The Denied Revolution: Paraguay's Economics of Independence

The Denied Revolution: Paraguay's Economics of Independence
Author(s): Richard Alan White

Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 6, No. 2, Views on Dependency (Spring, 1979), pp.
4-24
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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THE DENIED REVOLUTION:
PARAGUAY'S ECONOMICS OF INDEPENDENCE
by
Richard Alan White *
The political and economic institutions that governed Latin America dur-
ing the colonial era were formulated in Spain to enrich the metropolis, not to
promote the prosperity of America. New World silver and gold, as well as the
primary products produced by the Americans, underwrote centuries of Span-
ish involvement in European power struggles and aristocratic pretensions.
Thus, the imperial structure functioned in such a manner as to appropriate
the enormous wealth of its dependencies. Although a colonizer itself, Spain
was at the same time an economic colony of the more industrialized areas of
Europe. Consequently, to meet its chronic balance of payments deficits, the
great majority of wealth produced in the colonies quickly passed through the
Iberian Peninsula to pay for imported manufactured goods. In this way,
America's wealth served ultimately to finance the industrialization of the
northern European nations.
Latin America's Independence Revolution (1810-1826) removed the politi-
cal and economic Iberian link of the chain which bound them to the world
economic order. Yet, even though breaking these imperial ties, the nascent
Latin American nations, while gaining their political independence, only shift-
ed their economic dependence from Spain directly to the more industrialized
European nations, thereby initiating the neocolonial era.
In concert with its new political and economic status, America's social
structure also underwent some change. The creoles (native elites) assumed
the dominant class position, replacing the Spanish at the top of the social pyr-
amid. This shift in the focus of privilege and power largely accounts for the
extent of, and the severe and durable limits upon, the change in the social
structure brought about by the Wars of Independence. The basic conditions
of life for the vast majority of Latin Americans remained the same: only the
masters changed.
While from our twentieth-century perspective this transfer of power
stands in relief, it was neither an orderly nor a passive changing of the social
The author is a senior Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs. This article is a synthesis of
a section of the author's book, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, published in 1978 by New
Mexico University Press. Alburaueraue, New Mexico, 87131 ($12.95).
4
WHITE: PARAGUAY'S ECONOMICS OF INDEPENDENCE 5
Multifigure with ax and machete fighting with the vulture of imperialism, by Joel Fildrtiga.*
guard; and nowhere in all Latin America did it take such a bloody, complex,
and prolonged course as in the Rio de la Plata region. In the name of the
"causa comun" against Spain, Buenos Aires solicited, and received, solidarity
from the interior provinces. After the Spanish forces had been defeated in the
Rio de la Plata, the porteiios (inhabitants of the port city of Buenos Aires),
sought to impose a strong central government, thereby maintaining their con-
trol over the region's economy. In opposition to this centralist (Unitario) at-
tempt to preserve the political and economic structure of the old Viceroyalty
of la Plata, the autonomists (Federales) fought for a confederation of coequal
provinces. Both factions, or more accurately, tendencies - for diverse provin-
cial interests prevented division exclusively along regional lines - militarily
opposed Portuguese intervention in the Rio de la Plata. Yet, regardless of such
unity against the external threat, there ensued a protracted civil war among
themselves. In fact, it was the civil wars between the Unitarios and the Feder-
ales that began in 1814 which characterized Argentina's early national histo-
ry.
*Dr. Joel Filartiga, the noted Paraguayan physician and artist, contributed the drawings after
reading the Spanish version of this work. Filartiga runs a free medical clinic for the 50,000 inhabi-
tants of the Ybycui valley. Because of his opposition to the regime of Alfredo Stroessner, he has
been arrested and tortured on several occasions. On March 29, 1976, his 17-year-old son, Joelito,
was tortured to death by the Paraguayan police in what appears to have been a futile attempt to
gain information about Filartiga's political activities. His unrelenting efforts to see justice done in
the murder of his son took a dramatic turn last April. The person suspected of leading the Death
Squad, Chief Inspector Americo Penia, was arrested for visa violations in Brooklyn where he had
been living since he was dismissed from the police last year. Evoking a 1789 law that historically
has been used to prosecute pirates regardless of where they committed crimes, Filartiga's lawyers
have filed a $10 million wrongful death suit against Pefia in U.S. Federal Court. It is their conten-
tion that torturers should be considered the modern-day pirates subject to prosecution regardless
of jurisdiction. This potentially precedent-setting case is currently before the U.S. Second Circuit
Court.
Latin American Perspectives: Issue 21, Spring 1979, Vol. VI, No. 2
6 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
Paraguay consitutes the single exception to this historical outline. Under

the leadership of Dr. Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia (1814-1840), this coun-
try not only maintained absolute neutrality in the bloody Rfo de la Plata pow-
er struggle, but also underwent a radical social revolution. Although it is not
the purpose of this essay to elaborate upon the internal process of Paraguay's
early nineteenth-century revolution, a summary of its principal aspects seems
essential to understand the economic policies pursued by the popular regime.'
Following the defeat of the portefio invasion of the province in 1811, the
initial alliance among Paraguayan creoles and Spaniards quickly disintegrat-
ed, resulting in the overthrow of the Spanish administration in mid-May of
the same year. Through a series of astute political maneuvers, Francia utilized
the factionalism that existed among the creoles themselves, who rapidly di-
vided along the lines of the Unitario-Federal struggle that was forming
throughout the region. In 1813 the coalition of creole Federales and the Para-
guayan masses, led by Francia, disenfranchised the creole Unitario faction
from effective political participation and declared the province's indepen-
dence. Within a year the popular forces had succeeded in subordinating the
creole Federal faction and, by the enormous representative congresses of 1814
and 1816, further consolidated their power in the form of electing Francia dic-
tator of the Republic. Once bestowed with this absolute mandate, and in firm
command of the armed forces, Francia began building the foundation of Para-
guay's revolutionary society.
Yet, regardless of its formal declaration of political independence, Para-
guay still had not achieved total independence for it had yet to overcome its
colonial heritage of economic dependence. Trapped 1,200 miles up the Rio de
la Plata, Paraguay's only commercial water route continued to be controlled
by the regional metropolis of Buenos Aires. In 1817, as a punitive measure
against the "rebellious province," the portefios blockaded the river. The re-
sulting devastation of the nation's commerce served as the catalyst for the di-
sastrous 1820 Great Conspiracy to overthrow the popular regime by the Para-
guayan elites, whose privileged position had rested upon the traditional
monocrop export economy.
Once freed from the social and economic constraints imposed by the cre-
ole oligarchy - which was decimated following its aborted counterrevolution
of the early 1820s - the popular regime accelerated its policy of appointing
officials drawn directly from the masses. Francia did not allow the elites to
hold governmental or military positions, thus prohibiting them from exercis-
ing direct power; and through systematic waves of fines and confiscations,
the revolutionary administration further denied them the less direct, but
equally effective, power that money commands.
Along with abolishing the elite's municipal governing cabildo (council),
the revolutionary government controlled the Church and its auxiliary institu-
tions. It banned the Church's brotherhoods, closed its monasteries, and con-
fiscated its landed estates. Nullifying the royal land grants and confiscating
the property of the upper-class conspirators, the government enacted a pro-
found land reform which abolished the traditional latifundia land-tenure sys-
tem. By the time of Francia's death in 1840, well over one-half of Paraguay's
lFor a detailed presentation of the Paraguayan revolution, see White (1976).
rich central region had been established, and tens of thousands of people had
homesteaded farms leased from the state. The private sector of the economy
had to compete with the government which, reducing taxes to a minimum, re-
ceived most of its income from the sale of imported goods, livestock, and
state-produced manufactured products. Through stringent state control and
this sweeping land reform, the popular government diversified the nation's
production - destroying the monocrop economy and developing a balanced
economy which adequately provided for the fundamental needs of all of the
people.
In summary, the Paraguayans dismantled their former dependent class
society, denying the entire upper class - both Spanish and creole - their so-
cial, political, and economic positions of dominance. Together with establish-
ing a strong central government that represented the interests of the vast ma-
jority of its citizens, these measures formed the basis of the nation's unified
resistance to Argentine and European imperialism; thus Paraguay was able to
escape the new dependency suffered by the other provinces of the old Vice-
royalty that continued to be dominated by Buenos Aires as it emerged as the
American sub-metropolis of the neocolonial order.
In full recognition that a nation, to be truly sovereign, must possess eco-
nomic independence as well as political independence, Francia sought to es-
cape the dependency which continued to subordinate Paraguay to the region-
al and world metropolises. In a mid-1822 letter to the Commander of
Concepcion, Francia reviewed relations with Buenos Aires and analyzed
Paraguay's continued dependence:
Buenos Aires, for its own ends, evil desires, and with reprehensible intentions, has been
committing the evil deed and injustice of intercepting the commerce of Paraguay. It does
this not only to keep prices for the products of the commerce high and to deprive Paraguay
of the liberty to provide itself with arms and munitions, but also to steal and swallow up
the whole income of the estates, and products, of Paraguay by means of imposing exces-
sive and intolerable taxes. Paraguay has thus been put in such a vile and truly infamous
dependency that the situation has reached the point where each small town or port on the
route to Buenos Aires (having observed Paraguay's submission and shameful resignation),
wishes to force all the Paraguayan ships that stop there to pay tribute in products, under
the pretext of transit taxes, as if the river were not a free artery of commerce, and as if
they were sovereign rulers or masters of Paraguay (Froncia al Comandante . . . Acosta,
1818).
Francia continued his missive by further explaining the consequences of

