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CAUCASUS REGION POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ISSUES
THE GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN WAR

OF AUGUST 2008
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CAUCASUS REGION POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ISSUES
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CAUCASUS REGION POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ISSUES
THE GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN WAR

OF AUGUST 2008
ALEXANDER DAUSHVILI
EDITOR
New York
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The Georgian-Russian War of August 2008 / Alexander Daushvili and five others ; editor, Alexander
Daushvili (Vice-Chairman of the Board of ICCS, Georgia).
pages cm. -- (Caucasus Region political, economic, and security issues)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN: (eBook)
1. South Ossetia War, 2008. 2. Georgia (Republic)--History--1991- 3. Georgia (Republic)--Politics and
government. 4. South Ossetia (Georgia)--History. 5. Georgia (Republic)--Foreign relations--Russia
(Federation) 6. Russia (Federation)--Foreign relations--Georgia (Republic) I. Dau vili, Alek'sandre.
DK678.G45 2015
947.58086--dc23
2015025938
Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York
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CONTENTS
Preface vii
Chapter 1 How the August 2008 War was Prepared 1
Ucha Bluashvili
Chapter 2 Tragic Zigzags in the Georgian Governments
Domestic Policy Prior to the August 2008 War 21
Alexander Daushvili
Chapter 3 Crisis Diplomacy in the August 2008 War 35
Dazmir Jojua
Chapter 4 Russian-Georgian War of August 2008 and
North Atlantic Alliance 53
Otar Janelidze
Chapter 5 Military-Strategic and Tactical Issues Regarding
the Russian-Georgian War of 2008 65
Giorgi (Gia) Karkarashvili
Chapter 6 The Georgian-Ossetian Population Living in the
Conflict Zone before and after the 2008 War
(According to Ethnographic Materials) 77
Medea Burduli
Chapter 7 The Legend Is Still Fresh but Hard to Believe 87
Alexander Daushvili
Editors Contact Information 139
Index 141
PREFACE
The Russian-Georgian War of August 2008 stands out for its socio-
political, international, diplomatic, geostrategic, economic and moral-
psychological results. Despite the fact that only some years have passed since
the end of the war and we all are witnesses and participants of the preparation
and of the accomplishment of this dramatic event, there are still many
unanswered questions. There are more mysteries in respect of the actions of
the main participants of this dramatic event, which dispose historians to study
those events thoroughly hot on the trail, not to wait for a historical
distance, and fill up secret documents with logical arguments and noteworthy
hypotheses.
The scientific conference, held in Tbilisi in the large hall of The Georgian
National Academy of Sciences in the summer of 2014, was aimed precisely to
the approbation of the new scholarly ideas on different aspects regarding the
preparation and proceedings of the War of August 2008. The conference was
attended by representatives of the historical community of Georgia and of the
mass media. The reports were made at the conference by professors and
scholars of Sukhumi State University, Akhaltsikhe Educational University and
Tbilisi Scientific Centre for Historical, Ethnological, Religious Study and
Propaganda. A former Minister of Defense of Georgia, General Giorgi (Gia)
Karkarashvili, also sent his report.
The present collection of works is simply a publication of an English
version of these conference materials to which a critical analysis of the
sensational book in Georgia A Little War that Shook the World, written by
an eminent political-scientist and diplomat, R.D. Asmus, was added. In our
opinion, it will help American readers to comprehend the issues more
profoundly.
viii Alexander Daushvili
Today, when Russian aggression is directed against the sovereign state of

the Ukraine, separatism and ethnic cleansing are encouraged, and requirements
of the world democratic society are fully ignored by Putin, the question is:
where did this unbridled pretension of Russia to restore the USSR by means of
power, and punish those who want to get rid of the political influence of
Russia begin?
We think that Georgia was the firing ground where Putin and his political
group began to sound the first chords of their aggressive policy and show the
world how it was ready to stop the aggressor.
Unfortunately in 2008, the democratic world appeared to be unready for
various reasons and Putin swept to victory. He defeated Georgia and
recognized the de-facto governments of Abkhazia and Ossetia: that is, he
manifestly supported separatism, against which he still successfully fights in
his own country with fire and sword.
After its victory over Georgia, Russia officially started speaking of how it
had defeated the Georgian army perfectly trained by American experts, and in
several days achieved its capitulation. Exactly after this victory, Russian
diplomacy acquired an aggressive tone at international conferences and
summits, and Putins Russia conceived and accomplished the perfidious plan
of the disintegration and destruction of the Ukraine, which has been
proceeding with a Georgian scenario.
The participants of the conference think that the share of mistakes and
even obvious crime of the former Georgian government (i.e. the political
group of M. Saakashvili) is very large in the dramatic events of August 2008,
as it did not properly take into consideration the advice and recommendations
of its strategic ally, the administration of the US in its relationship with Russia.
did not prepare the population for war with Russia, whom obviously fell for
the bait of the provocations planned by Russia and its puppet government of
South Ossetia, did not work out the right strategy and tactics, suspiciously
rapidly ceded its positions and capitulated, which caused the disorganization
of the whole society. The aggressor perfectly took advantage of this and
occupied 20% of Georgian territory.
In the articles of this collection, the authors attempt to give well-reasoned
answers to the questions asked in Georgian society on the causes of the War of
August 2008. They will also discuss: the history of the political relationship
between Russia and Georgia for the last 25 years; on Georgias western
choice; on the purpose, errors and defects of domestic and foreign policy of
the Georgian government; on why they did not properly prepare the country
for this war; and why they did not envisage the advice and suggestions of their
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Preface ix
strategic allies. We hope that American readers will treat with understanding
the opinions and conclusions of the authors.
The authors will receive all constructive criticism with gratitude.
In: The Georgian-Russian War of August 2008 ISBN: 978-1-63483-400-1
Editor: Alexander Daushvili 2015 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Chapter 1
HOW THE AUGUST 2008

WAR WAS PREPARED
Ucha Bluashvili
The very complicated relations with Russia, our direct northerly neighbor
and follower of the same Orthodox religion, permeates through the latest
history of Georgia. A part of Georgian society explains it by the expansionist
and aggressive nature of Russian state leaders; the second part supposes that
the cause is rather the serious mistakes made by Georgian politicians.
It must be said that in both cases we have an attempt to give a one-sided
explanation of this complex and multilateral phenomenon that restricts the
borders of the investigation of its causes and makes it impossible to conduct a
full and perfect analysis.
On November 4, 1990, about a week after the national forces joined the
government of our country, the First Deputy of the chairman of the Supreme
Council, Akaki Asatiani, went to Moscow. Mikhail Gorbachov told him
frankly that if the new authorities in Georgia try to withdraw from the Soviet
Union, they must know that they will face serious problems in Abkhazia and
Ossetia and also in other regions compactly inhabited by national minorities.
No proper conclusions were drawn from this threat. At that time, the
euphoria resulting from the victory over communism was very strong in the
2 Ucha Bluashvili
government. Zviad Gamsakhurdia1 and his team believed they could overcome
all difficulties.
As the verbal warning did not get any results, the Kremlin passed into
action. Ossetian separatists, under instruction and encouragement from
Moscow, formed the republic of South Ossetia as early as December 9, 1990.
On 11th December, the Supreme Council of Georgia answered this demarche
with the abolition of the Autonomic Oblast of South Ossetia. Groups of
Georgian militia entered Tskhinvali. Hostilities began between the Georgians
and Ossetian separatists. Bloodshed having taken place in Tskhinvali was the
start of Russias plan aimed at the disintegration of Georgia.
The population of Georgia voted for its independence in the March 31
referendum. On April 9 of the same year, Georgia, the first state after the
Baltic Republics, announced both that it was leaving the Soviet Union and also
its independence. Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan confirmed
the disintegration of the USSR in Belovezh on December 8th. An agreement
was signed on the formation of a Commonwealth of Independent States. From
the former republics of the Soviet Union, only Georgia and the Baltic
countries refused to join.
The steps taken by the leaders of the new republic at that time are
positively evaluated by Georgian public opinion. Afraid of the Soviet empire,
we Georgians tried to avoid any political connection with Russia. However
that country is completely deprived of leverage against other member states of
the CIS, unlike the situation in the USSR where Russia was all powerful.
Russia could not force CIS member states even to recognize our occupied
territories and was obliged to implore Venezuela and Vanuatu to do so.
It is obvious that entering such a multi-national union as the CIS involves
making some concessions of sovereignty, but anticipated positive and negative
results are weighed on a scale and decisions made on the grounds of it.
Entering the CIS was dictated to us by a political purpose the return of
territorial integrity. Had we made such a step maybe it would not have
eliminated the motivation of Russia to stir up conflicts in Georgia, but it
certainly would have diminished it considerably.
Let us consider one historical parallel. After the February revolution of
1918, Georgia had a chance of declaring independence. Russia, weakened by
war and revolution, could not care for the whole of its empire. But an exact
forecast of the development of military operations was impossible even as late
1
Well-known Georgian dissident, the leader of the political union Round Table, the first
President of Georgia (1991-1992). After the Tbilisi War (December-January 1991) he left
Georgia. He was a controversial political figure.
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How the August 2008 War Was Prepared 3
as in the third year of World War I. Thus, the defining of a logical foreign-
policy course and the finding of a reliable ally were impossible. Turkey, as
well as Russia, was fighting to gain a foothold in the Caucasian region. Iran
was quite weak by this time but could also make problems for the
independence of Georgia. During World War I, European countries would be
useless as guarantors of the balance between Russia and Turkey which were
opposed to each other in attempting to control the Caucasus. On the contrary,
the states of Antanta were declaring that they recognized the whole and
indivisible Russia and separate nations of their empire were considered to be
parts of Russia. Neither of the versions for breaking this balance was of use to
Georgia. Had Russia left Transcaucasia, Turkey would inevitably have taken
its place. The weakening of the Turkish position would have untied the hands
of Russia for active fighting.
The Georgian politicians avoided fixing a radical political course in such a
difficult military course, so that should the situation change there would be the
possibility of correction or alteration. Nevertheless, the first Georgian National
Assembly of November 19-24, 1917 clearly defined its foreign political
orientation. The assembly affirmed that Georgian democracy since the day of
its foundation, has been closely connected to Russian democracy. Moreover,
the main reporter, Noe Zhordania2 remarked that if a constituent assembly
cannot be convened in the nearest future, we will be obliged to organize a
local constitutional meeting and give ourselves a constitution. We should
demand that Georgia be granted complete local self-government... [1].
Noe Zhordanias report was not controversial. Representatives of all
parties, attending the assembly, signed excluding the Bolshevik Filipp
Makharadze. Social-federalists liked the idea offered by Noe Zhordania of the
standing of the national forces on common soil. Socialist-revolutionists also
noted that their party did not see any necessity of any additions and completely
approved the principles formulated in the report. They remarked: Zhordanias
speech unites us all. It does not mean that there are no disagreements among
our members but at present we completely agree with this speech and will
making no separate announcements.
Why did the Georgian national parties demand complete political
independence for the country?
The Georgian politicians responded to this question quite concretely: If
Georgia declares its independence, Turkey will absorb Georgian territories.
2
Noe Zhordania was an outstanding figure of the international right wing social-democratic
movement and the chairman of the government of the first Georgian republic (1918-1921).
After the sovietization of Georgia he became a political emigrant.
4 Ucha Bluashvili
That is why we must agree to the restriction of sovereignty and thus retain
territorial integrity. At the right moment we will be able to restore our
sovereignty, but the return of our lost territory would be very problematic.
Such a position of Georgian politicians tells us of their foresight. They
were assisting Georgia but simultaneously retaining the benevolence if not of
the whole Russian political spectrum, at least of a large part. In this respect,
the speech by the representative of the Union of Georgian Soldiers at the
council held by the Russian democratic forces in Petrograd in September 1917
is characteristic: If we Georgians had not as yet presented our national
demand to the Russian democratic government, it is not because we lack
national self-consciousness, or enough power to realize our national ideal, no
we have both. But we think that at a time when the state and revolution are in
such intolerable conditions, we should not further complicate an already
complicated cause [2].
After the words of this Georgian politician the whole auditorium stood
and applauded.
Unfortunately when the Soviet Union collapsed Georgian politicians of
the 1980s and 90s could not display the same profound thinking, diplomatic
flexibility and acumen. Radicalism, some kind of bravado, the result of a lack
of both political intellect and experience intensified. This was logical. A large
part of Georgian politicians at the beginning of the 20th century had obtained
their tertiary education in European institutions. As to those of the end of the
century, they had not even received a proper secondary education, having
participated in dissident movements from yearly years.
At the end of the 1980s, the interests of the Georgian state, as in 1917,
required the temporary refusal of parts of its sovereignty in order to ensure the
retention of its territorial integrity. In 1988 a journalist asked the elderly poet,
Kolau Nadiradze, famous for his dissident poems: "How should Georgians
behave in the present situation?" The poets answer was astonishing: You
dont believe me, but Ill tell you. The Empire is breaking down, now we
should lie down and be silent. When it's broken, we will stand up, shake off
the dust and do our business.
This is the formula that would have helped us avoid a confrontation with
Russia at that time. Unfortunately, in the Georgian National Movement there
was no call for it, on the one hand, because of a generally low level of intellect
among the politicians, and, on the other hand, because of extreme ambition.
Failing to take into consideration anticipated dangers, improvident
boasting was followed by a logical consequence - Georgia was sunk in inner
conflicts imposed by official Russia.
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The latter took an active part in the overthrow of Zviad Gamsakhurdia,

then tried in every way to defeat Georgia in the Georgian-Abkhazian
confrontation which Russia itself provoked.
In 1994 a Russian-Georgian agreement was signed which was soon
ratified by the Parliament of Georgia. Russia abstained from the ratification.
This fact testified that Russia did not trust our country even after we had
become a member of the CIS and it decided to put it out of the association.
That is why it did not wish to be restricted by the ratification of an agreement
confirming internationally recognized borders.
In 1997 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia of that time, Yevgeny
Primakov, proposed the idea of the so-called Georgian-Abkhazian common
state. Each had the right to leave. It was not a particularly clever trap to cause
the disintegration of the Georgian state.
On May 19-26, 1998 the Georgian side tried to free Gali by means of
partisan forces. Later Georgian partisans and soldiers spoke of a secret deal
with the officers of the Russian army who, as in an exchange involving large
sums of money, should refrain from being involved in the conflict. This
undertaking seemed to be a shady business from the start and ended as it
should. The Georgian regular army does not help partisans. Gali was lost once
more. Abkhazians burnt down approximately two thousand houses. One
hundred and ninety partisans and peaceful inhabitants were killed in the
fighting. The number of refugees from Gali was 50 thousand.
The same year, a group of parliamentary members visited Moscow. They
explained to the Russian colleagues that Georgia requested two things from
Russia: 1) Russia should not interfere in the settlement of our conflicts and 2)
the Ministry of Defense of Russia should give us our share of arms from the
Soviet Union arsenal. Instead the Georgian side was prepared to fulfill all
Russia's demands, excluding such requirements that would be dangerous for
our sovereignty and territorial integrity. Giorgi Baramidze3 could not hide his
surprise on television that the Georgian delegation had failed to get any
concrete response from to Russian counterpart.
The attitude of Russia towards Georgia acquired an especially aggressive
character from 1999 when, on the one hand, the vertical line of Russia's
political system became consolidated as a result taken place in the Russian
leadership and, on the other hand, improvements having taken place in the
socio-economic life of Georgia gave the Georgian state the possibility to
3
Giorgi Baramidze - political figure of modern Georgia, one of the leaders of the political
organization of Mikheil Saakashvilis United National Movement, member of the
Georgian Parliament.
6 Ucha Bluashvili
accentuate its Euro-Atlantic course. Russia's policy of creeping annexation of

Georgian territories moved to a new phase.
The same year (1999) Russia demanded from Georgia the passing of its
army on its territory in the direction of Chechnya. When permission was
refused Russia bombed Pankisi Gorge in Georgia several times.
In 2000 Russia set a visa regime for Georgia but for Tskhinvali and
Abkhazia it introduced simplified rules.
In 2001-2002 a search for ways to settle the Georgian-Abkhazian and
Georgian-Ossetian conflicts was actively conducted within the limits of the
territorial integrity of Georgia (Bodens plan) under the aegis of the UN and
OSCE. But separatists and Russia systematically blocked these initiatives.
In 2002 Russia began giving its passports to the inhabitants of Georgia's
separatist regions.
In July 7, 2004 Ossetian separatists captured, disarmed and humiliated
Georgian policemen when they entered the village of Vanati. Separatists made
them kneel and the scenes were broadcast on television many times.
Two days later, on July 9th, after returning from Iran, Mikheil Saakashvili
categorically demanded at a meeting to move all the armed forces of Georgia
to Tskhinvali. Participants of the meeting managed to assure the President that
this step would be fatal for the country and for his presidency [3]. In 2006
Russia banned Georgian imports to Russia.
In addition a road blockade was set up. Flights of the Russian special
services over Georgian territory began in the same period. During September
to October, Georgia answered by detaining Russian spies and obtaining their
extradition. The Georgian authorities of that time did this undiplomatically and
demonstratively, in its own peculiar way. Putin gave this as the cause for the
deportation of Georgian citizens from Russia.
The same year (2006) Putin told Mikheil Saakashvili4 straight, that he
would form a North Cyprus in Georgia. A little later he repeated the same
during talks with the UN secretary.
From the same period there was increased aggression by separatist
regimes and also of activity by the Russian military groups on the Georgian
borders. Russian airplanes bombed Kodori Gorge and sent rockets to the
village of Tsitelubani.
It thus became more and more obvious that Russia was not a moderator of
conflicts, but its participant.
4
M. Saakashvili - political figure, third president of Georgia (2004-2013).
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Leading European states and the US acknowledged the independence of

Kosovo on February 17, 2008. By this action they put Georgia in jeopardy. It
was no secret that Russia would use this fact as an excuse for breaking up the
territorial integrity of Georgia. Xavier Solana, former General Secretary of
NATO, remarked at a meeting of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs
Committee that Kosovo could create a precedent and bring negative results to
Georgia: We are falling into a trap... President Saakashvili is already trapped,
all of us are becoming the victims of a double mechanism which would bring
good results for one, but not to the other. It would not be a situation where
both sides win. We should be able to seek and find a situation where both sides
would win, but it would not be easy [4].
Five days after the acknowledgement of the independence of Kosovo by
the West, Putin and Saakashvili met at the CIS Summit. Putin remarked to
Saakashvili: I do not understand why America started a campaign to Islamize
Europe. As the Albanians have obtained what they wanted, they will wish for
more and then will approach Macedonia. You see that we cannot leave the
West without answer, after Kosovo... I am sorry but you are also implicated in
this issue.
Mikheil Saakashvili answered that he did not see any connection between
the situation in Georgia and in Kosovo. He also said that if North Caucasians
support Abkhazians and Ossetians it is because they want independence as
well from Russia. Putin listened to Saakashvili calmly, then answered that the
problem of North Caucasians did not bother him. "We will look after them
somehow," he said and by putting this thumb to his throat he showed how he
would solve the problem.
Mikheil Saakashvili tried to persuade Putin: "Georgia could be the best
neighbor for you and let us think together about the respect of sovereignty
and territorial integrity of each other, taking into account vital strategic
interests, including those questions that worry you so much.
It was obvious that it was possible to make an agreement on everything,
including on the striving of Tbilisi to join NATO, if Moscow had the will to
settle the issue of the territorial integrity of Georgia. Putin abstained from
making an offer. His answer was I cannot give out lands in exchange of
concessions. Putin clearly declared to the Georgian delegation - the Minister
of Foreign affairs, David Bakradze and his deputy, Grigol Vashadze that
restoration of air communication with Georgia was possible, that they would
consider the return of Georgian wine to the Russian market but as for the
disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, we will give our answers
to the West, the US and to NATO in the context of Kosovo.
8 Ucha Bluashvili
You should not be upset, you should not worry, what we will do will not
be directed against you. This is our response to the action of the West.
When the eminent political scientist, Ronald Asmus refers to this subject,
he remarks that Putin openly sent a message to the West through Saakashvili:
"Recognition of Kosovo would return to you as a boomerang." Coming from
St Petersburg Saakashvili asked David Bakradze his impressions, he replied "I
think it smells like war" [5].
It was evident that Russia was going to answer the West on the Kosovo
events with recognition of the occupied territories of Georgia. Saakashvili
realized this danger well and warned political figures of the West more than
once, but they always assured him that Moscow was only threatening and that
the Kosovo precedent could have no negative results for Georgia. The
development of events showed that the calculation of European and American
politicians were false. The Russian authorities were determined not to leave
this step of the West without response. In the Kremlins opinion the best way
of paying US and Europe in the same coin was punishing Georgia. The
political decision was made, only its technical realization was left, but the
Russian state had a tremendous experience in such matters...
Russia had tried and done everything to weaken Georgia since the 1783
Treaty of Georgievsk, patiently waiting for the death of the last King of Kartli
and Kakheti; then made Georgian noblemen (some by threats, some by
promises) sign their agreement to Russian subordination. In the manifest of the
incorporation of Kartli and Kakheti into the Russian Empire was written that
this step had been made out of pity for a small people, follower of the same
religion.
The following occupation of Georgia also happened in the name of
supporting the revolted Georgian people. It was clear that Russia would try
again to don the mantle of protector of small peoples - Abkhazians and
Ossetians - oppressed by Georgian chauvinists. But this time it would not be
enough. It was necessary to show in the eyes of the international community
Georgia as the aggressor, after which Russia would come as a peacekeeper.
The first aim - the support of the Abkhazian and Ossetian peoples was
guaranteed for Russia. More complicated was the second aim, showing
Georgia as the aggressor. The resolution of this issue was not a problem for
Russia either.
In 1992 Russia could manage to tempt Edward Shevardnadze, a much
more experienced, balanced and farsighted politician: it forced him to bring
troops to Abkhazia. So it should not be difficult for Russia to fool unbalanced,
imprudent and not far-sighted Saakashvili.
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Russia followed its plan slowly, step by step. On March 4th, 2008 the
Parliament of South Ossetia addressed Russia with a request to acknowledge
its independence. Three days later, the Parliament of Abkhazia did the same.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation announced on
March 6th that Russia due to changing circumstances does not feel obliged to
follow the decision of the leaders of the CIS member states on banning trade-
economic, financial, transport and other relations with Abkhazia adopted on
the 19th January, 1996. The Russian Duma discussed the request of the
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia at a closed meeting on March 13.
The decision adopted by the Duma on March 21, envisaged complying with
this request. On April 14 the Nezavisimaya Gazeta published Marina
Perevozkinas article Moscow will answer NATO with Abkhazia in which
the author quotes the words of a Russian diplomat: Moscow should
acknowledge the independence of Abkhazia and Ossetia only in two cases: 1)
if Georgia really attempts to become a member of NATO and 2) should war be
declared.
In May, 2008 the Head of General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia,
Yuri Baluevski, spoke in a martinet style to NATO colleagues, who had
arrived in Moscow to attend consultations concerning the limits of NATO-
Russian cooperation: This summer a breakout of war is anticipated in
Georgia. Therefore I advise you to postpone your planned NATO-Georgian
joint training. Representatives of NATO took these words as usual Russian
malignant gossip and the latest attempt at blackmailing Georgia, but the
subsequent events affirmed that the Russian general was not joking.
After the August war, the same Y. Baluevski admitted that the war plan
against Georgia had been already worked out by the Head of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces by the end of 2005 or at the beginning of 2006, the co-
author of being Vladimir Putin. The latter was not contented only with
listening to reports and asking questions, but pointed out tasks to be carried
out, went deep into details, etc. The plan was first declared by Putin and then
by Medvedev.
Though Baluevski calls this plan a method of rebuffing aggression and
adequate measures against Georgian aggression, he also spoke of the
concrete terms of its practical realization in the period July to September,
2008. The Beijing Olympic Games played a decisive role in the fixing of the
date. What does all this signify? Either the Russian General Staff knew the
exact date of the aggression by the Georgian side three years before it occurred
which of course is absolute nonsense - or Russia itself had planned aggression
against Georgia at a time of maximum convenience for itself.
10 Ucha Bluashvili
However it needed a necessary element and thus was the performance of

the farce of aggression by Georgia [6].
Later both Putin and Medvedev spoke openly of the existence of such a
plan.
In the middle of June, 2008, Russian independent military expert, Pavel
Felgengauer, announced that the Kremlin and General Staff had adopted the
decision of carrying out military operations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In
his opinion it had to happen not later than the second half of August, taking
into account seasonal climatic changes in the Caucasian range in these regions
[7].
Ronald Asmus and the German Member of the European Parliament,
Elmar Brock, met at the international conference held in Yalta, July 2008. I
have recently met the Russian ambassador of the EU, Vladimir Chizhov, and
told him I was planning to visit Georgia in September. The Russian
ambassador smiled and said: Maybe you should go earlier. What if
September is too late?
It is very surprising that Georgia too was preparing not for defensive but
for offensive war.
Unfortunately there was a strong preparation for taking the desired for the
real among the politically immature youths standing at the head of the
Georgian state. After achieving success in Adjara, Saakashvili and his team
had the illusion that they would be able to return Abkhazia and Ossetia in a
similar way. They thought that Russia was so weakened and now feeble, that it
could not react adequately to the energetic actions of Georgia. This mood is
clearly expressed in an interview given by the former Minister of Internal
Affairs, Vano Merabishvili, to a Rustavi 2 television channel journalist on
September 29, 2006. Russia has never been so weak and unprotected as it is
today, and now it is very embarrassed, makes inadequate, spontaneous steps...
They are so confused that they have ordered an 800 passenger aeroplane for
taking 100 members of diplomats families... Today all the world sees that
Russia is an ordinary helpless country, and the myth of the omnipotence of its
intelligence services falls into oblivion. Certainly the blow which Georgia has
inflicted on Russia (the arrest of 4 Russian spies. U. B.) is for it particularly
painful. That is why I am expecting that Russia will not seriously provoke us
and if does makes such a step, the Russian side will be the first to suffer [8].
Saakashvilis personal characteristics: impatience, populism, making
serious decisions without prior thinking and in the narrow circle of friends, or
even individually, and so on, led to a truly national disaster - the propensity of
taking the desired for the reality.
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The Georgian President thought seriously that Operation Hurricane

successfully carried out by Zagreb during the war in Bosnia, by the result of
which Croatia regained its lost lands and where NATO, understanding that a
new reality assisted the settlement of conflict did not protest, should be the
model for Georgia. To present the world with a fait accompli, against a
background of "paralyzed (in his imagination) Russia" became Saakashvili's
ide fixe.
The President's statements that during the future elections, poll boxes
would be placed in Tskhinvali were the results of this mood and not only for
his populism. In fact some days previous to the elections on January 5, 2004,
in the village of Tamarasheni, some poll boxes were indeed placed. The
situation in South Ossetia will develop as in Adjara and this will be done by
the people themselves in the shortest time, he stated at the end of June 2004
in Istanbul. The adventure of 17-19 August of the same year occurred just due
to such a mood: this was the invasion of Georgian military groups in the
Tskhinvali region, the occupation of heights around the town and the
preparation for the attack of Tskhinvali. At that time Saakashvili had enough
sense to comprehend that Russia was prepared to intervene in the conflict.
That is why he withdrew the military groups from the conflict zone
unconditionally and the country was saved from disaster.
The Georgian authorities did not abandon their plans on returning
territories by military actions in the subsequent years, in 2005-2006 and also in
2007. Roland Asmus recollects a meeting of the former Minister of Defense,
Irakli Okruashvili, with western experts where Asmus was present.
Okruashvili was telling them openly that the status-quo in South Ossetia was
playing into the hands of the West but not the Georgian government and if the
West failed to assist Georgia in restoring control over that occupied territory,
then it should understand the Tbilisi would solve that problem with its own
forces [9]. Okruashvili declared in his interview with Reuters in September
2008, a month after the start of the August war, that our strategic priority was
Abkhazia but we worked out military plans for the return of both Abkhazia
and South Ossetia in 2005. The preliminary plan envisaged a double plan of
invasion into South Ossetia and obtaining the control of the Roki tunnel and
Java [10]. In spring 2007 Giga Bokeria, an official of Saakashvili's regime,
insisted on bringing troops into Tskhinvali. He was certain the Russians would
not intervene in this conflict. When recollecting this fact, Georgian billionaire
and former Prime Minister, Bidzina Ivanishvili in October 2011 wrote: I
managed to persuade Bokeria at the time that it was impossible to make such a
12 Ucha Bluashvili
step... I proved to Bokeria in forty minutes that what he intended was a purely
reckless scheme [11].
The Georgian Parliament on July 17, 2006 unanimously adopted a
resolution on the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping forces from the
Georgian conflict zones. The actions of the armed forces of the Russian
Federation in Abkhazia and in the former Autonomic Oblast of South Ossetia
are one of the main barriers to the peaceful settlement of these conflicts [12],
it was stated in a parliamentary resolution.
After the summit of SUAM leaders held in Baku on June 19, 2007,
Mikheil Saakashvili announced that the time of the Russian "stooge," Edward
Kokoiti was running out and that in the nearest future Tbilisi would start
talks with the leader of the interim administration of South Ossetia, Dimitri
Sanakoev, in order to define the status of the region within the structure of
Georgia. According to him the return of the region to Georgian jurisdiction is
an issue of some months. Georgia possesses all the resources to soon arrange
this issue peacefully [13].
On November 28, 2007 Saakashvili met Abkhazian refugees in the Tbilisi
City Council Hall. If the elections of the 5th of November pass well, we will
spend next winter in a warmer climate: We will return to our houses, I promise
you and give you a guarantee. I have never said anything more definite before.
I promise that in the nearest future - I was going to do it during my first
presidency but for a well-known reason I shortened my term - in the nearest
future, I mean in the next few months, I am not speaking of years - we together
with the international community will create conditions for your dignified and
safe return to Abkhazia [14].
On December 4 of the same year when meeting students at Tbilisi State
University, Saakashvili said: The Regime of Tskhinvali is loosened like a bad
tooth and I am sure if we conduct the elections of the 5th of January well, it is
really a question of weeks and not months. I am absolutely sure, I have
information... we are talking about a very short period, Russians have blurted
out several times that they are not interested in South Ossetia anymore [15].
It is obvious that such provocative statements made by Georgias highest
officials narrowed the frames of conducting dialogue and destroyed all
possibilities of the restoration of confidence and reconciliation.
Moscow observed Saakashvilis statements attentively. Georgia has
chosen the military way of settling the issues of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
This is the source of other provocations... Obvious logic is seen in the actions
of Georgian leadership. First of all, the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers,
then solve frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia the military way and
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officially apply to the Alliance for membership [16], stated Sergei Ivanov, the
Minister of Defense.
The rapid increase of expenses on defense also indicated the warlike mood
of the Georgian authorities. These expenses reached one billion, 300 million
dollars by 2007. This comprised one quarter of the country's budget. Russian
military experts were commenting in writing on the subject. Sergei Lavrov,
Minister of Foreign Affairs also remarked in his official statement: The fact
that certain circles in Tbilisi are preparing for war cannot be doubted, taking
into account the amount of armament which Georgia buys openly or secretly
[17].
As for Russians blurting about losing interest in South Ossetia, such an
impressions gained by Saakashvili and his advisors concerning the security
services of Russia speak only of their political immaturity and naivety. The
territory of the former Autonomous Oblast is much more important for Russia
from a strategic point of view than Abkhazia. This territory is like a dagger
stabbed in the heart of Georgia: from here, to our capital is approximately a
distance of 40 km and is only 5 km from the main highway of the country.
Thus while tanks are standing on South Ossetia's territory it is impossible to
speak of the security of the country.
Then why would Russia lose interest in South Ossetia? Blurting out was
part of a multi way and well planned play, initiated by Moscow for trapping
Saakashvili and it exactly hit its target!
So, it is quite obvious that both sides were preparing for war. For the
Russian side the main reason was the geopolitical interest of this country. It
saw that Georgia was looking to the West and the Russians did not accept this
fact. According to one Russian official, the concrete aims of Russia in the
August 2008 war were: 1. Establish full control over South Ossetia, eliminate
pockets of Georgian control and build a security zone against them; 2. Help
the Abkhaz authorities to bolster control over the largely Georgian populated
district of Gali in Abkhazia and drive out Georgian forces from the Kodori
Gorge; 3. Establish a Russian security zone on the western side of the border
between Georgian proper and Abkhazia around the city of Zugdidi; 4. Force
Georgia to sign a formal document renouncing the use of force; 5. Humiliate
Saakashvili and keep him under increasing pressure at home in the hope he
will eventually be toppled, as was Milosevic; 6. Destroy Georgias chance of
ever joining NATO [18]. The Georgian side was also preparing for war but not
with Russia, but with Ossetian and Abkhazian separatists. Saakashvilis team
hoped they could arrange the return of occupied territories by means of a
powerful sudden attack, a blitzkrieg.
14 Ucha Bluashvili
This notion was confirmed by their experience of 1. The peaceful

resolution of the Adjara problem during which Russia did not intervene
between the Georgian central authorities and a region. 2. The success of the
accomplished Zagreb operation Hurricane with the result Croatia regained
its lost lands and NATO seeing that a new reality assisted the settlement of a
conflict and therefore did not protest; 3. Saakashvili's ide fixe to present the
world with a fait accompli. 4. The belief of Saakashvili and his team that
paralyzed and weakened Russia would not be able to respond to this step of
Georgia. 5. Information deliberately leaked from Russia that Russia was no
longer interested in South Ossetia. 6. Georgian leaders of the time believed
that they would not have a better ally in the US than the Bush administration,
so they thought they should pass into action without waiting longer. There was
one more serious motive added to Saakashvilis ide fixe on organizing a
blitzkrieg in 2008: in the elections of January 5th, 2008 he only obtained 53%
of the votes. At the time there were well-grounded talks in Georgian society
that in the first round Saakashvili could not get 50%. That meant a second
round had to be held in which Levan Gachechiladze, the opposition candidate,
won. Saakashvili felt that he had lost the confidence of a large part of the
population and he felt it keenly. And for a revival of the peoples love, even
partial restoration of territorial integrity would be the best way to restore
public confidence in him.
What kind of situation was in the conflict zone just before the war?
Attacks and shooting, even the use of heavy artillery became frequent in
South Ossetia in the middle of June. There were wounded and dead on both
sides and houses were destroyed. In the OSCE report of the 4th of August, it
was said that the battles conducted after the 1st of August were the fiercest of
the past four years. Six Georgian policemen, eleven soldiers of a peaceful
subunit and fourteen civilians were wounded from July 29th to August 7th. Two
Georgian soldiers died on August 7 and two died later from their wounds.
There were victims on the Ossetian side too.
The Georgian side possessed information on the coordinated action of the
Ossetian separatists and Russian peacekeepers. Mikheil Saakashvili
understood that Ossetians were acting under orders and assistance of the
Russians. So immediately before the war, the illusion of defending neutrality
by the Russians disappeared for Saakashvili. He certainly understood that
should the Russians actively intervene in the war there was no chance of
victory. The Georgian president vainly tried to have contact with his Russian
colleague. On 6-7 July in Kazakhstan at the celebration of the 10th anniversary
of the founding of Astana, Saakashvili seized an opportunity of talking with
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Medvedev at dinner and asked him to hasten the practical realization of (as if
before agreed upon) the idea of a summit on Georgian conflicts. Medvedev
avoided answering directly "I have not created the Georgian problem; I have
inherited it," he said, implying "it is not my headache." Then he added: the
holding of such a summit would be hasty and we would not get concrete
results and that would cause the people disappointment. When Saakashvili
said What can happen worse than this? Medvedev replied: Much worse is
possible and finished speaking.
The side interested in keeping peace should endeavor to maintain talks
with the other side but the Russian leadership was avoiding meeting the
Georgians. Even on August 7 when Saakashvili tried evading large scale war
by using diplomatic channels and sent the Minister of Reintegration of
Georgia, Temur Iakobashvili, to Tskhinvali for the talks agreed upon
beforehand with the special representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Russia, Yury Popov, the latter did not go to the meeting and gave the reason
as a problem with a tyre in the telephone conversation with Iakobashvili.
When the latter asked why he did not have a spare tyre, Popov answered "it
too was deflated." The same day Kulakhmetov confessed that Georgian
villages were shelled from land close to Russian peacekeepers. He also said
that Ossetians were no longer under his control.
On August 6th and 7th, 2008 Saakashvili tried in vain to contact Medvedev.
The Russian President did not answer.
I think these facts show who was interested in the outbreak of war at a
given moment.
Saakashvili used his last means of avoiding war: On August 7, at 7 p.m.
he announced a one-sided ceasefire. Georgian armed forces were approaching
in the direction of the conflict zone in parallel with the ceasefire. This
circumstance gave Russia grounds for asserting that the one-sided ceasefire
from Saakashvilis side was in reality aimed at weakening the opponents
caution. But why did not the Russian and Ossetian sides respond to
Saakashvilis initiative? Why did they not agree on talks with the Georgian
side where they would be able to put forward their claims? It is obvious they
acted so because calming the situation was not part of Moscow's plan.
At 8.30 a.m.1) Merabishvili phoned Saakashvili and informed him that the
bombing of Georgian villages had not stopped. Saakashvilis answer was
Dont answer with shooting.
About 10.30 a.m. the Georgian Minister of Defense, D. Kezerashvili,
spoke to Saakashvili to inform him that Georgian villages were still under
artillery fire.
16 Ucha Bluashvili
Fire was opened on the Georgian peacekeepers among whom some were
wounded and dead. "If we dont open fire in response, we will not be able to
take away the wounded." Saakashvili sighed and again ordered: Dont reply.
Mikleil Saakashvili appeared to be between two fires. To act and resist the
Russians would be doomed to failure. Western friends, among them even
personally George Bush always assured him in the hopelessness of initiating
war with Russia. The Deputy State Secretary of the US, Dan Fried, was telling
the Georgian delegation visiting the State Department: If you enter there
(Abkhazia) perhaps you will win the first fight, maybe the second too but it
will be your last victory. Russia will intervene by all means and effortlessly
complete the deal! [19].
But neither retreating without fighting nor inaction was the way out.
Saakashvili understood that he, as President, would not retain his post in this
case, as the Georgian people would not forgive inactivity and losing territory
without a fight. He was sure that Georgia, as an independent actor in foreign
policy, would in such a case cease to exist.
So Saakashvili together with his political friends: Adeishvili, Ugulava,
Lomaia, Merabishvili and Kezerashvili decided to start a large-scale offensive.
It is obvious that this decision was a desperate answer to the aggression of
Russian and Ossetian separatists. The political scientist R. Asmus wrote:
"Georgia was like a little boy who couldn't bear endless blows on the head and
hit back at the older bully." But Saakashvilis decision was grounded on a
certain logic: despite everything, Saakashvili hoped that Russia would again
use the tried method of dispatching North Caucasian warriors, instructors and
weapons to take part in the war of the Georgian state against Ossetian
separatists, and Russia's regular troops would not openly intervene in the
battle. The Georgian army would overcome the resistance of the feeble groups
of Kokoiti in the shortest time and submit and bring an important part of the
territory of the separatist region under its control. Hostile actions would cease
in a week or ten days as a result of pressure from the international community.
The Georgian side would agree on the withdrawal of its troops from the
occupied territories on condition that neutral peacekeepers would be retained
there. Thus, Georgia would finally achieve its goal for which it had been
striving for so long in vain.
It must be said that there is a certain logic in the analysis made by Mikheil
Saakashvili based on information now available. Very few people thought that
Russia would change its tactics used in earlier Georgian-Ossetian and
Georgian-Abkhazian confrontations when it had remained half-hidden in its
assistance to the separatists.
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Now it would invade openly with its regular army into the territory of a
sovereign state. And furthermore none of the experts believed that the Russian
army would cross the conflict zone and that even the security of the capital of
Georgia, Tbilisi, would be in danger. The West could not imagine that Russia
would so painfully react to the Kosovo precedent, not because they held an
excessively high opinion on the morals of Russian leadership, no they simply
supposed that Russians would be sufficiently pragmatic not to make such a
mistake. Openly attacking Georgia, Russia would have presented itself as the
cause of the conflict and this should be avoided by all the rules.
Calculations of the West turned out to be mistaken once more. Russia had
made this step because of at least two causes: first, it showed the West that it
was ready for even the most radical actions in order to retain its influence in
the South Caucasus; secondly, successful steps made by Georgia towards the
Euro-Atlantic structures did not leave it any way out.
Georgian leadership fell into Russia's trap once more. Saakashvili with his
improvident and not fully calculated actions, against his wish, was doing
Putins business. The American political scientist, Lincoln Mitchell, implied
just this when he asked: With enemies like Saakashvili what does Russia
need friends for? [20]. But to make it look like as if the provocation of Putin
and Medvedev was the result of Saakashvilis unreasoned, adventurous
actions, as one part of our society asserts, is an obvious mistake.
Did Russia not make us lose Abkhazia at a time of balanced and cautious
Shevardnadze? Did not Russia set the Ossetians of Shida Kartli against us at
Gamsakhurdias time? The real cause of the war was not ethnic confrontation
but the striving of Georgia towards the West. Ronald Asmus in his interview
given to radio Tavisupleba remarked: The essence of the problem is not in
personalities. Russians hated the former President, Eduard Shevardnadze, no
less than Saakashvili. Saakashvili is not an obstacle. It was not a conflict of
personalities. It was a struggle of aspirations, geopolitical interests and
personal relations between Saakashvili and Putin that intensified an already
dramatic situation. Seventy to eighty percent of Georgians are oriented to the
West without Saakashvili, that is why the conflict is irresolvable from the very
beginning.
But nevertheless who started the war?
Russia had done everything to show that Georgia unleashed the war. It
partially succeeded. It is a fact that the first large scale offensive was
conducted by the Georgian army but it first made it against the Ossetian
separatists and not against the Russian military and secondly it was done only
after the opening of fire by Ossetian separatists with large-caliber arms,
18 Ucha Bluashvili
resulting in Georgian villages in the conflict being razed to the ground.

