Cuba: Ideological Success or Ideological Failure?

Jeffrey L. Roberg, Alyson Kuttruff

Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 29, Number 3, August 2007, pp. 779-795
(Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2007.0033

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/219881

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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Cuba: Ideological Success or Ideological

Failure?

Jeffrey L. Roberg* & Alyson Kuttruff**

Abstract
Cuba is typically viewed from one of two conflicting perspectives: a de-
liverer of education, healthcare, and democracy, or a violator of human
rights with no regard for its citizens. There is truth in both perspectives.
The Castro regime is still largely guided by its socialist ideology, but a visit
to Cuba reveals a country that no longer represents the egalitarian society
promised. Cubas use of neo-socialist and neo-capitalist policies is return-
ing Cuba to a class-based society. While the regime has largely shattered
the opposition through repression, its failures to meet its own legitimating
ideology will eventually lead to regime change.

I. Introduction

Cuba is typically viewed from one of two competing perspectives. On the

one hand, Cuba is viewed as a deliverer of education, healthcare, and a

* Jeffrey L. Roberg is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at
Carthage College. Dr. Robergs earlier research focused on the former Soviet Union and its
successor states, exploring issues of human rights and nuclear proliferation. In addition to
his book, Soviet Science Under Control: The Struggle for Influence, he has published several
articles on the role of Soviet technology and human rights. Recently he has expanded his
human rights and environmental politics research to include Latin America. He is currently
completing a research project on the Galpagos Islands. Dr. Roberg traveled to Cuba in
January 2002 and January 2004.
** Alyson Kuttruff graduated in 2006 from Carthage College with degrees in Political Science
and German. In January 2004 she traveled to several cities in Cuba to study the impact of
socialism on the Cuban economy and its political and social systems. While studying in
Germany at the Humboldt-Universitt zur Berlin in 20042005, she completed an internship
with the Party of Democratic Socialism. She returned to Berlin in March 2007 for a five month
internship in the German Bundestag as part of the Internationales Parlaments-Stipendium.

Human Rights Quarterly 29 (2007) 779795 2007 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
780 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Vol. 29

representative democracy that provides all of its citizens with an equal voice.
On the other hand, Cubas detractors view it as a violator of human rights
that does not care about its citizens well-being. Each of these perspectives
is, in part, both accurate and false. While it is true that the Cuban govern-
ment is still largely guided by its socialist ideology and is able to turn out
large crowds for a variety of protests, usually against the United States, it
is also true that Cuban society does not reflect the promises made by its
government. A visit to Cuba reveals a country that no longer represents the
egalitarian society promised by the Castro regime. Moreover, Cubas use of
both neo-socialist and neo-capitalist policies has triggered the beginning of a
return to a class-based society, in contrast to the official ideology. While the
Castro regime has largely shattered its political opposition through repression
and arrests, this article suggests that it is the regimes failure to meet its own
legitimating ideology that will lead to regime change in Cuba. Specifically,
the Castro regime has failed to fulfill the social contract that it made with
its citizens, and this failure is evident in everyday Cuban society.
On 31 December 1958, Batistas dictatorship came to an end and the
soon to be Soviet ally Fidel Castro came to power. A basic understanding
of Cold War politics explains why the United States enacted a political
and economic embargo of the island. Cuba became an ally of the evil
empire and was an important player in the Cold War, undertaking such
actions as sending advisors and troops to Angola to spread Communism.
The description of Cuba in the CIA World Factbook in many ways reflects
this view of Cuba:
Spanish rule was severe and exploitative and occasional rebellions were harshly
suppressed. It was US intervention during the Spanish-American War in 1898
that finally overthrew Spanish rule. The subsequent Treaty of Paris established
Cuban independence, which was granted in 1902 after a three-year transition
period. Fidel Castro led a rebel army to victory in 1959; his iron rule has held
the regime together since then. Cubas Communist revolution, with Soviet
support, was exported throughout Latin America and Africa during the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s.1

This account of US-Cuban relations is too simplistic on several accounts.

Evident in Cubas history is a struggle for political and economic indepen-
dence from the Spanish and the United States. Ironically Cuba allowed
its re-colonialization by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, only to be
followed by a period of Cuba once again losing its colonial benefactor in
August 1990. These periods of political and economic dependency affected
Cubas ability to fend for itself as an independent state.

1. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook 2005: Cuba (2005), available at
http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2005/geos/cu.html [hereinafter World
Factbook 2005].
2007 Cuba: Success or Failure 781

II. Cubas Fight for Independence: The Pre-Castro Era

Cubas fight for independence from colonial rule began as a struggle against
the Spanish in 1868. The desire for independence stemmed from a perceived
economic exploitation by the Spanish combined with an economic down turn
that saw Cubas share of world sugar production [falling] from 24 percent in
1875 to 11 percent by 1888.2 US involvement in Cuban affairs was sealed
following the signing of an 1891 preferential trade agreement between the
United States and Spain. The agreement increased Cubas dependence on
outside powers. Cubas dependence was particularly evident in 1894 when
the US placed heavy tariffs on Cuban sugar, further worsening the Cuban
economy. As revolution spread throughout Cuba against the Spanish, the
struggle for independence grew into the 1898 Spanish-American War with the
US wresting control over Cuba, Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico.
Cuba had gained independence from Spain, only to be occupied by the
US. Municipal elections held in 1900 saw pro-independence parties receiving
a substantial majority of the votes. However, US legislators were unwilling
to concede that Cuba should be independent. In 1902, after four years of
occupation, the US granted Cuba independence on the condition that the
Platt Amendment be added to the new Cuban Constitution. The provisions
of this amendment allowed the US to retain control over Cuba.
The U.S. government retained the right to intervene in Cuban affairs in the name
of protecting life, property, and liberty. The Cuban government could not enter
into treaties without U.S. consent. The U.S. government gained claims to land
and naval bases deemed necessary for security. Subsequent Cuban authorities
could not overturn the prior actions of the U.S. occupying government without
U.S. consent. The Cuban government also pledged to continue certain public
works projects begun during the occupation. Finally, the Cuban government
could not incur debts that called for funds beyond ordinary annual revenues.3

This was the price Cuba paid for independence.

Although Cuba had formally gained its independence, the Cuban
economy became even more tied to the United States, and by 1905, US
individuals and firms owned 60 percent of all rural land.4 Moreover, the
signing of a new trade agreement in 1903 granted Cuba preferential access
to the US sugar market and in exchange, US manufacturers gained special
access to the Cuban market.5 The next thirty years saw a Cuban economy
under stress, coupled with a series of corrupt governments. Cuban economic
conditions worsened still as a result of the Great Depression in 1930.

2. Charles H. Blake, Politics in Latin America: The Quest for Development, Liberty, and Governance
24849 (2005).
3. Id. at 250.
4. Id.
5. Id.
782 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Vol. 29

In 1933, Cubans elected the reformist Ramn Grau as President of Cuba.

Grau openly rejected the Platt Amendment and launched a number of re-
forms including womens suffrage, an eight-hour workday, a minimum-wage
law, redistribution of publicly owned land, and a requirement that Cubans
constitute at least half of each firms workforce.6 Graus policies confronted
both Cuban and US economic interests. Because of his actions, the US was
able to convince Fulgencio Batista to remove Grau and replace him with a
civilian government that was friendlier to US economic interests.
While the United States did get what it wanted, Batista demanded a
high price for his assistance.
In exchange for assurances from Batista that the Cuban government would not
harm US economic interests in Cuba, the US and Cuban governments jointly
agreed in 1934 to remove all provisions of the Platt Amendment but one: The
US would retain rights to military bases in Cuba in perpetuity.7

Though the general populace was in favor of removing the Platt Amend-
ment provisions, there remained some discontent over the control of military
bases. As a way to placate the opposition, Batista agreed to the creation of
a constituent assembly to revise the 1901 Constitution. The new constitu-
tion of 1940 called for a variety of political, economic, and social reforms.
Failure to fulfill the promise of this constitution, combined with new levels
of corruption and political repression, would eventually lead to the over-
throw of Batista.
The pre-Castro era was marked by repressive leaders and heavy foreign
involvement, and it is no wonder that the Cuban people welcomed the
overthrow of Batista by Castro and the Cuban rebels. The Castro regime
created a social contract with its people, in which the regime promised to
provide its people with education, healthcare, and racial, economic, and
political equality. In exchange, the Cuban people agreed to stay out of politi-
cal affairs and not to oppose the regime. Those opposed to this new social
contract began to leave Cuba in 1959. Many who left immediately had
economic interests that sided with the Batista government and the United
States, not the Cuban rebels. Later, mass emigrations occurred, such as the
Mariel Boat Lift in 1980, and individual or small group emigrations occurred
on a regular basis. Although some opposed the new regime, others were
in favor of Castros social contract. The question that must be addressed
here is whether or not the Cuban government is still considered legitimate
by its people.