such an ignominious and prejudicial procedure, which is destructive of its [Paraguay's]
prosperity, and which in time may cause its slow ruin by the dependency on the portenios.
These [the portenios] keep it in absolute servitude and make it live in tutelage, without al-
lowing it to have more commerce than they wish and when they so desire, prohibiting all
communication, correspondence and commerce with others [nations] after having swal-
lowed up the product of its labor (Froncia al Comandante . . . Acosta, 1818).
Thus, in spite of its declaration of political independence, the nation had

not escaped its colonial heritage of economic dependence. In fact, the reasons
behind Francia's future actions are found in his belief that Paraguay could
not develop until it freed itself from this dependence: "Not until Paraguay lib-
erates itself form this vile dependency and infamous yoke, freeing its general
commerce from such unjust obstacles diametrically opposed and contrary to
its happiness, will it ever be able to prosper, or have the progress that its cir-
La.tin A,,,.ican Perspectives: Issue 21, Sprin~g 1979, Vol. Vl, No. 2
cumstances and the great production of its soil promise" (Francia al Coman-
dante . . . Acosta, 1818).
Indeed, Francia viewed the situation with such gravity that six months
later he announced his intention to send a large military expedition against
the river towns which had been keeping "the Republic in the most infamous
and servile dependency, and in this manner prepare its backwardness, di-
munition and ruin" (Auto Supremo de ... 1823). But before the financing for
the expedition could be organized, the turns of international politics relieved
the necessity of Paraguayan involvement in the Platine civil wars.
Under the shadow of growing war clouds which would burst into the Cis-
-platine War (1825-1828) between Buenos Aires and Brazil, these regional su-
perpowers attempted to improve relations with Paraguay. The portefios re-
laxed the blockade in an effort to secure the necessary Paraguayan
ratification of a preliminary peace agreement with Spain, and hopefully to
fashion a military alliance with Paraguay before the outbreak of war with
Brazil. Yet, regardless of the offer to reestablish commercial and diplomatic
relations (Instrucciones de Garcia Cossio, 1920), none of the correspondence
sent to Francia by the portefno emissary in Corrientes, Juan Garcia de Cossio,
over the course of a year's time (November 1823-October 1824) even elicited a
reply.
In what proved to be of greater significance, Brazil, in early 1823 only

four months after declaring independence from Portugal, reversed its com-
mercial policy toward Paraguay. Freed from European political consider-
ations and thereby no longer required to regard Paraguay as a Spanish pos-
session, the American Empire attempted to drive a wedge into the portefio
effort to reconstruct the political and economic structure of the old Vice-
royalty by officially requesting commercial relations with Paraguay (Jose Pe-
dro Ces ar. . . , 1823:46). Francia, seeking commerce with other independent
states, accepted the Brazilian offer. "For our part," Francia replied, "there is
no objection in trading with the Portuguese in the same way that other peo-
ples of America who have constituted themselves into independent states
have done, and are doing" (Francia al Delegado de Missiones, 1823:298).
In response to this opportunity to reap lucrative profits, Brazilian mer-
chants, who traditionally had been excluded from direct trade with "the giant
province," swarmed into the southeastern border town of Itapuia to partici-
pate in the new commerce. In enormous wagons capable of holding well over
a ton of yerba or tobacco (the nation's principal exports), the traders carried
Paraguayan products across the Missions to the Brazilian town of San Borja.
From there, the goods were transported to Porto Alegre, which served as the
distribution point for Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Rio de Janeiro. Even the
prohibition on exporting precious metals did not dampen the merchants' en-
thusiasm, for in the five-week period from late July to the beginning of Sep-
tember 1823, Itapu'a authorities registered export license requests for more
then 21 tons of tobacco and 131 tons of yerba (El Subdelegado . . ., 1823; Or-
tellado . . ., 1823b; Moringo . . . , 1823).
Unlike Paraguay's previous commercial capitalist economy in which for-
eign and Paraguayan merchants had dominated trade for their own benefit,
Francia now subordinated their interests to those of the local and national
governments. Both the municipal and central governments collected a consid-
erable portion of their taxes in yerba and tobacco.2 But, because the munici-
palities often were unable to sell all these products locally - thereby incur-
ring losses of revenue (Cuenta de Mayordomo de Proprios, 1813) - Francia
decreed that all merchants engaged in the Asunci6n-Itapu'a traffic purchase at
least one-third of the total value of their cargo in yerba from the city of Asun-
cion at one peso per arroba (Decreto Supremo, 1923), the same price that it
sold for in Itapuia (Ortellado . . . , 1823a). Thus, in effect, the state "taxed" the
Paraguayan merchants in the form of free transportation for government pro-
ducts. In fact, during the years of greatest trade (1834-1837), the state even lev-
ied an additional "tax" in the form of establishing "contributions" from the
merchants engaged in the Asuncion-Itapu'a commerce (Cuaderno . . . Contri-
buciones de los Negociantes, 1834-1837).
Further, during times of decreased trade, such as the period of the conflict
with Corrientes (September 1832-June 1834), the government refused licenses
to merchants, giving priority to the actual producers of yerba, tobacco, and
other exportable products. In addition, the state even regulated export li-
censes among these farmers according to the district in which they lived.
Thereby, the government not only insured that all producers had an equal op-
portunity to benefit from their labor, but it also prevented flooding the export
market by controlling the amount of products that were available for export
(Francia al Administrador de Yuti, 1832).
If merchants received the lowest priority under Francia's economic poli-
cies, the national government occupied first place. Collecting a considerable
portion of its revenue in kind, the state, in addition to its monoploy of hard-
woods and shoe soles, possessed large quantities of yerba and tobacco as well
as surplus cattle and hides from its estancias. It collected these various pro-
ducts from the state estancias and tax collectors located throughout the re-
public, and transported them on its own fleet of river craft to the trading cen-
ters (Combrobantes del Libro de Caxa, 1829, 1832; Francia a' Rammirez, 1834b,
1834c, 1834d).
While the state conducted a vigorous trade in metals, textiles, clothing,
and other manufactured goods, of greatest importance was the traffic in arms
and munitions. As an economic incentive to private merchants who would
risk the hazards of bringing war materials up the Rio de la Plata, Francia in
1814 had declared arms and muntions free of import duties (Decreto Supremo
1814c), and shortly thereafter even authorized such merchants to export
precious metals or other highly valued products without paying sales or ex-
port taxes (Decreto Supremo . . . , 1816).
The monopoly of Paraguay's semiprecious hardwoods trade provided the
state with its most powerful economic inducement. Due to the relatively com-
pact bulk and high resale value of these hardwoods, traders stood to gain
enormous profits by selling them in Buenos Aires where they were prized for
the manufacture of fine furniture. Consequently, the government only granted
hardwood export licenses in exchange for arms and munitions. By applying
these economic incentives in varying combinations - depending upon the
quality of the war materials, merchants were exempted from specific taxes
2 Taxes of all types were often paid in kind; indeed some tax records were actually kept in arro-
bas of yerba rather than in pesos. For examples, see Receptorfa de San Estanislao (1828-1832),
Receptoria de la Villa de San Isidro (1832 and 1833), and Receptorfa de la Villa de San Pedro
(1835).
Latin American Pe spectives: Issue 21, Springs 1979, Vol. VI, No. 2
and granted a percentage of their exports in hardwoods - Paraguay managed