Georgian peacekeepers were killed, peaceful civilians and police were
wounded. Moreover, the Georgian army conducted this attack only after a
statement of Marat Kulakhmetov, the general of the Russian peacekeepers,
that Ossetians were no longer under his control and therefore his peacekeepers
could not fulfill their mission. After all this, the Georgian side took over the
function of establishing law and order in the conflict zone and in the defense
of the lives of its inhabitants.
It was not only its right but its obligation too.
The Russian-Georgian war was started by the Russian side which invaded
with its regular troops a sovereign country, carried out surgical strikes over the
whole territory of Georgia, occupied our lands and drove out the Georgian
population from the conflict zone...
Beneath criticism are those comments from Russia that it only started
military operation against Georgia after Russian peacekeepers had been killed.
According to Kulakhmetov Russian peacekeepers were killed on August 8
about 6 p.m. while the first groups of the Russian regular army had already
entered Georgia by about 3 a.m. on August 7. This fact did not appear on
official documents or the media but later Russians recognized this fact but the
entering of fresh troops was explained as a rotation of peacekeepers which is
beneath criticism too.
Invading Georgia, Russia revealed itself in the eyes of the whole world as
an aggressor. The answer of the international community was simple: as
former Assistant to the President of the US for National Security Affairs,
Stephen Hadlay, said to the Russians: This is not that America and its friends
are starting to punish you, it is simply the answer of the international system of
21st century that the rules of the 19th century are completely useless now [21].
But there was a lack of sharpness in the answer of the international
community. Today it is obvious that the courtesies shown by the West to
Russia led to the tragic development of events in present day Ukraine.
REFERENCES
[1] Newspaper Ertoba, 1917, November 23.
[2] Newspaper Alioni, 1917, October 5.
[3] Petre Mamradze, Adventure 08.08.08., Tbilisi, 2012, p. 33.
[4] Ibid., p. 88.
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[5] Roland D. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World, Tbilisi, 2010,
pp. 116-117.
[6] Roland D. Asmus, A Little War, that Shook the World, Tbilisi, 2010,
p. 164.
[8] Ibid., pp. 64-65.
p. 88.
[10] Ibid., p. 88.
[12] Ibid., p. 52.
[13] Ibid., p. 99.
[14] Ibid., p. 118.
[15] Ibid., p. 118.
[16] Ibid., p. 64.
[17] Ibid., p. 111.
p. 118.
p. 167.
p. 196.
Chapter 2
TRAGIC ZIGZAGS IN THE GEORGIAN

GOVERNMENTS DOMESTIC POLICY
PRIOR TO THE AUGUST 2008 WAR
Alexander Daushvili
The eminent American political scientist, Ronald Asmus, has, in my
opinion, one very interesting passage in his biased work A Little War that
Shook the World (Georgian translation, Tbilisi 2010), which David
Darchiashvili, editor of the book, failed to note as it was left without comment.
The respected political scientist is quoted as saying There was a war in
progress but Tbilisi seemed untouched, with people entertaining themselves as
usual.
This idea, potently offensive to Georgians in general and to Tbilisians in
particular, was born in the minds of French diplomats in Tbilisi at the time in
an attempt to neutralize the tragic results of the war; it appears they shared
their thoughts with the author of the book. The country was on fire, 20% of its
territories were occupied, and the enemy was approaching the capital, but its
population was in a state of bliss! I recall only one such example from world
history when Hitler occupied the northern zone of France. Under the Nazi-
friendly Vichy Regime in the south, a certain part of the population of
unoccupied France showed no concern for what was happening at the front
where French patriots were fighting against occupants.
Upon freeing Paris, De Gaullis government immediately ensured that the
Vichy leaders should receive the death penalty for their treachery.
22 Alexander Daushvili
It appears that we Georgians who distinguished ourselves by our military

prowess in both world wars suffered very many casualties and freely spent
ourselves in the war of others. We shared irresponsibility and indifference in
our own tragic trials. Such an accusation obviously needs serious examination.
In my opinion, this kind of situation can only arise when the public and
the authorities are: opposed to each other; when there is an insuperable gulf
between the two; when the authorities are hated; and when their words are not
believed. The result is that the people have no will to fight the enemy and in
fact are incapable of so doing.
We will proceed with attempts to show those aspects and zigzags of
domestic policy that brought the government to power with majority support,
but after only four years found itself in agony like the Vichy Regime. We will
refer to the main reasons for this situation.
MISTAKEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY

Saakashvilis government could not manage to form and develop an
intensive economic life in the country. Its economic policy was impulsive,
inconsistent, and harmful for the country. Despite this, they promised
Georgian businessmen optimal conditions for the development of the
economy. Experts affirm Any businessman who refused to finance
voluntarily the National Movement and their projects could escape the
punishing hand of Saakashvilis government. All businessmen, even those
with small incomes, were obliged to pay a share in the Nationals money
box. The authority knows the exact income of every businessman up to the last
tetra, and if they want to do business they have to pay a tribute. It is the
authoritys business racket. This was a fair evaluation.
The authority that always blamed Shevardnadze, its predecessor, for faulty
economic policies and persecution of the business world, could make little
progress in solving these problems, except with rhetoric. It could not create
normal market relations. Those economic steps it managed to realize and of
which they boasted to their own population and to foreign politicians were the
result of using administrative resources, obvious extortion, and participation in
the racketeering business. Despite all this, according to independent experts,
Georgias economic achievement was still insignificant compared to the
neighboring Transcaucasian countries.
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Tragic Zigzags in the Georgian Governments Domestic Policy 23
They assert that during Saakashvilis period Georgias growth was 3.7
times less than Azerbaijans and 2 times less than Armenias; this is according
to the Index of Direct Foreign Investment per capita.
The authorities could not manage to energize industry and agriculture.
Bank loans became the only way of obtaining money, and bankers, who were
in close relation with the authorities, robbed the population of Georgia in the
full meaning of the word, achieving thereby huge economic success.
According to the calculation of experts, the share of bank activities as a
percent of the countrys GDP rose from 13% in 2003 to 52.8% by the end of
Saakashvilis rule.
There was a large number of unemployed, and this strengthened the social
tension. They could not succeed in forming a middle class, despite the fact that
the National Movement was lavish with promises. Shevardnadzes criticism
of the rich becoming richer and the poor becoming poorer in Georgia during
Saakashvilis rule was perfectly valid.
The United National Movement is the political party formed by M.
Saakashvili. It unites some members of Shevardnadzes Citizens Union, the
political union of Zviad Gamsakhurdias Round Table, and friends and
supporters of the former speaker of the Parliament of Georgia, Zurab Zhvania.
This party was in power in Georgia from 2004-12. Now it is the main
opposition party.
What was so startling was that the authorities themselves, their certified
lackeys, biased experts, and even the President himself were speaking of
unbelievable progress in the economy. But the ordinary Georgian could not
agree. On the contrary, if you bought something for 100 GEL in 2003, a few
years later it was necessary to pay 180 GEL for the same.
Thus, the mistaken and one could say the criminal socio-economic policy
that was unable to create a stable foundation for economic revival, except with
the assistance of oligarchic capital, resulted in the massive impoverishment of
the population, economic stagnation, and social apathy that enlarged the gulf
between the population and the authorities.
THE PERSONNEL REVOLUTION

In my opinion, the criminal personnel policy carried out by the authorities
was one of the main social measures causing their distancing themselves from
the population. Humans are the basic leading and moving lever of any society.
Their significance increases particularly in a newly formed state with the
building of the country. In such conditions, the maximum use of the talents of
each member of society is essential. A wise personnel policy is of paramount
importance to any country. Let us recollect Stalins well-known formula The
personnel solve everything. That policy ensured those socio-economic
achievements that transform the Russia of wooden ploughs into a nation
equipped with nuclear weapons (W. Churchill).
There was certainly the hope that the new authorities, equipped with
revolutionary zeal, would suggest a new and appropriate solution to the
personnel problem. However, in my opinion, it is difficult to find an analogue
in world history of what was done here in Georgia. The fact is the authority
introduced into practice gerontophobia, i.e. strict age-discrimination.
Distinguished and fully qualified personnel were removed from state
management and all spheres of economic and civil life on puerile grounds. The
reins of government were given to youngsters who knew English, and so-
called specialists were frequently new graduates.
It appears that the aim was two-fold: 1) personnel who were able to
control, rebuke, criticize, or oppose the authorities were removed. 2) staff were
chosen by the authorities and appointed to responsible positions for no special
merit and in addition were granted high salaries. They became obedient
supporters of government policies and the Rose Regime, and they tried at all
costs to maintain their positions.
Saakashvili transformed different levels of state administration into a
blind executive of his own will and unbelievably strengthened administrative
recourses, turning them into the main means of domination. However, the
results of this personnel revolution quickly became obvious with the spread of
incompetence, the frequent change of ministers, the irresponsible decisions,
etc. Lawyers were again appointed as Ministers of Education, and soon after
failure they were sent to study in the US. The Presidents favorite girl dancers
were appointed to responsible positions, a customs officer to the post of
Minister of Defense, etc.
But the personnel revolution took deeper roots in the bosom of society. Its
principles were inculcated into organizations, educational institutions,
scientific centers, and universities. The method of destruction was simple a
biased director chosen by the authorities chose members of the certifying
commission himself and thus created a new labor organization. The
universally recognized and accepted principle of ensuring the employment of
all three generations, viz. the young, middle, and older generations, in order to
achieve a common civil aim was infringed upon. Infringement of this basic
principle cost Georgia dearly.
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There was a general impression that no one over fifty lived in the country
and that nobody was interested in their opinions or used their experience or
knowledge in any way. These zigzags of personnel policy certainly were
coming from the highest echelons of authority, but by whose dictates and for
what reason it is still difficult to say. We cannot exclude the presence of
people diseased with Freuds Oedipus complex. This question needs special
investigation. The fact is that Georgian society was deprived of wisdom and
experience. Its result soon became obvious; the level of competence decreased,
dilettantism was widespread, and a deficiency of personnel was evident in
every sphere but particularly in the structures of law.
Many examples can be mentioned regarding this vicious and pernicious
practice. I will dwell on two of them; the destruction of the staff of Tbilisi
State University and that of the Institute of History and Ethnology are
despicable examples of such a policy. The new biased leaders conducted
attestations, not according to preliminary worked-out criteria that would
exclude the possibility of using subjective factors, but by subjecting them to
the personal opinions of the commission members in order to discharge the
most highly qualified professionals and allowing them no appeal. Those
chosen were all loyally disposed towards the authorities and were given
increased salaries at the expense of those who had lost their posts. Following
the scanty pay associated with the Shevardnadze period, this sum seemed to be
manna from heaven. Alarming the new appointees with possible repression or
the loss of their new found manna, they became dumb conformists belonging
to the list of those faithful to the authorities. During the actual realization of
the personal revolution in Georgia, there is no known case of one or more of
the competition winners protesting the results of subjectively carried-out
attestations. This shows that the authorities rightly estimated the situation at
this stage and was thus able to win. The main result of the personnel
revolution was the barbaric destruction of working organizations, the creation
of division in the work place, the fostering of conformism, and the exclusion
of the more brilliant from an active creative life. It is obvious that Georgia,
consequently, has suffered much as regards wisdom and is sadly weakened
morally. These wounds will take much time to heal.
ZERO TOLERANCE
The creation of an unprejudiced and just judicial system became Georgias
inaccessible dream.
The population was expecting an impartial, objective, European type

judicial system like a cherished dream at every stage of the building of the new
Georgia. Saakashvili, a lawyer himself, immediately upon his appearance on
the political stage first as Shevardnadzes Minister of Justice and then as
President of Georgia promised society an improved legal sphere.
But what was installed in the judicial system of Georgia after the Rose
Revolution was very far from European standards of jurisdiction. Zero
tolerance, declared by the President to be a juridical principle of the country,
meant total war against the criminal world but also barbaric actions against
opponents of the regime, frightening society but simultaneously creating the
illusion of the invisible power of the authorities. This process was gradually
taking possession of the whole of Georgia like an octopus sucking in all its
basic elements. The court case dealing with Zurab Zhvania, Prime Minister of
Georgia, the citizens Girgvliani and Robakidze of the well-known maecenas
Badri Patarkatsishvilis family, of undesirable businessmen, and numerous
ordinary people astonished thinking Georgians with their cynicism, inhuman
attitude, and injustice. The decision of the Strasbourg Court on the Girgvliani
murder case inflicted a mortal strike on the competence of the judicial system
under Saakashvili and brought to light its ulcers. The Court is struck by how
the different branches of State power acted in concert in preventing justice
from being done in this gruesome homicide case.
At present, under the new authorities, investigations are being carried out
on the prison riots of the year 2006, on the scandalous outcome of the peaceful
action in November 2007, on the actions of masked men, the formation of
Zonder Brigades, and other resonant issues.
It is obvious that in the years of Saakashvilis rule, the court was
transformed into a poor appendage of the prosecutors office. According to
experts, the Soviet court exceeded in verdicts of not guilty per 100 cases that
of Saakashvilis court, which surely is a most serious indictment for an
authority covering itself with the mantle of democracy.
The judicial system became a source of filling the budget. Sums required
for judiciary dealings hung like a sword of Damocles over any citizen
unfortunate enough to have any relations with the court. The President boasted
of the new comfortable prisons but overlooked the fact that there were more
prisoners in his prisons than during the Stalin repressions in Soviet Georgia. In
a secret letter of 1937 addressed to Stalin, Beria wrote that there were
approximately 12, 000 prisoners, 5, 000 of whom were serving in Georgian
prisons.
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After two years of Sakashvili coming to power, the number of prisoners

doubled and became 15, 465. At the termination of the regime there were 24,
114.
The methods of and reasons for exerting influence upon prisoners in the
newly built modern style prisons are problems that should be noted separately.
Maniacs such as the Akhalaias and Topuridze carried out unbelievably
inhumane treatment against prisoners, such as raping with brooms.
Thus, Zero Tolerance, the terrible nondemocratic judicial system aimed
solely at the interests of the authorities, the violence and injustice that distorted
domestic policy, plus the corresponding increase of discontent among the
population, all served to widen the gulf between society and the government.
SOME ISSUES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE-

TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENT
The administrative-territorial arrangement, the reunification of the
country, etc. are the most significant issues of domestic policy. One of the
promises of the initiators of the Rose Revolution1 was precisely the
reunification of the country, the return of lost territories, and a critical
evaluation of the policy pursued in this direction by Shevardnadze. It is
difficult to call all this either patriotic or far-sighted.
Below we will briefly review Saakashvilis attempts when in power to
settle the situation in the conflict regions.
In the first few months of the Rose Revolution, during the formation of
the new government, Michael Saakashvili had no time for the regions
involved. During April and May of 2004, he was preoccupied with the
problem of Aslan Abashidze and Adjara. He was so far successful in that the
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov, escorted Aslan Abashidze
(initiator of unfortunate regional alterations) to Moscow.
The new form of regional government imposed on Adjara was considered
a worrisome sign by both local and some foreign experts.
Then came the turn of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These are some
headlines of a contemporary newspaper: New Rose Revolution is Ripe in
Abkhazia (Resonansi, January 30, 2004), Rehearsal of the Rose Revolution
1
Political scientists call a coup? the Rose Revolution of November 2003 accomplished by S
and his political group when Shevardnadzes authority was overthrown. S and his
supporters held red roses in their hands.
on the Approaches to Tskhinvali (Resonansi, June 1, 2004), Tskhinvali

Awaits the Rose Revolution (Resonansi, June 2, 2004). Other headlines were
Slow Scenario of South Ossetia and Rose Revolution Number 3
(Resonansi, June 14, 2004).
In the months that followed Saakashvilis rise to power, the situation in
Samachablo became so tense that a local Member of Parliament, Soso
Tsotniashvili, began to criticize the excessive activity of Saakashvilis
authority in the region: It was a serious mistake to suppose that people who
would shoot would not be found in Tskhinvali, as was the case in Adjara. Not
to mention ethnic differences and state patriotism, they have one motherland
and they are ready to fight for it up to the last drop of blood. Their President is
the symbol of their state. The more Kokoiti is criticized, the more authority
and sympathy he gains. The Georgian state mistakenly estimates the
possibilities of Ossetians living in Georgian regions, resolving the South
Ossetian problem, as they are Georgianized and are thus aliens to Ossetians
living in Tskhinvali. Their appeals to Ossetians living in Tskhinvali do not
carry any weight... At present I think that it is necessary to reestablish the
peace existing two months ago [8].
A bad peace is better than a good war is a saying that is worth
remembering. The new authorities in Georgia were forced to adhere to this
universally recognized truth. But this failed it to do: rhetorical phraseology
was rapidly followed by innovations and caused anxiety among the de-facto
leaders of conflict regions and Russia and even with the General Secretary of
the UN.
These innovations were connected to the declaration of Kodori Ravine
as North Abkhazia and also to legislative acts that meant the disbanding of E.
Kvitsianis group of local inhabitants, the transfer of the Abkhazian
government in exile to Kodori, the bringing of regular Georgian troops into the
territory, etc.
A similar innovation was carried out in the Tskhinvali region, in
territory controlled by Georgia, i.e., approximately one third of the region. A
temporary administration unit was formed with Vladimir Sanakoev at the
head. The latter had been a former local government representative and was in
opposition to Kokoiti. He was announced as a pro-Georgian power, alternative
to the regime existing in Tskhinvali. This was followed by substantial
investments from the Georgian state budget for reviving the cultural,
educational, and social infrastructure, but all this was absorbed by the August
war.
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Much propaganda emphasized the role of Vladimir Sanakoev in the

restoration of friendship between the Georgian and Ossetian peoples,
particularly the idea of their cohabitation in one state. Sanakoev was taken to
different international meetings and made speeches.
In all this, Mikheil Saakashvili was obviously imitating V. Putin, who had
been using the political status of the Kadyrov family, especially Kadyrov
Junior, in fatal fighting against the Chechens. This means assistance was given
to political groups that were loyal to and controlled by Russia and that were
opposed to the NationalLiberation Movement of the Chechen people. This
innovation worked for Russia but cost the regime much money. Also many
weapons were required. Georgias budget was not large enough for such
experiments or for expensive military outlays. This project was doomed to
failure from the start.
A further innovation of Mikheil Saakashvilis was the building of
patriotic camps in the strategically sensitive and tense centers of Kodori
Ravine, Ganmukhuri, etc. This action was another example of changing the
status quo of the region and was the reason why, as we have previously
mentioned, we earned the criticism of the Secretary General of the UN, Pan
GiMun, who demanded the dismantling of these camps, and the withdrawal of
the Abkhazian government from Kodori, etc. in a special statement [9].
To anyone studying in detail the chronology of events from January 2004
to August 2008, it will become obvious that Saakashvili was irresponsibly
playing at cat and mouse, i.e., playing with fire in Abkhazia and Samachablo.
His politics in these regions had no clear direction calculated with wisdom and
political flair, but rather had the character of a Georgian fairy-tale shepherd.
So Saakashvilis authority with its four years of unbalanced politics
resulted in an extremely strained situation in the conflict regions. He appeared
like a hidden wolf waiting for the opportune moment, in order to rush out to
tear up the sheep, vainly waiting for a savior to come to his rescue.
OPPOSITION-PHOBIA
Saakashvilis regime could not tolerate ideas of the Opposition, advice, or
admonition. The authorities having arrived with revolutionary daring, it
displayed narcissism and rapidly acquired a belief in its own faultlessness.
Healthy political opposition was not to be tolerated, and it justified its attitude
by declaring that there was no real opposition in Georgia and that the
country has no opposition, etc.
It is true that the Opposition was traditionally formed for various reasons
by the people from state structures. Let us remember that in Zviad
Gamsakhurdias period there were Tengiz Kitovani and Tengiz Sigua; in the
epoch of Shevardnadze there were Zurab Zhvania and Mikheil Saakashvili;
during Saakashvilis presidency there were Irakli Okruashvili, Nino
Burdjanadze, Goga Khaindrava, Irakli Alasania, and others. But popular
politicians suffered terrible repressions and were the subject of unbridled
gossip in state pocket televisions (Rustavi 2, Imedi and others).
The opposition in Georgia was never united. The existence of pocket
opposition in the political arena always gave them problems; however, some
opinions of the Opposition were expressed by the Republicans, the Ilia
Chavchavadze Society, Peoples Front, and others. Leaders of the Georgian
Opposition clearly warned the authorities in due time not to make false steps
that would put the country into a hopeless situation.
For example, the Georgian opposition spectrum replied with such
statements regarding the innovations carried out in Kodori ravine: The
ignoring of democratic principles by the authorities, the inculcation of a cult of
violence, the ignoring of the supremacy of the law and the permanent insulting
of the citizens dignity produced fertile soil for the turning of Georgia into a
field of armed adventure by the enemies of the Georgian state. The
unprincipled and irresponsible authority of Saakashvili will put the country in
jeopardy in the future too [10]. This document was signed by New Rights,
Republicans, Conservatives, Peoples Front, Labor Party, and Industrialists.
A Georgian newspaper wrote that One of the main intentions of the
Kodori Ravine adventure was provocation by the unbalanced Georgian
authorities noted for their impulsive actions in order to start a wide-ranging
armed operation in a very important and sensitive region from a strategic point
of view... Georgia may gain one more centre of destabilization in the Kodori
Ravine in place of its important strategic base [11].
The well-known and honored Georgian politician, one of the eminent
leaders of the Georgian National Liberation Movement, Nodar Natadze,
openly announced on the formation of a temporary administrative unit that
Kokoiti and Sanakoev were players of a team directed from Russia.
So representatives of the Georgian Opposition gave timely warning to the
authorities of the discrepancy between the steps made by the authorities and
the national interests of the country.
Taking their advice into consideration would have helped the country
avoid much danger, but, unfortunately, this was not the case.
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ANTI-DEMOCRACY
The anti-democracy actions of the authority, packed under the label of
super-democracy and the evident attempt of setting up an autocratic regime,
caused great indignation in Georgian society. This is well-confirmed by the
events of November 2007, when there was violence implemented by the forces
of law and order against peaceful citizens, the destruction of Imedi television
channel, and the implementation of unacceptable methods of conduct against
the Opposition, all of which forced Saakashvili to resign.
But the anti-democratic character of the presidential and parliamentary
elections of 2008, the maximum use of administrative recourses, pressure on
the voters, conformism, and the peculiar activity of unprincipled elements
became especially evident at that time. And the corruption of the voting
system, including the falsification of voting results, gave Saakashvili the
possibility to return to the post of President.
It is to be regretted that leaders of democratic countries, including the US
administration, paid small attention to the antidemocratic state of Georgia and
failed to react promptly. Indeed, they considered Saakashvili a beacon of
democracy.
Because of such a subjective attitude, serious questions concerning
western values and feelings of justice of the leaders of friendly countries
emerged among a large part of the population of Georgia. Those western
leaders were obviously blamed for their use of double standards. It was felt
that a certain part of the population of Georgia began doubting in the
expediency of the western orientation of Georgia.
Thus, the ignoring of democratic principles by the Georgian authorities,
the use of totalitarian methods of government, and the establishment of an
autocratic regime widened the gulf between society and its leadership.
FIGHTING AGAINST CATHEDRALS AND MONUMENTS

This was a special direction of Saakashvilis authority that reveals psycho-
socio sentiments and the true attitudes of the leaders toward national traditions
and values: ruining cathedrals and their disrespectful restoration. For example,
in Bagrati Cathedral there was the senseless removal and tragic demolishing of
monuments by Merab Berdzelishvili (David Agmashenebeli in Tbilisi and the
Victory memorial in Kutaisi).
There was the disrespectful attitude towards architectural masterpieces

such as the Imeli building, a unique architectural masterpiece by Zaria
Vostoka and others. Moreover, there were the innovations carried out in
Tbilisi Rique that clash against the style of the traditional urban housing of
Old Tbilisi and litter the old part of the city with buildings of doubtful value;
the expulsion of the legendary Laghidze water from Rustaveli Avenue, the
demolition of the first chemists not only in Tbilisi but in the whole of
Transcaucasia in the former building of Tbilisi municipality in order to
establish expensive boutiques in its place, and the loss of Tbilisi funicular, etc.
All this destruction shows Saakashvilis regime had no love for its motherland
and its capital, Tbilisi. This was confirmed by the voluntary transfer of
Parliament to Kutaisi.
The political infantilism of the authorities developed into narcissism with
permanent propaganda that everything started in Georgia with the Rose
Revolution of 2003; the idea is that Georgia is the first in the world, that
something or other was first made in Georgia. Not surprisingly, this irritated
the majority of the population.
This false presentation of the countrys history was not lost upon His
Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II. In his Christmas epistle, he clearly pointed to
the complex socio-economic and moral-psychological situation existing in the
country, using appropriate language to describe it. He wrote: Extreme
arrogance, self-confidence and pride have been promoted, leading to a fall in
spiritual belief and values [13].
Later, criticism of the authorities by His Holiness became more
pronounced: Arrogance is the first and the greatest and most terrible sin
which is rooted in every man and is the main obstacle to an approach to God
[14].
His Holiness truly estimated the existing regime: There is an absence of
Christian hierarchic relations. Saint Maximus called this absence tyranny and
it is based on the rule and violence of superiors and on slavery of the
subordinates. Unfortunately, an unchristian rule of interrelation prevails
around us [15].
Thus, nihilism towards traditional spiritual values, arrogance, ignoring the
traditions and spiritual strivings of the majority of the population resulted in
insuperable opposition between the authorities and the people that was
expressed in such a form as feasting in restaurants during the war of August
2008. And finally, the aggregate of the mentioned socio-economic, political,
and moral-psychological factors existing in the bosom of Georgian society are
proof indeed that there was an insurmountable gulf between the authorities and
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the majority of the population. It was impossible that the security service of
Georgia did not inform the supreme ruler and his surrounding of this state of
affairs.
Following the logic of history, in a similar situation any reasonable ruler
would abstain from all kinds of adventure, would ignore provocation, would
work seriously in the diplomatic arena, and use compromise where possible. If
we consider all the factors listed here, we can safely assert that the authorities
of Georgia were inadequate prior to the August 2008 war.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World, Tbilisi, 2010, p. 213.
[2] Rose Revolution, results, Tbilisi, 2012., p. 15.
[3] Ibid, p. 6.
[4] Ibid, p. 7.
[5] http:/www.civil.ge/geo/. p. 3-4.
[6] Party archive, Tbilisi, P. 14, Agh. 11, S. 152 (G), leaf 171.
[7] http:/factcheck.ge/article/uchananuashvili.p. 3.
[8] Newspaper Resonansi, August 10, 2004.
[9] Newspaper Axali Taoba, July 25, 2007.
[10] Newspaper AxaliTaoba, July 31, 2007.
[13] His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II 2003-2004, Christmas Epistle, p. 6.
[14] His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II 2003-2004, Christmas Epistle, p. 4-5.
[15] His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II 2003-2004, Easter Epistle, p. 9.
Chapter 3
CRISIS DIPLOMACY IN
THE AUGUST 2008 WAR
Dazmir Jojua
The Russian-Georgian War of August 2008 was a tragic event which
became a kind of turning point, and the beginning of a new political being in
our recent history. Russian military intervention, the occupation of historical
Georgian territories, the recognition of the Independence of Abkhazia and of
the so called South Ossetia, and the new wave of ethnic cleansing of the
Georgian population noticeably weighed heavily upon the security situation in
Georgia and created a new perspective of risks and challenges. The situation in
the nearby zones of occupation is very grave. The condition of creeping
occupation and actual military annexation still continues, international
mechanisms of security and conflict prevention are blocked, the peaceful
agreements of the 1990s1 which somehow had ensured an unsteady balance,
and even the freezing or stagnation of conflicts before the 2008 War were
denounced2.
The war negatively influenced the inner political situation in Georgia.
First of all, it refers to a change of the structures of the authorities. In this
respect, there was the vertical authority of Saakashvilis regime which gave a
1
Resolutions and decisions adopted by the UN, OSCE and CIS and other international
organizations on the territorial integrity of Georgia and the neutralization of tension and the
achieving of stability in the region.
2
There had been political unity for a short period until the death of Zurab Zhvania with Mikheil
Saakashvili as President, Zurab Zhvania as Prime Minister and Nino Burdjanadze as
Speaker of Parliament.
36 Dazmir Jojua
new impulse to the technology of the suppression of the opposition and in

general intensified that autocratic tendency of retreating from democracy
which had started with the end of the "triumvirate" established after the Rose
Revolution and the tragic events of November 2007 in Tbilisi, when
Saakashvils regime barbarically dispersed a peaceful manifestation.
In short, Georgia lived under a regime of total risk even before the August
2008 War.
And this is why a comprehensive study of this war, its strategic analysis,
its causes, the course of military action, the geopolitical and geostrategic
results, the complex and systematized understanding and realization of the
international factors of war is essential. A common picture of the War of
August 2008 with a structurally integrated macro-sociological model must be
created, in which corresponding segments of comprehension of all, or of
nearly all, its aspects will be gathered.
Opinions on the various aspects of the August 2008 War are multi-
dimensional and diverse in their inner mental structure. Essentially the topic is
a complicated synthesis of ideas which combines different and frequently
diametrically opposed points of view. In principle this feature is natural on the
one hand because of the tragic experience of the August 2008 War and, on the
other hand, from the point of view of intellectual standards of pluralism of
opinions.
Setting aside all else, the human has its own immanent organization of
thought when he obeys only his own autonomic rules and adapts himself only
slightly or fails to adapt at all to stamped ideological abstractions or
propaganda clichs. It is clear that besides the great number of diverse
opinions and conceptual flows, the common platform in the form of a
"consensus on the War of August" should exist - well composed, united,
inwardly differentiated and the whole conception dealing with fundamental
questions of the August War. We believe that any such concept cannot be
complete until there is an estimation of the global importance of that particular
war and that this requires the revelation of its international dimension and its
results. A qualified, unbiased and, what is more, a pragmatic comprehension
of Crisis Diplomacy of the 2008 War acquires great importance in
accomplishing this task.
As is well known, some international events in the 1950s and 60s,
especially the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the Caribbean Crisis of 1962 created a
new field of state diplomatic action that is the so called Crisis Diplomacy. It
differs from traditional diplomacy by its order, methods and organization of
the forms of the process. It is applied when there is a case of a collapse of the
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Crisis Diplomacy in the August 2008 War 37
preventive mechanisms of conflict regulation, an escalation of a crisis and

during a transition to war situations i.e., at the critical moment of a sudden
change to a dangerous position. As a rule, the resources of Crisis Democracy
are addressed when sudden and, in some cases, unconscious reactions on the
event are inevitable and that there is really no other way out or no other
mechanism for eliminating a much more catastrophic situation than the
existing conditions.
We believe that analyzing the Crisis Diplomacy of the August War is
necessary, as this is precisely the field which revealed most clearly the main
layer of the international dimension of the war which gave rise to the crisis
interrelation of the main players of modern world policy and to the inertia of
Cold War logic, remembering that Crisis Diplomacy is mainly just a product
of the Cold War. In our opinion, April 2008 can be considered as a starting
point of the Crisis Diplomacy of the War of August. The US-German
discussion at the Bucharest NATO summit were against the strategic issue of
granting Georgia the Membership Action Plan. In response, Russia supported
and even, to a certain extent, motivated by the Kosovo precedent3 began to
strengthen its pressure and strain the situation in our conflict regions, as well
as to expand its military forces. The process of placing a strategic trap by
Russia for the Georgian authorities reached its culmination. The Kremlin did
everything to ensure that this trap would appear to President M. Saakashvili
and his associates as an alternative between a peaceful loss of regions or the
discharge of a crisis by military intervention, i.e., between loss of territories
and the outbreak of war. Thus in April 2008, the mutual intricacy of
diplomatic flows and all strategic visions existing around the conflicts in the
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the tendency towards crisis of the
peace formats and escalation of the situation, the critical phase of sudden
change in the dangerous state of the situation brought about the placing of
Crisis Diplomacy on the agenda. For the first time in the history of Georgian
conflicts, the initiation of such diplomatic actions became inevitable which by
temporarily putting aside the general problems of full and comprehensive
settlement, had to ensure a concrete short-term task the non-acceptance of a
transition of a crisis into war and the application of preventive mechanisms.
We think that the so called Hadleys Memorandum should be
considered as the first manifestation of Crisis Diplomacy. In the second half of
April 2008 several special meetings were held by the Washington
3
The international acknowledgment of the independence of Kosovo began on the 17th of April
2008.
38 Dazmir Jojua
administration, concerning the situation existing in the Georgian conflict