6. Id. at 25152.
7. Id.
2007 Cuba: Success or Failure 783

III. Goals of the Revolution

Castro initially claimed that the revolution was humanist rather than either
capitalist or socialist. Castros Sierra Maestra Manifesto dated 12 July 1957
called for the following:
a. Immediate freedom for all political, civil, and military prisoners.
b. Absolute guarantee of freedom of information, of the spoken and
written press, and of all the individual and political rights guaranteed
by the Constitution.
c. Designation of provisional mayors in all the municipalities after con-
sultation with the civic institutions of the locality.
d. Suppression of embezzlement in all its forms and adoption of measures
that tend to increase the efficiency of all state agencies.
e. Establishment of the civil service on a career basis.
f. Democratization of labor politics, promoting free elections in all
unions and industrial federations.
g. Immediate initiation of an intensive campaign against illiteracy, and
civic education emphasizing the duties and rights of each citizen to
his society and fatherland.
h. Establishment of the basis for an agrarian reform to distribute barren
lands and convert into owners all the tenant farmers, sharecroppers,
squatters, and lessee planters who have small parcels of land, be it
property of the state or of private persons, with prior indemnification
to the owners of the land.
i. Adoption of a healthy financial policy that safeguards the stability of
our currency and tends to use the credit of the nation in productive
works.
j. Acceleration of the process of industrialization and the creation of
new jobs.8
The first government under President Manuel Urrutia Lle pursued a
state-capitalist model placing priority on land reform, agricultural diver-
sification, and import substitution. In January 1959, private property was
confiscated and redistributed and all foreign and domestic enterprises and
institutions were nationalized. The government also took control of the
media and religious institutions.9 It was not until Castro proclaimed adher-
ence to Marxism-Leninism in 1961 that cultural transformation took on a
pivotal role. Following the adoption of this ideology, Castro employed the
tactics of moral suasion, mass ideological education, and indirect coercion,

8. Fidel Castro, Revolutionary Struggle 19471958, at 346 (Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson
P. Valdes eds., 1972).
9. Julie Marie Bunck, Fidel Castro and the Quest for a Revolutionary Culture in Cuba 9
(1994).
784 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Vol. 29

which were to become hallmarks of the regime. It was also during this time
that the regime created the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
(CDR), and the government encouraged volunteerism and the revolutionary
idea of the conciencia.10 During this period, citizens saw great potential in
the revolution. Among less supportive citizens, the government employed
the CDR and other more coercive measures.11

IV. Social Services under the Castro Regime

The new regime based its political legitimacy on delivering the goods.
Specifically, the Castro regime promised to improve economic equality, re-
distribute land, reduce rent and place a cap on utilities, improve healthcare,
and increase literacy among the populace. As outlined below, the Castro
regime can make a claim to having fulfilled its part of the social contract,
specifically regarding living conditions, healthcare, and education.
Life Expectancy (years):
Male: 75.11 Female: 79.85 (2006)12
Infant Mortality (per 1000):
Male: 6.99 Female: 5.41 (2006 est.)13
Male: 7.11 Female: 5.5 (2005)14
Literacy:15
Male: 97.2% Female: 96.9% (2003 est.)16
Total population: 97%17
Physicians:
1:231 (2000)18
These health and literacy figures rank among the highest in Latin America,
as well as the developed countries of Europe and the United States. While
life expectancy is equivalent for Cuba and the United States, it is interest-

10. Conciencia connotes a consciousness of a national identity. It refers to the idea that
Cuba is now independent and no longer subservient to outside colonizers. Id.
11. Id. at 10.
12. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook 2006: Cuba (2006) available at http://
www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2006/geos/cu.html [hereinafter World Factbook
2006].
13. Id.
14. World Factbook 2005, supra note 1.
15. The CIA World Factbook defines literacy as being over the age of fifteen and able to
read and write. Id.
16. World Factbook 2006, supra note 12.
17. Id.
18. Paul B. Goodwin, Global Studies: Latin America 133 (2007).
2007 Cuba: Success or Failure 785

ing to note that the US actually has a higher rate of infant mortality. In the
United States:
US Life Expectancy (years):
Male: 75.02 Female: 80.82 (2006 est.)
US Infant Mortality (per 1000):
Male: 7.09 Female 5.74 deaths (2006 est.)19
Although these summary statistics are very impressive for the Cuban
Revolution, they do not provide the complete story. The Cuban economy
already faced difficulties, but beginning in August 1990, Cuba entered into
a period called the Special Period in Peacetime. It was at this time that the
Soviet Union ceased providing Cuba with aid and required Cuba to pay world
market prices for any future crude oil. The loss of its Soviet benefactor sent
Cubas economy into a tailspin. Although the Cuban government attempted
to keep in place the principle elements of its social policy, the system was
weakened by the special period and the increasing demand for services.
In 1990, prior to the termination of Soviet aid, Cuba spent 20.08 percent of
its GDP on social benefits such as universally free healthcare and education,
well above the 10.4 percent average in Latin America.20 While the most
urgent issues in the social system are currently being addressed, there are
still significant concerns about the quality of the services provided.

