Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A B S T R A C T . The
purpose of this article is a pragmatic interpretation of
utterances. In particular, the analysis aims at apprehending illocutionary
intention, as understood by Bach and Harnish (1979), in George W. Bushs
speeches and statements. I also investigate how the speaker carries his
discourse during the time period analysed. Here, I point to Scollon and
Scollons (2000) discussion of the theory of anticipatory discourse (the four
variables rapport with the audience, hostility towards the enemy, positive
self-presentation of the government and the speaker and rapport with the
people of Iraq measured in the course of the analysis and illustrated in the
figures make the problem in question clear). Additional comments are also
made concerning some distinctive features of the speakers discourse strategies
which belong to the area of rhetoric as broadly understood. The time period
chosen, covering Bushs principal speeches and statements, enabled me to
investigate the communicative action of the speaker during the recent conflict
between Iraq and the US. I analysed altogether some 44 speeches and
statements delivered during the given time period. That makes up for the
2,229 communicative acts identified for the total of 2,203 sentences analysed.
The framework used for the analysis is the one proposed by Bach and Harnish
(1979), i.e. the intention and inference approach, according to which
communicative acts are classified in terms of the kind of attitude each act
expresses. Thus, each utterance was classified as a particular subtype of the
four broad types of communicative illocutionary acts. Finally, I conclude by
trying to gather and comment on the crucial entities found in Bushs speeches
and statements.
1. Introduction
In this article I wish to analyze, employing the terminology of Bach and Harnish
(1979), communicative intention in George W. Bushs speeches and statements
during the period from 11 September 2001 to 11 September 2003. The key
theoretical concept of the present analysis is intentionality. However, before I
proceed with presenting the concept in question and the methodological frame-
work, my use of the term pragmatic analysis requires some clarification. Its use is
strictly connected with my understanding of pragmatics. Thus, I take it with
Kryk-Kastovsky (2002) who in her Synchronic and Diachronic Investigations in
Pragmatics consistently and convincingly accounts for Verschuerns view on
pragmatics: Pragmatics is understood . . . not as a separate language
component/module, but . . . as a perspective extending like an umbrella over the
entire language, so that phonological, lexical, or syntactic choices always have
particular pragmatic consequences (2002: 8). Thus, the present analysis can be
claimed to be pragmatic, insofar as it seeks the pragmatic consequences of a
particular choice of speech acts, finally arriving at the speakers communicative
intention. Obviously, final apprehension of the communicative intention is only
possible when the socio-political context is taken into account. In the course of
this analysis, while employing Bach and Harnishs intention-and-inference
approach, each utterance found in Bushs speeches and statements was classified
as a particular instance of a communicative act. The whole set of acts chosen by
the speaker, when judged also against its semantic content and socio-political
context the recent conflict with Iraq enabled me to arrive at conclusions of
pragmatic importance final apprehension of the speakers communicative
intention. As for the classifying process itself, it has to be said that final choices,
though made according to the schema, were in many cases intuitive a fact
explained later in the article.
INTENTIONALITY
Marmaridou (2000: 186) refers to intentionalism as one of the views, as distinct
from conventionalism and interactionalism, which can be applied to the analysis
of speech acts. Moreover, it specifically emphasizes the role of the speaker. She
further points to the concept of intentionality, as discussed in Searles work,
where it actually constitutes a powerful hypothesis concerning meaning in
language and the functioning of the human mind (2000: 193). Meaning within
this framework results from the addressee recognizing the speakers intention in
producing an utterance, which is identical to performing an action. Searle
further discusses such psychological states as belief, desire and intention, in
terms of which he then analyses intentionality. The five illocutionary categories
are said to be derivative of the basic aspects of the mind and are further analyzed
in the same mentalist terms. The following insights from intentionalism, as
adopted from Jaszczolt (1999) and Marmaridou (2000), are of relevance to the
azuka: Communicative intention 301
Defining intentions
Before going into the details of Bach and Harnishs approach, it seems reasonable
at this point to make reference to other definitions of intention. Let us first look
at Moravcsik (1975) and his definition of linguistic intention, which attempts to
make clear the difference between communicative and linguistic intentions, and
argues why the former are of special note. In Moravcsiks (1975: 53) words, the
302 Discourse & Society 17(3)
content, context, and the point intended to be recognized with the emphasis
on the third. The connection between structure and speech acts, they further
suggest, is inferential and not semantic (see Sadock, 1974 and Searle, 1969 for
the opposite view). According to Bach and Harnish, communicative illocution-
ary intentions are reflexive intentions in Grices (1957/1971) sense; in Bach and
Harnishs (1979: xivxv) words, a reflexive intention is an intention that is
intended to be recognized as intended to be recognized.