regions. The meetings were conducted by Stephen Hadley, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs. In a three point agreement, worked out
as a result of these consultations, details of such measures was envisaged
which had to ensure the hampering of Russian activity, on the one hand, and
the denying of a military choice by Saakashvili but, on the other hand, offering
him some guarantees.
The first point of the memorandum dealt with the necessity of starting a
dialogue between the Georgian central authority and the regional de facto
authority of Abkhazia. The second point dealt with the internationalization of
the peace process and the inclusion of an international contingent (at the initial
stage in the form of EU instructors) in order to restrict the Russian monopoly
in the area.
Georgia had to give a binding promise not to use force in response to
increasing representation in the conflict regions. The change in the format of
talks and the formation of a new forum, a kind of settling board, which
envisaged the introduction of the EU into the process, together with direct
participation of representatives of political parties was emphasized in the third
point.
Hadleys Memorandum contained some positive frames regarding solving
conflicts but unfortunately comprised some ideas that doomed it to failure
from the very start. Firstly, in exchange for compromise on the Georgian side,
no adequate guarantees were given in the memorandum to efficiently hamper
steps taken by the Russian-Abkhazian block. The general tendency in Russia-
West relations of the declaration of sharp reaction to the steps made by the
Kremlin did not give practical levers for the prevention of possible aggression.
The second point on starting direct dialogue between Tbilisi and Sukhumi or,
in other words, cooperation at a low level, originally the first point of the
plan, was quite ambiguous and non-pragmatic. It did not envisage the inner
logic of Russias peace politics, namely that the Kremlin would not permit
the distancing of the Abkhazian side from Russia, nor its participation in the
process as an independent state, or even worse the opening up of conflict
regions to the West. Thirdly, the Russian-Abkhazian block turned down a
priori the alteration of the settlement format, especially the inclusion of pro-
Georgian subjects or members of the European Union.
Hadleys Memorandum was blocked and could be helped neither by a
visit of M. Bryza who supervised questions on the South Caucasus in the US
Department of State, nor by the negotiations conducted by Alasania, the
Georgian ambassador in Abkhazia.
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Russian diplomatic obstruction certainly played a determining role in this

case. Here, as well as in general in the Crisis Diplomacy of the 2008 War, to
demonstrate the irrelevant and non-constructive position of the Kremlin, we
can mention the resolution that was passed by the State Duma on March 13th,
2008 On Settlement of Conflicts on CIS Territory [2] which has great
significance. In the document that at that time was some kind of instruction for
Russian diplomacy and today is a useful source for an objective analysis of
Russian policy, these reasons are listed which the Russian President must
consider the expediency of an acknowledgment of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. The first, second and fourth points are worthy of note in the catalogue
of reasons.
The first point concerns "contradictions between the new realities and
recognized norms of international law have recently developed a systemic
character." It appears that because of new realities or of one's ideas of them,
it is permissible to break norms and principles of international law, or even
worse to destroy the structural and conventional order of the international
system. Regarding the second point, the Kosovo precedent is directly noted
and that it cannot be omitted without consequences for frozen conflicts within
the CIS.
The fourth point refers to the participation of Russia in the settlement
process where it is clearly written that There is a possibility of refusing to
accept the existing format of settlement and the placing of international police
forces on the grounds that this is dangerous for the stability of the region. So
Russia considered from the very beginning changing the existing peace
formats and the expansion of international mechanisms of settlement to be
impossible, as in the process it would cause a transformation of its exclusive
status.
The resolution of the State Duma of March 13th 2008 became the
normative basis for the activation of the Kremlin's destructive policy in our
conflict regions. Beginning with President Putins decree of the 16th April
2008, on the establishment of direct relations with Abkhazia and so called
South Ossetia and ending with bringing on May 31st of Russian troops of the
76th Volgograd battalion into Abkhazia. On the other hand, the resolution of
March 13th defined, in an imperative form, the main components of Russian
policy concerning conflicts in Crisis Diplomacy, the opposition of notorious
"new realities" to international law, i.e., the inviolability of the territorial
40 Dazmir Jojua
integrity of Georgian4, the maximum assistance to the Kosovization of the

situation and the refusal to adopt the new settlement mechanisms and the
development of the crisis into war. That is why Hadleys Memorandum and
later the Steinmeier Plan and other Crisis Diplomacy actions were doomed to
fail. The tactical mechanism of putting a strategic "trap" for the Georgian
authorities was already switched on in the Kremlin. What was this "trap?" It
was a package of the following measures intending to hamper Crisis
Diplomacy by the destruction of peace formats, the intensification of armed
provocation and provoking retaliatory force majeure military strikes from
Georgian and the formation of a situational platform for Russian military
intervention.
On May 15th, 2008, the General Assembly of the UN passed another
resolution in which the territorial integrity of Georgia and the necessity for the
safe and respectful return of refugees were once again emphasized [3].
In June, the Georgian authorities tried to resort to indirect mechanisms of
discharging the very difficult situation, by-passing official peace initiatives
such as principles of settlement, projects of basic agreements, road maps, etc.
President M. Saakashvili addressed President D. Medvedev by letter [4] in
which the outline of the intermediate plan of settlement of the conflict in
Abkhazia was presented in a confidential manner. The Georgian side put
forward a proposal to divide Abkhazia into two - Gali and Ochamchire (the
dividing line being marked by the river Kodori) and the partial restoration of
Georgian jurisdiction, with mixed Georgian-Abkhazian administration or
international administration, free economic zones, a mixed Georgian-
Abkhazian police structure, a common administration with participation of an
international segment which should be already established in these districts.
In return, official Tbilisi was prepared to agree to continue in the Russian
CIS with its format and sign a document on not using force. After
approximately two weeks of silence, on July 3rd, the Kremlin refused to
consider Georgia's demands.
Thus in a letter from Saakashvili was presented a plan for the distribution
of the sovereignty of Abkhazia between Russia and Georgia in the form of a
double protectorate or condominium.
4
The following statement was made by B. Kenyakin, an official representative of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Russia on April 25th, 2008, and is symptomatic in this respect. "Russia
supports the changes towards territorial integrity of Georgia from a theoretical possibility to
a practical reality." so the Russians believe the territorial integrity of Georgia is a theoretical
hypothesis.
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This fact is doubly characteristic: firstly what right had Saakashvili to

speak on the division of historical territory, ceding part of it even temporarily.
After all it was an attempt to break that constitution of which he was the
guarantor of it being upheld.
But on the other hand and precisely in the context of Crisis Diplomacy,
this step is estimated differently: feeling the extreme danger of an escalation of
the conflict, the Saakashvili authorities were ready in order to avert the war to
make a maximum number of concessions and an irrelevant compromise from
the national point of view i.e., a division of Abkhazia. This implies that the
Georgian leadership acted on the verge of compromise and territorial
capitulation, in order that all peaceful means, including diplomatic channels of
capitulation would not be exhausted.
Both of the meetings of the Georgian and Russian Presidents on June 3rd
in St. Petersburg and on July 5th in Astana finished with no results. Moreover
D. Medvedev intentionally spoiled the proposal on the organization of the
Georgian-Russian bilateral summit in September 2008 in Sochi which had
almost been agreed upon during talks in St. Petersburg. It became clear that
the Kremlin was not about to change its imperial policy towards Georgia. At
the same time, and maybe this was due to the latter, Saakashvili also appeared
not to be prepared to abandon his aggressive military rhetoric.
The US State secretary, C. Rice, arrived in Tbilisi on 9th July 2008. During
the negotiations Saakashvili agreed not to use force, not as a separate feature
but in the form of a component of the whole complex package of settlement.
To C. Rice's statement You dont have the choice of using force and now the
main thing is to make a declaration on not using force," Saakashvili answered
he wished the same but it would have to be part of a larger agreement [5].
In her memoirs, published later, C. Rice, says categorically that she
warned the Georgian President that military action would have no prospect
and she excluded the possibility of any military assistance from the US if war
were started.
It is totally false to believe that the negotiations of July 9th created
understandable illusions among Georgians concerning military assistance from
Washington and that they were encouraged by the Americans to resolve the
crisis in a military way. Neither the illustrative material of the negotiations,
nor the logic of events, nor the dynamics of the diplomatic actions of the Bush
administration give any grounds for such a radical assertion.
The last attempt of Crisis Diplomacy to achieve a more or less de-
escalation was the visit of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frank-
42 Dazmir Jojua
Walter Steinmeier, to Georgia on July 13th, 2008. Steinmeier presented a

German version of conflict regulation in the form of a three staged plan:
1. The beginning of measures for the restoration of confidence, direct

Georgian-Abkhazian dialogue, a promise from the Georgian side of
not using force, demilitarization of the Kodori Ravine and the return
of refugees.
2. The accomplishment of common restoration and economical projects
in the region;
3. The definition of political status by assistance of international
intermediaries [6].
The Steinmeier Project was mainly based on the content format of existing
peace initiatives but at the same time contained such innovations which, in
contrast to earlier plans such as Hadleys Memorandum, increased the sphere
of compromise and expanded the area of responsibility but only for the
Georgian side. This was the main difference between the American and
German concepts. Such were, for example, the imbalance of responsibility of
not using force without more active response guarantees, restriction of the
exclusive functions of Russia and the expansion of an international presence -
not at all stages of the peace process but only at the last phase of the definition
of the political status, the retention of existing formats, etc.
That is why the Georgian side met the Steinmeier Project with some
skepticism. M. Saakashvili agreed to participate in the forthcoming
consultations in Berlin, hoping that with US help he would be able to revise
the German plan but substitute some points in the Steinmeier Project with
corresponding parts from Hadleys Memorandum.
As for the Abkhazian side, following the dictates of Moscow, it wholly
rejected the German initiative. The reason for blocking the Steinmeier Plan
was simply funny: they demanded additional time for the approbation of a
two-page text with known initiatives.
The preventive phase of Crisis Diplomacy actually failed, as it could not
ensure the avoidance of a military clash. Mistakes made by the President of
Georgia and some other members of the leading group played a certain role,
together with deliberate actions towards escalation by an alliance of Russia
and the separatists and the Kremlin's conflict policies.
The fact was that they could not display the appropriate diplomatic flair,
the necessary caution, flexibility, or orientation on a rational choice, nor the
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ability to analyze strategically, a skill so greatly required in such a situation, at

the turning point of a crisis.
The lead-up to the military crisis of July 29th August 6th 2008, the
hostilities of August and the Buffer Occupation of August-September are
known worldwide.
How was Crisis Diplomacy of this period conducted? It is evident that
after the failure of the preventive stage and in war conditions, the main
purpose of Crisis Diplomacy was achieving a ceasefire and the creation of a
treaty regime.
On August 8, 2008, some hours after the breakout of war, State secretary
of the US, C. Rice presented a three-point plan of ceasefire which involved an
immediate cessation of hostilities, bringing new international peace forces into
South Ossetia and conducting their new elections [7].
This plan became the main topic of talks between C. Rice and S. Lavrov,
the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
It should be noted that at the initial stage, the Georgian side attempted to
torpedo the plan. President M. Saakashvili, on the one hand, supported the
conditions of Rice's package of propositions but, on the other hand,
categorically demanded the resignation of E. Kokoiti and his separatist
alignment. Such a position was conditioned probably by the situation existing
at the front in that period - Georgian troops were controlling most of
Tskhinvali and its surrounding enclaves.
But after that the operative situation changed, the scales of Russian
intervention expanded and our forces began to retreat. Russia turned down the
package. Moreover, during the August 10th phone talk with C. Rice, S. Lavrov
noted that Russia is going to change the Georgian government. This was
more a declaration of political goals of aggression rather than the logic of
stopping the war.
In general, the military-political purpose of Russian intervention
considerably restricted the area of Crisis Diplomacy and substantially
weakened the diplomatic platform of making peace. Some documental data
give a clear idea of their aims which considerably exceed the limits of
notorious slogans on Rescuing the Abkhazian and Ossetian nations from
genocide and the Defense of our own Citizens.
Soon after the outbreak of war, a confidential meeting of American and
Russian high-ranking officials was held in Washington, where Russian
diplomats, in order to inform the American side, presented a list of the
Kremlin's intentions: a) the whole control of South Ossetia and the formation
of a security zone surrounding it; the squeezing out of Georgian forces from
44 Dazmir Jojua
Kodori Ravine; the formation of a security zone around Zugdidi; the coercing
of Georgia to sign the document on not using force; and the humiliation of
Saakashvili by having him under permanent pressure in Georgia, in order that
he would share Miloshevichs fate; and finally the annihilation of all
possibilities of Georgia becoming a member of NATO [8].
On the 15th August at one of the receptions in occupied Gori which was
attended by General V. Borisov, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air-
Landing Forces and Head of the 76th Division of Pskov and his deputy General
A. Kolpachenkov on the Russian side and Security Council Secretary A.
Lomaia and other officials from the Georgian side in answer to Lomaias
question as to what the Russians would do after the capture of Tskhinvali,
General Kolpachenkov answered (raising his right hand and placing the
forefinger of his left hand on its palm for a visual effect): Here is Georgia... it
is a country easily seized from east to west. Grabbing Abkhazia in the west
and Ossetia in the east... we tear the main transport artery in the middle,
bombing air and naval ports... then we sit and wait for the population in
despair to throw down the authorities.
We believe that the military-political objectives of Russian intervention
are clearly seen in that particular plan which was presented on August 9th,
2008, in parallel with the formation of buffer zones in Georgia, by having
close ties with the Kremlin World Strategic Institute.
1. Complete demilitarization of Georgia

2. Dismantling the Saakashvili regime
3. Creation of a confederative unit Union of Caucasian states (UCS)
from more than ten ethnic units in Georgia
4. The CSU would conduct foreign policy, would have a transport
infrastructure, a central bank and currency. Georgia should retain its
police force but not its army or security forces [10].
No comment!
On August 10th and 11th, 2008 consultations were held in the White House
concerning the granting of military assistance to Georgia by the US [11].
Different types of US military intervention were being discussed, beginning
with delivering to Georgia the newest type of weapons and military equipment
and ending with a limited operation on closing the Roki tunnel by
bombardment or with other actions, to impede Russian aggression. Two
groups opposed each other during the discussion: the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, Hadley, and his followers believed the
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peculiarities of conflict relations between Russia and Georgia were the main
reason for war and suggested that G. Bush should take measured, diplomatic
steps. The second group, led by Vice-president R. Chaney connected the war
with the Kremlin's imperial, geopolitical aims and therefore demanded more
active political steps for deterring Russia's geostrategic ambitions.
At the National Security Council of August 11th, after discussing
diplomatic and military versions of intervention, President Bush preferred the
diplomatic version. In order to neutralize Russian-US direct military conflict,
the decision was made to pass the initiative of diffusing the crisis situation to
the EU, with active participation of the US which supported Georgia largely
behind the scenes. Providing humanitarian help by means of the naval forces
of the US and the appearance in the Black Sea of several ships of the 6th Fleet
were used to act as a deterrent to Russian aggression.
So, after the failure of C. Rice's three-point plan and the decision of the
US Security Council of the 11th August, the main ally stepped aside and chose
tactics of active but distance support. Instead of a formation of an effective
international coalition and the organization of a strategic plan for preventing
Russian aggression, the US gave the reins of controlling the process to the EU.
This was the turning point in Crisis Diplomacy in the August War. Action was
now led by France, as it was holding the EU Presidency, together with the two
other members of the European troika: the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, J. Solana, and the OSCE Chairman-in-
Office, the Foreign Minister of Finland A. Stubb. An immediate ceasefire and
a restoration of the status quo existing prior to August 7th, became the central
formula of Crisis Diplomacy. The administration of the French President
began working out versions of a concrete mechanism of making peace.
In the evening of August 10th, the Georgian authorities announced the
withdrawal of troops from the conflict zone and at 5 a.m. of August 11th,
President Saakashvili expressed readiness to cease fire and to begin talks with
Russia regarding a truce. On August 12th, the Russian President, Medvedev,
also spoke on the end of the so called Operation for coercing Georgia to
peace. That somewhat facilitated the activation of diplomatic channels and
more or less increased their efficiency but only within the extremely difficult
process of Crisis Diplomacy.
The complexity and inconsistency of the process was conditioned first of
all by the strategic and operative results of the war. The Kremlin tried by all
means to transfer its success, together with the hostilities and sudden
catastrophe experienced by Georgia, to a diplomatic front and to consolidate a
treaty base obviously taking into consideration its own imperial interests.
46 Dazmir Jojua
On the other hand, restoration of some balance in the process of Crisis

Diplomacy was complicated because of heterogeneity (and also incomp-
atibility) within the EU. There was no common conceptual line and
correspondingly common tactics of action, especially regarding questions of
postwar relations.
Countries of the EU grouped around two main approaches: Italy, Spain,
Greece, Belgium, Luxemburg, Holland, Hungary and Slovakia supported the
German model which envisaged conducting a soft policy towards Russia while
Great Britain, Poland, Denmark, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia and
Lithuania supported the Latvian way of reacting to Russian aggression by
means of sanctions and a strict system of legitimate reprisals against the
aggressor.
The US Ambassador in Stockholm, R. Silverman, remarked in a secret
message sent to the state, that during the Caucasian crisis of 2008, Germany
was lobbying Russian interests. Both Germany and France were trying to
persuade some countries, including Sweden, to refuse to introduce sanctions
against Russia. As to the withdrawal of Russian troops already in 2008, Paris,
Berlin and Rome did not agree [12].
It is known that the EU did not carry out its strategic policy of preventing
Russian aggression or eradicating the results of the August War, in parallel
with a positive course of supporting Georgian territorial integrity and the non-
recognition of the independence of conflict regions. The Brussels summit of
September 1st, 2008 finally refused to introduce sanctions against Russia and
at the Nice summit of the 14th November, 2008 the EU announced the full
scale restoration of relations with Russia.
France, the main actor in this Crisis Diplomacy, was forced to take into
account, resulting in a situation of double asymmetry. In parallel with very
complicated talks with the Putin-Medvedev tandem and the restoration of
more or less a balance, N. Sarkozy had to conduct maneuvering within the EU
itself during the process of mutual consultations, in order not to deepen the
existing discord or undermine diplomatic attempts by expanding the line of
inner breakage common to political platforms.
A representative of Sarkozy's administration made the following remark
on the complexity of the position of the main mediator Georgia is not, has
never been and will never reach the sphere of special interest to France but our
aim is not to permit its turning into an apple of discord within the EU. Hence,
we will occupy an intermediate position between those who want to assist it
more (the Latvian Way) and those who abstain (the German Position) [13].
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So the structure of Crisis Diplomacy obtained a dual synthetic character.

In it two problems were combined: on one side, the conduct of tense dialogue
with Russia together with the creation of a maximally admissible regime of
ceasefire and, from the other side, the achieving of an intermediate centrist line
inside the EU, mainly for neutralizing the pragmatic position of the Germany-
Italy-Spain block [14].
The preliminary rough copy of the document on a ceasefire was drafted
on August 10th at night in Tbilisi during the visit of B. Kouchner and A. Stubb,
the French and Finish Ministers of Foreign Affairs respectively. President
Saakashvili signed it in the afternoon of August 10th and then B. Kouchner
took the document to Paris. In addition the Security Council of France under
the direction of Jean-David Levitte, advisor of the President, prepared a
second, alternative project.
N. Sarkozy met the Russian President Medvedev and Prime-minister Putin
on August 12th. The Russians rejected both the French-Finnish and the French
proposals and presented their own project which envisaged the occupation of a
large part of Georgian territory by creating wide security zones around conflict
regions.
N. Sarkozy and B. Kushner brought to Tbilisi a six point document
worked out after the talks which had been conducted in very difficult and tense
conditions and were sometimes even on the verge of collapse. It became clear
that the Kremlin had made in the preliminary version signed by President
Saakashvili, such changes which created legitimate grounds for the postwar
occupation of some territories of Georgia. The paragraph on territorial
integrity of Georgia was especially underlined in the preliminary version,
besides there was no talk of additional measures of security that had to be
taken by Russian troops. The formulation of paragraph IV - Organization of
international discussion on ensuring security of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
was creating a foundation on the analogy of the Kosovo precedent, for an
international process of the recognition of the independence of separatist
regions.
The visit of the French delegation to Tbilisi ended with Saakashvili not
signing the Sarkozy document. From then onwards the efforts of Crisis
Diplomacy were directed towards the neutralization of radical anti-Georgian
paragraphs. At the meeting between C. Rice and N. Sarkozy, held in Evian,
emerged the idea of adding some kind of appendix on the ceasefire agreement
[15]. M. Saakashvili received the letter from the French President on August
14th which contained additional explanation of the five point agreement on
ceasefire [16].
48 Dazmir Jojua
N. Sarkozy explained that before the formation of internal mechanisms,

Russian forces would accomplish additional measures of security. The
mandate and geographic localization of such additional measures were
indicated in the letter: temporary patrol on the adjacent territory of South
Ossetia, at a distance of 7-12 km from the administrative border. Free
movement and unblocking of the Georgian West-East transport highway had
to be ensured within the limits of additional measures. Later, on August 16th,
France concretized the definition of the August 12th agreement in an official
communiqu, underlining that additional measures should have been
conducted only in some zones of territories adjacent to the Tskhinvali region
[17].
C. Rice arrived in Tbilisi on August 15th [18]. M. Saakashvili signed the
agreement of August 12th after consultations with her and apparently receiving
additional guarantees from the US.
The ceasefire agreement making peace between Russia and Georgia, the
so called Sarkozy Document with the official title of Six Principles of
Conflict Settlement was adopted as follows:
1. Refusal to use force.

2. Complete and final halt to all kinds of hostilities.
3. Delivery of humanitarian aid to be ensured.
4. Return of Russian armed forces to their place of permanent location.
5. Return of Russian armed forces to pre-war positions; Russian armed
forces to carry out additional security measures until international
mechanisms have been worked out.
6. Start of international discussions with the purpose of settling the
conflicts and restoring peace.
The last chord of Crisis Diplomacy of the 2008 War were visits from the
highest UN delegates, N. Sarkozy, J. Solana and the President of the European
Commission J. M. Barroso, to Moscow and Tbilisi on September 8th, 2008. A
detailed plan of action concerning the main principles of the Sarkozy
Document was reflected in the achieved implementation agreement with the
title Implementation of agreement of August 2008. This agreement
determined a new mechanism for the separation of Georgian and Russian
military forces and established a procedural regime for the dismantlement of
buffer zones. The agreement envisaged the deployment of an EU mission of
monitoring and of the beginning of the Geneva talks, the so called Geneva
Format [19].
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The Kremlin agreed to an obligatory compromise in conditions of an

increasing international pressure. During the period September 9-5, a
deoccupation of the buffer zones was accomplished; on October 1st, an EU
observation mission started its activity in Georgia and on October 15th the
Geneva process began but Russia abruptly disagreed the main paragraphs of
agreement; it rejected the idea of withdrawing its troops from the regions of
Abkhazia and Tskhinvali and has continued to occupy these areas until the
present day; it recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on
August 26th, 2008 and refuses to annul the illegal acts of acknowledgment.
Such are the main stages of Crisis Diplomacy in the August 2008 War;
that is to say its inner anatomy. What conclusions can we reach by its
analysis?
First of all, it should be said that Crisis Diplomacy in principle fulfilled its
function neither badly nor well and only partially accomplished its purpose as
a significant element of the international process proceeding around the
August War and as an instrument of international politics oriented on a
conclusion of peace.
It is a fact that military activities were stopped, Georgia was rescued in
time from an extension of Russian intervention, total occupation and
destruction of central political, economic and military institutions, i.e., it is
true that the Georgian state system escaped complete destruction and the
Georgian people total genocide.
It is a fact as well that Crisis Diplomacy affected upon geopolitical and
geostrategic factors of such an important segment of modern international
politics, as Russia-West relations. The west achieved all three tactical aims: it
stopped the war, retained relations with Russia and also its own particular
image by closing the way to a new political regime in Georgia.
The Crisis Diplomacy of the August War confirmed once more that the
West would not venture to break global, strategic stability, would not risk
military conflict with Russia and certain groups in the Western establishment
would neither try to restore the Cold War, nor demand the imposition of
sanctions of various intensity.
In this respect, Crisis Diplomacy brought certain corrections in the
diplomatic paradigm of our state. It is known that the structure of this
paradigm is based on the principle of scale: there is a negative crisis in
Georgian-Russian relations and a positive crisis of preventive action in
Georgian-Western relations but on another scale. It is simple what should take
place: Georgian-Western relations must outweigh, or at least balance
negatively Russian-Georgian relations.
50 Dazmir Jojua
Only in such conditions, will relations with the West add the character of a
sustainable systemic regime for the security of Georgia. The Crisis Diplomacy
of N. Sarkozy could not cope with these dynamics, could not protect this
balance, the result of which the negative aspects of Georgian-Russian relations
overweighed the positive of Georgian-Western relations, with consequent
results. That is why the main lesson of the August War was that Georgia
should build its foreign and security policy on the grounds of pragmatic
prudence and acting in a manner corresponding to the situation with
intermediate tactic back motion in the frames of Euro-Atlantic orientation.
No other alternative exists, as Georgia is free in its geopolitical choice, but not
in the structure of this choice.
And finally, concerning one more dimension of Crisis Diplomacy,
certainly it was the following stage of opposing by the so-called soft power of
the confrontational interrelation between the West and Russia. Symbolic
expressions of it are the well-known collisions that occurred during Sarkozys
talks in Moscow. But if we look deeper into the inner layers of Crisis
Diplomacy we will see the helplessness of the present day Western position,
the revival of some kind of Chamberlainism, an incompatibility of the policy
conducted with the task of deterring aggression.
One can consider, for example, the Ukrainian Crisis. In this case, the war
regrouped the borders of the US and Russian spheres of influence, replaced the
points of their strategic confrontation and somehow changed the geopolitical
picture of the region. In this respect we should consider the August Wart to be
in the common trajectory of Russia-Western international behavior - in this
geopolitical struggle, the front line of which passes the route Baltic-Balkans-
Caucasus and Central Asia.
We should explain Russian aggression not only by a striving to attain
NATO but it is also Russias reaction to the Colored Revolutions, which the
West has been employing ever since the Portuguese Crisis of 1974. That is
why the August War is a kind of analogue of such events as the 1931
Manchuria Crisis, the 1935-36 Ethiopian war, the USSR-Finland War of 1939-
40 and the Sudeten Crisis of 1938. Thus Crisis Diplomacy shows that the
August War was not only a war as such, but part of a geopolitical process.
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REFERENCES
[1] R. D. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World, Tbilisi 2010, pp. 167-
169.
[2] Text, see: . , . - .
., 2011, . 396-297) (K. Zatulin, Russia and Abkhazia. Two
countries - one people, M 2011, pp. 396-397).
[3] Newspaper 24 Saati, May 16, 2008.
[4] R. D. Asmus, mentioned work, pp. 177-178.
[5] R. D. Asmus, mentioned work, p. 179.
[6] Report of Georgian government in connection with full-scaled
aggression against Georgia accomplished by Russian Federation,
Tbilisi 2009, p. 387.
[9] www.parliament.ge/index.php?!dhg_id=ENG_id=21134.
[10] . , 20 2008 . (Newspaper Commersant,
August 20, 2008).
[12] Representation of WikiLeaks data on internet platform - www.
interpressnews.ge/ge/politica/161950.
[14] Position of governments of A. Merkel and S. Berlusconi obviously left
the impression of new Chamberlainism, appeasing of the Kremlin,
disgraceful politics of ignoring Russian aggression.
[16] M. Gabedava, Russian aggression against Georgia, 2008, Tbilisi 2009,
p. 109.
[17] www.mfa.ge.
[18] www.president.gov.ge/?!=2712.
[19] D. Jojua, Military intervention of Russia in Georgia. The War of August
2008 and its results. Tbilisi 2010, pp. 258-261.
Chapter 4
RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN WAR OF AUGUST

2008 AND NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
Otar Janelidze
After the break-up of the Soviet empire, the cancellation of the Warsaw
treaty and the end of the Cold War, it was anticipated that such an organization
of collective security as the North Atlantic Alliance would lose its present
conditions because the most significant factors and circumstances which at one
time conditioned the formation of NATO, actually no longer existed. Contrary
to such an expectation, the role and importance of the Alliance in the new
system of international relations were not reduced. On the contrary, in Samuel
Huntingtons words, with the end of the Cold War one main and clear task
has emerged for NATO - to ensure its existence and not to permit Russia the
political and military control of Central Europe [1, 247]. Besides, according
to NATO regulations, this organization, in addition to ensuring the freedom
and security of its member states by political or by military means, is called
upon to guarantee the spread of democracy, personal freedom, the supremacy
of law and other values pertaining to the whole Euro-Atlantic region. What is
more, challenges emerged in the altered reality and new risk-factors and
dangers emerged underlining the necessity of NATO to an even greater extent.
Such transnational, global dangers as terrorism, ethno and political
conflicts, cyber-attacks, organized crime, etc. require various approaches,
broad international monitoring and control and operative reaction. And at
present, NATO possesses the most effective means and mechanism to
counteract these dangers. It is no coincidence that the attention of the world
54 Otar Janelidze
community supporting stable and peaceful development is mainly directed

towards NATO activity. This international military-political organization is
considered to be the main guarantor both in Europe, the US and in other parts
of the world. Georgia is included in this integration into NATO as well.
The idea of approaching the North Atlantic Alliance arose in Georgia at
the end of the 1980s, in the period of a rising national movement. Irakli
Tsereteli was one of the first who sounded out this idea at numerous meetings.
The reaction of the population was heterogeneous. The majority perceived the
view of Tsereteli as utopian, as the totalitarian Soviet regime still existed and
such a development of events was difficult to imagine.
Soon, Georgia declared a restoration of independence, but Zviad
Gamsakhurdias government did not express any particular interest or
inclination towards NATO.
Georgia is a buffer country because of its location. The sovereignty or
territorial integrity of a small country having a buffer function is always under
threat. The leaders of the country had to work out a mechanism of political
strategy based on balanced, neighborly and friendly relations which would
ensure its peaceful and stable development.
E. Shevardnadzes foreign course was precisely directed towards this. He
could deal with his strong and aggressive neighbor, Russia, to a certain extent
but at the same time expressed his aspirations towards integration into Euro-
Atlantic structures.
The first contacts of our country with the North Atlantic Alliance started
in the middle of the 1990s. The special program, Training and Arming, which
served to approach the Georgian army to NATO standards, was accomplished
with NATO assistance. Georgia joined the program Partnership for Peace and
became one of the founders of the Council of Euro-Atlantic Partnership.
Georgian armed forces participated both in NATO military training and in
peaceful operations such as Kosovo and Iraq. It can be said that Georgia
officially knocked at NATO's door.
In November 2002, at the high level meeting of the Council of Euro-
Atlantic Partnership which took place shortly after the NATO summit,
President E. Shevardnadze stated from the highest tribune that Georgia wanted
to become a member of NATO. There was a positive response to this wish, the
result of which was the drawing up of the Individual Partnership Action Plan
(IPAP) of Georgia with NATO at the beginning of 2003.
The main aim of this plan was the assistance of democratic development
and support in the implementation of a course of reforms in Georgia.
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Russian-Georgian War of August 2008 and North Atlantic Alliance 55
After the Rose Revolution, the political team coming to power was
determined that the integration of Georgia into NATO was the priority purpose
and main task of the foreign and security policy of the country.
The North Atlantic Council supported the Georgian IPAP on October 29,
2004. The plan of action envisages responsibilities concerning foreign and
security policy, settlement of conflicts, as well as a demand that countries
striving to become members of NATO should spend not less than 2% of their
GDP on defense. Since 2004 the Georgian government has defined the
development of defense and security systems as the first priority of the
country. This decision was clearly reflected in the budget of the Ministry of
Defense which increased from year to year and amounted to - in million laris -
173.9 in 2004, 368.9 - in 2005, 684.9 - in 2006, 1,494.5 - in 2007 and 1,545.2 -
in 2008.
The process of the integration of Georgia into the North Atlantic Alliance
is not directed against any country, but the leadership of the Kremlin perceives
it as a danger for the national interests of Russia. Moscow was obliged to put
up with the enlargement of NATO to the east, but it categorically resists both
Ukraine's and Georgia's membership of this organization.
It should be noted that in 2007 Georgia was announced to be an enemy of
Russia in a conception worked out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation. Media outlets working under the control of the
government firmly established this idea among the Russian population.
Besides, Moscow had openly announced even before the recognition of
the independence of Kosovo that the Kosovo precedent would allow Russia
the freedom to recognize the sovereignty of territories existing in the post-
Soviet space, including the break-away regions of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Despite this, cooperation between the North Atlantic Alliance and
Georgia continued.
NATO and Georgia established Intensive Dialogue (ID) from
September 2006. The official statement of NATO's Parliamentary Assembly
on this expressed support for Georgias striving to become a member of the
Alliance. In addition the corresponding legislative initiative of American
congressmen gave hope to the Georgians that membership of NATO was a
real and a near prospect [2].
High ranking representatives of the Georgian legislative and executive
powers permanently declared that Georgia would start the following stage of
Intensive Dialogue - Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 2006 and in 2008
would become a member of NATO. However NATO officials, including the
members of their estimation mission, warned representatives of NGOs and the
56 Otar Janelidze
whole of Georgian society that naming any dates and terms on the way to
integration contradicts NATO practice and would not be good either for the
reputation of NATO in the country. Pierre Lellouche, Secretary General of the
Parliamentary Assembly of NATO indicated the same in his 2006 report, when
he remarked that excessive expectations could cause disappointment.
Until recently, one of the conditions of the integration of a new candidate
country into NATO was a statement of the government that its country wishes
to be a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. The political will or wish of the
authorities was understood to be the decision of the whole country.
In December 2009, at a ministerial meeting held in Brussels, it was
officially announced that there would be an amendment concerning the point
mentioned. According to the new demand, the opinion of the population of the
country would be envisaged, together with the will of the government of the
candidate country wishing to enter NATO.
It is known that the Georgian Parliament unanimously approved the
decision on NATO membership for Georgia on March 13, 2007. Furthermore
in January 2008, a plebiscite was carried out in Georgia on this particular
issue. According to its results the majority (72.5%) of the Georgian population
supports the integration of their country into NATO.
Member states of the Alliance are not certain whether they wish for a new
member in NATO but many circumstances may influence them upon making a
decision. Not least among them is the attitude of the Russian Federation on the
issue of the enlargement of NATO to the east.
The Russian Federation has already been cooperating with the North
Atlantic Alliance for a long time. Agreements on strategic arms of attack,
problems in Afghanistan and the fight against piracy have been achieved due
to this cooperation but there remains unresolved issue which is most important
for us, namely that NATO and Russia cannot reach a consensus on Georgia.
I would like to add that besides the negative position of Russia, unsettled
conflicts and the low level of democracy in the country are the factors
impeding the further rapprochement of Georgia to the North Atlantic Alliance.
It is known Georgia could not obtain MAP in 2008 at the Bucharest
summit. It should be said that the Kremlin understood this fact to be a kind of
carte blanche from the West to activate destructive action against our country.
It is also known that Russia considers Georgia to be its zone of privileged
interest and uses every means for retaining influence in the region. This was
Russia's aim when using military aggression against Georgia in August 2008.
I will not dwell on details of this much talked of war but focus instead my
attention on the reaction of the North Atlantic Alliance to the aggression of
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Russia against Georgia during this war. According to a statement of S.

