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A DISSERTATION
School of Philosophy
Doctor of Philosophy
By
Stanley F. Grove
Washington, D.C.
2008
UMI Number: 3340658
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Quantum Theory and Aquinas's Doctrine on Matter
widely misunderstood and largely alien to modern mathematical physics, despite the
latter's preoccupation with matter and the spatiotemporal. The present dissertation seeks
cal"), and modern (quantum) approaches to physics, in order to highlight their com-
then addressed: elementarity, virtual presence, the "dispositions of matter," entia vialia,
natural minima, atomism, the nature of local motion, the plenum and instantaneous ac-
tion at a distance - all with a view to their incorporation in a unified account of formed
introduced early in the dissertation, and show how the material and formal principles
expounded in the central chapters can render these problems intelligible. Thus I propose
that wave and particle aspects in the quantum realm are related substantially rather than
accidentally, and that characteristics of substantial (prime) matter and substantial form
are therefore being evidenced directly at this level - in the reversibility of the wave-
particle transition, in the spatial and temporal instantaneity of quantum events, and in
the probabilism encountered in such phenomena. I offer related hypotheses for Heisen-
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In memory ofKatherine
A. Aristotelian physics 13
F. The background 36
I. Complementarity or hiddenness? 45
iv
Chapter Three - Matter Considered Philosophically 63
A. Introductory 63
C. Plato's chora 71
E. Neoplatonic commentators 91
M. Conclusion 249
A. Introductory 250
F. (Non)locality 273
J. Conclusion 299
vi
Appendix 1. The Ultimate Boundary of Matter 301
Bibliography 312
vii
Acknowledgments
That in all things God may be glorified. May the Blessed Virgin
Mary, Seat of Wisdom, and St. Thomas Aquinas bless all who
read these pages.
viii
Chapter One
Introduction
There is something unsettling in the realization that the natural and technological
science which dominates our world and our worldview today - a science which points
reductively to "pure" physics as its foundation - is far from being a unified science,
precisely at the deepest levels which it contemplates. The discipline we have inherited
from Galileo and Newton, Maxwell and Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrodinger and a
host of collaborators over the past 400 years is, in fact, unified only by its empirical-
mathematical method (and in some instances hardly even by that). It has undergone
"paradigm shifts" of startling significance in the past, and today it is a house very much
divided against itself. One thinks especially of the relativity-quantum theory impasse,
This may not seem problematic to a generation raised in the awareness that
science proceeds, after all, through the clash of opposing theories and the battleground
historical march of science, the astonishing success of its theoretical and practical
manifestations, the deep insight it has gained for us into the fabric of the universe past
and present. Surely physical science "works." Let it continue on its present course, a
1
2
But such an attitude runs counter to the deepest instinct of scientists themselves.
The sheer number of books and articles that have been written on the interpretation of
quantum physics attests to this. Science proceeds in the conviction that the universe is
both real and justified, that whatever the successes of the scientific enterprise thus far,
even more - perhaps far more - could be expected if lurking discrepancies were re-
depends on insight into what is given, more than on the "extent" of what is given. Phi-
cal sciences deal with phenomena which bewilder by their sheer variety and complex-
ity. That there are innumerable causal connections among these phenomena is beyond
doubt; but the connections themselves require to be inferred or discovered one by one.
Inspired theorizing facilitates the process of discovery but never dispenses with it;
physical science looks at the sensible, first, last, and always. And so the success of
physics is due to the large number of connections which have been elucidated over
time, while its more troubling aspect, which I have described as a lack of underlying
unity, is due to the number of connections which have not yet been made, and espe-
cially those which seem unlikely ever to be made. It happens regularly that a physical
theory has merit in view of a partial insight. It has heuristic value based upon a real cor-
3
respondence to experimental data, even though it falls short of being a "theory of every-
thing."
There is no reason for either apathy or complacency in view of this state of af-
fairs. If the theoretical foundations of the physical edifice can be made firmer - and they
always can - the structure can only benefit. There is no incoherence in nature; that ours
is a cosmos, rather than chaos, is implicit in the entire scientific enterprise. In fact, the
Three phases may be discerned in the long history of physical science. The first
of these, all too often adverted to only in condescending terms nowadays, is the Aristo-
the 4th century B.C. down to the late Renaissance. The second phase, which saw
mathematical physics come into its own, is what may be called "classical" physics,
emerging hesitantly from late medieval treatises and gaining sudden vigor in the work
of Galileo and his contemporaries. Newton would become the great exemplar here, and
it is the science which held indisputable sway down to the time of Einstein, Lorenz and
Poincare in the early 20th century. Finally there is the "quantum" phase, typically pre-
sented, in dramatic contrast to what had gone before, as a "revolution" with philosophi-
At the risk of oversimplifying, we may say that the first phase was characteristi-
cally non-mathematical and concerned with a multiplicity of causes and natures; the
while the third, though certainly not abandoning the mathematical as such, would raise
Is there, then, more than one science of physics? Few would deny that quantum
physics bears enough of a relation to, and continuity with, physics of the classical era to
warrant being called one and the same science. But many authors facilely dismiss the
earlier thought of Aristotle and his followers as being of no consequence in the modern
physical perspective. They would say there is only one "real" physics, ignoring "phi-
losophical" physics altogether and then forcing classical and quantum physics into a
single mold by dint of Niels Bohr's "correspondence principle" (according to which the
tum-theoretical description).
In the present investigation I aim to show that this interpretation is faulty. Con-
vanced in the age of Galileo and Newton, and physics as reconstituted by the quantum
authentic insight into material being, and not just naive superficiality. I will argue that
certain aspects of the natural philosophy inherited from Aristotle, and refined by Tho-
mas Aquinas a millennium and a half later, offer the key to a unification of the insights
of scientists working much more recently - that is to say, during the 400 years since
It will be seen that, paradoxically enough, it is classical physics, rather than its
Aristotelian precursor, which represents the departure from a holistic and comprehen-
sive account of the way things are. Quantum physics, "revolutionary" only in contrast to
the Newtonian paradigm which had dominated the formative centuries of modern sci-
ence, points the way to a resuscitation of Aristotelian insights which are vindicated, not
because the ancients had miraculous powers of anticipating the modern worldview, but
because they reflected well and truly upon the fundamental given: that physics is about
matter in motion.
This starting point is given to the ten-year-old who observes a baseball's path,
no less than to the physicist who follows the trajectories of muons in a cloud chamber.
Aristotle dropping a stone (granted, he doesn't seem to have done this very carefully, if
barding gold atoms with helium nuclei. In all cases the physicist is dealing with things
in motion: with spatiotemporal relations of entities that are defined ultimately in spatio-
nonexistent. But motion in and of itself remains the subject of a unitary definition and
causal account. The conclusions of an Aristotle, a Galileo, and a Schrodinger can all be
that it is not just a knowledge of nature but a knowledge of nature, conditioned by the
6
human mode of knowing. Implicit in this statement is the fact that there are only so
many kinds of questions that can be asked and answered. Such questions vary in their
content from age to age, but not in their form. Problems may be expected to arise, how-
ever, when scientists neglect to ask all the questions of which the inquiring mind is ca-
pable. Although scientific inquiry cannot but be affected, in any given epoch, by the
Zeitgeist, and in fact may benefit from the discipline afforded by reigning prejudice, the
other and darker side of the coin is that whole areas of legitimate and perhaps urgent
questioning may be left unattended. The almost comically highlighted hubris of a scien-
tific community facing endless surprises, setbacks and paradigm shifts - pick up any
copy of Scientific American and you will see the evidence - has to do with the fact that
nature is always more intricate and varied than we surmise. Whatever may be said about
nature's own resistance to interrogation, let us not fall short in our methods as we inter-
rogate it. Let us not arbitrarily narrow the field of genuinely scientific, which is to say
causal, inquiry.