to acquire considerable amounts of armaments in spite of the Spanish, Feder-
al, and portefio blockades. For example, in 1818 alone, the state was able to
purchase imported articles of war worth nearly 16,000 pesosA3
During the mid-1820s many of the war materials continued to make their
way up the Rio de la Plata in spite of the harassment of the lower river prov-
inces. During this period trading vessels were occasionally permitted to come
directly to Asuncion,4 but in order to maintain stringent national security and
to exercise tighter control over commerce, Francia gradually shifted the termi-
nal port of entry from the capital to the small southwestern border town of
Pilar.5 But by the late 1820s most military supplies, as well as all other im-
ports, unquestionably came by way of Itapuia and the overland Brazilian
trade route. Although incomplete documentation makes it difficult to deter-
mine precisely the extent of the state arms trade - which continued through-
out the years of Francia's administration6 - its volume can be gauged by the
purchase of 1,000 high-quality rifles and another 1,000 high-quality sabers in
mid-1832 (Francia al Delagado de Itapuia, 1932).
The commonly accepted idea of Paraguayan autarchy during the last half
of Francia's rule has no basis in fact. An examination of the sales-tax receipts
for Pilar and Itapu'a show continuing commerce through both of these ports
during this entire period (see Paraguayan export table). As demonstrated in
the accompanying table, it is evident that a steady, if modest, trade continued
through the river port of Pilar during the last decade of Francia's tenure. But
it was the Itapu'a commerce that proved to be Paraguay's major source of in-
ternational commerce, reaching its peak in 1835 when exports amounted, in
monetary value to 35 percent of total Paraguayan exports during the record
year of 1816; and when private-sector Pilar commerce is added, total private-
sector Paraguayan exports reached 38 percent of 1816 exports7 (Cuadernos de
Recaudacion. . . , 1816).
In addition to the exports from the private sector of the economy, an ac-
curate estimate of total Paraguayan exports during these years must include
the considerable traffic in state trade. Just as with the state arms commerce,
incomplete documentation makes it impossible to determine the precise vol-
ume of other state trade. But its magnitude can be appreciated by the fact that
of the Itapu'a commerce in 1837, state trade accounted for at least 35 percent
of total exports; and the following year accounted for a remarkable 65 percent
3 Cuenta General . . . para el ano de 1818. The seventeen inferior quality cannons included in
this year's purchases elicited a policy statement which noted that "in the future the exportation
of wood will only be permitted by those who bring good and serviceable arms" (Cuenta general
. . .Qano 1818 enero hasta noviembre . . ., 1818 ).
4For examples, see Raz6n del Cargamento de Nuestra Seniora del Rosario (1825a and 1825b), Ra-
z6n del Cargamento de la Goleta . . . (1827), and Los derechos de introduci6n . . . (1827).
5For examples, see Francia al Comandante de Pilar (1826 and 1827).
6Beginning in the early 1830s, the international merchants placed such a high demand upon Para-
guayan shoe soles (due to their compact size, fine quality, and high resale value) that the state ra-
tioned the export of this product in much the same manner as it did with hardwoods. For an ex-
ample of such dealings, see El Delegado de Itapuia a Francia (1831). For other examples of the
Itapuia arms traffic, see Francia al Comandante de Itapuia (1829), Francia al Delegado de Itaputa
(1833 and 1834), Roxas a Francia (1837a, 1837e) and Francia a Roxas (1840a).
7Paraguayan exports in 1816 amounted to 391,233 pesos.
of all exports. Even though these years were exceptional,

mate based upon the available documentation establishes the state as the na-
tion's largest exporter, with an average annual volume of from 15 to 20 per-
cent of total national exports. Thus, when state exports, approximated at 17.5
percent, are added to the private-sector exports, total Paraguayan exports for
1835 were minimally 46 percent of the nation's most "prosperous" year of
1816.
Paraguayan Exports: 1826-1838

(Pesos)
1826 1829 1832 1835 1837 1838
Private Sector Itapu'a Exports 39,038a 48,353a 86,830a 135

Private Sector Pilar Exports NA 16,551b 7,051 14
(Total Private Sector Exports) 64,904 93,881 149,913 103,935 48,063
' c c d d
State Itapula Exports 10,256 18,417 28,749 45,249 66,624
State Pilar Exports 3,510 1,496 3,047 11,347 22,791

(Total State Exports) 13,766 19,912 31,797 56,596 89,415
Total Paraguayan Exports 78,670 113,793 181,710 160,531 137,478
a Comprobantes de Alcabala, Itapua (1826, 1829, 1832, 1835, 1837, 1838).

b Comprobantes de Alcabala, Pilar (1829, 1832, 1835, 1837, 1838).
c These state exports are approximated at 17.5 percent of private-sector exports.
d Compiled from the correspondence of Delegado Casimiro Roxas de Itapuia a Francia
(1837-1838). These are minimum state export figures as the correspondence is obviously
incomplete.
e These state exports are approximated at 35 percent (1837) and 65 percent (1838) of pri-
vate-sector exports as these are the minimal percentages for which documentation is
available for Itapuia during these years.
Aside from being the single most important exporter, the government was
also the nation's principal importer. It not only utilized imported articles in
the state industries and to equip the armed forces, it also sold many of them
to the public through the state store in Asuncion. All imports came under
state regulation, from necessities such as ponchos, to luxury items such as
snuff (Gill . . . , 1827; Francia a' Ramirez, 1834a). Assuming the function of
consumer advocate, Francia forbade the importation of products of inferior
quality (Francia a' Ramirez, 1832b). Even consumer preferences became a con-
sideration, as exemplified by Francia's order to the delegate of Itapu'a to noti-
fy the merchants not to bring any more green or yellow ribbons as "the state
storekeeper here tells me that these two colors are not being purchased"
(Francia a' Ramirez, 1831). Indeed, state imports consisted not only of essen-
tials such as copper, iron, steel, caldrons, knives, hatchets, scissors, doorlocks,
and nails, but also of a variety of "nonessentials" such as books, hats, choco-
late, violin strings, playing cards, and even "513 little wooden dolls, all paint-
ed in colors to be children's toys, and composed of figures of men and wom-
en, and various little animals such as horses, tigers, [and] birds . . . " (Ramo6n
Leon . . . , 1937).
"The reasons for the extraordinarily large amounts of state exports during these years will be d
cussed below.
Latin A,,e,ica, Perspectives: Issue 21, Spring 1979, Vol. Vl, No. 2
Paraguay symbolically nailed to a stake with one arm free, the one which is chained to the vul-
ture of imperialism.
In addition to the preceding information, to understand the full signifi-

