NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, Petitioner,
Pangilan, the Supply Officer I of the DOT-
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483 promulgated on 7 August 2007 which found
petitioner Normallah A. Pacasum guilty of Falsification under Article 171, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, and its Resolution2 dated 22 October 2007 denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration and Motion for New Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence.
On 2 May 2002, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with Falsification of Public
Documents, defined and punished under paragraph 1 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
That on or about August 22-23, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in Cotabato
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, a high ranking public official being the Regional Secretary of
the Department of Tourism in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City,
while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation thereto,
taking advantage of her official position, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsified her Employee Clearance3 submitted to the Office of the Regional
Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the signature of
Laura Y. Pangilan, the Supply officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for the purpose of claiming her
salary for the months of August and September 2000. 4
On 29 May 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking that she be given the
opportunity to file her counter-affidavit during a preliminary investigation in order that her
right to due process would not be violated.5 Petitioner further filed an Urgent Motion for
Preliminary Investigation and/or Reinvestigation with a Prayer to Recall or Defer Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest.6
On 4 May 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for preliminary
investigation/reinvestigation decreeing that petitioner was not deprived of the opportunity to
be heard before the Office of the Ombudsman as she had waived her right to be heard on
preliminary investigation.7
On 16 June 2004, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.8 Thereafter, pre-trial conference was held and the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial
Order.9 The parties did not enter any admission or stipulation of facts, and agreed that the
issues to be resolved were as follows:
1. Whether or not accused Normallah Pacasum, being then the Regional Secretary of
the Department of Tourism in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Cotabato City, falsified her Employee Clearance, which she submitted to the Office
of the Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by
imitating the signature of Laura Y.
ARMM, for purposes of claiming her salary for the months of August and
September 2000;
2. Whether or not the accused took advantage of her official position in order to
commit the crime charged.10
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Subaida K. Pangilan, 11 former Human
Resource Management Officer V of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM);
Laura Y. Pangilan, former Supply Officer of the Department of Tourism, ARMM; 12 and
Rebecca A. Agatep,13 Telegraph Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon City.
Subaida K. Pangilan (Pangilan) testified that she was a retired government employee and
formerly a Human Resource Management Officer V of the ARMM which position she held
from May 1993 to 28 May 2003. As such, one of her duties was to receive applications for
clearance of Regional Secretaries of the ARMM. She explained that an Employees Clearance
was a requirement to be submitted to the Office of the Regional Director by retiring
employees, employees leaving the country or those applying for leave in excess of thirty days.
The person applying for clearance shall get a copy of the employees clearance and shall
accomplish the same by having the different division heads sign it.
Mrs. Pangilan disclosed that she knew the accused-petitioner Norma Pacasum to be the
former Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism (DOT), ARMM. She narrated that in
the year 2000, petitioner submitted the original of an Employees Clearance to her office in
compliance with the memorandum14 dated 8 August 2000 issued by Governor Nur Misuari,
directing all officers and employees to clear themselves of property and money
accountabilities before their salaries for August and September 2000 would be paid. Upon
inspection of the Employees Clearance, she noticed that the signature of Laura Pangilan
(Laura) contained in said document was not hers. She said Laura Pangilan was her daughter-
in-law, and that the latters signature was very familiar to her. Mrs. Pangilan immediately
photocopied15 the original Employees Clearance with the intention of sending the same to her
daughter-in-law for the purpose of having the latter confirm if the signature on top of her
name in the Employees Clearance was hers. There being no messenger available, she instead
called up Laura to come to her office to verify the signature. Laura, whose office was only a
walking distance away, came and inspected the clearance, and denied signing the same. After
she denied that she signed the clearance, and while they were conversing, the bearer of the
Employees Clearance took said document and left.
Mrs. Pangilan said she did not know the name of the person who took the original of the
Employee Clearance, but said that the latter was a niece and staff member of the petitioner.
She said that all the signatures16 appearing in the Employees Clearance were all genuine
except for Lauras signature.
The next witness for the prosecution was Laura Y. Pangilan, the person whose signature was
allegedly imitated. Laura testified that presently she was holding the position of Human
Resource Management Officer II of the Department of Tourism - ARMM. Prior to said
position, she was the Supply Officer of the DOT - ARMM from 1994 to January 2001. As
such, she issued memorandum receipts (MR) to employees who were issued government
property, and received surrendered office properties from officers and employees of the DOT
- ARMM. She said she knew the accused, as she was their Regional Secretary of the DOT -
ARMM.
Laura recounted that on 9 August 2002, Marie Cris17 Batuampar, an officemate and niece of
petitioner Pacasum, went to her house with the Employees Clearance of petitioner. Batuampar
requested her to sign in order to clear petitioner of all property accountabilities. She refused to
sign the clearance because at that time, petitioner had not yet turned over all the office
properties issued to her. A few days later, she was called by her mother-in-law to go to the
latters office and inspect the Employees Clearance submitted by the representative of
petitioner. She went to her mother-in-laws office and was shown the Employees Clearance of
petitioner. Upon seeing the same, she denied the signature 18 appearing on top of her name.
Thereupon, Marie Cris Batuampar, the representative of petitioner, took the Employees
Clearance and left.
Laura revealed she executed a joint complaint-affidavit19 dated 28 August 2001 regarding the
instant case. She issued a certification20 with a memorandum receipt21 dated 23 November
1999, signed22 by petitioner. The certification attested she did not sign petitioners Employees
Clearance because all the office properties issued to petitioner had not been turned over or
returned to the Supply Officer of the DOT - ARMM. Finally, she said that as of 2 January
2005, her last day as Supply Officer, petitioner had not returned anything.
The last witness for the prosecution, Rebecca A. Agatep, Telegraph Operator, Telegraph
Office, Quezon City, testified that she had been a telegraph operator for nineteen years. On 31
May 2005, she was at the Telegraph Office in Commission on Audit, Quezon City. She
received two telegrams23 for transmissions both dated 31 May 2005. One was addressed to
petitioner and the other to Marie Cris Batuampar. Upon receiving said documents, she
transmitted the documents through telegram. The telegram addressed to petitioner was
received by her relative, Manso Alonto, in her residence on 1 June 2005, while that addressed
to Ms. Batuampar was transmitted to, and received in, Cotabato City on 1 June 2005. 24
On 4 July 2005, the prosecution formally offered 25 its documentary evidence consisting of
Exhibits A, A-1, A-1-a, A-2, A-2-a, A-2-b, A-2-c, A-2-d, A-2-e, A-2-f, A-2-g, A-3, A-3-1, A-
4, A-4-a, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, and A-9, to which the accused filed her objections. 26 The trial
court admitted all the exhibits on 10 August 2005. 27
For the defense, petitioner and Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Regional Solicitor
General, took the stand.
For her defense, petitioner testified that she was appointed by ARMM Regional Governor Nur
Misuari (Gov. Misuari) as Regional Secretary of the DOT of the ARMM in 1999. She said she
was familiar with the Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov. Misuari directing all
ARMM officers and employees to liquidate all outstanding cash advances on or before 31
August 2000 in view of the impending expiration of the Governors extended term. At first,
she said the memorandum applied to her, she being a cabinet secretary, but later she said same
did not apply to her because she had no cash advances. Only those with cash advances were
required to get an Employees Clearance before they could receive their salaries. She then
instructed her staff to work on her salary.
Petitioner said she did not know where the original of her Employees Clearance was. Neither
did she know if the signature of Laura Pangilan therein had been imitated or forged. She
likewise said that although the Employee Clearance was in her name, she did not cause
Lauras signature to be affixed thereto.
Petitioner disclosed that she was able to get her salary for the month of August 2000 sometime
in said month, because ARMM Executive Secretary Randolph C. Parcasio told her that she
did not need a clearance before she could get her salary because she was re-appointed.28
Petitioner explained that she has not seen the original of the subject Employees
Clearance.29 When she first saw the photocopy of the Employees Clearance, the signature of
Laura was not there. She was able to see the photocopy of the Employees Clearance again
after this case had been filed with the Sandiganbayan, already with the alleged signature of
Laura. Petitioner said it was not she who placed or caused Lauras purported signature to be
affixed there.
Petitioner added that the memorandum of Gov. Misuari did not apply to her, because she had
no cash advances and she could receive her salary even without clearance. At that time, she
said the Cashier, Accountant and the Auditor checked her records and found that she had no
cash advances.30 Because she was elsewhere, she instructed her secretary to get her salary.
However, she was informed by her staff that her salary could not be released because the
Office of the Governor required a clearance. Her staff worked on her clearance, the purpose of
which was for the release of her salary for the months of August and September 2000. She
was able to get all the needed signatures except for Lauras signature. With the refusal of
Laura to sign, her staff went to Executive Secretary Parcasio and explained the situation.
Petitioner denied receiving a telegram from Asst. Special Prosecutor I Anna Isabel G.
Aurellano ordering her to submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor the original of the
Employees Clearance of the DOT-ARMM issued in her name sometime on 22-23 August
2000.
On cross-examination, petitioner said that prior to her receipt of her salary, she believed that
an Employees Clearance was necessary, and for this reason she had this document prepared
by her staff. She said her Employees Clearance was always in the possession of Marie Cris,
her assistant secretary. It was Marie Cris who showed her the document twice. 31
Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Solicitor General, testified that he was familiar with the
Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov. Misuari because the same was the product
of consultation among him, Gov. Misuari and ARMM Executive Secretary Parcasio. He
explained that this memorandum pertained only to outstanding cash advances. He added that
an Employees Clearance was not a requirement and was not sufficient to comply with the
directive contained in the memorandum, because what was required for the purpose of release
of salaries was a credit notice from the Resident Auditors of the Commission on Audit.
On 16 February 2007, the defense formally offered its documentary exhibits 32 consisting of
Exhibits 1 to 5, with sub-markings. The prosecution objected to the purpose for which Exhibit
1 was offered. The trial court admitted all the defense exhibits. 33
On 7 August 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision convicting petitioner of
the crime charged in the information. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Normallah A. Pacasum
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the Information and, with the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, hereby sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum with the accessories thereof and to
pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) with costs against the accused. 34
The Sandiganbayan found the signature of DOT-ARMM Supply Officer Laura Y. Pangilan
appearing in the Employees Clearance of petitioner to have been falsified/forged. It did not
give much weight on petitioners defense denying she was the one who actually falsified her
Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan and that she had no idea
about the alleged falsification, because it was her assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar,
who worked for her clearance and the one who submitted the said clearance to the Office of
the Regional Governor of the ARMM. The trial court found said denial unsubstantiated and
ruled that while there was no direct evidence to show that petitioner herself "actually"
falsified/forged the signature of Laura Pangilan, there were circumstances that indicated she
was the one who committed the falsification/forgery, or who asked somebody else to
falsify/forge the subject signature in her Employees Clearance. The Sandiganbayan added that
considering it was petitioner who took advantage of and profited from the use of the falsified
clearance, the presumption was that she was the material author of the falsification. Despite
full opportunity, she was not able to rebut said presumption, failing to show that it was
another person who falsified/forged the signature of Laura Pangilan, or that another person
had the reason or motive to commit the falsification/forgery or could have benefited from the
same.
The Sandiganbayan likewise did not sustain petitioners contention that she did not stand to
benefit from the falsification of her Employees Clearance and from the submission thereof to
the Office of the Regional Governor, because she allegedly had no existing cash advances.
She claimed that an Employees Clearance was not needed to enable her to draw her salary for
the months of August and September 2000 under the 8 August 2000 Memorandum of Gov.
Misuari, and that the presumption that he who benefits from the falsification is presumed to be
the author thereof does not apply to her. The lower court explained that the aforementioned
memorandum applied to petitioner, she being an official of the ARMM. It said that the
applicability of said memorandum to petitioner was even admitted by her when she, in
compliance therewith, instructed her staff/assistant secretary to work for her Employees
Clearance to enable her to collect her salary for the month of August 2000. It said that the fact
that she (allegedly) had no existing cash advances did not exempt her from the coverage of the
memorandum, because she must show she had no cash advances and the only way to do this
was by obtaining a clearance.
Petitioner argued that the photocopy of her Employees Clearance had no probative value in
proving its contents and was inadmissible because the original thereof was not presented by
the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan did not agree. It said that the presentation and admission
of secondary evidence, like a photocopy of her Employees Clearance, was justified to prove
the contents thereof, because despite reasonable notices (telegrams) made by the prosecution
to petitioner and her assistant secretary to produce the original of her Employees Clearance,
they ignored the notice and refused to present the original of said document.
On 21 August 2007, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Sandiganbayan35 to which the prosecution filed a Comment/Opposition. 36 Subsequent thereto,
petitioner filed a Supplement to Accuseds Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for New
Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence.37 Petitioner prayed that her motion for new
trial be granted in order that the testimony of Marie Cris Batuampar be introduced, the same
being newly discovered evidence. The prosecution filed its Opposition. 38
On 22 October 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit; and the motion for new trial, because the evidence sought to
be presented did not qualify as newly discovered evidence.39
On 16 November 2007, the instant petition was filed.
In our Resolution40 dated 27 November 2007, respondent People of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), was required to file its Comment on the
petition.41 After two motions for extension to file comment on the petition, which were
granted by this Court, the OSP filed its Comment dated 18 February 2008. 42 Petitioner was
required43 to file a Reply to the Comment, which she did on 5 June 2008. 44
On 5 August 2008, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition for review on
certiorari and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty (30)
days from notice. They filed their respective memoranda on 21 November 2008 and on 5
November 2008.45
Petitioner assails her conviction arguing that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in:
I. Finding that petitioner benefited from the alleged falsification, hence must be
deemed the author thereof, when the evidence on record does not support, but even
contradicts, such a conclusion.
II. Presuming that petitioner had unliquidated cash advances hence was required
under the Misuari Memorandum to submit her Employees Clearance to clear herself
of these, when there is no evidence to that effect and the prosecution even admitted
so.
III. Not resolving doubt as to the authenticity of the photocopy of the allegedly
forged Employees Clearance, in favor of the innocence of the Accused.
IV. In short-circuiting the right of the petitioner to present additional evidence on her
behalf, thus denying her due process.46
Petitioner contends that under the Misuari memorandum dated 8 August 2000, she was not
required to file an Employees Clearance to draw her salary, since what was required under
said memorandum was a Credit Notice from the COA. She further contends that since she was
not required to file said Employees Clearance because she had no cash advances, the signature
in her Employees Clearance was "irrelevant and a non-issue" because what was required was
a Credit Notice.
As to the first contention, we agree with petitioner that under the aforesaid memorandum,
what was required before she could draw her salaries was a Credit Notice from the COA and
not an Employees Clearance. The full text of the Memorandum47 form the Regional Governor
reads:
MEMORANDUM FROM THE REGIONAL GOVERNOR
TO: ALL CONCERNED
SUBJECT: AS STATED
DATE: AUGUST 8, 2000
1. In view of the impending expiration of the extended term of the undersigned, it is
hereby directed that all outstanding cash advances be liquidated on or before August
31, 2000.
2. Effective September 1, 2000, the salaries and other emoluments of all ARMM
officials/employees with unliquidated cash advance shall be withheld until they have
settled their accounts and a corresponding Credit Notice is issued to them by the
Commission on Audit.
3. Due to budgetary and financial constraints brought about by the drastic cut of our
budget, memorandum dated December 01, 1998 is hereby reiterated. Therefore all
releases for financial assistance is hereby suspended effective immediately.
4. For strict compliance.
PROF. NUR MISUARI
It is clear from said memorandum that what was required from officers/employees who had
unliquidated cash advances was the corresponding Credit Notice issued by the COA after they
had settled their accounts. There was indeed no mention of any Employees Clearance therein.
Up to this point, we agree with petitioner. However, on her contention that the signature of
Laura Pangilan in her Employees Clearance was "irrelevant and a non-issue," we disagree.
Whether the signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated or not is the main issue in this case for
falsification.
From the memorandum of Gov. Misuari, the Credit Notice requirement was effective only
starting 1 September 2000 and not before. In the case at bar, the information charges
petitioner not with failure to secure a Credit Notice, but with allegedly falsifying her
Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, Supply Officer I of the
DOT-ARMM. The Credit Notice requirement was therefore irrelevant and a non-issue as
regards the release of salaries prior to 1 September 2000.
The questions to be answered are: (1) Was the signature of Laura Pangilan in petitioners
Employees Clearance imitated? If yes, (2) Who imitated or caused the imitation of said
signature?
On the first query, the same was answered by Laura Pangilan. She said that the signature in
petitioners Employees Clearance was not hers. The same was an imitation. When a person
whose signature was affixed to a document denies his/her signature therein, a prima facie case
for falsification is established which the defendant must overcome. 48
Petitioner argues there was no need for her to file an Employees Clearance to draw her salary.
She adds that Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive Secretary of the ARMM, told her and her
secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, that she did not need an Employees Clearance because she
was re-appointed.49
These arguments are untenable. There was a need for petitioner to file an Employees
Clearance not only for compliance with the Misuari memorandum but, more importantly,
because her term of office was about to end, since her position was coterminous with the term
of Gov. Misuari, the appointing authority.50 She even admitted that before she received her
salary for August, 2000,51 an Employees Clearance was necessary.52 Moreover, her claim that
Atty. Parcasio told her and her secretary that she did not need an Employee Clearance to get
her salary does not persuade us. In fact, we find her alleged "re-appointment," when she was
working for her Employees Clearance at around August 2000, improbable. How could she
have been re-appointed by Gov. Alvarez,53 whom she claims re-appointed her sometime in the
year 2000, when Gov. Misuari was still the Regional Governor of the ARMM when she had
her Employees Clearance prepared sometime in August 2000? Clearly, her statement that she
did not need an Employees Clearance because she was re-appointed does not inspire belief.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for applying the presumption that if a person had in his
position a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and
profiting thereby, he is presumed to be the material author of the falsification. He argues that
the Sandiganbayan overlooked the fact that there was no evidence to prove that petitioner
made use of or uttered the Employees Clearance, because there was no evidence that she
submitted it -- if not, at least caused it to be submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor.
To support such claim, she said there were no "receipt marks" in the Employees Clearance to
show that the Office of the Regional Governor received said documents.
It is to be made clear that the "use" of a falsified document is separate and distinct from the
"falsification" of a public document. The act of "using" falsified documents is not necessarily
included in the "falsification" of a public document. Using falsified documents is punished
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, the falsification of the
Employees Clearance was consummated the moment the signature of Laura Pangilan was
imitated. In the falsification of a public document, it is immaterial whether or not the contents
set forth therein were false. What is important is the fact that the signature of another was
counterfeited.54 It is a settled rule that in the falsification of public or official documents, it is
not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the
reason that in the falsification of a public document, the principal thing punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed.55 Thus, the purpose for which the falsification was made and whether the
offender profited or hoped to profit from such falsification are no longer material.
The records further show that petitioner "used" or uttered the Employees Clearance. The fact
that the same was circulated to the different division heads for their signatures is already
considered use of falsified documents as contemplated in Article 172. The lack of the stamp
mark "Received" in the Employees Clearance does not mean that said document was not
received by the Office of the Regional Governor. We find the certification signed by Atty.
Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive Secretary of Office of the Regional Governor - ARMM, as
contained in the Employees Clearance, to be sufficient proof that the same was submitted to
the Office of the Regional Governor. It must be stressed that the Executive Secretary is part of
the Office of the Regional Governor.
Petitioner denies having "actually" falsified her Employees Clearance by imitating the
signature of Laura Pangilan, claiming that she had no knowledge about the falsification
because it was her assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her Employees
Clearance.
Petitioners denial, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, must certainly fail. Denial, when
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence,
which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.56 Denial is intrinsically weak, being a negative and self-serving
assertion.57
In the case at bar, petitioner did not even present as her witness Marie Cris Batuampar, the
person whom she instructed to work for her Employees Clearance. Her failure to present this
person in order to shed light on the matter was fatal to her cause. In fact, we find that the
defense never intended to present Marie Cris Batuampar as a witness. This is clear from the
pre-trial order, because the defense never listed her as a witness. 58 Her attempt to present Ms.
Batuampar to help her cause after she has been convicted is already too late in the day, and
Ms. Batuampars testimony, which is supposed to be given, cannot be considered newly
discovered evidence as to merit the granting of her motion for new trial and/or reception of
newly discovered evidence.
The lack of direct evidence showing that petitioner "actually" imitated the signature of Laura
Pangilan in her Employees Clearance will not exonerate her. We have ruled that it is not
strange to realize that in cases of forgery, the prosecution would not always have the means
for obtaining such direct evidence to confute acts contrived clandestinely. Courts have to rely
on circumstantial evidence consisting of pieces of facts, which if woven together would
produce a single network establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.59 We
totally agree with the Sandiganbayan, which said:
While there is no direct evidence to show that the accused herself "actually" forged the
signature of Laura Pangilan in the Employees Clearance in question, the Court nevertheless
finds the following circumstances, obtaining in the records, to establish/indicate that she was
the one who committed the forgery or who asked somebody else to forge or caused the
forgery of the signature of Laura Pangilan in her Employees Clearance, to wit
1. that the accused instructed her staff Maricris Batuampar to work for her
Employees Clearance in compliance with the Memorandum of ARMM Regional
Governor Nur Misuari and that the forged signature of Laura Pangilan was affixed
on her clearance are strong evidence that the accused herself either falsified the said
signature or caused the same to be falsified/imitated, and that possession by Maricris
of the falsified clearance of the accused is possession by the accused herself because
the former was only acting upon the instructions and in behalf of the latter;
2. that it was the accused who is required to accomplish and to submit her
Employees Clearance to enable her to collect her salary for the months of August
and September 2000 is sufficient and strong motive or reason for her to commit the
falsification by imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan or order someone else to
forge it; and
3. that the accused was the only one who profited or benefited from the falsification
as she admitted that she was able to collect her salary for the month of August 2000
after her falsified Employees Clearance was submitted and approved by the ORG-
ARMM and therefore, she alone could have the motive for making such falsification.
On the basis of the foregoing circumstances, no reasonable and fair-minded man would say
that the accused a Regional Secretary of DOT-ARMM had no knowledge of the
falsification. It is an established rule, well-buttressed upon reason, that in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation, when a person has in his possession or control a falsified document
and who makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is justified that such person is
the forger or the one who caused the forgery and, therefore, guilty of falsification. Thus, in
People v. Sendaydiego, the Supreme Court held that
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it
(uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the
material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged
documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be
proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the
forgers. (U.S. v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People v. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People v. Domingo, 49
Phil. 28; People v. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People v. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In line with the above ruling, and considering that it was the accused who took advantage and
profited in the use of the falsified Employees Clearance in question, the presumption is
inevitable that she is the material author of the falsification. And despite full opportunity, she
was not able to rebut such presumption by failing to show that it was another person who
forged or falsified the signature of Laura Pangilan or that at least another person and not she
alone, had the reason or motive to commit the forgery or falsification, or was or could have
been benefited by such falsification/forgery.60
The circumstances enumerated by the Sandiganbayan, as against the denials of petitioner,
convince us to apply the rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found
in possession of, and who has used, a forged document, is the forger and, therefore, guilty of
falsification.61 The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of
presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, which, if no contrary proof is
offered, will thereby prevail.62 A prima facie case of falsification having been established,
petitioner should have presented clear and convincing evidence to overcome such burden.
This, she failed to do.
Petitioner assails the weight given by the Sandiganbayan to the testimonies of the two
Pangilans when they failed to report the alleged falsification to the police or alert the Office of
the Regional Governor of said falsification, or tried to stop petitioner from getting her salaries.
We do not agree with the petitioner. It is a settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect
if not conclusive effect.63 The determination of the credibility of witnesses is the domain of
the trial court, as it is in the best position to observe the witnesses demeanor. 64 The
Sandiganbayan has given full probative value to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
So have we. We find no reason to depart from such a rule.
Aware that the prosecution failed to present the original from which the photocopy of
petitioners Employees Clearance was supposed to have been obtained, she maintains that the
Sandiganbayan should have doubted the authenticity and probative value of the photocopy of
the Employees Clearance.
The Sandiganbayan correctly admitted in evidence the photocopy of the Employees
Clearance. We agree when it ruled:
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself. The purpose of the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best evidence if
the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it
and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the latter
evidence is withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose
which its production would expose and defeat. Hence, as long as the original evidence can be
had, the Court should not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as
photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the original has been lost or destroyed
or cannot be produced in court. Such photocopies must be disregarded, being inadmissible
evidence and barren of probative weight.
The foregoing rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Under Section 3(b) of Rule 130,
secondary evidence of a writing may be admitted "when the original is in the custody or under
the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice." And to warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the
original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130
provides as follows:
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse partys custody or control. If the document is
in the custody or control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If
after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.
Thus, the mere fact that the original is in the custody or control of the adverse party against
whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must
prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said
party to produce the document which may be in the form of a motion for the production of the
original or made in open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces
tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the
same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to
produce it, or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.
Here, the accused admitted that her Employees Clearance was always in the possession of her
assistant secretary, [Marie Cris] Batuampar. So the prosecution in its effort to produce the
original copy of the said Employees Clearance of the accused, thru Assistant Special
Prosecutor Anna Isabel G. Aurellano of the Office of the Prosecutor, sent on May 31, 2005
thru the COA Telegraph Office at Quezon City two (2) telegram subpoenas addressed to
accused Normallah Pacasum, and [Marie Cris] Batuampar ordering them to submit to the
Office of the Special Prosecutor on or before June 8, 2005, the original of the Employees
Clearance in the name of Normallah Alonto Lucman-Pacasum for the release of her August
and September 2000 salary as DOT Regional Secretary. Notwithstanding receipt of the said
telegram subpoena by her uncle Manso Alonto in her residence on June 1, 200[5], the accused
did not appear before or submit to Assistant Special Prosecutor Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, the
original of the said Employees Clearance, much less offered to produce the same.
Under the circumstances, since there was proof of the existence of the Employees Clearance
as evidenced by the photocopy thereof, and despite the reasonable notices made by the
prosecution to the accused and her assistant secretary to produce the original of said
employees clearance they ignored the notice and refused to produce the original document, the
presentation and admission of the photocopy of the original copy of the questioned Employees
Clearance as secondary evidence to prove the contents thereof was justified.65
This Court decrees that even though the original of an alleged falsified document is not, or
may no longer be produced in court, a criminal case for falsification may still prosper if the
person wishing to establish the contents of said document via secondary evidence or
substitutionary evidence can adequately show that the best or primary evidence the original
of the document is not available for any of the causes mentioned in Section 3, 66 Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner claims she was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan severely restricted her
time to present evidence, allowing her only two hearing dates, thus resulting in her failure to
present another important witness in the of person of Atty. Randolph Parcasio. Petitioner was
not denied due process. She was given every opportunity to adduce her evidence. The
Sandiganbayan outlined the proceedings of the case as follows:
After the prosecution rested its case, by agreement of the parties, the initial hearing for the
reception of defense evidence was scheduled on September 19 and 20, 2005 both at 8:30 in
the morning. However, upon motion of the prosecution, the Court, in its Order of September
16, 2005, cancelled the setting as the handling prosecutor, Pros. Anna Isabel G. Aurellano,
had to attend a 5-day workshop at PHINMA in Tagaytay City on September 19-23, 2005 and
scheduled anew the hearing on November 23 and 24, 2005, both at 8:30 in the morning.
However, for failure of the defense counsel, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, to appear at the
November 23, 2005 hearing despite due notice, the Court cancelled the November 23 and 24
hearings, and moved the same to March 13 and 14, 2006 both at 8:30 in the morning, and at
the same time directed the said defense counsel to show cause in writing within five (5) days
from receipt of the Order why he should not be held in contempt for his failure to appear
despite due notice. In compliance with this Order,1awphi1 Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, filed his
Explanation and Withdrawal of Appearance, respectively, which were both Noted by the
Court in its Resolution of January 19, 2006.
In view of the absence of the accused in the March 13, 2006 hearing and her continued
failure to get a substitute counsel considering that her counsel, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, had
already withdrawn from the case since January 16, 2006, the Court cancelled the March 13
and 14, 2006 hearings and moved the same to July 3 and 4, 2006 both at 8:30 in the morning
and designated Atty. Conrado Rosario of the PAO as counsel de oficio of the accused and
directed the accused upon receipt of the order to immediately confer with said counsel for
purposes of preparing for her defense in the case.
On March 20, 2006, the Court issued the following Resolution, which reads:
Accused Normallah L. Pacasums letter of February 17, 2006 (received by mail on March 16,
2006) requesting extension of time to engage the services of counsel is merely NOTED
WITHOUT ACTION as the next hearings are scheduled on July 3 and 4, 2006 and said
accused would have more than ample time to engage the services of counsel of her choice. For
this reason, any excuse from the accused on said settings that she failed to engage the services
of counsel or that her counsel needs more time to prepare will be unacceptable. At all events,
this Court, in its Order of March 13, 2006, had already appointed Atty. Conrado Rosario of
the PAO as a counsel de oficio to represent the accused, with specific orders to the latter to
confer with Atty. Rosario and assist him in preparing for her defense.
On July 3, 2006, upon the manifestation of Atty. Conrado Rosario, counsel for the accused,
that since he was appointed counsel de oficio, the accused has not communicated with him
and therefore he was not ready to present any evidence for the accused, the Court cancelled
the hearing in order to give the defense another opportunity to present its evidence and reset
it to July 4, 2006, the following day as previously scheduled.
On July 4, 2006, the Court issued the following Order, which reads
"When this case was called for hearing, accused asked for the resetting of the case on the
ground that she just hired a new counsel who thereafter arrived and entered his appearance as
Atty. Napoleon Uy Galit with address at Suite 202 Masonic Building, #35 Matalino St.,
Diliman, Quezon City. With the appearance of her new counsel, Atty. Conrado C. Rosario is
hereby discharged as counsel de oficio of the accused.
"As prayed for by the accused, she is given the last chance to present her evidence on October
9 and 10, 2006, both at 8:30 oclock in the morning. For repeated failure of the accused to
acknowledge receipt of the notices of the Court, her waiver of appearance is hereby cancelled
and she is ordered to personally appear in the scheduled hearings of this case.
SO ORDERED.
On October 6, 2006, the accused thru counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman, filed an Entry of
Appearance, Motion For Postponement of October 9 and 10 Hearings stating therein that
since his service as new counsel was just engaged by the accused, and that the accused herself
cannot also attend the said hearing because she is undergoing fasting until October 24, 2006 in
observance of Ramadan, he asked to postpone the settings on October 9 and 10, 2006. At the
hearing on October 9, 2006, the Court issued the following, which reads
"Acting on the Entry of Appearance, Motion for Postponement of October 9 and 10, 2006
Hearing filed by accused Normallah L. Pacasum, thru counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman,
finding the same to be without merit, as this case has been set for hearing several times and
the accused has been given the last chance to present evidence, the Court hereby denies the
motion for postponement.
"In this regard, in view of the absence of accused Normallah L. Pacasum in todays hearing
despite the Order of the Court dated July 4, 2006, canceling her waiver of appearance, and
ordering her to personally appear before this Court, as prayed for by the prosecution, let a
Bench Warrant of Arrest be issued against the said accused. The cash bond posted for her
provisional liberty is ordered confiscated in favor of the government. The accused is given
thirty (30) days from notice to explain in writing why final judgment shall not be rendered
against the said bond.
With the Manifestation of Atty. Bantreas Lucman that the defense is not ready to present its
evidence today and tomorrow, the last chance for it to present its evidence, the Court is
constraint to consider the accuseds right to present evidence as waived.
The parties are hereby given thirty (30) days to submit their respective memoranda.
Thereafter, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, the accused thru counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order
dated October 25, 2006, and Motion to Set Hearing For Motion for Reconsideration and to
Lift Warrant of Arrest dated October 31, 2006.
At the hearing of accuseds motion for reconsideration on November 3, 2006, the Court issued
the following Order, which reads
"When the Motion To Set Hearing for Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of
Arrest was called for hearing this morning, only Attorneys Bantuas M. Lucman and Jose
Ventura Aspiras appeared. Accused Normallah L. Pacasum was absent.
In view of the absence of the accused, the Court is not inclined to give favorable action to the
Motion for Reconsideration. It must be stressed that the primordial reason for the issuance of
the order sought to be reconsidered in the presence of the accused in the previous hearing in
violation of the Courts Order for her to personally appear in the hearings of this case and for
her indifference to the directives of the Court. With the absence anew of the accused, the
Court has no alternative but to deny the Motion.
Moreover, the Court notes the allegation in the Motion that the counsel sought the assurance
of the accused (and she promised) to appear before this Court if the motion will be granted, as
if the Court owes the accused the favor to appear before it. The accused is reminded/advised
that the issuance of the warrant of arrest, she has to voluntarily surrender and appear before
the Court or be arrested and brought to the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance Consideration of Prosecutions
Memorandum (And for a Second Look on the Matter of Accuseds Right to Present Defense
Evidence) of the accused dated November 21, 2006, and the prosecutions Opposition thereto,
the Court issued the following Order, which reads
"This refers to the Accused "Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance Consideration of
Prosecutions November 7, 2006 Memorandum (And For a Second Look on the Matter of
Accuseds Right to Present Defense Evidence)" dated November 21, 2006 and the plaintiffs
Opposition thereto dated November 28, 2006.
"Inasmuch as the accused has already appeared before the Court and posted an additional
bond of P10,000.00 despite the aforesaid opposition of the prosecution, in the interest of
justice, the Court is inclined to reconsider and give favorable action to the motion and grant
the accused another and last opportunity to present here evidence.
"WHEREFORE, the motion is granted and this case is set for hearing for the accuseds last
chance to present and/or complete the presentation of her evidence on February 5 and 6,
2007 both at 8:30 in the morning in the Sandiganbayan Centennial Building in Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, despite the initial indifference of the accused to present her defense, the Court gave her
ample opportunity to present her evidence.67
The Sandiganbayan properly dealt with the situation. In fact, we find that the trial court was
lenient with the petitioner. The failure of the defense to present Atty. Parcasio was its own
doing. The defense failed to prepare its witnesses for the case. As proof of this, we quote a
portion of the hearing when petitioner was testifying:
ATTY. ASPIRAS
Q Would you know where (sic) the whereabouts of this Sec. Parcasio would be (sic) at this
time?
A He lives in Davao but after what happened to Gov. Misuari, we have not got together with
the other members of the cabinet of Gov. Misuari, but he lives in Davao, sir.
Q Would it be possible, Madame Witness, to request or ask him to testify in this case?
A After this hearing, I will look for Sec. Parcasio just to clear my name, sir.
CHAIRMAN
Not after this hearing, you should have already done that. Because we already gave you
enough opportunity to present your side, right? You should not be telling the Court that only
after this hearing, you will start looking (for) people who will, definitely, clear your name.
You should be doing that months ago, correct?
WITNESS
Yes, your Honors.68
Petitioner was charged with falsifying her Employees Clearance under Article 171, paragraph
1 of the Revised Penal Code. For one to be convicted of falsification under said paragraph, the
followings elements must concur: (1) that the offender is a public officer, an employee, or a
notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he falsifies a
document by counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric.
All the foregoing elements have been sufficiently established. There is no dispute that
petitioner was a public officer, being then the Regional Secretary of the Department of
Tourism of the ARMM, when she caused the preparation of her Employees Clearance (a
public document) for the release of her salary for the months of August and September 2000.
Such being a requirement, and she being a public officer, she was duty-bound to prepare,
accomplish and submit said document. Were it not for her position and employment in the
ARMM, she could not have accomplished said Employees Clearance. In a falsification of
public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position
when (1) he had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the
document; or (2) he had official custody of the document which he falsified. 69 It being her
duty to prepare and submit said document, she clearly took advantage of her position when
she falsified or caused the falsification of her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature
of Laura Pangilan.lawphil.net
Going now to the penalties imposed on petitioner, we find the same proper. The penalty for
falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is prision mayor and a fine not
exceeding P5,000.00. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the
commission of the felony, the imposable penalty is prision mayor in its medium period, or
within the range of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the
medium period of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from within the range of
the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional or from six (6) months and one
(1) day to six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No.
27483 dated 7 August 2007 and its resolution dated 22 October 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, NCR, represented by Nelson L. Acebedo, Dir. IV,
Office of the Legal Affairs, complainant,
vs.
REYNALDO B. STA. ANA, HRMO I, Leave Division, OCA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
For resolution is the administrative complaint filed against respondent Reynaldo B. Sta. Ana,
Human Resource Management Officer I, Leave Division, Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), Supreme Court for Dishonesty and Falsification of Public Documents relative to his
promotion as Human Resource Management Officer III.
Respondent gained employment in the Office of the Court Administrator, Supreme Court in
1976. He started as a Laborer and was later promoted to the position of Human Resource
Management Officer I. Sometime in 1996, respondent applied for promotion as Human
Resource Management Officer III. In support of his application for promotion to the said
position, he submitted the following documents:
(1) a Certificate of Eligibility purportedly issued by the Civil Service Commission
certifying that respondent Sta. Ana passed the Career Service Professional
examination on February 18, 1996 with a rating of 83.8%; 1 and
(2) a Personal Data Sheet (PDS) dated August 5, 1996 stating, under Item 18, that he
passed the Career Service Professional examination on February 18, 1996 with a
rating of 83.8%.2
Upon verification by Atty. Dante Huerta, Field Officer of the Civil Service Commission in the
Supreme Court, it was found that respondent Sta. Ana was not in the CSC-NCR Master List of
those who passed the MOWE Career Service Professional Examination given by the Civil
Service Commission on February 18, 1996 at Ramon Magsaysay High School. 3 Atty. Huerta
recommended the filing of a formal charge against respondent.1wphi1.nt
Thus, the Civil Service Commission Office for Legal Affairs (CSC-OLA) issued a formal
charge against respondent for Dishonesty and Falsification of Public Document committed as
follows:
That in support of promotional appointment to the position of Human Resource
Management Officer III, you submitted a Certificate of Eligibility certifying you to
have passed the Career Service Professional Examination on February 18, 1996 with
a rating of 83.8%. Upon verification with this Office's Registry of Eligibles, it was
found out that your name does not appear among those who have passed the said
examination. Such act is contrary to Civil Service Law and rules. 4
A copy of the formal charge was furnished respondent on October 11, 1996 requiring him to
file his Answer within five days from notice. Respondent asked for an extension of time to file
his Answer which was granted by the CSC-OLA on December 11, 1996.5 However,
respondent still did not submit his Answer within the extended period. He also failed to attend
the scheduled hearings despite notices for him to appear.6
On February 19, 1998, an ex-parte hearing was conducted by the Hearing Officer of the CSC-
OLA. A representative from the CSC Field Office in the Supreme Court, Ms. Rose Perlas,
testified to confirm the documents submitted by respondent in support of his promotional
appointment, namely: (1) a Certificate of Eligibility indicating that respondent passed the
Career Service Professional Examination held at Ramon Magsaysay High School on February
18, 1996;7 (2) a Personal Data Sheet dated August 5, 1996 stating that he passed said
examination;8 and (3) an official Appointment dated July 9, 1996 issued by then Chief Justice
Andres Narvasa promoting respondent to the position of Human Resource Management
Officer III.9
In the same hearing, a certification issued by Ms. Bella A. Mitra, Officer-in-Charge,
Examination and Placement Services Division (EPSD), CSC-NCR, was presented attesting
that respondent's name was not included in the Registry of Eligibles in the Career Service
Professional Examination held on February 18, 1996. 10 On the basis of this certification, it
was deduced that respondent submitted a spurious certificate of eligibility and made a false
entry in his Personal Data Sheet.
Hence, on June 22, 1998, the Hearing Officer of the CSC-OLA recommended that respondent
be dismissed from government service.11 This was affirmed by Atty. Nelson Acebedo,
Director IV, CSC-OLA, on June 24, 1998.12
On August 12, 1998, respondent filed a Petition to transfer jurisdiction of the case from the
Civil Service Commission to the Supreme Court and/or to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction13 pursuant to CSC Memorandum No. 53, Series of 1998, to wit:
Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court
clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judge's and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
The CSC-OLA thus referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on
August 18, 1998.
On May 17, 1999, the Office of the Court Administrator directed respondent to explain in
writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for dishonesty and falsification
of public documents.14
In a letter to the Court Administrator dated May 21, 1999, 15 respondent admitted the charge
and asked that the penalty meted him be reduced and that he be given another chance to serve
the court in order to correct his mistake.
On February 28, 2001, the Court resolved to docket the case as a regular administrative matter
and required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the available records on file. 16 On April 10, 2001, the CSC-OLA
manifested no objection to docketing of the case as a regular administrative matter and
submitting the same for resolution.17
In his Manifestation dated April 11, 2001,18 respondent reiterated that he admits the charge
against him and pleaded for forgiveness. Respondent asked that he be given another chance
considering that he has served the court for more than twenty (20) years and has consistently
received performance ratings of "Very Satisfactory" and "Outstanding." Pertinent portions of
respondent's Manifestation19 reads:
1. That he admits with so much regret that he indeed committed the act complained
of;
2. That he humbly pleads for forgiveness before this Honorable Court and he be
given another chance to prove his sincerity to correct his misdeed and promises that
this wrongdoing, although not done in the performance of his duties, this will never
happen in the future;
3. That he respectfully informs this Honorable Court that he served the Court for
more than twenty (20) years to the best of his ability. In fact, he was given a
performance rating of "Very Satisfactory" (VS) and "Outstanding," an indication that
he has been faithfully performing his job well. (Please see attached supporting
papers);
4. That this is the first Administrative Case filed against him; and
5. That he respectfully prays for compassionate justice before this Honorable Court
in inflicting a harsh penalty considering the future of his children and family depend
on his role (sic) financial support.
xxx20
On January 25, 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator affirmed the findings of the CSC-
OLA but recommended suspension for one (1) year without pay. In reducing the penalty, the
Court Administrator took into account -
xxx the fact that respondent has already spent more than twenty (20) years of his life
in the service of this Court and this is his first administrative complaint. It could be
that he committed the acts complained of out of his desire to be promoted for the
benefit of his family. Respondent's admission and prayer for forgiveness is a good
sign that he is indeed remorseful for what he did. xxx
True, respondent deserves to be penalized but the same may (sic) tempered in the
name of compassionate justice. Unlike the respondent in A.M. No. 95-1-01-MTCC
respondent Sta. Ana did not defraud and prejudice the government by his acts. He
neither assumed the position he desired nor received the compensation and benefits
pertaining thereto.
Moreover, it appears that Reynaldo B. Sta. Ana proved to be an asset of the Leave
Division, OAS-OCA. His efficiency is shown by his performance ratings xxx.
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Republic Act
6713, enunciates the State's policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service.21 And no other office in the government service exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the
judiciary.22
Every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty.23 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the conduct of court personnel,
from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any
suspicion that may taint the judiciary.24 The Court condemns and would never countenance
any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice
which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to
diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.25
Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to this standard of conduct.
One of the supporting documents respondent appended to his application for promotion to
HRMO III was a certificate of eligibility purportedly issued by the Civil Service Commission
certifying that he passed the career service professional examination on February 18, 1996
with a rating of 83.8%. In his personal data sheet, respondent also stated that he passed the
said examination on the same date and with the same rating. However, upon examination of
the records of the Examination and Placement Services Division (EPSD) of the Civil Service
Commission, it was disclosed that petitioner's name was not in the list of those who passed the
said examination held at Ramon Magsaysay High School on February 18, 1996. This belied
respondent's statement in his personal data sheet and led to the inevitable conclusion that
respondent submitted a false certificate of eligibility.
Under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of "use of falsified
documents" are (1) that the offender knew that document was falsified by another person; (2)
that the false document is embraced in Art. 171 or in any subdivisions 1 or 2 of Art. 172; (3)
that he used such document (not in judicial proceedings); and (4) that the use of the false
document caused damage to another or at least it was used with intent to cause such
damage.1wphi1.nt
It cannot be gainsaid that respondent was well aware that the certificate of eligibility he
submitted was false because he knew for a fact that he did not pass the career service
examination. It is, likewise, undeniable that his use of such false document in support of his
promotion to HRMO III prejudiced the other applicants who were genuinely qualified for the
position. Then Chief Justice Andres Narvasa had already issued his official appointment, even
though he neither assumed the position nor received the compensation and benefits pertaining
thereto.
Respondent's act of indicating in his personal data sheet that he passed that career service
professional examination when in fact he did not, also makes him liable for falsification of a
document by making an untruthful statement in a narration of facts, as defined under Art. 171,
par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code. In falsification by false narration of facts, (1) the offender
makes untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the ability to perform his duties with the integrity, uprightness and honesty demanded of an
truth of the facts narrated by him; (3) the facts narrated are absolutely false; and (4) it was employee in the judiciary.
made with a wrongful intent to injure a third person.26
WHEREFORE, respondent Reynaldo B. Sta. Ana is hereby DISMISSED from the service
Respondent stated in his personal data sheet that he passed the career service professional with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency and government-owned or
examination knowing fully well that it was not true because he did not pass the said exam. controlled corporation, and with forfeiture of unused leaves, if any, and retirement benefits.
Being an aspirant for promotion to a higher position, he had a legal obligation to disclose the This decision shall take effect immediately.1wphi1.nt
truth because the personal data sheet is required in connection with the promotion to a higher
position.27 In the case of Inting vs. Tanodbayan,28 the Court ruled that "the accomplishment of
the Personal Data Sheet being a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in
connection with employment in the government, the making of an untruthful statement therein
was therefore intimately connected with such employment xxx." In Belosillo vs. Rivera,29 we
said that since "truthful completion of Personal Data Sheet is a requirement for employment in
the Judiciary, the importance of answering the same with candor need not be gainsaid."