Ragozin, the permanent representative of Russia in NATO at the time, the
position of NATO to the conflict was indifferent and neutral and it only
collected information. But the neutrality of NATO did not mean inactivity.
NATO first responded to the wide-scale Russian-Georgian conflict on
August 8, 2008 when Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the Secretary General of the
Alliance, urged on both the opposing sides an immediate ceasefire and the
beginning of peace talk [3].
On August 9, Scheffer stated that the Alliance did not possess a mandate
to intervene in a conflict which had already begun [4]. The North Atlantic
Alliance ignored the appeal of the Republican US Presidential candidate,
Senator John McCain, to immediately summon a NATO council meeting in
order to assess the security situation of Georgia and to discuss measures which
would help stabilize the situation. But the speech of the leader of the Alliance
on 10th August announced the Alliance's point of view. In Scheffers words
Russia breached the territorial integrity of Georgia and used excessive
military power in South Ossetia during the conflict. The Secretary General
once again urged Russia and Georgia to cease fire.
From the five presidents of European countries who in August 2008
arrived in Georgia in support, four were leaders of state members of NATO.
But that does not mean that the North Atlantic Alliance shielded Georgia from
Russian aggression. However the Georgian government attaches a decisive
role to the attempts of the EU and the US in ceasing Russian aggression and to
the process of postwar regulation [5].
Indeed, hostilities ceased only when the French President, Nicolas
Sarkozy, reached an agreement with the Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev,
on August 12.
It should be noted that even after reaching a ceasefire and the end of
hostilities, Georgia was not left without the attention of the North Atlantic
Alliance.
On August 15, 2009, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer visited Georgia with a large
delegation of the Alliance. In his speech in Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State
University, he declared that NATO would support Georgia not with words
alone, but also with deeds; it would help Georgia to come out of the difficult
situation in which it found itself as a result of the August 2008 War.
Concretely, the organization aimed to assist Georgia in overcoming the results
of the war and also of reforming the army.
On behalf of the Alliance, Scheffer expressed his respect of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally
58 Otar Janelidze
recognized borders, condemned once again the Russian position for the
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; urged Moscow to change this
wrong decision and added that the Alliance would revise its relations with the
Russian Federation. In his words, all member states of NATO are sure that
they will see Georgia in the ranks of the Alliance and that the door of this
organization is always open to Georgia. The Secretary General underlined the
following: assistance to Georgia does not mean the Alliance will turn its back
on Russia, nor close its door to it. This is not in the interests of NATO.
Punishing Russia would not be the right way but Moscow should learn that if
it becomes internationally isolated, it is due to its own actions [6].
A revision of the relations of the North Atlantic Alliance with Russia
resulted in a halt in the working of the NATO-Russian Council which had
proceeded from November 2002. This halt was not long and since December
2009 sessions of the council have resumed.
As a result of the August 2008 War, a significant part of Georgian
territory was occupied by Russia. Georgia broke off diplomatic relations with
Russia. For its part, the Kremlin recognized the independence of Abkhazia and
so called South Ossetia and established military and political connections with
these states.
The war considerably worsened the security environment not only in
Georgia and the South Caucasus but also in the Black Sea region. Despite this,
the war could not hinder the process of a further rapprochement between
Georgia and NATO. A meeting of foreign ministers of NATO member states
was held on August 19, 2009 where the resolution on the creation of a NATO-
Georgia Standing Commission was adopted.
The Commission was established officially on September 15 of the same
year, at a meeting of the North Atlantic Alliance Council. The document on
the formation of this new structure of NATO-Georgia cooperation was signed
by the Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, and Prime
Minister of Georgia, Vladimir Gurgenidze. The main purposes of the
Commission are the deepening of the political dialogue between NATO and
Georgia and the assistance in the accomplishment of those reforms which
Georgia undertook in order to become a member of NATO [7].
The Georgian government considers that the purpose of the NATO-
Georgia Commission is assistance in the accomplishment of those reforms
which Georgia undertook in order to become a member of NATO [8].
A national program was drawn up within the limits of cooperation which
altered the previously existing IPAP-plan, considered as a framework
document of relations between the North Atlantic Alliance and Georgia.
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NATO conducts monitoring activities and periodically sums up the results

of proceeding with that program. On December 4, 2009, at a meeting of the
NATO-Georgian Commission, the work of Georgia on the implementation of
the commitments for membership of the North Atlantic Organization was
estimated positively.
The Russian-Georgian war complicated relations with NATO and Russia
to a certain extent but also brought about some temporary corrections. As has
been mentioned, the work of the Council of the North Atlantic Alliance and
Russia stopped because of the war, just as did all NATO-Russia joint projects.
But merely one year later the situation changed. The Alliance preferred to
retain contact with Russia than to isolate it and the existence of common
interests lead to a restoration of cooperation between both sides.
Since December 2009, the meetings of the Council have also been
restored. The new Secretary General of the Alliance, Anders Fogh Rasmussen,
visited Russia at the time. We have common challenges and interests and
Afghanistan is a key point of our cooperation, he declared during his Moscow
visit [9]. When referring to the issue of the attitude of the Russian Federation
to Georgia, the leader of the Alliance remarked: Moscow has not yet
completely implemented the agreement on a ceasefire, and asked Russia to
leave Georgian territory [10]. It is also worth noting that NATO did not
support the initiative of official Russia on the creation of a new architecture
of European security and refused to sign it but agreed for it to be included in
its discussion in the OSCE format.
The cooperation of Georgia with the Alliance has continued, the proof of
which are the meetings of the NATO-Georgia Commission held at the
beginning of 2009 and in the following period. One of these meetings, that of
September 6, 2010 in NATO headquarters, Brussels, was dedicated to the
Russian-Georgian conflict.
It should also be noted that the tone of NATO towards Russia softened to
some extent, but foreign ministers of Alliance member states still urge Russia
to cancel its decision on the recognition of the independence of the Georgian
regions - Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Twenty-eight member states of the North Atlantic Alliance confirm that
they continue the policy of the non-recognition of these two separatist regions
and support the territorial integrity of Georgia.
At the same time NATO urges Russia to fulfill all the commitments
envisaged by the ceasefire agreement and to refrain from taking steps which
could be dangerous for the security of Georgia. The Alliance also urges the
Russian Federation to ensure the entering of monitors from the EU observation
60 Otar Janelidze
mission into the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However the
attitude of Moscow towards these issues is as yet unchanged.
The Kremlin politicians insist that NATOs sympathy and solidarity with
official Tbilisi serve to restore the military potential of Georgia and to
strengthen the danger of a new military adventure in the region.
A deputy of the Russian Duma, Sergey Markov, expressed once again the
opinion of Russias governing elite. Answering the question of the
correspondent of the news agency GHN, When will the war end? Markov
answered: The wars in Caucasus will end when a complete and indivisible
dominance of Russia will be established in that region [11].
The position of the Georgian government has also not changed. It urgently
demands the de-occupation of those territories of the country which are still
illegally held by Russian military forces.
The strategy of the foreign policy of Georgia worked out by the foreign
office of the country after the August War and calculated for the years 2009 to
2012, expressed the official opinion. As is noted the military aggression of
Russia against Georgia served the accomplishment of the political course of
the Kremlin which is directed at the further weakening and returning of the
Georgian state by force into a zone of Russias privileged interests.
Georgia is ready to normalize its relations with Russia if it respects the
fundamental principles of international law, i.e., the independence of the
country, its territorial integrity and free choice. The development of mutually
beneficial and equal relations between two countries is possible only if based
on these principles [12].
The Russian President announced in July 2009 that someday Russia and
Georgia would restore relations based on these new realities which were
created after the August War. And the reality is that about one fifth of
Georgian land is occupied by the Russian Federation and Abkazia and South
Ossetia are independent states, the sovereignty of which is recognized by
Russia. Georgia refuses to submit to such a reality and hopes that it will be
able to correct this situation through the assistance of the international
community. Optimism is conditioned by the circumstance that Georgia, as a
member of the international community is included in NATOs security
policy, participates in regional and global security formats, and contributes to
the formation of a system of modern peaceful international relations, the
strengthening of security, stability and to the prosperity of the world.
Decisions adopted at the NATO anniversary summit in April 2009, in
Strasbourg and Kehl are perceived as consent of the irreversibility of the
process of the integration of Georgia into NATO, according to which the
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member states of the Alliance confirm once more their faithfulness towards
commitments taken at the Bucharest summit. That Georgia would become a
member state of NATO is underlined also in declarations made in the summits
of Lisbon (2010), Chicago (2012) and Wales (2014) [13].
At the same time, the ideas of a number of authoritative analysts should be
taken into account, namely that the collective defense system of the North
Atlantic Alliance would not be able to ensure the security and territorial
integrity of a possible member of this system and that NATO perhaps would
not even take part in the war to defend the interests of active members of this
organization and countries such as the Baltic and East European states should
take care of additional guarantees of defense and security.
The following advice of a Georgian expert also seems worthy of attention:
The events of August 2008 showed that due to excessive expectations
existing in society and its permanent misinformation on what NATO stands
for, a feeling of disappointment may arise against the West and the Alliance
and also the belief that they have deserted us [14].
Against this background it should be interesting whether the attitude of the
Georgian population towards the North Atlantic Alliance changed after the
Russian-Georgian war. Now we will acquaint you with results of a
sociological research carried out by a group of business consultants in April
2009. The respondents numbered 1,800 and were chosen by accidental
sampling among which 400 reside in regions adjacent to Turkey, 300 in
regions adjacent to Tskhinvali, 200 in areas populated by Armenians, 450
from Tbilisi and from other cities (Kutaisi, Batumi, Zugdidi, Poti, Gori,
Rustavi) a total of 250.
According to the results of the research, the notion of a large part of the
population on NATO is superficial. As many as 49% of the population
interrogated did not know what the letters NATO stood for, but the degree of
trust in the Alliance is actually the same as before the August War. A total of
73.3% supports the integration of Georgia into this organization, 52.6%
consider that our membership of NATO became more important after the
Russian-Georgian war. Only a few (7.9%) think that nothing will change for
Georgia after its integration into NATO. And 16% think regarding Russian-
Georgian relations that Russia will carry out a more aggressive policy towards
our country after its integration into NATO and in the opinion of 28%, Russia
will slacken its aggressive policy.
The answer to the question, If you could choose only one international
organization a member of which Georgia could be, which one would you
choose? is interesting as 46.% answered that they would choose the CIS,
62 Otar Janelidze
12.3% said NATO and 15.4% preferred the EU. However in Tbilisi the figures
were 2.9%, 44.9% and 27.8% respectively.
The fact that 33% (but 46.4%) in Tbilisi of people interrogated think that
Russia hinders the integration of Georgia into NATO is worth noting and
27.9% consider it necessary to hold a dialogue with the Russian Federation
(and in Tbilisi 30%) in order to hasten our membership of NATO [15].
The Georgian Dream political force came to power in Georgia in 2013 and
is faithful to the Euro-Atlantic course of the country and in addition aims to
normalize relations with Russia, but a big breakthrough in this direction has
not yet been observed.
CONCLUSION
In this article the relation of Georgia with the North Atlantic Organization
is discussed, the process of the integration of Georgia into the Alliance is
elucidated and impeding factors are analyzed.
Attention is focused on the position of NATO towards Russias aggression
against Georgia in August 2008. The fact that the North Atlantic Alliance,
from its leaders words, did not possess a mandate for direct intervention is
emphasized.
Nato expressed its negative attitude towards Russian violence by stopping
the work of the NATO-Russian Council. The activity of all mutual NATO-
Russian projects was also stopped. The Alliance estimated the event discussed
in the following way: Russia ignored the territorial integrity of Georgia and
used excessive military power during the conflict in South Ossetia.
The Russian-Georgian war did not hinder the process of approaching
Georgia to the North Atlantic Alliance.
The proof of this is the formation of the NATO-Georgia Standing
Commission and the readiness of the Alliance to help Georgia in overcoming
the war results and in reforming the army as well as the declarations of Lisbon
in 2010, Chicago in 2012 and Wales in 2014 where the idea of Georgia
becoming a member state of NATO was underscored.
NATO assists in territorial maintenance of the integrity of Georgia and its
sovereignty; it condemns the Russian position on the recognition of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia and urges Moscow to reverse this wrong decision and to
fully implement its agreement on a ceasefire.
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REFERENCES
[1] S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations (in Russian), M., 2006.
[2] http://www.republicans.ge/myuploads/sagazeto%20publikaciebi/NATO-
Oct06-present.pdf.
[3] http://lenta.ru/news/2008/08/08/jaan/.
[4] http://www.rian.ru/world/20080809/150223077.html.
[5] See. Strategy of Georgian Foreign Policy. http://www.polity.ge/georgia/
politics/1068-saqartvelos-sagareo-strategia.html.
[6] http://www.kommersant.ru/doc-y.aspx?DocsID=1027021.
[7] http://www.nato.int/docu/other/ru/updates/2008/09-september/r0915c.
html, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-115e.html.
[8] http://www.polity.ge/georgia/politics/1068-saqartvelos-sagareo-
strategia.html.
[9] Newspaper 24 Saati, 2009, December 18.
[10] http://presa.ge/index.php?text=newsandi=11428.
[11] Newspaper Sakartvelos Respublika 2009, December 9.
[12] http://www.polity.ge/georgia/politics/1068-saqartvelos-sagareo-
strategia.html.
[13] http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEOandsec_id=453.
[14] Sh. Pichkhadze, NATO-Georgia: Expectation, Reality, Ppospect. http://
www.fes.ge/rus/images/Fes_Files/Pulications08files/krizisi%202008%2
0 geo.pdf.
[15] www.natoinfo.ge.
Chapter 5
MILITARY-STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL

ISSUES REGARDING THE RUSSIAN-
GEORGIAN WAR OF 2008
Giorgi (Gia) Karkarashvili
This report is mainly founded on the monograph we published in 2009,

Our Country on Fire, which is founded on an objective analysis of all
available information from various sources, including decisions of
parliamentary commissions and eye witness accounts. However, as we cannot
present all the details of strategy and tactics that were employed, we will
concentrate on those aspects that are particularly significant.
The first duty of any government is obviously, on the one hand, to
neutralize the anticipated military danger, and on the other, to be ready to
defend the country. Unfortunately the Georgian military political leadership
ignored the obvious signs of aggression, nor did it realize the probable
development of events. This was despite the fact that the government had long
been well aware of the danger and also that the highest military political
leadership of our northern neighbor made unconcealed statements on the
necessity of military intervention should hostilities be renewed in the conflict
zone. For example on July 11th, 2008 Colonel-General Sergei Makarov, head
The Georgian general Giorgi (Gia) Karkarashvili was Minister of Defense during the
Shevardnadze period (1993-95), participated in the defense of Sokhumi and distinguished
himself by his courage and patriotism.
66 Giorgi (Gia) Karkarashvili
of the North-Caucasian military division, announced that should hostilities

break out in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali, Russian troops would invade Georgia.
Such a strong hint was surely sufficient warning for the Georgian
leadership to confirm that war could possibly break out and that the Russians
would not fail to make good use of their domination in the air.
Let us now consider the military situation in the conflict region.
Tskhinvali with its well-armed formations and control systems was actually a
well-defended town and could repulse attacks until such time as the arrival of
additional forces.
In the conflict zone, shooting and provocation had previously been
occurring. However, from July 20 the adversary passed to the systemic
bombardment of the Georgian peacekeepers posts by 82 mm and 120 mm
mortars. In the period of July 1st to August 7th, double-sided firing was at its
most intensive. The evacuation of Tskhinvali citizens took place on August
3rd.The Georgian villagers, however, were not offered similar protection,
despite the increasing intensity of the firing. The situation became so strained
that even the OSCE observers could not stop provocations and left Tskhinvali
on August 6th.
Complicated political processes proceeded against a background of
endless shooting and minor attacks between the two sides, where the interest
of transforming the conflict into armed confrontation could readily be seen.
Russian peacekeeping forces, whose main duty was to avoid hostility and
bloodshed, on the contrary were assisting the escalation of events with their
inactivity.
It is our strong belief that despite of the complex situation, if our
politicians had had any common sense and goodwill, it could still have been
possible to avoid war. But Georgias political leaders as if they had forgotten
the bitter lessons of their latest history, had not learnt sense and could not
understand that their declarations looked more like a call for war rather than an
attempt to avoid one.
According to reliable information we have received and on the grounds of
analysis we consider President Saakashvili, when in Gori, decided to launch an
attack individually! He did not gather the Security Council and wait for its
decision. He stubbornly repeated mistakes made in 1992 by his predecessor
Edward Shevardnadze. Presumably he came to this decision in a mood of
anger mixed with malice. Unfortunately, the all-important question of war or
peace was decided not with sound judgment and a feeling of responsibility, but
with a hot temper and rage.
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Military-Strategic and Tactical Issues 67
The fact that there was no institution in the state, nor a parliament or
government prepared to oppose such a decision was pitiful. Neither the
ministers, not the Secretary of the Security Council had enough courage and
spirit to oppose the President. A sequence of activities is envisaged by the
constitution in such a crucial moment for the country but even the Security
Council had no meeting.
One circumstance provokes particular interest at this stage: the Georgian
authorities possessed secret information concerning possible aggression from
Russia and it is incomprehensible as to why this was hidden from their own
population and from their international friends. No Georgian agency
broadcasted such information. We will not describe in detail the chronology of
events but will merely single out some aspects:
1. The reasoning behind the actions of Tskhinvalis de-facto authorities,

their hesitation and attempts to wreck meetings at the time possibly
was due to the fact that the Ossetian side was ready for any sacrifice
to justify Russian aggression if only to drag Georgia into war.
2. Representatives of the Georgian authorities as if forgetting Russian
military troops were approaching Roki tunnel began speaking to
Kulakhmetov not on the anticipated aggression but were making
friendly overtures regarding some shady deals.
3. The temptation of the Georgian side was great, when you have no
doubt of your own success and simultaneously you are convinced that
Russia will not intervene to prevent your provocation and impudent
tricks. It seems the Georgian authorities were misinformed about the
possible intervention of Russia. Somebody or something that appears
to be still invisible to us was over reassuring them. Or were they in
hope of some shady deals?
4. It has been confirmed that the military leadership of Georgia could
neither imagine nor comprehend who their opponent would be in the
awaited conflict and planned fighting tasks for military units and
groups proceeding from such an operative-strategic situation. In our
case the leadership of Georgia defined its enemy as the military
leadership of South Ossetia. And the latter believed their enemy to be
brigades and heads units and band formations in the conflict zones.
The Commander-in-Chief ordered to open fire at 23.40 pm, August 7th,

2008. This order of the President had dramatic consequences. The
international community condemned and accused the Georgian side for
opening massive artillery fire, as there were still civilians in Tskhinvali. In

addition, this became one of the pretexts of the Russian Federation to
intervene in the war. Nor did Georgian society justify the attack launched by
the Georgian side. As for the approximately 50 missiles shot in the direction of
the many storeyed government buildings of the capital, they had no effect
whatsoever from a military point of view.
We will offer you some observations:
Analysis I. Since the first minutes of the war mutual incompatibility of
military actions and political statements were apparent. Also from the first few
minutes it was seen that Ossetian armed formations were defined to Georgian
military units as opponents and the actions of the latter when occupying
villages had nothing in common with repulsion of aggression. The Georgian
side was making statements on capturing Ortchosani and Tsinagora, whereas
these villages are located at a distance of 12 km from the Igoeti-Gori road. As
for Dmanisi and Znauri, we have learnt that they were not occupied despite
what the authorities claimed. It is astonishing! Nothing was in common with
repulsing aggression or with capturing of villages close to the Igoeti-Gori
route, nor why the Georgian side should consider the action it to be a success.
Analysis II. We now know that by this time the military-political
leadership of Georgia had already had affirmed information that Russia was in
fact intervening in the military conflict and would never permit Georgia to
realize its political goals. This being the case, in order to discover the
supposed character of the war, the authorities had to be quick-witted and
decide on a future action plan for military units regarding exactly the
prevention of aggression. But, it seems, their early success blunted their
minds. The planned attack on Tskhinvali did not at all answer to the purpose
of preventing aggression. I do not know when and by whom this decision was
made but already it was known that the Russian troops would enter through
the Roki tunnel.
Analysis III. Here the fighting morale of the troops should be mentioned.
At the initial stage they were prepared to make battle to defend the Georgian
people. The moral-psychological condition of the military units and personnel
was as firm as any commander could wish. First the main task needed to be
exactly defined and then to choose right direction as from where to strike.
Disorganization began at 04.00-05.00 a.m. on August 8th. The
concentration of all forces in one narrow direction to make an attack from
Zemo-Nikozi was inadmissible. It seems unbelievable when planning a
fighting operation that such a mistake could have been made by a military
leadership, which obtains its education in the best US military institutions.
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Who chose as the only direction of the main thrust the route through which the
Georgian army had to advance was one in which they had to pass between two
Russian military bases? In our opinion, the reason was that Tskhinvali was still
considered as the direction for the main thrust and that this was a political
decision.
According to the materials of a parliamentary commission1, it seems as if
the President ordered not to enter Tskhinvali, but the Joint Staff changed the
order without permission and determined Tskhinvali would be the main
direction of operations.
Analysis IV. I would like to believe in the incerity of testimonies given by
various people on the parliamentary commission, but there is some doubt that
work of the commission served more than the justification of wrong steps
made by the military-political leadership rather than the establishment of truth.
According to the commission, entering Tskhinvali was conditioned by the
circumstance that it was necessary to create a safe passage for the evacuation
of the population from Didi Liakhvi Ravine2. It seems after the end of the war,
a political group was sitting discussing the creation of arguments to justify
recent hostilities and seemed interested in little else. From the operative-
tactical point of view, the assertion that Tkhinvali should be attacked if there
arose a necessity to evacuate the population from Didi Liakhvi Ravine was
nonsense. There was a much shorter way from Ergneti to Tamarasheni in order
to provide a safe passage. As affirmed, the population of Didi Liakhvi was left
to its fate.
As already remarked upon, the main mistake caused other criminal
mistakes. Embarrassment was observed as early as 4 am, August 8th. Nikozi
appeared to be under the artillery fire of the adversary; there were great
gatherings of personnel and of military technique on an unknown base. In the
darkness under a two-hour bombing raid, the Georgian troops were awaiting
orders from their commanders. At 6 oclock mutual coordination between
battalions and company, and later between other units acting in the direction of
attack was lost. Personnel of different subdivisions were intermixed.
Despite problems Georgian army formations managed to crush resistance
at the entrance of Tskhinvali and at 12 oclock occupied some streets, and so
managed to control the south and south-west part of the city. Hero Street was
1
Here is meant a special parliamentary commission by the government of Mikheil Saakashvili,
created as a result of pressure from public opinion, but its subjectivity, incorect
interpretation of facts and conclusions, gave rise to its distrust by the population.
2
Liakhvi Ravine - South Ossetian territory formerly inhabited by ethnic Georgians, is today
completely empty as a result of the ethnic cleaning carried out by the Russian occupants.
full of Georgian units. The military-political leadership was already telling its
own population that Tskhinvali was wholly occupied. In reality we controlled
only 30% of it. But I must add that our entering Tskhinvali was chaotic, both
interconnected and connected action being entirely lost. Simply the units could
not accomplish what was expected of them. Uncontrollable processes started
in the subdivisions and chaos and lack of organization were observed.
Subdivisions were so intermixed that the men could not understand who their
commander was and whose orders they had to obey. All was confusion!
It should be noted that there was much organization and sense of purpose
among the special troops of the Antiterrorist and 3rd Operative Departments of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs. One could see that they were given defined
tasks, knew which building had to be taken, which street controlled and so on.
But endless irresponsible PR by the authorities destroyed everything. It
was known to all that when the mobilization of the reserves was announced,
Ugulava, Gabashvili and Intskirveli3 were at the Gori base but Prime Minister
Lado Gurgenidze went to Vaziani where were assembled the reservists. This
was broadcast on television and half an hour after interviews with government
representatives, the Russian aviation massively bombed Vaziani and Gori
the districts of the mobilization of reservists.
I now particularly wish to dwell on Russias aggressive plan and strategy.
The Russian side had planned and studied the anticipated development of
events long before. Details of Russian aggression were determined and
thought out beforehand, but in such a way as not to give Russia the appearance
of being the aggressor. Their wish was to catch the Georgian side committing
an aggressive act. That is why the Russians set out to create an impression that
in the first stage of hostilities they had not intervened. The Georgian side was
only too pleased to take this view of matters. Russia needed the following
actions, carried out by the Georgian side for the implementation of its own
aggressive plans: firing by artillery and missiles on Tskhinvali at night, the
fact of the death of 12 Russian peacekeepers, the attack on Tskhinvali
allegedly followed by a large numbers of victims and so on. When everything
was done, a rapid reaction by the Russian army followed: they did their best
not to admit Georgian reservists into the district of hostilities. They did this by
means of aviation. From the moment the plot of the Russian military
leadership became obvious which was the acquisition of the complete
3
High ranking, but not-military officials of Mikheil Saakashvili's team who were incompetently
interfering in the working out of military plans and in decision-making.
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domination of Russian aviation in the air and the putting out of action airports
and runways, in order to prepare the ground for its own operative groupings.
Unfortunately, the Georgian military-political leadership could not
understand the character of the war. The underlying problem was that
politicians were leading the war and not the military.
As for the Ossetian side, the organization of the defense of Tskhinvali was
so clearly defined that it was soon made evident as to what purpose served the
appointment of Russian generals to different positions in Kokoity's
administration. All the buildings chosen as positions of resistance had already
been chosen. In addition, the Ossetian side had prepared resistance centers on
the roads along which Georgian units had to move. Therefore the statement
made by the parliamentary commission was correct: Georgian formations
occupied Tskhinvali by 2 p.m. having taken only 50 minutes to do so.
However, they left in 10 minutes offering no resistance.
The errors of the Georgian military leadership led to the tragedy of
Dubovaya Roshcha, a failure experienced in the middle of Tskhinvali due to
which Georgian troops had completely left their armaments by 3 a.m. Despite
this, the authorities were shamelessly cheating their own people for two days,
claiming that Tskhinvali was still controlled by Georgia.
Fighting operations were proceeding in the directions of Kvaisi, Perevi
and Znauri, but no particular military gains were achieved. A study of the
fighting actions of the Georgian formations reveals a certain regularity:
characteristics of attack demands were not observed such as rapid march non-
stop during day and night, accomplishment of decisive thrusts by means of the
complete straining of forces, maneuvering, breaking of positions of self-
defense and passing further.
Moreover, it is quite obscure for us why the cleaning of Ossetian villages
from military formations was entrusted to the 43rd battalion when at 4 a.m.
Russia had already made a statement on beginning military intervention in
Georgia. Proceeding from a vague fighting task, the 43rd battalion which had
practically had no opponent at the direction of attack, spent all its fighting
morale against a small reference position and used its physical military power
for the cleaning up of villages.
As for the morale-psychological state of the Georgian army, their ardent
aspiration was soon turned into complete embarrassment. In the night of 7th
August, the Ossetian armed formations were defined to them as their
opponents but they received no information until the afternoon of August 8 as
to what was happening in Tskhinvali and Gori. Members of the battalion
received information on the operative situation by telephone.
While soldiers of the 42nd battalion were running away from the
battlefield, the 41st battalion was occupying the defensive district on the height
to the north of Avnevi and controlling the Khetagurove-Dzara road; they were
periodically coming under the artillery fire of the opponents. They saw the
wounded soldiers of the 42nd battalion and their low psychological state was
passed on to them. Much gossip was spread concerning the number of dead
and the brigade was seized with hysteria, the men became oppressed and
uncontrollable. The connection between the battalions became disconnected.
Certainly, besides the failures there was selflessness on the part of the
soldiers and even some military success. For example, on August 8th Georgian
soldiers brought down 3 and damaged 3-4 Su-25 attack aircraft belonging to
Budyonovsks 368th Assault Aviation Regiment. After this the pilots of this
regiment refused to take part in another battle. The bringing down of Tu-22M3
strategic bomber of the 52nd Shaykovka Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment by
Georgian anti-aircraft gunners was considered as a catastrophe in Russia.
Georgian soldiers displayed courageous fighting during the confrontation with
General Xrulov's column and the General Xrulov was wounded.
But the fighting morale of Georgian soldiers could not overcome the fatal
errors of the Georgian military-political leadership and these same fatal errors
have obviously much in common with crime.
Defeat on the approaches to Tskhinvali and attempts to rectify their
consequences caused one more serious error. The Senaki second brigade
appeared in the conflict zone. One can only suppose this was not previously
planned for Samachablo. Perhaps their aim was to control the West. It is
unknown to us how by that time the Georgian military-political leadership
realized the possibility of opening up a second front from Abkhazia. We
believe that this brigade was left there precisely for this.
But by aggravating the situation plans were changed. Defense of the West
was entrusted to subdivisions of Samegrelo MIA. As it became clear later, it
was one more fatal error. Due to this same error Western Georgia appeared to
be completely at the mercy of Russian aggression.
The Georgian authorities continued their disinformation. For example,
David Bakradze stated at 3.57 p.m.: Georgian military troops are retaining
and controlling all strategic positions in the Tskhinvali region. In addition they
control the Roki and Java routes. It is unexplainable who the Chairman of
Parliament meant when referring to the controllers of Roki tunnel, when the
Kvaisi group had long before moved to the districts of Oni and Ambrolauri
and to Oni itself and their villages were being bombarded by Russian aviation.
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The fate of the peaceful population in the areas experiencing active

fighting is a separate issue. It has been confirmed that when government
representatives - Ugulava, Lomaia and Gabashvili were announcing that
Tskhinvali was controlled by the armed forces of Georgia, the population of
the Liakhvi Gorge saw with their own eyes that the 4th brigade had completely
left the west part of Tskhinvali. The population of Didi Liakhvi knew that
Dimitri Sanakoevs SWAT was the first to leave the Gorge. It was followed by
Georgian peacekeepers and policemen. Left to their own fate, the inhabitants
of Didi Liakhvi Gorge were to leave the fighting area assisted by soldiers of a
Chechen unit which was part of the Russian peacekeeping forces. By the
morning of August 9th the Liakhvi Gorge was almost empty. The only
remaining people being the elderly.
Certainly, the Georgian army obtained some local success and inflicted
serious material damage to the opponent. For example, according to
information of Russian sources, at the initial stage only 5 of their 17 tanks
escaped damage, 40 transport units required repairs to their vehicles and the
first Russian column was actually destroyed by fire, etc. These successes,
however, could neither change the fate of the war, nor the moral-psychological
state of the individual soldiers, as serious errors made by the military-political
leadership at the beginning of military operations did not allow the Georgian
fighters the chance to bring local successes to the desired end.
The result was not long in coming: the state of the Georgian military
leadership became absolutely hopeless after the opponent brought and
deployed military columns on the road to Gori. By this time, the Georgian
authorities had already lost any perception of reality and all ability of analysis.
Meanwhile Russian aviation occupied the air space; they bombed several
times the military bases of Senaki and Khoni, four times Vaziani military base,
twice Marneuli airport and once that of Kopitnari airport. They bombed the
towns: Gori and Kareli, Oni village - Tsedizi, a village of upper Abkhazia -
Chkhalta, Kodori and the mountain Makhata. Later, the Poti port was also
bombed.
The activity of Russian aviation was followed by the opening of a second
front: 4 Russian military ships and 4000 Russian soldiers entered Ochamchire.
The hopelessness of the situation became clear even to Saakashvili. At 5
p.m. he announced: The Georgian side is ready to cease fire and withdraw
troops from the conflict zone. Georgia is ready to start talks with Russia on a
ceasefire and on a cession of hostilities. Despite this statement, the opponent
did not consider halting the attacks. They were already moving from
Tskhinvali to Gori and the front line was passing to the west along the river
Liakhvi, and to the east towards Eredvi and Arbo.
When I think how that tragic war proceeded, I wish to point out that the
battles mentioned which continued for two days, did not reflect the training
and thorough preparation by our army by American professionals. The
inability to fight appeared to be of a purely psychological character and this
was caused by the fact that the Military Staff could not comprehend from the
very first minutes the specific character of the war. Had the soldiers been
psychologically prepared by the military-political leadership, they would have
been able to inflict more damage to the opponent, even by the anti-aircraft
means being at their disposal and despite Russian air domination.
However the Georgian army had some advantages. By means of drones,
Georgian soldiers could daily observe the area of hostilities on an online
program to discover the whereabouts of enemy artillery and aviation in order
to destroy them. The Georgian army was superior to that of Russia in terms of
discipline and order. Unfortunately, serving in Iraq left an imprint on the
fighting knowledge of the Georgian armed forces. In Iraq training, preparation
and mastering of military knowledge were oriented to patrolling. Such training
as battalion at attack, battalion in defense were not conducted. The army
was being prepared only for patrol and not for the defense of the Motherland.
As events showed us, the problems existing in the Georgian army, were more
serious than anybody could have imagined.
The mistakes made in military construction appeared suddenly.
Unfortunately a lack of patriotism was also felt. Legends composed by
politicians during the past four years regarding the strength of the Georgian
army appeared to be a myth and expenses spent on military construction
untargeted.
We lost the war, and left behind the bodies of dead comrades, wounded
soldiers, fighting armament and equipment, our own respect and dignity on the
battlefield. Later the opponent left this shameful inscription on the wall of
their artillery base: Comrade Georgians, learn warfare, we will come and
inspect you...
Everybody, whose heart beats for the Motherland, must remember these
words: we must learn by our mistakes and the mania of dilettantism should be
stopped in Georgia once and for all, especially that of political and military
immaturity which is equal to betrayal. We really must start socio-economic,
political and military building of our country as the 5 day August War left
more problems than we had before and, as the subsequent events showed that
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only the Georgian people with their inexhaustible energy, true love of the
Motherland and enormous diligence can resolve these problems.
I will finish my article with the words of the famous Georgian writer
Chabua Amirejibi: Be smart Georgians and protect Georgia!
Chapter 6
THE GEORGIAN-OSSETIAN POPULATION

