOL]
Is a director liable?
Garcia v SSC
Section 28 (f) of the SS Law provides the following:
(f) If the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an
association, partnership, corporation or any other institution, its
managing head, directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties
provided in this Act for the offense.
SSC found Garcia, the sole surviving director of Impact Corporation,
petitioner herein, liable for unremitted SSS contributions. The issue is
whether or not petitioner, as the only surviving director of Impact
Corporation, can be made solely liable for the corporate obligations of
Impact Corporation pertaining to unremitted SSS premium contributions
and penalties therefore.
Court said yes. Section 28(f) is clear and unambiguous.
Mendoza v People
1st case:
The Information against petitioner reads:
xxx xxx xxx
That sometime during the month of August 1998 to
July 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, being then the proprietor of
Summa Alta Tierra Industries, Inc., duly registered
employer with the Social Security System (SSS),
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fail and/or refuse to remit the SSS
premium contributions in favor of its employees
amounting to P421,151.09 to the prejudice of his
employees.
Contrary to and in violation of Sec. 22(a) and (d)
in relation to Sec. 28 of Republic Act No. 8282,
as amended
The term "managing head" in Section 28 (f) is used, in its broadest
connotation, not to any specific organizational or managerial
nomenclature. To heed petitioner's reasoning would allow unscrupulous
businessmen to conveniently escape liability by the creative adoption of
managerial titles.
MR:
RA No. 9903 (Social Security Condonation Law) creates two
classifications of employers delinquent in remitting the SSS
contributions of their employees: (1) those delinquent employers who
pay withinthe six (6)-month period (the former group), and (2) those
delinquent employers who pay outside of this availment period (the
latter group). Waiver of accrued penalties: derived from the last proviso
of Section 4 of RA No. 9903.
The dispositive portion provides:
The Court AFFIRMS the petitioner's conviction for violation of Section
22(a) and (d), in relation to Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8282, and the
petitioner is thus sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In light of Section 4
of Republic Act No. 9903, the petitioner's liability for accrued penalties
is considered WAIVED. Considering the circumstances of the case, the
Court transmits the case to the Chief Executive, through the Department
of Justice, and RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the
petitioner.
Does novation serve to negate the prosecution of a criminal liability
under RA 1161, as amended?
SSS v DOJ
Facts: The Martels were charged by the Prosecutors Office with
nonremittance of SSS contributions. At first, they offered a parcel of
land. However, later on, they offered computer-related services.
The Court held that novation was inapplicable in this case. This Court
first recognized the possibility of applying the concept of novation to
criminal cases in People v. Nery, involving a case for Estafa. In that
case, the Court observed that although novation is not one of the means
recognized by the Revised Penal Code to extinguish criminal liability, it
may "prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true
nature of the original basic transaction," provided the novation takes
place before the filing of the Information with the trial court.
Thus, novation has been invoked to reverse convictions in cases where
an underlying contract initially defined the relation of the parties such as
the contract in sale on commission in Estafa cases or the contract in sale
of goods in cases of violation of the Trust Receipts Law. Further, the
party invoking novation must prove that the new contract did indeed take
effect.
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RA 8291: Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997
Jurisdiction
GSIS has original and exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising
under RA 8291 with respect to:
- Coverage
- Entitlement to benefits
- Collection and payment of contributions
- Any other matter related to any or all of the foregoing
which is necessary for their determination
Which body of GSIS is vested with Quasi-Judicial Functions?
Board of Trustees.
Who are covered? Are judges covered?
Compulsory for all employees:
- Appointive or elective
- Whether temporary, casual, permanent or contractual with
employee-employer relationship [thus, those under job orders are
not covered]
- Those who are receiving basic pay or salary but not per diems,
honoraria or allowances; and
- Those who have not reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
years old
Who are not covered?
- Employees who have separate retirement schemes under special
laws and are therefore covered by their respective retirement laws,
such as the members of the Judiciary, Constitutional
Commissions, and other similarly situated government officials;
- Uniformed members of AFP & PNP including BJMP;
- Those who are not receiving basic pay or salary
- Contractuals who have no employer and employee relationship
with the agencies they serve
Who is a dependent legitimate child?
Who are dependents?
a. the legitimate spouse dependent for support;
b. any legitimate, legitimated and/or legally adopted child,
including any illegitimate child, who is unmarried, not gainfully
employed, who has not attained the age of majority, or being
at the age of majority but incapacitated and incapable of self-
support due to a mental or physical defect acquired prior to
age of majority; and
c. the parents dependent upon the member for support.
New benefits
a. Unemployment Benefit
The benefit is paid when a permanent employee is involuntarily
separated from the service as a result of the abolition of his office or
position usually resulting from reorganization.
Who is eligible?
Permanent employee who has paid 12 monthly contributions.
Duration of benefit depends on length of service ranges from
2 mos. to a maximum of 6 mos