By making a false statement in his personal data sheet to enhance his qualification and
increase his chances of being considered for promotion, which in fact happened because he
was issued an appointment as HRMO III by then Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, respondent
prejudiced the other qualified aspirants to the same position. It does not matter that respondent
did not actually assume the position and receive salaries and benefits pertaining thereto. The
law does not require that actual injury to a third person be present. What is necessary is that
there be intent to injure. Moreover, in People vs. Po Giok To,30 it is held that when official
documents are falsified, "the intent to injure a third person need not be present because the
principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as
therein proclaimed."

The facts and evidence, coupled with respondent's admission, sufficiently established his
culpability. Respondent's use of a false certificate of eligibility constitutes an act of dishonesty
under civil service rules and his act of making a false statement in his personal data sheet
renders him administratively liable for falsification. Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, dishonesty (par. a) and falsification (par. f) are considered grave
offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon commission of the first
offense.

On numerous occasions, the Court did not hesitate to impose such extreme punishment on
employees found guilty of these offenses.31 There is no reason why respondent should be
treated differently. The Court takes note of the fact that initially, respondent did not controvert
this evidence against him. Neither did he admit the charge. In fact, deliberately or otherwise,
respondent did not participate in the proceedings before the CSC. He did not file any answer
and failed to appear in the scheduled hearings despite due notice. When he was found guilty
of the charge by the CSC-OLA and was recommended for dismissal, he filed a petition to
transfer jurisdiction to the Office of the Court Administrator and/or motion to dismiss the
case. It was only when his case was transferred to the OCA did he confess his guilt, more than
three years after he was first charged in the CSC.

While we recognize that respondent committed the acts complained of out of an extreme
desire to be promoted for the benefit of his family, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to what is
clearly a transgression of the law. Dishonesty and falsification are malevolent acts that have
no place in the judiciary.32 Because of his conduct, the Court seriously doubts respondent's
JASMIN MAGUAD and REBECCA BRIOSO, complainants,
vs.
NICOLAS DE GUZMAN and RUBY C. BARCENAS, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
This is a complaint filed by Jasmin Maguad and Rebecca Brioso against Nicolas de Guzman,
Sheriff of Branch 47 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City and Ruby Barcenas, Court
Social Worker in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, for grave misconduct,
falsification and immorality.
The complaint 1 alleges that sometime in 1982, respondent Nicolas de Guzman (lawfully
married to Corazon Punzalan de Guzman), and respondent Ruby Barcenas, single, unlawfully
and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at 137 Ignacio St., Pasay City; that in
October, 1983, when respondents' first illegitimate child Nathaniel Roy was born, respondents
unlawfully and maliciously conspired to falsify an entry in the Birth Certificate of said child,
making it appear that respondents were lawfully married on December 8, 1982; that when
respondents' second illegitimate child Natalia, was born in 1984, respondents unlawfully and
maliciously conspired to falsify an entry in the said child's Birth Certificate, making it appear
that respondents were lawfully married on December 8, 1984 (perhaps a typographical error
meant to be December 8, 1982 as in the first Birth Certificate).
In their joint comment and/or answer, 2 the respondents admitted that respondent Nicolas de
Guzman was married to Corazon Punzalan in 1968 and has two legitimate children with her;
de Guzman explained that he and Corazon Punzalan had long been separated in fact and a
reconciliation between them for purposes of their living together again has become quite
remote as she is now living with another man by the name of Eliseo Almero; de Guzman
added that he has not been remiss in his obligations as a father to his two legitimate children,
as he provided them within his means all that they needed for their sustenance. Respondents
denied the complainants' allegation that they cohabited as husband and wife under scandalous
circumstances; they also denied that they unlawfully and maliciously conspired to falsify the
entries in the certificates of live birth of their two children. They claimed that the truth is that
respondent de Guzman had no knowledge, much less any participation in the entries therein
relating to their alleged marriage on December 8, 1982; that in the birth certificates of the
children, the informant appearing therein is only respondent Barcenas. The respondents
explained that Barcenas was "constrained to supply such erroneous information as regards her
civil status solely for purposes of shielding her two children from the stigma of shame and
disgrace that they might encounter in their later years in life by reason of their illegitimacy."
De Guzman and Barcenas took exception to the claim of the complainants that they filed the
present charges as "concerned citizens." According to the respondents, "for some ulterior
designs," the complainants allow themselves to be the willing pawns of one Leoncio Cesar in
the latter's attempts to unduly harass herein respondents because respondent Barcenas was one
of the private complainants against Leoncio Cesar for Grave Oral Defamation before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 46, in Crim. Cases Nos. 93-1300 to 1303.
In a resolution 3 dated March 23, 1994, the complaint was referred to Executive Judge
Conchita Carpio Morales for investigation, report and recommendation. However, in view of
the promotion of Executive Judge Morales to the Court of Appeals, this case was referred to
Acting Executive Judge Alfredo J. Gustilo of Branch 116, Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
for investigation, report and recommendation. 4
During the hearing of the case, instead of presenting proofs in support of the accusation, the
complainants offered in evidence their joint Affidavit of Desistance, 5 dated August 12, 1994
stating, among others:
3. That, assisted by our private lawyer, we recently conferred with the said two
accused about this case and we have realized: (a) that they had no malicious or criminal intent
when they made that entry and that Ruby Barcenas innocently did it in the best interest of
their said children to avoid future social stigma upon the persons of the said children when
they grow up; and (b) that Mr. De Guzman had been separated for many years from his wife,
who has likewise been living her own life with a common-law husband in Mindoro; and that
his wife and two children with her had expressly condoned and consented to his relationship
with Ms. Barcenas many years ago;
4. That we are no longer interested to pursue this administrative case and that
therefore, in the interest of justice, we hereby request the Supreme Court, thru the
investigating Executive Judge of Pasay City to dismiss the same.
In his Investigation Report 6 dated November 2, 1994 Acting Executive Judge Alfredo J.
Gustilo (now Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan), made the following findings which the
Court quotes with approval:
Misconduct means intentional wrong doing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior, specially by a government official. (Webster's Third New International
Dictionary). To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.
(Lacson vs. Rogue, 92 Phil. 456) No act of the respondents appears or has been established
which can be considered as misconduct in office. The charge of grave misconduct against
them is therefore without any basis.
With respect to the charge of falsification, the complainants allege that the
respondents committed the offense when they made, through conspiracy, an entry in the birth
certificates of their children that they were married on December 8, 1982, or December 8,
1984, in Davao City, when in fact they were not. Apparently, this accusation is predicated on
one of the ways of committing falsification, i.e., by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code. One essential element of
this kind of falsification is that there must be a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the fact
claimed to be false. In other words there must be a law requiring, expressly or impliedly, the
disclosure of the truth of the fact alleged to have been falsified. No law has been shown by the
complainants making it either expressly or impliedly a duty of an informant in a record of
birth to disclose the truth that the parents of the child covered by it are married or not.
Consequently, the charge of falsification against the respondents cannot likewise prosper.
It is alleged in the complaint that the respondents conspired with each other in
making the entry in the birth certificates of their children that they were married. Conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. (Art. 8, Revised Penal Code). The rule is that conspiracy
should be shown by strong and convincing evidence. No evidence has been adduced in this
case indicating that the respondents agreed and decided to make the entry in the birth
certificates of their children that they were married. Even on the assumption that such entry in
the birth certificates of Nathaniel and Natalia would constitute falsification by making an
untruthful statement in a narration of fact, only respondent Barcenas, the informant who made
the entry, could be held liable therefor. Respondent De Guzman could not be made to answer
for it, since there is no proof that he conspired with his co-respondent in making such entry.
On the other hand, the circumstances in this case admitted by the respondents are
sufficient to sustain the charge of immorality. It is not in accordance with the norms of
morality for a man who is legally married to cohabit with another woman during the
subsistence of such marriage. In the same manner, it is against the tenets of morality for a
woman to be living together with a married man not her husband. The stigma of immorality
attaches to this kind of relationship even if the married man is separated from his wife and the
woman living with him is single. This is specially so when the persons concerned are public
officers who are supposed to maintain a high standard of morality so as to live up to their role
to be looked upon as models in society.
However, to temper justice with mercy, these circumstances may be considered to mitigate the
liability of the respondents:
1. They have voluntarily admitted that they are living together as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage.
2. Respondent De Guzman and his lawful wife have been separated in fact for a long time and
his wife is already cohabiting with another man, thereby rendering reconciliation between
them improbable.
3. Notwithstanding their separation, respondent De Guzman has continued giving support to
his children with Punzalan.
4. The relationship between the respondents is one of the realities of life which is difficult to
prevent from happening, more so because respondent De Guzman has been separated for a
long time from his wife.
5. Apparently, the lawful wife and legitimate children of respondent De Guzman have
tolerated the relationship between the respondents as can be implied from the fact that none of
them has filed a complaint against them.
6. There is no indication that the relationship between the respondents has caused prejudice to
any person or has adversely affected the performance of their functions and duties as officers
of the government to the detriment of the public service.
7. The complainants have desisted from further prosecuting their complaint and asked for its
dismissal, admitting that the filing of the present charges was an offshoot of a civil case
involving complainant Maguad and the respondents.
The investigating Judge made the following recommendation:
1. Respondents Nicolas de Guzman and Ruby Barcenas be exonerated of the charges of grave
misconduct and falsification; and
2. Both respondents be found guilty of the charge of immorality.
However, because of the aforementioned mitigating circumstances, only the penalty of
suspension from office for one (1) month without pay be imposed on them.
Additionally, the respondents should be admonished to terminate their cohabitation or to take
such proper course of action as will legitimize the relationship between them.
The Court fully agrees with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge that
the respondents be absolved from the charges of grave misconduct and falsification, the same
being duly supported by the evidence on record and jurisprudence on the matter.
With regard to the third accusation, the stigma of immorality attaches to the kind of
relationship between the respondents, the same being improper, notwithstanding the fact that
respondent de Guzman was separated from his wife (who is now living with another man) and
respondent Barcenas was single. In Nalupta, Jr. vs. Tapec, 7 this Court held that illicit
relations is considered disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action pointing
out that Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989 of the Civil Service Commission has
categorized disgraceful and immoral conduct as a grave offense for which a penalty of
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day shall be imposed for the first offense while the
penalty of dismissal is imposed for the second offense.
However, this being the first offense of the respondents and there being no allegation in the
complaint that respondent Barcenas knew that de Guzman was married even before they
started their relationship and came to know of it only when it was already too late to back out,
with the birth of their children, and taking into account the circumstances enumerated by the
Investigating Judge that may be considered to mitigate their liability, the Court, in order to
temper justice with mercy is inclined to impose a lighter penalty upon the respondents.
In a Memorandum 8 for the Chief Justice dated September 28, 1998, the Court Administrator
recommended that the respondents Deputy Sheriff Nicolas de Guzman and Social Worker
Ruby Barcenas be absolved from the charges of grave misconduct and falsification, but
respondent de Guzman should be suspended for two (2) months without pay for immorality
and respondent Barcenas be suspended for fifteen (15) days without pay and both respondents
be admonished to terminate their relationship or to take the necessary steps to legitimize the
same.
Parenthetically, on February 5, 1999, the respondents filed a Manifestation 9 stating among
others:
5. That on May 25, 1995, respondent Nicolas de Guzman filed a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite;
6. On August 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered by the Honorable Judge Dolores C. Espanol
in favor of the respondent;
7 That on November 27, 1998, Entry of Final Judgment regarding the Annulment of Marriage
was issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court Branch 90, Imus, Cavite; and,
8. That on October 19, 1998, the respondents had tied their marriage knot before the
Honorable Judge Leticia P. Morales of Regional Trial Court, Makati.
WHEREFORE, respondents Deputy Sheriff Nicolas de Guzman and Court Social Worker
Ruby Barcenas are absolved from the charge of grave misconduct and falsification, but
respondent de Guzman is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without pay and respondent
Barcenas for fifteen (15) days also without pay, both for immorality.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RICARDO BAYOT, defendant-appellant.
During the month of April, 1907, and for several years prior thereto, the defendant was and
had been the janitor of the city hall in the city of Manila. He had under his charge 12 or 15
men whose business it was to take care of and clean the building. In the month of April, one
of these men was Manuel Manalo. The work assigned to him was the cleaning of the water-
closets. The work done by all of these laborers had to be performed before the offices opened
in the morning or after they were closed at night. The water-closets were cleaned only once a
day and that work was done by Manuel Manalo in the morning before 8 o'clock. During the
month of April he went to the building every day about half past 6 and performed this work,
which was all the work that was assigned to him, and which was all the work which he had to
perform during the entire day. He was not in the building any day after 9 a. m. There was
evidence, however, that it was the duty of these men to remain in the building so that if any
extraordinary work should be required of them they would be there to perform it. The
evidence shows that some of the men were allowed to go away, and others stayed there and
that those that stayed there did nothing except to perform the regular work assigned to them.
On the 1st of May, 1907, a pay roll was made out for the month of April. It contained the
names of all the workmen and a square against each name for each day in the month. All of
the square against each name of Manuel Manalo contain a vertical line. The defendant signed
the following certificate upon this pay roll: "I certify that I have been in charge of the men
whose names appear on the above roll during the period indicated, that the roll is correct, and
that the labor has been performed as stated." Manuel Manalo received pay at the rate of 70
cents a day and for the month of April he was paid P21.
A complaint was filed against the defendant charging him, as a public official, with the
falsification of a public document, to wit, this pay roll, it being alleged that the certificate
which he attached thereto was false. He was convicted in the court below of the crime charged
against him and has appealed.
To our minds the only question in the case is as to the meaning of the vertical lines placed in
the square opposite the names of these laborers. It is claimed by the appellant that they only
mean that the persons to whom the lines referred had performed upon the days mentioned the
services which had been required of each one. If this is the correct meaning of these lines,
then the certificate signed by the defendant was true, because it was proven that Manuel
Manalo had performed during the month of April all the work which was assigned to him. It is
claimed by the Government, however, that these lines indicate, not that Manuel Manalo
performed all the work that was required of him during the day, but that he was present in the
building during all the day and it relies upon the following statement made at the top of the
payroll: "Mark the time each day in ink under the proper date, using full or fractional marks
for part of a day as earned." The Attorney-General insists that, inasmuch as Manuel Manalo
was not present all of the day, the time during which he was present all of the day, the time
during which he was present should have been indicated by a fractional mark. There are no
fractional marks upon this time roll. Mr. Dorrington, the then superintendent of public
buildings and a witness for the Government, was asked: "What mark is generally made on the
labor pay rolls to indicate a man has worked one-half a day?" and he answered: "I do not
know what would be put there in a case of that kind." He further testified: "Q. Have you ever
seen on the pay roll a man's name for one half a day's work? A. Not that I recall; it may be
possible in some cases; I do not recall."
If that part of the certificate signed by the defendant which states that he had been in charge of
the men was correct, and that part which states that the labor had been performed was correct,
the only question is, Is that part of the certificate which says "that the roll is correct," false or
true? After considerable hesitation we have come to the conclusion, in view of all the
testimony in the case, that it can not be said that this statement was false; in other words, that
the vertical lines do not necessarily mean that the person against whose name they appear was
present in the building during every hour of the day. The defendant, therefore, can not be
convicted of the crime of falsification of a public document by a public official.
There are some additional facts in the case not before stated, which to our mind have no
bearing upon the precise question in this case, namely, whether the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged against him, for the crime thus charged does not depend upon the advantage of
profit which the defendant may obtain from the falsification. A defendant may be guilty of
this crime without in any way profiting thereby. The additional facts referred to are the
following:
It was proven by the Government and admitted by the defendant, that during the month of
April, and for sometime before, Manuel Manalo was and had been the defendant's cook; that
after he had finished his work at the city hall in the morning the defendant gave him money
and sent him to the market where he bought provisions; and that he returned to the city hall,
stayed there until about 9 o'clock, and then went to the defendant's house where he worked as
cook until about 2 o'clock in the afternoon and then went to his own house. For these services
as a cook the defendant paid nothing, although he claims that he was educating the minor
child of Manuel Manalo. That this conduct of the defendant in availing himself of the services
of Manuel Manalo under the circumstances was grossly irregular and that it perhaps
constitutes a crime under the provisions of the Penal Code is not to our minds decisive of the
question here raised. However delinquent the defendant may have been, the question here is,
Did his delinquency amount to the crime of the falsification of a public document? If it did
not, he must be acquitted of the present charge and we can not inquire under this complaint as
to what other offense he may have committed.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the defendant is acquitted, with the costs of
both instances' de oficio.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PO GIOK TO, defendant-appellee.
In the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the defendant appellee Po Giok To was charged with
the crime of falsification under the following information:
That on or about the 7th day of January, 1952, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to
falsify or forge a public document, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify, or forge a public document consisting of residence certificate No.
A-1618529 issued to him in the City of Cebu, on January 7, 1952, by e
representative of the City Treasurer of Cebu, to wit: by misrepresenting to the said
representative of the City Treasurer of Cebu that his name is Antonio Perez, that his
place of birth is Jaro, Leyte and that his citizenship is Filipino, and by means of such
misrepresentation, said representative of the City Treasurer of Cebu was made to
issue and write, and in fact did issue and write, on the corresponding lines on said
residence certificate No. A-1618529 the name of Antonio Perez, as the name of the
taxpayer, Jaro, Leyte as his place of birth, and Filipino as his citizenship, thus
causing it to appear that the said residence certificate No. A-1618529 dated January
7, 1952, was issued to one Antonio Perez with his place of birth as Jaro, Leyte, and
with his citizenship as Filipino, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew,
his true name is Po Giok To, his place of birth is Amoy, China, and his citizenship is
Chinese.
The accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that the information does not allege (1) that
the accused had the obligation to disclose the truth in the document allegedly falsified, nor (2)
that the accused had the wrongful intent to injure a third person. The City Fiscal opposed the
motion to quash claiming that the information alleges all the integral elements of the offense
charged as defined by the statute. The lower Court, however, found the motion to quash
meritorious and ordered the amendment of the information. Upon insistence of the City Fiscal
that the information was sufficient and that he was not in possession of any evidence that the
accused made use of the residence certificate containing the alleged false entries, the Court a
quo dismissed the case without prejudice. Hence, this appeal by the Government.
The sole issue is whether or not the information in question alleges sufficient facts to
constitute the crime of falsification of public document. The defense contends that the
information is insufficient for failure to recite two alleged essential elements of the crime
charged; namely, the obligation on the part of the accused to disclose the truth, and wrongful
intent on the part of the accused to injure third persons.
We agree with the Solicitor-General that the first element allegedly lacking in the information,
viz., the obligation on the part of the accused to disclose the truth as to the facts that should
appear in a residence certificate, is inherent in the very nature and purpose of said document.
Section 3 Commonwealth Act 465 (otherwise known as the Residence Tax Act) provides "that
the residence certificate for persons shall contain the full name, place and date of birth,
citizenship, civil status, length of residence in the city or municipality where the certificate is
issued, occupation or calling", all of which facts are required to appear therein for the purpose
of establishing the true and correct identity of the person to whom the certificate is issued.
Needless to say, this provision implies that the person to whom the certificate is issued must
state to the officer who issues the same, the true facts, required to appear therein, the latter
having merely the ministerial function of recording thereon the facts as supplied by this
person. And to guarantee that the facts given correctly and truly identify the holder of the
certificate, he is also required by Sec. 3, supra, to sign the document and affix his right hand
thumb mark thereon. There is, therefore, no question that the accused had the duty to disclose
the true facts about his name, place of birth, and citizenship to the officer or employee who
issued his residence certificate No. A-1618529; and such duty being inherent in the
transaction, there was no need for the criminal charge to allege that the accused had such duty.
Anent the second element allegedly lacking in the information in question, the law is clear that
wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of
the crime of falsification of public document.
Article 172, par. 1, in connection with Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, under
which provision the accused is charged, provides as follows:
ART. 171. Falsification by the public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic
minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall
be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of
his official position shall falsify a document by committing any of the following
acts:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents.
The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine
of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in
the next preceding article in any other kind of commercial document.
On the other hand, Art. 172, par 2, defining the crime falsification of private
document, provides:
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with intent to cause such
damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in the next preceeding article.
The distinction made by the law between falsification by private persons, first, of public
documents, and secondly of private documents, is clear; the first is committed by the mere
performance of any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171; while the second is
committed not only by the performance of any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art.
171; but it must likewise be shown that such act of falsification was committed to the damage
of a third party or with intent to cause such damage.
The reason for the distinction is given in a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated
December 23, 1885, cited by this Court in the case of People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48; i.e., that
in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private
persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third
person, for the reason that, in contradiction to private documents, the principal thing punished
is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed.
Our own commentators on the Revised Penal Code are also agreed on this distinction.
(Francisco, Revised Penal Code.) Sec. ed., Vol. II, Part 1, p. 301; Guevara, Comm. on the
Revised Penal Code, IV Ed., P. 172; Albert, Revised Penal Code, 1948 Ed., p. 398).
thereof. Which law is applicable should be determined when the case is decided on its merits.
At the present stage of the proceedings, however, it can be stated that whether the crime
charged be punishable under the Revised Penal Code, or sec. 12 Comm. Act No. 465, the
information was sufficient, and its dismissal for insufficiency by the Court below was
improper and erroneous.
The order of the trial court dismissing the information filed in this case is, therefore, reversed,
and the case is remanded to the Court below for further proceedings, with costs against the
defendant-appellee.