LIVING IN THE CONFLICT ZONE BEFORE
AND AFTER THE 2008 WAR (ACCORDING TO
ETHNOGRAPHIC MATERIALS)
Medea Burduli
The study of Georgian-Ossetian relations, both by Georgian and by
Ossetian historians and ethnologists, has a long history. There are differences
of opinion, not only between their historians but also among Georgian
scholars, on the date of the arrival and settling of Ossetians in Georgia.
Consequently much research has been carried out on this issue. I wish to
attract your attention to the basic problems which have taken place in Inner
Kartli, the so called South Ossetia, since the 1990s, seen through the eyes of
ethnologists.
Although the war between Russia and Georgia did not occur until 2008,
we should take into account the ambitious intentions regarding the unification
of the Two Ossetias. Otherwise, it would be a simplification and a one-sided
view of the issue. It is known that Ossetian politicians have been demanding
the formation of an independent state of Ossetia in Georgia since the 1990s. A
certain section of Ossetians supported this idea from the start.
It is known that representatives of different ethnic groups have been living
in Georgia throughout its history. Relations between nations, national policy
and national integration in multi-ethnic countries define the conditions of the
national minorities and generally that of the stability of the country. Georgians
78 Medea Burduli
had always been proud of their tolerant nature and not without grounds, as
there had never been any ethnic confrontation in the history of Georgia.
However, after the unification of Georgia with Russia the relationship between
ethnic groups in our country, including with Ossetians, began to deteriorate.
First the Russian empire and then the Bolshevic authorities tried to and
achieved estrangement of a certain section of Ossetians from Georgians.
The granting by the Soviet leadership of the status of Autonomous Region
on the territory of Georgia gave rise to new Ossetian ambitions. Executives of
the autonomic region assisted in the strengthening of the Russian language at
the expense of the Georgian. In their schools the state language of Georgia,
recognized by its constitution, was no longer taught. When speaking about
Georgian-Ossetian relations the following factor should be borne in mind.
Scholars, when studying the reason for an ethnic conflict, believe the cause to
be ethno-territorial, as if a whole ethnic group claims the right to govern the
territory on which it resides. However, territorial claims never emerge in a
whole ethnic group or in its majority. The demands are usually made by the
political elite, political parties, their leaders, intellectuals, etc. [1]. Thus putting
forward territorial claims in the name of an ethnic group does not mean that
the whole ethnic group shares solidarity with such demands.
The opinion of the majority of Ksani Ravine Ossetians at the beginning of
the conflict in the 1990s is a good example, as they showed little enthusiasm
until the radical part of the National Movement of Ossetia contrived to drag
the majority of the population into ethno-conflict. Though the inhabitants of
the Ksani Ravine did not fight with weapons against Georgians, the majority
did not even welcome what was happening. However their attitude is now
changing.
It is important to become acquainted with the works of Ossetian
historians, how they admonish their own people, take retaliatory measures and
oppose the truth to their fictional account. It should be noted that in the
inciting of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, the lions share belongs to such un-
conscientious Ossetian historians who distort historical facts, create
scholarly works in which they write that the original area of the Ossetian
settlement was Inner Kartli, a historic-ethnographic region of Georgia, that
South Ossetia and this territory existed together even at the time of Vakhtang
Gorgasali and then Georgian Kings and feudal lords appropriated it.
An Ossetian historian, Naphi Jusoiti, goes so far as to declare, without any
historical evidence, that 5000 years ago Ossetians lived in Georgia and that for
Mark Bliev the Kingdom of Kartli (Iberia) of the Middle Ages was no more,
no less aGeorgian-Ossetian confederation [2]. Naturally our northern neighbor
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The Georgian-Ossetian Population Living in the Conflict Zone 79
assists Ossetian historians in the appropriation of other lands and such

ambitions, an excellent example of which are statements made in the Russian
Duma and by high-ranking officials in 2004. According to these persons,
Russia affiliated North and South Ossetia in 1774 and that South Ossetia was
never part of the Georgian state.
It is known world-wide that the policy and crisis of the totalitarian regime
of the Soviet Union at the end of the 20th century aggravated relations
between peoples living in a united brotherhood and stimulated separatism.
Centers of conflicts appeared. It is known that such centers mainly occurred,
and still occur, on state borders where representatives of non-dominant ethnic
groups live compactly and separatism easily emerges.
Georgian frontiers are sensitive to this failure and separatist hot spots
appeared in Georgia, with the assistance of inner and outer enemies. During
the last two decades Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian con-
frontation has taken place, both of which were inspired from outside the
country. The situation became more complicated after the August 2008War
when Russia acknowledged these two regions as independent states.
Unfortunately the Georgian state could not avoid this pernicious war, after
which lost territories and the number of people transformed into refugees in
their own country became larger. Family members and relatives now live on
different sides of a barbed wire border, that being one result of the August
2008War.
As I have already mentioned, I was an eye-witness of processes
proceeding in South Ossetia from the 1990s, as I am from the Akhalgori
district.1 Simultaneously I am working on the topic The Occupied District of
Akhalgori and the Dynamics of Georgian-Ossetian Relations with a group of
scholars - N. Jalabadze, L. Janiashvili and L. Mghebrishvili - under a Rustaveli
Grant. We have found quite important ethnographic material which will make
it possible to present our ideas. The importance of such material to explain
historical events is well known.
The famous geographer, Vakhushti Batonishvili, already in the 18th
century indicated the importance of ethnographic material for a better
explanation of historical processes. Evaluations by the great Georgian thinker,
Ilia Chavchavadze, and eminent historian, Ivane Javakhishvili, are also well
known. We will discuss this issue on the grounds of ethnographic material
alone.
1
The district becoming an autonomic unit of South Ossetia where 80% of the population was
Georgian and after the 2008 August War is nearly deserted by its inhabitants.
80 Medea Burduli
Let us conduct a short historical review for a more realistic presentation of

this topic.
Vakhushti Batonishvili wrote the reasons for the settlement of Ossetians in
Georgian houses and villages: In those places where we drew up an
inventory, first Georgian peasants had lived, but then their landlords brought
there Ossetians. The Georgians went to the valley, as there were few people
because of enemies [3].
Ethnograph G. Chikovani writes about the arrival of Ossetians in Imereti:
"The territory of the sources of the River Kvirila was abandoned by the
Georgians at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century
and its landlord, Abashidze, did not receive any income from it. To
compensate for this lack Abashidze brought Ossetians to the territory. At this
stage Ossetians were considered to be refugees... Ossetians founded four
villages at the time" [4].
Among the materials of the ethnographic expedition in the Ksani Ravine
in 1938, a well-known ethnographer, academician G. Chitaia, wrote that the
process of ethnic regrouping from the mountains to the valley was still
continuing, giving the following as examples: from the village of Zhamuri to
Akhalgor; from Akhalgori to Kanda; from Lomisi to Iphnevi (Khalibegoani)
and from Iphnevi to Tskhinvali and so on and this indicates that the process
should be carefully evaluated during the investigation, as in the results of such
processes, mixed ethnographic complexes are formed [5].
This dangerous tendency of Georgians leaving their dwellingswas
demonstrated even more clearly by the events which developed after the 2008
War. In my opinion the quite thoughtless action of our government of
selecting the Akhalgori district where no hostile acts were taking place to
create a new compact settlement for the population could have negative
results. Nowadays in the Ksani Ravine, in the Akhalgori district, where at
every stage in history Georgians formed the majority of the population, only a
small number are left. There are many reasons for this: during the past few
years the Public Registration Office was closed, so after a parent's death, his
children could not register their home which made many inhabitants feel
insecure. Neither the Georgian state nor the Ossetian government recognize
the population's rights and permanently hinder their coming into Akhalgori
and today it is almost impossible to obtain them; form N9 is simply not given.
Living conditions have become harder for Georgians; mainly the older
generation remains excluding teachers and doctors. Nowadays even those
people registered in Akhalgori/Leningori but do not permanently live there, or
as the authorities note work in Georgia and can enter Akhalgori only on
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holidays, are not given new certificates. The departure of the ravine by the
Georgians of course alters the ethnic picture. I must emphasize that I
concentrate my attention on Akhalgori because no Georgians are left in other
districts.
I should also point out on the infringement of their rights by people having
an inheritance in Akhalgori or by inhabitants who were registered in Tbilisi by
the Georgian government. Naturally, all conditions of every person living in
Georgia despite his/her ethnic origin or religious beliefs should be assured but
among these people should of course be included Georgians of South Ossetia
who have been trying in vain to obtain rights similar to those of the Ossetians.
It is unfortunate that the mood of even Georgian refugees has changed.
Not all of them dream of returning to their old homes. If we group our
respondents according to age, we will see the following picture: among the
generation of grandparents all would return if possible, from that of parents a
little more than half would return as permanent inhabitants and from young
people very few. Such a mood does not really allow for an optimistic
prognosis.
I have already mentioned how the establishment of Ossetians on the
former settlements of Georgians occurred. Now using the example of one
village, I will show you this process which in fact I well remember. According
to my materials, even after the formation of the Akhalgori district and before
the 1940s and 50s, the village of Akhmaji was in the Dusheti District. This
was confirmed by Chitaia in his records resulting from his 1935 expedition.
He wrote that the village of Akhmaji/Akhmaja, along with Odzisi, belonged to
the Dusheti district [6].
The history of this village is a typical example of how a purely Georgian
village became one with a mixed population. Akhmaji was a little Georgian
village with 45-50 families before the 1950s and 60s. Here livedthe
Macharashvilis, the Berianidzes, the Khutsishvilis, the Butkhuzis, the
Burdulis, the Kobouris, the Kobadzes, the Shiukashvilis, the Chaboshvilis, the
Gagishvilis, the Toroshvilis (Georgianized), one family of the Gunashvilis and
one family of the Lichelis. The planned settlement of Ossetians in Akhmaja
began in the decade 1950-60, from the mountainous Ossetian villages of
Orkhevi, Bedoiani, Khubaani and Gochiani. Those who migrated were the
Gutsaevs, the Kadzilovs, the Tuaevs, the Bedoevs, the Muzaevs and the
Khubaevs. As a result of their migration, a large part of the Georgian
population left Akhmaji. Naturally the question arises, why? One reason was
because of a lack of building sites, so the Georgians could not provide separate
housing for newly married couples. Certainly there was dissatisfaction
82 Medea Burduli
between emigrants and permanent inhabitants, as people of an alien ethnos

were settling in Georgian houses. We must note here that repeated measures
were enforced such as if anyone had over a quarter more than their allocated
share of the land, it was handed over to a migrant. Large areas of the deserted
territory of Ossetian villages were used for sawmills of collective farms.
Gradually, the dissatisfaction and obstacles were changed into neighborly
relations and from the 1980s began the formation of Georgian-Ossetian
families. It seemed at first glance as if everything was returning to normal.
However after the collapse of the Soviet Union everything changed.
Fortunately only two to three men shared the ideas of separatists in the whole
Ksani Gorge and in the village of Akhmaja. After the separation of Akhalgori
district from the Autonomous Region, the families of two of these separatists
left the village and moved to Alania. They sold their housesbut after 2008
returned to their homes free of charge. Their owners do not have the
possibility to enter Akhalgori today. As we know, Akhalgori district was
separated from the so called South Ossetia and was submitted to Mtskheta-
Mtianeti administration in the 1990s, before the establishment of the
provisional administration of Sanakoev.
Despite the results of the war of 2008 and the fact that they can get into
their homes only with the permission of others, the Georgian director of the
Akhalgori kindergarten could not help hiding his surprise when we asked for
data on the nationality of the children. Both Ossetians and Georgians left
Akhalgori. I really do not know how many Ossetian and how many Georgian
children are in the kindergarten. I have never thought about it. We have 475
children. Children from the Tsilkani settlement of refugees attend our
kindergarten. The kindergarten is also functioning in Phrezeti.
It is worth noting that Georgians and Ossetians continue to create families.
The local population of Akhalgori, both Georgian and Ossetian, still apply to
Tbilisi for medical aid and the permanent regime also assists. Economically
the district was connected to the markets of Tbilisi until last year, for example
selling fruit and vegetables or bringing necessary products from Tbilisi but
nowadays this cannot be done. Some products, such as flour, formerly brought
from Tskhinvali to Akhalgori has been replaced by cheap Russian flour.
Russian bases were built in Akhalgori as well as in Akhmaja. The manpower
for construction came from the North Caucasus at the end of 2012 and moved
from Akhalgori to Tskhinvali. The Russian military men have brought their
families and comfortable houses have been built for them. Their children
attend the Akhalgori Russian School.
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The population of the Ksani Ravine has been lodged in purpose built
houses in various places and the ravine is now deserted. Since 2009 the
building of a Russian military base has started. Neither Ossetians nor
Georgians have been allowed to work there; it is mainly the North Caucasian
population from Chechnya and Dagestan, etc. who work here. During the
construction of the base, the Russian manpower bought from Tbilisi different
kinds of agricultural products and drinks and even products to start a business.
Bargaining is mainly conducted in the Georgian Lari. From an economic point
of view this situation was profitable for the population remaining in the Ksani
Ravine. Today it has changed and movement between Akhalgori and Tbilisi
has become more difficult.
We will present one more concrete example. The village of Akhmaja is by
the border in the so called buffer zone adjoining the territory occupied by
Russia. Russian has built a military base there, the construction work having
started in 2009. It should be noted that the work was interrupted several times,
the reason given being the lack of qualification of the builders. Maybe there
were other reasons. It could be that when they were starting to build the base
and were walking with the maps of the region and revising borders, they could
not even find Akhmaja on the map. Your village is not on this map, you
should not live here, they said. In their opinion the village appeared later, but
as I mentioned, Akhmaja belonged to Dusheti district up to the 1950s and the
border of the region was two kilometers to the north on Tadiantkhevi Mount.
Note that on the latter, Georgian soldiers were standing from August to the end
of October 2008.
In my opinion, as the Georgian government failed to protest against the
building of a military base in the Dusheti district, then the construction
continued rapidly and was completed by the spring of 2012and living in the
village become unbearable. The Tbilisi entrance to the village was finally
blocked by the end of the same year. Since then the connection with the rest of
Georgia became impossible without going via Akhalgori, thus lengthening the
route by 20 km. Complicated procedures for obtaining form N 92 were added,
resulting in the majority of the population of Akhmaja and Akhalgori being
left without this certificate and consequently losing the right of entering their
paternal home.
Since the spring of 2014 new certificates have been given on the grounds
of form N9 but for inexplicable reasons, some of the owners of the new
2
Here the pass is meant, controlled by local puppets of the authorities, without which neither
Georgians, nor Ossetians are permitted to move.
84 Medea Burduli
certificate found themselves blacklisted, the reason of which nobody knows

nor is interested, with the result that the number of people having the right of
movement has decreased by nearly half. For example, about ten inhabitants of
Akhmaja have received such certificates but prior to August 2008, eighty
families lived in their own homes.
The general dynamics of the regime of occupation can be viewed thus:
from August 2008 until the spring of 2009 when entering Akhalgori was
possible only with a Georgian Identity Card; from the second half of 2009 a
Russian translation of an ID card needed to be certified by a notary; from 2010
a Russian translation of a warranted certificate of personal property was also
required; in 2012 the Akhalgori administrative border was closed several times
for various reasons and from autumn of the same years nobody was admitted
without a so called form N9; from 2014 the number of inhabitants having
the right to enter Akhalgori was further restricted.
Now only five schools function owing to the small number of school age
children in Akhalgori district; for example, according to data of 2012, there
were only seven pupils but nine teachers in a nine grade school. Today the
childrens number has decreased to five. It should be noted that Ksani Ravine
has the privilege in the Republic of South Ossetia that some of its inhabitants
can still move to their old dwelling but nobody knows how long this will last
and the inhabitants are in a constant state of stress.
I wish to draw your attention to another dangerous tendency which was
revealed in the last presidential elections. If in local government elections
inhabitants were less involved, this cannot be said about the presidential
elections. Those registered in the Akhalgori region were forced to obtain
certificates and participate in elections. The majority fixed its choice during
the pre-election period. Problems and promises expressed by the population at
meetings had to be taken into account. The first demand of the population,
both Georgian and Ossetian, was free and unlimited movement within
Georgia. They received promises from the presidency candidates but these
pre-election promises remain unfulfilled.
Georgian-Ossetian good neighborly relations face a severe test in
Akhalgori district. I believe this arose because the majority of inhabitants were
Georgians and anti-Georgian propaganda acted less on local Ossetians. Six
years have passed since the Ksani Ravine was abandoned by Georgians and
Ossetians, excluding those Ossetians who welcomed the events which
occurred. Today a large number of Ossetians has returned to Akhalgori and
naturally their homes are still in the Mukhrani Valley. However we cannot say
the same about the Georgian population. As to the question why they do not
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return, the answer would be: Human rights do not exist for us there: relatives
would not come to our celebrations or to console us in our misfortunes, so
such a return would be senseless. We think this argument is worth taking into
account.
We also wish to point out here that the numerous mixed families have led
to a positive effect on Georgian-Ossetian relations and continue to do so.
There has not been any kind of confrontation between Ossetians and
Georgians as yet. However there were cases of theft and burglary by Ossetians
from Tskhinvali and Java during the first months of the conflict.
Ossetian historians suppose that the time for gathering stones has now
come. A certain Robert Kulumberov admonishes Ossetians in his article with
this title. In his opinion, Ossetians are easily assimilated. Thanks to this
characteristic, Georgians made them assimilate and the propensity of
Ossetians for assimilation with other peoples should be stopped and the
reverse process begun. Ossetia has been allotted its territories, the best
example of which was the transfer of the Larsi Ravine to Georgia in 1997 on
the Russian-Georgian border that there was a South Caucasian center of
Alans on the territory of present day Gori in the 16th century, the borders of
which extended to Mtskheta and so forth. And that the return of national
territories is an important moment in national ideology. The author remarks
that though it requires prolonged work we should remember that part of our
Motherland is still outside our borders and we should think of its return. A
toast should be heard in every family that we will drink Truso Ravine water in
the coming year or we will pray in Tarangelo chapel. There is nothing
unrealistic in all this. Not much time has passed since we did not believe we
would acquire absolute victory in the fight for independence and an
acknowledged republic. Thanks to our selfless struggle, now we have
acknowledgment not only by Russia, but also by Nicaragua, Venezuella and
Nauru and this is only part of our revival of the Great Alania. The time has
come to gather stones and let it happen in the next decades. Simply talking
about it is what is required at present [7].
Thus according to ethnographic material, in Ksani Ravine where
Georgians still live the Russian-Ossetian authorities establish a regime so strict
that their stay there will become unbearable. The first euphoria of the
Ossetians has passed, the visiting of relatives and their children and having
contact with Georgia has become complicated for them too because owing to
the August 2008 War, members of families were left on different sides of the
border which is now of barbed wire.
86 Medea Burduli
On the level of everyday life, nearly nothing has changed in the relations
between Georgians and Ossetians; neighborly relations still exist; mixed
marriages continue to take place. On the question of the relations between
those Ossetians and Georgians who stayed in Akhalgori, some Ossetian
respondents in Akhalgori answer hopefully that they know well that this
situation is temporary and that it will not be always such, so they dont cut
the branch on which they sit.
REFERENCES
[1] L. Melikishvili. Anthropology of Conflict (ethnic aspects), Tbilisi, 2006,
pp. 83-84.
[2] . , - ,
, 2000. . 48-49; R. Topchishvili, When Ossetians settled in
Georgia, Journal Istoriani, 2012, N 3 (15).
[3] Vakhushti Bagrationi, Description of the Kingdom of Georgia, Tbilisi,
1973, pp. 363-364.
[4] G. Chikovani, The acts of purchase and sale from the family archives of
Ossetians in Upper Imereti. See coll. Historic-ethnographic
researches, Tbilisi 2004, pp. 230-231.
[5] G. Chitaia, Ethnographic expedition in Ksani Ravine in 1938 (brief
report), Works, V. II, 2001, pp. 391-399.
[6] Ibid. pp. 391-398.
[7] , , ,
N41-42, 571-572, 2011 ).
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Chapter 7
THE LEGEND IS STILL FRESH BUT

HARD TO BELIEVE
Alexander Daushvili
In 2010, the publishing house of Ilia State University, distinguished for its
loyalty to the authorities of the day, printed in the Georgian language the book
of an eminent political scientist and diplomat, Ronald Asmus, entitled A
Little War that Shook the World.
There are many significant considerations and conclusions in the work,
but it also contains many unacceptable, wrong and patently exaggerated
opinions. We suppose that polemics with the author would create an objective
picture for readers on the tragic events of 2008, which happened in Georgia.
Let us begin with the fact that this book is dedicated to the War of August
2008 a very important and especially dramatic event for us Georgians. It was
written quite fast, translated and published with very high polygraphic
standards that indicate not only personal interest, but also the good
organizational qualities of its sponsors. The editor of the Georgian version of
the book is Mr. David Darchiashvili (a recognized face of Saakashvilis
political unit the National Movement, the former head of the local Soros
Fund - Open society Georgia, today a member of the Georgian parliament
etc. In other words, one of the ideologists of the party).
In our opinion, all of this indicates that the author of the work was a
distinguished and valuable person in M. Saakashvili government, which would
have created exclusive working conditions for him, provided him with their
own memoires and paid generous fees.
How long did it take him to write this work? If we believe the author, it
was written in less than a year after the war [1].
If we take into account that the translation of the work, its edition, the
preparation of its electronic version and printing required a certain amount of
time, we can suppose that the book was written very fast, (i.e., it was
necessary for somebody, who was in such a haste, that the respected diplomat
worked hard to present his notable and rather broad investigation on what
shook the world, to Georgian society in the maximum amount of time).
Now, let us return to the book under review. Georgian historiography has
already responded to this very dramatic theme with some monographs and
numerous scholarly articles and letters in the press. Of course, everything is
before us, the study of this phenomenon is just beginning, arguments are being
put forward, the seeking of facts and the collection of memoire material are all
underway. A certain passivity of professional historians on this issue can be
understood: very little time has passed since the events of the War of August
2008, new materials have to be sought, numerous facts to be collected,
mutually exclusive considerations of political statements to be screened and
summed up in order that the work of objectively thinking historians would not
bear the character of exaggeration and conjecture.
Let us start with the listing of the positive aspects of work:
1. The main merit of the work is its author, an experienced diplomat, a

political scientist, a political figure deeply versed in foreign-policy
processes, who has a perfect knowledge both of the US State
Department, and of the moods, interests and aspirations of the
European and Russian authorities.
It should be noted that the most significant foreign policy documents are
available for him: UN and EU resolutions and decisions, English-language
sources, materials reflecting personal relations of well-known statesmen,
memoirs, and especially memoir materials on the diplomatic activity of
Georgian political figures.
A knowledge of the Georgian language sources and the ability of their
application in work is a separate issue, but we will discuss this later.
Ideas of such a high professional level are undoubtedly and will be of
great importance for Georgian historians in the future, who will use and even
criticize some reported investigations.
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The Legend Is Still Fresh but Hard to Believe 89
We would especially like to highlight those positive passages of the work

which are particularly interesting the Kosovo precedent and the Bucharest
summit.
2. The Kosovo precedent is a most significant theme and we will dwell

on it especially.
I would like to start with the fact that the former Yugoslavia resembles
Georgia in its historic fate: a strong and united Orthodox country in the past,
formed by the South Slavs, was destroyed due to aggressive and stronger
neighbors, was not able to resist religious expansion and disintegrated into
Catholic, Muslim and Orthodox regions. The Austrian empire had annexed its
western provinces and strengthened the cultural influence of the Catholic
religion and Turkey spread its religion, but a large part of the country was left
Orthodox and united around Serbia.
The historical battle on Kosovo field - in Prishtina in 1389 - when the
Serbian patriot, Milosh Obilich, killed the Sultan of Turkey, Murad, is of great
importance for all Serbs and South Slavs. This area was a district of the
Serbian state, but as is well known in history, as a result of its being a part of
Turkey, its own territories were vulnerable free and unrestricted migration was
always encouraged by the metropolis, or worse the far aimed plans of
suzerainty. Moslem Albanians were resettled here just as Armenians,
Estonians and Germans etc. were resettled in Georgia by Russians.
During the government of Josip Broz Tito, when Yugoslavia was an
atheistic and totalitarian state, religious differences were not of great
importance. As soon as the totalitarian regime was overthrown, and the nations
recollected their religion and the customs of their ancestors, here, as in the
Soviet Union, republics and autonomic units started an internecine battle for
territories, a restoration of sovereignty and so on. The situation in this so
called promised land for Soviet citizens became so strained that the UN and
EU decided to intervene into its domestic affairs. The confrontation was
especially dramatic in Kosovo. Albanians wanted to join their historical
motherland Albania, while Serbia was trying to retain its territorial integrity
and could not cede its historical land. But Serbs made up only 30 percent of
the population in Kosovo.
In spring, 2008 the question of the acknowledgment of the independence
of Kosovo arose and it was positively resolved by unanimous agreement upon
the action to be taken by the US and EU countries. As they asserted - all other
means of conflict settlement were over. This acknowledgment of Kosovo
happened against a background of ignoring the sharply negative attitude and

several diplomatic demarches of the Russian Federation.
The author of the book we discuss is well acquainted with nearly all the
material concerning the question, which is presented in full and it is of great
importance for Georgian historians in their future research work. The time will
come, when Georgian historians will study in detail the processes taking place
in Kosovo and comprehend what role this decision played in the historical fate
of Georgia.
In accordance with the authors assertion: In the spring of 2008, Western
diplomacy in recognizing Kosovo... inadvertently contributed to the summers
slide to war in Georgia [2].
The author strengthens this idea even more when he says: Recognizing
Kosovos independence was the first Western policy step that helped trigger a
Russian backlash against Georgia and accelerated the path toward war [3].
It is a serious statement and many people think so, but I would put the
question - why did not the acknowledgment of Kosovo assist the aggravation
of processes in mountainous Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Transnistria (Moldova)
or in other separatist regions of the world?
The answer is this - in Karabakh and Transnistria, as well as in Georgia,
the Russian factor was the main and determinant one, as well as the degree of
Russian-Azerbaijan and Russian-Moldovan relations. Russia, which secretly
supports Armenians in Azerbaijan and Transnistrians in Moldova in these
conflicts, does not yet dare to patently oppose the leaders of these states, and
local separatists could not or did not use the Kosovo precedent as an excuse.
We would like to remark that the author, in our opinion, is superfluously
strict towards the West.
It is impossible not to agree with the author that ... Kosovo remained a
cause clbre for Russian nationaliststhe penultimate symbol of Russias
impotence under Yeltsin vis--vis the West.
The author feels that the authors reasoning is not wholly stable in this
context and remarks: The similarities and differences between Serbias
conflict over Kosovo and Georgias conflict over Abkhazia still ignite
passionate debate. It is a timely and necessary inclusion, because to accuse
the West in the tragedy of Georgia in August 2008 only because it, the West,
after a decade of observation, diplomatic analysis and non-effective realization
of various political decisions, adhering completely to all diplomatic laws and
only when other methods could not discharge the conflict in Kosovo, decided
to acknowledge the independence of this enclave, is simply unjust.
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But we will repeat it again the Kosovo precedent did not stimulate the
strengthening of separatist tendencies and onset of conflict, neither in these
post-soviet countries we mentioned, nor in the separatist regions of Europe and
Asia: for example the Basque Country and Catalonia (Spain), Wales and
Scotland (Great Britain), Corsica (France), Quebec (Canada) and so forth.
Thus, the shoe pinches in Georgian-Russian relations and not in
Kosovo to which we will later refer).
3. A diplomatic single combat proceeding during the Bucharest summit

is completely and objectively studied in the work under review. The
Bucharest summit was very important for Georgia, as it and Ukraine
were hoping be granted MAP there.
At the initial stage of fighting for the restoration of the independence of

Georgia, one comparatively young wing of the National Movement
(I. Tsereteli and his group) demanded the joining of Georgia to the military-
political organization, NATO, from the end of the 1980s).
The reason behind this idea is easily guessed - defending Georgia from
possible Russian aggression, was wholly Utopian then, but with time it was
acquiring real contours. Already in the period of E. Shevardnadze's rule in
Georgia (1992-2003), the relation of Georgia with NATO and its participation
in its different programs became real and systematic.
After the Rose Revolution, the political grouping of M. Saakashvili
declared NATO membership as an end in itself and tried to achieve this aim
by every means. It must be underscored, that the great majority of the
Georgian population was in sympathy with this idea.
Political leaders of the EU and NATO also strengthened Georgian hopes
of NATO membership.
The author of the book under review pays great attention to the peripetia
of the aspiration of Georgia towards NATO. The respected author, who is
closely related to the governing structures of NATO and himself was actively
taking part in the realization of a number of NATO projects, tells us in detail
and objectively from the inside of questions regarding NATO expansion to the
East since 1999, when the question of NATO membership was decided of
countries of the former Warsaw block - Poland, the Czech republic and
Hungary. The admission of the author, that these countries were far less
prepared than had been expected, is fair [5].
But those countries were accepted.
If we consider the historical experience of NATO, neither was Turkey a

model country of democracy in the 1950s, nor did it meet the standard
requirements of NATO, but the policy of the cold war, the proximity of
Turkey to the Soviet Union of Stalin and the existence of territorial claims
from the Soviet Union, made the NATO leadership readily take the decision of
accepting Turkey into NATO.
But this had been in the past, in the distant past. And in 2008 the Soviet
Union no longer existed, the danger had lessened, Russia was not the Soviet
Union, and nor was Vladimir Putin, Josef Stalin.
But nevertheless, the Russia of 2008 was not similar to the Russia of the
Yeltsin period in 1999, when it was economically weakened and morally
broken. Vladimir Putin managed to stop the dismemberment of Russia, to
improve the military economy, to strengthen the military infrastructure and to
consolidate the Russian population on the note of nationalism by means of
petrodollars. Russia was different by that period and it demanded that its
geostrategic interests be taken into account.
After the Rose Revolution, M. Saakashvilis government declared his
political orientation to the West, that is at the level of phraseology, as an end
in itself and thus opposed the balanced traditional policy. Well-known western
politicians were in sympathy with this striving. For example Xavier Solana
announced in January 2004: Georgian membership in NATO is a reality.
About ten years have passed since these words, and this possibility has not as
yet been realized, i.e., Mr. Solana obviously was either deliberately making a
false statement or was unable to grasp the reality.
Georgian newspapers encouraged the population with headlines: In the
nearest future Georgia could be accepted as a full and equal member of a so
called extended Europe, In a week Georgia will become a candidate-
member of NATO!, Membership of Georgia in NATO is taking place in
Istanbul, Georgia becomes a candidate for membership in NATO,
and so on [7].
Of course, there were no real grounds for such optimism, but the Georgian
government was intensifying its propaganda to a greater and greater extent on
being accepted for NATO membership, whereas it was more and more moving
away from the chance through its own anti-democratic actions.
The author correctly understood this attempt of the Georgian government,
when he notes: But while Georgia and Ukraine might have talked about
joining NATO, such discussions were largely seen as pro forma. Their
candidacies were not taken seriously given the lack of democracy and reform
at home [8].
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This point of view somehow changed after the Rose Revolution, when M.
Saakashvili was announced to be a beacon of democracy and, what he was
doing mainly, if not everything, was acceptable for the US and Europe - at
least outwardly.
The author objectively shows the coulisses1 of NATO and concludes
justly in his work: it was really a debate about the future of NATO
enlargement and the Alliance in general, as well as about relations with
Russia.
The author fairly convincingly shows the fear of the leaders of the NATO
member states: They were unsure if it (NATO membership of Ukraine and
Georgia) served their national interest and feared it was a bridge too distant for
NATO, and above all they were worried about being pulled into a new conflict
with Russia over Georgia. When they said that Ukraine or Georgia were not
ready, they were also saying that they were not ready either [9].
In our opinion this is a strict, but objective statement; the author again
emphasizes the West, that they were not ready either and were not able to
take responsibilities. They cannot be blamed for this. Here we are dealing not
with unhappy Yugoslavia, standing on the verge of disintegration and its
leader, Miloshevich, but with Vladimir Putin, the bloody suppressor of the
national-freedom movement of Chechnya and the staunch fighter against the
supposed dismemberment of Russia, equipped with nuclear weapons and
enriched by petro-dollars. That is why the cautious policy of the West is fully
understandable for serious western experts and, in this case, the author seems
superfluously strict.
The political reality of the world at the beginning of the XXI century and
especially in 2007-2008 was the following: Europe would not oppose Russia
over Georgia and the Ukraine, because they did not have any serious economic
potential or raw materials. Europe would not oppose the already irritated
Russia, especially that a belligerent Russia could carry out its plans
spontaneously, while the West considered all a thousand times before acting,
owing to its excessive liberalism and democracy.
The authors conclusion seems quite natural and unbiased in this context:
The countries opposing MAP were often using procedural or performance-
based arguments to make larger political and strategic points. They not only
had real doubts about the democratic reforms or readiness of Georgia or
Ukraine. Many of them simply thought enlargement had gone far enough in
terms of straining NATO cohesion or irritating Russia.
1
Behind the scenes.
The authors conclusion is correct and should be taken into account, but
sadness similar to reproach is shown in this sentence, concerning the fact that
the countries opposing MAP were often using procedural or performance
based arguments to make larger political and strategic points. It seems, in the
authors opinion, they had to close their eyes on non-standard situation,
procedural discrepancy and arguments in the aspirant countries of the Ukraine
and Georgia. And we would add our evaluations to this list, which the author
does not cite here, but manifests richly in another place: on the rough
infringement of democratic principles, the attempts to reanimate ugly forms of
totalitarianism, the neglect of liberal values and so on and so on. We will be
speaking in detail on this theme.
The author describes the positions of all the leaders of the leading
countries at the Bucharest summit objectively and without hiding
anything. He indicates that Germany, for example: Now that Germany was
encircled by friendly allies, Berlin saw its national interest in the enlargement
process as achieved.
Yes, this is a correct evaluation. The government of Angela Merkel had
already forgotten (if she remembered, or knew) the remarkable words said by
the German political figure Hans-Dietrich Genscher in Tbilisi after the
establishment of diplomatic relations: Georgia has always been oriented to
Europe, Georgia was twice disappointed, when waiting support from European
countries. Such a thing will not happen a third time [10].
It happened, Mr Genscher, it happened!
The author connects the strict policy of German towards Georgia and the
Ukraine at the Bucharest summit to the pro-Russian lobby in German
politics, but, for some reason, does not put his usual rhetorical question -
perhaps Georgia and Ukraine had committed a fault, giving rise to such a
severe attitude from Germany?
The Russian factor was swaying over the heads of the leaders of all
European states like the sword of Damocles, but NATO had been formed with
just one precise aim, to defend everybody exactly against this sword of
Damocles, hadnt it?
It is true, that Germany depended on Russian energy carriers, but Russia
was even more interested in not losing Germany as an economic partner, is
that not so? The declaration of even one weeks embargo on Russia would
create serious problems for the Russian economy.
Thus, abstention of the European countries at the Bucharest summit, in my
opinion, was conditioned by the failure to execute obligations taken by the
Georgian government, its un-readiness for NATO, indifference towards
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democratic values and not by Angela Merkels whim, as the author tries to
convince us: "while an Atlanticist, Merkel was not immune from the broader
currents of German strategic thinking and society" [11].
So it seems, the respected author would have liked if a more balanced and
wise German lady had been free from the broader currents in German
strategic thinking and society for the sake of an unbalanced Saakashvili.
The respected author also touches upon the US position at the Bucharest
summit in an appropriate way. For the last twenty years, the US has been
entrusted with a particular mission in the process of the development of
Georgias historical fate. Georgia would be in a very difficult situation in the
post-Soviet period without the US during its civil war and social tension. The
author assesses the American factor for Georgia as outstanding: American
money, advisors, and friends poured into Georgia to assist in this attempt to
remake the country."
The author formulates the position of the US at the Bucharest summit
correctly and emphasizes the discord of G. Bush, Junior, with the chancellor of
Germany: "They did disagree on what Western and specially NATO policy
should be. Bush believed that the best way for Georgia to overcome its flaws
was for the West to embrace Georgia even more closely and work with it, not
keep it at arms length and further its insecurities."
The position of the French president is also correctly formulated in the
work: "Officially, France opposed MAP for Georgia and Ukraine and fully
supported Berlins position." (The book under review, p. 135).
Of course, when leading European countries, Germany and France, are
against giving MAP, the attempts of the US administration and the assistance
of the new members of NATO: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia did not have
any real meaning, and Georgia and the Ukraine were left without MAP at this
stage: that, of course, was due to the success of Russian diplomacy.
Thus Georgia could not get MAP in Bucharest but as the Georgian
government insisted, we have got more than that! and it was mainly the fault
not of the intrigues of Russian diplomacy, but of the domestic policy of the
Georgian government, i.e., its "democratic shortcomings" [12].
5. The Russian factor in the book is certainly main and determinant; the
author is an experienced diplomat and a thinking man, who sees well the
objectives, possibilities and prospects of the foreign policy of Putins Russia in
the post-Soviet space. It is impossible not to agree with him: "Russia deeply
opposed and resented Georgias effort to escape its historic sphere of influence
and anchor itself to the West" [13].
The author is right when he remarks: Russia had de facto declared war on
Georgia well before hostilities broke out in the summer of 2008, as Moscow
concluded that Tbilisi would not bend. This war was the culmination of a
broader Russian strategy of rollback, fueled by rising nationalism and
petrodollars, and designed to reestablish its dominance over its neighbors.
It seems our respected author thinks that this idea (which even children
realize in Georgia) is his own and that it was unknown to statesmen of
America and the West, who did nothing to avoid this tendency.
The phrase used by the author - escape its historic sphere of influence -
jarred upon our ears. We do not know how deep the authors knowledge of
Georgian history is, how well he knows the history of Georgia of the XVIII,
XIX and XX centuries and of what he is aware of Russian influence and
Georgian-Russian relations, but as this phrase slipped from his lips we would
like to remark: that freeing our country from a historic sphere of influence has
been always difficult and very expensive for Georgia. At the end of the XVIII
century, Erekle II tried to free us from the traditional historic sphere of
influence of Iran and it ended with the 1795 tragedy and of the destruction of
Tbilisi by Iranians. The Russian empire did not even stir to lend a hand to help
Georgia and its inactivity caused one more catastrophe for the Georgian
nation!
In 1921 Georgians tried to free themselves from a historic sphere of
influence once more - but now from a Russian one. This attempt by the
chairman of the democratic government, Noe Zhordania, and his political
group ended with catastrophe once again due to the indifference and
inattention of Europe when XIth Red Army entered Tbilisi and the Soviet flag
was raised over Tbilisi.
At the verge of the XX-XXI centuries, the same question of freeing from
the historic sphere of influence arose before Georgia and again
unsuccessfully - the catastrophe of August 2008. For how many more times,
will this happen before we learn sense?
Undoubtedly these analogues indicate a certain regularity and we will also
speak of them.
The main topic of the work is undoubtedly Georgia, with its problems,
possibilities, political mistakes and failures: the authors favorable attitude
towards Georgia and Georgians is obvious. We do not want to believe that he
does not differ from the Georgian government and nor is he against Georgian
statehood: this we feel in the work. Neither do we wish to believe that this
book was written due to factors, still unknown to us, and not out of respect and
love of Georgia. We do not wish to believe many other things.
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But what we believe after the reading of this rather long work, we will
now explain to you.
1. We really believe that the source base of the work leaves much to be
desired. First of all the scarcity of materials on Georgia catches the eye. We
have also noted that in this work there are many decisions and resolutions of
international organizations, the government of the US and of leading European
countries, but there is little Georgian material whether documentary or
unofficial. The author takes his information on Georgia only from the official
structures of M. Saakashvilis government and that causes suspicion in any
Georgian researcher, for the very low degree of trust towards M. Saakashvilis
government, as also for the places of obtaining this factual material. As the
respected author indicates more than once we were assuring him sitting at a
table, talks on the rooftop of Kopala Restaurant [14] etc., points to where
some information on Georgia was obtained - not in archives and libraries, or
after prolonged talks with leaders of political parties, but on the rooftop of
Kopala Restaurant, sitting at a table.
The fact that Georgian material has been handled by Saakashvilis
political grouping and has been prepared in their kitchen is confirmed by the
authors evaluation of Aslan Abashidze, the leader of Adjara. The latter is
mentioned as a drug baron in this book. Supposedly A. Abashidze is not
infallible in regards to the Georgian state, but the court has not convicted him;
nobody has proved that he was a drug baron, so the respected author did not
have to offer a subjective assessment by M. Saakashvili to the readers and by
so doing he breached the presumption of innocence, one of the corner-stones
of American democracy. Aslan Abashidze had enough sins but objectivity
requires me to mention that before the appearance of Bidzina Ivanishvili, it
was Aslan Abashidze in the epoch of cold and hunger who was the main
philanthropist and supporter of the arts and culture in Georgia.
Reminiscences from the ideological arsenal of A. Lomaia, T.
Iakobashvili, G. Baramidze and other members of this group often cited by the
author, indicate that Georgian material was prepared in the kitchen of M.
Saakashvilis political group.
The fact that the author did not use the Georgian mass-media, to become
acquainted with public opinion in connection with various problems and
events, even though news in English could be obtained from three newspapers
and one TV program, all giving priority to the weeks political news. There is
also the fact that there seems to be no interest in the four million people who
live and work in this God blessed country, but ruined by its irresponsible sons.
This in particular, intensifies my critical attitude towards the book under