cance and functioning of revolutionary Paraguay's international commerce, it
is essential to review several key aspects of Francia's economic policy. Most
importantly, foreign trade was not considered simply the domain of the own-
ers of the means of production and commerce. Consequently, commerce - no
longer conducted by the national and international elite for their own benefit
- was regulated by the Paraguayan state in the interest of the entire popula-
tion.
As the first economic expression of this revolutionary priority, the gov-
ernment prohibited the exportation of gold and silver specie to meet Para-
guay's habitually unfavorable balance of trade payments. Under the tradition-
al dependent trade, commerce suffered not only from the heavy taxation of
the lower-river provinces - which resulted in depressing the prices of-ex-
ports while inflating the cost of imports - but, because the constant siphon-
ing off of specie left Paraguay with a chronic shortage of capital. Its depen-
dency was further deepened by the related necessity of Paraguayan
merchants to rely upon the portefio credit merchants.9 Consequently, as ex-

pounded in one of Francia's first decrees after being elected dictator in 1814,
and reiterated numerous times during the years of his tenure (Orden del Dic-
tador . . . , 1823; Decreto Supremo . . . , 1825), Paraguayan law absolutely
forbade the exportation of precious metals.
Although Francia clearly recognized that "there is no doubt that the
wealth of nations is a nerve and a basis of their defense; and therefore all na-
tions wish to multiply the sources of their riches and the channels which
transport them, believing that the lack of such auxiliary facilities can bring
about their ruin and dissolution" (Decreto Supremo . . ., 1814b), he insisted
that,
The export of precious metals is, however, not essential to maintain external commerce if
the exportable fruits and products that come from the different regions of the Republic are
always greater than the imports that they consume. Consequently, the exportaton of specie
is therefore certainly useless, disadvantageous and prejudicial because, as it does not favor
an equal balance of trade, it would debilitate the State by diminishing its resources (De-
creto Supremo . . , 1814b).
In later years Francia moved to eliminate private, as well as public, for-

eign debt by actually forbidding Paraguayan merchants from contracting for-
eign debts in the course of their business (Francia a' Ramirez, 1832a). In cases
where such indebtedness was incurred, the government not only prohibited
the violator from discharging the debt, but also levied a fine of an equal
amount to be paid to the state treasury (for examples, see ANA, 1835b and
1837).
In conjunction with the above policies, the state regulated external com-
merce by initiating a stringently enforced system of trade licenses which re-
quired all Paraguayans to secure government authorization to export local
products (Decreto Supremo . . ., 1814a), upon which the state set a minimum
price10 (Rengger, 1827:151). Through these and other regulations, the govern-
ment established a planned economy, thereby providing Paraguay with the
means of breaking its traditional economic dependence and maintaining an
equitable balance of trade.
While still enjoying the advantages of their dominant position, members
of the oligarchy had found it advantageous to circumvent such regulations
(Rengger, 1827:192); for Paraguay's traditional monocrop economy - through
its superexploitation of the nation's labor force - had constituted the eco-
nomic foundation of their privileged, although dependent, status. But by the
mid-1820s, with the elimination of the elite as the dominant economic, politi-
cal, and social force, the traditional dependent commerce was no longer ac-
ceptable; indeed, it was intolerable.
Within the context of these nationalist priorities, the unexpected arrival
at Pilar of a portefio trading vessel was viewed with deep suspicion. As most
of the great quantities of goods that the ship carried were destined for con-
signment and did not have the proper Paraguayan trade licenses, the entire
matter appeared as if it might be an attempt to subvert Paraguay's commer-
cial policies. Fearing that the acceptance of the goods would "give grounds to
9For a detailed discussion of Paraguay's traditional dependence, see White (1975:417-433).
10For a discussion of the reasons determining export prices, see Francia A Ramfrez (1829). In addi-
tion, as Rengger reported, the government also established maximum prices on retail sales; see
Vazquez (1962:555-560).
Latin Americcm Perspectives. Issue 21, Spring 1979, Vol. VI, No. 2
those who wish to impute our government of being inconsistent," Francia

ordered the schooner to return downstream without unloading its cargo
(Francia a] Comandante de Pilar, 1825). Further, he suspected that the consid-
erable quantity of unlicensed goods belonged to the English who, together
with the portefios, planned to enmesh the nation in commercial conflicts.
Francia believed that in reality the incident was a machination of the porte-
fios, "to keep Paraguay in dependency, and to see if finally they can obtain its
submission" (Francia a] Comandante de Pilar, 1825).
Once again reiterating the demand for free navigation, Francia under-
scored his commitment to his nations independence - defined in economic
terms as the opposite of Paraguay's traditional dependence - in his message
to the portefio merchants:
When the flag of the Republic is allowed free navigation to the sea, all that come to trade
will be admitted and then commerce will be organized as is best suitable and in a manner
that is beneficial to the Paraguayans, and not only 'as it has been until now, for the exploi-
tation and profit of the foreigners (Francia a] Comandante de Pilar, 1825).
It is this critical distinction between free navigation and the organization