One identifies what that intention is on the basis of what is said together with
mutual contextual beliefs (MCBs). What is said depends on the expression
uttered, its meaning in the language, what the speaker means by it and what
things are being referred to. MCBs are understood here in terms of beliefs rather
than knowledge because they need not be true in order to figure in the
speakers intention and the hearers inference (Bach and Harnish 1979: 5).
These attitude configurations can be used to represent the future actions of the
hearer, as well as the future actions of the speaker. Although Motsch (1980:
167) concludes that the apparatus sketched . . . is merely a tentative theoretical
basis for an analysis of empirical material, it seems that it would undoubtedly
304 Discourse & Society 17(3)
contribute to making the framework for the study of speech acts more structured
and explicit, which is what Bach and Harnish advocate in their study. Motschs
investigation is limited to directives and commisives (to adopt Searles terms) but,
as he suggests, if extended, the same apparatus could be used to characterize
representatives and expressives.
According to Bach and Harnishs classification, there are four types of
communicative illocutionary act, with every act type being further differentiated
in terms of the reasons for or the strengths of the attitudes expressed. Constatives
express the speakers belief and his/her intention that the hearer has or forms a
like belief. Directives express the speakers attitude towards a future action by the
hearer and his/her intention that the utterance be taken as a reason for the
hearers action. Commisives express the speakers intention that the utterance
obligates the hearer to do something. And finally, acknowledgements express the
feeling towards the hearer, or in the case of formal utterances, the speakers
intention that his/her utterances satisfy certain social expectations regarding the
expression of certain feelings.
Bach and Harnish (1979: 40) comment on their taxonomy as follows, which
will at the same time serve as a transition into another central concept of their
approach the speech act schema (SAS):
The fundamental idea behind our taxonomy is that . . . expressed attitudes . . . are all
homogenous with the speech act schema. That is the SAS represents the general form
of illocutionary intention and inference, and the entries in the taxonomy provide
the content, as is evident in the concluding step of the SAS: the identification of the
illocutionary act being performed. Since such acts are identified by their intents, the
distinguishing features of each illocutionary act type specify the very thing H must
identify in the last step of the SAS.
Generally, the categories used do not overlap, with the entries in each category
satisfying the criteria for belonging to that category. Still, the authors are aware of
certain shortcomings in the classification. To make the schema even more explicit,
the subcategories could be further subdivided. One could, moreover, specify a
greater number of verbs falling under each subcategory. Furthermore, they point
to certain verbs occurring under more than one heading, as with the
TA B L E 1 . Classification of communicative acts (as adopted from Bach and Marnish, 1979)
nation. I did not include any joint statements or speeches addressed to some
particular social/ professional group (e.g. the FBI employees). I also excluded
interviews in which the speaker was asked questions and gave answers; the
speakers answer would have to be interpreted on the basis of the question asked,
which is not within the parameters of the present study. Moreover, when a
speech was accessible only in the form of an excerpt and not in its full form I did
not include it. The data included were all taken from the governmental web pages
to ensure their authenticity and accuracy.