Moreover, the acts charged, if true, would result in confusion in the government records, since
the fingerprint of the accused would not correspond to that of the person whose personal
circumstances are recited in the certificate. Such confusion in its records evidently operates to
the Government's prejudice. Being the natural and direct result of the criminal act charged, the
accused must be presumed to have intended it.

Defendant-appellee also advances the theory that a private person can not commit the crime of
falsification charged, i. e., by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, referring to
the opinion of the late Justice Albert that "only of the eight ways of committing falsifications
enumerated in Article 171, to wit, the first, the fifth, and the sixth, are open to a private
individual" (Albert, supra, p. 405); and stresses that if there had been any falsification at all in
this case, it was committed by the employee who, though innocently, wrote the allegedly
untrue facts on defendant's residence certificate. The opinion quoted plainly refers to direct
falsification by a private person, and does not contemplate situations where the accused,
though a private person, becomes a principal to the act of falsification committed by a public
official or employee, by induction, cooperation, or planned conspiracy (cf. Sent. of Tribunal
Supremo of Spain of 23 Mar. 1885; 28 Apr. 1905; 28 Mar. 1893). In the present case,
although it is true that it was the employee of the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu who
performed the overt act of writing the allegedly false facts on the defendant's residence
certificate, it was however, the defendants who induced him to do so by supplying him with
those facts. Consequently, the employee was defendant's mere innocent agent in the
performance of the crime charged, while defendant was a principal by inducement.