review.
This circumstance seems to us as one of the main defects of the work: the
author should have obtained the material on the socio-political situation in
Georgia, defined the attitude of different layers of Georgian society towards
the existing government and their opinions on Georgian-Russian, Georgian-
American and Georgian-European relations. Those of political parties
(Republicans, New Democrats, Labourists, Ilia Chavchavadze
Society and others), should also have been consulted as also those well-
known political figures: Nino Burjanadze, Levan Gachechiladze, Nodar
Natadze, David Gamkrelidze, Paata Zakareishvili, Tamar Chkheidze, Irakli
Batiashvili and others who are not even mentioned in the work. These people,
who were in opposition to M. Saakashvilis government were voicing very
interesting ideas, drawing new plans for the regulating of Georgian-Russian
relations, relations with separatist regions, appealing to the government to be
cautious and observant. Many solutions which have been now implemented
were put forward by them at the time. M. Saakashvilis government ignored all
their rational proposals.
Many materials from those cited by R.D. Asmus are not in accordance
with what the Georgian authorities actually said or thought and were corrected
only after the development of political events.
We set ourselves the task of studying the chronology of events from
January 2004 to September 2008 and have recorded many shortcomings,
mistakes and controversies. No author would be able to remain objective and
impartial with respect to these events without taking into account this
enormous material.
2. The second and, in my opinion, very serious defect and, it can be said,
even a crime of the work is that any thinking citizen of Georgia would be
charged with anti-American, anti-Western mood while reading this work and,
what is more, the feeling of nostalgia for Russia would be intensified in him.
The author tries to assure us, that the Georgian authorities really made
some mistakes, did not envisage the tragedy of 2008, but the main culprit in
these events is the West, leaving Georgia to an infuriated Russia.
Let us see, what the respected author proves to us: ... But the West did
not take them (Georgian interests) into account, The West did not consider
any strategy to restrain it (Russian aggression) and it did not go further than
idle talk, There was no Western strategy to engage or protect Georgia from
the collateral damage, the United States and the European Union, did not
take seriously Moscows threats that it would retaliate against Kosovos
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independence by moving against Georgia the West had no strategy or plan

to shield Georgia, Europe was not burning with desire to assist Georgia, It
meant Tbilisi would have to rely on a European Union openly divided in its
views on and support for Georgias aspirations to go West, and Sarkozy
knew little about Georgia and often cared less [15].
Now let us consider the ideas of Asmus on NATO: None of the parties
on either side of the Atlantic could ever quite speak with a single credible
voice (the book under review, p. 172). When Georgian officials informally
inquired at NATO about holding formal North Atlantic Council (NAC)
consultations with Georgia over their internal situation, they were told they
would be better off not doing so, as the Alliance did not want to get involved
in an internal dispute. At the beginning of August, when the war broke out,
the North Atlantic Council held only one meeting and limited itself to merely
one statement.
Now let us also consider our first strategic ally, the United States of
America, the Americans warned the Georgian side that initiating a war with
Russia would be pernicious for their country, You might help us with
Stinger rockets to avoid presumed air attacks (the Georgians begged). Such
a request was considered, but finally Washington refused to satisfy it. At a
meeting of the Principals Committee on Monday, August 11, Hadley therefore
put the military option on the table to see whether there was any support for
such steps to help the Georgians repel the Russians. There was not [16].
Similar citations could be quoted endlessly because the author is strict,
sometimes even unnecessarily while assessing the position of the West
towards Georgia.
That is why I assert, that after reading the book and it appears that few
people have read Asmuss book in Georgia as copies remain in the bookshop
of Tbilisis Ilia University, already strong skepticism of Georgians towards the
West will be intensified. They can say the US and the West did not forgive
Iraq the occupation of Kuwait and lit a real hurricane in the desert. Europe
did not forgive Milosevic the bombing of Kosovo; to spite him they
recognized the independence of Kosovo; the West did not forgive Saddam
Husseins chemical poisoning of the Kurds so Hussein was put to death, etc.
What is the problem? Georgia which has been trying with frantic frenze
for already twenty-five years to become a member of NATO and the EU, and
to be a full and equal partner of the West was patently dismissed, was left
unprotected in the most complicated period of its history, they did not give it
Stingers, did not send troops to defend it, and its destruction did not bother
them.
The matter, of course, is in Russia, a Russia full of nuclear weapons... As

an old socio-democrat, the leader of the government of the first Georgian
republic (1918-1921), Noe Jordania, would say: It was obvious, that Russia,
even fallen Russia was taken into consideration [17].
If Georgia had been as rich as Kuwait, full of oil products, a country
famous for gold and diamond mines and not a country razed to the ground by a
cascade of foolish leaders that would have been overthrown by America or
Europe, the situation would have been entirely different.
But I will try to prove that even in this case the respected author is not
right.
The West has acted and will always act as required by the political,
geostrategic and economic interests of Europe and on the whole of the West.
Hence, any authority of Georgia is obliged to act as required by the
political, geostrategic and economic interests of Georgia and not to be in a
state of passive expectation of assistance.
3. In the book under review, the attention is focused on the start of the
armed conflict and the movement of opposing sides. In my opinion, it is not
accidental.
Let us listen to Asmus: It was 23.35 the night of August 7 in Tbilisi. He
(Saakashvili) had just given the order for his armed forces to attack what his
intelligence service had reported to be a column of Russian forces moving
from the small South Ossetian town of Java just south of the Russian-Georgian
border toward the city of Tskhinvali, the capital of the small separatist
enclave [18].
The author quite clearly names the time of the start of the conflict - 11.35
pm, August 7, 2008.
Where was gained such precision? The author does not present any
document confirming this fact. That day, August 7, 2008, he was in the
Bulgarian resort of Varna, where he was resting (the book under review, p. 1).
Thus, he was not in Tbilisi, and no document was produced, i.e., in this
case Asmus evidently confirms and repeats information told him personally by
the Georgian authorities, because the time of the start of the war is indicated
quite differently in the conclusion of Tagliavinis report for the EU: On the
night of the 7 to 8 August 2008, a sustained Georgian artillery attack struck the
town of Tskhinvali. Other movements of the Georgian armed forces targeting
Tskhinvali and the surrounding areas were under way, and soon the fighting
involved Russian, South Ossetian and Abkhaz military units and armed
elements [19].
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Now I will cite the Georgian press. I will remind you of the chronology of
events: Georgian villages were under fire from the Ossetian side on 7th
August. Georgians were responding. The order came at 7 oclock; Georgians
ceased firing; they did not answer back even when bullets fired by Ossetians
killed a Georgian soldier at the Avnevi peacekeeping post [20].
It is obvious that both these neutral sources do not record the movement of
Russian regular troops on 7th August, 2008. It is worth noting that the
chronological list of events, published in the period of 6-15 August in the
Georgian press by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, does not confirm the
movement of Russian regular military units on the territory of South Ossetia,
either. There is nothing said about Russian regular military units in the list of
events of 7 August [21].
Thus, the respected author deludes the reader. Moreover, M. Saakashvilis
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Georgian mass-media and Tagliavinis report
do not confirm any movement of Russian regular military units in South
Ossetia on 7 August, 2008.
Saakashvilis government realized the necessity of recording the fact of
the movement of Russian regular military units later, because of the
international response and we must suppose that they imposed their point of
view on the author.
Today, five years after these tragic events, M. Saakashvili and
representatives of his team again repeat the statement concerning the
movement of Russian regular military units in South Ossetia and, if it is true, if
Russian military units were really moving on the territory of South Ossetia,
that means that Saakashvili and his government concealed this fact from the
Georgian society and this is a real crime before the country and people and
needs special study.2
4. The problem of Russian-Georgian relations is central in the work for
certain reasons. We have already mentioned that we do not think the author
was deeply versed in this problem from a historical perspective. Knowledge of
the works of academician N. Berdzenishvili, Professors M. Poliectov, E.
Machavariani, M. Samsonadze etc. is not seen in his work.
The author mainly restricts himself to some dramatic episodes of the XX
century and relations developed in the XXI century and even this, which is
striking, is from the ideological kitchen of M. Saakashvilis political group.
2
The well-known politician, I. Batiashvili, reported the fact in the Georgian mass-media more
than once.
For example, Asmus knows that the Georgians would passionately

recall how their forefathers had not fought the Bolsheviks in 1921 and had lost
their independence for the next seventy years. Unfortunately, the author does
not know that one of the reasons of this tragedy was the position of the US too,
which had not recognized the independence of Georgia and considered it to be
within sphere of Russian interests. Here we refer to a note of the US State
Secretary, Colby, in 1920 in which talk is on the unity of the Russian state and
the refusal of the US to acknowledge the independence of countries within the
limits of Russia influence.
The author knows even that. But Georgians, too, came to play a
prominent role in Soviet history, producing a long list of personalities in the
arts, the military, and politics. The respected author insists that Georgia was
occupied, but let him remind us, which occupied country plays a prominent
role in the history of the metropolis? At the top of that list are some of the
worst despots in Soviet history - most famously Joseph Stalin and his secret
police chief, Lavrenty Beria.3 It is likewise remarkable that the authors
Georgian informer either did not know or did not remember Abel Enukidze
nor Eduard Shevardnadze.
After such historical research, Asmus assures us, What made these
conflicts so explosive, however, was not due to history. We cannot agree with
this argument, as the reasons for the conflicts developed at the verge of the
XX-XXI centuries are to be sought exactly in the farthest past and are dictated
by our dramatic history.
The main reason is that since ancient times has been hung over Georgia
like the sword of Damocles, is its particular geostrategic situation in the South
Caucasus. According to strict geostrategic laws, on this territory only a very
strong state, for example, the Georgia of David Agmashenebeli and Tamar
from Nicopsia to Daruband, could control the Caucasian passages and roads
independently.
If it could not have done so, proof of the existence of Georgians on this
territory would have disappeared and a new strong people would have settled
here. Georgians have well understood this truth during the long period of their
history. That is why Georgia permanently has been fighting against
Byzantium, Persia, Mongols, Khazars, Tamerlane or Agha-Makhmad-Khan.
Georgians have managed and retained their identity and originality up the
present and it is a great victory over their history.
3
So it seems the author has not read W. Churchills evaluations nor Roosevelt letters, etc.
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The main method of Georgian diplomacy in this hard battle was the
rational policy of a balance of power when one has to reasonably use the
opposition between potential enemies, kindle and strengthen this opposition,
not give them the possibility of accomplishing an attack with their joint forces
and use their weakness in every possible way, in order to finally accomplish
the tasks set before your country, and preserve your physical existence.
Georgian kings of the Late Middle Ages perfectly understood this
principle. When the expanding Russian empire pestered and obliged the old
King Erekle to sign the Georgievsky Treaty, Russia entered Transcaucasia and
the historical balance, existing in the Caucasus for centuries was broken, and
we had to endure the result - the devastating attack of Tbilisi by Agha-
Makhmad-Khan.
When the leaders of the Georgian Democratic Republic turned their backs
on Russia and announced we prefer western capitalists to eastern fanatics,
the result was the 25 February of 1921.
Now it is also obvious that Saakashvili radically changed E.
Shevardnadzes balanced course of foreign policy to a pro-western policy but
only in phraseology; the kind of democrat he was we have already seen and
will see in future which irritated Russia very much and we ended with the War
of August 2008.
Let us stop here.
Who and what Russians are, Georgians know well, as well as Algerians
know who the French are, and the Hindus perfectly know who the English are
and so on.
Colonialism is not good, but it is inevitable for the historical development
of some countries and it has its positive and negative sides. Colonialism was
not strange for the Georgian people. They also experienced its positive and
negative results: Russians helped Georgians in regaining their historical
territories: Akhaltsikhe, Akhalkalaki, Adjara, Tao-Klarjeti and Abkhasia, but
at the same time they sowed the seeds of separatism in these territories.
Despite this, Russian emperors and then the General Secretaries of the
former USSR appreciated the fine geostrategic location of Georgia, with its
capital Tbilisi which had continued to be the political, economic and cultural
center of Transcaucasia for the last two centuries. It was the capital of the
Viceroy of the Caucasus and then the capital of the Transcaucasian Federation.
Only during the last nine years was it reduced to the level of a provincial city
by M. Saakashvili who belittled its political significance and nearly made it
lose its function of capital.
Georgians were faithful to the Russians. After the anti-imperialistic

actions of the first third of the XIX century, they took part in all Russias
Caucasian wars. A total of 200 thousand Georgians took part in World War I,
and 700 thousand in World War II. These numbers point to those serious roots,
those deep relations between these two nations, destruction of which was the
wish of a certain power having certain, far-reaching considerations.
Certainly Georgians were fighting for independence against Russian
Tsarism in 1804, 1812, 1819-20 and 1833 and were fighting against
Communist dictatorship in 1921-22, 1924 and later but since then thanks to the
Georgians' adaptive factors and the Georgian origin of J. Stalin they became
well accustomed to the Communist regime. They applied the greatest efforts at
building a Communist system in Georgia and reached high social and cultural
results: the economy developed, cities and villages were built, a socio
infrastructure was developed, as well as science, culture, the arts, theatre,
cinema and sport. Georgians held a distinguished place in the Soviet Union at
the beginning of the 1980s due to their high standard of living and cultural
achievements that caused obvious jealousy in a certain section of the Russian
intelligentsia.
Despite this, there were no anti-Russian sentiments in Georgia till the
1980s but anti-Georgian sentiments were very strong in Russia. This tendency
was particularly strengthened in Gorbachevs years of Perestroika, when
Russian publicists and politicians criticizing Stalin and Beria used to blame
Georgians and criticized their history, culture and traditions.
In a complicated and controversial political process, the attempt by the
Devourer of Georgians 4 to create a strong anti-Georgian formation in the
Post-Soviet space was patently seen, in order to weaken and finally crush the
historically distinguished role of Georgia in the South Caucasus.
So it seems we Georgians lost sight of the secret or public actions of this
force which resulted in the unification of all the anti-Georgian forces. At the
end of the 1980s, this concentration was already a fact, and presented a serious
threat. It was necessary to find out the head of this power. This task was
fulfilled on the 9 April, 1989, when the military power of the Soviet Union, in
fact Russians, spilled the blood of innocent Georgian women and girls and
"burnt bridges" between Georgians and themselves by this action.
Thus, the relations between Georgians and Russians were seriously
damaged, blood was spilled under new conditions on the threshold of the
anniversary of the restoration of independence of Georgia. Then everything
4
A force historically envying Georgians and trying to belittle their role in the South Caucasus.
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happened very quickly. The leaders of Ossetian and Abkhaz separatists, the
North Caucasian confederates, the Muscovite lobby of Dashnaktsutyun,
Russian chauvinists and anti-Stalinists easily found a common cause and
began fighting against Georgians and Georgia was left quite alone in the South
Caucasus. And where was NATO then? Or Europe and America?
Even today the geostrategic location of Georgia, its possibility of
controlling the Caucasian Range disturbs Russian chauvinists, who constantly
imagine the disintegration of Russia. In their opinion, this danger is present
especially from the political leaders of the restless nations of North Caucasus,
who could be freed from Russian influence and connected to the rest of the
world directly, only by means of Georgia. That is why the attitude of Russians
towards the foreign policy orientation of Georgia is so particularly sensitive.
Proceeding from this fundamental idea, in spite of the existence of a large
Georgian Diaspora in Russia5 and in spite of the significant contribution of
Georgians in the economic, cultural and social life of Russia, pro-Georgian
claims, the activity of the Georgian lobby and the results of this activity in
Russia were always reduced to a minimum during the conflicts of the last
decades, while Abkhazian, Ossetian and Armenian lobbyists managed
everything against Georgia in Russia, and they reached this position owing to
the coincidence of the political interests with those of the Russian ruling elite.
It should also be underlined that most Georgian millionaires and
billionaires, if not everybody fledged, earned their money in Russia. It is
said that about half a billion dollars are sent to relatives in Georgia by
Georgian citizens living in Russia, i.e., Russia is an Eldorado for Georgia,
the main hearth for gaining material success. Name me one Georgian who has
become a millionaire in the US or in Europe!
These are the two main paradoxes. Russia is at the same time the main
hearth and shelter for becoming rich, obtaining material success and
improving social conditions for Georgians but it is also the main source of the
fight against Georgians. It is a really illogical co-existence.
When M. Saakashvili and his political group so irritated the Russian
authorities with his anti-Russian hysteria and gratuitous insult, that they
sacked Georgians from their jobs and made others leave prestigious positions.
Among the latter were academician L. Bokeria, producer G. Danelia, the
singers Z. Sotkilava and L. Kasrashvili, S. Pavliashvili and K. Topuria and the
brothers Meladze and who played an important role in the life of Russia. They
5
Its number increased in the 1990s by Georgians searching for work and their number today
consists of some hundreds of thousands.
were deported in cargo airplanes where a number of them died, and the
positions left by them were quickly occupied by those who always had
dreamed of humiliating the Georgians.
Georgian-Russian relations have been proceeding against just such a
dramatic background for the last twenty years: Zviad Gamsakhurdias openly
anti-Russian politics against a background of zero support from the West,
ended in failure. In spite of E. Shevardnadzes balanced politics; we must not
forget that exactly owing to his attempts it was decided to withdraw Russian
military bases from Georgia at the Istanbul summit of 1999 but relations with
Russia still could not be regulated.
R. D. Asmus does not examine Georgian-Russian relations in such a long
chronological stretch which of course he could not do so in such a short period
of time and that is why he is limited to information handed him by Georgian
informers.
The author writes justly: It is not arguable for anybody, that Russian-
Georgian relations were really tense, Georgia and Russia were approaching
nearer and nearer the threshold of war. Moscow had taken a variety of
political and economic steps, both overt and covert, to try to destabilize
Saakashvili's government. Putin had personally warned Saakashvili on more
than one occasion that his pro-Western course would have consequences, and
so on. The author really wastes a lot of time and energy to record Putin-
Saakashvilis opposition, their hatred and implacability.
But he says nothing about regarding the fact there was no such tension
between them several years previously, that the victory of the Rose Revolution
was to a certain extent connected to Putins name. Let us remember the visit of
Putins representative, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Igor Ivanov,
that fatal night and his role of mediator between Shevardnadze and the
Triumvirate of Burdjanadze, Saakashvili and Zhvania.
The factor of Russia was also important in settling the fate of Adjara
without bloodshed. Remember another of Igor Ivanov's visits and how he
brought to Moscow the "drug baron Aslan Abashidze.
It was not accidental that the young president of Georgia, Mikhail
Saakashvili, held his first official visit in the Kremlin with Putin and,
fascinated by the result of the talks, remarked: As I do not interfere in what
happens in Russia, so Russia does not interfere and will not interfere in what
happens in Georgia. Here are some extracts from Georgian newspapers: The
first personal meeting of Putin and Saakashvili ended successfully...
Saakashvili announced before that his aim was neither more nor less than to
become friends personally and in general with Russia [22].
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Saakashvili also said at the briefing: The warmer will become relations
between Georgia and Russia, the stronger will become Georgia. Newspapers
even asserted: as if the Georgian president promises that he will ensure the
security of Russian investment in Georgia personally.
Pro-Russian rhetoric was so strong and unbelievable from the Georgian
government at that time, that the well-known politician, Nodar Natadze, saw in
it a serious danger and even criticized the Georgian president.
But pro-Russian propaganda in Georgia did not end and on 27 May, 2004,
a hundred leading Russian businessmen arrived in Tbilisi. Among them was
the ethnically Georgian businessman, Kakha Bendukidze, closely connected
with Putin. The managers of leading industrial organizations of Itera,
Gazprom, Lukoil and leaders of other firms and influential businessmen
were in the delegation.
The Georgian president greeted them warmly and announced: We need
Russian capitalists, they are braver and more intuitive [23].
Lobbying of the interests of Russian capital was also reflected in the fact
that Kakha Bendukidze, an eminent representative of the Russian oligarchy,
was appointed as State Minister of the Economy and was handed all the levers
of governing the economy of Georgia.
The successful transfer of Russian capital to Georgia continued; it was
strengthening its position more and more and taking possession of industrial
resources. It even came to the moment when the administration of the US was
forced to allot large sums for the rehabilitation of the main oil pipe-line, as the
Georgian government was going to sell it to Russia! Despite this, President
Saakashvili gave Russia more than one strategically important object, among
which was even the unique hydroelectric power station of Enguri.
The political flirtation with Russia continued side by side with an
economic one. In the summer of 2004, the following information appeared in
the Georgian press after one of the meetings of the Georgian president,
Saakashvili, with Putin: ...it is interesting that after the meeting with Putin,
the Georgian president is planning a special operation in one of the regions of
Georgia. 24 It was no secret for anyone, where this special operation would
be carried out. This arrangement in South Ossetia failed and the Russian-
Georgian honeymoon came to an end too.
These issues, for understandable reasons, are not discussed in the authors
work under review. He attaches particular importance to the peripetia of
Russian-Georgian relations of the last years and justly blames Russia for their
great-power diplomatic methods in their relations with Georgia. The author
does not tell anything new when he says: But the root cause of this war was
geopolitical. Georgia was determined to go West and Russia was determined

to stop it from doing so.
When everything is thus and it is really true, then all sides interested in
this issue should find a foreign policy course which would be the least painful,
safe and successful.
The position of Russia is understandable; the widening of NATO to the
east is unacceptable for its geo-strategic interests. Russia defended its position
to the end, used in its interest the obvious indifference and mistakes of western
leaders, and won.
How did the Georgian government act? That is the question!
After a cordial cuddle, swearing friendship and the ending of the
honeymoon with Putin, high-ranking officials of the Georgian government
started using abusive language towards the Russian government, starting
against Chief Medical Officer, G. Onishchenko, and finishing with President
Vladimir Putin.
An observation of Onishchenkos activity shows that he permanently finds
some defects in German, English, Norwegian, Ukrainian or Chinese products.
This is his duty and it is a fact that Russian firms poison the Russian
population with food, medicines, semi-manufactured products and so on. The
Chief Medical Officer therefore has the right to dislike their products, if it does
not meet the requirements of international norms. It is a domestic affair of
Russia and it does not concern us.
When G. Onishchenko put an embargo on Georgian wine and mineral
water, did not we know that he was right? Dont we drink this wine and this
Borjomi? Did not the Georgian president himself attack representatives of
different departments at a government meeting because of adulterated
products? Then, why were we surprised because of Onishchenkos decision?
Could we afford to use bad language towards him and the Russian people?
Why did we artificially spoil relations, the logical result of which became the
driving out of Georgian migrants in Russian style, followed by the death of
some people?
Though Saakashvili was asserting at the meeting of a temporary
parliamentary commission that he had not said so, but our respected author
supposes in his book that M. Saakashvili was reported to have referred to him
(Putin) as Lilli-Putin [25].
Such courage in a Georgian high-ranking official should have been
guaranteed by something, or perhaps by somebody who would order this new
style politics, or that somebody would reprimand the offender that it was
enough to cuddle, to give a demonstration of love but that too would not
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answer for our politics; it was necessary for more sharpness in the relationship
and such a supposition is also possible.
The whole cascade of irresponsible statements made by representatives of
the Georgian government, the analogue of which cannot be found in the
practice of diplomacy, perhaps, had started due to it, hadnt it?
If we add the uncertain, ambiguous attitude of the West towards Russia
when on the one hand they try to include post-Soviet Russia in the economic
or political, military structures of the West, made it even a member of the elite
Eight, despite the fact that Russia did not meet any of the principal criteria
of being a member, invented different projects and programs of drawing
Russia nearer to NATO and at the same time made Russia look on with a
smile, how methodically the influence of Russia upon East Europe and the
Middle East was diminishing, and then the final blow... Kosovo!
The author of the book remarks justly: Kosovo remained a cause clbre
for Russian nationaliststhe penultimate symbol of Russias impotence vis--
vis the West under Yeltsin.
We will add nothing...On the one side M. Saakashvili and his group with
their undiplomatic ethics, and on the other the West, with its strict politics
towards Russia which greatly irritated V. Putin. Russia needed face-saving, in
order not to move into a state of the third category and not to lose its self-
respect. In such a situation, it would help, support with money and weapons
Abkhazians, Ossetians, Armenians, Transnistrians and so on, who did not run
away but worshipped it.
In our opinion, the situation in summer of 2008 was of that kind.
What had to be the action of the Georgian government towards the
Russian administration in such a situation, especially after the Kosovo
precedence and the Bucharest summit? The answer is surely a thousand times
more cautious and measured...It is clearly seen: the infuriated tiger is seeking
his victim to pour out its malice.
M. Saakashvili manifested such a refined mastership, played a role so
masterly in order that this victim would be Georgia, that one becomes
suspicious willy-nilly...
A brief chronological list is given below:
2004, January-July: honeymoon of Russia and Georgia.
2004, July - 2005, February: worsening of relations, shame of
Tskhinvali.
2005, February: Lavrovs visit, funeral music in Tbilisi streets, throwing
of eggs etc.
2006 - Shameful speech of Nino Burdjanadze at the ceremonial meeting

dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the Russian State Duma in the Russian
parliament in Tavrida Palace, Saint Petersburg. Instead of speaking on the
great merit of Georgians in the building of Russian democracy, the well-
known socio-democrat, K. Cheidze, was the chairman of a Duma faction for
years, Irakli Tsereteli was the Minister of the Post-telegraph of the Russian
temporary government and so on, she spoke of petty blunders, ran after cheap
popularity, criticized Putins government and caused a common feeling of
irritation among Russian deputies, following a request of Saakashvili as they
were in one camp at the time.
2007 - January - Russia recalled its ambassador from Tbilisi.
2007 - March, 31 - Sochi agreement, confirmation of schedule of
withdrawal of military bases, strange warming of relations.
2008 - February - Putin-Saakashvilis meeting in Moscow - we begin
everything from the beginning!
Such a shakeup in Russian-Georgian relations certainly would not be
good.
The anti-Russian hysteria of the Georgian government sometimes was so
alarming, that in the Georgian media, which had seen everything, sometimes
even such statements used to appear: A meowing cat catches no mice...
It was also written: Russia blew up the gas-pipe in agreement with
Georgia. Prominent politician T. Chkheidze asserted this fact. The newspaper
Akhali Taoba even insisted that the explosion of the gas-pipe was
performed by Russia and Saakashvili. The chairman of the Peoples Front,
Nodar Natadze, pointed out and thinks so even today, that the Georgian
authority is a direct agent of Russia.
This obviously indicates that a certain part of Georgian society did not
believe the anti-Russian rhetoric of the Saakashvili regime and required that
the national interest in relations with Russia should be protected by deed rather
than by word.
This part of society seriously in 2006 put the question of the departure of
Georgia from the CIS but the government, suspiciously, did not pay any
attention to it. The recognized propagandist of the nationalists, David
Darchiashvili, declared in response to the opposition: Banging of a door
would not work with an enormous neighbor, when the country considers
entering NATO as its main task [26].
S. Zurabishvili, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia also paid
attention to suspicious political games of the Georgian government with
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Russia. For example, she declared that authorities suspiciously play with
Russia.
It is clear, that the relationship of the Georgian government with Russia
was obviously inadequate and was very similar to the character of one
Georgian fairy tale, and not only Georgian, namely, of the shepherd who
cheated people, crying wolf, wolf! When the wolf really came and ate the
sheep, people did not believe him and did not help. Nobody trusted him,
nobody helped!
We can say much more about the suspicious relations of M. Saakashvili
with the Russian government, but the culmination of this game was M.
Saakashvilis speech on TV in the evening of 7th August, 2008, as was
reported in Akhali Taoba: Yesterday Saakashvili mentioned Russia as
warmly, as he has never done before. This was at a time when, according to
his statements of that day the regular troops of Russia were already on
Georgian territory. Earlier, the Georgian government blamed Russia for
everything. But yesterday it was found that Russians did not take part in
provocations, nor did the State Minister, Temur Iakobashvili, grudge warm
words towards Russia [27]
Later, the official authorities of Georgia, together with our respected
author, began to assert, that the regular troops of Russia were on the territory
of Georgia already on the 7th of August and trampled upon our sovereignty.
And if it is so, the president of Georgia, known for his anti-Russian
speeches and rhetoric did not say anything about it and mentioned the
occupants with gratitude and kind words in this situation...
Here we deal with the obvious disinformation of the Georgian population
- M. Saakashvili and T. Iakobashvili disarmed the Georgian population by this
TV performance, misinformed them and obviously hid the objective
circumstances. People thought he was praising Russia, i.e., there is nothing to
worry, some deal has been made with Russia; they are ceding us Samachablo
and the restoration of constitutional order is being carried on there.
Unfortunately, one can hardly come across materials on these events in the
work under review.
4. M. Saakashvilis Ossetian-Abkhazian behavior of cat-and-mouse way
is presented very modestly in this book. We cannot demand from the author,
who was very restricted in time as perhaps his client made him hurry to
describe in detail the real character of Ossetian-Georgian and Abkhazian-
Georgian conflicts, their history, the peculiarities of their development,
mistakes and even crimes on the three sides. Georgian social scientists have
dedicated numerous works to these problems (G. Gasviani, J. Gamakharia, E.
Khoshtaria-Brosse, S. Vadachkoria). But it would have been better had the

author showed deeper layers of this confrontation, in order to form a certain
idea of the true essence of the issue for readers; especially for English-
speaking readers.
Such general statements included in the book will not lead the reader to
see the depth of the issue, will not allow them to create an idea of the essence
of the conflict: he (Saakashvili) believed passionately in Georgias territorial
integrity and had made the recovery of these separatist provinces a key part of
his political manifesto, Saakashvili had repeatedly told his American and
European counterparts that Abkhazia and South Ossetia were existential issues
for him [28].
If the author connects the main character of this book to these two regions
so organically, then the reader should know, at least briefly, that these two
regions are historically indivisible parts of Georgia, and that they had been
parts of the Georgian Kingdom since ancient times. The Apsuas, the Abkhaz-
Adyghe population, moved from the North Caucasus and settled in Abkhazia,
intermingled with old Abkhazians who were the builders of a united Georgian
state and assimilated with them. Excessive protraction of the process of feudal
disunity in Georgia, and the fact, that we, Georgians, could not complete to the
end the work started by Erekle II and could not manage to unite the country
without the assistance of foreign power, such as the Germans, Italians and
others, ended in the fact that the Abkhazians and a significant part of
Georgians of South Georgia, adopted Mohammedanism, and lost the feeling of
unity with Georgians. But it must be emphasized that Georgians (Megrelians)
living on Abkhazian territory had been in a state of intensive economic,
cultural and close household connections with the new Abkhazians. Russia
annexed Abkhazia from Georgia, as an independent principality, and then
organized genocide there, declared the Georgians to be a traitor nation
because of insubordination, but at the same time it was able to ignite anti-
Georgian sentiments that had never been eradicated in spite of great attempts.
A similar situation was in Samachablo. The population in Shida Kartli
thinned out because of permanent destroying raids and the Ossetians moving
from the North Caucasus were not driven out. As in previous centuries,
Georgian nobles considered them to be refugees and settled them on their
lands. They multiplied, scattered in different corners of Georgia and in some
places even became Georgians, and mixed Georgian-Ossetian families
appeared.
In the XIX century, when Georgia itself was a colony and was a
subordinate of Russia, the metropolis, without envisaging its wishes, moved
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Armenians to Akhalkalaki, Akhaltsikhe and Abkhazia - the Dukhobors and

Molokans to Lower Kartli, Germans to Lore and so on. These populations did
not take any part in Georgian cultural or political life during the whole of the
XIX century.
The leadership of the first Georgian republic could not regulate normal
relations with them as they did not even have time: on the contrary, bloody
attacks were inspired by outer forces, the memory of which had been passed
on from generation to generation. It was clear that these two ethnic groups of
Abkhazians and Ossetians already manifested pro-Russian sentiments very
strongly during that period.
It should be noted, that the Zviadist wing of the National-Liberation
movement of Georgia could not adequately evaluate the processes in those
regions in the 1980s and made it more tense and even bloody, having
succumbed to provocations. However there was an alternative vision as well,
for example, that of the Ilia Chavchavadze Society.
E. Shevardnadze also caused these relations to be bloody, having
succumbed to provocations in Abkhazia, due to which a ruthless and fierce
fratricidal war started.
The only success that E. Shevardnadze managed was that the conflict in
both regions was temporarily frozen. At that time everybody, even Russia,
recognized the territorial integrity of Georgia. There were diplomatic attempts,
as they tried the internationalization of this issue, and its freeing from the
diplomatic influence of Russia. A cure brought about by wounds started...
Even peoples diplomacy began to act...
Now, we will briefly review the attempts of M. Saakashvilis party to
settle the situation in the conflict regions after the Rose Revolution. If we
believe the respected author, M. Saakashvilis dream was the restoration of
the territorial integrity of Georgia, the return of separatist provinces, as
these two regions were 'existential' issues for him.
In the first months of the Rose Revolution and formation of the new
government, M. Saakashvili certainly did not have time for these regions. In
April-May he was busy with Aslan Abashidze and the problem of Adjara and
he even won. Again the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov
brought Aslan Abashidze, the creator of ugly regional structures, to Moscow.
The form of regional government was changed in Adjara, and it caused
alarm among many people, among whom were international experts.
Now the turn of Abkhazia and South Ossetia came. The headlines of
Georgian newspapers of those days were as follows: The Rose Revolution is
ripening in Abkhazia, Rehearsal of Rose Revolution on Tskhinvali
approaches, Rose Revolution is being expected in Tskhinvali, Unhurried

scenario in South Ossetia - Rose Revolution N3 [29].
And how did all this agitation finish - Captured Georgians are tortured in
Tskhinvali. According to Ossetians, they found the list of Georgian spies and
military maps, which Georgian scouts left behind. Fertilizers, pensions,
computers, books and passes brought from Tbilisi to Tskhinvali caused serious
alarm, They are already waiting for an attack.
It was followed by the capture of fifty Georgian military men, their move
to Tskhinvali and public insult, the so called Tskhinvali shame.
The situation became so complicated that M. Saakashvili was threatening
to abandon the Dagomis agreement (June, 1992).
Let us stop here.
The Dagomis agreement which was drawn up in June 1992, on the
initiative of Shevardnadze and Yeltsin and was signed by representatives of
both Ossetias, envisaged:
1. In order to exercise control over the implementation of a cease-fire, the
withdrawal of armed formations, a disbanding of forces of self-defense and the
maintenance of the regime of security in the region, a mixed Control
Commission composed of representatives of opposing parties shall be set up.
2. Every party participating in the work of the Commission shall appoint its
own representatives. 3. Until the aforementioned tasks are implemented, joint
forces on the coordination of activities aimed at the establishment of peace and
the maintenance of order shall be created within the Control Commission
[30].
The agreement, despite its defects and errors, played a certain positive role
in the establishment of a stable peace in the region; refugees more or less
returned to their places of habitation, the Georgian language was restored,
Ergneti rebuilt economic, although not always legitimate, bridges between
representatives of the two peoples and, what is more, later the OSCE became
the guarantor of peace in South Ossetia, which had its representation in the
region and somehow controlled the situation.
That is why M. Saakashvilis threat of not complying with the format of
the Dagomis agreement meant the ignoring of these achievements.
An extract from the interview of Soso Tsotniashvili, a Samachablo
Member of Parliament, seems very interesting, as it presents an objective
evaluation of the situation existing in the region. The Member of Parliament
criticizes the excessive activity of M. Saakashvilis government in the region
and completely excludes any parallels with Adjara. It was a serious mistake
to suppose, that there could not be found people in Tskhinvali, as had been the
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case in Adjara, who would shoot. If we say nothing regarding ethnic difference
and state patriotism, the motherland is of prime importance for the Osettians
and they are ready to fight to the last drop of their blood in order to defend it.
Their president is the symbol of their state. The more they abuse Eduard
Kokoity, the more authority and sympathy he acquires. The Georgian
authorities excessively evaluate the possibilities of Ossetians living in the
Georgian regions in the matter of a resolution of the South Ossetian problem,
as they are Georgianized and are an alien element for the Ossetians living in
Tskhinvali. Their opinions do not carry any weight for Ossetians living in
Tskhinvali. At this stage I consider it necessary to establish such peace, which
prevailed until at least two months ago [31].
Nothing need be added. It is obvious, that the Member of Parliament
meant a restoration of the status quo in the region and its strict preservation,
as on the grounds of the Dagomis agreement.
It is a good saying: a bad peace is better than a good war. Georgia
should have followed this generally recognized truth. But it did not do so:
rhetoric phraseology was quickly followed by innovations, that caused alarm
among not only the de facto leaders of the conflict regions and Russia, but
even also to the General Secretary of the UN.
These innovations were connected with a declaration that Kodori
Ravine was North Abkhazia and the ensuing legislative acts, which meant
the liquidation of the militia, the so called Kvitsiani group, composed of local
inhabitants, the transfer of the government of Abkhazia in exile to Kodori, the
bringing of regular armed formations into Kodori and so on.
A similar innovation was accomplished in the Tskhinvali region, a
provisional administrative unit of approximately a third of the district was
formed on the territory controlled by Georgia, at the head of which was
appointed Vladimir Sanakoyev who that time was in opposition to Kokoity.
He was a former official and now he was announced as an alternative, pro-
Georgian force against the regime existing in Tskhinvali. This was followed
by investment of large amounts from the state budget in this new
administrative unit for the restoration of cultural-educational and social
infrastructure, all of which was devoured by the August war. Vladimir
Sanakoyevs work for the restoration of friendship between the Georgian and
Ossetian peoples living in one state was propagandized in every way. He was
taken to different international gatherings and spoke at these meetings. This
innovation was even liked by the American ambassador, who made an
official statement regarding it [32].
It is not difficult to guess that in this case M. Saakashvili imitated V.