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
The framework used for the analysis is the one proposed by Bach and Harnish
(1979), i.e. the intention and inference approach, according to which
communicative acts are classified in terms of the kind of attitude each act
expresses. Thus, every single utterance was treated as an instance of
communicative action. I then tried to apprehend what sort of attitude each
utterance expressed, classifying it as a particular subtype of the four broad types
of communicative illocutionary acts (see Figure 1 and the example of assertives
above). As mentioned and explained above, the analysis was pragmatic I was
looking for the pragmatic consequences of the speakers choice of speech acts. In
doing so I took into account semantics and structure as well as socio-political
context. The combination of all these enabled me to arrive at a result of
pragmatic importance. This approach accords with that of Bach and Harnish.
They provide quite a detailed description of each subtype, specifying verbs that
fall under each subtype (see the example of assertives above). This, however, only
serves as a clue to interpretation. The connection between linguistic structure
and speech acts is inferential. Every time an inference is made it necessarily
ANALYSIS
How does the speaker carry his discourse?
In the present section I investigate how the speaker carries his discourse. Scollon
and Scollon (2000) point to a theory of human agency which itself is included in
a theory of anticipatory discourse. The theory of human agency assumes an
analysis in terms of different stances as regards feasibility and efficiency of ones
actions with respect to the future, which range from agentive to fatalistic. In
other words, the question becomes to what extent we believe that an action
(communicative action in this case) can effectively be taken to influence possible
outcomes. Pertaining to this claim is also Scollons (2001: 2) argument that in
times of political crisis we attempt to carry political discourses more consciously
through anticipation of possible social friction. Van Dijk (1998: 2568)
expresses a similar opinion when he talks about legitimation discourse:
Legitimation may not be necessary in normal course of events and when no
challenges to institutional power or authority are imminent. They become
imperative, however, in moment of crisis, when the legitimacy of the state, an
institution . . . is at stake. Legitimation, then becomes part of the strategies of crisis
management, in which in-groups and their institutions need self-legitimation and
out-groups must be delegitimated.
Moreover, according to Wodak et al. (1999; cited in Scollon, 2001) the degree of
conscious intention is the function of the texts fixedness. Thus, one may expect
its highest degree in fixed texts, e.g. political speeches, which is the case in the
present analysis. I will try to find whether S indeed carried his discourse
consciously during the period analysed. If it proves correct it will mean, in turn,
310 Discourse & Society 17(3)
as can be seen in Figure 1A. The increase here is noted, on average, every second
day, reaching its peak in November 2001 (Figure 1) Then, it systematically
decreases, and only a slight increase is observable in 2003. This seems strange as
we might expect that it would reach its highest level in 2003. It might have
possibly helped Bush to have A support his war ventures. In this respect, Ss
communicative behaviour deviated from what I expected.
As can be seen from Figures 2 and 2A the level of hostility towards E remains
high throughout the entire three years, which serves to promote and finally
establish the negative picture of E. In 2001 we observe an increase of hostility in
the days right after the attack. In 2002 the level of hostility remains constant
312 Discourse & Society 17(3)
FIGURE 3 A . Positive self-presentation of the government and the speaker yearly trend
but rather low with a sudden increase in early October the period marking the
first anniversary of the attacks and immediately prior to the full-scale military
conflict, which started on 20 March 2003. In 2003 we note quite a high level
just before the war starts; it remains quite high in March (the first month of the
war) and then steadily decreases. The subsequent observable increase occurs just
before the second anniversary of the attacks.
As can be seen in Figure 3A, the level of positive self-presentation remains
high throughout 2001 and 2003. A decrease is observable in 2002. Figure 3
shows that the level of positive self-presentation remains quite high from
February until March 2003 with a sudden increase in April right after the war
azuka: Communicative intention 313
finishes. Then it slowly decreases before rising again before the second
anniversary of the attack on the World Trade Center.
As one might have expected in this case, the level of rapport suddenly
increases in 2003 when the USA starts its military operations in Iraq, as seen in
Figures 4 and 4a. It suddenly increases in February before the war starts, which
may serve as preparation of PI for the imminent conflict. It remains quite high in
March and April before then decreasing. Only in August and September before
the second anniversary of the attacks does S increase the level of rapport,
renewing promises addressed to PI.