Equivalent of benefit 50% of the average monthly
compensation
Options Those who have more than 15 years service may either
avail of retirement or separation benefits as the case may be.
b. Separation benefit
A cash payment of 18 times the basic monthly pension at time of
separation and a life pension to start at the age of 60 will be given to
those who separate from the service with at least 15 years of service
and are below 60 years of age
Who are eligible?
i. Rendered at least 3 years but less than 15 years
- cash payment equivalent to 100% of Average Monthly
Compensation for every year of service payable upon
reaching 60 or upon separation whichever comes later if not
receiving monthly pension from permanent total disability
ii. Rendered at least 15 years & who is below 60 at the time of
resignation/separation
- cash payment equivalent to 15 times the basic Monthly
Pension payable upon separation plus monthly pension
starting 60
Primary beneficiaries in case of survivorship
The legitimate spouse, until he/she remarries, and the dependent
children.
IRR, Rule II, Sec. 2.5:
Member separated for cause:
automatically forfeit
Unless terms of resignation or separation provide otherwise
Member separated not for cause
shall continue to be member & entitled subject to qualification & other
prescription
Entitlement to personal contributions
Lledo v. Lledo
May a government employee, dismissed from the service for cause, be
allowed to recover the personal contributions he paid to the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS)?
Neither P.D. No. 1146 nor R.A. No. 8291 contains any provision
specifically dealing with employees dismissed for cause and the status
of their personal contributions. Thus, there is no inconsistency between
Section 11 (d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, and Section
4 of P.D. No. 1146, and, subsequently, R.A. No. 8291. The inevitable
conclusion then is that Section 11 (d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as
amended, continues to govern cases of employees dismissed for cause
and their claims for the return of their personal contributions.
Finally, it should be remembered that the GSIS laws are in the nature of
social legislation, to be liberally construed in favor of the government
employees. The money subject of the instant request consists of
personal contributions made by the employee, premiums paid in
anticipation of benefits expected upon retirement. The occurrence of a
contingency, i.e., his dismissal from the service prior to reaching
retirement age, should not deprive him of the money that belongs to him
from the outset. To allow forfeiture of these personal contributions in
favor of the GSIS would condone undue enrichment.
Pursuant to the foregoing discussion, Cesar is entitled to the return of
his premiums and voluntary deposits, if any, with interest of three per
centum per annum, compounded monthly.
||
COA disallowances
GSIS vs. COA, G.R. No. 138381 & 141625, November 10, 2004
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien.-
xxxxxxxxx
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein
as well as the benefits, sums or monies
corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall
be exempt from attachment, garnishment,
execution, levy or other processes issued by the
courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative
bodies including Commission on Audit (COA)
disallowances and from all financial obligations of
the members, including his pecuniary accountability
arising from or caused or occasioned by his
exercise or performance of his official functions or
duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with
his position or work except when his monetary
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liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of
the GSIS.
It is clear from the above provision that COA disallowances cannot be
deducted from benefits under RA 8291, as the same are explicitly made
exempt by law from such deductions. Retirement benefits cannot be
diminished by COA disallowances in view of the clear mandate of the
foregoing provision.
Accordingly, the GSIS interpretation of Section 39 that COA
disallowances have become monetary liabilities of respondents to the
GSIS and therefore fall under the exception stated in the law is
wrong. No interpretation of the said provision is necessary given the
clear language of the statute. A meaning that does not appear nor is
intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be
placed therein by construction.
Moreover, if we are to accept the GSIS interpretation, then it would be
unnecessary to single out COA disallowances as among those from
which benefits under RA 8291 are exempt. In such a case, the inclusion
of COA disallowances in the enumeration of exemptions would be a
mere surplusage since the GSIS could simply consider COA
disallowances as monetary liabilities in its favor. Such a construction
would empower the GSIS to withdraw, at its option, an exemption
expressly granted by law. This could not have been the intention of the
statute.
That retirement pay accruing to a public officer may not be withheld and
applied to his indebtedness to the government has been settled in
several cases. In this case, the Court had to distinguish between the
COA disallowances that were allowed from those that were not. Since
the disallowance only accrued when the respondents were already
retired, it gave rise to a case of solution indebiti. Nonetheless, it may be
recovered not by deducting on the retirement pay, but on the other
assets of the respondents.
Prescriptive period
4 years from date of contingency except life and retirement which do not
prescribe.
Sec. 39
GSIS v NLRC security guards money claims
The case revolves around the decision of the NLRC holding GSIS
solidarily liable for the judgment rendered in favor of the security guards
who were considered their employees because the contractor was
declared a labor-only contractor.
GSIS argues that the enforcement of the decision is impossible because
its charter unequivocally exempts it from execution. The Court rejected
this argument and held that GSISs charter should not be used to evade