Putin, who in his fatal battle against the Chechen people had used the political
status of the Kadyrov family and especially that of Kadyrov junior this
implying a general assistance given to the political group controlled by Russia
and loyal to Russia, which is in opposition to the national-liberation movement
of the Chechen people. This innovation still seems justified to Russia,
though it cost enormous sums from the budget to keep up this ugly regime.
Moreover, together with money, a huge Russian arsenal guards this
undertaking of Putin. Georgia had neither resources, nor military capabilities
for such an experiment. This project was doomed to failure from the very
beginning.
There were political parties and statesmen, who from the very beginning
critically evaluated these innovations of M. Saakashvili. For example, the
spectrum of oppositional parties responded to the innovations accomplished
in Abkhazia with the following statement: "Not taking into account democratic
principles, setting up of a cult of violence, ignoring of the supremacy of the
law and a constant insulting of the respect of its own citizens formed a rich
soil for enemies to use the Georgian state as a place of armed adventure.
Saakashvilis good-for-nothing and irresponsible government still more than
once will confront the country with great danger" [33]. This document was
signed by the New Rights, Republicans, Conservatives, Peoples
Front, Labor Party and the Industrialists.
Georgian newspapers wrote: One of the main intentions of the
organization of adventure in Kodori Ravine was the provocation of an
unbalanced mind and was distinguished by its impulsive actions. The
Georgian government began a broad-scaled armed operation in this
strategically very important and sensitive region... Georgia might have
obtained one more hearth of destabilization instead of the most important
strategic bridgehead in the Kodori Ravine [34].
An eminent and respected Georgian political statesman, one of the
outstanding leaders of the National-Liberation Movement, Nodar Natadze,
clearly stated on the formation of the temporary administrative unit: Kokoity
and Sanakoyev are players of a team directed from Russia.
One more was added to these innovations of Saakashvili. This was the
building of patriotic camps in strategically sensitive flashpoints such as
Kodori Ravine and Ganmukhuri. They also changed the status quo in the
region and, as I have already mentioned, we deserved the criticism of the
General Secretary of the UN, Ban Ki-moon who in a special statement
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demanded the dismantling of these camps, the withdrawal of the Abkhazian

government from Kodori and so on [35].
For those who study in detail the chronology of events from January 2004
to August 2008, M. Saakashvilis irresponsible cat-and-mouse behavior, his
explicit playing with fire in Abkhazia and Samachablo will become obvious.
His policy towards the mentioned regions did not look like activity directed
with wisdom and political flair, but, as we have already mentioned, it was
similar to the conduct of the shepherd boy who cries wolf.
M. Saakashvilis government with its immature, unbalanced politics, in
four years not only did not relax but strained to the limit the situation in the
conflict regions, which was exactly in the plans of the lying in wait wolf,
i.e., the aggressor, and as soon as its chance came, it rushed to tear the
sheep, and no one came to the aid of the boy shepherd.
The chronicle of events we have studied confirms that from January 2004
to August 2008 there was always tension, shooting and mutual claims in
Tskhinvali. There was no necessity for the Georgian government to start a
large-scaled confrontation with separatists in August, 2008, and also we
should remember the fact that all Georgias strategic allies were insisting on
not leading any provocation so as not to give a pretext to Russians, but the
President of Georgia, guarantor of the safety and territorial integrity of the
country, readily resorted to inadequate measures by using artillery and
bombing his own citizens in Tskhinvali.
5. Due to understandable reasons, the main hero of this work The Little
War that Shook the World is the former President of Georgia, Mr. Mikhail
Saakashvili. If we take into account who the editor is (Mr. David
Darchiashvili) and the publisher (Mr. Gigi Tevzadze), we should assume that
the work under review would offer the reader the merit of this political
statesman, show and analyze his features, and reach corresponding
conclusions.
It is really so. The author rather boldly paints the portrait of this
controversial political person, who should be evaluated in future by Georgian
history objectively: a brash and brilliant pro-Western leader of the Rose
Revolution in November 2003, Saakashvili made no secret of his desire to
liberate his country from Russian domination.
So what about when he handed the most significant strategic and
economic objects of the country to Russian business either secretly or openly?
Enter Mikheil Saakashvili, who was another large Georgian personality
with aspirations of changing his country and the region. The Kremlin would
come to despise him even more than Shevardnadze.
Flamboyant, brash, and at times autocratic, Saakashvili was determined

to paint on a larger historical canvas. (Dear reader, how do you like that?
A.D.).
Saakashvili soon became a poster child for the Bush Administrations
freedom agenda and "democracy promotion efforts, It was the David the
Builder side of him.
We cannot argue with the author. M. Saakashvili was really declared to be
the poster child of George Bush, the President of the US, a Beacon of
democracy haunted by David Agmashenebelis example.
Is such evaluation and description just, or is it that M. Saakashvili does
not deserve so much praise?
Objectivity requires us to remark that the author has critical expressions
concerning M. Saakashvili as well and they are rather many: I think
Saakashvili misinterprets the position of Bush and his administration. (We
obviously deal with political myopia! A.D.), In order that Saakashvili would
not become conceited owing to such support. (Political lack of restraint
A.D.), Because of an unbalanced Saakashvili.36 (political unsteadiness
A.D.). These are rather strict statements, but they do not conceal positive
evaluations and we consider them to be criticism which places its object in an
especially suitable situation. This is a well-approbated method in literature, to
describe a negative character but to accentuate such of his features so that one
treats him with sympathy. This method is well known to Hollywood
producers. They sometimes present criminals and recidivists so that the
audience even sympathizes with them.
I had come to such an idea when I noticed, that the respected author does
not give his critical remarks a complete form, limits himself to a general
statement. We do not know what he means when referring to M. Saakashvilis
unsteadiness, or that he was an incorrigible bully, or an autocrat etc.
Normally these are not mere phrases, are they? But in our respected
authors work these are in fact just mere phrases. Behind them there is the fate
of a country, the fate of ordinary people, the Aprasidzes, Girgvlianis,
Robakidzes and many others, the distorted historical path of the country, are
they not?
In our opinion, the authors mistake in regard to Saakashvili is that the
latter and his political team are shown in the book isolated, separated from
Georgia and from the Georgian people. Nowhere is seen the attitude of
Georgian society towards its president or opinions and evaluations of the
parties in opposition.
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Unfortunately, the author cannot see the transformation, which M.

Saakashvilis group made. There is no evaluation of why the Triumvirate of
Burdjanadze, Saakashvili and Zhvania disintegrated, or of how rapidly the
political coalition of Saakashvili began to disintegrate.6 There is no analysis as
to why S. Zurabishvili, the diplomat brought up in France, and Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Georgia, left Saakashvilis group, etc.
And what is more, the socio-economic situation of that society on which
the author worked so much is not studied. We think that without a thorough
study of this situation in Georgia we cannot understand those events in foreign
policy which our respected author tries to relate.
The author of the work under review wants to assure us that M.
Saakashvili took this tragic step in August 2008, because he did not believe
he could survive as president of Georgia if he failed to defend Georgian
citizens in those areas he still controlled; he believed his oath as president to
defend his citizens and his countrys territorial integrity required him to do
nothing less.
To defend his citizens - it seems the author was not given typical
examples of Saakashvili defending his citizens: facts of the barbaric eviction
of refugees from temporary shelters by the help of SWAT, in order to sell
these buildings profitably or to hand them over for one lari to some money-
bags.
To defend his citizens - when honored representatives of the Georgian
intelligentsia were sacked and thrown into the street and this reform was
conducted so masterly, that those left at work became blind executives of the
evil will of the government, and did not even utter a word on the illegal
sacking of their colleagues.
To defend his citizens - when material levers in the hands of the
government were transformed into the confrontation and separation of the
population and a weapon of boundless domination over it.
To defend his citizens - when age discrimination became the rule and
clever and professional workers of Georgia were dismissed from their
employment, the organs of state administration were filled with teenagers and
ignorant non-professionals and military affairs were led by a custom officer,
economics by a former dancer, culture by a former member of the Mkhedrioni,
a criminal military group, and so on. This policy yielded results very soon.
In short, to defend his citizens did not really worry Saakashvili.
6
Koba Davitashvili left the coalition as early as February 200, Zviad Dzidziguri in the May and
so on continuously.
Then, what was he attempting? What were his concerns?

He was worrying because he wanted to retain his own power while
wanting simultaneously to swim in the whirlpool of hedonism.
One observation of the author of the work under review is interesting: the
outcome, Saakashvili believed, would be such a political debacle that his
government would not survive; He did not believe he could survive as
president of Georgia if he failed to defend the Georgian citizens in those areas
he still controlled; His action was a desperate response to... his conviction
that he would never survive politically if he stood by and did nothing, He
did not believe he could survive politically at home if he did nothing to try to
defend the thousands of Georgian citizens in the conflict regions (underlined
by us A.D.) [37].
Thus, the author assures us that M. Saakashvilis actions in those tragic
days were forced upon him and if he did not act so, he would not retain his
power.
But he did retain it, did he not? M. Saakashvili lost the war, could not
regain two separatist regions, shamefully ran away from the battlefield,
chewed his tie in a panic, in front of all world, lost 20% of the country,
inflicted an enormous blow against his own motherland, made mistakes or, to
put it bluntly, committed crimes which will take decades to remedy, and not
only retained his power but consolidated and strengthened it inconceivably,
enriched it with totalitarian elements, and insulted Georgian people in every
possible way. For example, after losing the war he enjoyed living in his new
ostentatious palace, invited suspicious masseuses, wandered abroad to eat
sushi, flew to Milan on a shopping expedition, to Bodrum for entertainment
and so on, adapted the constitution to his personal interests, strengthened and
encouraged impudence among his party, formed punitive brigades called
zonder brigades etc. i.e., made everything that a worthless leader might do to
his people.
Let us leave M. Saakashvili for a while and return to the book under
review...
We noted that the author devoted a special passage to the Kosovo
precedent and the results of the Bucharest summit that, in his opinion, became
the impulse for the breaking out of the War of August 2008.
The author also says that the doubt of Western politicians hindered the
integration of Georgia into Europe. The lukewarm European support for
Georgia... reflected real doubts about Tbilisis democratic reforms at home.;
Berlin thought Saakashvili was hyping the Russian threat to deflect attention
from his own democratic shortcomings (underlined by us A.D.);
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He (G. Bush Junior) and Merkel saw the same weaknesses and shortcomings
in Georgia; He (Sarkozy) had a more relaxed view of Saakashvilis style and
shortcomings.
Such expressions on Saakashvilis shortcomings are many in the book.
But what are the political shortcomings he speaks about: what infringements
of democracy does he mention? The author is suspiciously silent here.
The respected author is not interested in this issue, he does not delve into
the problem, he thinks his quotes of short phrases pronounced by Saakashvili
will envelope those shortcomings, defects and obvious crimes of M.
Saakashvilis government which existed for a whole nine years in Georgia.
The author should have collected all the materials on those defects and
shortcomings in detail, that Saakashvilis government had committed, as it is
just because of these we were not received into NATO, nor in the EU, and will
never be received, if we are not true and faithful followers of those principles,
towards which we are striving so boldly outwardly. However inwardly the old
mentality and impetuous striving towards power let the Georgian government
make fatal mistakes once again.
The respected author has said nothing in his work under review on one of
the main characteristics of the Georgian president - his demagogy and his
mendacity, which is pernicious for any country. The president in fact is a
terrible liar. We will give only one example confirming this: the Georgian
president declared at a well-attended meeting of parliament on 12 August,
2008, which was attended by five European presidents and many Nationals:
Russia brought in Georgia 1,200 tanks in an hour, i.e., more than were
brought in Afghanistan during the first days, more than were brought in
Czechoslovakia...
But the Georgian president named quite a different number, five to seven
hundred, at the meeting of the Temporary Parliamentary Commission [38].
That the number given by the president is certainly false, becomes clear by
the fact that a total of 1,200 tanks (from Germany and the USSR) took part in
one of the largest tank battles of all time at the village of Prokhorovka during
World War II.
The Georgian president certainly lied before the five European presidents
and what is more, for the umpteenth time before his own people.
The respected author does not say anything about the shameful fleeing of
the Georgian president from the battlefield, when he left the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of France and ran so fast that even his guard could not catch us
with him. Frightened, he fell to the ground and embarrassed Georgians before
the whole world, for the umpteenth time too! It happened at the frontier town
of Gori.
Although it is impossible that Asmuss quick eye failed to notice, as he
notices everything and sees everything; how similar were the political steps or
reforms made by M. Saakashvili and V. Putin, despite using the bad
language used by Saakashvili towards Putin, such as referring to him as
Lilliputin and insulting him in many other ways.
I will show you some examples:
1. Saakashvili started an educational reform and established the

National Common Entrance Exam and so on in 2005. Putins
government carried out the same educational reform a little later
which caused serious alarm among the Russian intelligentsia.
2. V. Putin created R. Kadyrovs shameful regime in Chechnya at the
beginning of the XXI century, after the suppression of the National-
Liberation Movement of the Chechen people, and by means of this
regime he tries to obtain the loyalty of Chechnya by pouring an
enormous amount of money into the country and bribing the local
political elite. In 2007 M. Saakashvili created the Provisional
administrative unit of South Ossetia on the basis of the Georgian
villages of the Akhalgori district and South Ossetia, appointing V.
Sanakoev as its head which we have already mentioned. Putins
novelty still justifies his hopes, and M. Saakashvilis novelty has
failed.
3. Saakashvili started a reform of the Academy of Sciences of Georgia
in 2006. Institutes, and what is more their property, were taken away
from the Academy. Institutes were joined to Universities, and the
freed buildings were sold. They destroyed Georgian research, paying
no attention to the protest of Georgian scholars.
4. V. Putins government carried out the same reform in 2013 when he
wished to modernize the Academy of Sciences of Russia by the
expropriation of their property, and the discharging of the
management of the institutes.
5. Saakashvili advanced an offer on economic amnesty after losing the
parliamentary elections in 2012 that meant the amnesty of illegally
enriched people and the pardon of embezzlers of an enormous amount
of state property during his rule. Thanks to the principled position of
the new parliament, this initiative was not successful.
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Vladimir Putin in 2013 made his obedient State Duma adopt the law on
economic amnesty, which contextually repeats the ideas of M. Saakashvili
in many ways.
Thus, the beacon of democracy, Mikheil Saakashvili, and the despot
Vladimir Putin think similarly on many questions and this raises doubts in me.
Generally, I would like to share my observation with my readers. I
suppose, that one circumstance does not correspond with historical logic and
requires special study; all three presidents of Georgia: Zviad Gamsakhurdia,
Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikheil Saakashvili were or are suspiciously
connected to the intelligence service of the USSR, the infamous KGB,
regarding their biographies: Zviad Gamsakhurdia was a person tortured in a
KGB prison, Eduard Shevardnadze was closely connected, due to his position,
to this organization, and Mikheil Saakashvili, by means of his uncle and some
details of his biography.
Is it a simple coincidence or is some pattern hidden in these three cases?
The result is the same for the Georgian people. None of them could take
Georgia forward, none of them could achieve its historic aim, and they could
not fulfill promises given to the people, but all created many problems.
6. I would like to dwell on one issue, scarcely mentioned in the book of
the respected author: Matt Bryza was a senior American official in the State
Department responsible for Georgia and the person who bore the brunt of
Georgian frustration, but he was also the person with whom they shared their
most sensitive fears and thoughts.
This statement does not correspond to the truth. Matthew Bryza provoked
smiles due to his helplessness and became at the end of his work in Georgia
the hero of many jokes, as he did not bear the brunt of Georgian frustration
and was not the person with whom they shared their most sensitive fears and
thoughts, but he did indeed bear the brunt of M. Saakashvilis frustrations
and hopes and was the person with whom M. Saakashvili shared his most
sensitive fears and thoughts.
There were talks in the lobbies of a secret connection between
representatives of the official government with this American high-ranking
person, on his wonderful wedding in Turkey and so on.
He really should have known best of all the frustration of Georgians, the
shortcomings of the Georgian government in the process of the
democratization of the country, those illegal activities and violation of
elementary human rights and freedom that had taken place during
Saakashvilis regime in Georgia which was the main reason why we stayed
outside NATO. Thus, Matthew Bryza is responsible not only because he did
not inform the US administration of the cultivation of a really antidemocratic

course in Georgia, but also because he failed to report its presidents excessive
autocratic behavior.
Witty Georgians compared Matthew Bryza with the instructor of the
Central Committee of the CPSU. These instructors terrified secretaries of the
local Central Committees in the period of communist dictatorship. Georgians
were even whispering in lobbies that none of the instructors of the Central
Committee would have given the right to the first secretary to commit so many
mistakes and violations as did M. Saakashvilis government. But Matthew
Bryza was silent, G. Bush (junior) was silent, America was silent.
By the way, I would like to attract your attention to the relations between
M. Saakashvili and the US administration. The fact that the American
administration had paid attention to Saakashvili as early as at the beginning of
the 1990s, in the period of his studying and working in America, will be
thoroughly investigated by historians in the future such as why they oriented
exactly on M. Saakashvili? He was the nephew of a KGB general, closing
related to the Communist Party of Georgia, Central Committee and Tbilisi
Civil Committee, was he not?
But it is clear, that he was a blue-eyed boy, a beacon of democracy
etc. for G. Bush (junior). R. D. Asmus puts forward this thesis every possible
moment, but this unprincipled liberalism, which the US administration showed
towards M. Saakashvilis government is incomprehensible: they closed their
eyes on the illegal use of administrative resources during the elections,
violation of human rights, serious discrimination of oppositional political
parties, escalation of violence, the use of zonder brigades, the cultivation
of pocket televisions, the ignoring of the mass-media and so on.
Were they not correctly informed? Then John Tefft, the ambassador of the
US in Tbilisi, together with Matthew Bryza are guilty, who, it seems, did not
provide Washington with the correct information and like Bryza was
fascinated by the deeds of the blue-eyed boy.
One case described by the author provokes a smile. It concerns one of the
last meetings of M. Saakashvili with the Bush administration. Here is what the
author writes: Bildt spent the next hour trying to convince Saakashvili that
such thinking was folly, that a military solution was a chimera... Bildt
nevertheless left the dinner worried. He immediately let his American
colleagues know of the conversation, including his concern that Saakashvili
was misreading the signals coming from the Bush Administration. Washington
was stunned by Bildts report. Senior officials went back and reviewed the
records of the Oval Office meeting between Bush and Saakashvili. The
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American president had been clear that he would support Georgia, including at
the Bucharest summit, but he had underscored that there were to be no
surprises and no use of force [39].
This extract really indicates that M. Saakashvili was a bad partner even for
the US and was misreading the signals coming from the Bush
Administration, and, in fact, periodically information did appear in the
Georgian media that should there be military aggression against Georgia,
Washington would assist us. In our opinion this bait was spread by M.
Saakashvilis special PR services, but fairness requires us to note, that in the
case described in the book, M. Saakashvili made an official statement, that
talks on military assistance from America do not correspond with the truth
[40].
But, generally, the administration of the US with its policy of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of Georgia, did not seem to note the anti-
democratic activity and autocratic methods of governing of M. Saakashvili.
For example G. Bush stated at the meeting with Saakashvili in March 2008,
that he did not doubt that democracy flourished in Georgia and that he
believed the country would be received in NATO. Saakashvilis methods
rendered us a disservice. We were neither accepted into NATO, nor were we
given MAP, and were left face to face with the furious Russian bear.
7. The reaction of Mr D. Darchiashvili, editor of the book, on a significant
fact, related by the author is worthy of attention. It refers to the idea of
creating a confederation. The respected author remarks: The separatist
leadership of Abkhazia and South Ossetia demanded full independence.
Georgia counteracted by offering far-reaching autonomy as part of a loose
confederation. The author develops an analogous thought in other places in
the book too, and provokes a reciprocal remark by Darchiashvili. Incidentally
it is the only remark of the editor and that is why we paid attention to it:
Supposedly, the author does not mean the juridical meaning of this term and
emphasizes the general principles of the distribution of sovereignty. The fact is
that the Georgian government did not offer a model of confederation for these
regions.
Such an irritated reaction by the editor makes one wonder and, in our
opinion, points to something.
The author obviously heard from Georgian high ranking officials within
the limits of a loose confederation and not in the limits of confederation
somewhere, maybe sitting at a table or on the Kopala balcony.
Today, a confederative union in its authentic meaning practically does not
exist anywhere. Even the Swiss confederation is a federation in reality.
There has been much discussion in Georgia during the past few years on
territorial organization. There are scholars and experts who categorically
oppose the federal system of Georgia and consider it to be damaging the
country: these views were shown especially boldly at the discussion held at the
Ivane Javakhishvili Institute of History and Ethnology on the 17 February
2005 when the eminent Georgian scholars: Academician M. Lortkipanidze,
Academician D. Muskhelishvili, Professor B. Savaneli, Professor A.
Bendianishvili and others pointed to the negative results of federation, and
even worse of a confederation for the country, on the grounds of an analysis of
the historical development of Georgia.
But I will say as a piece of information, that when at the end of the 1920s
the question of the territorial organization of Georgia became so acute and
when the central committee of the CC of the CP of Georgia had to fight not
only against secret separatism, but also against the problem of the
autonomization of some regions of Georgia, the well-known scholar and
politician, M. Tsereteli, dedicated a special article to this problem in the
periodicals of the Georgian community in Paris, and announced Switzerland as
a possible and acceptable model for Georgia in future: the political system of
Georgia should be the union of autonomic cantons; every region of Georgia
should be given the possibility of arranging its own life [41].
An extract from the shorthand record of interrogating the Georgian
president, M. Saakashvili strongly hints of the conduct of secret talks with the
separatist regimes. This record was made when the parliamentary provisional
commission interrogated the president after the War of August. M.
Saakashvili said at the time, we offered and still offer Abkhazians the chance
to govern Georgia together with us, by dividing our authority. As a result, if
we had announced Sukhumi to be the federal center, it would have been the
subject of talks. Obviously the Georgian authorities were making more than
necessary concessions during negotiations with the separatists. Saakashvilis
chimerical idea of moving the capital from Tbilisi to Sukhumi was changed to
the idea of moving the capital after the lost War of August 2008 from Tbilisi
to Kutaisi.
After such facts it is hard to believe the evaluation of the author that he
was haunted by the example of David Agmashenebeli."
Where did Asmus see this? What revealed it to him?
8. I would not be able to leave out one more remark made in the book
without reacting: There was a war going on, but Tbilisi seemed untouched by
it, with people still partying and enjoying themselves [43]. This idea was born
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in the minds of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France and people

accompanying him A.D.
The editor, it seems, did not notice this very insulting remark for
Georgians, but I understand why. He knows perfectly well why it happened.
Georgian people made the greatest sacrifices in fighting for freedom and
democracy in World War II, when 700 thousand citizens of Georgia were
fighting in anti-fascist groups of different countries; there was unbelievable
enthusiasm in factories and plants, on the collective farms in scholarly
organizations and in the cultural establishments of Georgia. Such things
happen only when people and government are united in their common battle.
So, what happened in Georgia in August, 2008 that Tbilisi seemed
untouched by it, with people "still partying and enjoying themselves?
The respected author should know and I believe, he knows it perfectly
well that such thing happen only in the case when there is an insuperable gulf
between the people and the government, when the government is hated and
helpless, when people do not believe a word it says and when the government
is incapable of uniting the people against the enemy and lead them to the
desired victory.
And when this is so, and when the government is a liar and helpless, the
bridge is broken between the government and the people, as happened and was
noted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France. History knows of such
events, for example when in 1940 there was established the Vichy regime in
France, after the latters defeat by Germany, etc.
In Georgia M. Saakashvili personally in the war did everything in order to
disarm Georgian people psychologically and morally. Those who could win
this war: clever, balanced, highly qualified patriots and faithful Georgians,
were deliberately left at home by Saakashvilis government. The country was
governed by representatives of non-professionals, conformists and nihilists
selected by Saakashvili.
The authority deprived the Georgian people of initiative from the very
beginning. M. Saakashvilis government provoked the disorientation of the
population by its mutually exclusive statements that could not be an accidental
phenomenon and needs special study. Here we refer to M. Saakashvilis and T.
Iakobashvilis statements on TV on 7 August 2008. Saakashvili had long
before the war lost the Georgians confidence and in such a situation he would
not be suited for a role of national hero, fighting against the enemy. The reality
was that the whole world saw what a hero he was in Gori, lying on the ground,
fleeing from the battlefield before the eyes of Kushner, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of France.
9. The author of the book under review discusses the plan of conflict
settlement with the separatist regions of Georgia put forward by Steinmeier the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany but actually by the large and strong
state of Germany, which the author accuses of indifference towards Georgians.
We suppose that this plan with its realism and, what is more, with resources
for its accomplishment, frightened parties wishing to continue the conflict, and
the August adventure was conducted exactly in order to bury this plan.
Franz-Walter Steinmeiers peaceful plan envisaged: 1. Non-renewal of fire
and an unconditional return of refugees, 2. Official registration of agreement
on economic collaboration between the sides, 3. Definition of the status of
Abkhazia.
We think that this project is distinguished for its importance. It connects
two necessary components: the official registration of the agreement on the
non-usage of fire which was the dream of both Abkhazians and Ossetians and
the unconditional returning of refugees to their own dwellings which was the
Georgians dream.
Undoubtedly, the initiator of this plan, from the powerful state of
Germany, was Chancellor Angela Merkel who would have tried to realize it.
This plan was approved by the main European states, as it was just and
peaceful. Discussion regarding it and its usage as a basis, would have moved
this prolonged conflict from a dead end and would have planned concrete
ways towards its settlement.
That is why the plan was not accepted. With the beginning of hostilities in
the region, all peaceful attempts, the great work carried out by the peoples
diplomacy were abandoned, blood was shed once more, refugees appeared
again, and roads connecting the opposing parties were closed for a long time.
THAT WAS NOT SAID IN THIS BOOK

The book is finished, which concerns a very dramatic event for our
country, the War of August 2008, and if we are to believe the author it shook
the world.
Dear author, you are not right, it did not shake the world! Leading
countries do not act in this way when the world shakes.
Hitlers aggression shook the world; Saddam Husseins action shook
the world and the amoral conduct of Bashar Asad shook the world.
Measures were taken against them, and the aggressors were forgiven nothing.
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The world made both material and human sacrifices and won. It happens so,
when aggression "shakes the world.
The fact that the international community and leading democratic
countries, did not support the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia by Russia, an independence from Georgia, that in fact meant
incorporation into Russia and reproached Russia does not mean, in my
opinion, that the world was shaken.
Russia was the aggressor of the War of August 2008: it did not have the
right to violate the border of a sovereign state unilaterally, without discussion
and the consent of the international community, without a resolution of the
Security Council of the UN, even if the barbaric bombardment of Tskhinvali
by Saakashvili, as an inadequate answer to the military activity of illegal
Ossetian units on the border sector, were its cause. The world could have
passed M. Saakashvili to the Hague tribunal as happened in the case of
Miloshevich.
In my opinion, the international community rather calmly watched events
in the South Caucasus and actually has not done anything yet to eradicate the
results of Russian aggression.
But I would like to share my ideas and my pain on the events of August
2008 to readers as to provoke this event and who assisted the development of
this event in such a way that it was only Georgia which incurred losses.
Let us begin:
1. By an irony of fate, Mikheil Saakashvili, who was brought up in the

family of a KGB general, as his own father had left him, his uncle on his
mothers side became his educator and friend. He was taught English by the
son of Kandid Charkviani, the First Secretary of the CCCP of Georgia who
was one of the successful cadres of Stalin-Beria, was educated at the
International Law Department of Kiev University, bosom of the Soviet
nomenclature, did military service in KGB military units for reasons unknown
to us and received the care of the secretaries of the CC and TC: hence
according to all written or unwritten laws, he was a perfect candidate for the
post of instructor for the CC of AULYCL or for a post of secretary of the
Tbilisi party committee and finally to become the third president of Georgia.
2. He patently supported the Military Council in January 1992 before the
arrival of Shevardnadze in Tbilisi and criticized the experience of Z.
Gamsakhurdia in talks on international relations regarding policy undertaken
towards Ossetians in an article published in the official organ of the new
government Georgian Republic (see Georgian Republic, 1992, 31

January).
3. M. Saakashvili left his native country and went to the US to study, as
soon as Shevardnadze arrived. He did not take part in the civil war, did not
shed his own blood and sweat in the building of a new Georgia, until Z.
Zhvania noticed him, brought him back to Tbilisi and united him with
Shevardnadzes group. Here he became one of the most ardent flatterers of
Shevardnadze, quickly made his political career in the Union of Citizens,
successfully headed Shevardnadzes faction in parliament, defended
Shevardnadzes domestic and foreign policy and became his Minister of
Justice. The whole country remembers how Shevardnadze led him by the hand
before the elections, in order that he could win.
4. When Georgians became so irritated by Eduard Shevardnadzes regime,
uncertainty and corruption, that Shevardnadze seemed to them the source of
everything evil, just then the blue-eyed boy, fighter for justice and western
orientation, the menace of corrupt functionaries, the uncompromised fighter
for the interests of Georgia, who dexterously stabbed" the person who had led
him by the hand, who had helped him in his career, became the head of a
Triumvirate who ruined the international recognition and merit of Eduard
Shevardnadze accumulated during decades though, we must add, it was
partially the latter's own fault.
5. M. Saakashvili masterly used millions of dollars of G. Soros, B.
Patarkatsishvili and B. Ivanishvili. He set out to fulfill the great wish of the
Georgian people to free their country from total corruption, to establish true
democracy, to finally unite our country and to become a member of NATO
and the EU, to create conditions for a happy and comfortable life. In
November 2003 he threw off from the throne his master and well-wisher,
together with the latter's confederates.
6. The hopes were strong but equally weak were the foundations. From the
very beginning Saakashvili was a Russian project. The share of Igor Ivanov,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, in the successful end of the Rose
Revolution, the arrival of the landing party of Russian businessmen in the
very first months of Saakashvilis presidency, the increasing influence of
businessman Kakha Bendukidze, who had close relations with Putin, the
beginning of an intensive friendship with the Russian president, i.e., the
"honeymoon," the intensifying of positive rhetoric with his neighbor, the quick
hopes of a settlement of relations with the conflict regions and the prospect of
a possibility of a withdrawal of Russian military bases, which in fact was the
achievement of E. Shevardnadze, all indicate this.
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In my opinion, the subsequent intensification of anti-Russian rhetoric, the

worsening of personal relations with the Russian leadership was evidently a
mask for carrying out really pro-Russian activities such as stirring up anti-
Georgian hysteria in Russia, the victims of which appeared to be Georgians
living in Russia, the greatest Georgian diaspora in the world, with all the
ensuing social and economic consequences.
7. But the political ugliness of Saakashvili became evident very soon:
because of discord, the coalition began breaking up the first to leave being
Koba Davitashvili followed by many others: only those, connected to the
president by blood, i.e., lawlessness, injustice and crime, stayed with him,
such as the unprincipled remains of the political group of Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, the Mkhedrioni and E. Shevardnadzes political groups. The
mysterious death of Zurab Zhvania and the dispute with Nino Burdjanadze
finished this process leaving M. Saakashvilis group as a monolithic political
unit, and this should become the object of a special study dealing with, for
example, a synthesis of such political figures as the former members of Z.
Zhvanias group: M. Machavariani, K. Gogorishvili, G. Baramidze and others,
the Zviadists with E. Kherkheulidze, I. Ochiauri, Z. Tsiklauri and others and
those of one more group who God only knows where they came from: Chiora
Taktakishvili, Giorgi Bokeria and others similar to them, is of great interest. A
surprising feature occurred as that generation could easily say white was
black and black was white and look into your eyes simultaneously
displaying both their unscrupulousness and servility. What could they have in
common? A common crime before the Georgian people is the mortar of this
monolith.
8. The illogical cat-and-mouse game with the Abkhazians and
Ossetians, the frivolous attitude towards the most complicated regional
problems, the thoughtless cancelation of the status of Adjara, which was badly
perceived both in Georgia and abroad, the changing of the existing status-quo
on territories adjacent to the conflict regions: the declaration of Kodori as
North Abkhazia, the transfer of the Abkhazian Government in exile to
Kodori, the formation of the provisional administrative unit of South Ossetia,
the arranging of patriotic camps, irresponsible statements and actions and the
ignoring of the peoples diplomatic attempts, artificially complicated the
situation many times during the period 2004-2008, which sometimes had fatal
results, for example, the shame of Tskhinvali and finally the massive
artillery bombardment of Tskhinvali during the night of 7 August 2008.
9. The majority of the Georgian population was unemployed. Social
reforms were carried out deliberately so that the employed part of society
opposed the unemployed. In the budget organizations only those loyal to the
authorities were left whose salaries were increased at the expense of their
dismissed colleagues. Against the background of Shevardnadzes total poverty
this increase was such kindness that this section of society forgot that their
material welfare was due to the material humiliation of their former
colleagues, and adjusted to it. In fact they entered into an alliance with
Saakashvilis regime and became his political and economic supporters. This
was the first victory of conformism.
Georgian society was actually split as a result; one part of society opposed
the other. Direct and indirect increasing of taxes, inflation, the existence of the
most complicated and unresolved problems excluded the making of any
unbalanced steps, especially those of military nature, from a country like this
had become.
10. The significant intellectual and experienced part of the society was
subjected to age segregation resulting in the fact that the most experienced,
authoritative, learned and balanced people were sacked from all state,
scholarly and public organizations and many of these unfortunates could not
stand their new situation psychologically and died. They were replaced by
inexperienced, poorly qualified people who knew only elementary English.
Having done this, the government artificially broke off the essential close
connection among the old, middle and young generations in society and thus
weakened the whole of Georgia. There cannot be found an analogue of such a
disgrace in the world. By this action they ensured the loyalty of socially
promoted teenagers" to the regime, which gained them what they did not
deserve. This was the second victory of conformism.
11. The large creative unions, the National Academy of Sciences of
Georgia, the unions of writers, composers and architects were all persecuted
and oppressed and their role which had always been very important for
Georgian society was belittled, their property was sold and their former great
authority was undermined.
12. The trade union movement with its enormous amount of property, the
cornerstone of the defense of human rights and freedom in democratic
countries, was transformed into pocket trade union of the government. They
deprived it of real rights and resources and appropriated and squandered its
enormous property. The fact, that the trade union movement was neglected by
all three presidents Z. Gamsakhurdia, E. Shevardnadze and M. Saakashvili
also needs a special study.
13. There was a permanent restriction of democratic rights and freedoms,
persecution and oppression of oppositional parties and oppositional ideas,
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restriction of the freedom of their action, a reduction of the rights of the mass-
media and an increase of the number of pocket televisions, and finally the
constitution was altered several times with the sole object of permanently
maintaining Saakashvili's power permanently.
All this happened in the period when the possibility of Georgia becoming
a member of the international organizations of NATO and the EU was
completely dependent on the degree of democracy in the country. Thus,
Saakashvili blocked the possibility of membership in these organizations by
his domestic policy.
14. The barbaric breaking up of the peaceful demonstration on 7th
November, 2007, the use of tear-gas against demonstrators, injustice
committed against the owners of Imedi TV and so on indicate the anti-
democratic nature of M. Saakashvilis regime.
15. The oppression of free business, the control of the main directions of
business, the substitution of E. Shevardnadzes businessmen by new ones
subordinate to government control, the illegal alienation of state property,
inappropriate spending, cultivation of despicable form of disposing of state
property for a symbolic sum of 1-2 lari (supposedly about 27 thousand cases),
the establishing of an atmosphere of nepotism and cronyism in the economy
of Georgia and so on.
16. The politicization of the electoral process, the usurpation of its
leadership and the whole electoral process and the establishment of falsity
from beginning to end such as, would it be a presidential or parliamentary
election right up to 2012, the formation of a special organizational system, the
illegal use of state resources, the creation of greenhouse conditions for the
candidates acceptable for the government and discrimination of oppositional
forces, the organization of artificial obstacles, persecution-oppression,
blocking of financial resources, the usurpation of the advertising sphere, and
even terror.
17. Despite the fact that the political forces of Abkhazians, Ossetians and
Russians, etc. opposing Georgia were consolidating in 2004-2008, the
Georgian government was signing agreements on mutual assistance, for
example, Abkhazians and Ossetians against Georgia and so on. M.
Saakashvilis government used neither the tribune nor the capabilities of the
CIS envisaged in the regulations of this international organization, nor did it
use the potential of the Black Sea Countries Organization, and what is more,
nor the greatest possibilities of GUAM, this very important union of Ukraine,
Azerbaidjan and Moldova also troubled by separatism like Georgia. The
question of a mutual battle against separatism has never been raised. Even
during the conflict the capabilities of none of these international regional