A. Education

Between 1969 and 1988 Cuba witnessed a large growth in both the number
of students and teachers as the government attempted to fulfill its revolution-
ary promises. Student-teacher ratios fell from 27:1 to 12:1.21 To achieve this
increase in teachers, the government permitted individuals without university
degrees to teach. The government also redefined the teaching profession to
pre-university levels, meaning that university students were permitted to act
as teachers provided they had the correct knowledge of Marxism-Leninism
and other relevant subjects.22 On a related note, the number of students
repeating grades in Cuba declined by the 1980s.23 While this may initially
be viewed as a success for Cubas education system, in reality the low pro-

19. World Factbook 2006, supra note 12.

20. Miren Uriarte, Social Policy Responses to Cubas Economic Crisis of the 1990s, 35 Cuban
Stud. 105, 106 (2004).
21. Benigno E. Aguirre & Roberto J. Vichot, The Reliability of Cubas Educational Statistics,
42 Comp. Educ. Rev. 118, 122 (1998).
22. Id. at 125.
23. Id. at 127.
786 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Vol. 29

portion of students repeating grades in Cuba is largely the result of pressure

on teachers to promote students at pre-university levels. The United States
has a similar issue of grade inflation in its schools.24
It is important to remember that public schooling is the only formal
education in Cuba: education through the ninth grade is compulsory.25 While
public schooling is required, university training is not. As of 1998, only 7
percent of the population had graduated from college, and roughly another
1.3 million students received degrees from technical schools.26 Finally, since
the Rectification in the 1980s, final exams have been abolished in several
subjects, and the passing grade on exams was lowered from 70 to 60 per-
cent.27 Over the past five years even fewer qualified students are pursuing
higher education and have turned their attention towards working in the
tourism industry, instead of finishing their academic degrees. The tourism
industry permits educated students, particularly those who are multi-lingual,
to earn sufficient income to support their families.

B. Health

As demonstrated by the data above, in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
healthcare statistics in Cuba were far better than in other Latin American
countries. Polio, malaria, tetanus, diphtheria, and human rabies have been
effectively eliminated from the island.28 Conditions for AIDS patients have
improved, and Cuba has the lowest reported prevalence of HIV in the hemi-
sphere.29 Moreover, the Family Doctor Program ensures one physician and
one nurse for every 100 to 200 Cuban families, and Cuban doctors are in
demand in under-served states.30 According to Granma International, 71,000
doctors are currently practicing in Cuba.31
Despite these positive aspects, it must be noted that the collapse of the
socialist bloc in the late 1980s, coupled with the effects of the US embargo,
has had a devastating effect upon the Cuban healthcare system. Some public
health catastrophes, such as the outbreak of optic and peripheral neuropathy

24. Id. at 134.

25. The Cuban Experience: Education in Cuba, available at www.library.thinkquest.org/18355/
education_in_cuba.html.
26. Id.
27. Rectification refers to an ideological correction that is deemed necessary by the Cuban
Communist Party. It is a way to make Cubans engage the revolutions ideals in their
daily lives. Aguirre & Vichot, supra note 21, at 136.
28. Michle Barry, Effect of the U.S. Embargo and Economic Decline on Health in Cuba,
132 Annals of Internal Medicine 151 (2000).
29. Id. at 153.
30. Id. at 151.
31. Anett Rios Jauregui, Cuba Now has 71,000 Doctors, Granma Intl, 17 Nov. 2005, avail-
able at http://www.granmai.cubaweb.com/ingles/2005/noviembre/juev17/47turquino.
html.
2007 Cuba: Success or Failure 787

in 1992 and 1993, are directly attributable to the US embargo.32 The US

embargo has severely limited Cuban access to medications, instruments,
diagnostic tools, and vaccines, because approximately 50% of all newly
patented drugs are developed or sold by US owned companies or their
subsidiaries.33
There were 1,297 medicines readily available in Cuba prior to 1991,
but only 889 of these medicines are now obtainable, with doctors access to
these drugs intermittent at best.34 Because US-developed drugs are unavail-
able, a startling 80 percent of the medicines currently available in Cuba
are manufactured in Cuba itself. The lack of financial resources in Cuba,
however, has caused a shortage of the raw materials needed to manufacture
medicines, severely limiting the number of medicines available to the public.
Due to intellectual property laws, Cuba can only produce generic drugs, once
again limiting the overall number of medicines available to its citizens. For
the average Cuban citizen, drugs are simply not obtainable on a consistent
basis, be they prescription or even just a simple tablet of aspirin.
Finally, beyond national access to medication, the US embargo has had
serious effects on public health at the local level. It was reported in 1995
that when individuals check into the hospital, they must bring their own
sheets, toilet paper, soap, and other personal items.35 Running water and
disinfectants are regularly unavailable, and blackouts are common. As stated
above there is a lack of medicines, and even basic medical supplies, such
as gloves, gauze, and antibacterial soap are in very short supply. Moreover,
absenteeism among medical staff and theft of supplies are major problems.36
The embargo has also limited Cubas access to water treatment chemicals
and spare parts for its water supply system, resulting in an increase in water-
born diseases that doctors do not have the means to treat effectively.37

C. Food and Basic Necessities

Related to these health concerns, food shortages have resulted in a drastic

reduction of the median weight in children and adults.38 Food is rationed
in Cuba, but the monthly government food rations last only about ten days.