Finally, it is argued for the defendant-appellee that there being a special law with respect to
residence certificates expressly punishing their falsification (Commonwealth Act No. 465),
this special law, and not the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, should apply in this case;
and since Commonwealth Act No. 465, sec. 11 punishes the falsification of a residence
certificate only when it is done "for the purpose of using the same in the payment of revenue
or in securing any exemption or privilege conferred by law", which element is not alleged in
the information, the same was properly dismissed by the lower Court. Again this contention is
without merit. The fact that Commonwealth Act No. 465 punishes the falsification of
residence certificates in the cases mentioned therein does not prevent the application of the
general provisions of the Revised Penal Code on other acts of falsification not covered by the
special law, since under Art. 10 of the Rev. Penal Code, it has supplementary application to all
special laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary, and Commonwealth Act
No. 465 makes no provision that it exclusively applies to all falsifications of residence
certificates. Then, again, section 12 of Commonwealth Act. No. 465 penalize all
other violations of the residence certificate law not covered by the preceeding sections
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO MONTANO and WENCESLAO CABAGSANG, defendants-appellants.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, convicting the
defendants-appellants of the crime of falsification of public documents. The defendant
Wenceslao Cabagsang was the chief of police and the defendant Pedro Montano was the
justice of the peace of the municipality of Tanza in the Province of Cavite, in the month of
September, 1930, when the crimes for which they were convicted occurred. It appears from
the evidence that on September 5, 1930, a criminal complaint against one Arturo A. Soriano
for the crime of qualified seduction was filed with the said justice of the peace. The justice,
apparently to favor Soriano, delayed the preliminary investigation until the offended woman
on September 18, 1930, filed with him a motion demanding immediate action and calling his
attention to the fact that his delay was a violation of the circular of instructions of the judge of
the Court of First Instance of said province. The case was then set for hearing on September
22, 1930. Thereafter administrative charges against the justice of the peace were filed with the
Court of First Instance of Cavite, alleging that the delay in the preliminary investigation was a
violation of the circular of the Court of First Instance, dated November 15, 1928, requiring all
justices of the peace to dispose of all preliminary investigations within ten days from the date
on which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.lawphil.net
The evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that prior to the hearing of said administrative
case, the defendants, in order to make it appear that there had been no violation of the said
instructions to the justices of the peace, falsified official records in their custody as follows:
The defendant chief of police fraudulently altered and falsified the municipal police blotter
and the book of records of arrests and the return of the warrant of arrest and Soriano's bail
bond so as to make them show that the said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested and gave bond on
the 13th day of September, 1930, whereas, in truth and in fact, as said records showed before
said falsification, the said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested and released on bond on the 6th day
of September, 1930; that the defendant Pedro Montano conspired and cooperated with his
codefendant in making said falsifications in order to meet the administrative charges then
pending against him. The court below rejected the defense of the accused that said alterations
were made in good faith and corresponded to the true facts of the case. There is no issue of
law raised in the assignment of errors. We have made a careful review of the evidence and
have come to the conclusion that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed, with
costs against the appellants. So ordered.
ROSALINDA BERNARDO VDA DE ROSALES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIO G. RAMOS, respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This complaint for disbarment was filed in behalf of complainant Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de
Rosales by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against respondent Atty. Mario G.
Ramos for violation of Act No. 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, Title IV, Ch.
11, otherwise know as the Notarial Law, particularly Secs. 245 and 246 thereof.
In September 1990 Manuel A. Bernardo, brother of complainant Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de
Rosales, borrowed from Rosalinda the Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. 194464
covering Lot No. 1-B-4-H in her name. The lot measures 112 square meters and is located at
the back of Manuel's house on Fabie Street, Paco, Metro Manila. On 25 November 1990
Rosalinda sold this lot to one Alfredo P. Castro. When she asked her brother Manuel to return
her title he refused.
On 22 October 1990 Rosalinda executed an Affidavit of Loss of her title and presented the
affidavit to the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On 3 September 1991 the Register of Deeds informed Rosalinda that her title to the property
was already transferred to Manuel by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale she purportedly
executed in favor of Manuel on 5 September 1990. The document was notarized by
respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos on 1 October 1990 and entered in his Notarial Register as
Doc. No. 388, Page No. 718, Book No. 10, Series of 1990. Rosalinda however denied having
signed any deed of sale over her property in favor of Manuel.
On 3 September 1991 Rosalinda filed with the NBI a complaint for falsification of public
document against her brother Manuel. The NBI invited respondent Atty. Ramos for
questioning. The complaint alleged among others that on 12 September 1991 Atty. Mario G.
Ramos executed an affidavit before the NBI admitting that when Manuel presented the
purported Deed of Absolute Sale to him for notarization, he (Atty. Ramos) found some defects
in the document and that complainant Rosalinda was not around. The NBI Questioned
Documents Division also compared Rosalinda's signature appearing in the Deed of Absolute
Sale with samples of her genuine signature, and found that the signature in the purported Deed
of Absolute Sale and her genuine signatures were not written by one and the same person.
On 5 October 1992 the NBI transmitted its findings to the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila with the recommendation that Manuel and Atty. Ramos be prosecuted for Falsification
of Public Document under Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171 of The Revised Penal Code, and
that Atty. Ramos be additionally charged with violation of the Notarial Law.
The NBI also transmitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) photocopies of the NBI investigation report and its annexes, and a verified
complaint1 for disbarment signed by Rosalinda. The CBD received the records on 5 October
1992. On the same date, the CBD through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez directed
respondent to submit an answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Respondent admitted in his Answer2 that he had affixed his signature on the purported Deed
of Absolute Sale but failed to enter the document in his Notarial Registry Book. He also
admitted executing before the NBI on 12 September 1991 an affidavit regarding the matter.
Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the complaint since according to him he only
inadvertently signed the purported Deed of Absolute Sale and/or that his signature was
procured through mistake, fraud, undue influence or excusable negligence, claiming that he
simply relied on the assurances of Manuel that the document would not be used for purposes
other than a loan between brother and sister, and that he affixed his signature thereon with
utmost good faith and without intending to obtain personal gain or to cause damage or injury
to another.
The CBD set the case for hearing on 3 March 2000, 28 April 2000, 16 June 2000 and 5
October 2000. Complainant never appeared. The records show that the notices sent to her
address at 1497 Fabie Street, Paco, Manila, were returned unclaimed. 3
On 26 January 2002 the IBP Board of Governors approved the report and recommendation of
the CBD through Commissioner Fernandez that the case against respondent be dismissed in
view of complainant's failure to prosecute and for lack of evidence on record to substantiate
the complaint.4 The Investigating Commissioner found that the notices sent to complainant
were returned unclaimed with the annotation "moved out," and that she did not leave any
forwarding address, and neither did she come to the CBD to inquire about the status of her
case. From these actuations, he concluded that complainant had lost interest in the further
prosecution of this case,5 and so recommended its dismissal.
We cannot wholly agree with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. It is clear from the pleadings before us that respondent violated the Notarial
Law in failing to register in his notarial book the deed of absolute sale he notarized, which fact
respondent readily admitted.
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. It requires him to
keep a notarial register where he shall record all his official acts as notary, 6 and specifies what
information with regard to the notarized document should be entered therein. 7 Failure to
perform this duty results in the revocation of his commission as notary public. 8
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.9 Notarization
converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. 10 A notarial document is by law entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must
be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a
private instrument.11
For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties.12 Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this
form of conveyance would be undermined. 13Hence a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein.14The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is
the party's free act and deed.15
The notary public is further enjoined to record in his notarial registry the necessary
information regarding the document or instrument notarized and retain a copy of the
document presented to him for acknowledgment and certification especially when it is a
contract.16 The notarial registry is a record of the notary public's official acts. Acknowledged
documents and instruments recorded in it are considered public documents. If the document or
instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt is
engendered that the document or instrument was not really notarized, so that it is not a public
document and cannot bolster any claim made based on this document. Considering the
evidentiary value given to notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record the
document in his notarial registry is tantamount to falsely making it appear that the document
was notarized when in fact it was not.
We take note of respondent's admission in his Answer that he had affixed his signature in the
purported Deed of Absolute Sale but he did not enter it in his notarial registry. This is clearly
in violation of the Notarial Law for which he must be disciplined.
Respondent alleges that he merely signed the Deed of Absolute Sale inadvertently and that his
signature was procured through mistake, fraud, undue influence or excusable negligence as he
relied on the assurances of Manuel A. Bernardo, a kababayan from Pampanga, that the
document would not be used for any illegal purpose.
We cannot honor, much less give credit to this allegation. That respondent notarized the
document out of sympathy for his kababayan is not a legitimate excuse. It is appalling that
respondent did away with the basics of notarial procedure in order to accommodate the
alleged need of a friend and client. In doing so, he displayed a decided lack of respect for the
solemnity of an oath in a notarial document. He also exhibited his clear ignorance of the
importance of the office of a notary public. Not only did he violate the Notarial Law, he also
did so without thinking of the possible damage that might result from its non-observance.
The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a notary public
certifies to the due execution and delivery of the document under his hand and seal he gives
the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be
acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should surround the
execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without
further proof of their execution and delivery.17 Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood or consent to the doing of any. 18 Failing in this, he must accept the consequences of
his unwarranted actions.
From his admissions we find that Atty. Mario G. Ramos failed to exercise the due diligence
required of him in the performance of the duties of notary public. We do not agree however
that his negligence should merit disbarment, which is the most severe form of disciplinary
sanction. Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by
his serious misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the bar. Removal from the bar
should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe - reprimand, temporary
suspension or fine - would accomplish the end desired.19 Under the circumstances, imposing
sanctions decreed under the Notarial Law and suspension from the practice of law would
suffice.
WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial Law, the commission
of respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos as Notary Public, if still existing, is REVOKED and
thereafter Atty. Ramos should be DISQUALIFIED from reappointment to the office of
Notary Public.
Respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months effective immediately. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court his receipt
of this Decision to enable it to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TO LEE PIU, defendant-appellant.
This is an appeal from a judgment convicting the appellant of the crime of using a false name
and sentencing him to 2 months and one day of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of 325 pesetas,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment of the fine, and the costs of the trial.
The appellant was charged with using a false name. The evidence is to the effect that he came
to the Philippine Islands in 1911 and presented a section six certificate, which is attached to
the record as Exhibit A, wherein his name appears as To Lee Piu. Thereafter, he attached to an
application for a passport the name Toribio Jalijali. Said application was accompanied by the
affidavits of two witnesses and by a baptismal certificate showing that a person by that name
was born in the Philippine Islands in 1878. On the trial there was no denial of the fact that
appellant signed the name Toribio Jalijali to the application for a passport; and the only
evidence which may be regarded as having been contradicted in the case is that given by the
defendant himself when he testified that he was born in the Philippine Islands, that his name is
Toribio Jalijali, that he went to China at an early age, and, feeling doubtful as to his ability to
prove his right to reenter, applied to the American consul at Canton for a section six
certificate; that, on such application, he stated to the consul that his name was Toribio Jalijali,
and that, upon being told by the clerk of the consulate that it was not necessary to put his
surname in such application, wrote therein the Christian name Toribio alone.
The charge is prosecuted on the theory that To Lee Piu appellant's correct name and that the
name Toribio Jalijali is false.
Counsel for appellant maintains that the Government, in order to maintain the action, must
prove (a) that the two names in question were different, and (b) that the name alleged to be
false was in fact false; and that the failure of the Government to meet these, or either these,
requirements must result in an acquittal.
It is contended on this appeal that the Government did not meet either of these requirements.
Counsel says:
Upon the issue as to whether the two names were identical the evidence is to the
effect that To Lee Piu is the nearest that the word Toribio can be written in Chinese
characters, and that it is the way in which a Chinese interpreter would naturally write
such a word.
With respect to the charge that the name used in the application for a passport was a false
name, counsel contends that the allegation upon which that charge is based was not proved by
the Government. He says in brief:
Even were the testimony upon this issue contradictory or doubtful, conceding for the
sake of argument that the two names are legally different, the burden would be
clearly upon the Government to show which was the true and which was the false
name; and having made their election and alleged that one of the two names is false,
affirmative proof must be introduced in support of this issue.
We are satisfied on the whole case that the conviction must stand. From the fact and
circumstances in evidence it appears established beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant
used the name of another person for the purpose of deceiving Government and, by that
deception, to obtain a passport. He came to the Philippine Islands as a Chinese person
traveling for curiosity and pleasure. He so represented himself to the American consul at
Canton and, by that representation, obtained a section six certificate. In his application for that
certificate he stated that he was a Chinese person, and that his name was To Lee Piu .He came
to the Philippine Islands upon those representations; and, by virtue of the certificate obtained
thereby, was permitted to enter the country. Desiring to return to China, or travel in other parts
of the world and, at the same time, be permitted to return to the Philippine Islands at will, he
sought to obtain a passport as a citizen of the Philippine Islands under the sovereignty of the
United States. In order to accomplish his purpose it was necessary for him to show to the
authorities of the Philippine Islands issuing passport that he was in fact a citizen of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to a passport. He thereupon took unto himself a
Filipino name, one not his own, and made his application for a passport attaching to his
application the name Toribio Jalijali.
As to the difference between the two names, To Lee Piu and Toribio Jalijali, a mere glance at,
or a single pronunciation of, the two names serves to demonstrate beyond question their
complete unlikeness. It is true that the name Toribio when pronounced by a Chinaman may
sound like To Lee Piu. But it must be observed, in the first place, that the name assumed by
the appellant and signed to the application for a passport is not Toribio but Toribio Jalijali;
and, in the second place, that the name assumed by the appellant in China and that under
which he presented himself to the American consul at Canton, was not Toribio nor Toribio
Jalijali, but To Lee Piu, thus clearly implying that he belonged to the family or tribe of To,
and, therefore, was not of Philippine origin or birth. The claim of the appellant that the clerk
of the American consulate at Canton told him that, in making an application for a section six
certificate it was unnecessary to give his surname, cannot be accepted. Such a contention is so
unusual and so opposed to universal experience that it must fall of its own weight. It seems
incredible that an American consul, or any of his responsible employees, would give such
information to a Chinese person applying for the privilege of entering American territory. It
cannot be accepted without strong corroborative proof that an American consul, or his
accredited representative, would inform the appellant that the most important of his two
names, his family name, could be omitted or entirely disregarded in a proceeding having for
its main purpose his identification. The surname is the only name by which identification is
rendered possible. The Christian name, while being the specific and individual name, is of no
value whatever for identification purposes. One of the most important duties of American
officials engaged in permitting the entry of Chinese persons into American territory is to
establish and preserve the identity of the particular individual to be admitted. Without the
ability to identify all control over the admission of Chinese is lost. It is not to be believed that
an American official whose duty it is to enforce the laws pertaining to Chinese exclusion and
to protect the territory of the United States from an invasion of Chinese laborers, would
inform a Chinaman desiring to enter American territory that he might dispense with the only
evidence upon which an identification of him could be based. The Christian name is without
value for the purposes of identification until after the surname is known.
That the name Toribio Jalijali was a false name as applied to the appellant in this case is in our
judgment beyond question in the record. It is undoubted that To Lee Piu was the name by
which the appellant was known in China. It is the name he gave to the American consul and it
is the only name he gave. He alleged that he was born in China in October, 1878, and applied
for a certificate which is required of Chinese persons only. Upon his own statements and the
statement of his government he was given a section six certificate. It would seem to us that
these facts are sufficient to establish, prima facie at least, that the appellant is a Chinese
person and a Chinese subject; that he was born in China in October, 1878; and that his name is
To Lee Piu. These facts being established it is incumbent on the appellant to relieve himself of
the charge that, when he stated under oath in his application for a passport that his name was
Toribio Jalijali and that he was born in Santa Cruz, Manila, on the 27th of April, 1878, he did
not tell the truth; or to give such proof with reference thereto as would raise in the mind of the
trial court a reasonable doubt as to his true name. The only evidence offered by the appellant
in this connection was a certificate of baptism of an infant named Toribio Jalijali, born in
Santa Cruz, Manila, in April, 1878. The names of several witnesses appear in this certificate.
None of them were produced on the trial; nor was it shown that these witnesses, or any of
them, were dead, or that the appellant was unable to procure their presence at the trial. No
effort was made to find or offer as a witness his alleged father or mother.
On the trial the appellant testified in the Chinese language by means of a Chinese
interpreter. He showed no familiarity with the Spanish language or with any of the
Philippine dialects; and the trial court said, with reference to his personal
appearance, that so far as could be judged from all surface characteristics the
defendant is in truth and in fact a Chinese person as he describes himself in the
Philippine Carnival certificate Exhibit A; and adds: "A comparison of the two
documents, the certificate Exhibit A and the application for passport, is alone
sufficient to show that the defendant's statements are unworthy of credence, that his
claim is that he was born m in the Philippine Islands is false, and that the name
Toribio Jalijali now claimed by the defendant is false and assumed.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOPE ESTRAA, defendant-appellant.
TRENT, J.:
The complaint filed in this case is as follows:
That on the 26th of July, 1909, in the municipality of Bacolod, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippine Islands, the said Lope Estraa, having been duly sworn as a
witness in the Court of First Instance of the said province in criminal case No. 1055,
entitled "United States vs. Gil Gamao et al.,"1 for murder, illegally, maliciously,
willfully, and falsely testified and declared, under oath, that on the 15th day of May,
1909, one Dionisio Tambolero came to his house in Japitan, within the jurisdiction
of the municipality of Escalante, in said province, at about 7 p.m. on the said 15th
day of May, 1909, and that he remained in the house of the said accused (Lope
Estraa) until the following day; when, as a matter of fact, and as accused, Lope
Estraa, well knew, the said Dionision Tambolero was not at Japitan on the said 15th
day of May, 1909; all of which was in violation of the statutes in such case made and
provided.
The accused was arraigned, plead not guilty, tried, convicted, and sentenced to be confined in
the Insular penitentiary, for the period of one year and one day, and "to hereafter be incapable
of holding public office or of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands," and to
pay the costs of the cause. He appealed to this court.
The Roman Catholic priest in charge of the parish in the town of Escalante, Province of
Occidental Negros, was fatally wounded on the night of May 15, 1909, and died about 5 a.m.
on the following morning. Subsequently thereto criminal case No. 1055, wherein the United
States was plaintiff and Gil Gamao et al. were defendants, charged with the assassination of
the said priest, was instituted in the Court of First Instance in the said province. The appellant,
Lope Estraa, was called as a witness for the defense in said criminal case and after being
duly sworn according to law, testified, among other things, that he was then living in the
barrio of Japitan, jurisdiction of the said town of Escalante, and that one Dionisio Tambolero
came to his house in the said barrio about 7 p.m. on May 15, 1909, and remained there all
night, leaving about 5 a.m. on the following morning. The prosecuting officers, believing this
testimony to be false, filed a complaint against the appellant, charging him with the crime of
perjury. On the trial of this case in the court below the appellant again testified that the said
Tambolero passed the night of May 15, 1909, at his house, and called as witnesses to
corroborate him on this point his wife and stepson who did in fact corroborate the testimony
of the appellant, in that the said Tambolero came to the appellant's house and passed the night
of May 15, there, but they could not specifically state the hour he left the following morning.
Dionisio Tambolero testified in this case that he did not know exactly where the defendant's
house is situated in the barrio of Japitan and that he never was at any time in the house of the
defendant in the said barrio; that on the morning of the 15th of May, 1909, he went to the
church in Escalante, heard mass, and returned to his house in the said town of Escalante; that
at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon he returned t the sacristia, arriving there abut 5 o'clock that
afternoon, had a conversation with Natalio Inson about certain baptisms which had taken
place on that afternoon, and that on leaving the sacristia he went to the store of one Jose
Nieva and remained there until about 6.30 or 7 o'clock in the evening; that on leaving this
store he returned to his own house and later went to the house of his compadre; that he and his
family did not sleep in his own house on the night of May 15 on account of it being used for
the storage of tobacco, but that they did sleep in the next house, which was owned by an
employee of his; that the next morning, when he was informed by a policeman named
Clemente Magallon of what happened to the priest on the night before, he went direct to the
convent, arriving there a few minutes after 5 o'clock; that within one-half hour after he arrived
at the convent Gregorio Tudanca gave him some money and sent him to a Chinese store to
buy nails to be used in making a casket for the deceased priest.
According to the testimony of this witness he did not leave the town of Escalante at any time
during the night of May 15, 1909. He was in the sacristia of the church at 4 o'clock on the
afternoon of May 15, and was at the convent the following morning just a few minutes after 5
o'clock. The testimony of this witness as to the time he was at the sacristia on the afternoon of
the 15th of May is corroborated with reference to the time he went to the convent on the
following morning is corroborated in every particular by the testimony of Gregorio Tudanca,
Celedonia Samonte, and Vicente Olmedo, all of whom testified positively that they saw the
said Tambolero at the convent about 5 o'clock on the morning of the 16th of May assisting in
the preparation of the body of the deceased priest for interment. So it has been conclusively
established that Dionisio Tambolero did not go to the house of the appellant in the barrio of
Japitan on May 15, neither did he spend the night of the 15th of May in the appellant's house.
Considering the distance from the appellant's house to the town of Escalante, which requires
at least two and one-half hours, either by land or water, and the difficulties to be encountered
in making this journey, it was a physical impossibility for Tambolero to have left the house of
the appellant at the time stated by him (the appellant) and to have arrived at the convent at the
time he appeared there to assist in the burial of the priest. The appellant, Lope Estraa, did
therefore knowingly and intentionally testify falsely, under oath, before a legally constituted
tribunal, when he swore that Tambolero passed the night of May 15 in his (appellant's) house.
The prosecution in this case is based on the said false testimony of the appellant given in
criminal case No. 1055. It may be inferred that Dionisio Tambolero was a material witness for
the prosecution in said criminal case No. 1055. If said Tambolero did, in fact, testify as a
witness for the prosecution in that case, the record of the case at bar fails to disclose what his
testimony was. Tambolero did not state that he was a witness in the said murder case (No.
1055), neither did he make any reference to what he knew, if anything, about the commission
of that murder; but on the contrary, reading his testimony alone, it would appear that he knew
nothing about the facts surrounding the commission of that crime, as he stated that after
leaving the Chinese store he went to his own house, slept in the house of one of his
employees, and was informed the following morning by a policeman that the murder had been
committed. The only reference to the testimony of Tambolero in said murder case appears in
the appellant's brief, wherein his counsel states that "In said case (referring to criminal case
No. 1055) a witness for the prosecution, called Dionisio Tambolero, testified that on the night
of May 15, 1909, when the murder was committed he saw Mauricio Gamao, with a bolo in his
hand, come out of the lower part of the convent." (Mauricio Gamao was one of the defendants
charged with the assassination of the priest in case No. 1055.) If this statement of counsel for
the appellant be accepted as true, hen Tambolero did testify that he saw one of the defendants
in that case (No. 1055) on the night of the murder leaving the lower part of the convent with a
bolo in his hand. This statement of counsel will be considered later.
Counsel for the appellant insists that the court below should have dismissed this case for the
reason that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute the crime of perjury as defined
and punished by Act No. 1697, basing his contention on the ground that in order to sustain a
conviction under said Act it was necessary to show that the appellant had testified twice about
a certain matter, his latter testimony testified once he should have been charged with the crime
of false swearing (falso testimonio), under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Penal Code.
Section 3 of the Act No. 1697 is as follows:
Any person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or
person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be
administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully
and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not
believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and
shall, moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving
testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the judgment
against him is reversed.
This section specifically provides that any person who has taken an oath before a competent
tribunal that he will testify truly, or that any written testimony by him subscribed is true,
willfully and contrary to such oath, states or subscribes to any material matter which he does
not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury. This section does not impliedly require as an
essential element of the crime of perjury that a defendant who is prosecuted for having
violated these provisions should have testified twice in any case or in any investigation, his
second testimony being contradictory of his first, but he can be charged and convicted of the
crime of perjury if he willfully testifies, under oath, as provided in said section, to any
material matter which he does not believe to be true.
In the case of the United States vs. Concepcion (13 Phil. Rep., 424), the defendants were
inspectors of the election board in the municipality of Calibo, Province of Capiz, in the
election for Delegates held on the 31st of July, 1907. The defendants were accused and
convicted for having violated the provisions of the Election Law, in that they refused to
inscribe the name of one Esteban Leocario without just cause. The point in controversy in said
case was whether or not Esteban Leocario appeared before the inspectors (the accused) in
order to have his name registered in the electoral list. The accused were convicted of having
violated the provisions of the Election Law and on appeal to this court the sentence and
judgment of the lower court was affirmed. The defendants having testified in that case that the
said Esteban Leocario did not appear before them on the day alleged, to have his name
registered as an elector, the prosecution filed a complaint against the said defendants charging
them with the crime of perjury. The fact in controversy in both cases was only one, namely,
the appearance or nonappearance of Esteban Leocario before the election inspector. The
defendants having been convicted of the crime of perjury, they appealed, and this court, in
passing upon the questions involved, said (pp. 425, 429):
The important question in the case, however, is whether this offense is to be
punished by the provision of the Penal Code, articles 318 and following, or whether
these articles have been impliedly repealed by section 3 of Act No. 1697. If the case
falls within the provisions of the Penal Code and those provisions are still in force,
the judgment must be reversed, because this case for perjury was tried and decided
in the court below before the testimony was given.
xxx xxx xxx
Our conclusion is that the articles of the Penal Code relating to perjury have been
repealed, and that the crime is now defined and punished by section 3 of Act No.
1697.
So the reason given by counsel for the appellant as to the sufficiency of the allegations in the
complaint is untenable, but there is a good reason why the complaint is insufficient in law, and
that is that there is no allegation in this complaint that the testimony of the appellant in
criminal case No. 1055 was material to the issues involved in said case. This question
apparently escaped the attention of the trial court, the prosecuting officers, and counsel for the
appellant. It is not mentioned anywhere in the record, nor the brief's filed in this court.
As we have said, the appellant willfully and contrary to the oath which he had taken, testified
in said criminal case No. 1055 that Tambolero came to his house about 7 p.m. on May 15 and
remained there until 5 a.m. of the next day. This testimony was false, but the record does not
disclose (aside from the statement of the counsel before mentioned) whether or not this false
testimony did affect, or could have in any way affected, the question involved in said murder
case.
It is now necessary to determine whether or not the appellant is guilty of the crime of perjury
under section 3 of Act No. 1697, above quoted (the provisions of the Penal Code with
reference to false testimony having been repealed by Act No. 1697), when it is not alleged in
the complaint, nor does it appear from the record, that the false testimony given by the
appellant in said criminal case No. 1055 was material to the issues involved therein.
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, it is well settled that an indictment for perjury must
show conclusively that the testimony given or assertion made by the defendant on the trial on
which he was sworn or it will be fatally defective. This may be done either by a direct
allegation that it was material, or by the allegation of facts from which its materiality will
appear. (30 Cyc., 1433, and U. S. vs. Singleton, 54 Fed. Rep., 488; U. S. vs. Cowing, 25 Fed.
Cas., No. 14880, 4 Cranch C. C., 613; Hembree vs. State, 52 Ga., 242; State vs. Anderson, 103
Ind., 170 State vs. Gibson, 26 La. Ann., 71; State vs. Williams, 60 Kan., 837; People vs. Ah
Bean, 77 Cal., 12; Gibson vs. State, 47 Fla., 16; State vs. Cunningham, 66 Iowa, 94; People vs.
Collier, 1 Mich., 137; Wood vs. People, 59 N. Y., 117; Buller vs. State, 33 Tex. Cr., 551, and
numerous other cases cited.)
No objections to the sufficiency of the complaint were made in the court below, and it is now
well settled that it is not error for this court to refuse to sustain such objections taken for the
first time on appeal when the fatal defects in the complaint are supplied by competent proof.
(Serra vs. Mortiga, 204 U. S., 470, reported in 11 Phil. Rep., 762.)
The complaint in the case at bar is fatally defective for the want of an allegation that the
testimony, alleged to be false, was material to the issues involved in the murder case. Our
statute (section 3 of Act No. 1697, supra) specifically makes materiality an essential element
of the crime of perjury and without this the crime can not legally exists. As no objection to the
sufficiency of the complaint was raised this fatal defect could have been supplied by
competent testimony on the trial.
The materiality of a matter sworn to must be established by evidence and can not be left to the
presumption or inference. (30 Cyc., 1443, and Nelson vs. State vs. Aikens, 32 Iowa, 403;
wood vs. People, 59 N. Y., 117; Garrett vs. State, 37 Tex. Cr., 198.)
The term "material matter" means the main fact which was the subject of the inquiry, or any
circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to
corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to the subject of the inquiry, or which
legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies. (In re Franklin County, 5 Ohio S.
and C. PI. Dec. 691; 7 Ohio, N. P., 450; People vs. Green well, 5 Utah, 112, 13 Pac., 89.)
By the common law perjury is the willful and corrupt taking of a false oath, lawfully
administered in a judicial proceeding or the course of justice in regard to a matter material to
the issue or point of inquiry. (30 Cyc., 1399, and cases cited therein.)
This definition of perjury, as modified by statute, may be more accurately defined to be the
willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood, under oath or information administered by
authority of law, in a material matter, the offense being enlarged and made to extend to other
false oaths than those taken in the course of judicial proceedings. (30 Cyc. 1400, and cases
cited.)
In the case of the State vs. Hattaway (10 Am., Dec., 580) one Shackleford having indicted for
stealing a cow and afterwards discharged, brought an action against the prosecutor for
malicious prosecution. In this action Hattaway was called as a witness and testified that
Shackleford purchased the cow in question from one Carter, and that he was present at the
time. Being asked where he lived at the time, he said, "Near Carter's; perhaps within 100
yards;" whereas it was proved that he did not live in the State. The perjury assigned was his
false testimony as to where he lived. The trial court instructed the jury that the testimony was
not material so as to constitute perjury, but the jury thought otherwise and found the defendant
guilty. The defendant then moved to set aside the verdict as contrary to the law, and the court
in passing upon this motion said (p. 581):
It seems to be agreed by all the writers on criminal law, that one ingredient in the
crime of perjury is that the oath relate to some matter material to the question in
issue: . . . There can be no doubt but that an extrajudicial oath, or one relating to a
matter utterly immaterial, or even an impious oath, taken in idle conversation, may
be as offensive in the eye of justice. But there are many offenses against morality
and religion which are not cognizable in courts of justice. For such offense, a man is
answerable only to his God, and not to the laws of his country. . . .
There is no offense the general character of which is better understood than that of
perjury; and no point better settled, perhaps, than that the oath must relate to some
fact material to the issue.
There is a distinction between perjury and false swearing; the one is stubborn and corrupt,
while the other is simply not true, lacking the elements which go to constitute the crime of
perjury. (Miller vs. State, 15 Fla., 577.)
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 is a copy, with the necessary changes only, of section 5392 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States. This section (5392) is as follows:
 Every person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or
person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be
administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully
and contrary to such oaths states or subscribed is true, is guilty of perjury, which he
does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment, at hard labor, not more than
five years; and shall, moreover, thereafter be incapable of giving testimony in any
court of the United States until such time as the judgment against him is reversed.
The essential parts of this section (5392) and section 3 of that Act No. 1697 are exactly the
same. It is also true that section 3 of our perjury law is practically the same as that of nearly
all of the States of the Union wherein materiality is made, by statute, an element of the crime.
An essential element of the offense created by the statute (section 5392, Rev. Stat.) is the
materiality of the matter charged to have been falsely stated. (U. S. vs. Landsberg, 23 Fed.
Rep., 585.)
In some jurisdictions the prosecution of perjury is continued until the same proceedings in
which the perjury is alleged to have been committed has been ended, but under our law (Act
No. 1697) it is not necessary that the proceeding in which the perjury was committed should
be terminated before prosecution for that crime is commenced.
(U. S. vs. Concepcion, supra.) The contrary rule obtained for prosecutions under the
provisions of the penal code. (U. S. vs. Opinion, 6 Phil. Rep., 662; and U. S. vs. Adolfo, 12
Phil. Rep., 296.)
Where materiality is made by statute, as in Act No. 1697, an essential element of the crime of
perjury, the doctrine of the courts that it must be shown by competent proof that the false
testimony was material to the issues involved, is settle beyond question. This doctrine
pervades the entire adjudged law on the subject. "Whatever we move in this department of our
jurisprudence we come in contact with it. We can no more escape from it than from the
atmosphere which surrounds us."
Aside from the statement of counsel in his brief, heretofore referred to, the prosecution has
failed to establish the legal guilt of the accused of the crime of perjury, inasmuch as it has not
been proven in any manner that the false testimony of the appellant was material in the murder
case.
We shall now determine in what way, if any, the said statement of counsel can affect the guilt
of the accused. As we have said, he has not committed a crime (if this statement of counsel
does not affect the result) for which he can be punished under the law in force in this
jurisdiction. In order to sustain a conviction based on a fatally defective complaint, the defects
must be supplied by competent proof. Counsel in his printed brief in this court states that the
witness Tambolero testified in said murder case that when the murder was committed he saw
one of the defendants come out of the lower part of the convent with a bolo in his hands. This
is not a confession, as there is a marked difference between a confession and such a statement,
but this is purely a statement by counsel made in the appellate court. It is more than probable
that the appellant himself knows nothing of this statement; no doubt he has never seen the
brief filed in this case. So such a statement made for the first time on appeal is not competent
proof to established the guilt of the appellant. when such guilt must depend solely upon the
said statement. Counsel for appellant was not authorized by his client to make this statement.
In the case of Sweet Clayton vs. State (4 Tex. App., 515), George Spears and Sweet Calyton
were indicated in the district court of Uvalde, Texas, for the crime of conveying, or causing to
be conveyed, into the jail of Uvalde County, certain instruments for the purpose of aiding two
prisoners to make their escape. A motion for the arrest of the judgment was made in the court
of appeals, based on the ground of the insufficiency of the indictment. The court did not
sustain the contention of counsel for the defendants, but on its own motion reversed the
judgment on another ground which was not raised by counsel and which referred to the
admissions made by defendant's counsel, and in passing upon this question the court, speaking
through Mr. Justice White, said (p. 518):
The charge of the court, which was otherwise unexceptionable, presents an error
which will necessitate a reversal of the case. In the fourth subdivision of the charge
the jury are told that "it is admitted by the defendant's counsel that John Woods and
Lark Calyton were prisoners legally confined in the county jail of Unvalde County,
on an accusation of felony, to wit, theft of a cow." As was said in the case of Nels vs.
The State: The prisoner's counsel had no authority to make any statement or
admission to supply the place or have the force of evidence against him. No
confession of theirs could bind or affect him. Their admission could not in law
prejudice or affect his rights; nor could they be in any wise jeopardized by the
assumption of any grounds whatever upon which his defense may have been placed
by his counsel. Whether those grounds were correct or incorrect, true or false, was
wholly immaterial. That was not the question for the consideration of the jury,
whose duty it was to decide the question of the guilt or innocence upon the law as
given them by the court, and the evidence as given by the witnesses, irrespective of
any admissions by the prisoner's counsel, or any grounds upon which they may have
rested his defense.
In this case, defendant's counsel no doubt admitted in open court, at the time the defendants
were on trial and in their presence, that the said Woods and Clayton were prisoners legally
confined. It does not appear that the defendants made any objections to the said admission.
Notwithstanding all these facts the court reversed the judgment solely for this reason.
In the case at bar we do not find it necessary to go as far as the Texas court did, for the reason
that the statement of counsel for the appellant was not made in the trial court and this record
fails to disclose whether said statement was made in the presence of the accused; but it does
conclusively show that the same was made for the first time in the printed brief on appeal. So
such a statement can not be accepted as competent proof to supply the fatal defects in the
complaint and form the basis upon which a conviction can be entered.
Our conclusions are, therefore, that the appellant is not guilty of the crime of perjury for the
reasons above set forth. The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs de
officio.
ANTONIO B. MONFORT III and ILDEFONSO B. MONFORT, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. ANTONIA M. SALVATIERRA, PAUL MONFORT, RAMON H. MONFORT,
JACQUELINE M. YUSAY, YVETTE M. BENEDICTO, ESTER S. MONFORT,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and CITY PROSECUTOR OF CADIZ CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioners Antonio B. Monfort III and Ildefonso B. Monfort seek to set aside the Decision
dated 28 January 20052 and Resolution dated 26 May 2005 3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 67109. In its Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Resolutions dated 11 October 20004 and 15 August 2001,5 of the Secretary of Justice which
dismissed the petitioners criminal complaint for perjury against private respondents Ma.
Antonia M. Salvatierra, Paul Monfort, Ramon H. Monfort, Jacqueline M. Yusay, Yvette M.
Benedicto and Ester S. Monfort.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Petitioners are children of the late Antonio H. Monfort, Jr., one of the original
stockholders/incorporators of the Monfort Hermanos Agricultural Development Corporation
(MHADC).6 On 28 October 1998, petitioners filed a letter-complaint for perjury under Article
183 of the Revised Penal Code before the City Prosecutor of Cadiz against private
respondents. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 8009. In the said complaint, petitioners
claimed that the private respondents made false statements in their respective counter-
affidavits dated 11 June 1998 which the latter had executed and submitted to the City
Prosecutor of Cadiz in connection with another complaint for perjury, docketed as I.S. No.
7883, earlier filed by the petitioners against the private respondents. The alleged false
statements referred to the declarations of the private respondents that the 1996 annual
stockholders meeting of the MHADC was held on 16 October 1996, and that they were
elected as board directors of the MHADC during the same meeting. Petitioners insisted that
the 1996 annual stockholders meeting of the MHADC was held, not on 16 October 1996, but
on 27 November 1996 as stated in the 1996 General Information Sheet (GIS) accomplished by
the MHADC and submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Iloilo
Extension Office. Further, there is nothing in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC which states that
an election of the board of directors of the MHADC took place on 16 October 1996.7
Subsequently, private respondents filed their joint counter-affidavits dated 9 December 1998
in I.S. No. 8009 before the City Prosecutor of Cadiz. They alleged that they are stockholders
of record of the MHADC; that a stockholders meeting of the MHADC was held on 16
October 1996 where they were elected as board directors of MHADC; that the MHADCs
corporate accountant, Litonjua, Desabelle and Associates (LDA), was responsible for the
preparation of the MHADCs GIS; that the LDA made erroneous statements in the 1996 GIS
of MHADC; that the erroneous statements refer to the date of the MHADCs annual
stockholders meeting and the persons composing the MHADCs board of directors; that the
LDA had admitted having committed such honest error; that the LDA had rectified the same
by submitting a letter to the SEC informing the latter that the annual stockholders meeting of
the MHADC for the year 1996 was held on 16 October 1996 and not on 27 November 1996;
that what transpired on 27 November 1996 was not the annual stockholders meeting of the
MHADC but merely a special meeting of the board of directors thereof; and, that, the private
respondents were elected as board directors of the MHADC during the annual stockholders
meeting on 16 October 1996.8
Private respondents thus argue that they cannot be held liable for perjury since one of the
elements of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is that the assertion of
falsehood must be willful and deliberate; that the terms willful and deliberate imply malice
and evil intent in asserting falsehood; and that this element is lacking in the case at bar.9
Thereafter, Investigating Prosecutor Abraham E. Tionko (Investigator Tionko) issued a
Resolution dated 14 April 1999 in I.S. No. 8009 dismissing the letter-complaint for perjury of
the petitioners for lack of probable cause.10 Investigator Tionko noted that the statements in
the 1996 GIS of the MHADC are indeed erroneous. The 1996 GIS stated that the
stockholders meeting and election of the board of directors took place on 27 November 1996.
If such information were true and correct, then according to Investigator Tionko, it would
have been impossible for some of the board directors to be elected as such on 27 November
1996 since they were already deceased at that time. 11 Moreover, if the 1996 annual
stockholders meeting of MHADC was indeed held on 27 November 1996 which fell on a
Wednesday, it would have been inconsistent with the by-laws of the MHADC which states
that the annual stockholders meeting of the MHADC shall be held on the last Thursday of
November, which, according to the 1996 calendar, fell on 28 November 1996.
As to the matter of whether or not the stockholders may hold their annual meeting on a date
other than that specified in its by-laws, Investigator Tionko opined that such is not within the
province of his office to rule.12
He, thereafter, made the following findings: that it was not impossible for the MHADC
stockholders to have conducted their annual meeting on 16 October 1996; that there would
have been willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood on the part of the private respondents
only if no error was committed in the preparation of the 1996 GIS of MHADC; that private
respondent Ramon H. Monfort was not aware of the said errors at the time he subscribed and
swore to the correctness of the 1996 GIS of MHADC as Vice-President thereof; that upon the
discovery of the errors, the LDA sent a letter to the SEC providing the latter with the correct
information; that such should be considered as mere negligence and imprudence on the part of
private respondent Ramon H. Monfort; and that the crime of perjury cannot be committed by
negligence or imprudence. The dispositive portion of Investigator Tionkos Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the undersigned believes there is no probable cause to support a finding of
perjury against all of the respondents and this complaint is hereby dismissed. 13
Petitioners appealed the aforementioned Resolution to the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor for Region VI. In his Resolution dated 19 November 1999, Regional State
Prosecutor Vicente E. Aragona (Prosecutor Aragona) denied due course to petitioners appeal
as the same was filed out of time.14 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
was dismissed by Prosecutor Aragona in his Resolution dated 22 December
1999.15 Prosecutor Aragona sustained the claim of the private respondents that the annual
stockholders meeting of the MHADC was held on 16 October 1996 at Agmac Building,
Bacolod City, where they were elected as board directors since this is supported by evidence
on record consisting of the notices of stockholders meeting and registry return receipt. 16 He
also affirmed that patent errors were committed in the preparation of the 1996 GIS of the
MHADC. Pertinent portions of the 22 December 1999 Resolution of Prosecutor Aragona
reads:
We then ruled and so rules here, that an erroneous document is incorrect and therefore not the
truth. It cannot be used as basis to charge the respondents for Perjury, for the simple reason
that it is not an evidence that they lied under oath. In fact, it is an evidence not only of it being
an incorrect document but also of the fact that the November 27, 1996 meeting written in it
was a mistake and that the dead persons listed as elected officers in that meeting is likewise a
mistake. This evidence has no probative value to establish prima facie case for perjury
because of its nature as being worthless due to its inherent incredibility to establish that
November 27, 1996 is the true date of the Annual Stockholders Meeting of the Monfort
Hermanos Agricultural Development Corporation.
In view of the foregoing, the appeal should be, as it is hereby dismissed. 17
Petitioners, then, appealed to the Secretary of Justice. Finding no reversible error in
Prosecutor Aragonas Resolution dated 22 December 1999, Undersecretary of Justice Regis
V. Puno dismissed petitioners appeal in his Resolution dated 11 October 2000, 18 to wit:
This resolves the appeal from the resolution of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region VI,
Iloilo City in the above-entitled case dismissing the complaint against Ma. Antonia M.
Salvatierra, et. al. for perjury.1avvphil.net
Section 9 of Department Order No. 223 dated June 30 1993, as amended, (now Section 12 in
relation to Section 7 of Department Circular No. 70 dated 3 July 2000), prescribing rules on
appeals from resolution in preliminary investigations provides that the Secretary of Justice
may, motu proprio, dismiss outright an appeal if there is showing of any reversible error in the
questioned resolution. We have carefully examined the record of the case and we found no
such error committed by the prosecutor that would justify a reversal of his resolution, which is
in accord with the law and evidence on the matter.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. 19
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of Undersecretary Punos Resolution dated 11
October 2000 but this was denied in the Resolution dated 15 August 2001 of Undersecretary
of Justice Manuel A.J. Teehankee since no new matter was raised to warrant the review of the
same,20 viz:
A perusal of the motion shows no new matter which was not taken into consideration in our
review of the case. Hence, we find no compelling reason to alter or modify our resolution.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED with finality. 21
Petitioners appealed the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice dated 11 October 2000 and 15
August 2001, respectively, to the Court of Appeals. On 28 January 2005, the Court of Appeals
rendered its Decision affirming the said resolutions. 22It ruled that the Secretary of Justice did
not commit grave abuse of discretion since its non-finding of probable cause for perjury
against private respondents is based on law, jurisprudence and evidence on records. It also
held that the private respondents had sufficiently established the fact that a stockholders
meeting of the MHADC actually took place on 16 October 1996, and that they were elected
during the said meeting as board directors. It further stated that willful and deliberate assertion
of falsehood, as one of the elements of perjury, is not present in the instant case. 23 The fallo of
the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us
DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the Resolutions dated October
11, 2000 and August 15, 2001 respectively, issued by the public respondent Secretary of
Justice.24
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution dated 26 May 2005.25
Petitioners filed the present petition raising the sole issue of whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the findings of the Secretary of Justice that there is no probable
cause to indict the private respondents for the crime of perjury. 26
According to the petitioners, the insistence of the private respondents that the annual
stockholders meeting of MHADC took place on 16 October 1996, and that they were elected
during the said meeting as board directors constitute willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood because it is not in harmony with the constitution and by-laws of MHADC which
provides that the annual stockholders meeting and the election of board directors shall be
held every last Thursday of November for each year. They stressed the fact that the date 16
October 1996 is not the last Thursday of November in the year 1996. They also claimed that
the notices of meeting dated 1 October 1996 received by the private respondents are
"incompetent" to prove that the annual stockholders meeting and the election of directors of
the MHADC took place on 16 October 1996. Further, the intent of the private respondents to
commit a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood is evident in the 1996 GIS of the
MHADC which does not specify that an election of board directors took place on 16 October
1996.27
Petitioners also averred that the correction of the alleged erroneous entries in the 1996 GIS of
MHADC was made by the LDA, MHADCs corporate accountant, only after the lapse of two
years from the execution of the said document. They argued that the same was a futile attempt
on the part of the private respondents to escape criminal liability since: a) at the time the
corrections were made, they had already charged private respondent Ramon H. Monfort with
perjury and falsification of private document for including in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC
the names of stockholders who were already deceased as elected board directors of
MHADC;28 b) the alleged errors in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC, particularly in the
composition of the alleged elected board of directors, is belied by the 1997 GIS of MHADC
filed by private respondent Ramon H. Monfort which reiterated the names of the deceased
stockholders as elected directors of MHADC; this is not just one mistake but two mistakes
already; c) there was ill-motive on the part of the private respondents when it sent, through
LDA, a letter to the SEC to correct the alleged errors because at the time such letter was
received by the SEC, the City Prosecutor of Cadiz had already issued a resolution in I.S. No.
7883 finding probable cause for perjury against private respondents; and d) at the time of the
correction of errors, a total of six or more criminal cases for perjury were already filed by the
petitioners against private respondents and some are still pending resolution. 29
Petitioners further asseverated that the private respondents statements in their respective
counter-affidavits dated 11 June 1998 in I.S. No. 7883 that they were elected board directors
during the 16 October 1996 annual stockholders meeting show willful and deliberate
assertion of falsehood since the private respondents had made these same statements as their
bases in filing civil cases for forcible entry and delivery of personal property against
petitioners which cases, however, were eventually dismissed by this Court in G.R. No. 152542
and No. 155472.30 They posited that this Court had dismissed the civil cases as the private
respondents failed to establish the fact that they were duly elected as board directors of
MHADC and, as such, were not authorized to file the said cases. Based on these premises,
petitioners concluded that there is more than enough evidence to support the finding of
probable cause for perjury against private respondents. 31
These contentions are devoid of merit.
It should be emphasized at the outset that the function of a preliminary investigation is to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial.32 It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the prosecutor determines
the existence of a probable cause that would warrant the prosecution of a case. 33 Probable
cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
private respondent is probably guilty thereof. It is such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an
honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or positive
cause;" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief.34
In this proceeding, the prosecutor is vested with authority and discretion to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to justify the filing of corresponding information. 35 If the
prosecutor found probable cause to indict the respondent for a criminal offense, it is his duty
to file the corresponding information in court.36 However, it is equally his duty not to
prosecute when after an investigation, the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a
prima facie case.37 We explained the rationale in the case of People v. Pineda,38 thus:
A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular
criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments
thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount
the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to
recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his
conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may
result in our courts being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a
criminal suspects right to due process - the sporting idea of fair play - may be transgressed. x
x x.
Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation
administered by authority of law on a material matter.39 Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code
states the definition of and penalty for perjury, thus:
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person who, knowingly make untruthful statements and not being included
in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit,
upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases
in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of
the falsehoods mentioned made in this and the three preceding articles of this section shall
suffer the respective penalties provided therein.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the elements of perjury are as follows:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized
to receive and administer oath.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or
made for a legal purpose.40
The third element of perjury requires that the accused had willfully and deliberately asserted a
falsehood. A mere assertion of a false objective fact is not sufficient. The assertion must be
deliberate and willful.41
In the instant case, the petitioners failed to establish the fact that the private respondents made
a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in their counter-affidavits dated 11 June 1998.
Private respondent Ramon H. Monfort had sufficiently and reasonably explained the
circumstances surrounding the preparation and his signing of the erroneous statements in the
1996 GIS of the MHADC. He narrated that as Vice-President of the MHADC, he signed and
certified the same under oath; that he was not, however, aware of the erroneous statements
therein at the time when he signed it; that it was LDA as MHADCs corporate accountant
which had solely prepared the 1996 GIS of the MHADC; that he always relied on the
accuracy of LDA; that he hastily signed it since, at that time, the LDA representative was in a
hurry to beat the deadline in submitting the same to the SEC; that after being informed of the
erroneous statements, the LDA sent a letter to the SEC informing the latter of the mistakes
and supplying the correct informations therein; that the erroneous statements were due to the
oversight of the LDA; and, that he admitted that he was negligent in not carefully reading and
analyzing the statements therein.42
The nave reliance of the private respondents on the foregoing circumstances in executing
their respective counter-affidavits dated 11 June 1998 negates willful and deliberate assertion
of falsehood. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the
accused.43 Willfully means intentionally, with evil intent and legal malice, with consciousness
that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be received as a
statement of what was true in fact. It is equivalent to "knowingly." "Deliberately" implies
"meditated" as distinguished from "inadvertent acts." It must appear that the accused knows
his statement to be false or is consciously ignorant of its truth. 44
In this case, the private respondents believed in good faith that, based on the above-explained
events, their statements in their respective counter- affidavits dated 11 June 1998 are true and
correct. Good faith or lack of malice is a valid defense vis-a-vis the allegation of deliberate
assertion of falsehood in perjury cases.45
It should also be borne in mind that perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to
belief or conviction as to its truth. Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement is an adequate
defense.46 The private respondents had consistently claimed that the 1996 GIS of the MHADC
is erroneous on its face. They have maintained all along their stand that the annual
stockholders meeting of the MHADC was held on 16 October 1996 and not on 27 November
1996. They also submitted documentary evidence to prove that the annual stockholders
meeting took place on 16 October 1996, and that the LDA had already communicated to the
SEC the mistakes and corrections in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC. 47 In addition thereto, they
also submitted a letter coming from the SEC which acknowledged the corrections therein and
had noted that the same now form part of the records of the MHADC. 48
Further, the Secretary of Justice had found that the 1996 GIS of the MHADC is patently
erroneous. It concluded that the same is worthless and has no probative value in evidence
because it does not establish the fact that the true date of the annual stockholders meeting for
the year 1996 took place on 27 November 1996. This finding was sustained by the Court of
Appeals in its Decision dated 28 January 2005.
As a general rule, this Court will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations and
leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the
filing of an information against an offender.49 As an exception, however, this Court may
inquire into the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation if, based
on the records, the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion.50 In the case at bar, the
City Prosecutor of Cadiz, the Regional State Prosecutor for Region VI, and the Secretary of
Justice had consistently ruled that there is no probable cause to indict the private respondents
for the crime of perjury. We find no grave abuse of discretion or manifest error on their part
considering the fact that their non-finding of probable cause is supported by the evidence on
record. It is well to state, too, that the resolution of the Secretary of Justice declaring the
absence or existence of a probable cause and affirmed by the Court of Appeals is accorded
high respect and generally conclusive on this Court.51 We find no exceptional reasons to
deviate from this principle.
The pronouncements of this Court in G.R. No. 152542 and No. 155472 52 do not automatically
imply that there is sufficient evidence or probable cause to indict the private respondents for
the crime of perjury. It should be underscored that in G.R. No. 152542 and No. 155472, there
is no finding with regard to the correct date of the 1996 annual stockholders meeting and the
election of the board of directors as to bind this Court in the Petition at bar.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67109 dated 28 January 2005 and 26 May 2005,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
MEDARDO M. PADUA, complainant,
vs.
IRENEO S. PAZ, in his capacity as Sheriff IV, Branch 31, Regional Trial Court, San
Pedro, Laguna, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Complainant Medardo M. Padua charges respondent Ireneo S. Paz, Sheriff IV of Branch 31 of
the Regional Trial Court, San Pedro, Laguna, with grave misconduct, falsification of public
document, perjury, giving false testimony, and abuse of position in connection with Civil Case
No. 3225.1 On 12 June 1997, a Toyota Tamaraw wagon model 1994 bearing plate number
TKU 319 belonging to Medardo M. Padua ("complainant") figured in a traffic accident with
the vehicle of Ireneo S. Paz ("respondent sheriff"), a 1981 Ford Laser bearing plate number
DAL 334. Complainant's 18-year old son Ryan Nio Padua ("Ryan Padua") was driving
complainant's vehicle at the time of the accident.
Police Officer Victoriano A. Sabuco prepared a Traffic Accident Investigation
Report2 ("police report") shortly after completing the investigation of the accident. The police
report stated that at the time of the accident Ryan Padua possessed a valid driver's license with
license number NO1-95-179337.3
Complainant claimed that after the traffic accident, he gave respondent sheriff his calling card.
This card supposedly contained the addresses and telephone numbers of both the complainant
and his insurer, Covenant Assurance Company ("Covenant"). 4 Since respondent sheriff
appeared satisfied with the arrangement, complainant believed the matter was amicably
settled. Thus, complainant went his own way and so did respondent sheriff.
However, on 26 November 1998, several armed men, including police officers, claiming to be
from the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna, awakened complainant at 6:00 a.m. in his
house. The men announced that they were enforcing a writ of execution issued by the
Municipal Trial Court of Bian, Laguna ("Bian MTC"). Complainant was able to convince
the men from the sheriff's office to give him some time to clarify the matter, and so the men
peacefully left the premises.
Complainant soon discovered the reason for the sheriffs' surprise visit. He and his lawyer
found out that on 30 June 1997 respondent sheriff filed with the Bian MTC a civil case for
damages5 in connection with the traffic accident. The summons was allegedly sent to
complainant's mother in Novaliches, where complainant previously resided. This, complainant
claims, explains why he was not aware of the case filed against him until the sheriffs made
their surprise visit. Complainant was declared in default for failing to file an answer within the
reglementary period. Subsequently, there was an ex-parte presentation of evidence before a
commissioner. Soon after this ex-parte hearing, Estanislao S. Belan of the Bian MTC
rendered a decision on 24 November 1997 in respondent sheriff's favor. Complainant
vigorously opposed the execution of this decision because of the alleged defective summons.
On 18 December 1998, complainant filed this administrative complaint against respondent
sheriff for falsification of public document, perjury, giving false testimony and abuse of
position.6 Complainant also asserted that under the current civil service rules, respondent
sheriff did not possess the necessary qualifications to hold his present position. 7Complainant,
moreover, stated that he resorted to all the means available to prevent the enforcement of an
obviously unjust decision considering the numerous false statements and misrepresentations
made by respondent sheriff.8 He narrated that he felt so aggrieved by the numerous attempts
of the sheriffs of the Bian MTC to enforce the writ of execution despite the fact that he had
already gone to the courts to defend himself.9
On 25 March 1999, respondent sheriff filed an Answer10 denying all of complainant's material
allegations. Respondent sheriff contended that he only filed the civil case for damages because
complainant failed to honor his repeated promises that his insurer would pay for the damage
to respondent sheriff's vehicle.
On 7 May 1999, complainant filed his Reply refuting respondent sheriff's allegations in the
Answer and reiterating some of the allegations in his Complaint.
The Court, in the Resolution of 9 May 2001, assigned to Executive Judge Norberto Y.
Geraldez11 ("Investigating Judge Geraldez") this administrative complaint for investigation,
report and recommendation.
On 6 November 2001, the Court received the report and recommendations of Investigating
Judge Geraldez. Some of Judge Geraldez's findings included the following:
A. Medardo Padua alleged some irregularities in the service of summons and copy of
the complaint. Medardo Padua failed to present any evidence to prove the same. The
Traffic Accident Investigation Report (Exhibit B) and Ryan Padua's driver's license
(Exhibit K) showed that Ryan Nio Padua's residence was at Novaliches. There was
basis to serve the summons at Novaliches. His claim that respondent knew that he
now lives in Las Pias was not supported by evidence.
B. Medardo Padua claimed that Ireneo Paz gave a false statement in court. This was
when Ireneo Paz testified that he went to Novaliches to talk to him. Medardo Padua
claimed this was not true. There was no evidence to prove this.
C. Medardo Padua claimed that Ireneo Paz falsified the Traffic Accident
Investigation Report (Exhibit B-1). In said Exhibit B-1 Ryan Padua's age was 13. He
presented the same as evidence before the MTC.
Medardo Padua presented a copy of the same Traffic Accident Investigation Report
(Exhibit B) where the age of Ryan Padua was 18 years old. Respondent did not file
any opposition to the said Exhibit B. There was evidence to prove that Ireneo Paz
may have committed falsification of the Traffic Accident Investigation Report
(Exhibit B-1).
It is interesting to note that Ryan Padua, as per his driver's license (Exhibit K) and
Certification from the Land Transportation Office (Exhibit K-1) was born on
January 4, 1977. Therefore, Ryan Padua, at the time of the accident on June 12, 1997
was 20 years and 5 months old and not 13 or 18 years old.
D. Ireneo Paz in his subscribed complaint for damages alleged that Ryan Padua had
no driver's license. Ireneo Paz knew the same was false as, as per Traffic Accident
Investigation Report (Exhibit B), Ryan Padua had a driver's license. And, Ireneo Paz
was well aware of this. There was evidence to show that Ireneo Paz may have
committed perjury.
E. Ireneo Paz testified in court that he never filed a claim before the Covenant
Insurance Company when there was evidence to prove that he had filed a claim with
said insurance company and submitted documents (Exhibit H, H-1 to H-7). Ireneo
Paz may have given a false testimony.
Investigating Judge Geraldez stated in his Resolution dated 5 November 2001, that:
As Ireneo Paz committed grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of public service, it is respectfully recommended that said respondent be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, and disqualification to hold
any public position in any branch or agency of the government including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
Upon receipt of Investigating Judge Geraldez's findings and recommendations, the Court
referred this administrative case to the Office of the Court Administrator on 10 December
2001 for evaluation, report and recommendation.
After a careful evaluation of the record of this case, the Office of the Court Administrator
("OCA") agreed with the report of Investigating Judge Geraldez. The OCA affirmed in toto
his recommendations and found them to be wholly supported by evidence and jurisprudence.
The OCA recommended that respondent sheriff Ireneo S. Paz be dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Moreover, the OCA recommended that the case be referred to the Department of
Justice for investigation and filing, if warranted, of the appropriate criminal case against
complainant or respondent sheriff, or both.12
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusions of the OCA.
Complainant first imputes to respondent sheriff the act of falsifying the police report
respondent sheriff presented to the court. Respondent sheriff presented to the Bian MTC a
photocopy of the police report,13 showing that at the time of the traffic accident Ryan Padua
was only thirteen years old, well below the statutory minimum age for driving, which is
eighteen years. Respondent sheriff's copy of the police report is marked as Exhibit "B-1" and
is a certified true copy of the original. However, it was Dahlia E. Borromeo, the Clerk of
Court of the Bian MTC, who certified it.
To refute this piece of evidence submitted by respondent sheriff, complainant presented a
different copy of the same police report, duly marked as Exhibit "B." This copy of the police
report was certified by Police Officer Victoriano A. Sabuco of the Metro Traffic Force,
Southern District Traffic Command, Pasay City. He was also the police officer who prepared
the original document. This copy submitted by complainant states that Ryan Padua's age is
eighteen years old.
Respondent sheriff never filed any opposition to Exhibit "B." He never contested its
authenticity. His silence may be construed as a tacit admission of the authenticity of Exhibit
"B," and necessarily also a tacit admission that the police report he presented in court is a
falsified copy.
Respondent sheriff stood to benefit from having the police report reflect that Ryan Padua was
an underage driver, showing that Ryan Padua was at the time of the accident not qualified to
drive a vehicle. As a father to a minor, complainant would also be liable for the negligent acts
of his son that cause damage to others.14 Thus, as found by Investigating Judge Geraldez,
there is "evidence to prove that Ireneo Paz may have committed falsification of the Traffic
Accident Investigation Report ('Exhibit B-1')," an act constituting grave misconduct.
Another charge imputed against respondent sheriff is the act of having committed perjury.
Perjury is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law requires such
oath.15
There are four elements that comprise the crime of perjury, namely: (a) the accused made a
statement under oath on a material matter; (b) the statement was made before a competent
officer, authorized to receive and administer oaths; (c) the accused made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood in the statement and, (d) the sworn statement containing the
falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
Respondent sheriff in his verified complaint for damages stated that Ryan Padua had no
driver's license on 12 June 1997, which was the date of the vehicular accident. Respondent
sheriff knew that this statement he made under oath was false. This conclusion is drawn from
the tact that in respondent sheriff's own copy of the police report, at the time of the accident,
Ryan Padua possessed license number NO1-95-179337. This information contained in
respondent sheriff's copy of the police report completely contradicts the statement respondent
sheriff made in his very own complaint. Respondent sheriff cannot merely feign ignorance of
this detail which is material to his complaint for damages. Based on the evidence, all the
requisite elements of the act of perjury exist. Clearly, respondent sheriff committed perjury in
filing his verified complaint for damages, an act constituting grave misconduct.
Another accusation complainant makes against respondent sheriff is the act of giving false
testimony. Complainant cites respondent sheriff's testimony in court that he never filed a
claim with complainant's insurer, Covenant. Complainant, however, points out that respondent
sheriff did file a claim with Covenant to collect on complainant's admitted liability for his
son's part in the vehicular accident.
On 21 August 1997, in an ex parte hearing conducted before the Clerk of Court of the Bian
MTC, respondent sheriff stated under oath that he approached complainant to plead with him
to pay the damages respondent sheriff incurred from the accident. However, complainant
allegedly refused to pay the damages and instead claimed that his insurance company would
pay the damages. When asked if respondent sheriff contacted this insurance company,
respondent sheriff claimed he did not because complainant did not even mention to him the
insurance company that insured complainant's car. 16
However, ample evidence exists on record to prove that respondent sheriff indeed had filed a
claim with Covenant, contrary to the statement he made under oath. Respondent sheriff
submitted several documents to the insurance company, namely: (1) a Certificate of
Registration;17 (2) an official receipt from the Land Transportation Office evidencing payment
of such registration;18 (3) a driver's license;19 (4) a receipt20 from Imperial Insurance, Inc.,
evidencing payment of premium, which receipt is duly marked as received by Covenant; (5) a
Private Car Policy21issued by Imperial Insurance, Inc. in favor of one Ireneo Paz, also marked
as received by Covenant; and (6) a detailed estimate22 issued by Cosmetic Car Care
enumerating the various repairs needed on respondent sheriff's vehicle.
All these are some of the requirements necessary prior to the filing of an insurance claim with
Covenant. Respondent sheriff did contact Covenant and even filed a claim with Covenant for
payment of the damage to his car, despite his sworn testimony to the contrary. Clearly,
respondent sheriff gave false testimony in the ex-parte hearing, an act also constituting grave
misconduct.
Court personnel charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, bear a heavy responsibility in insuring that their conduct is always beyond
reproach.23 The preservation of the integrity of the judicial process is of paramount
importance. All those occupying offices in the judiciary should at all times be aware that they
are accountable to the people. They must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives. 24
Indeed, all those involved in the administration of justice must at all times conduct themselves
with the highest degree of propriety and decorum and take utmost care in avoiding incidents
that degrade the judiciary and diminish the respect and regard for the courts. 25
In grave misconduct, there must be substantial evidence showing that the acts complained of
are corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or constitute flagrant disregard of
well-known legal rules.26 Respondent sheriff's introduction in evidence of the falsified police
report, committing perjury and giving false testimony, are plainly corrupt acts and show an
intent to disregard flagrantly the law. They constitute grave misconduct that corrodes respect
for the courts. Incidentally, respondent sheriff's acts of perjury and of giving false testimony,
which show a predisposition to lie, defraud and deceive, also constitute dishonesty.27
The penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service, 28 with forfeiture of all benefits
and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or agency of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.29 In Remolona v. Civil Service
Commission,30 the Court En Banc ruled that, to warrant dismissal, grave misconduct or
dishonesty need not be committed in the course of performance of duty by the person charged.
The Court explained the rationale for this rule, as follows:
The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or
is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not
connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government
cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties
correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more
and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even
against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is
employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence
and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and
dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and
 actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. CRISTE B. VILLANUEVA, Petitioner,
Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in vs.
office and the discipline and morale of the service. THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and HORST-KESSLER VON
SPRENGEISEN, Respondents.
Public confidence in our courts is vital to the effective functioning of the judiciary. Court
personnel who commit misconduct or dishonesty diminish the faith of the people in the DECISION
judiciary's ability to dispense justice.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Respondent sheriff failed to live up to the high ethical standards demanded by the office he
occupies. By committing the questioned acts, respondent sheriff undermined the integrity of Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
the service and jeopardized the public's faith in the impartiality of the courts. Respondent (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76999 dismissing the petition for certiorari assailing the finding of
sheriff, who is an important court personnel because he enforces judicial orders, debased the the Secretary of Justice that no probable cause exists against private respondent Horst-Kessler
judicial process by introducing in evidence a falsified document, committing perjury and Von Sprengeisen for perjury.
giving false testimony in an effort to obtain unfairly a favorable judgment for himself.
The Antecedents
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sheriff IV Ireneo S. Paz of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 31, San Pedro, Laguna, guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT. The Court imposes
on him the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, excluding On April 2, 1996, the Refractories Corporation of the Philippines (RCP) filed a protest before
the Special Committee on Anti-Dumping of the Department of Finance against certain
accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or agency of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. importations of Hamburg Trading Corporation (HTC), a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines. The matter involved 151.070 tons of magnesite-
based refractory bricks from Germany.2 The case was docketed as Anti-Dumping Case No. I-
98.