of a Paraguayan commerce in a manner beneficial to Paraguay which serves
as the key to understanding the nation's economy; for Francia did not equate
the concepts of free navigation and free trade. While consistently demanding
the right of free navigation for Paraguayan vessels - a central aspect of
breaking its dependency upon foreign transportation of its exports and im-
ports - Francia never confused this concept with that of free trade.
Francia consistently maintained that independent "nations only have
trade with whom they want, when and how they want, and when it accom-
modates them, stopping when they find it convenient for whatever reason"
(Francia a) Comandante . . . Acosta, 1818). Indeed, upon learning that the
Commander of Concepcion had informed the Brazilians that the object of the
American "causa comun" was unrestrained commercial trade, Francia severe-
ly admonished him: "If anyone makes a similar response, and knows all of
the meaning and significance that can be given to such an expression, without
doubt he has done so in profound and extreme malice; and if not, it is neces-
sary to say that he is an idiot, that without knowing what this means he has
impertinently rattled off an absurdity" (Francia a) Comandante . . . Acosta,
1818).
Exemplifying the priorities and functioning of Paraguayan commerce is
the typical transaction conducted with a female Spanish merchant who ar-
rived at Pilar in late 1825 with a large shipment of imports which she wished
to trade for yerba. Following standard procedure, the delegate of Pilar sent a
detailed report to Asuncion listing the quantities and quality of the merchan-
dise, the price that the Andalusa claimed to have paid for them in Buenos
Aires, and her declaration that she was prepared to accept the yerba at what-
ever price Francia assigned (Gill . . ., 1825). Francia reviewed the prices of
the imports, and even though they were greatly inflated according to the pub-
lished prices found in the portenlo gazettes that he regularly received, he
agreed to a transaction. Authorizing the delegate to exchange specified
amounts of state yerba for each of her products, Francia noted the exaggerat-
ed prices, but, as he explained, "this does not matter, because the contract
that is offered her is not based upon the concept of fixed values" (Francia a)
Delegado de Pilar, 1825). And by "fixed values" Francia meant the price that
items would fetch on the open market.
In organizing Paraguayan international commerce, Francia rejected the
classic liberal concept of the market place where the laws of supply and de-
mand determined the prices of commodities. Indeed, the liberal capitalist eco-
nomic institution of "free trade" served as the basis of nineteenth-century
economic imperialism. The world metropolises, due to their industrial and
technological advantages, could "naturally" set the prices of their manufac-
tured goods low enough to undersell local production - thereby prohibiting
the development of industry in the neocolonies - yet high enough so that
these nations chronically incurred a negative balance of trade payment. Con-
sequently, the deficit had to be discharged by transferring specie and capital;
and by thus constantly siphoning off the accumulated wealth, the metropo-
lises prospered while the Latin American nations found themselves without
the necessary capital to develop their economies.
Jose Antonio Vaizquez captured the fundamental nature of nineteenth-
century economic liberalism when he succinctly observed: "Liberalism in Eu-
rope, in the mouth of Victor Hugo, is Liberalism. Liberalism in the former
Spanish colonies, in the mouth of Rivadavia or Mitre, is only colonialism"
(Va-zquez, 1962:70).
After the elimination of the oligarchy from their- dominant economic posi-
tion in the early 1820s, Francia was able to avoid this dilemma by not basing
international commerce on open market prices, or in his own words, "upon
the concept of fixed values." Although the price of imports certainly was a
contributing factor, the classic capitalist market function of exchanging
commodities upon the basis of their prices exercised only minimal influence;
for Francia did not permit the terms of Paraguayan trade to be determined by
regional or world market prices. Instead, he organized the exchange of
Paraguay's exports - defined explicitly by Francia as "the product of its
labor" (Francia al Comandante de Concepci6n, 1822) - upon the amount of
labor required for their production, in relation to the utility of the imports.
In the case of state trade, the mechanism for accomplishing this was rela-
tively simple: the government set by fiat the amounts of each native product
that would be exchanged for specified amounts of imports after evaluating
their usefulness." For all remaining trade the state assured an equitable ex-
change by adjusting the prices of exports to the prices of imports.
The application of this economic principle is best illustrated in the price
differentials found in Itapu'a and Pilar. As overland transportation was con-
siderably more expensive and time consuming than river traffic, the price of
imports at Itapu'a was accordingly greater than in Pilar. Consequently, rather
than basing the Itapuia commerce upon the fixed prices of Paraguayan ex-
ports - which considering the high cost of Itapuia exports would have meant
accepting significantly fewer imports or incurring a deficit in the balance of
trade - Francia gradually raised the price of exports to compensate for the
expensive imports. In 1823 the prices of Paraguay's principal exports - yerba
and tobacco - were 80 and 200 pesos a ton respectively, both in Pilar and
"'Indeed, as particular products were no longer necessary due to the development of the Para-
guayan economy, which came to produce many traditional imports, Francia simply prohibited
their further importation. See Castro a Francia (1830) for such a prohibition on flour, oil, and ol-
ives.
Lati,n American Perspectives Issue 21, Spring 1979, Vol. VI, No. 2
Itapuha. While the price of th

the years of Francia's tenure, by 1826 the government had raised them to 120
and 320 pesos respectively in Itapuia, and further, to 180 and 400 pesos respec-
tively by 1829 - an increase of 125 percent in the price of yerba and 100 per-
cent in the price of tobacco at Itapu'a over the cost of these same products be-
ing sold in Pilar at the same time (for archival references, see Paraguayan
export table). Additionally, Francia forced the Brazilian merchants to accept
both old and fresh yerba, and tobacco, without allowing any price distinction
(Comerciantes Brasileiros . . . , 1829) while the merchants trading at Pilar
were subjected to such regulations only in the case of tobacco, being permit-
ted to purchase the yerba fuerte at a mere 40 pesos a ton (for archival refer-
ences, see table).
Thus, by not basing commerce on open market prices - but rather upon
the utility of imports in relation to the amount of labor required to produce
the exports - Paraguay acquired its imports in exchange for its exports with-
out incurring a deficit in the balance of trade. Furthermore, by thus organiz-
ing commerce "in a manner beneficial to the Paraguayans," the nation neces-
sarily did not provide an "open" market where the industrialized European
countries could sell their products without limit as to price or utility. It is only
within this context that Paraguay was "closed" to international commerce, for
the nation's state-controlled economy excluded the establishment of the clas-
sic capitalist "free market."
Francia's economic nationalism not only led Paraguay out of the depen-
dent status of formal Spanish colonialism, but, by rejecting the structurally
inequitable concept of free trade, it prevented capitalist penetration of its
economy, thereby denying the new imperialists the opportunity of reducing
Paraguay to the status of a dependent neocolony. Therefore, it is understand-
able that Paraguay - unique in its successful opposition to the emerging neo-
colonial order - became the object not only of portenio aggression, but also of
English ambition.
As background to Britain's position, it should be noted that English diplo-

macy at this time centered upon forming alliances with the American metro-
polises. Due to the mutual interests of the European metropolis and its Ameri-
can sub-metropolises in reconstructing the splintered administrative units of
the old Viceroyalties into politically and economically unified neocolonial na-
tions, Britain's diplomatic design completely disregarded provincial or region-
al self-determination. Realizing that political and economic stability constitut-
ed the principal prerequisite for reliable sources of primary materials to feed
their industries, as well as for sustained markets of their manufactured goods,
England saw that the advantages of such alliances rested in the fact that the
metropolitan centers constituted the only force capable of stabilizing the ram-
pant political chaos and economic dislocations in both the production and
distribution sectors of the American economies. In turn, the American metro-
polises, through their monopoly of international trade, were able to maintain
their domination over the provincial economies, which thus remained depen-
dent upon these commercial centers to market their exports and purchase
their imports.12
With the end of the Cisplatine War (1825-1828), renewed agitation for war
against Paraguay swept Buenos Aires. Although partially motivated by inter-
nal political considerations, the invasion would, as the British consul in Bue-
nos Aires informed the Foreign Office, serve the double purpose of "rich
Plunder," and more importantly as far as Sir Woodbine Parish was con-
cerned, "of assuring once more an intercourse with that rich Country and the
rest of the World" ("Woodbine Parish Papers" [4]:348). Of course, the British
consul was not interested in such intercourse in the abstract, but rather be-
cause his nation planned to dominate the potentially enormous markets of
Paraguay; for as Mr. Hope, an English agent in Corrientes, had informed him
in a confidential report the previous year: "I suppose, was the trade open,
about one million and a half dollars [i.e., pesos] worth chiefly of British Man-
ufactures might be annually introduced there" ("Woodbine Parish Papers"
[7]:348).
It is no accident, then, that the intense propaganda campaign conducted
in the portefio press was led by the influential British Packet and Argentine
News, which enthusiastically supported the "expedition to liberate Para-
guay." Emphasizing the commercial opportunities to be gained from the new
markets that would be "opened," the paper's October 1, 1828, editorial
pressed for the attack against Paraguay: "We think that those who reflect
upon these advantages, will agree that the attempt to open the trade of Para-
guay is worth a few sacrifices" (The British Packet and Argentine News [117],
October 1, 1828).
But once again the turns of Platine politics favored Paraguay. Due to an-
other outbreak of civil war which drew attention away from efforts to resub-
jugate Paraguay, the British-supported Argentine invasion had to be aban-
doned.
In fact, the triumph of the powerful Argentine caudillo Juan Manuel de
Rosas (1829-1831 and 1835-1852) resulted in a shift of policy toward Paraguay.
With his resources taxed by Platine faction fighting, military compaigns
against the native inhabitants of the interior, and international conflicts, Ro-
sas' primary concern was that the republic remain neutral. Satisfied that
Francia had no intention of breaking his longstanding policy of noninterven-
tion in the region's civil disputes, Rosas sought to assure Paraguayan neutral-
ity by also assuming a nonantagonistic position.
Regardless of the improved relations with the port, the harassment of the
lower river provinces kept the Pilar trade at a modest level throughout the
1830s; and during the latter half of the decade, the Itapu'a trade suffered a de-
cline due to the Farroupilho Revolt (1835-1845), a bloody secessionist move-
12For a remarkably clear example of the functioning of England's diplomatic design, see the series
of letters between the newly appointed British consul in Buenos Aires, Sir Woodbine Parish, and
Francia found in Parish a Francia (1824); Francia a Parish (1825); and Parish i Francia (1825). At-
tempting to "open Paraguay for free trade," Parish, completely misreading the nature of the Para-
guayan revolution, offered to enter into trade negotiations and even recommend to the English
Crown that a commercial consul be named to reside in Asunci6n; but in order to do so, the Eng-
lishman emphasized, it was "absolutely essential that first of all a preliminary accord be reached
between the government of said State [Paraguay] and that of the United Provinces of the Rio de
la Plata ...." In effect, Parish demanded that Paraguay sacrifice its hard-won independence
for the sake of British trade.
ment in the southern Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul, through which all
of its commerce passed, further leading to a new round of civil war which en-
gulfed the entire Rio de la Plata by 1838. Uruguayan factional strife, which
began several years earlier, had merged with the continuing autonomists'
struggle to oppose portefio domination in the Argentine Confederation. Com-
pleting this already complex picture, the French, irritated by Rosas' refusal to
extend them the privileges of the 1825 British-Argentine commercial treaty,
blockaded Buenos Aires and supplied military aid to anti-Rosas forces both in
Uruguay and Argentina from 1838 to 1840.
The principal effect of these upheavals upon Paraguayan commerce was