32. Barry, supra note 28, at 152.

33. Id.
34. American Association for World Health, Denial of Food and Medicine: The Impact Of
The U.S. Embargo On Nutrition In Cuba (1997), available at http://www.cubasolidarity.
net/aawh.html.
35. Joseph P. Cangemi, What Castros Revolution has Done to the Majority of the Cuban
People, 161 Education 105, 105 (2001).
36. Id. at 106.
37. American Association for World Health, supra note 34.
38. Barry, supra note 28, at 152.
788 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Vol. 29

While fruits, vegetables, meat, and even lobster are available at farmers
markets, most Cubans cannot afford them due to their high prices. The fol-
lowing are typical rations for one person per month:
Rice (arroz) 6 lbs.
Sausage (chicaro) 20
Refined sugar (Azcar refino) 3 lbs
Raw sugar (A. crudo) 2 lbs.
Salt (Sal) 3/4 lb.
Bath soap (Jabn Bao) 3/4 bar
Cooking oil (aceita) 1/2 lb.
Coffee (caf) 20 oz.
Soup noodles (fideos) 8 oz.
Canned beef 8 oz./six months39
Approximately all of a persons monthly rations can fit into two plastic
bags. At a time when malnutrition is dropping in the rest of Latin America, it
is rising in Cuba. Daily caloric intake in Cuba dropped 33 percent between
1989 and 1993.40 Street food is cheap and abundant, but it is unhealthy.41
The poor diet and lack of medical supplies are taking their toll on Cubans,
with less than 18 percent of the population living beyond age sixty- five.42
As with medical supplies, soap, toilet paper, and cleaning products are
in very short supply for the average Cuban, if these items can be found at
all. Clothes are extremely expensive; a pair of jeans can cost as much as
1,500 pesos or approximately $60 (US) on the black market. This is much
more than an average Cuban makes in a month.43 Moreover, socks and
underwear have practically disappeared.

D. Transportation

Public transportation is affordable, but buses are packed and it is often neces-
sary to wait quite some time for a bus with space. The camel busses used
by the general population resemble sardine cans with people squeezed into
every inch of the vehicle. The extent of the public transportation system has
declined as the population has grown: In 1959 there was one bus for every
2,000 inhabitants; in 2003 there was one bus for every 7,000.44

39. This information was collected by the authors from a ration store board in Cuba 17
January 2002 and confirmed in January 2004; See also Ben Corbett, This is Cuba 8689
(2002).
40. American Association for World Health, supra note 34.
41. Alexandra Aguilar, Socialist Paradise Lost, 18 The World and I 164 (2003).
42. Id.
43. Cangemi, supra note 35, at 108.
44. Aguilar, supra note 41, at 164.
2007 Cuba: Success or Failure 789

While taxis are numerous in Havana, they are largely reserved for tourists.
Those few existing taxis for Cubans are difficult to find and very expensive
for the locals. Two reasons for the high price are the lack of spare parts and
the expense of gasoline, which is both rationed and of poor quality. Gas
rationing leads normally law abiding citizens to turn to the black market
for fuel. Each automobile, truck, or bus has a specific type of license plate.
Amarillos (policemen dressed in yellow) are permitted to stop certain auto-
mobiles and load passengers into the vehicle if there is room available.45 The
driver must accept these extra passengers since the state, not the individual,
owns the vehicle. Finally, travel within Cuba is extremely difficult due to
the lack of trains, buses, and planes, so trips between neighboring cities or
towns can take all day or longer.

E. Housing

Housing is an increasingly pressing concern. The initial distribution of hous-

ing after the revolution has underlined class distinctions that can still be felt
to this day. Despite the growing population, the construction and restoration
of homes is at a standstill, and three generations often share one small apart-
ment. Phone service has also not expanded much since it was installed in
1930.46 In general, houses are dilapidated, and there are few materials for
their maintenance. If that were not enough, electricity is not reliable, water
is very controlled, and there is a lack of natural gas.47

V. Economic Effects of the Special Period

As discussed earlier, Soviet-Cuban relations changed in August 1990. At

this time the Soviet Union stopped providing economic aid to Cuba and
required Cuba to pay world market prices for its crude oil. Cuba referred
to the next few years as the Special Period. Having lost its benefactor, the
Cuban government was forced to make adjustments. To its credit, Cuba did
not use the crisis to revoke the basic benefits of free socialized medicine
and education, nor did it attempt to exclude sectors of the population
from basic benefits and services. The amount of government expenditures
in education, health, social security, and social assistance has risen since
1990. But the purchasing power of the peso has drastically decreased and
therefore the quality of services today clearly does not equal the quality

45. Cangemi, supra note 35, at 107.

46. Aguilar, supra note 41, at 164.
47. Cangemi, supra note 35, at 108.
790 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Vol. 29

levels of the 1980s.48 The challenge currently facing Cuba is to recover the
previous effectiveness of the social system while increasing its efficiency, in
order to maximize the limited resources available.