I have alluded to the subject matter of this study in historical terms, as proffering
a key to the unification of physics as pursued in different eras. The present thesis is not
concerned with the historical as such, however, but with the retrieval of a broader tradi-
tion in physics, in the interest of deepening the level of current physical understanding.
It aims at restoring, to the physicist's conceptual arsenal, the fourfold causal analysis of
Aristotelian physics, while giving up nothing of what modern science has achieved. In
7
particular, its immediate goal is an explication of the enduring validity of material cau-
sality, of matter as understood philosophically, in a physics from which it had been ef-
I work toward these conclusions in four chapters. In Chapter Two is traced the
theme of what physics is, or has been considered to be, about - not in the particulars of
its investigations, so much as in the kinds of conclusions that have been expected of it.
Here my main framework is that of the threefold division of physics already mentioned.
The treatments of Aristotelian and classical physics are the most summary. Aristotle's is
some of its great inaugurators, is shown to be progressively less concerned with the
manifold of Aristotelian causality and more preoccupied with the quantitative as such.
The question of whether physics in the classical conception can be considered scientific
under Aristotelian principles is then raised and given a qualified affirmative answer.
The remainder of the chapter, somewhat more than half, is then devoted to a description
of quantum physics. This description is wholly nonmathematical, and part of the reason
for my devoting more space to it is a perceived need to assure the reader that a subject
terms. In this conviction I follow the precedent of many quantum theorists themselves,
8
quantum physics: complementarity and the uncertainty principle, arising from the wave-
particle duality with its juxtaposition of continuous and discrete aspects. My focus
throughout is "physical" rather than epistemological, in the belief that the much-vexed
cal approach. I then recapitulate the three phases in physics, by way of suggesting that
the notion of potentiality will provide the key to understanding their succession and dif-
ferences. The chapter is then closed with a listing of five aporiai, drawn from the heart
of quantum physics, that I will be keeping in mind as I proceed through the following
chapters.
Chapter Three is the longest and the main chapter. It aims at presenting the prin-
integral account. A brief history of conceptions of matter begins the chapter, and then a
synopsis of Thomistic references is given. The several rationes of matter are then taken
up section by section, progressing roughly from the physical to the metaphysical, in the
conviction that a compelling account, even for modern readers, must exhibit the
wholeness that metaphysics alone can bring to the discussion. Thus we consider the ma-
among a plurality of cosmic beings, and as the sine qua non of intelligibility even
formal principle in hylomorphic being; these are the aspects of form that seem most
pertinent to our attempt to explicitate the role of matter in physics. It will be seen,
indeed, that one cannot treat adequately of either matter or form without
complementary allusion to the other; our intellectual grasp of these principles reflects
their intimate relation in reality. After a brief historical introduction, the doctrine of
Aquinas is summarized from his De principiis naturae. I then attempt to elucidate the
identity of form qua real principle and form qua principle of intelligibility. There
follows a distinction between accidental and substantial form, and some remarks on the
necessary unicity of the latter. Next is a rather more detailed treatment of elemental
forms and their virtual presence in higher composite beings, which is then situated in
relation to the conception of "dispositions of matter." The ideas of natural minimum and
impossibility of void are then treated, by way of arguing for an elemental or inflma
Thomistic view of the universe is then presented, and the Aristotelian conception of
motion is related to this structured plenum. The chapter closes with a discussion of the
Having thus gone over the traditional terrain, making what I hope will prove
the aporiai of Chapter Two, prepared to offer plausible resolutions of each. Since my
approach has been to focus on the concept of potentiality as understood in the philoso-
phic! perennis, I then turn to some recent authors in order to compare my conclusions on
It must be noted that this is a philosophical study, and while I think it will be
clear that modern mathematical physics is heavy with philosophical implications, one
cannot pretend to "do physics" with no more than philosophical insights. The histori-
cally delicate (and needlessly provocative) relationship between philosophy and modern
physics will, I hope, emerge from my pages as more fruitful than not - indeed, as being
a relationship urgently needing cultivation. This certainly does not imply, however, that
if I can sketch resolutions that are plausible enough to stimulate further thought and in-
vestigation. In a word, I trust I will not have forgotten that the relation between the dis-
ciplines of philosophy and mathematical science is one of subsidiarity: each benefits the
other in different ways, the former contributing a broader perspective on reality as such
It may well be wondered whether, in the attempt to bring many elements to-
gether in a small space, I will have failed to do justice to any of them. Every synthesis,
after all, depends for its cogency upon adequate analyses. In defense I will say, first,
that in so far as I am for the most part covering ground non novum sed noviter, it would
11
Thomistic physics and metaphysics. Secondly, this thesis is written in the conviction
that a re-establishment of Aristotelian and Thomistic principles in the sciences must be-
gin with a convincingly architectonic portrayal. For the ancient science was rejected en
bloc because of the perceived inadequacy of its several particulars; whereas that sci-
ence, qua science, never really depended upon particular data, but upon far more gen-
eral and certain observations of nature. The particular as such cannot constitute a
science, let alone a philosophy. Any attempt to show how well the Aristotelian vision
holds up, despite the collapse of however many particulars that were once associated
To the extent that modern physics is disunified, it must fall short of the explanatory
character iconically associated with it. The very feature that has marked post-Galilean
of a more or less deterministic nature - seems called into question by physics at the
quantum level; and if the quantum revolution has furthered dramatically man's
penetration into the workings of nature, it has done so in virtue of an unhappy truce
In this chapter I sketch out what distinguishes classical physics - that of Galileo,
Newton, Maxwell, et al. - from quantum physics on the one hand, and from Aristotelian
physics on the other. Such an approach may seem unduly broad: is not the problem
whole? But just as physics after Galileo marked a significant epistemological departure
from the Aristotelian paradigm of the preceding 1900 years, so has physics after Planck
and Einstein undergone a shift that is epistemological at root (quite apart from the
specific problems of the "Copenhagen interpretation"), and not simply a matter of what
12
13
questions that have been asked, and the kinds of answers given, during the three histori-
cal phases of physical science. It will be part of the burden of this thesis to show that
physics, so far from having altered direction as a whole - not once, but twice over the
past 400 years - has really only passed through an interval (the era of classical physics)
matical sophistication. With the advent of quantum theory, physics is poised to regain
an explanatory depth that had belonged to it, though never of course fully realized, dur-
A. Aristotelian physics
For Aristotle, physics is the science of being as mobile, i.e., of natures which have
intrinsic principles of motion (change) and rest.1 The changes to which spatiotemporal
beings are subject are four in number, all, however, being involved in some way with
local motion.2 Substantial change is not motion in the proper sense, though it is condi-
tioned by, and attendant on, motion properly speaking, which pertains to accidental be-
ing.
resolved the difficulties of both the preSocratics and his master Plato: matter, form, and
privation.3 Of these the first two are identified as causes properly speaking; they are in-
1
Physics HA (192b8-23).