its liabilities to its employees, even to its indirect employees, as
mandated under the Labor Code.
RA 7699: Portability Law
When applicable?
Gamogamo v PNOC
The Court found baseless petitioner's contention that the principle of
tacking of creditable service was mandated by Republic Act No. 7699. It
held that the totalization of service credits was resorted to only when the
retiree did not qualify for benefits in either or both the Social Security
System (SSS) and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
In this case, petitioner was qualified to receive benefits granted by the
GSIS, if such right had not yet been exercised. In any case, petitioner's
fourteen years of service with the DOH may not remain uncompensated
because it may be recognized by the GSIS pursuant to Section 12 of the
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977, as may be determined by
the GSIS. Since petitioner may be entitled to some benefits from the
GSIS, he cannot avail of the benefits under R.A. No. 7699.
When is totalization resorted to?
A member of GSIS who does not qualify for old age and other benefits
by reason of non-fulfillment of the required period of service may be able
to qualify for such benefits by making use of the period during which he
rendered services to a private employer and for which contributions were
paid to SSS. This is allowed under RA 7699 (approved May 1, 1994)
PD 442, as amended/P.D. 626: Employees Compensation
Presumption of Compensability
Workmens Compensation Act - This Act works upon the presumption of
compensability which means that if the injury or disease arose out of and
in the course of employment, it is presumed that the claim for
compensation falls within the provisions of the law. Simply put, the
employee need not present any proof of causation. It is the employer
who should prove that the illness or injury did not arise out of or in the
course of employment.
Theory of Aggravation
All that the Workmens Compensation Act requires to entitle claimants
to its benefits is a showing that the nature of the deceased's work and
duties did aggravate his illness as in this case.|||(Belmonte v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission)
In the present law, for the sickness and resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the claimant must prove either of two things:
a. Doctrine of Occupational Disease that the sickness was
the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A
of the Rules on Employees Compensation
b. Theory of Increased Risk if the sickness was not so listed,
that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the
claimants working conditions
The diseases listed in Annex A are presumed to be work-related but
not every death resulting therefrom automatically entitles a claimant to
death benefits. Annex A requires that, for the statutory presumption of
causal relation to arise, it must be established beforehand that the listed
disease was contracted under certain working conditions.
The following conditions must be satisfied:
1. The employees work must involve the risks described therein
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the employees
exposure to the described risk
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and
under such other factors necessary to contract it
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the
employee.
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Art. 203, Labor Code (Prohibition against demand or charge for fee)
Under Labor Code:
ART. 203. Prohibition. - No agent, attorney or other person pursuing or
in charge of the preparation or filing of any claim for benefit under this
Title shall demand or charge for his services any fee, and any stipulation
to the contrary shall be null and void. The retention or deduction of any
amount from any benefit granted under this Title for the payment of fees
for such services is prohibited. Violation of any provision of this Article
shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred pesos nor more
than five thousand pesos, or imprisonment for not less than six
months nor more than one year, or both, at the discretion of the court.
Under SSS:
SECTION 17. Fee of Agents, Attorneys, etc. No agent, attorney or
other person in charge of the preparation, filing or pursuing any claim for
benefit under this Actshall demand or charge for his services any fee,
and any stipulation to the contrary shall be null and void. The retention
or deduction of any amount from any benefit granted under this Act for
the payment of fees for such services is prohibited: Provided, however,
That any member of the Philippine Bar who appears as counsel in any
case heard by the Commission shall be entitled to attorney's fees not
exceeding ten percent (10%) of the benefits awarded by the
Commission, which fees shall not be payable before the actual payment
of the benefits, and any stipulation to the contrary shall be null and void.
Any violation of the provisions of this Section shall be punished by a fine
of not less than five hundred pesos (P500.00) nor more than five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment for not less than six (6)
months nor more than one (1) year, or both, at the discretion of the court.
Meaning of accident
Unforseen for which the injured party is not legally responsible.
ECC Board Resolution No. 12-03-08
Declaring the compensability of death of an employee due to assault
when the same occurred in the course of performance of official
functions notwithstanding the fact that the motive was personal in
nature.
This Commission RESOLVES AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, to
declare the compensability of death of an employee due to assault
notwithstanding the fact the motive is personal in nature if the same
occurred in any of the following situations, in addition to those provided
under Item II of Circular No. 03-709 dated 22 July 2009:
1. The employee was at his assigned/designated workplace, or
at a place where his work requires him to be;
2. The employee was executing an order from the employer
regardless of the time and place of the incident, or in the