the disruption of its supplies of European-manufactured goods because for-
eign ships found it increasingly difficult to work their way into the harassed
and often blockaded ports of Porto Alegre, Montevideo, and Buenos Aires.
Consequently, beginning in 1836, Brazilian merchants arriving at Itapu'a, un-
able to acquire sufficient imported commodities, began bringing greater
amounts of gold to exchange for Paraguayan products.13
In turn, the private-export sector of the Paraguayan economy, stagnated

by the scarcity of imports, suffered a drastic decline (see Paraguayan exports
table). Normally, in a free-market export economy governed by the laws of
supply and demand, such conditions can produce rampant inflation of not
only the scarce imports but, due to the saturation of specie, can also cause the
prices of even local commodities to rise. While, as discussed above, the roots
of economic dependence extend deep into structural inequities, it is precisely
such crises - whether they be the result of "normal readjustments" in the
world economy or due to "unrelated political developments" - that epito-
mize the dependency of export economies by vividly demonstrating that their
prosperity is dependent upon forces completely outside of their control. Left
to the functioning of the capitalist world-market economy, even such appar-
ently accidental incidents as civil strife along trade routes, to say nothing of
deliberate economic manipulations, may very well plunge these dependent
national economies into major depressions. But, reflecting the effectiveness of
Paraguay's economic policies and the subsequent strength of the national
economy, the value of Paraguayan exports actually increased during the last
years of the decade.
Paraguay, like all the former colonies, had chronically suffered from a
scarcity of specie. But under state control the internal exchange rate of gold
remained constant during the last fifteen years of Francia's administration at
17.3 pesos fuertes14 to an ounce of gold.15 As a means of acquiring more hard
currency, the government set the international exchange rate at 17.75 pesos
"For examples, see Miguel Sompayo do Comercio do Brasil a Tesoureria do Estodo (1836), Roxas
a Froncia (1837b, 1838a, 1839b, 1840).
14During this entire period Paraguay did not issue a national currency, but continued using the
Spanish-minted peso fuerte and peso corriente. The relationship between the two remained con-
stant throughout Francia's tenure, with the peso corriente being valued at three percent less than
the peso fuerte. For examples of conversions, see Cuento de Mayordomo de Proprios (1815, 1835,
1840).
"For examples of conversions from gold to pesos fuertes, see Cuento General de dinero efectivo
(1825-1826, 1831, 1838, 1840).
fuertes per ounce of gold,16 thereby providing merchants with an incentive to

trade in gold, as they would realize a 2.6 percent appreciation over the value
of Paraguayan currency. For example, in the yerba trade at Itaputa, merchants
exchanging their gold at the international exchange rate could then purchase
yerba at an effective price of 175.3 pesos per ton rather than the established
price of 180 pesos per ton.17
But by the mid-1830s, due to the accumulated effects of Paraguay's eco-
nomic policies, the nation no longer suffered from a shortage of hard curren-
cy, and therefore the government actually depreciated the value of the in-
creasing amounts of gold that began flowing into Itapuia. Beginning in 1836,
Francia reduced the amounts of native products that would be exchanged for
each ounce of gold.18 Again Itapu'a yerba serves as a convenient example.
Rather than exchanging yerba at an effective price of 175.3 pesos per ton in
transactions conducted for gold, from this date onward Francia set an effec-
tive price of 204 pesos per ton'9 - thus appreciating the value of Paraguayan
yerba by a full 16 percent.
Even though price fluctuations are common in export economies, the sig-
nificance of the appreciation in the value of Paraguayan exports lay in the
fact that the increase was the result of an active policy on the part of the
Paraguayan state, rather than a passive reflection of external forces.
An even more important demonstration of the effectiveness of Paraguay's
state-controlled economy can be seen in the fact that the severity of the de-
pression suffered in the private sector - which grew increasingly worse as
the decade came to a close in spite of the elimination of the special tax on the
Asuncion-Itapu'a traffic (Cuaderno . . . , 1834,1837) - did not extend to the
overall national economy. Although in 1837 and 1838 private-sector exports
declined 31 and 68 percent respectively in relation to their 1835 level, total na-
tional exports declined only 12 percent in 1837 and 24 percent in 1838 (see ta-
ble).
In order to achieve such remarkable economic stabilization, the state in-
tervened where the private sector failed to fulfill the nation's needs by pro-
viding marketing and transportation facilities for Paraguay's widespread in-
ternal trading centers. This was accomplished by utilizing its commercial fleet
of fifteen vessels (Libro de Receptor de yerba, 1838) which transversed the re-
public buying local products and transporting them to Itapuia (for examples,
see Roxas a' Francia, 1837f, 1839a and Francia a Roxas, 1838, 1840a). The gov-
ernment - in possession of these additional quantities of yerba, tobacco, and
hides which augmented the already considerable amounts normally collected
16Ramirez cites as the customary exchange rate 17 pesos fuertes and 6 reales, or 17.75 pesos
fuertes, per ounce of gold (Ramirez a Francia, 1830). As a point of clarification, it should be noted
that 8 reales equaled one peso.
'7Since at the established price of 180 pesos per ton, 17.3 pesos equals .0961 tons and 17.75 pesos
equals .0986 tons, the difference of .0025 tons represents an increase of 2.6 percent.
'8For an example, see Roxas a Francia (1837c) in which the Delegate of Itapua noted that Francia
had refused an offer to exchange 120 ounces of gold for 12.5 tons of yerba, insisting instead upon
146 ounces - an effective price of 202 pesos per ton.
'9For examples, see Roxas a Francia (1837d) in which the delegate informed Francia that his de-
mand of 220 ounces of gold for 18.75 tons of yerba - an effective price of 203 pesos per ton-
was accepted by the Brazilian merchant; and Roxas a Francia (1838b) in which the delegate in-
formed Francia of another transaction in which 80 ounces of gold was exchanged for 6.75 tons of
yerba - an effective price of 205 pesos per ton.
Machete striking the vulture of imperialism.
from its own estancias and through taxation was thus able to offset the
collapse of the private sector by increasing state exports to account for at
least 35 percent of all national exports in 1837 and 65 percent of total exports
in 1838 (see table).
Further mitigating the effects of the economic crisis, the government filled
its vessels on their return voyages with imports, and products from Para-
guay's diverse regions, which it then offered for sale to the public (Informe
. . ., 1839). The magnitude of state control of, and participation in, the na-
tional economy during these years is demonstrated by the massive increase in
state sales. In inverse proportion to the declining commerce in the private sec-
tor in relation to its 1835 level, profits from state sales increased 98 percent by
1837, rising to 168 percent 1838, temporarily dipping to 88 percent in 1839, be-
fore growing to an incredible 244 percent in 1840.20
It was this massive state intervention and the corresponding degree of
2OCalculated upon statistics found in the Paraguayan National Budgets (1835, 1837, 1838, 1839, and
1840).
control that such participation provided - combined with the rejection of the
inherently unequal concept of free trade - that distinguished Paraguay's
economy from those of all other Latin American nations of the epoch. Unlike
its semi-independent, neocolonial sister states, whose dependent economies
served to enrich the local elite and the capitalist world metropolises, Para-
guay, by establishing an autonomous economic as well as political system,
had truly won its full independence.
Through the destruction of the oligarchy's dominant position and the
radical reorientation of its international commerce, Paraguay did not permit
its riches to be consumed by the national elite nor siphoned off to the region-
al or world metropolises. And although these same forces finally united to
overthrow the popular regime in the genocidal War of the Triple Alliance
(1864-1870), until that time the state assured that the product of Paraguay's la-
bor - the nation's wealth - remained within Paraguay to benefit the original
producers of that wealth - the people of Paraguay.
REFERENCES
ANA (Archivo Nacional de Asunci6n)