2
Physics V.l, 2 (225a34-226b9).
3
Physics l.l (190bl0-191al); 1.8, 9 (191a24-192a34).
14
trinsic to the thing moved. The full analysis of motion brings in two additional (extrin-
sic) causes, agent and end; all other "causes" are variants on one of these four.4
Matter becomes, for Aristotle, a main factor in determining the possibility and
the divisions of science.5 Every science presupposes the basic abstraction from particu-
lar matter whereby intelligible forms can be received into the immaterial intellect; but
since this is the only abstraction prerequisite to a science of mobile being, it is com-
monly linked to physics in particular. Thus physics is the science of those things which
are material in re, and which also involve matter (taken universally) in their definitions.
(A further abstraction, whereby things associated with matter in re are defined without
reference to matter, gives us the objects of the science of mathematics; finally, the sci-
ence which is able to consider even beings that are immaterial in themselves, i.e., meta-
separation, separation
The Aristotelian analysis of material being proceeds, in the first instance, from
yielding such hybrid constructs as the earth-centered cosmos, the four elements and four
humors, and so on, no more detracts from the soundness of his fundamental analysis
4
Physics II.3 (194bl6-195b30); II.7 (198al4-bl0).
5
Metaphysics VI.l (1025b25-1026a20).
15
than, say, today's highly problematic classification of elementary particles can be said
physical sciences during the 16th and 17th centuries, sweeping away earlier modes of
natural-philosophical discourse as successive triumphs of the 18th and 19th centuries pre-
pared the way for our own scientifically sophisticated and highly technologized era.
While better scholarship has done much to temper the myth of a radical break with their
medieval precursors,6 scientists of the early modern period were certainly originative
enough to write, self-consciously and at times pointedly, about the freshness of their
approach.
But we will not find the point of departure where later apologists have pretended
to see it. Copernicus, often taken to have signaled a radical break with the universe of
the ancients, was, as Koyre says, "not a Copernican" (in the oft-alleged sense of being a
See for instance Pierre Duhem, Le Systeme du monde: Histoire des doctrine cosmologiques de
Platon a Copernic (Paris, 1913-1959); James A. Weisheipl, The Development of Physical The-
ory in the Middle Ages (London, 1959); William A. Wallace, Prelude to Galileo: Essays on
Medieval and Sixteenth-Century Sources of Galileo's Thought (Boston, 1981) and Galileo and
His Sources: The Heritage of the Collegio Romano in Galileo's Science (Princeton, 1984);
David C. Lindberg and Robert S. Westman, eds., Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution
(Cambridge, 1990). Useful bibliographies will be found in, inter alia, Pierre Duhem, Medieval
Cosmology: Theories of Infinity, Place, Time, Void, and the Plurality of Worlds, edited and
translated by Roger Ariew (Chicago, 1985), and William A. Wallace, The Modeling of Nature:
Philosophy ofScience and Philosophy of Nature in Synthesis (Washington, D.C., 1996).
16
is hardly different in kind from the Ptolemaic elaboration of the ancient and Aristotelian
conception; circular paths are transposed and reassigned, but the underlying physical
reasons, so far as they are alluded to at all, could equally have been found in the presen-
tation of an Aristotle. "I consider that gravity is nothing more than a certain natural de-
sire given by divine providence of the Architect of the Universe to all parts to recover
their unity and wholeness by coming together again in the form of a globe. We may be-
lieve that this tendency is shared also by the Sun, the Moon and the other wandering
stars...." In this he anticipates the identification of terrestrial and celestial physics that
will come to flower in the thought of Newton, but as yet the reasoning, while un-
something other than a quantitative description as prior causal foundation for the latter.
Not that Copernicus dwells at length on the physical as such; he is preoccupied with
Kepler is the next great name on the march to modernity, his greatest claim to
fame being perhaps his abandonment of the circle with its connotations of celestial per-
fection. (Not that "celestial perfection" wasn't to play a very large role in his own think-
7
Alexandre Koyre, The Astronomical Revolution: Copernicus, Kepler, Borelli, translated by R.
E. W. Maddison (Ithaca, N. Y., 1973), p. 65.
8
Cited in Koyre, Astronomical Revolution, p. 56.
9
Koyre^s Platonism leads him to argue {Astronomical Revolution, pp. 58 and 113) that Coper-
nicus saw geometrical forms as causative of planetary movements; but he cites, inter alia, E.
Brachvogel as perceiving that for Copernicus the geometry was only a concomitant of the
planetary natures. Cf. 58, n.l 13
17
remained coupled with a deep reliance on a causality which is only described, not con-
The very title of his New Astronomy indicates as much: Astronomia Nova
the preface that, while setting himself to correct the planetary tables "I came also upon
Aristotle's metaphysics, or more precisely, celestial physics, and I studied the natural
causes of motion. This consideration provided very clear reasons which show the Co-
pernican doctrine to be true...." 10 That his eventual assignation of the cause in question
- a quasi-magnetic force residing in the Sun - is cast in terms hardly Aristotelian, is not
no less striking, prima facie, than differences in the traditions themselves. But Kepler
evidently thought himself to be improving upon, rather than overturning, the Aristote-
lian view.
rather than a priori "from the particular significance of the Sun" - that since "the Sun is
situated at the center of the [solar] system, it follows.. .that the source of the motive
10
Koyre,p. 167.
18
force also is situated in the Sun."11 It is "more likely that the source of motion is mo-
tionless where it is situated [as is the Sun, in Kepler's conception], than that it has mo-
At the same time, Kepler did not hesitate to assail a very distinctive Aristotelian
and medieval doctrine, that of "natural place" in its geocentric formulation. My point is,
not that Kepler was a crypto-Aristotelian, but that he had not made the essential break
with Aristotle, which would consist in the jettisoning of causal explanations as such.13
modern ways of thinking physically. This is not at all to say that he marks a clean rup-
ture with the developments of the late Middle Ages, nor that he remained free of what
must now appear as decided archaisms. But with Galileo physicists can generally feel
that they are in familiar territory; in his writings the quantitative approach to the study
of mobile being becomes well established, and causes beyond the reach of mathematical
analysis are barely considered, even in passing. The question of most interest to our in-
quiry is, not to what extent did Galileo insist upon observation and experiment (answer:
very much indeed), nor to what extent did he mathematize the world under his consid-
u
Koyre,p. 191.
12
Koyre,p. 192; cf. p. 198.
13
It is worth notice, that the much-derided doctrine of "natural place" in Aristotle, assailed with
ever-increasing confidence by Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, and utterly alien to the Newto-
nian formulation of celestial physics, turns out, on deeper consideration, to have suffered only a
slight transposition. Matter is attracted to matter, the more according as it is the more densely
situated "in space": this broad expression is as compatible with the thought of Newton and Ein-
stein as with that of Aristotle. It is ironic that, just as the ancient and medieval mind had re-
joiced in a metaphysics and an anthropology conformable to the presumed unicity of the Earth
(man's abode) as cosmic center, so have scientistic philosophers of more recent times linked
their denials of human pre-eminence to the very plurality of such centers.