performance of his official functions; or
3. The employee was "going to or coming from" his workplace,
subject to the existing guidelines of the same.
|||
ECC Board Resolution No.14-02-15
Compensability of Injuries or death of the soldiers and policemen when
responding to a crime situation when they are not at their assigned post
ECC Board Resolution No. 15-04-15
DECLARING THE COMPENSABILITY OF INJURIES SUSTAINED BY
EMPLOYEES AT PLACES OF RECREATION WITHIN THE
EMPLOYERS' PREMISES
Paragraph 6.1 of Board Resolution No. 93-08-0068, dated August 5,
1993, is hereby modified or amended to read as follows:
"Personal Comfort Doctrine
"6.1. Acts performed by an employee
a. within the time and space limits of his employment to minister
to personal comfort such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger
or other physical demands
b. while on the places of recreation within the employer's
premises, or
c. to protect himself from extreme temperature in a place within
the employer's premises,
shall be deemed incidental to his employment and injuries which
the employee suffered in the performance of such acts shall be
considered compensable and arising out of and in the course of
employment."
ECC Board Resolution No. 15-01-20
ADVISORY ON THE DEFINITION OF MISSING PERSONS UNDER
EC BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 14-07-20
The following are the series of events which should be considered in the
grant of EC benefits:
1. The word "missing" refers to unknown fate or there is no trace
of whereabouts of a worker, employee and uniformed
personnel while he/she is in the performance of his/her duties
during calamities or fatal events.
2. The worker, employee or uniformed personnel was not seen
or heard from after the lapse of four years from the occurrence
of the incident.
3. The disappearance of the worker, employee or uniformed
personnel gives rise to presumption of death.
4. The death of the worker, employee or uniformed personnel
arises out of and in the course of employment.
|||
ECC Board Resolution Nos. 10-03-45
CLARIFYING THE RULES ON PRESCRIPTION
According to the case of Buena Obra vs SSS and Mesa vs. SSS, when
a claimant filed a claim for disability or death benefits before the Systems
either under the SSS Law or GSIS Law, the claim for same benefits
under the Employees Compensation Law should be considered as filed.
The filing of disability or death benefits under either the SSS Law or the
GSIS Law within 3 years from the time the cause of action accrued
would stop the running of the prescriptive period under P.D. 636, as
amended.
ECC Board Resolution Nos.11-04-10
SETTING THE RECKONING DATE OF THE THREE-YEAR
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD IN THE EVALUATION OF EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION CLAIMS FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY
(PTD)
In the case of ECC vs. Sanico, the Supreme Court held that:
1. "Permanent total disability means disablement of an
employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of
similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to
perform, or any kind of work which a person of [his] mentality
and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute
helplessness;
2. "In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is
compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting
in the impairment of one's earning capacity;
3. "The prescriptive period for filing compensation claims should
be reckoned from the time the employee lost his earning
capacity, i.e., terminated from employment, due to his illness
and not when the same first became manifest."
This Commission RESOLVES that the prescriptive period for filing
compensation claims should be reckoned from the time the employee
lost his earning capacity.
ECC Board Resolution Nos.12-01-02
DECLARING THE COMPENSABILITY OF INJURIES AND ITS
RESULTING DISABILITY OR DEATH SUSTAINED BY STAY-IN
LOCAL EMPLOYEES WITHIN THE QUARTERS FURNISHED BY THE
EMPLOYERS
"Bunkhouse Rule" - ". . . where the employee is required to stay in the
premises or in quarters furnished by the employer, injuries sustained
therein are in the course of employment regardless of the time the same
occurred."
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This Commission RESOLVES AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, to
declare the compensability of injuries, and its resulting disability or
death, sustained by stay-in local employees in their quarters regardless
of the time of its occurrence except when the disability or death was
occasioned by the employee's intoxication, willful intention to injure or
kill himself or another, or notorious negligence as provided under Article
172 of P.D. No. 626, as amended.
Compensability
GSIS v CA
In this case, Osteosarcoma is not listed as an occupational disease in
the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. Hence, it is
supposed to be upon the claimant or private respondents to prove by
substantial evidence that the risk of contracting Osteosarcoma was
increased by the working conditions of the late Abraham. Substantial
evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The records show that
Abraham failed to present evidence to establish that the development of
his ailment was traceable to his working conditions in the Philippine
Navy, the now defunct Philippine Constabulary and the PNP. Further,
private respondents' allegation in their petition for review with the CA
that Abraham, as a rifleman in the Philippine Navy, may have been
exposed to elements like a virus which could have contributed to his
ailment does not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence. The
rule is that awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and
presumptions as the claimant must prove a positive thing. The
application of the rules would mean that absent any proof that the risk
of contracting the ailment was increased by the working conditions of
the late Abraham, private respondents would not be entitled to
compensation.
Considering, however, that it is practically undisputed that under the
present state of science, the proof referred by the law to be presented