1831* September 1 (LC [Libro do Caja] 34, entry 477)
1835a February 6 (LC 38, entry 49)
1835b February 19 (LC 38)
1837 September 30 (LC 40)
1840a July 19 (LC 43, entry 378)
1840b August 1 (LC 43, entry 393)
Auto Supremo de 20 de enero de 1823

1823 (BNRJ [Biblioteca Nacional, Rio de Janeiro], CAS [Cuaderno de Auto Supremos] IV- 17,
2, 8)
Castro a Francia
1830 February 27 (ANA, SH [Secci6n Hist6rical 394)
Comerciantes Brosileros a Froncia
1829 October 2 (ANA, NE [Nueva Encuadernaci6n] 1252)
Comprobantes de Alcabala, Itopio . . .

1826 (ANA, NE 1243, 1244)
1829 (ANA, NE 2569, 2570)
1832 (ANA, NE 2583, 2584)
1835 (ANA, NE 2592, 2593, 2596-2599)
1837 (ANA, NE 2969-2973)
1838 (ANA, NE 1304-1307)
Comprobontes de Alcabolo, Pilar . . .

1829 (ANA, NE 1835)
1832 (ANA, NE 1858)
1835 (ANA, NE 1881)
1837 (ANA, NE 1886)
1838 (ANA, NE 3128)
Comprobantes del Libro de Coxo

1829 November 9 (ANA, NE 1854)
1832 February (ANA, NE 1865)
Cuaderno . . . Contribuci6n de los Negociontes

1843-1837 (ANA, NE 1871)
Cuadernos de Recaudoci6n por el Derecho de Siso sobre los frutos exportados . . .

1816 (ANA, NE 1826)
*The reference date for all sources taken from the Archivo Nacional de Asunci6n and th
Biblioteca Nacional, Rio de Janeiro, are to the actual document not the date of publication.
Latin Americon Perspectives- Issue 21, Spring 1979, Vol. VI, No. 2
Cuenta de Mayordomo de Proprios (Asunci6n) . . .

1813 (ANA, NE 1188)
1815 (ANA, NE 1232)
1835 February 6, entry 49 (ANA, LC 38)
1840 August 1, entry 393 (ANA, LC 43)
Cuenta General . . . ano 1818 . . . enero hasta noviembre . . .

1818 January 20 entry (ANA, NE 1224)
Cuenta General . . . para el ano de 1818

1818 December 31 entry (ANA, NE 1230)
Cuenta General de dinero efectivo

1825-1826 December 8, 1825, entry (ANA, NE 2922)
1831 September 1, entry 477 (ANA, LC 34)
1838 January 4, entry 24 (ANA, LC 41)
1840 July 19, entry 387 (ANA, LC 43)
Decreto Supremo de . . .
1814a November 4 (ANA, SH 223)
1814b November 13 (ANA, SH 223)
1814c December 12 (ANA, SH 223)
1816 September 8 (ANA, SH 223)
1823 September 12 (ANA, SH 237)
1825 November 3 (ANA, SH 237)
Delegado Casimiro Roxas de Itapua a Francia

1837 January 12 to November 30, 1837 (ANA, SH 377)
1838 January 3 to December 31 (ANA, SH 377 AND 378)
El Delegado de Itapua a Francia

1831 November 16 (ANA, NE 1273)
Los derechos de introducci6n y Alcabala correspondientes a los efectos que ha introducido

por el Rfo en esta Ciudad . . .
1827 June 7 (ANA, LC 27)
Francia a Parish
1825 January 26 (BNRJ, CRB [Colegao Rio Branco] I-30, 7, 38)
Francia a Ramfrez
1829 June 14 (ANA, SH 240)
1831 April 12 (ANA, SH 241)
1832a January 9 (ANA, SH 241)
1832b May 19 (ANA, SH 241)
1834a May 14 (ANA, SH 242)
1834b October 8 (ANA, SH 242)
1834c November 6 (ANA, SH 242)
1834d December 13 (ANA, SH 242)
Francia a Roxas
1838 October 27 (ANA, SH 243)
1840a May 25 (ANA, SH 244)
1840b August 3 (ANA, SH 244)
Francia al Administrador de Yutf

1832 October 9 (ANA, SH 241)
Francia al Comandante de Concepci6n

1822 August 12 (ANA, SH 235)
Francia al Comandante de Concepci6n, Fernando Acosta

1818 June 23 (ANA, SH 228)
Francia al Comandante de Pilar

1825 August 31 (BNRJ, CRB I-29, 23, 27)
1826 May 8 and September 15 (ANA, SH 238)
1827 August 8, 1827 (ANA, SH 294)
Francia al Delegado de Itapuia

1829 June 24 (ANA, SH 240)
1832 August 12 (ANA, SH 241)
1833 February 27 (ANA, SH 242)
1834 September 3, November 28, and December 27 (ANA, SH 242)
Francia a0 Delegado de Missiones

1823 March (BNRJ, CRB), in Julio Cesar Chaves, El supremo dictador, Madrid, 1964
Francia al Delegado de Pilar

1825 December 12 (ANA, NE 708)
Gill a Francia
1825 December 4 (ANA, SH 393)
1827 July 4 (ANA, NE 2568)
Informe del Delegado de Concepci6n a Francia