19
eration (answer: almost completely), but how did he view this experimentally deter-
mined and mathematized body of knowledge vis-a-vis causes in the real order?
seek to penetrate the true and internal essence of natural substances or content ourselves
undertaking with regard to the closest elemental substances as with more remote celes-
tial things."14 The "properties" which remain accessible to us - Galileo instances, in the
case of the sunspots which form the subject matter of the present Letter, "their location,
motion, shape, size, opacity, mutability, generation, and dissolution" - are all features
vein that would be repeated even much later in his works, "These in turn may become
the means by which we shall be able to philosophize better about other and more con-
Galileo's Assayer (II Saggiatore) of 1623, often called his philosophical mani-
festo, actually contains relatively little in the way of philosophical remarks, and those
mostly upon the unreality, or rather the subjectivity, of sensible qualities in the context
of an atomism that recalls Lucretius. But there is this famously succinct passage: "Phi-
losophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands continually open to our
gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the lan-
guage and read the letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of
14
Cited in Stillman Drake, Galileo at Work: His Scientific Biography (Chicago, 1978), p. 199.
15
Drake, Galileo at Work, p. 200.
20
mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures with-
out which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it... ."16 One need not
adopt an extreme Platonist reading of this passage (such that the universe is constituted
which Galileo had been thoroughly exposed as a student, was well aware that material
being is inevitably quantitative being, and medieval thinkers had returned often to the
scriptural declaration that God "has disposed all things according to measure, number,
and weight." But while the tripartite Aristotelian division of sciences comprised phys-
ics, mathematics and metaphysics - to which the scholastics added scientiae mediae
such as astronomy and optics, embracing aspects both physical and mathematical - it
was hardly an Aristotelian way of speaking, to identify the second of these with phi-
losophy simpliciter. In the context of his other remarks about substances and their quali-
ties it cannot be held that Galileo had rejected an underlying reality beyond the
some reliable knowledge that would not have to be continually revised. There would
16
Stillman Drake, Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo (New York, 1957), pp. 237-8. "But note
that the passage is unclear about the precise status of this geometrical language....it lierally says
that mathematics is the language, not of the universe, but of philosophy." Gary Hatfield, "Meta-
physics and the New Science" in Lindberg and Westman, eds., Reappraisals of the Scientific
Revolution, p. 130.
21
always be other knowledge that science could not touch, and he was content to leave
that to philosophers."17
Galileo, then, seems to have been at least moderately skeptical about philoso-
phical inquiry into underlying causes; he was dedicated, in any case, to the mathemati-
cal grasp of phenomena accessible to the senses. Restricting himself to the phenomenal
and the measurable, he nowhere denies that the latter is grounded in an underlying sub-
stantial reality. But that is, for him, no longer science's concern.
also retained a stronger instinct for causal explanation in science. In a letter to Mersenne
he writes, concerning Galileo, "I find generally that he philosophizes much better than
ordinary, in that he avoids as best he can the errors of the scholastics and undertakes to
examine physical matters by mathematical reasonings. In this I accord with him en-
tirely, and I hold that there is no better way to find the truth... .But he has not examined
things in order, and...without having considered the first causes of nature he has only
sought the reasons of some particular effects, and thus he has built without founda-
tion."18 What Descartes perceives as Galileo's weakness is, of course, the latter's
strength, namely his refusal to let a priori constructs lead him from the path of true in-
quiry. Descartes, while seizing upon quantitative methods in the science of mobile be-
ing, did not sufficiently allow his mathematical facility to be tempered by a respect for
17
Cf. Galileo's remark, "Philosophy itself cannot but benefit from our disputes, for if our con-
ceptions prove true, new achievements will be made; if false, their refutation will further con-
firm the original doctrines." Cited by Drake in his Galileo at Work, p. 108, from Galileo,
Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems (translated by Stillman Drake, Berkeley,
1953).
18
Cited by Drake, Galileo at Work, pp. 387-8.
22
Note that all four representative thinkers mentioned thus far were thoroughly
mathematical in their modus operandi, and to that extent marked a break with the mixed
remark needs qualification. On the one hand, the "predecessors" were by no means
motions. Nor were they, in some pursuits (such as alchemy) more than others, incapable
principled disregard for underlying causality tout court, however agnostic their scien-
Newton, more than any other physicist down to the quantum era, may be taken
as paradigmatic in our survey of the evolution in scientific thinking about causality. The
"philosophy of nature" which animates his works was adumbrated in his predecessors,
especially Galileo and Descartes, and remained normative for two centuries. Here, pre-
eminently, we see the essence of post-Aristotelian and pre-quantum physics. From the
standpoint of the 21 st century we can say that Newtonian thought is a major fault-line,
separating definitively the ancient and modern even as it constituted an upheaval in its
own right; but like upheavals generally it would prove to be not altogether constructive.
23
The very title of his greatest work would have struck earlier philosophers as oxymo-
At times Newton rejects any inquiry into the causes underlying those properties
from attempts at causal explanation in an analogical mode, as for example in the "Que-
ries" which are appended to the "hypothetical" discussion of the nature of light in the
Opticks.20 Nor have such explanatory forays stood the test of time to the extent that his
In fact, the very mathematization which constituted the Principia a work of mas-
tery, where the Opticks remained one of exploration (however brilliant), proceeded in
virtue of a certain abstention from the nature and definition of that which it described.
The laws of motion and gravitation are not explanatory, in the sense of tracing causal
dependencies to ever deeper levels; they are descriptive, albeit in unprecedented detail.
This narrowing of scientific inquiry to the quantitative is of course what we have been
often taken to be Maxwell's work in electricity and magnetism. Physics is here pushed
19
See for instance Definition 8 in Principia mathematicae philosophiae naturalis: "I use inter-
changeably and indiscriminately words signifying attraction, impulse, or any sort of propensity
toward a center, considering these forces not from a physical, but only from a mathematical
point of view." The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, translated by I.
Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman (Berkeley, 1999), p. 408.
20
See for instance Queries 8, 11-14, 17, etc.: Isaac Newton, Opticks, or a Treatise of the Reflec-
tions, Refractions, Inflections and Colours ofLight (New York, 1952), pp. 339-406 passim.
24
far beyond what Newton could have imagined; many phenomena of light and electro-
magnetism unknown in Newton's day, including those whose wave character seemed
now beyond question, were brought together in a sophisticated treatise, nearly every
page of which seems worlds removed from the comparatively primitive treatments in
the Principia.
But it is precisely the differences between Maxwell and Newton which under-
score their radical similarity. From a philosophical (as opposed to experimental) stand-
point, their work is cut from the same cloth. By the 19th century, prodigious advances in
many branches of physics and chemistry had occurred against the backdrop of a prevail-
ing insouciance with respect to substance philosophically conceived. The fourfold ac-
the positivistic apotheosis of the late 19th century it was quite explicitly rejected.
Mathematics alone prevailed. The Humean and Kantian critiques of causality and
knowledge of the noumenal only provided post hoc support for a scientific attitude that
Let us observe three simple instances of physical description, as proposed on the verge
F^GMiMj/r2.