The protest was referred to the Bureau of Import Services (BIS) of the Department of Trade
and Industry, to determine if there was a prima facie case for violation of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7843, the Anti-Dumping Law. Sometime in February 1997, the BIS submitted its report to
the Tariff Commission, declaring that a prima facie case existed and that continued
importation of refractory bricks from Germany would harm the local industry. It adopted the
amount of DM 1,200 per metric ton as the normal value of the imported goods.3

The HTC received a copy of the said report on February 14, 1997. However, before it could
respond, the chairman of the Tariff Commission prodded the parties to settle the matter
amicably. A conference ensued between RCP Senior Vice President and Assistant General
Manager Criste Villanueva and Jesus Borgonia, on the one hand, and HTC President and
General Manager Horst-Kessler Von Sprengeisen and Sales Manager Dennis Gonzales, on the
other. During the conference, the parties agreed that the refractory bricks were imported by
the HTC at a price less than its normal value of DM 1,200, and that such importation was
likely to injure the local industry. The parties also agreed to settle the case to avoid expenses
and protracted litigation. HTC was required to reform its price policy/structure of its
importation and sale of refractory bricks from Germany to conform to the provisions of R.A.
No. 7843 and its rules and regulations. Jesus Borgonio thereafter prepared and signed a
compromise agreement containing the terms agreed upon which Villanueva and Borgonia
signed.4 Bienvenido Flores, an Office Clerk of RCP, delivered the agreement to HTC at the
9th Floor of Ramon Magsaysay Center Building, 1680 Roxas Boulevard, Manila by Von
Sprengeisens approval.5

However, Von Sprengeisen did not sign the agreement. Borgonia revised the agreement by
inserting the phrase "based on the findings of the BIS" in paragraph 1 thereof. Villanueva and
Borgonia signed the agreement and had the same delivered to the office of HTC on April 22,
1997 by Lino M. Gutierrez, a technical assistant of RCP. Gonzales received the agreement
and delivered the same to Von Sprengeisen. After 20 minutes, Gonzales returned, with the
agreement already signed by Von Sprengeisen.6 Gonzales, who had also signed, then gave it
to Gutierrez. On the same day, Notary Public Zenaida P. De Zuiga notarized the
agreement.7 Gonzales delivered a copy of the notarized Agreement to HTC. 8
RCP submitted the compromise agreement to the Tariff Commission. During the May 9, 1997
hearing before the Commission for the approval of the agreement, a representative of HTC
appeared. He offered no objection to the Agreement. The Commission submitted its report to
the Special Committee which rendered a decision declaring that, based on the findings of the
BIS, the normal value of the imported refractory bricks was DM 1,200 per metric ton. HTC
received a copy of the decision on March 4, 1998. Neither RCP nor HTC appealed the
decision to the Court of Tax Appeals.
In the meantime, HTC imported refractory bricks from Germany anew and noted that the
normal value of the said importation under the decision of the Special Committee based on the
BIS report was DM 1,200 per metric ton. On July 28, 1998, the HTC filed an Urgent Motion
to Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment with the Special Committee on Anti-Dumping, praying
that such decision be declared null and void on the following grounds:
1. THE FRAUD HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY THE PROTESTANT DURING THE
NEGOTIATION FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
2. THAT INSERTIONS AND/OR SUBSTITUTION OF THE FACTS NOT AGREED
UPON WAS DELIBERATELY AND SURREPTITIOUSLY MADE BY THE
PROTESTANT IN THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE
AND CONSENT OF THE PROTESTEE.9
The motion was verified by Von Sprengeisen. The HTC averred therein that Villanueva
violated Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code when he surreptitiously inserted the phrase
"based on the findings of the BIS" in the agreement without the knowledge and consent of
Von Sprengeisen and despite their agreement to put behind them the findings of the BIS.
Appended to the motion was an Affidavit of Merit executed by Von Sprengeisen in which he
alleged, inter alia, that sometime in February 1997, the BIS came out with its Report
declaring that the normal value of the magnesite-based refractory bricks was DM 1,200 per
metric ton; before
HTC could respond to the report, Villanueva invited him to a conference for the purpose of
finding the best solution to the pending case before the Commission; he and Gonzales
attended the meeting during which it was agreed, by way of a compromise, that the parties
will accept the amount of DM 1,050 per metric ton as the normal value for all magnesite-
based refractory bricks from Germany; when he received the draft of the compromise
agreement prepared by Villanueva, he approved the same; subsequently, Villanueva
transmitted a compromise agreement already signed by him to Von Sprengeisen for his
review, approval and signature; believing that the compromise agreement reproduced the
contents of the first compromise agreement, he signed the second agreement without reading
it; when he received, on March 4, 1998, a copy of the decision of the Tariff Commission
based on the compromise agreement of the parties wherein the committee adopted the
findings and recommendations of the BIS (that the normal value of the shipment was DM
1,200 per metric ton), he was shocked because he never agreed to the use of such findings for
the reformation of its price policies; there was, in fact, an agreement between him and
Villanueva to put behind them the findings of the BIS; he called up Villanueva at his office
but failed to contact him despite several attempts; suspecting that something amiss happened,
he had the draft of the first compromise agreement retrieved but his secretary failed to locate
the same; it was only sometime later that his secretary found the folder-file containing the
draft and was appalled to discover that Villanueva had substantially altered the first draft of
the compromise agreement; this made him conclude and confirm his suspicion that
Villanueva, thru deceit and fraud, induced him to sign the compromise agreement to the
prejudice of the HTC.10
The RCP opposed the motion. But, in a parallel move, Villanueva, in his capacity as Senior
Vice President and Assistant General Manager of RCP, filed a criminal complaint for perjury
against Von Sprengeisen in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Appended thereto
was a complaint-affidavit executed by Villanueva wherein he declared, inter alia, that Von
Sprengeisen made the following false statements in the Urgent Motion, thus:
a. [Complainant] was the one who called up his office, inviting him to a meeting for the
purpose of finding the best and most equitable solution to the case (p. 3, Urgent Motion);
b. RCP and Hamburg Trading agreed to put behind them the findings and recommendations of
the Bureau of Import Services (BIS) with respect to the anti-dumping protest filed by RCP (p.
3, Urgent Motion);
c. The original version of the Compromise Agreement sent to him was merely a draft (p. 3,
Urgent Motion);
d. The phrase "based on the findings of the Bureau of Import Services" was inserted in
paragraph 1 of the final Compromise Agreement without his knowledge and consent (p. 3,
Urgent Motion); and
e. [Complainant] was the one who surreptitiously inserted the aforesaid phrase (p. 3, Urgent
Motion).11
Villanueva also alleged that Von Sprengeisen made the following false statements in his
Affidavit of Merit:
a. [Complainant] invited him to a conference for the purpose of finding the best solution to the
case;
b. [Complainant and he] agreed to put behind [them] the findings and recommendation of the
BIS submitted to the Secretary of Finance;
c. We agreed to the amount of DM 1,050/ton as the normal value for all magnesite-based
refractory bricks from Germany;
d. The original version of the Compromise Agreement sent to him was merely a draft; and
e. Through deceit and fraud, [complainant] induced [respondent] to sign the final Compromise
Agreement.12
In his Counter-Affidavit, Von Sprengeisen averred that whoever called the other for a
conference was not a material matter. Since the first draft of the Compromise Agreement
transmitted to him was by fax, he asked the complainant to send to him the hard copy of the
Agreement for his signature. He further narrated that when he received the hard copy of the
compromise agreement, he did not bother to review since he assumed that it contained the
same provisions in the faxed copy. He did not suggest that the phrase "based on the findings
of the BIS" be inserted in the hard copy of the agreement because he and Villanueva were at
odds on the BIS finding the normal price of the goods was DM 1,200 per metric ton. He
insisted that it would have been senseless of him to agree to such insertion; as such, he did not
make any willful and deliberate assertion of any falsehood as to any material fact. 13
Investigating Prosecutor Francisco G. Supnet found no probable cause for perjury against the
private respondent and recommended the dismissal of the complaint. Second Assistant City
Prosecutor Leoncia Dimagiba reviewed the resolution of Prosecutor Supnet and found
probable cause for perjury against the private respondent for alleging in his Affidavit of Merit
that he was induced to sign the compromise agreement through fraud and deceit. According to
the Second Assistant City Prosecutor, the allegation of the private respondent "thru deceit and
fraud to sign the final Compromise Agreement" was a deliberate assertion of a falsehood,
designed as it was merely to give the BIS the impression that private respondent was misled
into agreeing to the compromise agreement. She further opined that the allegation was
perjurious, considering that the private respondent had sufficient time to pass upon the
Compromise Agreement and could have availed the services of legal minds who could review
the terms and conditions thereof before signing the same;14 hence, she recommended the
reversal of Prosecutor Supnets resolution and the filing of the information. The City
Prosecutor approved the recommendation of the Second Assistant City Prosecutor.
Accordingly, an Information for perjury was filed against the private respondent with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
The private respondent appealed the resolution to the Secretary of Justice, who reversed the
resolution of the City Prosecutor on September 20, 2002. According to the Justice Secretary,
the complainant failed to establish the materiality of the alleged false assertions and that the
said assertions were willful and deliberate. Moreover, the allegations in the Affidavit of Merit
are not altogether false since the intention of the parties in executing the compromise
agreement was precisely to put behind the ruling of the BIS, despite which the complainant
inserted the condition that the parties would be bound by such findings and
recommendations.15 The decretal portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the City Prosecutor of Manila is hereby
REVERSED. The City Prosecutor is directed to withdraw the information for perjury against
respondent Horst-Kessler von Sprengeisen and to report the action taken within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.16
Villanueva then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the resolution of the
Justice Secretary, alleging therein that grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction, was committed in issuing the said resolution. 17 The private respondent, for his
part, sought the dismissal of the petition alleging that, as found by the Justice Secretary, there
was no probable cause against him for perjury.18
On February 13, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolution of the Justice
Secretary.19
The CA declared that, as posited by the Office of the Solicitor General in its comment on the
petition, the parties had agreed to put behind them the findings and recommendations of the
BIS with respect to the anti-dumping protest. The appellate court stated that its finding is
buttressed by the fact that the amount of DM 1,050 was not mentioned in the first compromise
agreement and that, under such agreement, the HTC obliged itself "to reform
its pricing policy and structure with respect to refractory products being imported to and sold
in the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 7843 and its implementing
rules and requirements." The CA emphasized that it was inclined to believe that there was no
meeting of the minds of the parties when the petitioner inserted the phrase "based on the
findings of the BIS" in the revised compromise agreement; hence, there could not have been
perjury when the private respondent executed the Affidavit of Merit and the Urgent Motion to
Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment. The CA also agreed with the findings of the Secretary of
Justice that the insertion of the condition in the compromise agreement that the parties would
be bound by the BIS findings and recommendation gave the private respondent reason to
believe that he was deceived by the petitioner into signing the Agreement; as such, the private
respondents allegation in his Affidavit of Merit, that he was induced to signing the
Compromise Agreement through fraud and deceit, was not altogether false. Consequently, the
CA ruled, the private respondent did not make any willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood.20 The appellate court conformed to the disquisitions of the Secretary of Justice in
the assailed resolution and concluded that the private respondent did not, in the Affidavit of
Merit, make a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. 21
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court against
private respondent Von Sprengeisen and the Secretary of Justice, insisting that the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing
the petition and affirming the assailed resolution.
The petitioner maintains that, during the preliminary investigation, he adduced substantial
evidence to prove probable cause for perjury against the private respondent. He maintains that
probable cause does not mean actual and positive causes; nor does it import absolute certainty.
It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. It is enough that it is believed that the act
or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. He avers that, contrary to the claim
of the private respondent in his Affidavit of Merit, the meeting between him and Jesus
Borgonio, on the one hand, and the private respondent and HTC Sales Manager Dennis
Gonzales, on the other, was arranged by the latter and not by him. As gleaned from the draft
and final copies of the compromise agreement, the parties made express reference to
the prima facie findings of the BIS that the actual export price of HTC was below the fair
market value. By agreeing that such findings of the BIS be included in the Compromise
Agreement, the said private respondent impliedly agreed to such findings as basis of the price
for which HTC would sell the German-made magnesite-based refractory bricks in the
Philippines. The petitioner avers that the fact that the amount of DM 1,050 per metric ton was
not specifically mentioned in the compromise agreement was of no importance, considering
the parties acceptance of such findings is based on R.A. No. 7843. He points out that the
private respondent could not have failed to notice the difference between the first draft and the
final copy of the agreement before signing it because, as alleged by Lino Gutierrez in his reply
affidavit, it took the private respondent twenty minutes or so after receiving the agreement to
review the final draft before signing it. Moreover, the Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or
Vacate Judgment signed by the private respondent was filed more than 15 months from the
execution of the compromise agreement and after four months from the Tariff Commissions
approval thereof.
The petitioner argues that it is incredible that during the interregnum of 19 months, the private
respondent failed to discover the revisions/insertions in the final draft of the compromise
agreement. Considering the premises, the petitioner submits, the private respondents filing of
the Urgent Motion for and in behalf of HTC was merely an afterthought, to enable the latter to
escape compliance with the terms and conditions of the Agreement.
The petitioner further insists that the insertion of the contested phrase in the final draft of the
compromise agreement was necessary although it may not be in the best interest of HTC. He
posits that the falsehoods made by the private respondent in his Urgent Motion and Affidavit
of Merit were material to the proceedings in the Anti-Dumping Office of the Tariff
Commission because these were used to set aside the compromise agreement executed by the
parties.
In his Comment on the petition, the private respondent avers that the issues raised by the
petitioner are factual, hence, improper in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The determination of the existence
of a probable cause is primarily an administrative sanction of the Secretary of Justice. He
insists that the findings of the Justice Secretary should be accorded great respect, especially
since the same were upheld by the CA. He asserts that the petitioner failed to establish in the
CA and in this Court that the Justice Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in her resolution.
The petition has no merit.
The pivotal issue in this case is factual whether or not, based on the records, there was
probable cause for the private respondents indictment for perjury.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of fact may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari. Findings of facts of a quasi-judicial agency, as affirmed by the CA,
are generally conclusive on the Court, unless cogent facts and circumstances of such a nature
warranting the modification or reversal of the assailed decision were ignored, misunderstood
or misinterpreted. Thus, the Court may delve into and resolve factual issues in exceptional
cases. The petitioner has failed to establish that any such circumstance is present in the case at
bar.22
The Court finds that the public respondent did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution, and that the CA
did not commit any reversible error in its assailed decision and resolution. If at all the public
respondent erred in issuing the assailed resolution, such is merely an error in the exercise of
jurisdiction, reversible by a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court especially
so where, as in this case, the issues before the CA were factual and not legal. The absence or
existence of probable cause in a given case involves a calibration and a reexamination of the
evidence adduced by the parties before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the
probative weight thereof. The CA thus ruled correctly when it dismissed the petition before it.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as
are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
private respondent is probably guilty thereof. It is such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an
honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or positive
cause;" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the
reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge." 23
The determination of its existence lies within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after
conducting a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an offended party. 24 The Resolution
of the Secretary of Justice declaring the absence or existence of a probable cause affirmed by
the CA is accorded high respect. However, such finding may be nullified where grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is established. 25
Perjury is defined and penalized in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall
be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being
included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an
affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath
in cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of
the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section shall suffer the
respective penalties provided therein.
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may affect the earnest concerns of the
parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated when the false statement is made. 26
The seminal modern treatment of the history of perjury concludes that one consideration of
policy overshadows all others the measures taken against the offense must not be so severe
as to discourage aggrieved parties from lodging complaints or testifying. 27 As quoted by Dean
Wigmore, a leading 19th Century Commentator, noted that English law, "throws every fence
round a person accused of perjury, for the obligation of protecting witnesses from oppression
or annoyance, by charges, or threats of charges, of having made false testimony is far
paramount to that of giving even perjury its deserts."28
Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation
administered by authority of law on a material matter.29 The elements of the felony are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material
matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive
and administer oath.
(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for
a legal purpose.30
A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The assertion must be
deliberate and willful.31Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the
accused.32 Willfully means intentionally; with evil intent and legal malice, with the
consciousness that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be
received as a statement of what was true in fact. It is equivalent to "knowingly."
"Deliberately" implies meditated as distinguished from inadvertent acts. 33 It must appear that
the accused knows his statement to be false or as consciously ignorant of its truth. 34
Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as to its truth. A
false statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement is an
adequate defense.35 A false statement which is obviously the result of an honest mistake is not
perjury.
There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made by the
defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the defendant did not believe
those statements to be true.36
Knowledge by the accused of the falsity of his statement is an internal act. It may be proved
by his admissions or by circumstantial evidence. The state of mind of the accused may be
determined by the things he says and does, from proof of a motive to lie and of the objective
falsity itself, and from other facts tending to show that the accused really knew the things he
claimed not to know.37
A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn statements
of the accused. The prosecution must prove which of the two statements is false and must
show the statement to be false by other evidence than the contradicting statement. 38 The
rationale of this principle is thus:
Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony under oath at a different time will not
be sufficient to establish the falsity of testimony charged as perjury, for this would leave
simply one oath of the defendant as against another, and it would not appear that the
testimony charged was false rather than the testimony contradictory thereof. The two
statements will simply neutralize each other; there must be some corroboration of the
contradictory testimony. Such corroboration, however, may be furnished by
evidence aliunde tending to show perjury independently of the declarations of testimony of
the accused.39
The term "material matter" is the main fact subject of the inquiry, or any circumstance which
tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen
the testimony related to the subject of the inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credence
of any witness who testified. In this case, a matter is material if it has a material effect or
tendency to influence the Commission in resolving the motion of HTC one way or the other.
The effects of the statement are weighed in terms of potentiality rather than probability.40 The
prosecution need not prove that the false testimony actually influenced the Commission. 41
The private respondent did err when he declared, in the motion of the HTC and his affidavit,
that it was the petitioner who invited him to a
conference. The truth of the matter is that it was Gonzales who did so. Nonetheless, the issue
of who called for a conference is of de minimis importance because, after all, the parties
agreed to meet after having been prodded by the Chairman of the Commission to settle the
case instead of going through the tribulations and expenses of a protracted litigation. No
adverse inference (related to the merits of their respective contention in this case) can be
ascribed as to whoever called the conference. After all, parties are even urged to settle cases
amicably.
Besides, as correctly declared by the Second Assistant City Prosecutor in her resolution:
The allegation that it was complainant who invited respondent to the meeting may not be a
deliberate lie. Respondent may not have known who arranged the meeting, but as he was able
to talk to complainant, he presumed that it was complainant who extended the invitation.
Moreover, the identity of the one who initiated the meeting is not material considering that
there was a meeting of the minds of the Parties.42
The Court also agrees with the contention of the private respondent that the copy of the first
agreement transmitted to him was a fax copy of the draft, and that, contrary to the allegations
of the private respondent, such agreement was prepared by Borgonia and not by the petitioner.
As gleaned from page two of the agreement, the particulars of the residence certificates of the
petitioner and the private respondent were not typewritten, hence, cannot as yet be notarized.
As claimed by the private respondent, a copy was transmitted to him for his personal review,
and if he found it to be in order, the petitioner and Borgonia would prepare and sign the
agreement and give it back to him for review and signature, with the particulars of his
community tax certificate indicated in the final copy.
Undeniably, the identity of the person who prepared or caused to prepare the compromise
agreement subsequently signed by the petitioner and the private respondent was of prime
importance because only such person should be charged for perjury. The private respondent
erroneously stated in his Affidavit of Merit and Urgent Motion that it was the petitioner who
prepared the agreement that was signed by the parties. It turned out that it was Borgonia who
prepared the first and the second copies. However, the private respondent cannot be held
liable for perjury since it was Borgonia who prepared the agreement and not the petitioner.
The Court agrees with the following contention of the private respondent in his counter-
affidavit:
4.6 While complainant claims that it was not he but Mr. Borgonia who made the insertions,
there is no doubt that, indeed, the insertions were made into the document. Since complainant
is the signatory to the Compromise Agreement, it is but natural for one to presume that he had
made the insertions. At the same time, I can not be expected to know that it was Mr. Borgonia,
as claimed by complainant, who made such insertions. 43
Indeed, Borgonia was merely the Manager of the Management Information Group of RCP,
whereas the petitioner was no less than its Senior Vice President and Assistant General
Manager, Borgonias superior. Unless and until approved by the petitioner, any agreement
prepared by Borgonia was merely a piece of paper, barren of any legal effect. In this case, the
compromise agreement prepared by Borgonia had the petitioners
imprimatur. Borgonia was merely a witness to the agreement. For all legal intents and
purposes, the petitioner had the compromise agreement prepared under his supervision and
control. It cannot thus be concluded that the private respondent made a deliberate falsehood
when he alleged that the agreement was prepared by the petitioner.
The Court is not persuaded by the petitioners claim that, during the conference, he and the
private respondent agreed that, based on the BIS report, the normal value of the imported
refractory bricks per metric ton was DM 1,200, and that such report would be used as basis for
the revision of the price policy and structure of HTC.
It bears stressing that, during the conference, the petitioner and the private respondent had
agreed on three aspects of the case: (1) based on the prima facie findings of the BIS, the
normal value of the goods per meter ton was DM 1,200 and that the actual export price of
HTC was below the fair market value; (2) to terminate the case, HTC will have to adjust and
revise its price policy and structure for imported refractory bricks to conform to R.A. No.
7843 and rules and regulations implementing the law; and (3) if HTC fails or refuses to
comply with its undertaking, RCP will be entitled to a writ of execution without need of
demand. However, the petitioner and the private respondent could not have agreed on such
base price; the petitioner insisted on the amount recommended by the BIS (DM 1,200) while
the private respondent insisted on DM 950. There was an impasse. By way of a compromise,
the parties agreed to do away with the BIS recommended base
value and agreed for HTC to base the normal value of the importation per metric ton under
R.A. No. 7843 and the rules issued implementing the law. This is gleaned from the affidavit of
Borgonia:
13. During the meeting, Mr. von Sprengeisen suggested that the value of DM 1,050/ton be
applied as the price at which Hamburg Trading would sell German-made magnesite-based
refractory bricks in the Philippines. Mr. Villanueva did not agree to the suggested value, as we
considered it low. In the end, both parties decided to base the determination of the price on the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7843 and its implementing rules and regulations. 44
Borgonia prepared the first compromise agreement and incorporated therein the agreement of
the petitioner and the private respondent arrived at during the conference, thus:
1. For the purpose of buying peace and by way of concession in order to end litigation, the
SECOND PARTY undertakes and commits to reform its pricing policy and structure with
respect to refractory products being imported interest sold in the Philippines in accordance
with the provisions of Republic Act 7843 and its implementing rules and regulations.45
If, as claimed by the petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint, he and the private respondent had
agreed that HTC will use as basis for its price policy and structural revision, the BIS report,
for sure, Borgonia would have incorporated the said agreement in the first compromise
agreement. He did not, and Borgonia has not offered any explanation for such failure. The
petitioner signed the draft of the agreement without any plaint or revision. It was only in the
second compromise agreement that was later signed by the petitioner and the private
respondent that Borgonia incorporated the phrase
"based on the findings of the BIS." Borgonia and the petitioner made the insertion on their
own, without the a priori consent of the private respondent.
The Court is not convinced by the petitioners contention (and that of Borgonia in his
Affidavit) that the petitioner and the private respondent had agreed to leave the final
determination of the base value or price of importation per metric ton to a third party (BIS).
The private respondent could not have agreed to the use of the BIS report because, as
mentioned, he had strenuously objected to its use as basis for the revision of its price policy
and structure. For HTC to admit that the BIS finding of DM 1,200 per metric ton was the
normal value of the refractory bricks from Germany for the purpose of resolving the anti-
dumping case is one thing; but for HTC to agree to be bound by the BIS recommendation for
the purpose of revising its price policy and structure is completely a different matter.
With the petitioner and the private respondents admission of the prima facie findings of the
BIS, the Commission can prepare its recommendation to the Special Committee on the protest
of the RCP to the HTC importation subject of the case. Thereafter:
D. The Special Committee shall, within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the report of the
Commission, decide whether the article in question is being imported in violation of this
section and shall give due notice of such decision. In case the decision of dumping is in the
affirmative, the special committee shall direct the Commissioner of Customs to cause the
dumping duty, to be levied, collected and paid, as prescribed in this section, in addition to any
other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on such article, and on the articles of the same
specific kind or class subsequently imported under similar circumstances coming from the
specific country.
In the event that the Special Committee fails to decide within the period prescribed herein, the
recommendation of the Commission shall be deemed approved and shall be final and
executory.46
On the matter of the revision or adjustment of the price policy and structure of HTC, the
parties had agreed to accomplish the same in due time. It goes without saying that the RCP
retained the right to object to or protest to the price policy and structure revision of HTC.
The agreement of the petitioner and the private respondent not to be bound by the base value
in the BIS report for the revision of its price policy and structure is not unexpected because:
(1) the findings of the BIS are only prima facie, meaning to say, not conclusive, and HTC was
accorded a chance to base its price policy and structure on evidence and informations other
than those contained in the BIS report; (2) the normal value of the imported refractory bricks
may fluctuate from time to time, hence, the need for any importer to revise its price policy and
structure from time to time; and (3) the base value to be used by HTC in revising its price
policy would be scrutinized and resolved initially by the Commission, by the Special
Committee and by the Court of Tax Appeals on appeal.
The process agreed upon by the petitioner and the private respondent was not only practical
and fair, but in accord with law as well.
In fine, the private respondent did not commit any falsehood in the Urgent Motion and his
Affidavit of Merit when he declared that he and the
petitioner put behind them the BIS report, and agreed to use R.A. No. 7843 and the rules and
regulations implementing the same to determine the base price for the revision of the price
policy and structure of HTC.
Admittedly, the respondent did not object to the offending phrase before and after signing the
agreement and for a considerable stretch period until HTC filed its motion. However, we do
not agree with the contention of the petitioner that such failure of the respondent to object to
the offending phrase for such period of time amounted to an admission that, indeed, the
private respondent was aware of the offending phrase in the Agreement, and to his agreement
thereto; and estopped the private respondent from alleging that he was deceived by the
petitioner into signing the Compromise Agreement. In his appeal to the DOJ, the private
respondent declared that:
The petitioner failed to append to his petition records of the Commission that the private
respondent appeared for HTC, on May 9, 1997, before the Commission for the hearing on the
Compromise Agreement; and showing that the private respondent did not object thereto.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76999 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.