314 Discourse & Society 17(3)
We have seen from the figures above that in the majority of cases S carries out
his discourse in a manner that would be, by any reasonable judgement,
predictable: he conducts his discourse more consciously when certain challenges
to his authority are anticipated. On certain occasions, however, he deviates from
what we might have commonly expected. For instance, contrary to expectations,
S does not keep the level of rapport with A high in 2003 when the war is taking
place. This does not in any way mean that he stopped strategizing his discourse.
He continues to do so, but rather in quite a different way. It turns out that in order
to add to the negative depiction of the enemy, Ss discourse does not have to be
rich in negative descriptives. Quite the contrary: negative informatives (i.e.
informative ((E)(-))) seem more convincing and, more importantly, objective. This
becomes clear as the detailed interpretation below makes evident.
2. General specification of the communicative acts used with categories (S) (S+G),
TA B L E
(M), (ON) ), (A) and (E)
(S), (S+G),
20012003 (A) 20012003 (E) 20012003 (M), (ON)
before and at the beginning of the war itself. It seems that the speaker is trying to
provide the nation with much information before the upcoming conflict with a
view to making citizens feel suitably informed. Informatives remain the prevalent
mode of speaking until the official end of the war. In 2002 the number of
informatives used decreases, which may indicate a degree of stabilization in the
year between the two critical points. There seems to have been no need to
bombard people with information during this period, though informatives still
prevail, albeit to a lesser extent. When informing, the speaker most often refers to
the activities of himself and the government (S+G) and the government alone (G),
as, for example, in this utterance: And members of Congress are working together,
regardless of party, in the best American spirit, to help get our economy moving
again (informative (G)(+)), (22.09.2001). Simultaneously, the speaker uses
positive terms with respect to the categories mentioned, trying to ensure their
positive portrayal and to present their activities as beneficial to the people. Rarely
does the speaker refer to himself and his activities alone (S), with the exception of
2001 when he not only refers to his own activities but describes them in positive
terms, as in Im asking Congress for new law enforcement authority, to better
316 Discourse & Society 17(3)
TA B L E 3 . Specification of the communicative acts used with respect to category (S) (and also
(S+G), (M) and (ON))
track the communications of terrorists, and detain suspected terrorists until the
moment they are deported (informative (S)(+)), (29.09.2001). It is also
characteristic that in 2003 (the year of the Iraq conflict) the speaker starts
referring to the military (M), informing of its actions and portraying it as
beneficial for the nation, as, for example, in the following utterance: Even before
the fighting began in Iraq, Special Operations forces were inside the country,
moving in to protect key infrastructure, protect the oil fields owned by the Iraqi
people, secure vital bridges (informative (M)(+), (16.04.2003). Only in 2003, as
well, does the speaker refer to allies/potential allies of the USA. He often does so in
positive terms and, thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that he is trying to win
them over to the US cause and gain their good will.
The assertive is the second most frequently used subtype of communicative
act. Its use increases in 2001, then decreases in 2002, only to rise again in 2003.
The speaker uses this mode again when referring to his own actions, the actions
of the government, or both, often depicting them or their actions in such positive
terms as: We care for the innocent people of Afghanistan, so we continue to
provide humanitarian aid, even while their government tries to steal the food we
send (assertive (S+G)(W)(+)), (08.11.2001). In so doing, the speaker affirms,
maintains and declares, as if stating the obvious. This adds to the picture of the
speaker as self-confident and convinced of the righteousness of his position and
actions. He wants the audience to accept his statements as a matter of fact
something which is obvious and should not be questioned but taken for granted,
even when the issues he touches upon are controversial and likely to be challenged.
azuka: Communicative intention 317
Confirmatives of the types (A)(+) and (A)(W)(+) are communicative acts used
frequently by the speaker, e.g. And we have seen our national character in
eloquent acts of sacrifice (A)(W)(+), (14.09.2001). The communicative
intention here is similar to that of retrodictives, as mentioned above. The speaker
positively assesses/bears witness to the admirable deeds of the Americans, thus
encouraging his audience to believe in American strengths and values.