The attractive gravitational force F expresses the tendency of two masses Mi, M2, sepa-
rated by distance r, to move toward one another across a distance r. This force, i.e. the
25
tendency which it names, can be meaningful (and measurable) only within a finite time
interval during which the said motion could occur. This time-reference appears in the
dimensioned constant
distance (r, measured in meters), time (measured in seconds), and mass (Mi, M2, meas-
ured in kilograms). But mass, Newton's quantitas materiae, is, in the Newtonian con-
text, both the quantitative measure of a body's resistance to a change in its velocity, and
gravitation, mass refers to a center of physical attraction (always having spatial dimen-
d/t2.
fect a change in the velocity of a body. This is encapsulated in Newton's second law of
motion, F = ma, a being the acceleration (change of velocity) of a body of mass m, sub-
ject to force F. Physicists today generally recognize four kinds of force in nature -
into the description of such infinitely varied actions as the fall of a raindrop or the col-
and time and mass; and even time is but the measure of spatial variation.21 Clearly,
however, more than mass, time and distance are presupposed in the equation. We do not
among bodies, namely their tendency to move toward one another, but it neither states
nor implies anything about what those bodies are, beyond their mere possession of mass
which are analogously fundamental in describing a wide range of electric and magnetic
field phenomena:
VD =p
V-B = 0
v x E = -as / dt
VxH = J + dJ)/dt
Here D stands for electric displacement, B for magnetic flux density, E for the electric
field strength, H for the magnetic field strength, J for electric current density and p for
temporal relations among entities which exhibit attraction and repulsion through
"forces" other than gravitational. (A generation after Maxwell it would be realized that,
21
This statement is compatible with the Aristotelian quasi-definition of time as the measure of
change, inasmuch as all change either is or entails locomotion: cf. Physics VIII.7 (260a27-bl4).
Substantial change is not motion and is instantaneous. As we shall see, it does not occur
"through" space either.
27
unlike gravitation, a feature common to matter as such, electrical forces are associated
in different ways with different constituent particles of subatomic matter, while mag-
netic forces result from certain motions of electrically charged particles.) Of course, re-
and repulsions differentiated at the subatomic level is nowhere apparent in the equa-
tions; that is presupposed by them. What do the equations actually express (or imply)?
and repulsive influence ("fields"), whose "densities" and "strengths" (as well as quanti-
ties derivative from these) are so many specifications of the locomotive behavior of
charges within them. In other words, just as in the case of gravitational force and mass,
and this not merely as presupposing space and time but as constituting nothing other
structures of Maxwellian theory shed no further light on the underlying nature of elec-
tromagnetic attractions and repulsions. We have, again, only an abstract system of spa-
abstract plane.
I present one more instance of physics in the classical mode, that is, of physics
conceived as a purely quantitative investigation into the sensible world. This is the cen-
tral group of equations constituting Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity, and the ex-
post-Newtonian. But whatever may be said about its alleged transformation of how
space and time must enter into physics, special relativity at any rate does not depart
from the paradigm already instanced by Newton and by Maxwell. The Lorentz trans-
is, once again, nothing but a relating of distances (x, y, z) and time measurements (t), v
and c, the speed of light, being themselves simply distance/time ratios. The dynamic
implications of the "physics of the Lorentz transformation" (as special relativity has
cal physics down to our own day), while c is an immediate space/time relation and E
(energy) is simply the potential for work, i.e. for applying a force (an attractive or repul-
sive tendency between bodies) through a distance. There is no positive "content" in the
equations of special relativity, as there was none in the equations of Maxwellian elec-
quantum physics, beyond the quantifiable aspect of local motion, i.e., variation in spa-
tial relationships.
With this sampling of paradigmatic physical statements before us, it is worth asking: if
sense is it a science? Leibniz and others had already made the charge against Newton,
and it is no less applicable to everyone from Galileo to Einstein: without a basis in defi-
nitions expressive of the nature of mobile being, is not the mathematization characteris-
tic of modern physics radically deficient? Is it not looking only at a part rather than the
whole, with the concomitant risk of mistaking the part for the whole?
stantial being at all, except indirectly: concerned exclusively with, and restricted in its
very methodology to, the quantitative, it is about accidents in so far as they are associ-
ated with quantity. It is a scientia media, as noted previously, physical on the material
according to the canons of the Posterior Analytics; its certitudes are anchored in the fact
"Entirely" means, not only that material being is the sole origin of our quantita-
tive concepts, but, in the first place, that the principles of mathematics - discrete and
are defined without any reference to matter and its contingency. "Three apples" is con-
22
Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In De caelo 1.3: "a natural body has sensible matter added to its mathe-
matical extension, and therefore it is not improper for the natural scientist to use mathematical
principles in his demonstrations" {corpus naturale addit materiam sensibilem supra magnitudi-
nem mathematicam: et ideo non est inconveniens si naturalis in suis demonstrationibus utatur
principiis mathematicis: non enim est omnino aliud genus, sed quodammodo sub illo contine-
tur) - cited in William A. Wallace, "Thomistic Reflections on The Modeling ofNature: Science,
Philosophy, and Theology," unpublished essay. Cf. pp. 1-2 in that essay, and other references to
Aquinas therein. See also Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. Gerald B. Phelan
(New York, 1959), pp. 35-46.
30
tingent; apples come and go. But "three" simpliciter is abstracted from the materiality of
far as it is not actual but only the possibility of the actual. Herein lies the inability of
rassment to the "final theorists" of every generation. Physics, like every natural science,
theoretical constructs. The discovery phase is always present because material being -
the "matter" of the physicists - is not purely actual but is radicated in a potential princi-
ple which can only be rendered intelligible to the extent that it becomes (imperfectly)
unveiling new levels of actuality or actualizing further the potentialities of matter, and
fact it is one measure of the inadequacy of a physical theory, that it does not provide a
23
The process of abstraction is not without mystery; the intellectus agens works in virtue of a
certain connaturality between knower and known, discerning ("illuminating") in the latter a fac-
tor which is at once concrete and universal. The reality of "three" is attested continually in the
mind's reversion to brute reality; were "three," as abstracted from three apples, not real in a uni-
versal sense, it could not be coherently applied to three oranges.
31
disunified, because the phenomena have not disclosed their quantitative aspects in their
The mere fact that mathematical physics deals with material being is not suffi-
cient reason for denying to physics a properly scientific character. Aristotelian physics,
dealing with being precisely as material, is understood to be a science in the strict sense.
concerned with the particular, specifically with the particularization associated with de-
grasped universally, but quantities as accidents of natural being are grasped contin-
gently. Knowing that 5 times 12 gives 60 does not enable us to say that any 5 carbon
atoms will contain a total of 60 nucleons. Other factors, which can only emerge through
further observation and experiment, may supervene, varying the neutron numbers.
Modern physics has a scientific character to the extent that it involves the con-
stancy of definable natures, but is unscientific to the extent that it treats of the accidental
rather than the substantial. Natural substances are determinative of their concomitant
accidents, but only within certain limits. A carbon atom cannot (so far as we know) con-
tain only one neutron, or as many as 20; its very nature as carbon - a configuration of
six protons - is incompatible with these extremes. But it can have six neutrons, or seven
ics. But this determinism has never been realized beyond simple cases over a restricted
time interval. It is brave talk; it may even be said to have guided scientific investiga-
tion;24 but the standing reproof to every claim of physical determinism is the contin-
gency and unpredictability, not only of physical systems as they are encountered in
everyday investigation, but of the entire course of physical science over the centuries.