3.9 True, respondent-appellant may have been remiss and lacking in circumspect in failing to
review the hard copy Compromise Agreement and notice the insertion. Being in the trading
business, respondent-appellant personally handles hundreds of documents daily and is on the
telephone for most of the day communicating with suppliers and customers. And he had no
reason to believe that either complainant-appellee or Mr. Borgonia would make such an
insertion, especially after respondent-appellant had accepted the fax Compromise Agreement
wording and conveyed such acceptance to complainant-appellees office. Respondent-
appellant also had to reason to even think that such a surreptitious insertion would be made;
after all, he had a very warm and friendly meeting with complainant-appellee and Mr.
Borgonia and came out of it with a feeling that he could trust complainant-appellee (p. 4,
Annex "C").

3.10 Hence, when respondent-appellant alleges that he was induced to sign the hard copy
Compromise Agreement through fraud and deceit, respondent-appellant honestly believes that
he was misled into signing it. He was misled by the fact that he had been sent the fax
Compromise Agreement by complainant-appellee, that he had conveyed its acceptability to
complainant-appellee and now requested for the hard copy for execution, that he had been led
to trust that the findings and recommendation of the BIS were being put behind them and that
complainant-appellee had agreed to such a compromise. The transmittal of the hard copy
Compromise Agreement, without any notice or mention by complainant-appellee or
complainant-appellees office that it contained
insertions or wording different from the fax Compromise Agreement, and on respondent-
appellants understanding that the wording of the hard copy Compromise Agreement would
be exactly the same as the fax Compromise Agreement, constitutes the fraud or deceit
allegedly by respondent-appellant.47

In his rejoinder-affidavit, the private respondent explained that:

2. Again, contrary to the allegations in the Reply-Affidavits, I was unable to review the
Compromise Agreement delivered by Mr. Gutierrez on 22 April 1997 as I was busy with
numerous calls and business at the time it was delivered. Also, I had been led to believe in our
meetings with Mr. Villanueva and Mr. Borgonia that I could trust them. So, after having seen
the fax Compromise Agreement and being amenable to it, I trusted that they would send a
genuine hard copy. As it turned out, I was mistaken. 48