A. Legalization of the US Dollar

One of the adjustments made by the Cuban government was the legaliza-
tion of the US dollar in 1993. Due to the loss of their Soviet benefactor,
Cuba needed to find a new way of obtaining foreign hard currency. The
Cuban peso did not have the same purchasing power as foreign exchange
because the price of the Cuban peso was administratively set, rather than
a free-floating currency. In order to purchase crude oil, grain, fruit, and
other commodities on the international market, accepting US dollars was
deemed an acceptable and practical solution to this problem. Given that
many Cubans already received US dollars from family members abroad, the
government simply legalized a currency that had been circulating within
the economy illegally.
Since its legalization, Cuban society has been strictly divided between
those who have access to dollars and those who do not.49 Income inequality
in Cuba is growing, and unemployment is a problem. In particular, there is
a growing gap between those working in the private sector of the economy
where employees are paid in US dollars and the government sector where
employees are paid in pesos. Moreover, an inverted pyramid has taken
shape in which education and professional preparation has been devalued.50
An examination of the current estimated monthly incomes helps explain
the situation:51
Police officers in Vieja Habana 800 pesos
Doctors/surgeons 450500 pesos
Government officials 300400 pesos

48. Uriarte, supra note 20, at 117.

49. As of 8 November 2004, the Cuban government no longer permits local transactions in
US dollars. The Canadian Dollar, British Pound, Euro, and the Swiss Franc were unaf-
fected. For the purposes of consistency and ease of discussion, this paper will refer to
dollars rather than these other currencies or the convertible peso.
50. Uriarte, supra note 20, at 110.
51. Corbett, supra note 39, at 15, 91, 94, 98. See also Ana Julia Jatar-Hausmann, The Cuban
Way 11315 (1999). In general, salaries in Cuba have been steadily rising, but staying
in rough proportion to what is stated here. For a discussion of wage inequality in Cuba
see James K. Galbraith, Laura Spagnolo, & Daniel Munevar, Pay Inequality in Cuba: the
Special Period and After, Working Paper Series of the Society for the Study of Economic
Inequality (2006), available at http://www.ecineq.org/milano/WP/ECINEQ2006-52.pdf.
One note about this sourceit only examines state wages, not tips or other sources of
income.
2007 Cuba: Success or Failure 791

State workers 200 pesos

Tourist hotel construction workers 185235 pesos
Entry level workers 148 pesos
Street sweepers 100 pesos
Retirees on Social Security 75130 pesos52
When considering these salary levels, it is crucial to understand the dual
streams of the Cuban economy. Healthcare, utilities, housing, transporta-
tion, and basic foodstuffs are all subsidized heavily, and therefore, a simple
conversion from pesos to dollars is not particularly useful when trying to
understand incomes in Cuba. However, trying to live on pesos alone is ex-
tremely difficult, due to the lack of materials and food available in the peso
markets. According to Merri Ansara, the majority of Cubans could live quite
well on practically any salary in ordinary pesos PLUS $100200 in convert-
ible per month.53 Without access to dollars, life in Cuba becomes much
more difficult. The introduction of the dollar has clearly reinvigorated the
class system in Cuba. In particular, a new class has arisenthe Yummies,
Cubas new class of young upwardly mobile Marxists, replacing the idea
of the socialist man.54 There is a clear distinction between the socialism
of the peso and the yummie dollar-communism.55

B. Growth of the Tourism Industry

More than 2.3 million tourists visited Cuba in 2005.56 Revenues from tour-
ism now total about $2 billion a year providing roughly a third of Cubas
hard-currency income.57 Ironically, the reorientation of the Cuban economy
towards tourism and the export of raw materials is a textbook case of neo-
colonial dependent development, which Castro supposedly overthrew in
1959. Those Cubans who work in the tourism industry can make $1020
a day, depending upon their position.
Only about half of the population has access to dollars and other for-
eign currencies, and the majority of remittances go to families with already

52. While Cuban pesos have no value in the international currency market, 25 pesos are
approximately equal to $1 US. See Jatar-Hausmann, supra note 51, at 11315.
53. Email correspondence from Merri Ansara, Director of Common Ground (7 Feb. 2005)(on
file with author). Common Ground is an organization that facilitates travel to Cuba.
54. Marc Cooper, For Sale: Used Marxism, 290 Harpers Magazine 54 (1995).
55. Id.
56. Mariagny Taset Aguilar, Cuba, the country that many people want to know, Granma
Intl, 10 May 2006, available at http://www.granma.cu/ingles/2006/mayo/mier10/20feria.
html.
57. Juan Forero, Cuba Perks Up as Venezuelas Lifeline Foils U.S. Embargo, N.Y. Times, 4
Aug. 2006, at 3.
792 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Vol. 29

high incomes.58 This acceptance of dollars into the economy along with the
buildup of the tourism industry and foreign investment has posed a challenge
to the socialist ideology of the regime. As author Marc Cooper states, for
those with dollars socialism is nothing more than a political speech.59