Thanks, predictives and informatives are other frequently occurring subtypes
of communicative acts. Acts expressing gratitude, the category of thank,
prevail in September 2001 and February, March and April 2003. Although it
generally occurs at the end of a speech/statement as thank you or thank you
for listening, it is also encountered in the acts expressing gratitude for particular
things done by the addressee, as in I want to say thanks for the hundreds of
thousands of Americans who pray for the victims and their families
(12.09.2001). Such actions serve to both establish rapport with the audience
and add positively to the speakers overall self-presentation. Predictives of the
type (A)(W)(+), as in We will not tire, we will not falter and we will not fail
(20.09.2001), prevail in 2001. In these the speaker usually unfolds consolatory
visions, aimed at arousing the people to action and predicts future events of
which the audience will be the agent or beneficiary. He wants the audience to
believe that this indeed will be the case, thus encouraging them to act, while at
the same time raising their spirits in the face of future threats. The use of
informatives increases in 2001, mainly in November and with respect to the
audience; and in 2003, mainly with respect to the people of Iraq. Information
concerning the audience is mostly of the observational kind, for example: Since
September the 11th, many Americans, especially young Americans, are
rethinking their career choices (08.11.2001). Such observational images may
in these cases serve to establish a common ground of experience between the
audience and the speaker. Frequent references to the audience may enable the
speaker to foster closer bonds with common Americans. Information concerning
the people of Iraq conveyed mainly in April the time of the war usually has
exemplary value. The speaker informs the audience of Iraqi activities that are
consistent with the expectations of the US authorities.
Furthermore, the speaker frequently uses requestives and descriptives. The
former, used mainly in September 2001 right after the attack, usually serve to
give the people notice of possible inconveniences and ask for their forbearance in
a polite requestive form, as in I ask for your patience, with the delays and
inconveniences that may accompany tighter security; and for your patience in
what will be a long struggle (20.09.2001). The increased use of descriptives in
2001 especially in September and November serves to create a positive
representation of the American people, enhancing their self-confidence and self-
satisfaction, as in America is a nation full of good fortune; with so much to be
grateful for (14.09.2001). This effect is enhanced further when the pronoun
we is used, which additionally intensifies solidarity, as in We are a different
country from what we were on September the 10th sadder and less innocent;
320 Discourse & Society 17(3)
stronger and more united; and in the face of ongoing threats, determined and
courageous (08.11.2001).The speaker thus wants to raise public morale in the
face of recent threatening incidents.
Also characteristic and self-explanatory is the speakers use of promises
addressed to the people of Iraq during the war, such as The people of Iraq can
know that every effort will be made to spare innocent life, and to help Iraq
recover from three decades of totalitarian rule (15.03.2003). Indicative is also
the speakers use of promises addressed to the American people in September
2003. It seems that by employing this strategy the speaker tries to ensure a
positive image of himself and his government, renewing their commitment
towards the American people: As libertys home and defender, America will not
tire, will not falter, and will not fail in fighting for the safety and security of the
American people and a world free from terrorism (04.09.2003).
As for the mode of communicative action concerning (E) (see table 5 below)
what may at first seem strange is the distinctive prevalence of informatives with
reference to the category (E). The number of informatives here increases steadily
from 2001 through 2002, and reaches its peak in 2003. The majority of
informatives used concerns what S considers the patently deplorable activities of
the enemy. These seek to elicit immediate response and condemnation by the
audience, as in The network runs a poison and explosive training center in north-
east Iraq and many of its leaders are known to be in Baghdad (06.02.2003). The
rhetorical weakness of informatives in comparison, for instance, with overtly
negative descriptions is only apparent. The informative mode of speaking suggests
maximum objectivity, which stems from the force of the facts. The speaker does
nothing but state the facts. The communicative intention is, however, clear: to add
to the negative portrayal of the enemy without being accused of biased evaluation.