organizations were involved. This question also requires a scholarly study.
18. The question arises if you really know that a military conflict will
occur with Russia, if you show excessive activity towards Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, when the Russian State Duma threatens to recognize the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and strategic allies" assure you
that they will not help you if you enter into conflict with Russia - this is one
thing but if on the other hand, you know well the economic and military
capabilities of your country and that you will not be able to cope with the
invading enemy, which is worried because of the loss of its past glory in the
world and is irritated and looking for a pretext for war, you declare like a
stubborn child those who try to stir up a conflict will put my teeth on edge
(Akhali Taoba, 22 September, 2007) what is it, heroism or provocation?
Please, tell us President, whose teeth was on edge?
19. Certainly, the main political conduct for a reasonable, thinking
government under such socio-economic and moral-psychological conditions
would be to be: "meek and mild, i.e., careful, careful and once more careful,
as the Georgian opposition noted at the time. How did Saakashvili behave? He
gave Russia the chance to settle in Georgia for a long time. Why?
I suppose that the governing elite of all four sides taking part in the
conflict - Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia - wanted to break into
war: it was their urgent need.
a) Russia needed a little war to divert attention from the social problems
in its country as the economic crisis of 2008 was already approaching. The
Russian political elite, humbled on the international arena for years, looking at
the violation of its own rights as it seemed to it, irritated by the international
community ignoring its strategic interests, tried to assert its active capacity
and, besides, if it had done so with the excuse of a fatherly care of little
nations, being one of the reasons for traditional Russian aggression, it would
have strengthened its self-confidence and image of a first-rate power.
If we take into account how the language of the political elite has
changed since the War of August 2008, the amplitude of its actions, ambitions
and attitude towards the west, particularly during the late event, the conflict in
Syria, it is obvious that Putins Russia has restored its lost glory since
August 2008 by obtaining two additional military bases one in Abkhazia and
one in Ossetia.
b) The political leadership of Abkhazia and Ossetia also wanted war. They
would have disregarded all attempts of the peoples diplomacy and the world
commonwealth to settle the conflicts justly, would have closed the doors for
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those from both sides wishing to unite Georgia and would have divided
Georgian, Abkhazian and Ossetian peoples with rivers of blood.
c) Saakashvilis government needed war and it became particularly
obvious after the tragic final of the war to obtain multi-billion assistance from
the international community, to strengthen his regime economically and his
individual dictatorship and to suppress the Georgian people. All the activity of
M. Saakashvili and his political team since the tragic War of the August 2008
is the proof of this statement.
If I am mistaken and my evaluation is wrong, then M. Saakashvilis
government had to act so, as did the governments of Belgium and the
Netherlands during World War II, they surrendered to the aggressor without
fighting. A completely occupied country is easier to be freed, by the world
community than to regain 20% of its territories. Let us recollect, more than
half century has passed, but Japan has not been able to regain the Kuril Islands
up today.
And the authors mistake is just here: Saakashvili started the war not
because of political interests, but due to his desire to retain and strengthen his
own regime. That Russians did not take Tbilisi was not because of the protest
of people of goodwill but because Russia needed Saakashvilis regime in
Georgia and, also, those military bases in the regions of Abkhazia and Ossetia.
History does not remember a precedent when a president would lose a
war, lose 20% of its territories, three states would have been formed on its
territory, but would declare with self-satisfaction "we have won the war."
At present the situation is more complicated than it was in E.
Shevardnadzes time in 2003.
But all four sides are satisfied with the war's results: the Russians obtained
military bases, restored their self-respect with a little successful war, they
can boast that they destroyed in five days an army trained and armed by
American instructors and that they helped small, oppressed nations. Russia
has regained that lost tone of voice by which it always used to surprise the
world.
The war was very profitable for the political elite of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia as it resulted in the recognition and the establishing of particular
relations with Russia; uncountable millions arrived from Russia; privileges,
flats and country cottages have fallen into their hands. They fail to think of
how shamelessly and illegally they have driven away thousands of Georgians
from historical Georgian lands and it seems today that even the world
commonwealth is not especially worried concerning this question.
The authorities of Georgia also benefited by the war; they obtained a

multi-billion dollar assistance and a large amount of secret money and
subsidies were written off by the war. Easy money, though actually earned
by Georgian blood, strengthened M. Saakashvilis regime. With more money,
they gained more supporters. Saakashvili seemed to be undefeatable and he
was going to stay in politics for ever.
M. Saakashvili himself who, according to the author, if he lost the two
disputed regions would not retain his power, not only retained it, but even
strengthened it, and shamelessly increased his hedonism, with expensive
palaces, restaurants and caf-chantants, voyages abroad, suspicious masseuses
and singer-dancers.
Only long-suffering Georgia and its unhappy people suffered losses.
Dear reader, before I finish my narrative I would like to refer to one more
issue. I am not an astrologer, but observation of historical events reveal a
phenomenon, requiring attention: certain numbers point at the regularity of
positive or negative features of historical events. I published a long letter on
this subject in a Georgian newspaper in 1992. The object of my observation
was number 9 and its importance in Georgian history.
This number obviously played a very bad role in world history:
revolutions and wars are connected with this number, during the English
bourgeois revolution King Charles I was beheaded in 1649, the French
bourgeois revolution happened in 1789 and World War II started in 1939.
Great men and tragic historical persons if we examine the year of their birth
are also members of the club of nine: Napoleon Bonaparte (1769), Adolf
Hitler (1889), Lavrentiy Beria (1899), Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1939).
Number nine is also distinguished in Georgian history. On 9 March, 1902
workers in a demonstration organized by Stalin in Batumi were shot; on 9
March, 1956 a demonstration in memory of Stalin by citizens of Tbilisi were
shot; on April 9, 1989 a peaceful demonstration was broken up in Tbilisi, and
among the victims were women and girls. On April 29, 1991 a great
earthquake happened in Racha, etc.
I was afraid of number 9, while M. Saakashvili was in power. I was afraid
that something tragic would happen, that something would be spoiled, that war
would break out, and people would be harmed.
But in fact no dramatic event happened under this number during the
period of Saakashvilis rule.
But, this number appeared later - he was in power for 9 years and these
years were the years of tragic events, failure, shattered hopes for us and for the
whole of Georgia.
www.ebook3000.com
These ideas emerged in my mind when I finished reading the long book of
R. Asmus, respected American diplomat and political scientist, on the very
tragic event for Georgia, the War of August 2008, and I have tried to share my
impressions with you.
Thank you for your attention.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World, Tbilisi, 2010, p. 6.
[2] Ibid., page 95.
[3] Ibid., page 121.
[4] Ibid., page 97.
[6] Newspaper Resonance, 2004 January 16.
[7] Ibid., 2004 2 April, 8 June, 9 June and so on.
[8] R. Asmus, Op. cit., page 126.
[9] Ibid., 2010, page 128.
[10] Georgia, 90-s of the XX century, Chronicles, Tbilisi 2010, page 142.
[12] Ibid., page 135.
[14] Ibid., page 175.
[15] Ibid., pp. 33, 97-98, 114, 208-209, 211, 172 and so on.
[16] Ibid., pp. 166, 205.
[17] N. Jordania, My Past, Tbilisi, 1990, p. 112.
[19] Heinrich-Bll-Stiftung South Caucasus, p. 12.
[20] Newspaper Akhali Taoba, 2008, August 8.
[21] Ibid., 2008, August 17-23.
[22] Newspaper Resonance, 2004, February 12.
[23] Ibid., 2004, May 28.
[24] Ibid., 2004, July 5.
[26] Newspaper Akhali Taoba, 2008, January 28.
[27] Ibid., Tbilisi, August 8.
[28] R. Asmus, Op. cit., pp. 32-33.
[29] Newspaper Resonance, 2004, January 30, June 1, June 2, June 14.
[30] Newspaper Sakartvelos Respublika, 1992, June 26.
[31] Newspaper Resonance, 2004, August 10.

[32] Newspaper Akhali Taoba, 2007, May 12.
[33] Ibid., 2007, July 31.
[34] Ibid., 2007, July 31.
[35] Ibid., 2007, June 27.
[36] R. Asmus, Op. cit., pp. 157, 172.
[37] Ibid., 26, 32, 34, 43.
[39] R. Asmus, Op. cit., pp. 157-158.
[41] Newspaper Tetri Giorgi, Paris, 1930, September, no 32.
[42] ((http:?//www.civil.ge/geo/artikl.php.2id-20112, p. 11)
[43] R. Asmus, Op. cit., p. 213.
www.ebook3000.com
EDITORS CONTACT INFORMATION
Professor Alexander Daushvili

Doctor of Historical Sciences
Vice Chairman of the Board,
International Centre for Christian Studies,
Tbilisi, Georgia
Email: adaushvili@yahoo.com
INDEX
anger, 66
# annihilation, 44
anxiety, 28
20th century, 4, 79
apathy, 23
21st century, 18
appointees, 25
armed conflict, 100
A armed forces, 6, 12, 15, 48, 54, 73, 74, 100
Armenia, 23
Abkhazia, viii, 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, Armenians, 61, 89, 90, 109, 113
16, 17, 27, 28, 29, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, arrest, 10
44, 47, 49, 51, 55, 58, 59, 60, 63, 66, 72, artery, 44
73, 90, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, Asia, 91
125, 128, 129, 131, 134, 135 aspiration, 71, 91
abolition, 2 assessment, 97
abuse, 115 assimilation, 85
Afghanistan, 56, 59, 121 asymmetry, 46
age, 24, 81, 84, 119, 132 atmosphere, 133
aggression, viii, 6, 9, 10, 16, 38, 43, 44, 45, attitudes, 31
46, 50, 51, 56, 57, 60, 62, 65, 67, 68, 70, authorities, 1, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14, 22, 23, 24,
72, 91, 98, 125, 129, 134 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37,
agriculture, 23 40, 41, 44, 45, 56, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73,
airports, 71 78, 81, 83, 85, 87, 88, 98, 100, 105, 111,
Akaki Asatiani, 1 115, 126, 132, 136
Akhaltsikhe, vii, 103, 113 authority, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31,
Akhaltsikhe Educational University, vii 36, 38, 100, 110, 115, 126, 127, 132
Albania, 89 Autonomous Oblast, 13
alienation, 133 autonomy, 125
alters, 81 avoidance, 42
amplitude, 134 Azerbaijan, 23, 90
anatomy, 49
ancestors, 89
142 Index
CIS, 2, 5, 7, 9, 35, 39, 40, 62, 110, 133

B cities, 61, 104
citizens, 6, 26, 30, 31, 66, 89, 105, 116, 117,
backlash, 90
119, 120, 127, 136
Balkans, 50
civil war, 95, 130
bankers, 23
cleaning, 69, 71
barriers, 12
climate, 12
base, 30, 45, 69, 70, 73, 74, 83, 97
cold war, 92
Batumi, 61, 136
Cold War, 37, 49, 53
Beijing, 9
collaboration, 128
Belgium, 46, 135
collateral, 98
bilateral, 41
collateral damage, 98
Black Sea region, 58
collisions, 50
blame, 104
common sense, 66
blood, 28, 104, 105, 115, 128, 130, 131,
Commonwealth of Independent States, 2
135, 136
communication, 7
Bosnia, 11
communism, 1
brothers, 106
Communist Party, 124
Bulgaria, 46
community, vii, 8, 12, 16, 18, 54, 60, 67,
Bush, President, 45
126, 129, 134, 135
community support, 54
C competition, 25
complexity, 45, 46
caliber, 17 composers, 132
candidates, 84, 133 comprehension, 36
Caribbean, 36 conception, 36, 55
category a, 109 conference, vii, viii, 10
Caucasian population, 83 conflict, 5, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 27, 28, 29,
Caucasians, 7 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 49,
Caucasus, 3, 17, 39, 50, 58, 60, 102, 103, 57, 59, 62, 65, 66, 67, 68, 72, 73, 78, 85,
104, 105, 129, 137 90, 91, 93, 100, 112, 113, 115, 117, 120,
ceasefire, 15, 43, 45, 47, 48, 57, 59, 60, 63, 128, 131, 134
73 conflict prevention, 35
Central Asia, 50 confrontation, 4, 5, 17, 50, 66, 72, 78, 79,
central bank, 44 85, 89, 112, 117, 119
Central Europe, 53 consensus, 36, 56
certificate, 83, 84 consent, 61, 129
challenges, 35, 53, 59 construction, 74, 82, 83
chaos, 70 controversial, 2, 3, 104, 117
Chavchavadze, Ilia, 30, 79, 98, 113 controversies, 98
Chechens, 29 conviction, 120
chemical, 99 cooperation, 9, 38, 55, 56, 58, 59
Chicago, 61, 62 coordination, 69, 114
children, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 96 corruption, 31, 130
chimera, 124 cost, 24, 29, 116
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Index 143
covering, 26 doctors, 80
creep, 6, 35 domestic policy, 22, 27, 95, 133
crimes, 112, 120, 121 dominance, 60, 96
criminals, 118 drawing, 54, 98, 109
critical analysis, vii dream, 25, 26, 81, 113, 128
criticism, ix, 18, 23, 29, 32, 117, 118 Duma, 9, 39, 60, 79, 110, 123, 134
Croatia, 11, 14
cronyism, 133
cultivation, 124, 133 E
cultural influence, 89
Easter, 33
culture, 97, 104, 120
economic consequences, 131
cure, 113
economic crisis, 134
currency, 44
economic policy, 22, 23
cyber-attack, 53
economics, 120
Cyprus, 6
education, 68
Czech Republic, 46
educational institutions, 24
election, 84, 133
D embargo, 94, 108
employment, 24, 120
Dagestan, 83 encouragement, 2
dancers, 24, 136 enemies, 17, 30, 79, 80, 103, 116
danger, 8, 17, 30, 41, 55, 60, 65, 92, 105, energy, 75, 94, 106
107, 116 enlargement, 55, 56, 93, 94
death penalty, 22 environment, 58
defects, viii, 98, 108, 114, 121 equipment, 44, 74
deficiency, 25 Estonia, 46, 95
delegates, 48 estrangement, 78
democracy, 3, 26, 31, 36, 53, 56, 92, 93, 97, ethics, 109
110, 118, 121, 123, 124, 125, 127, 130, ethnic cleansing, viii, 35
133 ethnic groups, 77, 79, 113
democratization, 123 euphoria, 1, 85
Denmark, 46 Europe, 7, 8, 54, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 99, 100,
depth, 112 105, 109, 121
despair, 44 European Commission, 48
destruction, viii, 24, 25, 31, 32, 40, 49, 96, European Parliament, 7, 10
100, 104 European Union, 38, 98
dignity, 30, 74 evacuation, 66, 69
diplomacy, viii, 37, 39, 90, 95, 103, 109, everyday life, 86
113, 128, 135 evidence, 78
disappointment, 15, 56, 61 evil, 119, 130
disaster, 10, 11 exaggeration, 88
discrimination, 24, 119, 124, 133 exclusion, 25
dismantlement, 48 executive power, 55
dissatisfaction, 82 exercise, 114
distribution, 40, 125 exile, 28, 115, 131
144 Index
expulsion, 32 109, 110, 111, 116, 117, 121, 123, 125,

extracts, 106 133
extradition, 6 Georgian National Academy of Sciences,
vii
Georgian politicians, 1, 3, 4
F Georgians, 2, 4, 15, 17, 21, 22, 26, 41, 55,
69, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85,
factories, 127
86, 87, 96, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105,
fairness, 125
110, 112, 113, 114, 122, 123, 124, 127,
families, 10, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 113
128, 130, 131, 136
farms, 82, 127
Germany, 46, 47, 94, 95, 121, 127, 128
fear(s), 93, 123
global security, 60
feelings, 31
God, 32, 98, 131
fights, viii
Gori, 44, 61, 66, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74, 85, 122,
financial, 9, 133
128
financial resources, 133
governments, viii, 51, 135
Finland, 45, 50
Great Britain, 46, 91
fires, 16
Greece, 46
flaws, 95
greenhouse, 133
flexibility, 4, 42
Grigol, 7
flour, 82
grouping, 91, 97
food, 108
growth, 23
force, 2, 13, 38, 40, 41, 42, 44, 48, 60, 104,
GUAM, 134
115, 125
guilty, 26, 124
foreign policy, viii, 16, 44, 60, 88, 95, 103,
105, 108, 119, 130
formation, 2, 26, 27, 30, 38, 40, 43, 44, 45, H
48, 53, 58, 61, 62, 77, 81, 82, 104, 113,
116, 131, 133 headache, 15
formula, 4, 24, 45 hedonism, 120, 136
foundations, 130 height, 72
France, 21, 45, 46, 47, 48, 91, 95, 119, 122, helplessness, 50, 123
127, 128 heroism, 134
free choice, 60 heterogeneity, 46
freedom, 53, 55, 93, 118, 124, 127, 132, 133 history, viii, 1, 21, 24, 32, 33, 35, 37, 66, 77,
freezing, 35 80, 81, 89, 96, 99, 102, 104, 112, 117,
Freud, 25 136
friendship, 29, 108, 116, 130 homes, 81, 82, 84, 85
homicide, 26
hopelessness, 16, 73
G hostile acts, 80
hostilities, 43, 45, 48, 57, 65, 69, 70, 73, 74,
GDP, 23, 55
96, 128
genocide, 43, 49, 112
hostility, 66
Georgian government, viii, 11, 43, 51, 55,
hot spots, 79
57, 58, 60, 81, 83, 92, 95, 96, 107, 108,
housing, 32, 82
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Index 145
human, 36, 124, 129, 132 internal mechanisms, 48

human right(s), 124, 132 international law, 39, 40, 60
humanitarian aid, 48 international meetings, 29
Hungary, 46, 92 international relations, 53, 61, 130
Hussein, Saddam, 99, 129 internationalization, 38, 113
hydroelectric power, 107 intervention, 35, 37, 40, 43, 44, 45, 49, 51,
hypothesis, 40 62, 65, 67, 71
hysteria, 72, 105, 110, 131 investment(s), 28, 107, 115
Iran, 3, 6, 96
Iraq, 54, 74, 99
I irony, 129
issues, vii, 12, 26, 27, 60, 107, 112, 113
ideal, 4
Italy, 46, 47
identity, 103
ideology, 85
illusion, 10, 14, 26 J
image(s), 49, 63, 134
imagination, 11 Japan, 135
imports, 6 Java, 11, 72, 85, 100
impotence, 90, 109 Javakhishvili, Ivane, 57, 79, 126
improvements, 5 judiciary, 26
impulsive, 22, 30, 116 jurisdiction, 12, 26, 40
inadmissible, 68 justification, 69
inattention, 96
income, 22, 80
incompatibility, 46, 50, 68 K
independence, 2, 3, 7, 9, 37, 46, 47, 49, 54,
Kartli, 8, 17, 77, 78, 112, 113
55, 58, 59, 60, 85, 90, 91, 99, 102, 104,
Kazakhstan, 2, 14
105, 125, 129, 134
kindergarten, 82
Independence, 35
Kosovo, 7, 8, 17, 37, 39, 47, 54, 55, 89, 90,
industrial organization, 107
91, 99, 109, 120
industry, 23
Kurds, 99
inertia, 37
Kuril Islands, 135
inflation, 132
Kutaisi, 31, 32, 61, 126
infrastructure, 44, 92, 104
Kuwait, 99, 100
inheritance, 81
initiation, 37
institutions, 4, 49, 68 L
integration, 54, 55, 56, 61, 62, 77, 121
integrity, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 35, 40, 46, 47, 54, Late Middle Ages, 103
57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 89, 112, 113, Latvia, 95
117, 119 laws, 91, 102, 129
intellect, 4 lead, 43, 59, 112, 127
intelligence, 10, 100, 123 leadership, 5, 12, 15, 17, 31, 41, 55, 65, 66,
interference, 125 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 78, 92, 113, 125, 131,
intermediaries, 42 133
146 Index
liberalism, 93, 124 mission, 18, 48, 49, 56, 60, 95

liberation, 116 Moldova, 90, 134
light, 26 Mongols, 102
Lithuania, 46, 95 monopoly, 38
loans, 23 morale, 68, 71, 72
lobbying, 46 moral-psychological, vii, 32, 68, 73, 134
local government, 28, 84 Moscow, 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 27, 42,
localization, 48 48, 50, 55, 58, 59, 60, 63, 96, 99, 106,
love, 14, 32, 75, 97, 109 110, 113
loyalty, 87, 122, 132 motivation, 2
Luxemburg, 46 multidimensional, 36
lying, 117, 128 multi-ethnic, 77
murder, 26
music, 110
M myopia, 118
Macedonia, 7
majority, 22, 32, 54, 56, 78, 80, 83, 84, 91, N
132
management, 24, 122 naming, 56
mania, 74 narcissism, 29, 32
manpower, 82, 83 National Academy of Sciences, vii, 132
mantle, 8, 26 national interests, 30, 55
married couples, 82 national parties, 3
mass, vii, 97, 101, 124, 133 national policy, 77
mass media, vii National Security Council, 45
masterpieces, 32 national traditions, 31
materials, vii, 69, 80, 81, 88, 97, 98, 111, nationalism, 92, 96
121 nationalists, 90, 109, 110
matter, 100, 115 nationality, 82
McCain, Senator John, 57 NATO, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 37, 44, 50, 53, 54,
media, 18, 97, 101, 110, 124, 125, 133 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 91, 92,
medical, 82 93, 94, 95, 99, 105, 108, 109, 111, 121,
membership, 13, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 91, 92, 124, 125, 130, 133
93, 133 Nauru, 85
Membership Action Plan, 37, 55 neglect, 94
memory, 113, 136 Netherlands, 135
mice, 110 neutral, 16, 57, 101
middle class, 23 NGOs, 56
Middle East, 109 Nicaragua, 85
migrants, 108 North Caucasus, 82, 105, 112
migration, 81, 89 nostalgia, 98
Mikhail Gorbachov, 1 nuclear weapons, 24, 93, 100
militia, 2, 115
mineral water, 108
minorities, 1, 77
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Index 147
personal relations, 17, 88, 131

O personality, 118
piracy, 56
objectivity, 97
plants, 127
obstacles, 82, 133
platform, 36, 40, 43, 51
obstruction, 39
playing, 11, 29, 117
occupied territories, 2, 8, 13, 16
pluralism, 36
octopus, 26
poison, 108
Oedipus complex, 25
Poland, 46, 91, 95
officials, 12, 43, 44, 56, 70, 79, 99, 108,
police, 18, 39, 40, 44, 102
125, 126
policy, viii, 3, 6, 23, 25, 27, 39, 41, 46, 50,
oil, 100, 107
55, 59, 60, 61, 79, 88, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95,
Old Tbilisi, 32
103, 117, 120, 125, 130
operations, 2, 10, 54, 69, 71, 73
political force, 62, 133
oppression, 133
political leaders, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72,
optimism, 92
73, 74, 105, 135
organ(s), 120, 130
political opposition, 29
organize, 3
political parties, 38, 78, 97, 98, 116, 124
originality, 103
political party, 23
Orthodox religion, 1
political system, 5, 126
OSCE, 6, 14, 35, 45, 59, 66, 114
politics, 29, 38, 49, 51, 63, 94, 102, 106,
Ossetia, viii, 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
109, 117, 136
27, 35, 37, 39, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 55, 57,
population, viii, 2, 14, 18, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27,
58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 67, 77, 78, 79, 82, 84,
31, 32, 35, 44, 54, 55, 56, 61, 67, 69, 70,
85, 101, 107, 112, 114, 122, 125, 129,
73, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 89, 91,
131, 134, 135
92, 108, 111, 112, 119, 127, 132
populism, 10, 11
P poverty, 132
precedent, 7, 8, 17, 37, 39, 47, 55, 89, 90,
pain, 129 91, 120, 135
paints, 117 preparation, vii, 10, 11, 74, 88
parallel, 2, 15, 44, 46 preservation, 115
parents, 81 presidency, 6, 12, 30, 84, 130
Parliament, 5, 9, 12, 23, 28, 32, 35, 56, 72, presumption of innocence, 97
115 prevention, 38, 68
participants, vii, viii principles, 3, 24, 30, 31, 39, 40, 48, 60, 94,
patriotism, 28, 65, 74, 115 116, 121, 125
peace, 12, 15, 28, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, prisoners, 26, 27
48, 49, 57, 66, 73, 101, 114, 115 prisons, 26, 27
peace process, 38, 42 producers, 118
peacekeepers, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 66, 70, 73 professionals, 25, 74, 120, 127
peacekeeping, 12, 66, 73, 101 prognosis, 81
peacekeeping forces, 12, 66, 73 project, 29, 47, 116, 128, 130
permission, 6, 69, 82 propaganda, 29, 32, 36, 84, 92, 107
permit, 38, 46, 53, 68 prosperity, 61
148 Index
protection, 66 resources, 12, 22, 37, 107, 116, 124, 128,

protectorate, 40 132, 133
public opinion, 2, 69, 97 response, 5, 8, 16, 37, 38, 42, 54, 101, 110,
publishing, 87 120
Putin, viii, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 17, 29, 39, 46, 47, restaurants, 32, 136
92, 93, 95, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 116, restoration, 7, 12, 14, 29, 31, 40, 42, 45, 46,
122, 123, 130, 134 54, 59, 89, 91, 105, 111, 113, 115
rhetoric, 22, 41, 107, 110, 111, 115, 131
rights, 80, 81, 85, 132, 133, 134
R risk(s), 35, 36, 49, 53
root(s), 24, 104, 108
racketeering, 22
roses, 27
radio, 17
routes, 72
ratification, 5
rules, 6, 17, 18, 36
raw materials, 93
Russian-Georgian War of August 2008, v,
reactions, 37
vii, 35
reading, 97, 98, 99, 137
realism, 128
reality, 10, 11, 14, 15, 40, 53, 60, 70, 73, 92, S
93, 126, 128
reasoning, 67, 90 Saakashvili, Mikheil, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 16, 29,
recall, 21, 102 30, 35, 69, 70, 118, 123, 129
recognition, 8, 9, 35, 46, 47, 55, 58, 59, 63, sadness, 94
129, 130, 135 safety, 117
recommendations, viii sanctions, 46, 49
reconciliation, 12 Sarkozy, French President Nicolas, 57
recovery, 112 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 57
Red Army, 96 scarcity, 97
reform(s), 55, 58, 93, 94, 119, 121, 122, 132 school, 78, 84
refugees, 5, 12, 40, 42, 79, 80, 81, 82, 112, science, 104
114, 119, 128 secondary education, 4
regional problem, 131 security, 13, 17, 33, 35, 43, 44, 47, 48, 50,
regions of the world, 90 53, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 107, 114
regulations, 53, 133 security forces, 44
rehabilitation, 107 security services, 13
relatives, 79, 85, 105 segregation, 132
religion, 1, 8, 89 self-confidence, 32, 134
religious beliefs, 81 self-consciousness, 4
repression, 25 separatism, viii, 79, 103, 126, 134
repulsion, 68 Serbia, 89, 90
reputation, 56 Serbs, 89
requirements, viii, 5, 92, 108 services, 6, 10, 125
reserves, 70 settlements, 81
resistance, 16, 69, 71 shame, 110, 114, 132
resolution, 8, 12, 14, 39, 40, 58, 115, 129 sheep, 29, 111, 117
shelter, 105
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Index 149
Shevardnadze, Eduard, 17, 102, 123, 130 sweat, 130

shoot, 28, 115 Sweden, 46
showing, 8 Switzerland, 126
signals, 125 sympathy, 28, 60, 91, 92, 115, 118
signs, 65 synthesis, 36, 131
singers, 106 Syria, 134
slavery, 32
Slovakia, 46
social infrastructure, 28, 115 T
social life, 105
tactics, viii, 16, 45, 46, 65
social problems, 134
tanks, 13, 73, 121
society, viii, 1, 14, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
target, 13
31, 32, 56, 61, 68, 87, 88, 95, 98, 101,
taxes, 132
110, 119, 132
Tbilisi, vii, 2, 7, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 21,
socio-political, vii, 98
25, 31, 32, 33, 36, 38, 40, 41, 47, 48, 50,
solidarity, 60, 78
51, 57, 60, 61, 62, 81, 82, 83, 86, 94, 96,
solution, 24, 124
99, 100, 103, 107, 110, 114, 121, 124,
South Ossetia, viii, 2, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
126, 127, 129, 130, 135, 136, 137, 138
14, 27, 28, 35, 37, 39, 43, 47, 48, 49, 55,
Tbilisi Scientific Centre, vii
57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 67, 69, 77, 78, 79,
teachers, 80, 84
81, 82, 84, 100, 101, 107, 112, 114, 115,
technology, 36
122, 125, 129, 131, 134, 135
teeth, 134
sovereign state, viii, 17, 129
telephone, 15, 71
sovereignty, 2, 4, 5, 7, 40, 54, 55, 58, 60,
tension, 23, 35, 95, 106, 117
63, 89, 111, 125
territorial, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 27, 35, 40, 41,
Soviet Union, 1, 2, 4, 5, 79, 82, 89, 92, 104
46, 47, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 78,
Spain, 46, 47, 91
89, 92, 112, 113, 117, 119, 126
specialists, 24
territory, viii, 4, 6, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 28, 41,
speech, 3, 4, 57, 110, 111
47, 48, 58, 59, 69, 78, 80, 82, 83, 85,
spending, 133
101, 102, 111, 112, 115, 135
St. Petersburg, 41
terrorism, 53
stability, 35, 39, 49, 61, 77
tertiary education, 4
Stalin, Joseph, 102
theatre, 104
standard of living, 104
theft, 85
state borders, 79
thoughts, 21, 123
statehood, 96
threats, 8, 99
strategic position, 72
tooth, 12
stress, 84
trade, 9, 132
structure, 12, 36, 40, 47, 49, 50, 58
trade union, 132
style, 9, 27, 32, 108, 109, 121
traditions, 32, 104
subjectivity, 69
training, 9, 54, 74
substitution, 133
trajectory, 50
Sukhumi State University, vii
transformation, 39, 119
suppression, 36, 122
translation, 21, 84, 88
Supreme Council, 1, 2
transport, 9, 44, 48, 73
150 Index
treatment, 27
Treaty of Georgievsk, 8
W
Tskhinvali, 2, 6, 11, 12, 15, 28, 43, 44, 48,
Wales, 61, 62, 91
49, 61, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74,
walking, 83
80, 82, 85, 100, 110, 114, 115, 117, 129,
Washington, 38, 41, 43, 99, 124, 125
132
water, 32, 85
Turkey, 3, 61, 89, 92, 123
weakness, 103
weapons, 16, 29, 44, 78, 109
U welfare, 132
White House, 44
Ukraine, viii, 2, 18, 55, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, withdrawal, 12, 16, 29, 45, 46, 110, 114,
134 117, 131
unification, 77, 78, 104 witnesses, vii
unions, 132 workers, 119, 136
United States, 98, 99 working conditions, 88
universities, 24 world democratic society, viii
urban, 32 world policy, 37
USSR, viii, 2, 50, 103, 121, 123 World War I, 3, 104, 121, 127, 135, 136
worldwide, 43
worry, 7, 8, 111, 120
V
Vanuatu, 2 Y
vegetables, 82
vehicles, 73 young people, 81
Venezuela, 2 Yugoslavia, 89, 93
victims, 7, 14, 70, 131, 136
violence, 27, 30, 31, 32, 62, 116, 124
vision(s), 37, 113
Z
voicing, 98
Zhordania, Noe, 3, 96
voters, 31
voting, 31
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THE GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN WAR

Additional books in this series can be found on Novas website

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THE GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN WAR

NOTICE TO THE READER

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

Today, when Russian aggression is directed against the sovereign state of

HOW THE AUGUST 2008

The latter took an active part in the overthrow of Zviad Gamsakhurdia,

accentuate its Euro-Atlantic course. Russia's policy of creeping annexation of

Leading European states and the US acknowledged the independence of

However it needed a necessary element and thus was the performance of

The Georgian President thought seriously that Operation Hurricane

This notion was confirmed by their experience of 1. The peaceful

resulting in Georgian villages in the conflict being razed to the ground.

TRAGIC ZIGZAGS IN THE GEORGIAN

It appears that we Georgians who distinguished ourselves by our military

MISTAKEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY

THE PERSONNEL REVOLUTION

The population was expecting an impartial, objective, European type

After two years of Sakashvili coming to power, the number of prisoners

SOME ISSUES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE-

on the Approaches to Tskhinvali (Resonansi, June 1, 2004), Tskhinvali

Much propaganda emphasized the role of Vladimir Sanakoev in the

FIGHTING AGAINST CATHEDRALS AND MONUMENTS

There was the disrespectful attitude towards architectural masterpieces

new impulse to the technology of the suppression of the opposition and in

preventive mechanisms of conflict regulation, an escalation of a crisis and

administration, concerning the situation existing in the Georgian conflict

Russian diplomatic obstruction certainly played a determining role in this

integrity of Georgian4, the maximum assistance to the Kosovization of the

This fact is doubly characteristic: firstly what right had Saakashvili to

Walter Steinmeier, to Georgia on July 13th, 2008. Steinmeier presented a

1. The beginning of measures for the restoration of confidence, direct

ability to analyze strategically, a skill so greatly required in such a situation, at

1. Complete demilitarization of Georgia

On the other hand, restoration of some balance in the process of Crisis

So the structure of Crisis Diplomacy obtained a dual synthetic character.

N. Sarkozy explained that before the formation of internal mechanisms,

1. Refusal to use force.

The Kremlin agreed to an obligatory compromise in conditions of an

RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN WAR OF AUGUST

community supporting stable and peaceful development is mainly directed

Russia against Georgia during this war. According to a statement of S.

NATO conducts monitoring activities and periodically sums up the results

MILITARY-STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL

Giorgi (Gia) Karkarashvili

This report is mainly founded on the monograph we published in 2009,

of the North-Caucasian military division, announced that should hostilities

1. The reasoning behind the actions of Tskhinvalis de-facto authorities,

The Commander-in-Chief ordered to open fire at 23.40 pm, August 7th,

opening massive artillery fire, as there were still civilians in Tskhinvali. In

The fate of the peaceful population in the areas experiencing active

THE GEORGIAN-OSSETIAN POPULATION

assists Ossetian historians in the appropriation of other lands and such

Let us conduct a short historical review for a more realistic presentation of

between emigrants and permanent inhabitants, as people of an alien ethnos

certificate found themselves blacklisted, the reason of which nobody knows

THE LEGEND IS STILL FRESH BUT

1. The main merit of the work is its author, an experienced diplomat, a

We would especially like to highlight those positive passages of the work