Moreover, even before filing the Urgent Motion and signing the Affidavit of Merit, the private
respondent tried for several times to contact the petitioner, but the latter failed to return his
calls. This reinforced the suspicion of the private respondent that the insertion of the offending
phrase was not, after all, inadvertent but deliberate, calculated to deceive him to the prejudice
of HTC. The private respondent may be blamed for putting too much trust and confidence on
the petitioner, but he certainly cannot be indicted for perjury for lack of probable cause.
EMERALD GARMENT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER and H.D. LEE COMPANY, INC., respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, Emerald
Garment Manufacturing Corporation seeks to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
29 November 1990 in CA-G.R. SP No. 15266 declaring petitioner's trademark to be
confusingly similar to that of private respondent and the resolution dated 17 May 1991
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The record reveals the following antecedent facts:
On 18 September 1981, private respondent H.D. Lee Co., Inc., a foreign corporation
organized under the laws of Delaware, U.S.A., filed with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks
& Technology Transfer (BPTTT) a Petition for Cancellation of Registration No. SR 5054
(Supplemental Register) for the trademark "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" used on skirts, jeans,
blouses, socks, briefs, jackets, jogging suits, dresses, shorts, shirts and lingerie under Class 25,
issued on 27 October 1980 in the name of petitioner Emerald Garment Manufacturing
Corporation, a domestic corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. The
petition was docketed as Inter Partes Case No. 1558. 1
Private respondent, invoking Sec. 37 of R.A. No. 166 (Trademark Law) and Art. VIII of the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, averred that petitioner's trademark
"so closely resembled its own trademark, 'LEE' as previously registered and used in the
Philippines, and not abandoned, as to be likely, when applied to or used in connection with
petitioner's goods, to cause confusion, mistake and deception on the part of the purchasing
public as to the origin of the goods." 2
In its answer dated 23 March 1982, petitioner contended that its trademark was entirely and
unmistakably different from that of private respondent and that its certificate of registration
was legally and validly granted. 3
On 20 February 1984, petitioner caused the publication of its application for registration of the
trademark "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" in the Principal Register." 4
On 27 July 1984, private respondent filed a notice of opposition to petitioner's application for
registration also on grounds that petitioner's trademark was confusingly similar to its "LEE"
trademark. 5 The case was docketed as Inter Partes Case No. 1860.
On 21 June 1985, the Director of Patents, on motion filed by private respondent dated 15 May
1985, issued an order consolidating Inter Partes Cases Nos. 1558 and 1860 on grounds that a
common question of law was involved. 6
On 19 July 1988, the Director of Patents rendered a decision granting private respondent's
petition for cancellation and opposition to registration.
The Director of Patents found private respondent to be the prior registrant of the trademark
"LEE" in the Philippines and that it had been using said mark in the Philippines. 7
Moreover, the Director of Patents, using the test of dominancy, declared that petitioner's
trademark was confusingly similar to private respondent's mark because "it is the word 'Lee'
which draws the attention of the buyer and leads him to conclude that the goods originated
from the same manufacturer. It is undeniably the dominant feature of the mark." 8
On 3 August 1988, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals and on 8 August 1988, it filed
with the BPTTT a Motion to Stay Execution of the 19 July 1988 decision of the Director of
Patents on grounds that the same would cause it great and irreparable damage and injury.
Private respondent submitted its opposition on 22 August 1988. 9
On 23 September 1988, the BPTTT issued Resolution No. 88-33 granting petitioner's motion
to stay execution subject to the following terms and conditions:
1. That under this resolution, Respondent-Registrant is authorized only to
dispose of its current stock using the mark "STYLISTIC MR. LEE";
2. That Respondent-Registrant is strictly prohibited from further
production, regardless of mode and source, of the mark in question
(STYLISTIC MR. LEE) in addition to its current stock;
3. That this relief Order shall automatically cease upon resolution of the
Appeal by the Court of Appeals and, if the Respondent's appeal loses, all
goods bearing the mark "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" shall be removed from
the market, otherwise such goods shall be seized in accordance with the
law.
SO ORDERED. 10
On 29 November 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the decision
of the Director of Patents dated 19 July 1988 in all respects. 11
In said decision the Court of Appeals expounded, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Whether or not a trademark causes confusion and is likely to deceive the
public is a question of fact which is to be resolved by applying the "test of
dominancy", meaning, if the competing trademark contains the main or
essential or dominant features of another by reason of which confusion and
deception are likely to result, then infringement takes place; that
duplication or imitation is not necessary, a similarity in the dominant
features of the trademark would be sufficient.
 The word "LEE" is the most prominent and distinctive feature of the
appellant's trademark and all of the appellee's "LEE" trademarks. It is the
mark which draws the attention of the buyer and leads him to conclude that
the goods originated from the same manufacturer. While it is true that there
are other words such as "STYLISTIC", printed in the appellant's label, such
word is printed in such small letters over the word "LEE" that it is not
conspicuous enough to draw the attention of ordinary buyers whereas the
word "LEE" is printed across the label in big, bold letters and of the same
color, style, type and size of lettering as that of the trademark of the
appellee. The alleged difference is too insubstantial to be noticeable. Even
granting arguendo that the word "STYLISTIC" is conspicuous enough to
draw attention, the goods may easily be mistaken for just another variation
or line of garments under the ap appelle's "LEE" trademarks in view of the
fact that the appellee has registered trademarks which use other words in
addition to the principal mark "LEE" such as "LEE RIDERS",
"LEESURES" and "LEE LEENS". The likelihood of confusion is further
made more probable by the fact that both parties are engaged in the same
line of business. It is well to reiterate that the determinative factor in
ascertaining whether or not the marks are confusingly similar to each other
is not whether the challenged mark would actually cause confusion or
deception of the purchasers but whether the use of such mark would likely
cause confusion or mistake on the part of the buying public.
xxx xxx xxx
The appellee has sufficiently established its right to prior use and
registration of the trademark "LEE" in the Philippines and is thus entitled
to protection from any infringement upon the same. It is thus axiomatic that
one who has identified a peculiar symbol or mark with his goods thereby
acquires a property right in such symbol or mark, and if another infringes
the trademark, he thereby invokes this property right.
The merchandise or goods being sold by the parties are not that expensive
as alleged to be by the appellant and are quite ordinary commodities
purchased by the average person and at times, by the ignorant and the
unlettered. Ordinary purchasers will not as a rule examine the small
letterings printed on the label but will simply be guided by the presence of
the striking mark "LEE". Whatever difference there may be will pale in
insignificance in the face of an evident similarity in the dominant features
and overall appearance of the labels of the parties. 12
xxx xxx xxx
On 19 December 1990, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Private respondent opposed said motion on 8 January 1991 on grounds that it involved an
impermissible change of theory on appeal. Petitioner allegedly raised entirely new and
unrelated arguments and defenses not previously raised in the proceedings below such as
laches and a claim that private respondent appropriated the style and appearance of petitioner's
trademark when it registered its "LEE" mark under Registration No. 44220. 13
On 17 May 1991, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution rejecting petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and ruled thus:
xxx xxx xxx
A defense not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal for the
first time. An issue raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely
in the proceedings in the lower court is barred by estoppel.
The object of requiring the parties to present all questions and issues to the
lower court before they can be presented to this Court is to have the lower
court rule upon them, so that this Court on appeal may determine whether
or not such ruling was erroneous. The purpose is also in furtherance of
justice to require the party to first present the question he contends for in
the lower court so that the other party may not be taken by surprise and
may present evidence to properly meet the issues raised.
Moreover, for a question to be raised on appeal, the same must also be
within the issues raised by the parties in their pleadings. Consequently,
when a party deliberately adopts a certain theory, and the case is tried and
decided based upon such theory presented in the court below, he will not
be permitted to change his theory on appeal. To permit him to do so would
be unfair to the adverse party. A question raised for the first time on
appeal, there having opportunity to raise them in the court of origin
constitutes a change of theory which is not permissible on appeal.
In the instant case, appellant's main defense pleaded in its answer dated
March 23, 1982 was that there was "no confusing similarity between the
competing trademark involved. On appeal, the appellant raised a single
issue, to wit:
The only issue involved in this case is whether or not
respondent-registrant's trademark "STYLISTIC MR.
LEE" is confusingly similar with the petitioner's
trademarks "LEE or LEERIDERS, LEE-LEENS and
LEE-SURES."
Appellant's main argument in this motion for reconsideration on the other
hand is that the appellee is estopped by laches from asserting its right to its
trademark. Appellant claims although belatedly that appellee went to court
with "unclean hands" by changing the appearance of its trademark to make
it identical to the appellant's trademark.
Neither defenses were raised by the appellant in the proceedings before the
Bureau of Patents. Appellant cannot raise them now for the first time on
 appeal, let alone on a mere motion for reconsideration of the decision of
this Court dismissing the appellant's appeal.
While there may be instances and situations justifying relaxation of this
rule, the circumstance of the instant case, equity would be better served by
applying the settled rule it appearing that appellant has not given any
reason at all as to why the defenses raised in its motion for reconsideration
was not invoked earlier. 14
xxx xxx xxx
Twice rebuffed, petitioner presents its case before this Court on the following assignment of
errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF A FOURTH
"LEE" TRADEMARK IMITATING THAT OF THE PETITIONER'S
ON MAY 5, 1989 OR MORE THAN EIGHT MONTHS AFTER THE
BUREAU OF PATENT'S DECISION DATED JULY 19, 1988.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
DEFENSE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES MUST BE RAISED IN THE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE BUREAU OF PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT CONSIDERED
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S PRIOR REGISTRATION OF ITS
TRADEMARK AND DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HAD FAILED TO PROVE COMMERCIAL
USE THEREOF BEFORE FILING OF APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION. 15
In addition, petitioner reiterates the issues it raised in the Court of Appeals:
I. THE ISSUE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE IS WHETHER OR NOT
PETITIONER'S TRADEMARK SYTLISTIC MR. LEE, IS
CONFUSINGLY SIMILAR WITH THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
TRADEMARK LEE OR LEE-RIDER, LEE-LEENS AND LEE-SURES.
II. PETITIONER'S EVIDENCES ARE CLEAR AND SUFFICIENT TO
SHOW THAT IT IS THE PRIOR USER AND ITS TRADEMARK IS
DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
III. PETITIONER'S TRADEMARK IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S AND THE REGISTRATION OF ITS
TRADEMARK IS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH.
IV. PETITIONER'S "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" TRADEMARK CANNOT
BE CONFUSED WITH PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S LEE
TRADEMARK. 16
Petitioner contends that private respondent is estopped from instituting an action for
infringement before the BPTTT under the equitable principle of laches pursuant to Sec. 9-A of
R.A. No. 166, otherwise known as the Law on Trade-marks, Trade-names and Unfair
Competition:
Sec. 9-A. Equitable principles to govern proceedings. In opposition
proceedings and in all other inter partes proceedings in the patent office
under this act, equitable principles of laches, estoppel, and acquiescence,
where applicable, may be considered and applied.
Petitioner alleges that it has been using its trademark "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" since 1 May
1975, yet, it was only on 18 September 1981 that private respondent filed a petition for
cancellation of petitioner's certificate of registration for the said trademark. Similarly, private
respondent's notice of opposition to petitioner's application for registration in the principal
register was belatedly filed on 27 July 1984. 17
Private respondent counters by maintaining that petitioner was barred from raising new issues
on appeal, the only contention in the proceedings below being the presence or absence of
confusing similarity between the two trademarks in question. 18
We reject petitioner's contention.
Petitioner's trademark is registered in the supplemental register. The Trademark Law (R.A.
No. 166) provides that "marks and tradenames for the supplemental register shall not be
published for or be subject to opposition, but shall be published on registration in the Official
Gazette." 19 The reckoning point, therefore, should not be 1 May 1975, the date of alleged use
by petitioner of its assailed trademark but 27 October 1980, 20 the date the certificate of
registration SR No. 5054 was published in the Official Gazette and issued to petitioner.
It was only on the date of publication and issuance of the registration certificate that private
respondent may be considered "officially" put on notice that petitioner has appropriated or is
using said mark, which, after all, is the function and purpose of registration in the
supplemental register. 21 The record is bereft of evidence that private respondent was aware of
petitioner's trademark before the date of said publication and issuance. Hence, when private
respondent instituted cancellation proceedings on 18 September 1981, less than a year had
passed.
Corollarily, private respondent could hardly be accused of inexcusable delay in filing its
notice of opposition to petitioner's application for registration in the principal register since
said application was published only on 20 February 1984. 22 From the time of publication to
the time of filing the opposition on 27 July 1984 barely five (5) months had elapsed. To be
barred from bringing suit on grounds of estoppel and laches, the delay must be
lengthy. 23
More crucial is the issue of confusing similarity between the two trademarks. Petitioner
vehemently contends that its trademark "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" is entirely different from and
not confusingly similar to private respondent's "LEE" trademark.
Private respondent maintains otherwise. It asserts that petitioner's trademark tends to mislead
and confuse the public and thus constitutes an infringement of its own mark, since the
dominant feature therein is the word "LEE."
The pertinent provision of R.A. No. 166 (Trademark Law) states thus:
Sec. 22. Infringement, what constitutes. Any person who shall use,
without the consent of the registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or
colorable imitation of any registered mark or trade-name in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods, business or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as to the source or
origin of such goods or services, or identity of such business; or reproduce,
counterfeit, copy or colorably imitable any such mark or trade-name and
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels,
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to
be used upon or in connection with such goods, business or services; shall
be liable to a civil action by the registrant for any or all of the remedies
herein provided.
Practical application, however, of the aforesaid provision is easier said than done. In the
history of trademark cases in the Philippines, particularly in ascertaining whether one
trademark is confusingly similar to or is a colorable imitation of another, no set rules can be
deduced. Each case must be decided on its own merits.
In Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 24 we held:
. . . But likelihood of confusion is a relative concept; to be determined only
according to the particular, and sometimes peculiar, circumstances of each
case. It is unquestionably true that, as stated in Coburn vs. Puritan Mills,
Inc.: "In trademark cases, even more than in other litigation, precedent
must be studied in the light of the facts of the particular case."
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, it has been observed that:
In determining whether a particular name or mark is a "colorable imitation"
of another, no all-embracing rule seems possible in view of the great
number of factors which must necessarily be considered in resolving this
question of fact, such as the class of product or business to which the
article belongs; the product's quality, quantity, or size, including its
wrapper or container; the dominant color, style, size, form, meaning of
letters, words, designs and emblems used; the nature of the package,
wrapper or container; the character of the product's purchasers; location of
the business; the likelihood of deception or the mark or name's tendency to
confuse;
etc. 25
Proceeding to the task at hand, the essential element of infringement is colorable imitation.
This term has been defined as "such a close or ingenious imitation as to be calculated to
deceive ordinary purchasers, or such resemblance of the infringing mark to the original as to
deceive an ordinary purchaser giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, and to cause
him to purchase the one supposing it to be the other." 26
Colorable imitation does not mean such similitude as amounts to identity.
Nor does it require that all the details be literally copied. Colorable
imitation refers to such similarity in form, content, words, sound, meaning,
special arrangement, or general appearance of the trademark or tradename
with that of the other mark or tradename in their over-all presentation or in
their essential, substantive and distinctive parts as would likely mislead or
confuse persons in the ordinary course of purchasing the genuine article. 27
In determining whether colorable imitation exists, jurisprudence has developed two kinds of
tests the Dominancy Test applied in Asia Brewery, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 28 and other
cases 29 and the Holistic Test developed in Del Monte Corporation v. Court of Appeals 30 and
its proponent cases. 31
As its title implies, the test of dominancy focuses on the similarity of the prevalent features of
the competing trademarks which might cause confusion or deception and thus constitutes
infringement.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . If the competing trademark contains the main or essential or dominant
features of another, and confusion and deception is likely to result,
infringement takes place. Duplication or imitation is not necessary; nor it is
necessary that the infringing label should suggest an effort to imitate. [C.
Neilman Brewing Co. v. Independent Brewing Co., 191 F., 489,
495, citing Eagle White Lead Co., vs. Pflugh (CC) 180 Fed. 579]. The
question at issue in cases of infringement of trademarks is whether the use
of the marks involved would be likely to cause confusion or mistakes in the
mind of the public or deceive purchasers. (Auburn Rubber Corporation vs.
Honover Rubber Co., 107 F. 2d 588; . . .) 32
xxx xxx xxx
On the other side of the spectrum, the holistic test mandates that the entirety of the marks in
question must be considered in determining confusing similarity.
xxx xxx xxx
In determining whether the trademarks are confusingly similar, a
comparison of the words is not the only determinant factor. The trademarks
 in their entirety as they appear in their respective labels or hang tags must
also be considered in relation to the goods to which they are attached. The
discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the predominant
words but also on the other features appearing in both labels in order that
he may draw his conclusion whether one is confusingly similar to the
other. 33
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the foregoing tenets to the present controversy and taking into account the factual
circumstances of this case, we considered the trademarks involved as a whole and rule that
petitioner's "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" is not confusingly similar to private respondent's "LEE"
trademark.
Petitioner's trademark is the whole "STYLISTIC MR. LEE." Although on its label the word
"LEE" is prominent, the trademark should be considered as a whole and not piecemeal. The
dissimilarities between the two marks become conspicuous, noticeable and substantial enough
to matter especially in the light of the following variables that must be factored in.
First, the products involved in the case at bar are, in the main, various kinds of jeans. These
are not your ordinary household items like catsup, soysauce or soap which are of minimal
cost. Maong pants or jeans are not inexpensive. Accordingly, the casual buyer is predisposed
to be more cautious and discriminating in and would prefer to mull over his purchase.
Confusion and deception, then, is less likely. In Del Monte Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 34 we noted that:
. . . Among these, what essentially determines the attitudes of the
purchaser, specifically his inclination to be cautious, is the cost of the
goods. To be sure, a person who buys a box of candies will not exercise as
much care as one who buys an expensive watch. As a general rule, an
ordinary buyer does not exercise as much prudence in buying an article for
which he pays a few centavos as he does in purchasing a more valuable
thing. Expensive and valuable items are normally bought only after
deliberate, comparative and analytical investigation. But mass products,
low priced articles in wide use, and matters of everyday purchase requiring
frequent replacement are bought by the casual consumer without great
care. . . .
Second, like his beer, the average Filipino consumer generally buys his jeans by brand. He
does not ask the sales clerk for generic jeans but for, say, a Levis, Guess, Wrangler or even an
Armani. He is, therefore, more or less knowledgeable and familiar with his preference and
will not easily be distracted.
Finally, in line with the foregoing discussions, more credit should be given to the "ordinary
purchaser." Cast in this particular controversy, the ordinary purchaser is not the "completely
unwary consumer" but is the "ordinarily intelligent buyer" considering the type of product
involved.
The definition laid down in Dy Buncio v. Tan Tiao Bok 35 is better suited to the present case.
There, the "ordinary purchaser" was defined as one "accustomed to buy, and therefore to some
extent familiar with, the goods in question. The test of fraudulent simulation is to be found in
the likelihood of the deception of some persons in some measure acquainted with an
established design and desirous of purchasing the commodity with which that design has been
associated. The test is not found in the deception, or the possibility of deception, of the person
who knows nothing about the design which has been counterfeited, and who must be
indifferent between that and the other. The simulation, in order to be objectionable, must be
such as appears likely to mislead the ordinary intelligent buyer who has a need to supply and
is familiar with the article that he seeks to purchase."
There is no cause for the Court of Appeal's apprehension that petitioner's products might be
mistaken as "another variation or line of garments under private respondent's 'LEE'
trademark". 36 As one would readily observe, private respondent's variation follows a standard
format "LEERIDERS," "LEESURES" and "LEELEENS." It is, therefore, improbable that the
public would immediately and naturally conclude that petitioner's "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" is
but another variation under private respondent's "LEE" mark.
As we have previously intimated the issue of confusing similarity between trademarks is
resolved by considering the distinct characteristics of each case. In the present controversy,
taking into account these unique factors, we conclude that the similarities in the trademarks in
question are not sufficient as to likely cause deception and confusion tantamount to
infringement.
Another way of resolving the conflict is to consider the marks involved from the point of view
of what marks are registrable pursuant to Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 166, particularly paragraph 4 (e):
CHAPTER II-A. The Principal Register
(Inserted by Sec. 2, Rep. Act No. 638.)
Sec. 4. Registration of trade-marks, trade-names and service-marks on the
principal register. There is hereby established a register of trade-marks,
trade-names and service-marks which shall be known as the principal
register. The owner of a trade-mark, trade-name or service-mark used to
distinguish his goods, business or services from the goods, business or
services of others shall have the right to register the same on the principal
register, unless it:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Consists of a mark or trade-name which, when applied to or used in
connection with the goods, business or services of the applicant is merely
descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, or when applied to or
used in connection with the goods, business or services of the applicant is
primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of
them, or is primarily merely a surname; (Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
"LEE" is primarily a surname. Private respondent cannot, therefore, acquire exclusive
ownership over and singular use of said term.
. . . It has been held that a personal name or surname may not be
monopolized as a trademark or tradename as against others of the same
name or surname. For in the absence of contract, fraud, or estoppel, any
man may use his name or surname in all legitimate ways. Thus,
"Wellington" is a surname, and its first user has no cause of action against
the junior user of "Wellington" as it is incapable of exclusive
appropriation. 37
In addition to the foregoing, we are constrained to agree with petitioner's contention that
private respondent failed to prove prior actual commercial use of its "LEE" trademark in the
Philippines before filing its application for registration with the BPTTT and hence, has not
acquired ownership over said mark.
Actual use in commerce in the Philippines is an essential prerequisite for the acquisition of
ownership over a trademark pursuant to Sec. 2 and 2-A of the Philippine Trademark Law
(R.A. No. 166) which explicitly provides that:
CHAPTER II. Registration of Marks and Trade-names.
Sec. 2. What are registrable. Trade-marks, trade-names, and service
marks owned by persons, corporations, partnerships or associations
domiciled in the Philippines and by persons, corporations, partnerships, or
associations domiciled in any foreign country may be registered in
accordance with the provisions of this act: Provided, That said trade-
marks, trade-names, or service marks are actually in use in commerce and
services not less than two months in the Philippines before the time the
applications for registration are filed: And Provided, further, That the
country of which the applicant for registration is a citizen grants by law
substantially similar privileges to citizens of the Philippines, and such fact
is officially certified, with a certified true copy of the foreign law translated
into the English language, by the government of the foreign country to the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. (As amended.) (Emphasis
ours.)
Sec. 2-A. Ownership of trade-marks, trade-names and service-marks; how
acquired. Anyone who lawfully produces or deals in merchandise of any
kind or who engages in lawful business, or who renders any lawful service
in commerce, by actual use hereof in manufacture or trade, in business,
and in the service rendered; may appropriate to his exclusive use a trade-
mark, a trade-name, or a service-mark not so appropriated by another, to
distinguish his merchandise, business or services from others. The
ownership or possession of trade-mark, trade-name, service-mark,
heretofore or hereafter appropriated, as in this section provided, shall be
recognized and protected in the same manner and to the same extent as are
other property rights to the law. (As amended.) (Emphasis ours.)
The provisions of the 1965 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 38 relied
upon by private respondent and Sec. 21-A of the Trademark Law (R.A. No. 166) 39 were
sufficiently expounded upon and qualified in the recent case of Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals: 40
xxx xxx xxx
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on
trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must
subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is
being decided by a municipal tribunal (Mortisen vs. Peters, Great Britain,
High Court of Judiciary of Scotland, 1906, 8 Sessions, 93; Paras,
International Law and World Organization, 1971 Ed., p. 20). Withal, the
fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does
not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law
in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in
most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not
superior, to national legislative enactments.
xxx xxx xxx
In other words, (a foreign corporation) may have the capacity to sue for
infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the Philippines on
account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the question of whether
they have an exclusive right over their symbol as to justify issuance of the
controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the
Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus
incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in the Philippines files a complaint for
infringement, the entity need not be actually using its trademark in
commerce in the Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have the
personality to file a suit for infringement but it may not necessarily be
entitled to protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the
local market.
xxx xxx xxx
Undisputably, private respondent is the senior registrant, having obtained several registration
certificates for its various trademarks "LEE," "LEERIDERS," and "LEESURES" in both the
supplemental and principal registers, as early as 1969 to 1973. 41 However, registration alone
will not suffice. In Sterling Products International, Inc. v. Farbenfabriken Bayer
Aktiengesellschaft, 42 we declared:
xxx xxx xxx
A rule widely accepted and firmly entrenched because it has come down
through the years is that actual use in commerce or business is a
prerequisite in the acquisition of the right of ownership over a trademark.
 xxx xxx xxx
It would seem quite clear that adoption alone of a trademark would not
give exclusive right thereto. Such right "grows out of their actual use."
Adoption is not use. One may make advertisements, issue circulars, give
out price lists on certain goods; but these alone would not give exclusive
right of use. For trademark is a creation of use. The underlying reason for
all these is that purchasers have come to understand the mark as indicating
the origin of the wares. Flowing from this is the trader's right to protection
in the trade he has built up and the goodwill he has accumulated from use
of the trademark. Registration of a trademark, of course, has value: it is an
administrative act declaratory of a pre-existing right. Registration does not,
however, perfect a trademark right. (Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
To augment its arguments that it was, not only the prior registrant, but also the prior user,
private respondent invokes Sec. 20 of the Trademark Law, thus:
Sec. 20. Certificate of registration prima facie evidence of validity. A
certificate of registration of a mark or tradename shall be a prima
facie evidence of the validity of the registration, the registrant's ownership
of the mark or trade-name, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the
same in connection with the goods, business or services specified in the
certificate, subject to any conditions and limitations stated therein.
The credibility placed on a certificate of registration of one's trademark, or its weight as
evidence of validity, ownership and exclusive use, is qualified. A registration certificate
serves merely as prima facie evidence. It is not conclusive but can and may be rebutted by
controverting evidence.
Moreover, the aforequoted provision applies only to registrations in the principal
register. 43 Registrations in the supplemental register do not enjoy a similar privilege. A
supplemental register was created precisely for the registration of marks which are not
registrable on the principal register due to some defects. 44
The determination as to who is the prior user of the trademark is a question of fact and it is
this Court's working principle not to disturb the findings of the Director of Patents on this
issue in the absence of any showing of grave abuse of discretion. The findings of facts of the
Director of Patents are conclusive upon the Supreme Court provided they are supported by
substantial evidence. 45
In the case at bench, however, we reverse the findings of the Director of Patents and the Court
of Appeals. After a meticulous study of the records, we observe that the Director of Patents
and the Court of Appeals relied mainly on the registration certificates as proof of use by
private respondent of the trademark "LEE" which, as we have previously discussed are not
sufficient. We cannot give credence to private respondent's claim that its "LEE" mark first
reached the Philippines in the 1960's through local sales by the Post Exchanges of the U.S.
Military Bases in the Philippines 46based as it was solely on the self-serving statements of Mr.
Edward Poste, General Manager of Lee (Phils.), Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the H.D.
Lee, Co., Inc., U.S.A., herein private respondent. 47 Similarly, we give little weight to the
numerous
vouchers representing various advertising expenses in the Philippines for "LEE" products. 48 It
is well to note that these expenses were incurred only in 1981 and 1982 by LEE (Phils.), Inc.
after it entered into a licensing agreement with private respondent on 11 May 1981. 49
On the other hand, petitioner has sufficiently shown that it has been in the business of selling
jeans and other garments adopting its "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" trademark since 1975 as
evidenced by appropriate sales invoices to various stores and retailers. 50
Our rulings in Pagasa Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals 51 and Converse Rubber
Corp. v. Universal Rubber Products, Inc., 52respectively, are instructive:
The Trademark Law is very clear. It requires actual commercial use of the
mark prior to its registration. There is no dispute that respondent
corporation was the first registrant, yet it failed to fully substantiate its
claim that it used in trade or business in the Philippines the subject mark; it
did not present proof to invest it with exclusive, continuous adoption of the
trademark which should consist among others, of considerable sales since
its first use. The invoices submitted by respondent which were dated way
back in 1957 show that the zippers sent to the Philippines were to be used
as "samples" and "of no commercial value." The evidence for respondent
must be clear, definite and free from inconsistencies. "Samples" are not for
sale and therefore, the fact of exporting them to the Philippines cannot be
considered to be equivalent to the "use" contemplated by law. Respondent
did not expect income from such "samples." There were no receipts to
establish sale, and no proof were presented to show that they were
subsequently sold in the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
The sales invoices provide the best proof that there were actual sales of
petitioner's product in the country and that there was actual use for a
protracted period of petitioner's trademark or part thereof through these
sales.
For lack of adequate proof of actual use of its trademark in the Philippines prior to petitioner's
use of its own mark and for failure to establish confusing similarity between said trademarks,
private respondent's action for infringement must necessarily fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision and resolution are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL SAMANIEGO and JUANA BENEDICTO DE PEREZ, defendants-appellants.
On the 20th day of December, 1907, the following information was presented to the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila against the defendants in this case:
That on or about 25th day of November, 1907, in the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said Manuel Samaniego did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously lie with and have the sexual intercourse with the said accused, Juana
Benedicto de Perez, who was then and there, as the said accused, a married woman
and the lawfully wedded wife of Jose Perez, being then and there a married woman
and the lawfully wedded wife of the said Jose Perez Siguenza, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with the
said accused, Manuel Samaniego.
The defendants were arrested under the said information and were confined in Bilibid, the said
Samaniego on the 21st day of December, 1907, and the said Juana Benedicto de Perez on the
26th of the same month. after the arrest of the said defendants, Juana Benedicto de Perez, at
the instance of the prosecuting attorney, was examined by three physicians for the purpose of
determining her mental condition. On the 27th day of December, 1907, the doctors made their
report to the Court of First Instance, expressing the opinion that the said Juana Benedicto de
Perez was mentally deranged. On the 7th day of January, 1908, the defendants were tried on
the charge of adultery, as presented in said information, and, after the introduction of the
proofs attorney and the trial court believed that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the
conviction of either of the defendants, and they were both accordingly acquitted of that
charge. In the judgment acquitting the defendants the court included permission to the
prosecuting attorney to file against either or both of the said defendants a new information
charging them with the crime defined in article 441 of the Penal Code. On the 8th day of
January, 1908, pursuant to such permission, the prosecuting attorney presented against both of
the defendants an information charging them with the crime mentioned in said article, as
follows:
That on and for many weeks prior to the 27th day of November, 1907, in the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands. the said Juana Juana Benedicto De Perez was a married
woman, and that the said Manuel Samaniego knew that she was married and united
in the bonds of matrimony with and was the legitimate consort of Jose Perez
Siguenza; that during the period of time above expressed the said Manuel Samaniego
and Juana Benedicto de Perez, willfully, illegally, and criminally and scandalously,
without having any matrimonial tie between them, habitually appeared together in
public places and frequented together places of recreation, suspicious places, vacant
houses, and houses of bad repute, in the daytime as well as in the nighttime; and
lewdly and indecently went to the bed together in the house of the husband of the
said Juana Benedicto de Perez during the late hours of the night, dressed only in their
night clothes, and in decorously, indecently, and immodestly embraced each other
and caressed each other in the presence of the family, children, and servants of the
said husband of Juana Benedicto de Perez; all with public scandal and with scandal
to the community, and with shame and humiliation to the husband and family of the
said Juana Benedicto de Perez.
After the presentation of this information, it appearing that the proofs under the charge therein
contained would be the same as were those under the charge in the information first herein set
forth, the prosecuting attorney and the attorneys for the defendants agreed to submit and did
submit the case to the court for final determination upon the proofs already taken in the trial
on the charge of February, 1908, the trial court rendered a decision in which he found the
defendants guilty of the crime charged, condemning the defendant Samaniego to the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum degree and the ordering the defendant Juana Benedicto de
Perez confined in an asylum for the insane until the further order of the court. On the same
day the defendants excepted to said decision and made a motion for a new trial. On the 12th
day of February said court, upon its own motion, and, so far as appears of record, without
notice to or consent of the defendants or their attorneys made an order reopening said case
"for the purpose only, " as expressed in the order, " of receiving evidence as to the publicity of
the acts charged in the complaint." On the 15th day of April, following, additional evidence
was taken in the case and used by the court as the basis for a further judgment in the action.
This was done over the objections and exception of defendant's attorneys. On the 18th day of
April the courts rendered a decision affirming the judgment rendered by him on the 5th day of
February in the same case. In the same decision he denied defendant's motion for a new trial.
The witnesses for the prosecution during the trial of the defendants on the charge made in the
first information, viz, that of adultery, were Jose Perez, the husband of Juana Benedicto de
Perez, three of his children, and his cochero. The husband testified that Juana, after having
lived with him for more than twenty years, and having borne him more than five children,
expressed the desire to separate from him on account of the physical abuse and ill treatment
which she had received and was receiving at his hands. He testified further that he himself
desired to terminate his marital relations with her and that he wanted a divorce; and, as a
preliminary step to that end, we obtained her arrest at the hands of the police, who, at his
request, conducted her in a patrol wagon publicly through the streets of the city of Manila to
an asylum for the insane, where she was detained and imprisoned against her will. He
declared further that the reason why he thus humiliated and disgraced her and deprived her of
her liberty was his ardent desire to save her soul; that, in ordering her arrest and reclusion, he
was acting under the advice and counsel of various lawyers and doctors. He further testified
that, after her arrest, she many times implored him to give her back her liberty and permit her
to return to her family; and that, during one of such supplications, she admitted to him that the
defendant Samaniego was her friend, but, at the same time, denied that he had ever taken
advantage of that friendship in any way whatever.
In attempting to prove the adultery alleged in the information, the prosecution presented as
witnesses the persons above mentioned, viz Caridad Perez, daughter of the defendant Juana;
Rafael Perez, a student of medicine, 18 years of age, son of the defendant Juana; Concepcion
Perez, 12 years of age, daughter of the defendant Juana; together with the cochero of the
family, all of whom lived with the accused, Juana, and her husband at No. 257 Calle
Nozaleda, Manila.
According to the testimony of these witnesses, the kitchen and the toilet of the house, no,. 257
Nozalada, are situated on the ground floor. Here slept the cochero in a bed called by the
family a bench. This was the only bed in the lower part of the house which could possibly be
used for any purpose.lawphil.net
On the night if the 6th of November, 1907, the accused, Juana Benedicto de Perez,
accompanied by her daughters, attended a dance given by a friend. The other accused,
Samaniego, was also present. Juana and her daughters returned home late at night. There were
then present in the house the accused, Juana Benedicto de Perez; her three daughters, Caridad,
Rosario, and Conchita, and a friend of Conchita; her son Rafael; a younger son, Manolo; and
the cochero. When the mother and the daughters who and attended the dance with her were
preparing for bed, Conchita discovered that there was a stranger in the lower part of the house
and by her cries brought the household to the spot. She declares in her testimony that when
she first saw the stranger he was near the cochero's bed and while she was watching the
movements of the stranger, her mother went below and appeared to be talking with him; that
not for a moment did she lose sight of her mother during all the occurrence.
The cochero testified that the stranger was Samaniego and that he came first to
the cochero's bed and talked with him a while, but afterwards the cochero went to asleep, and
later, on hearing the cries of Conchita, he saw Samaniego trying to conceal himself in the
kitchen and also observed that the caused, Juana Benedicto de Perez, was going up and down
the stairs.
The married daughter, Caridad, who, it appears, was not at the dance, testified that, when
Conchita informed the family that a stranger was in the lower part of the house, she awoke her
brother Rafael, who accompanied her below, where they found the defendant Samaniego,
dressed only in his drawers; that she gave him a blow in the face and ordered him immediately
to quit the house; that he asked her pardon and requested permission to put on his clothes; that
permission to do so was refused and she and her brother ejected him from the house by force
and later the cochero handed him his clothes over the wall.
Caridad also testified that Samaniego was once at the house and talked with her mother
though the window from the street, and on that occasion her mother delivered to him a pawn
ticket; that once when she and her mother were in a carromata on the streets the defendant
approached them and spoke to her mother. The testimony of Rafael shows that one morning,
as he was returning from the hospital in Quiapo, he saw the defendant Samaniego on foot near
the carromata of his mother in the Botanical Garden talking to her.
The acts complained of lack many of the elements essential to bring them within the purview
of the article of the Penal Code invoked by the prosecution. Every act that was in anywise
public fails entirely of those qualities which offend modesty and good morals by "grievous
scandal or enormity." The occurrence at the residence on the night of the 6th of November did
not have that publicity which is required by the article of the Penal Code referred to (U. S. vs.
Catajay, 6 Phil. Rep., 398; supreme court of Spain, April 13, 1885, December 14, 1903, and
January 27, 1908; Viada, vol. 3, p. 130.)
The evidence introduced on the reopening adds nothing to the case already made by the
prosecution. The case was reopened for a particular purpose and the evidence to be
introduced, if any, was restricted to a particular condition, viz, the "publicity or non-publicity
of the acts charged in the complaint." On the reopening, evidence was presented by the
prosecution in relation to the alleged occurrence between the defendants in Plaza Palacio.
Concerning this incident testimony had already been given on the trial by the witness Rafael
Perez. Testimony was also given on the reopening by the same witness as to an occurrence
between the defendants one morning in the Botanical Garden. In relation to this same event he
had already given this testimony on the trial. His evidence as to these two events given on the
reopening of the case is wholly inconsistent with, if not absolutely contradictory of, his
testimony in relation to the same events given on the trial. Such testimony can have no weight.
The other testimony given on the reopening by this witness and the testimony of the witness
Amadeo Pacheco can have no bearing or weight in the decision of this case because such
testimony relates to the acts and relations between the defendants which are not "charged in
the complaint" and concerning which no evidence whatever had been offered on the trial.
In the judgment of this court the evidence fails to show the defendants guilty of the crime
charged.
The judgments of conviction of the trial court is, therefore, reversed, the defendants acquitted
and their discharge from custody ordered.

Luisa Avesilla testified that the accused, Juana Benedicto de Perez, pais the board of
Samaniego for three months in a restaurant where she was cashier, and that on one occasion
Juana ate with Samaniego in the restaurant. On that occasion she was accompanied by her
grandson.

The cochero testified that he frequently had as passengers in the carromata the two
defendants; that on one occasion he had waited for them while they went to a house in Calle
Cervantes, and on another occasion they had gone into a house on Calle Malacaang, the
witness supposing that the house was unoccupied because the accused, Juana, had told him
that she was looking for a house to rent; that the witness at no time observed anything
improper in the conduct or deportment of the two defendants. There is no proof whatever that
these were places of bad repute or that any of them were unoccupied.