This is not to say that there is an absolute indeterminacy in material being (as it would
appear from a divine or perhaps angelic standpoint). But determinism in the classical
ter as the potential principle of cosmic being. Such indeterminacy, already long known
in principle through the Aristotelian analysis of mobile being, had to await the unique
ships into which those quantities enter. I have already touched on this, in regard to the
three "paradigmatic instances" of physical formulation; let us develop the point further.
physics, is applied analogically rather than univocally across the entire domain of
physical inquiry. The physical qualities that are investigated quantitatively are, in and of
24
"In practice, the belief in Determinism has rendered a great service to scientists by preserving
them from sloth." Louis de Broglie, Matter and Light: The New Physics, translated by W. H.
Johnston (New York, 1948), p. 238.
33
no ratio between the concepts of, say, "volume" and "pressure," the one referring to
space and the other to the collective momenta of particles. But physics in the modern
sense is not about qualities as such; it is about the quantifiable aspect of qualities. Both
Nor is this an arbitrary result of the mind's a priori constructs. It is at root due to
the fact that every physical quantity, as noted previously, is reducible to spatial relation
and variation. In the next chapter I identify this spatiality with the prime matter that en-
ters into all cosmic being as such. It is because the objects of physics, disparate as they
seem to be, are all manifestations, so to speak, of prime matter, that they can be known
What of the equations themselves? It is one thing to speak of the analogical ap-
matics as the means whereby we effectively relate physical quantities to one another.
But just how much does the mathematical formulation tell us? The universality of a
physical formula is represented by its abstractness. But in the abstract a formula does
not give us a description of the concrete reality; it does so only as solved, i.e., as stated
in terms of determinate quantities. The formula is, as it were, in potency to its solutions
ity to concrete instances. But this applicability is not implicit in the formula itself; it was
only a contingent basis for the formula's derivation. Given the contingent nature, the
34
materiality, of what is governed by the formula, there is always the possibility that the
formula will be found inadequate, i.e. that not all its mathematically possible solutions
Of course the formulas of physics are derived on the basis of their physical ap-
plicability, and if the supposition is made that nature is continuously (infinitely) vari-
able, then infinitely many solutions will have a physical as well as mathematical import.
But such continuity, however implied by mathematical expressions in their own order,
the quantum revolution in physics: if physical reality is not simply quantity, then the
features of quantity as such will not be adequate to its description; other, non-
quantitative factors may supervene. The quantitative will be only a part, and not the
These quantitative relations are not only made possible, but have physical sig-
nificance - they disclose real relationships among material beings - because they are
ultimately manifestations of the very materiality that unites cosmic being. Nevertheless,
to say that physico-mathematical relationships are real is not to say that they are other
or that the qualities which modern physics investigates (and a fortiori their underlying
Having briefly reviewed key aspects of both Aristotelian and classical physics, it re-
mains now to introduce the third era in physical science, that of quantum theory, before
giving a comparative overview. I present this part of the account in a little more detail,
since it is in the heart of quantum physics that the aporiai of the present dissertation are
located.
whole are satisfied that their investigations are of the real world, describing the very
same order of being in which airplanes fly and steaks are grilled and poets move their
pens. That is a world amenable to quantitative description, which is not to say that it is a
world entirely quantitative. It is, an Aristotelian would say, accidentally quantitative, its
form and matter. This entails that physical being is susceptible of an analysis in terms
that are non-quantitative - indeed, that the essential description, pertaining to the sub-
On the other hand, the materiality which constitutes physical being as physical
or mobile is manifested, as I shall argue in the next chapter, precisely in terms of three-
dimensionality. The fact that mathematical explorations of the physical world can lead
dimensionally) currently eludes us, does not warrant the conclusion that the reality be-
tially three-dimensional being, and if all motion is reducible to variation in the three-
36
construct in which higher dimensions are considered to be spatial yet distinct from the
everyday spatial dimensions; so also, all physical entities or states or processes which
case, for example, with electron "spin"). Although the analogical mode of scientific dis-
course is continually prone to misinterpretation and any number of false starts or dead
temporal variation. In this conviction I seek to present quantum physics in terms no less
F. The background
Quantum physics dawned about the turn of the 20th century, with the growing realiza-
tion that the subatomic domain is governed by certain laws having no clear analogy in
the classical-physics framework. All through the 19 century there had accumulated
matter. "Atoms" were understood to be the least particles of substances with irreducibly
25
"Now among the systems of geometrical entities that are called Euclidian, Riemannian, etc.,
spaces, only tri-dimensional Euclidian space is directly constructible in intuition." Jacques
Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 168.
37
fixed properties, the chemical elements. But atoms in turn were found to have particular
components. In 1897 the electron, basic unit of negative electric charge, was recognized
to be one such component.26 The location of the much more massive proton, positively
charged component of the atom, within a comparatively tiny nuclear region of the atom
neutral, were discovered in 1932.) These new "elementary particles," whose numbers
would be greatly augmented as the century wore on, were understood to have finite di-
space.
1901 that intractable theoretical difficulties could be resolved if the energy of electro-
magnetic waves were considered to vary across the spectrum, not continuously, but by
discrete amounts, these amounts (later called quanta) being proportionate to the radia-
tion frequencies. In 1905 Einstein carried the idea further to explain why light is ob-
served to dislodge electrons from certain metallic atoms only if its frequency (rather
than intensity) is above a certain minimum threshold (a function of the metal in ques-
tion), and to impart only discrete kinetic energies to the ejected electrons.
It had been known for some time that incandescent gases emit light, not in con-
tinuous spectra but at discrete frequencies; in 1885 it had been shown by Balmer that
26
J. J. Thomson; R. Millikan measured the charge in relation to electron mass, 1909 and there-
after.
27
E. Rutherford's gold-foil experiments, 1911.
38
these frequencies, in the case of the hydrogen spectrum, can be related by a simple nu-
merical formula.
The structure of the atom, in the wake of Rutherford's discovery of the nucleus,
was at first assumed to be on the model of a planetary system; but theoretical difficul-
ties involving the energy loss of orbiting electrons forced a reassessment. Bohr then
posited that electrons are locked into discrete orbits, which somehow preclude radiative
loss (and consequent inward spiraling).28 He showed that, for the case of hydrogen, the
discrete energy levels represented by the Balmer lines corresponded well to the energy
The Compton effect, in which light is scattered by free electrons with a resultant
quanta acting as particles with definite momentum (a directed or vector quantity); both
the light quantum (photon) and the electron are affected by the interaction, with mo-
mentum being conserved such that the difference in photon energy corresponds to a dif-
In 1924 de Broglie suggested that, just as light exhibits wavelike and particulate as-
pects, so might electrons, hitherto regarded as particles, have definite wave features.
the macroscopic level by the obvious fact that all our knowledge of the former is had
through its physical interaction with the latter, could only be further substantiated by a
deepening awareness of how electrons and photons - quanta of matter and light respec-
tively - are intimately linked in such phenomena as the photoelectric effect, the discrete
spectra of the Bohr atom, and the Compton effect. De Broglie stated that the wavelength
Planck had earlier employed in relating the frequency of a photon to its discrete energy,
E = hv.30
foundation to the Bohr's discrete electron orbits, namely by conceiving each electron
which each orbit has, in accordance with its energy level, definite parameters in terms
of size, shape, and orientation, still constitute a major part of modern chemistry.
Electrons give further evidence of their wavelike character in scattering and diffraction phe-
nomena, such as those put to everyday use in the electron microscope.