Assertives and retrodictives belong to the second group of acts used most
frequently. The former are used mostly in 2001 and 2003, with a sudden
the speaker reinforces the image of his own competency. It may also suggest self-
reliance and infallibility, as in Grief and tragedy and hatred are only for a time
(assertive (S)(+)), (14.09.2001).
Apart from differentiating between Us and Them, the speaker distinctively
frames his discourse through the employment of negative other-presentation
and positive self-presentation. This strategy is reflected mainly in negative
descriptions used with reference to the enemy and positive ones used with
reference to the members of the we-group. Lexicalization plays the principal role
here, i.e. derogatory and negative terms used with respect to the enemy and
neutral or squarely positive ones used with respect to the we-group. Moreover,
negative other-presentations are usually organized around the concepts of
difference, deviance and violation of the we-group norms. As Van Dijk (1998:
267) points out, the strategy of negative other-presentation and positive self-
presentation indicates the existence of the so-called ideological square, which
plays an important role in the above-mentioned two strategies. It consists of the
four moves by means of which positive information about Us and negative
information about Them is emphasized, while negative information about Us and
positive information about Them is suppressed. Negative other-presentation and
positive self-presentation is further emphasized by metaphors, though S uses
very few of them. They are used to highlight the negative character of the enemy,
as in And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in historys
unmarked grave of discarded lies (predictive (E)(-)), (20 September 2001) or to
emphasize the positive character of the audience, as in Our nation this
generation will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future
(predictive (A)(W)(+)), (20 September 2001).
It also seems that communicative act patterns are shaped by some of the
persuasive strategies discussed by Cap (1998). In his discussion of the rhetoric of
the American presidential inaugurals against the background of research into
the nature of socio-psychologically grounded persuasion, Cap points to different
persuasion strategies or models of persuasion which when applied to presidential
discourse lead to the emergence of four types of presidential persuasion (for the
detailed discussion of these see Cap, 1998). As Cap notes, presidential
persuasion will not be treated merely in terms of a set of relevant performatives
(. . .); it should be understood as a helpful device for the realization of leadership
enactment, taking thus various linguistic forms (1998: 148). And so in the
present analysis there is not a direct relation between persuasion and
communicative acts; persuasive strategies present in the speakers discourse were
not arrived at on the basis of assigning communicative acts at the micro-level.
Persuasive models are here a superior category underlying the tone of the
speakers statements, which may only get strengthened by a particular choice of
communicative act. Still, the persuasive strategies in question seem worth
mentioning as they considerably add to the overall rhetorical strength of the
speakers discourse. The following strategies could be traced in the speeches
analysed: (1) American self-perception, as exemplified in A great people has been
324 Discourse & Society 17(3)
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main aim of the analysis presented above was the apprehension of
communicative intention in George W. Bushs speeches and statements. The
theoretical framework employed was that laid out by Bach and Harnish the
intention and inference approach. Within that approach, Bach and Harnish
propose a very integrative explanation of the whole concept of linguistic com-
munication. Their major point in this respect is that linguistic communication
essentially involves the speakers having a special sort of intention (an intention
that the hearer make a certain sort of inference) and the hearers actually
making that inference (1979: xvii). The point of the speakers utterance ought
to be recognized both through content and context but also because the point is
intended to be recognized. Thus, Bach and Harnishs approach takes into
account the three factors mentioned. In this it differs (to its advantage) from two
other major theories, that of Searle (1969) and Sadock (1974), both of whom
claimed that the connection between speech acts and structure was semantic.
For Bach and Harnish it is inferential, always involving content, context and
communicative intention. The nature of these three factors is characterized and
systematized in detail (and I encourage anyone interested in this topic to return
to Bach and Harnishs original text ). Within their framework Bach and Harnish
also provide a detailed classification of speech acts, which served as a tool for the
present analysis. As mentioned above, in the course of analysis the schema
revealed certain deficiencies concerning the classifying process, such as a lack of
clear-cut categories for certain kind of acts or the fact that according to the
schema certain utterances proved to be of a double or triple identity. These
should not however be treated as a major flaw in the whole schema difficulties
with the classification mentioned above could have been predicted, taking into
account the fact of the classification being based on verbs. All in all, it did not
pose a major obstacle for the analysis, the results of which have hopefully proved
sound and of interest.