C. Racial Equality

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba also made immense strides in
the reduction of racial inequality, keeping with the idea that revolutionary
Cuba should be a raceless society.60 This is in stark contrast to Cuba prior
to the revolution. As the CIA World Factbook states, Cubas racial problems
began with its possession by the Spanish following 1492. As more Euro-
peans arrived, the native Amerindian population of Cuba began to decline.
. . . Large numbers of African slaves were imported to work the coffee and
sugar plantations.61
The effects of the special period have not been evenly distributed
among racial groups. In general, the dollarization of the economy has lead
to the fragmentation of Cuban society and the majority of those receiving
family remittances and working in the tourist sector are white.62 Throughout
the 1980s, a strong correlation existed between race and the quality of the
housing, the effects of which can be easily seen today.63 Beyond this housing
problem, blacks and mulattos are over-represented in the prison population
and are much more likely than whites to be deemed socially dangerous.64
Cuba has reverted to a pre-revolutionary mentality where blacks are more
often perceived as lazy, inefficient, dirty, ugly, and prone to criminal activi-
ties.65 The equality that was promised by the revolution has lost popular
support, given the struggle for basic goods among all poorer Cubans.66
The achievement of racial equality in Cuba was largely dependent upon
government performance. Now that the government is unable to devote
as many resources to deal with racial issues, Cubans are reverting back to
pre-revolutionary stereotypes that clearly have not been eliminated from
the island. Racial tensions now seem to be more prevalent than before the
crisis period began.67

58. Uriarte, supra note 20, at 110.

59. Cooper, supra note 54, at 55.
60. Alejandro de la Fuente, Recreating Racism: Race and Discrimination in Cubas Special
Period, 15 Socialism & Democracy 65, 68 (2001).
61. Central intelligence agency (cia), the world factbook 2007: cuba (2007), available at https://
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html [hereinafter World Factbook 2007].
62. de la Fuente, supra note 60, at 76.
63. Id. at 72.
64. Id. at 74.
65. Id. at 80.
66. Id. at 83.
67. Id. at 89.
2007 Cuba: Success or Failure 793

VI. Political and Civil Human Rights

No discussion of Cuba would be complete without mentioning the lack of

basic political and civil liberties in Cuba. Cuban citizens do not enjoy the
most basic political and civil liberties, as Castros regime uses repressive
measures to deter its opposition. Cubans are systematically denied freedom
of expression, association, assembly, privacy, movement, and due process
of the law, under the pretext of protecting state security. While in theory
Cubas constitution creates separate and well-defined roles for the different
branches of government, in actuality the executive has clear control over
all branches of power.68 Castro controls all important political appointments
because of his multiple offices.69 He has also rendered the legislative branch
inconsequential, and the judicial system is not independent. Freedom of
speech is severely restricted by Cubas Criminal Code and the spreading of
unauthorized news, insulting patriotic symbols, and possessing or distrib-
uting enemy propaganda are all expressly forbidden.70 The state therefore
controls the media and independent journalists are often harassed and in-
timidated. Moreover, internet access, when available, is extremely limited.
Finally, while nearly 200 dissidents were permitted to meet in Havana in
May 2005, these types of mass gatherings remain the rare exception rather
than the rule.71
The laws restricting freedom of speech make it easy to arrest individuals
with viewpoints that differ from those of the regime. According to a July 2005
list made by the Cuba Commission for Human Rights and National Reconcili-
ation, a respected local human rights group, there are currently 306 prisoners
incarcerated for political reasons.72 The sentences for these prisoners range
in length from twenty-six months to twenty-eight years.73 Prison conditions
are harsh, and prisoners are often subjected to beatings and denied medical
attention. Hunger strikes are also common among the inmates.
Fourteen of the seventy-five dissidents arrested in a March 2003 crack-
down have been released for health reasons and possibly because they are
of advanced age.74 The fourteen released men are older, and some have