1839 December 16 (ANA, NE 1900)
Instrucciones de Garcia Cossfo

1920 Documentos para la historia argentina, XIII, Buenos Aires
Jos6 Pedro Cesar a Jos6 Norberto Ortellano

1823 February 1 (BNRJ, CRB I-30, 21, 86) San Borja, in R. Antonio Ramos, La politico del Bra-
sil en el Paraguay: bajo la dictadura del Dr. Francia, Asunci6n, 1943
Libro de Receptor de yerba

1838 (AA, NE 1900)
Miguel Samnpayo do Comercio do Brasil a Tesoureria do Estado

1836 December 12, Itapua (ANA, ME 1886)
Moringo a Ortellado
1823 September 2 and 4 (BNRJ, CRB I-29, 23, 28)
Orden del Dictador de la Republica

1823 August 20 (BNRJ, CRB I-29, 23, 28)
Ortellado a Francia
1823a March 8, 1823 (BNRJ, CRB I-19, 23, 28)
1823b July 27 and August 7, 1823 (BNRJ, CRB I-29, 23, 28)
Paraguayan National Budgets

1835 (LC 38)
1837 (LC40)
1838 (LC 41)
1839 (LC 42)
1840 (LC 43)
Parish a Francia
1824 July 17 (BNRJ, CRB I-30, 7, 38)
1825 April 14 (BNRJ, CRB I-30, 6, 38)
Ramirez a Francia
1830 October 23 (BNRJ, CRB I-20, 2, 6)
Ram6n Leon a Francia

1837 March 4 (ANA, NE 1894)
Raz6n del Cargamento de la Goleta perteneciente a Don Jos6 Manuel Isara

1827 January 3 (ANA, NE 1849)
Raz6n del Cargamento de Nuestra Senora del Rosario

1825a March 21 (ANA, NE 1825)
1825b October 17 (ANA, NE 1845)
Receptoria de la Villa de San Isidro . . .

1832 and 1833 (ANA, NE 1863)
Receptoria de la Villa de San Pedro

1835 (ANA, NE 1879)
Latin American Perspectives, Issue 21, Spring 1979, Vol. VI, No. 2
Receptoria de San Estanislao . . .

1828-1832 (ANA, NE 1865)
Rengger, Johann Rudolph

1827 The Reign of Doctor Joseph Gaspar Roderick de Francia in Paraguay, London
Roxas a Francia
1837a February 4 (ANA, SH 377)
1837b February 10 (ANA, SH 377)
1837c April 4 (ANA, NE 1890)
1837d April 19 (ANA, SH 377)
1837e May 29 (ANA, NE 1893)
1837f June 30 (ANA, SH 377)
1838a February 19 (ANA, SH 377)
1838b February 27 (ANA, SH 377)
1838c April 27 (ANA, SH 377)
1839a March 12 (ANA, SH 378)
1839b December 1 (ANA, SH 378)
1840 June 21 (ANA, SH 378)
El Subdelegado de Santiago a Francia

1823 September 4 (BNRJ, CRB I-29, 23, 28)
Vazquez, Jos6 Antonio

1962 El doctor Francia, visto y oido por sus contemporaneos, Asunci6n
White, Richard Alan

1975 "The Political Economy of Paraguay and the Impoverishment of the Missions," The
Americas, XXXI (April 1975), 417-433
1976 "America's First Radical Revolution: The Political Economy of Popular Paraguay (1810-
1840)," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA
"Woodbine Parish Papers" (4)

1828 Woodbine Parish to the Earl of Aberdeen, September 28 (Public Records Office, Lon-
don Foreign Office 354) in John Williams, "Woodbine Parish and the 'Opening' of Para-
guay," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, CXVI (August)
"Woodbine Parish Papers" (7)

1827 Mr. Hope to Mr. Parish, Corrientes, March 17, 1827 (Public Records Office, London For-
eign Office 354) in John Williams, "Woodbine Parish and the 'Opening' of Paraguay," Pro-
ceedings of the American Philosophical Society, CXVI (August)

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The Denied Revolution: Paraguay's Economics of Independence

Author(s): Richard Alan White

Paraguay consitutes the single exception to this historical outline. Under

lFor a detailed presentation of the Paraguayan revolution, see White (1976).

Francia continued his missive by further explaining the consequences of

Thus, in spite of its declaration of political independence, the nation had

In what proved to be of greater significance, Brazil, in early 1823 only

and granted a percentage of their exports in hardwoods - Paraguay managed

of all exports. Even though these years were exceptional,

Paraguayan Exports: 1826-1838

Private Sector Itapu'a Exports 39,038a 48,353a 86,830a 135

State Pilar Exports 3,510 1,496 3,047 11,347 22,791

a Comprobantes de Alcabala, Itapua (1826, 1829, 1832, 1835, 1837, 1838).

In addition to the preceding information, to understand the full signifi-

merchants to rely upon the portefio credit merchants.9 Consequently, as ex-

In later years Francia moved to eliminate private, as well as public, for-

those who wish to impute our government of being inconsistent," Francia

It is this critical distinction between free navigation and the organization

Itapuha. While the price of th

As background to Britain's position, it should be noted that English diplo-

The principal effect of these upheavals upon Paraguayan commerce was

In turn, the private-export sector of the Paraguayan economy, stagnated

fuertes per ounce of gold,16 thereby providing merchants with an incentive to

Machete striking the vulture of imperialism.

ANA (Archivo Nacional de Asunci6n)

Auto Supremo de 20 de enero de 1823

Comprobantes de Alcabala, Itopio . . .

Comprobontes de Alcabolo, Pilar . . .

Comprobantes del Libro de Coxo

Cuaderno . . . Contribuci6n de los Negociontes

Cuadernos de Recaudoci6n por el Derecho de Siso sobre los frutos exportados . . .

Cuenta de Mayordomo de Proprios (Asunci6n) . . .

Cuenta General . . . ano 1818 . . . enero hasta noviembre . . .

Cuenta General . . . para el ano de 1818

Cuenta General de dinero efectivo

Delegado Casimiro Roxas de Itapua a Francia

El Delegado de Itapua a Francia

Los derechos de introducci6n y Alcabala correspondientes a los efectos que ha introducido

Francia al Administrador de Yutf

Francia al Comandante de Concepci6n

Francia al Comandante de Concepci6n, Fernando Acosta

Francia al Comandante de Pilar

Francia al Delegado de Itapuia

Francia a0 Delegado de Missiones

Francia al Delegado de Pilar

Informe del Delegado de Concepci6n a Francia

Instrucciones de Garcia Cossfo

Jos6 Pedro Cesar a Jos6 Norberto Ortellano

Libro de Receptor de yerba

Miguel Samnpayo do Comercio do Brasil a Tesoureria do Estado

Orden del Dictador de la Republica

Paraguayan National Budgets

Ram6n Leon a Francia

Raz6n del Cargamento de la Goleta perteneciente a Don Jos6 Manuel Isara

Raz6n del Cargamento de Nuestra Senora del Rosario

Receptoria de la Villa de San Isidro . . .

Receptoria de la Villa de San Pedro

Receptoria de San Estanislao . . .

Rengger, Johann Rudolph

El Subdelegado de Santiago a Francia

Vazquez, Jos6 Antonio

White, Richard Alan

"Woodbine Parish Papers" (4)

"Woodbine Parish Papers" (7)

The Denied Revolution: Paraguay's Economics of Independence

The Denied Revolution: Paraguay's Economics of Independence