As for the results of the detailed analysis above, it can be seen that the
speakers selection of speech acts is indicative of his communicative intention.
When carrying his discourse, the speaker assumes the agentive stance. Thus, we
can assume that the speaker believes that by strategizing his discourse in a
particular way in this case through the selection of appropriate speech acts
he may influence some self-projected outcomes in the future. During the time
period analysed, the speaker carries his discourse consciously, anticipating
possible challenges to the legitimacy of the authorities decisions. On the basis of
the speech acts analysed and the rhetorical phenomena and the strategies they
contain, I have made conclusions regarding the speakers communicative
intention. To reiterate: the speaker (George W. Bush) deliberately seeks to
328 Discourse & Society 17(3)
establish rapport with both the audience and Iraqi people, while simultaneously
asserting positive American self-perception. Furthermore, he attempts to present
the authorities in a positive manner and preserve their legitimacy. Finally, he
seeks to portray the Other the enemy in a squarely negative way.
REFERENCES
Primary sources:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/response/text/resources2.html
(11 September 2001a) Remarks by the President upon arrival at Barksdale Air Force Base.
(11 September 2001b) Statement by the President in his address to the nation.
(12 September 2001) Remarks by the President while touring damage at the Pentagon.
(13 September 2001a) Remarks by the President to the travel pool after visiting
Washington Hospital.
(13 September 2001b) National Day of Prayer and Remembrance for the victims of the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.
(14 September 2001) Presidents remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance.
(15 September 2001) Radio address of the President to the nation.
(20 September 2001) Address to a joint session of Congress and the American people.
(22 September 2001) Radio address: Despite challenges, economy fundamentally strong.
(29 September 2001) Radio address of the President to the nation.
(7 October 2001) Presidential address to the nation.
(11 October 2001) President pays tribute at Pentagon memorial.
(20 October 2001) Presidents radio address from Shanghai, China.
(27 October 2001) Radio address of the President to the nation.
(8 November 2001) President discusses war on terrorism.
(9 November 2001) President Bush acts to make holiday travel safer.
(11 December 2001) President: the world will always remember September 11.
(29 December 2001) Radio address by the President to the nation.
(11 September 2002) Presidents remarks at the Pentagon.
(14 September 2002) President discusses growing danger posed by Saddam Husseins
regime.
(5 October 2002) President: Iraqi regime danger to America is grave and growing.
(7 October 2002) President Bush outlines Iraqi threat.
(9 November 2002) President Bush recaps important week in weekly radio address.
(7 December 2002) Radio address of the President to the nation.
(28 December 2002) Presidents weekly radio address.
(6 February 2003) President Bush: World can rise to this moment.
(15 February 2003) Presidents weekly radio address.
(26 February 2003) President discusses the future of Iraq.
(8 March 2003) War on terror.
(15 March 2003) President discusses Iraq in radio address.
(17 March 2003) President says Saddam Hussein must leave Iraq within 48 hours.
(22 March 2003) President discusses beginning of operation Iraqi Freedom.
(29 March 2003) President discusses Iraqi Freedom progress in radio address.
(12 April 2003) Operation Iraqi Freedom.
(16 April 2003) President Bush outlines progress in operation Iraqi Freedom.
(17 May 2003) President Bush honors military in weekly radio address.
(26 May 2003) President Bush honors the brave and fallen defenders of freedom.
azuka: Communicative intention 329
Secondary sources:
Aijmer, K. (1977) Acts of Deference and Authority, Gothenburg Papers in Theoretical
Linguistics, University of Gothenburg.
Allan, K. (1986) Linguistic Meaning, Vol 2. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Bach, K. and Harnish, R. M. (1979) Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts. Cambridge:
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