68. Human Rights Watch, Overview of Human Rights Issues in Cuba (31 Dec. 2005), avail-
able at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/cuba12207.htm.
69. Fidel Castro was sworn in as Prime Minister of Cuba and Commander in Chief of the
Cuban Armed Forces after the overthrow of Batista in 1959. In 1965, he was named
the First Secretary of the newly-founded Communist Party of Cuba. With the passing of
a new constitution in 1976, Castro became the President of the Council of State and
the President of the Council of Ministers of Cuba.
70. Human Rights Watch, supra note 68.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Amnesty International, Cuba Annual Report (2005), available at http://www.amnestyusa.
org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2005&c=CUB.
74. Benoit Aubin, Idealists or Fools?, 118 Macleans 30 (2005).
794 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Vol. 29

health problems. The remaining sixty-one detainees are mostly younger men.
Interestingly, those released do not believe that they were released because
of health problems, but rather in a bid to ease relations with the European
Union.75 Vsquez Portal, who was initially sentenced to eighteen years in
prison but was among those released, does not believe that the human rights
situation could possibly improve while Castro is in power. Dissidents have
catered primarily to a foreign audience, while most Cubans have not heard
of the imprisoned reformers. Thus, Cuba currently lacks a viable opposition
and, perhaps more importantly, the necessary public awareness needed to
create one.

VII. Survival of the Castro Regime

Despite difficulty in fulfilling the social contract since losing Soviet patron-
age, the Castro regime has managed to survive. The authoritarian regime
has done this by using a variety of release mechanisms that would permit
average Cubans to either vent their frustrations or to help them overcome
problems. Specifically, as discussed above, the regime has permitted some
market incentives to be used such as farmers markets and foreign direct
investment, and the legalization of the dollar and other foreign currencies to
help citizens make ends meet. When these measures have not been enough,
the regime has typically blamed the US for the conditions of its people,
arguing that life would be better if it were not for the embargo. Blaming
the US for Cubas current problems seems to resonate well with the Cuban
populace. By blaming the US, the Cuban government is able to tap into the
anti-colonial feelings of the Cuban people, making the claim that fighting
the embargo is just another part of Cubas long struggle for economic and
political independence. When all else fails, the regime has periodically
permitted dissidents to leave Cuba, and finally, when even this has not been
a palatable option, the regime has relied on coercion.
Ultimately, Cubas government will survive or fall based upon its fulfill-
ment of the social contract it has made with its own people. History has
already provided us with two examples of how communist countries can
react to the necessity of fulfilling citizens needs. In the case of the Soviet
Union, the Soviet leadership was unable to meet the social contract demands
of its people.76 While the Soviet Union tried to ultimately reform itself dur-
ing the Gorbachev regime by offering its people economic and political
liberalization, in the end, these policies failed to fulfill the expectations of

75. Id.
76. For more information about the Soviet case see Richard Sakwa, Gorbachev and his reforms
19851990 (1990); Stephen White, After Gorbachev (1993).
2007 Cuba: Success or Failure 795

the Soviet populace. The Soviet Union ceased to exist within six years of
the onset of its reforms.
The Peoples Republic of China offers us a second case study.77 In China,
Deng Xiaoping tried to remake the social contract by telling his citizens
to get rich, albeit with a variety of limitations. China embraced a form
of neo-capitalism, that in contrast to the former Soviet Union, allowed it
to maintain a tight political hold on its citizens. Political repression is still
considered a legitimate tool of the Chinese government for those that cross
the line of acceptable behavior. Nonetheless, Chinas economic growth has
been impressive and its citizens are, in terms of economic and social needs,
living better than they have in the past. Thus, the Chinese government is
fulfilling its share of the social contract.

VIII. Conclusion

Cuba sits at the precipice of an important decision. This article has argued that
Cuba is not fulfilling its part of the social contract with its citizens, which is
leading to a loss of legitimacy for the government. However, this should not
be taken as the death knell of the Cuban regime. Castro has shown himself
to be a pragmatist in his willingness to back away from ideological doctrine
in an attempt to provide his people with the basic necessities they need.
In some cases this has worked well, in others not. Cuba appears unwilling
to follow the policies of the former Soviet Union for fear that communist
Cuba would find itself in the dustbin of history. Moreover, Cuba has not
been willing to fully follow the Chinese path of neo-capitalism. In part, this
is because Cuba still does not control its own economic fate.
Finally, Cubas immediate savior contains the seeds of Cubas destruc-
tion. Because tourism dollars are so important for the survival of the Cuban
state, Cuba finds itself in a new form of colonialism where it must ensure
that tourist dollars keep coming in at the expense of developing other parts
of its economy. As some sectors of the Cuban society gain access to foreign
currency and the luxuries it affords while others struggle to feed their fami-
lies using only the peso, the Cuban revolution will come under greater and
greater strain. It is the position of the authors that the survival of the Castro
regime will be determined by how well the Cuban populace believes the
regime is fulfilling its part of the social contract. US focus on political hu-
man rights abuses, while important, is misplaced for understanding whether
the Castro regime will survive or fall. In the end the survival of the regime
before and after Castros death will in large part be determined by how well
it meets the needs of its people.

77. For more information about China see Bruce Gilley, Chinas Democratic Future (2004);
Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution through Reform (2004).