by the deceased private respondent claimant was unavailable and
impossible to comply with, the condition must be deemed as not
imposed.
Before the amendment, the law simply did not allow compensation for
the ailment of respondent. It is under this set-up that the Raro case was
decided. However, as the ECC decision noted, the law was amended
and now "the present law on compensation allows certain diseases to
be compensable if it is sufficiently proven that the risk of contracting is
increased by the working conditions." It, therefore, now allows
compensation subject to requirement of proving by sufficient evidence
that the risk of contracting the ailment is increased by the working
conditions.
As earlier noted, however, in the specific case of respondent, the
requirement is impossible to comply with, given the present state of
scientific knowledge. The obligation to present such as an impossible
evidence must, therefore, be deemed void. Respondent, therefore, is
entitled to compensation, consistent with the social legislation's intended
beneficial purpose.
Alano v ECC
The deceased was waiting for a bus to the school where she works as
a principal. However, while waiting, she was bumped by a mini van that
resulted to her death. The petitioner alleges that the deceased's
accident has "arisen out of or in the course of her employment." The
respondent Commission reiterates its views and contends that the
present provision of law on employment injury is different from that
provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) and is
"categorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at
the workplace, or elsewhere while executing an order from the
employer." We rule in favor of the petitioner. It is not disputed that the
deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place
where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if
she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private
or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the
accident. She was there because her employment required her to be
there.
Lorenzo v GSIS
The wife of the deceased died due to Cardio-Respiratory Arrest due to
Terminal Leukemia. Petitioner, being the surviving spouse, claimed for
Employees Compensation death benefits from the GSIS. It was denied
on the ground that the GSIS Medical Evaluation and Underwriting
Department (MEUD) found Rosario's ailments and cause of death,
Cardio-respiratory Arrest Secondary to Terminal Leukemia, a non-
occupational diseases contemplated under P.D. No. 626, as amended.
Sickness, as defined under Article 167 (1) Chapter I, Title II, Book IV of
the Labor Code of the Philippines refers to "any illness definitely
accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Employees'
Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment,
subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by
working conditions.
It is well to stress that the principles of "presumption of compensability"
and "aggravation" found in the old Workmen's Compensation Act is
expressly discarded under the present compensation scheme. As
illustrated in the said Raro case, the new principle being applied is a
system based on social security principle; thus, the introduction of "proof
of increased risk." As further declared therein:
The present system is also administered by
social insurance agencies the Government
Service Insurance Syatem and Social Security
System under the Employees Compensation
Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible
equilibrium between the employer's obligation to
pay workmen's compensation and the
employee's right to receive reparation for work-
connected death or disability.
GSIS v Capacite
The deceased was a DAR employee who died of lung cancer. The CA
justified the compensability of her disease by saying that Elma had
been exposed to voluminous dusty records and other harmful
substances that aggravated her respiratory disease.
While item 17, Annex "A" of the Amended Rules of Employee's
Compensation considers lung cancer to be a compensable occupational
disease, it likewise provides that the employee should be employed as
a vinyl chloride worker or a plastic worker. In this case, however, Elma
did not work in an environment involving the manufacture of chlorine or
plastic, for her lung cancer to be considered an occupational
disease. There was, therefore, no basis for the CA to simply categorize
her illness as an occupational disease without first establishing the
nature of Elma's work. Both the law and the implementing rules clearly
state that the given alternative conditions must be satisfied for a disease
to be compensable.
Limitation to compensability
Section 1. Limitation No compensation shall be allowed to the
employee or his dependents when the injury, sickness, disability or
death was occasioned by any of the following:
a. His intoxication persons condition in being under the
influence of liquor or prohibited drugs to the extent that his
acts, words or conduct are impaired visibly as to prevent him
from physically and mentally engaging in the duties of his
employment
b. His willful intention to injure or kill himself or another; or
c. His notorious negligence something more than mere or
simple negligence; deliberate act to disregard own personal
safety
GSIS v Angel
With the law upon the facts, we conclude that the death of Sgt. Angel
did not result from an accident which is compensable under Presidential
Decree No. 626. It was on the contrary occasioned by an intentional or
designed act which removes the resulting death from the coverage of
the State Insurance Fund. It is unexpected that the discussion below by
the GSIS, the ECC and the Court of Appeals, veered away from the
indispensible antecedent that the death must be caused by accident
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and, instead, focused on the requirement that the death must arise out In the case at bar, the requisite substantial evidence came from the
of or in the course of employment. Such that, the ECC denied expert opinion of Dr. Arsenio A. Estreras Jr., a Diplomate in Internal
compensability because: Medicine who issued the Death Certificate.