40
atomic matter), together with a wavelike structure in both.31 This duality of aspect
would give rise to endless speculation about the seeming incompatibility of wave and
particle. In general, the challenge was to describe the reduction of a wavelike (and to
that extent relatively dispersed or "continuous") entity to a much more localized (parti-
clelike) entity.
interplay of variables on the quantum level: Heisenberg, with the assistance of Pauli and
others, came up with a matrix algebra that very well reproduced the discrete quantities
encountered in experiment; such a methodology did not imply anything whatever about
the "between" states, but there was growing doubt whether reference to a physical basis
made sense anyhow. Schrodinger meanwhile developed a wave equation, not unrelated
to classical wave theory, though modified through the application of certain boundary
conditions to yield the discrete quantum states (rather than the infinitely variable solu-
tions of classical wave theory). The two formalisms were soon found to be mathemati-
cally equivalent: both wave mechanics and matrix mechanics gave the probability that a
particlelike event would occur at a given point in space and time, given the parameters
wave equation was that "wave packets" representing energy concentrations were in fact
31
Bohm, in Quantum Theory, p. 26, says there are "two crucial differences between the kind of
physical law obtained in classical theory and the kind suggested by experience with quantum
phenomena. The first difference is that whereas classical theory always deals with continuously
varying quantities, quantum theory must also deal with discontinuous or indivisible processes.
The second difference is that whereas classical theory completely determines the relationship
between variables at an earlier time and those at a later time (i.e., it is completely [determinis-
tically] causal), quantum laws determine only probabilities offuture events in terms of given
conditions in the past."
41
what had classically been described as particles. But this interpretation was destined to
In situation after situation it became evident that there could be no univocal comparison
of continuous and discrete (of wave and particle, etc.) under either formalism. Wave
observed and described only at each other's expense; this was an empirical fact, and it
experiments and mathematical constructs alike implied that the reduction of continuous
this shortly, only remarking for now that these situations are all dynamic in nature, i.e.,
having to do with transitions or, in the language of an older physics, the "mutability" of
The quantization which had been invoked and mathematized to deal with such
phenomena as the photoelectric effect and hydrogen emission lines had not presupposed
other than a classically "deterministic" interpretive framework - that is, the discrete na-
cause-and-effect can be described with 100% probability, event by event. But it soon
became evident that, at the quantum level, when dealing not simply with particular out-
32
"...where matrix mechanics depends upon the properties of non-commuting matrices, wave
mechanics can be derived from the properties of non-commuting [algebraic] operators." Jim
Baggott, The Meaning of Quantum Theory: A Guide for Students of Chemistry and Physics (Ox-
ford, 1992), p. 30.
42
comes (as in the two instances just cited), but with their genesis in time and space,
other things) the physical quantities position and momentum. Momentum in turn implies
a change in position over time, being defined as p = mv. Basically, that aspect of a
quantum entity that is evolving over time can be seen as precluding positional precision,
inasmuch as it is position that is evolving. Motion, in other words, partakes of the con-
tinuous (as does time, which is its measure), while place is more determinate.
The paired physical quantities that are related as continuous and discrete at the
quantum level go beyond the oft-cited and paradigmatic "momentum and position." For
instance, the excitation energies of atomic orbitals stand in relation to their finite life-
lives.
ticular actualization. Thus the electron or photon can be elsewhere than where it actu-
ally is, can have an energy other than what it presently has, and so on. Since this
inherent variation applies to all quantum characteristics (being, as I shall argue later, a
manifestation of materiality itself), among which are those paired entities mentioned
above, there is a relation of uncertainty between the conjugate parameters such that the
more determinate the one, the less determinate is the other. Such linked properties are
43
most often supposed to be physically related so that the probability function governing
the pair of them entails a reciprocal relation between their probabilities taken sepa-
rately.33 In the limiting cases, a 100% probability of a particle's being in a given loca-
tion would entail a zero probability of its having a determinable momentum, and vice
versa.
electron's excitation energy for a given orbital, and in the values of its average lifetime
(duration of excitation) in that state. The more precisely one of these ranges is deter-
mined, the less will be the other. Or: there is a range in the values of a pi-meson's mass,
and in the values of its half-life. But the more determined the mass value, the less de-
tive expression from the mathematical formalism of both Heisenberg's matrices and
erators of the former. It can be better "visualized" via Schrodinger: in his wave mechan-
More technically, the psi-function widths for momentum and position, or analogous pairs of
conjugate variables, are Fourier transforms of each other such that AxAp > hiAn.
44
the wave packet is always of finite extent, always a little "fuzzy" and to that extent not
Bohr famously laid down as the principle of complementarity that the wave and
particle aspects of physical entities are equally valid descriptions, but impossible to de-
termine simultaneously. Since one aspect emerges under one kind of observation, and
the other under a different kind of observation, we cannot observe both together; rather,
The very nature of the quantum theory ... forces us to regard the space-time
coordination [meaning: particle behavior] and the claim of causality [meaning:
wave behavior], the union of which characterizes the classical theories, as com-
plementary but exclusive features of the description .... 35
his physical conceptions, have been the subject of much discussion.36 Here I will only
observe that one need not impute to him a raw subjectivism; that would be the dubious
achievement of some later interpreters. To say that one's modus observandi dictates
which aspect of reality one observes is not the same as to say that one's observations
This physical interpretation or visualization of a particle is highly debatable, and far from the
conception embraced by most physicists today; nevertheless it represents the way in which
SchrSdinger himself, de Broglie and Einstein preferred to conceive of the quantum.
35
Niels Bohr, in Nature 121 (Supplement, 1928): 580; cited in Abraham Pais, Niels Bohr's
Times, in Physics, Philosophy, and Polity (Oxford, 1991), p. 315; bracketed text by Pais. Jim
Baggott (The Meaning of Quantum Theory, p. 86) summarizes neatly: "For Bohr, complemen-
tarity lay at the heart of the strange nature of the quantum world. The uncertainty principle be-
comes merely a mathematical statement expressing the limits imposed on our ability to make
measurements based on complementary concepts of classical physics."
36
See for example Steen Brock, Niels Bohr's Philosophy of Quantum Physics in the Light of the
Helmholtzian Tradition of Theoretical Physics (Berlin, 2003).
45
I. Complementarity or hiddenness?
consider the celebrated two-slit effect. It is well known that light, in virtue of its wave-
like nature, can form alternating light and dark interference bands after passing through
narrow and closely spaced slits in an opaque screen. These bands, on analogy with what
is clearly seen in the case of water waves passing through twin apertures in a barrier,
have been interpreted as the result of constructive and destructive interference among
light waves. When either one of the two slits is closed, the light, as would be expected,
no longer forms an interference pattern. The especially intriguing thing, however, is that
as long as both slits are left open the interference pattern will eventually develop, even
if the light is admitted through the screen slits one photon at a time. But the very con-
cept of the photon arose in consideration of light's discrete or particlelike aspects. How
can wavelike behavior be exhibited by a particlelike entity? Feynman set the tone for
much of modern reflection when he described this phenomenon as one which is "im-
possible, absolutely impossible, to explain in any classical way, and which has in it the
Now the obvious interpretation, on analogy with classical wave theory, might
seem to be that light maintains its extended and wavelike nature even in its least con-
figuration, i.e., photon by individual photon - in other words, that a single quantum
does, or at least can, pass through both slits and self-interfere on its way to the recording
apparatus. But note how the interference pattern is seen to develop: it is literally built up
37
The Feynman Lectures on Physics, vol. 3 (Reading, Mass., 1965), p. 1-1.