Upon the proofs above stated, which are all of the proofs adduced in the trial on the charge of
adultery and are the same proofs upon which the defendants were acquitted of that charge, the
prosecuting attorney recommended that the defendants be convicted of the crime defined in
article 441 of the Penal Code, of which they stood charged, and the court thereupon convicted
them thereof.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
J. J. KOTTINGER, defendant-appellant.
The question to be here decided is whether or not pictures portraying the inhabitants of the
country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live,
are absence or indecent. Surprising as it may seem, the question is one of first impression not
alone in the Philippine Islands, but in the United States, Great Britain, and elsewhere. This
will explain why a case which otherwise would be heard and voted in Division has been
submitted to the court in banc for decision.
On November 24, 1922, detective Juan Tolentino raided the premises known as Camera
Supply Co. at 110 Escolta, Manila. He found and confiscated the post-cards which
subsequently were used as evidence against J. J. Kottinger, the manager of the company.
Out of these facts arose the criminal prosecution of J. J. Kottinger in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The information filed in court charged him with having kept for sale in the
store of the Camera Supply Co., obscene and indecedent pictures, in violation of section 12 of
Act No. 277. To this information, the defendant interposed a demurrer based upon the ground
that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an offense and were not contrary to law; but
trial court overruled the demurrer and the defendant duly excepted thereto. Following the
presentation of evidence by the Government and the defense, judgment was rendered finding
the defendant guilty of the offense charged and sentencing him to pay a fine of P50 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs.
The five errors assigned by defendant-appellant in this court divide themselves into two
general issues. The first point sustained by counsel for the appellant is in nature a technical
objection, growing out of the defendant's demurrer. The second point, in reality the decesive
issue, is as suggested in the beginning of the decision. We will take upon the assignments of
errors as thus classified in order.
Act No. 277 is the Philippine Libel Law. But included therein is a section, No. 12, making
obscene or indecent publications misdemeanors. Said section 12 which, it is contended by the
Government, has here been violated, and which, appellant argues, does not apply to the
information and the facts, reads as follow:
Any person who writes, composes, stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, or keeps for
sale, distributes, or exhibits any obscene or indecent writing, paper, book, or other
matter, or who designs, copies, draws, engraves, paints, or otherwise prepares any
obscene picture or print, or who moulds, cuts, casts, or otherwise makes any obscene
or indecent figure, or who writes, composes, or prints any notice or advertisement of
any such writing, paper, book, print, or figure shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand dollars or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or both.
Counsel has gone to the trouble to make a careful analysis of section 12 of the Libel Law
which is intended to bear out his thesis, first, that section 12 does not prohibit the taking,
selling, and publishing of alleged obscene and indecent pictures and prints, and second, that
the information in this case charges no offense prohibited by section 12. Recall, however, that
the law provides punishment, among other things, for any person who keeps for sale or
exhibits any absence or indecent writing, paper, book, or other matter, and that the
information charges the defendant, among other things, with having wilfully and feloniously
kept for sale, distribution, or exhibition, obscene and indecent pictures.
The phrase in the law "or other matter", was apparently added as a sort of "catch-all." While
limited to that which is of the same kind as its antecedent, it is intended to cover kindred
subjects. The rule of ejusdem generis invoked by counsel is by no means a rule of universal
application and should be made to carry out, not to defeat, the legislative intent. Even if the
phrase "or other matter" be cobstrued to mean "or other matter of like kind," pictures and
postcards are not so far unrelated to writings, papers, and books, as not to be covered by the
general words (Commonwealth vs. Dejardin [1878], 126 Mass., 46; 30 Am. Rep., 652; Brown
vs. Corbin [1889], 40 Minn., 508).
The line of argumentation is more refined that practical. Once conceded that section 12 of Act
No. 277 does not cover the present case, there yet remain for application article 571, No. 2, of
the penal code, and section 730 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. The section
of the Revised Ordinances cited is most specific when it provides in part that no person shall
"exhibit, circulate, distribute, sell, offer or expose for sale, or give or deliver to another, or
cause the same to be done, any lewd, indecent, or absence book, picture, pamphlet, card, print,
paper, writing, mould, cast, figure, or any other thing."
While admittedly the information is lacking in precision and while the content of section 12 of
the Libel Law is not as inclusive as it might be, we yet conclude that the information is not
fatally defective, and that said section 12 covers the alleged facts.
We come now to decide the main issue. We repeat that our own researches have confirmed
the statement of counsel that no one parrallel case be found. We must perforce reason from
the general to the specific and from universal principle to actual fact.
The pictures which it is argued offend against the law on account of being obscene and
indecent, disclose six different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines.
Exhibit A carries the legend "Philippines, Bontoc Woman." Exhibit A-1 is a picture of five
young boys and carries the legend "Greetings from the Philippines." Exhibit A-2 has the
legend "Ifugao Belle, Philippines. Greetings from the Philippines." Exhibit A-3 has the legend
"Igorot Girl, Rice Field Costume." Exhibit A-4 has the legend "Kalinga Girls, Philippines.
Exhibit A-5 has the legend "Moros Philippines."
The prosecution produced no evidence proving the postcards obscene and indecent because it
thought the post-cards themselves the best evidence of that fact. The fiscal admitted in open
court "that those pictures represented the natives (non-Christians) in their native dress." The
defendant, on the other hand, attempted to show that the pictures as true to life. Dr. H. Otley
Beyer, Professor in the University of the Philippines, corroborated by other witnesses,
testified from his studies in various parts of the Islands, such as the Mountain Province, Abra,
Palawan, and Mindanao and Sulu, that none of the pictures represented poses which he had
not observed on various occasions, and that the costumes worn by the people in the pictures
are the true costumes regularly worn by them. Are such pictures obscene or indecent?
The word "obscene" ands the term "obscenity" may be defined as meaning something
offensive to chastify, decency, or delicacy. "Indeceny" is an act against behavior and a just
delicacy. The test ordinarily followed by the courts in determining whether a particular
publication or other thing is obscene within the meaning of the statutes, is whether the
tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged
as being obscene may fall. Another test of obscenity is that which shocks the ordinary and
common sense of men as an indecency, (29 Cyc., 1315; 8 R. C. L., 312.)
The Philippine statute does not attempt to define obscene or indecent pictures, writings,
papers, or books. But the words "obscene or indecent" are themselves descriptive. They are
words in common used and every person of average intelligence understand their meaning.
Indeed, beyond the evidence furnished by the pictures themselves, there is but little scope for
proof bearing on the issue of obscenity or indecency. Whether a picture is obscene or indecent
must depend upon the circumstances of the case. (People vs. Muller [1884], 96 N. Y., 408; 48
Am. Rep., 635.)
Considerable light can be thrown on the subject by turning to the Federal Laws prohibiting the
use of the mails for obscene matter and prohibiting the importation into the Philippine Islands
of articles, etc., of obscene or indecent character. (U. S. Rev. Stat., art. 3893; 36 stat. at L.,
135; 7 Fed. Stat. Ann., 1194, sec. 3[b].)
"Obscene," as used in the Federal Statutes making it a criminal offense to place in the mails
any obscene, lewd, or lascivious publication, according to the united States Supreme Court
and lesser Federal courts, signifies that form of immorality which has relation to sexual
impurity, and has the same meaning as is given at common law in prosecutions for obscene
libel. (Swearingen vs. U. S. [1896], 161 U. S., 446; U. S. vs. Males [1892], 51 Fed., 41; 6
Words and Phrases, 4888, 4889.)
The case of United States vs. Harmon ([189], 45 Fed., 414), grew out of an indictment for
despositing an obscene publication in a United States post-office in violator of the Postal Law.
Judge Philips said:
The statute does not undertake to define the meaning of the terms "obscene," etc., further than
may be implied by the succeeding phrase, "or other publication of an indecent character." On
the well-organized canon of construction these words are presumed to have been employed by
the law-maker in their ordinary acceptation and use.
As they cannot be said to have acquired any technical significance as applied to
some particular matter, calling, or profession, but are terms of popular use, the court
might perhaps with propriety leave their import to the presumed intelligence of the
jury. A standard dictionary says that "obscene" mean "offensive to chastity and
decency; expressing or presenting to the mind or view something which delicacy,
purity, and decency forbid to be exposed." This mere dictionary definition may be
extended or amplified by the courts in actual practice, preserving, however, its
essential though, and having always due regard to the popular and proper sense in
which the legislature employed the term. Chief Justice Cockburn, in Rex vs. Hicklin
(L. R. 3 Q. B., 360), said: "The test of obscenity is this: Where the tendency of the
matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall;"
and where "it who suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to persons
of more advanced years, thoughts of the most impure and libidinous character." So,
also, it has been held that a book is obscene which is offensive to decency or
chastity, which is immodest, which is indelicate, impure, causing lewd thoughts of
an immoral tendency." U. S. vs. Bennet, 16 Blatchf., 338. Judge Thayer, in U. S. vs.
Clarke, 38 Fed. Rep., 732, observed:
"The word "obscene" ordinarily means something which is offensive to
chastity; something that is foul or filthy, and for that reason is offensive to
pure-minded persons. That is the meaning of the word in the concrete; but
when used, as in the statute, to describe the character of a book, pamphlet,
or paper, it means containing immodest and indecent matter, the reading
whereof would have a tendency to deprave and corrupt the minds of those
into whose hands the publication might fall whose minds are open to such
immoral influences."
Laws of this character are made for society in the aggregate, and not in particular.
So, while there may be individuals and societies of men and women of peculiar
motions are idiosyncrasies, whose moral sense would neither be depraved nor
offended by the publication now under consideration, yet the exceptional sensibility,
or want of sensibility, of such cannot be allowed as a standard by which its obscenity
or indecency is to be tested. Rather is the test, what is the judgment of the aggregate
sense of the community reached by it? What is its probable, reasonable effect on the
sense of decency, purity, and chastity of society, extending to the family, made up of
men and women, young boys and girls, the family, which is the common nursery
of mankind, the foundation rock upon which the state reposes?
. . . To the pure all things are pure, is too poetical for the actualities of practical life.
There is in the popular conception and heart such a thing as modesty. It was born in
the Garden of Eden. After Adam and Eve ate of the fruit of the tree of knowledge
they passed from the condition of perfectibility which some people nowadays aspire
to, and, their eyes being opened, they discerned that there was both good and evil;
"and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made
themselves aprons." From that day to this civilized man has carried with him the
sense of shame, the feeling that there were some things on which the eye the
mind should not look; and where men and women become so depraved by the
use, or so insensate from perverted education, that they will not evil their eyes, nor
hold their tongues, the government should perform the office for them in protection
of the social compact and the body politic.
As above intimated, the Federal statue prohibits the importation or shipment into the
Philippine Islands of the following: "Articles, books, pamphlets, printed matter, manuscripts,
typewritten matter, paintings, illustrations, figures or objects of obscene or indecent character
or subversive of public order." There are, however, in the record, copies of reputable
magazines which circulate freely thruout the United States and other countries, and which are
admitted into Philippines without question, containing illustrations identical in nature to those
forming the basis of the prosecution at bar. Publications of the Philippine Government have
also been offered in evidence such as Barton's "Ifugao Law," the "Philippine Journal of
Science" for October, 1906, and the Reports of the Philippine Commission for 1903, 1912,
and 1913, in which are found illustrations either exactly the same or nearly akin to those
which are now impugned.
It appears therefore that a national standard has been set up by the Congress of the United
States. Tested by that standard, it would be extremely doubtful if the pictures here challenged
would be held obscene or indecent by any state of Federal court. It would be particularly
unwise to sanction a different type of censorship in the Philippines that in the United States, or
for that matter in the rest of the world.
The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without attempted
presentation of persons in unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine
community, the moral sense of all the people in the Philippines, would not be shocked by
photographs of this type. We are convicted that the post-card pictures in this case cannot be
characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul, or filthy.
We readily understand the laudable motives which moved the Government to initiate this
prosecution. We fully appreciate the sentiments of colleagues who take a different view of the
case. We would be the last to offend the sensibilities of the Filipino people and the sanction
anything which would hold them up to ridicule in the eyes of mankind. But we emphasize that
we are not deciding a question in political theory or in social ethics. We are dealing with a
legal question predicated on a legal fact, and on this question and fact, we reach the
conclusion that there has not been proved a violation of section 12 of the Libel Law. When
other cases predicated on other states of facts are brought to our attention, we will decide them
as they arise.
We seem to recall the statement of counsel that the proprietor of the photographic concern
whom he represents would on his own initiative place suitable and explicit inscriptions on the
pictures so that no one may be misled as to them. Indeed, he might even go further and out of
consideration for the natural sensibilities of his customers, withdraw from sale certain pictures
which can be pointed out to him.
We hold that pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they
appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live, are not obscene or indecent within
the meaning of the Libel Law. Disagreeing therefore with the appellant on his technical
argument but agreeing with him on his main contention, it becomes our duty to order the
dismissal of the information. 1awph!l.net
Judgment is reversed, the information is dismissed, and the defendant-appellant is acquitted
with all costs de oficio. So ordered.
GAUDENCIO E. FERNANDO and RUDY ESTORNINOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision 1 dated March 21, 2003 and the
Resolution dated September 2, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25796,
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), Branch 21, in
Criminal Case No. 99-176582.
The RTC convicted Gaudencio E. Fernando and Rudy Estorninos for violation of Article
2012 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 960 and 969, and
sentenced each to imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision
correccional, and to pay the fine of P6,000 and cost of suit.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows.
Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers of the Philippine
National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in the National Capital Region
(PNP-CIDG NCR) conducted police surveillance on the store bearing the name of Gaudencio
E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair). On May 5, 1999, Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, issued Search Warrant No. 99-1216 for violation of Article
201 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certain Warren
Tingchuy. The warrant ordered the search of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair at 564
Quezon Blvd., corner Zigay Street, Quiapo, Manila, and the seizure of the following items:
a. Copies of New Rave Magazines with nude obscene pictures;
b. Copies of IOU Penthouse Magazine with nude obscene pictures;
c. Copies of Hustler International Magazine with nude obscene pictures; and
d. Copies of VHS tapes containing pornographic shows. 3
On the same day, police officers of the PNP-CIDG NCR served the warrant on Rudy
Estorninos, who, according to the prosecution, introduced himself as the store attendant of
Music Fair. The police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and
ten (10) different magazines, which they deemed pornographic.
On September 13, 1999, petitioners with Warren Tingchuy, were charged in an Information
which reads as follows:
That on or about May 5, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, publicly and jointly exhibit
indecent or immoral acts, scenes or shows at Music Fair, located at 564 Quezon
Blvd., corner Zigay [S]t., Quiapo[,] this City[,] by then and there selling and
exhibiting obscene copies of x-rated VHS Tapes, lewd films depicting men and
women having sexual intercourse[,] lewd photographs of nude men and women in
 explicating (sic) positions which acts serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market
for lust or pornography to public view.
Contrary to law.4
When arraigned, petitioners and Tingchuy pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution offered the confiscated materials in evidence and presented the following
witnesses: Police Inspector Rodolfo L. Tababan, SPO4 Rolando Buenaventura and Barangay
Chairperson Socorro Lipana, who were all present during the raid. After the prosecution
presented its evidence, the counsel for the accused moved for leave of court to file a demurrer
to evidence, which the court granted. On October 5, 2000, the RTC however denied the
demurrer to evidence and scheduled the reception of evidence for the accused. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
Thereafter, the accused waived their right to present evidence and instead submitted the case
for decision.5
The RTC acquitted Tingchuy for lack of evidence to prove his guilt, but convicted herein
petitioners as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused GAUDENCIO
FERNANDO and RUDY ESTORNINOS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged and are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR
(4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional as maximum, to pay fine of P6,000.00 each and to pay the cost.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused WARREN TINGCHUY
beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
The VHS tapes and the nine (9) magazines utilized as evidence in this case are
hereby confiscated in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. But the appellate courtlatter affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court, as follows,
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error on the part of the trial court, the
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.7
Hence the instant petition assigning the following errors:
I. Respondent court erred in convicting petitioner Fernando even if he was not
present at the time of the raid
II. Respondent erred in convicting petitioner Estorninos who was not doing anything
illegal at the time of the raid.8
Simply, the issue in this case is whether the appellate court erred in affirming the petitioners
conviction.
Petitioners contend that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of the search, they
were selling pornographic materials. Fernando contends that since he was not charged as the
owner of an establishment selling obscene materials, the prosecution must prove that he was
present during the raid and that he was selling the said materials. Moreover, he contends that
the appellate courts reason for convicting him, on a presumption of continuing ownership
shown by an expired mayors permit, has no sufficient basis since the prosecution failed to
prove his ownership of the establishment. Estorninos, on the other hand, insists that he was
not an attendant in Music Fair, nor did he introduce himself so.9
The Solicitor General counters that owners of establishments selling obscene publications are
expressly held liable under Article 201, and petitioner Fernandos ownership was sufficiently
proven. As the owner, according to the Solicitor General, Fernando was naturally a seller of
the prohibited materials and liable under the Information. The Solicitor General also maintains
that Estorninos was identified by Barangay Chairperson Socorro Lipana as the store attendant,
thus he was likewise liable.10
At the outset, we note that the trial court gave petitionersthem the opportunity to adduce
present their evidence to disprove refute the prosecutions evidence. 11 . Instead, they waived
their right to present evidence and opted to submitted the case for decision.a1 12 The trial court
therefore resolved the case on the basis of prosecutions evidence against the petitioners.
As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in
pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and
indecent materials must justify the regulation or limitation.
One such regulation is Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. To be held liable, the
prosecution must prove that (a) the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene;
and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such materials. 13 Necessarily, that
the confiscated materials are obscene must be proved.
Almost a century has passed since the Court first attempted to define obscenity in People v.
Kottinger.14 There the Court defined obscenity as something which is offensive to chastity,
decency or delicacy. The test to determine the existence of obscenity is, whether the tendency
of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall.15 Another test according to Kottinger is "that which shocks the ordinary and
common sense of men as an indecency."16 But, Kottinger hastened to say that whether a
picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that
ultimately, the question is to be decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the
community reached by it.17
Thereafter, the Court in People v. Go Pin18 and People v. Padan y Alova, et al.,19 involving a
prosecution under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, laid the tests which did little to
clearly draw the fine lines of obscenity.
In People v. Go Pin, the Court said:
If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits and art galleries
for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people interested in art, there
would be no offense committed. However, the pictures here in question were used
not exactly for arts sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other words, the
supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so that the
cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to
have been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it
would not be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid
entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons
interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and
improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid
curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love [of] excitement, including the youth who
because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves from
the ill and perverting effects of these pictures.20
People v. Padan y Alova, et al. in a way reaffirmed the standards set in Go Pin but with its
own test of "redeeming feature." The Court therein said that:
[A]n actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have
no redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but
clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals,
inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a
corrupting influence specially on the youth of the land. 21
Notably, the Court in the later case of Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak,22 involving motion
pictures, still applied the "contemporary community standards" of Kottinger but departed from
the rulings of Kottinger, Go Pin and Padan y Alova in that the Court measures obscenity in
terms of the "dominant theme" of the material taken as a "whole" rather than in isolated
passages.
Later, in Pita v. Court of Appeals, concerning alleged pornographic publications, the Court
recognized that Kottinger failed to afford a conclusive definition of obscenity, and that
both Go Pin and Padan y Alova raised more questions than answers such as, whether the
absence or presence of artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art
exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, determine what art is; or
that if they find inspiration in the exhibitions, whether such exhibitions cease to be
obscene.23 Go Pin and Padan y Alova gave too much latitude for judicial arbitrament, which
has permitted ad lib of ideas and "two-cents worths" among judges as to what is obscene or
what is art.24
The Court in Pita also emphasized the difficulty of the question and pointed out how hazy
jurisprudence is on obscenity and how jurisprudence actually failed to settle questions on the
matter. Significantly, the dynamism of human civilization does not help at all. It is evident
that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the
rapid advance of civilization.25 It seems futile at this point to formulate a perfect definition of
obscenity that shall apply in all cases.
There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v.
California which established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person,
applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 26 But, it would be a serious
misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in
determining what is "patently offensive."27 No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale
or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive
"hard core" sexual conduct.28 Examples included (a) patently offensive representations or
descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; and (b) patently
offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd
exhibition of the genitals.29 What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial
determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judges sound
discretion.
In this case, the trial court found the confiscated materials obscene and the Court of Appeals
affirmed such findings. The trial court in ruling that the confiscated materials are obscene,
reasoned as follows:
Are the magazines and VHS tapes confiscated by the raiding team obscene or
offensive to morals? . . .
Pictures of men and women in the nude doing the sexual act appearing in the nine
(9) confiscated magazines namely Dalaga, Penthouse, Swank, Erotic, Rave,
Playhouse, Gallery and two (2) issues of QUI are offensive to morals and are made
and shown not for the sake of art but rather for commercial purposes, that is gain and
profit as the exclusive consideration in their exhibition. The pictures in the magazine
exhibited indecent and immoral scenes and actsThe exhibition of the sexual act in
their magazines is but a clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency and an offense to
public morals, inspiringlust and lewdness, exerting a corrupting influence
especially on the youth. (Citations omitted)
The VHS tapes also [exhibit] nude men and women doing the sexual intercourse.
The tape entitled "Kahit sa Pangarap Lang" with Myra Manibog as the actress shows
the naked body of the actress. The tape exhibited indecent and immoral scenes and
acts. Her dancing movements excited the sexual instinct of her male audience. The
motive may be innocent, but the performance was revolting and shocking to good
minds...
In one (1) case the Supreme Court ruled:
Since the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees
were usually not artists or persons interested in art to satisfy and inspire
their artistic tastes but persons who are desirous of satisfying their morbid
curiosity, taste and lust and for [love] of excitement, including the youth
who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield
 themselves from the ill and perverting effects of the pictures, the display of
such pictures for commercial purposes is a violation of Art. 201. If those
pictures were shown in art exhibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to
be viewed and appreciated by people interested in art, there would be no
offense committed (People vs. Go Pin, 97 Phil 418).
[B]ut this is not so in this case.30
Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the trial court are accorded great
respect, even by this Court, unless such findings are patently unsupported by the evidence on
record or the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts. 31 In this case, petitioners
neither presented contrary evidence nor questioned the trial courts findings. There is also no
showing that the trial court, in finding the materials obscene, was arbitrary.
Did petitioners participate in the distribution and exhibition of obscene materials?
We emphasize that mere possession of obscene materials, without intention to sell, exhibit, or
give them away, is not punishable under Article 201, considering the purpose of the law is to
prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The offense in any of the forms
under Article 201 is committed only when there is publicity. 32 The law does not require that a
person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting obscene materials to be liable,
for as long as the said materials are offered for sale, displayed or exhibited to the public. In the
present case, we find that petitioners are engaged in selling and exhibiting obscene materials.
Notably, the subject premises of the search warrant was the Gaudencio E. Fernando Music
Fair, named after petitioner Fernando.33 The mayors permit was under his name. Even his
bail bond shows that Hhe lives in the same place.34Moreover, the mayors permit dated
August 8, 1996, shows that he is the owner/operator of the store. 35 While the mayors permit
had already expired, it does not negate the fact that Fernando owned and operated the
establishment. It would be absurd to make his failure to renew his business permit and illegal
operation a shield from prosecution of an unlawful act. Furthermore, when he preferred not to
present contrary evidence, the things which he possessed were presumptively his. 36
Petitioner Estorninos is likewise liable as the store attendant actively engaged in selling and
exhibiting the obscene materials. Prosecution witness Police Inspector Tababan, who led the
PNP-CIDG NCR that conducted the search, identified him as the store attendant upon whom
the search warrant was served.37 Tababan had no motive for testifying falsely against
Estorninos and we uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties.
Lastly, this Court accords great respect to and treats with finality the findings of the trial court
on the matter of credibility of witnesses, absent any palpable error or arbitrariness in their
findings.38 In our view, no reversible error was committed by the appellate court as well as the
trial court in finding the herein petitioners guilty as charged.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 21, 2003 and the Resolution dated September 2,
2003, of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 99-176582 are hereby AFFIRMED.
FREDRIK FELIX P. NOGALES, GIANCARLO P. NOGALES, ROGELIO P.
NOGALES, MELINDA P. NOGALES, PRISCILA B. CABRERA, Phil-Pacific
Outsourcing Services CorpORATION and 3 x 8 Internet, represented by its proprietor
Michael Christopher A. Nogales, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Presiding Judge TITA BUGHAO ALISUAG,
Branch 1, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Respondents.
At bench is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners
Fredrik Felix P. Nogales, Giancarlo P. Nogales, Rogelio P. Nogales, Melinda P. Nogales,
Priscila B. Cabrera, Phil-Pacific Outsourcing Services Corp. and 3 x 8 Internet, represented by
its proprietor Michael Christopher A. Nogales (petitioners) against respondents People of the
Philippines and Presiding Judge Tita Bughao Alisuag (Judge Alisuag) of Branch 1, Regional
Trial Court, Manila (RTC).
The petition challenges the August 19, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-
G.R. SP No. 105968, which affirmed with modification the August 6, 2008 Order 2 of Judge
Alisuag of the RTC; and its January 25, 2010 Resolution, 3which denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
THE FACTS:
On July 30, 2007, Special Investigator Garry Meez (SI Meez) of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) applied for a search warrant before the RTC to authorize him and his
fellow NBI agents or any peace officer to search the premises of petitioner Phil-Pacific
Outsourcing Services Corporation (Phil-Pacific) and to seize/confiscate and take into custody
the items/articles/objects enumerated in his application. The sworn application, docketed as
Search Warrant Proceedings No. 07-11685,4 partially reads:
SWORN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT
That he has been informed, verily believes and personally verified that JUN NICOLAS,
LOREN NUESTRA, FREDRICK FELIX P. NOGALES, MELINDA P. NOGALES,
PRISCILA B. CABRERA and/or occupants PHIL-PACIFIC OUTSOURCING
SERVICES CORP. located at Mezzanine Flr., Glorietta De Manila Building, 776 San
Sebastian St., University Belt, Manila have in their possession/control and are concealed in
the above-mentioned premises various material[s] used in the creation and selling of
pornographic internet website, to wit:
1. Computer Sets
2. Television Sets
3. Internet Servers
4. Fax Machines
5. Pornographic Films and other Pornographic Materials
6. Web Cameras
7. Telephone Sets
8. Photocopying Machines
9. List of clients and
10. Other tools and materials used or intended to be used in the commission of the crime.
The application for Search Warrant No. 07-11685 of SI Meez was acted upon by Judge
Alisuag. On August 3, 2007, a hearing was conducted wherein Judge Alisuag personally
examined SI Meez and two other witnesses in the form of searching questions and their
answers thereto were duly recorded by the court. The witnesses affidavits were also
submitted and marked as supporting evidence to the application for the issuance of a search
warrant. On the same date of the hearing, the application was granted and the corresponding
Search Warrant,5 issued. The said search warrant is quoted as follows:
SEARCH WARRANT
TO: ANY PEACE OFFICER
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath applicant SI III
GARY I. MEEZ of the Special Task Force Division, National Bureau of Investigation, and
his witnesses, ISABEL CORTEZ y ANDRADE of 167 5th Avenue, Caloocan City and
MARK ANTHONY C. SEBASTIAN of No. 32 Arlegui Street, San Miguel Quiapo, Manila
that there are good reasons to believe that VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 201 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED IN RELATION TO R.A. 8792 (ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE ACT) has been committed and that JUN NICOLAS, LOREN NUESTRA,
FREDERICK (sic) FELIX P. NOGALES, GIAN CARLO P. NOGALES, ROGELIO P.
NOGALES, MELINDA P. NOGALES, PRISCILA B. CABRERA and/or OCCUPANTS OF
PHIL. PACIFIC OUTSOURCING SERVICES CORPORATION located at Mezzanine Floor,
Glorietta De Manila Building, 776 San Sebastian St., University Belt, Manila, have in their
possession and control of the following:
1. Computer Sets
2. Television Sets
3. Internet Servers
4. Fax Machines
5. Pornographic Films and other Pornographic Materials
6. Web Cameras
7. Telephone Sets
8. Photocopying Machines
9. List of clients and
10. Other tools and materials used or intended to be used in the commission of the crime.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search any time of the DAY of the
premises mentioned above which is Mezzanine Floor, Glorietta De Manila Building, 776 San
Sebastian St., University Belt, Manila and take possession of the following:
1. Computer Sets
2. Television Sets
3. Internet Servers
4. Fax Machines
5. Pornographic Films and other Pornographic Materials
6. Web Cameras
7. Telephone Sets
8. Photocopying Machines
9. List of clients and
10. Other tools and materials used or intended to be used in the commission of the crime.
and bring to this Court the said properties and persons to be dealt with as the law may direct.
You are further directed to submit a return within ten (10) days from today.
On August 8, 2007, SI Meez submitted a Return of Search Warrant 6 to the RTC manifesting
that in the morning of August 7, 2007, the operatives of the Special Task Force of the NBI
implemented the said search warrant in an orderly and peaceful manner in the presence of the
occupants of the described premises and that the seized items were properly inventoried in the
Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized. The items seized were the following:
1. Ten (10) units of Central Processing Units (CPUs);
2. Ten (10) units of monitors;
3. Ten (10) units of keyboard;
4. Ten (10) units of mouse; and
5. Ten (10) units of AVRs.
The RTC then issued an order granting the prayer of SI Meez to keep the seized items in the
NBI evidence room and under his custody with the undertaking to make said confiscated
items available whenever the court would require them.
Aggrieved by the issuance of the said order, the named persons in the search warrant filed a
Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Return Seized Properties. 7 In the said motion,
petitioners cited the following grounds:
A. Respondents do not have programmers making, designing, maintaining, editing,
storing, circulating, distributing, or selling said websites or the contents thereof;
B. Respondents do not have any website servers;
C. Respondents do not own the websites imputed to them, which are actually located
outside the Philippines, in foreign countries, and are owned by foreign companies in
those countries;
D. The testimony of the witnesses presented by the NBI are contradicted by the facts
of the case as established by documentary evidence;
E. The NBI withheld verifiable information from the Honorable Court and took
advantage of the limited knowledge of courts in general in order to obtain the search
warrant for their personal intentions;
F. The NBI raided the wrong establishment; and
G. The element of publicity is absent.
On December 26, 2007, the RTC denied the motion 8 stating, among others, that:
1.) It cannot be said that publicity is not present. The Phil-Pacific Outsourcing
Services Corp., is actually persuading its clients, thru its agents (call center agents),
to log-on to the pornographic sites listed in its web page. In that manner, Phil-Pacific
 Outsourcing Services Corporation is advertising these pornographic web sites, and
such advertisement is a form of publicity.
2.) Even if some of the listed items intended to be seized were not recovered from
the place where the search was made, it does not mean that there was no really crime
being committed. As in fact, pornographic materials were found in some of the
computers which were seized.
3.) In the same way that the names listed in the Search Warrant were not arrested or
not in the premises subject of the search, it does not mean that there are no such
persons existing nor there is no crime being committed.
4.) As a rule, Search Warrant may be issued upon existence of probable cause.
"Probable cause for a search is defined as such fact and circumstances which would
lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be reached." Hence, in implementing a Search Warrant, what matters most
is the presence of the items ought to be seized in the place to be searched, even in the
absence of the authors of the crime committed.
5.) The Search Warrant was issued in accordance with Secs. 3 to 6, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Search Warrant may be quashed or invalidated if there is an
impropriety in its issuance or irregularity in its enforcement. Absent such
impropriety or irregularity, quashal is not warranted.
Undaunted, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said order on the following
grounds: (a) the trial court erred in holding that there was no impropriety or irregularity in the
issuance of the search warrant; (b) the trial court erred in holding that there was no irregularity
in its enforcement; and (c) the trial court erred in holding that publicity was present.
On February 19, 2008, petitioners requested the RTC to issue a subpoena duces tecum ad
testificandum to SI Meez and the witnesses Isabel Cortez and Mark Anthony Sebastian
directing them to appear, bring the records evidencing publicity of pornographic materials and
testify in the hearing set on March 7, 2008.
Meanwhile, in a resolution dated February 21, 2008, 9 the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor
recommended that the complaint for violation of Article 201 10 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) against petitioners be dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence and the same
was approved by the City Prosecutor. Hence, on May 6, 2008, petitioners filed a Supplemental
Motion to Release Seized Properties11 manifesting that the complaint against them was
dismissed, and that, for said reason, the State had no more use of the seized properties.
12
On August 6, 2008, the RTC issued the assailed second order, which denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners. The RTC, however, partially granted the prayer of
petitioners. Judge Alisuag wrote:
Be it noted that the proceedings held by this Court when it heard the Application for Search
Warrant by NBI Special Investigator Meez is very much different [from] the case resolved
by the Office of the City Prosecutor. The case before the Office of the City Prosecutor, while
the same [was] dismissed cannot be the ground to release the seized properties subject of the
Search Warrant issued by the Court. When the Court issued the Search Warrant, indeed, it
found probable cause in the issuance of the same, which is the only reason wherein Search
Warrant may be issued.
On the case heard by the Office of the City Prosecutor, the Resolution has its own ground and
reason to dismiss it.
xxx xxx xxx
That the subject of the Search Warrant which is now under the custody of the NBI [was] made
subject of the case and as well as the witnesses for that case which was resolved by the Office
of the City Prosecutor is of no moment.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is Denied.
The Motion to Release Seized Properties is partially granted.
Accordingly therefore, let the computer sets be hereby returned to the respondents. The CPU
and all the rest of the softwares containing obscene materials which were seized during the
implementation of the valid Search Warrant are hereby retained in the possession of the
National Bureau of Investigation thru applicant Special Investigator Garry J. Meez.
SO ORDERED.13
Not in conformity, petitioners sought relief with the CA via a special civil action for certiorari
alleging that Judge Alisuag committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when she partially granted the motion of petitioners for the release of the seized
properties such that only the monitor sets were released but the CPUs and the softwares were
retained under the custody of the NBI.
The CA affirmed with modification the assailed August 6, 2008 Order of the RTC. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, the assailed order issued by the
respondent Judge on August 6, 2008 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
CPUs and softwares which were ordered to be retained by the NBI through SI Meez shall be
released in favor of the petitioners herein with the condition that the hard disk be removed
from the CPUs and be destroyed. If the softwares are determined to be unlicensed or pirated
copies, they shall be destroyed in the manner allowed by law.
SO ORDERED.14 [Underscoring supplied]
The CA explained:
1.) It is undisputed that the seized computer units contained obscene materials or pornographic
files. The hard disk technically contains them but these files are susceptible to modification or
limitation of status; thus, they can be erased or permanently deleted from the storage disk. In
this peculiar case, the obscene materials or pornographic files are stored in such a way that
they can be erased or deleted by formatting the hard disk without the necessity of destroying
or burning the disk that contains them. By structure, the hard drive contains the hard disk and
the hard drive can be found in the CPU. These obscene materials or pornographic files are
only stored files of the CPU and do not permanently form part of the CPU which would call
for the destruction or much less retention of the same.
2.) Notwithstanding, with the advancement of technology, there are means developed to
retrieve files from a formatted hard disk, thus, the removal of the hard disk from the CPU is
the reliable manner to permanently remove the obscene or pornographic files. With regard to
the softwares confiscated and also ordered to be retained by the NBI, nothing in the evidence
presented by the respondents shows that these softwares are pornographic tools or program
customized just for creating obscene materials. There are softwares which may be used for
licit activities like photograph enhancing or video editing and there are thousands of softwares
that have legitimate uses. It would be different if the confiscated softwares are pirated
softwares contained in compact discs or the pre-installed softwares have no license or not
registered; then, the NBI may retain them. In the particular circumstances of this case, the
return of the CPUs and softwares would better serve the purposes of justice and expediency.
3.) The responsibilities of the magistrate do not end with the granting of the warrant but
extend to the custody of the articles seized. In exercising custody over these articles, the
property rights of the owner should be balanced with the social need to preserve evidence
which will be used in the prosecution of a case. In the instant case, the complaint had been
dismissed by the prosecutor for insufficiency of evidence. Thus, the court had been left with
the custody of highly depreciable merchandise. More importantly, these highly depreciable
articles would have been superfluous to be retained for the following reasons: (1) it was found
by the prosecutor that there was no sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioners violated
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 8792 (Electronic Commerce Act);
(2) the obscene materials or pornographic files can be deleted by formatting or removing the
hard disk from the CPUs without destroying the entire CPU; and (3) the petitioners did not
dispute that the files found in the seized items were obscene or pornographic but the said
devices are not obscene or illegal per se. Hence, where the purpose of presenting as evidence
the articles seized is no longer served, there is no justification for severely curtailing the rights
of a person to his property.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a resolution dated January
25, 2010.15
Undeterred, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari16 with this Court anchored on the
following:
GROUNDS:
6.1. The decision by the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the respondent trial
judge constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as
it violates the constitutional proscription against confiscation of property without due
process of law, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
6.2. Since the case involves pornography accessible in the internet, this is a case of first
impression and current importance.17 [Emphases ours]
ISSUE
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in ordering the
removal and destruction of the hard disks containing the pornographic and obscene materials.
THE COURTS RULING
Petitioners argue that there is no evidence showing that they were the source of pornographic
printouts presented by the NBI to the RTC or to the City Prosecutor of Manila in I.S. No.
07H-13530. Since the hard disks in their computers are not illegal per se unlike shabu, opium,
counterfeit money, or pornographic magazines, said merchandise are lawful as they are being
used in the ordinary course of business, the destruction of which would violate not only
procedural, but substantive due process. 18
The argument of petitioners is totally misplaced considering the undisputed fact that the
seized computer units contained obscene materials or pornographic files. Had it been
otherwise, then, petitioners argument would have been meritorious as there could be no basis
for destroying the hard disks of petitioners computer units.
While it may be true that the criminal case for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code was dismissed as there was no concrete and strong evidence pointing to them as the
direct source of the subject pornographic materials, it cannot be used as basis to recover the
confiscated hard disks. At the risk of being repetitious, it appears undisputed that the seized
computer units belonging to them contained obscene materials or pornographic files. Clearly,
petitioners had no legitimate expectation of protection of their supposed property rights.
The CA is correct in stating that the removal of the hard disk from the CPU is a reliable way
of permanently removing the obscene or pornographic files.1wphi1 Significantly,
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 969 is explicit. Thus:
Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited Articles. The disposition of the literature, films, prints,
engravings, sculptures, paintings, or other materials involved in the violation referred to in
Section 1 hereof shall be governed by the following rules:
a. Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the government to be
destroyed.
b. Where the criminal case against any violator of this decree results in an
acquittal, the obscene/immoral literature, films, prints, engravings, sculpture,
paintings or other materials and other articles involved in the violation referred to
in Section 1 hereof shall nevertheless be forfeited in favor of the government to
be destroyed, after forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Chief of Constabulary.
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Clearly, the provision directs the forfeiture of all materials involved in violation of the subject
law. The CA was lenient with petitioners in modifying the ruling of the RTC in that the CPUs
and softwares, which were initially ordered to be retained by the NBI, should be released in
their favor with only the hard disk removed from the CPUs and destroyed. If the softwares are
determined to be violative of Article 201 of the RPC, unlicensed or pirated, they should also
be forfeited and destroyed in the manner allowed by law. The law is clear. Only licensed
softwares that can be used for legitimate purposes should be returned to petitioners.

To stress, P.D. No. 969 mandates the forfeiture and destruction of pornographic materials
involved in the violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, even if the accused was
acquitted.1awp++i1

Taking into account all the circumstances of this case, the Court holds that the destruction of
the hard disks and the softwares used in any way in the violation of the subject law addresses
the purpose of minimizing if not totally eradicating pornography. This will serve as a lesson
for those engaged in any way in the proliferation of pornography or obscenity in this country.
The Court is not unmindful of the concerns of petitioners but their supposed property rights
must be balanced with the welfare of the public in general.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 19, 2009 Court of Appeals Decision is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that only the CPUs and those softwares determined
to be licensed and used for legitimate purposes shall be returned in favor of the petitioners.
The hard disk drives containing the pornographic materials and the softwares used in any
way in violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, unlicensed or pirated shall be
forfeited in favor of the Government and destroyed.