Clearly the deceased was not performing his parents as beneficiaries

official duties at the time of the incident. On the
contrary, he was being investigated regarding his
alleged involvement on a pilferage/gunrunning
case when he was found dead in his cell, an
activity which is foreign and unrelated to his
employment as a soldier. Thus, the protective
mantle of the law cannot be extended to him as
the documents appear bereft of any showing to
justify causal connection between his death and
his employment.
Bartolome v SSS
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents"
in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and ought
to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to
"legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent
parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does
not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents"
are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,
who are in need of support or assistance.

Coverage formula Prescriptive period

"arising out of" upon consideration of all circumstances, a causal Art. 201: 3 years from the time the cause of action accrued.
connection between the condition under which the work is required to
be performed and resulting injury, refers to the origin or cause of the When did the cause of action accrue? From the date of the occurrence
accident of the contingency.

"in the course of employment" refers to time, place and ECC v Sanico
circumstances under which the accident takes place. Prescription not to be reckoned when PTB became known but from time
employee lost his earning capacity (termination from job due to illness)
24-hour-duty doctrine
The concept of workplace cannot always be literally to a soldier on active Defenses against EC claims
status whom for all intents and purposes, is on a 24 hour official duty 1. Not work connected or not occupational
status, subject to military discipline and law and call of his superior 2. Limitations (intoxication, etc..)
officers at all times, except when he is on vacation leave status; this 3. No notice was given to the employer under Art. 212 of the
doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances
Labor Code
but only those which, although not on official line of duty, are
nonetheless basically police service in character 4. Prescription

Valeriano v ECC
The Court ruled that petitioner's injuries and consequent disability were Good luck, bes.
not work-connected and thus not compensable. Petitioner was not able
to demonstrate solidly how his job as a firetruck driver was related to the
injuries he had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a
purely personal and social function having dinner with some friends
is clear from the records of the case. His injuries were not acquired
at his work place; nor were they sustained while he was performing an
act within the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his
superior. The Court also ruled that the 24-hour-duty doctrine cannot be
applied to petitioner's case, because he was neither at his assigned
work place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met an
accident. But the more important justification for the Court's stance is
that he was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a firetruck
driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his
injuries.

Can a claim for benefit be defeated by the mere fact of separation

from service?

GSIS v Cuanang
In the instant case, the wife of the respondent died a year after her
retirement. Clearly, the period between her retirement and demise was
less than one year. Indeed, if a death which occurred almost four and
one half years after retirement was held to be within the coverage of the
death benefits under PD 626, as in the Manuzon case, with more reason
should a death which occurred within one year after retirement be
considered as covered under the same law. A claim for benefit for such
death cannot be defeated by the mere fact of separation from service.

Further, we agree with the pronouncements of the Court of Appeals that

there was substantial evidence to support respondent's claim. Hence,
the degree of proof required under PD 626 was satisfied, i.e., "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." Probability and not ultimate degree of certainty is
the test of proof in compensation proceedings.

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