46
manifested, presumably in virtue of whatever quantum event was involved in the re-
cording (e.g., chemically affecting a grain of photographic emulsion, etc.). Thus the in-
as a statistical accumulation of places where the photon energy has become localized
(particlelike) after traveling wavelike through the slits. It may be supposed that it is the
characteristics of the wave propagation that have determined the statistical distribution
of wave-particle transition events; but the resulting interference pattern is not so analo-
gous, after all, to that formed by water waves, where countless individual water parti-
cles can add and subtract. Rather, the interference pattern is discovered to be a statistical
ton trajectories, each of them somehow wavelike until it encounters a situation which
reduces the wave to a more localized entity. There seems to be no deterministic way to
describe the transition from wave to particle. Before the particle is "here" in the record-
ing apparatus it is not "there" - since the wave aspect precludes that kind of description.
interpretation whereby both particle and wave aspects could be maintained in actuality,
while allowing for only one or the other to dominate a particular experimental (observa-
tional) situation. The issue was perceived to be one of causality. Einstein led the way
with his conviction that a physics theory, as reflecting the way things are in the world,
47
must in principle refer to causal mechanisms.38 If an entity with obvious wave charac-
teristics (e.g., the light passing through a slit) suddenly evidences the localized proper-
mechanics fail to identify a cause. In particular, Einstein was perturbed by the implica-
tion that an instantaneous quantum transition would exhibit acausality by violating spe-
influences.
One idea, originating with de Broglie and taken up by Einstein, was that the
photon (for instance) is a real particle associated with a real wave ("pilot wave," in
some descriptions), which "guides" the particle on a trajectory; this dual entity could be
expected to display particle and wave aspects, depending on the experimental circum-
stances. Since the "particle" is understood to remain unobservable until there is a parti-
clelike interaction (at which point the wave aspect is no longer evident), this hypothesis
could be regarded as the harbinger of what would later be called (in the work of Bohm
and others) hidden-variables theories, characterized by the supposition that there exists
an aspect of quantum reality, hidden from our observations, which determines (causally,
even if unpredictably) the quantum event to one outcome and not another. But the pilot-
wave hypothesis encountered theoretical difficulties which prevented its wide accep-
Bohr presents a detailed account of his debate with Einstein over these matters in Paul A.
Schilpp, Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (Living Philosophers, vol. 7) (La Salle, 111.,
1970).
48
tance. Moreover it did not go sufficiently to the heart of the problem as Einstein con-
ceived it. 39
theoretical description was brought into new focus in 1935 by Einstein, Podolsky and
Rosen, who proposed a situation involving widely separated particles A and B having
some property X, whose values for the two particles (XA, XB) must be mutually exclu-
sive because of quantum rules governing the circumstances of the property's origin.
Someone, measuring the value of XA, could thereby know, without measuring, the corre-
sponding value ofXB. Moreover, if one decided to measure instead A's value for some
conjugate property Y, again having mutually exclusive values for the two particles (YA,
YB), the same situation would obtain. EPR argued that this gedankenexperiment ruled
out the Copenhagen understanding of quantum reality (so called from its origins in the
thought of Niels Bohr and others based in 1920s Copenhagen), whereby one determines
also for the unmeasured particle B - while the "choice" at A remained, in principle, un-
39
"The hidden variable is not the pilot wave itself- that is already adequately revealed in the
properties and behaviour of the wavefunction of quantum theory. It is actually the particle posi-
tion that is hidden. Now we know.. .that two correlated quantum particles cannot be locally real,
and so the pilot wave idea can be sustained only if we acknowledge that influences between the
two particles can be communicated at speeds faster than that of light. It seems that we cannot
have it both ways: either quantum theory is already complete or we must introduce non-local
hidden variables which, in turn, appear to make the theory incompatible with special relativity."
Baggott, The Meaning of Quantum Theory, pp. 161f.
49
section) at A, determining which one (of two) conjugate variables would be known
there per the uncertainty principle, would not be applicable at B, in apparent violation of
the uncertainty principle. This point can be sharpened by noting (as EPR did not) that in
principle, another observer at B could decide at the same moment to measure instead
on comparing notes later with the B-observer, the A-observer would be in a position to
know, via inference from his own measurement of the X-value at A, particle B ' s l -
value, and also, through the other observer's direct measurement at B, particle B's Y-
value - in violation of the uncertainty principle without depending upon the special-
strengthened the claim of EPR, that quantum mechanics' intimation of ontological inde-
Bohr's response to the EPR argument was the claim that the observer's choice
variable there; hence, for Bohr, the EPR objection is a non-issue because it couldn't cor-
respond to any real experimental setup. The observation I made above, concerning the
use of two observers working simultaneously, should put Bohr's own confidence on this
Cf. also Baggott: "I find Bohr's wording really rather vague and unconvincing. His emphasis
is once again on the important role of the measuring instrument in defining the elements of real-
ity that we can observe. Thus, setting up an apparatus to measure the position of particle A with
certainty, from which we can infer the position of particle B, excludes the possibility of measur-
ing the momentum of A and hence inferring the momentum of B. If there is no mechanical dis-
turbance of particle B (as EPR assume), its elements of physical reality must be defined by the
50
its apotheosis in Max Born, who rejected the physical (real) interpretation that
Schrodinger had given to his own wavefunctions, relating the latter instead to the prob-
ability of finding a quantum particle in a given region. Although his idea owed some-
thing to the "pilot wave" conception of de Broglie and Einstein, Born's underlying
philosophical commitment was decidedly positivist, and much of the subsequent discus-
the formalism is no more than a description of what we can know of quantum systems -
scription of the realization of one quantum state from among all the other probables,
nature of the measuring device we have selected for use with particle A." The Meaning of
Quantum Theory, p. 101.
51
travel from the source through slit 1 and onto the specified point on the second
screen. There is obviously a vast number of such possible trajecto-
ries....Feynman tells us to consider all such possibilities and to assign to each a
complex probability amplitude. He is able to specify a rule for what that ampli-
tude should be. It involves a quantity which physicists call action....[T]here is a
natural number associated with any quantity of action, namely the number of
h[bar] units....Feynman next gives a rule for associating a complex amplitude
with this number....You then add together all the contributions from all the dif-
ferent paths and - hey presto! - the result is the same probability amplitude
which you would have calculated by the more pedestrian procedure of solving
the Schrodinger equation....
From the point of view of conventional quantum theory the electron has no
trajectory; from Feynman's point of view it has every trajectory. Either way the
neat classical idea of tracing a well-defined motion is lost."41
In an influential treatise on quantum theory David Bohm wrote that "we must give up
the classical picture of a precisely defined spin variable associated with each atom, and
ment is given by the wave function."42 Whatever he meant by "potentiality" in this case,
he would later develop a theoretical context in which hidden variables loomed large.43
which every real particle has a definite position and momentum; but he also introduced
a "quantum potential" which governs particle motion in a way that is not dependent on
distance (as is a classical potential, e.g. the gravitational field). Thus the quantum poten-
"The quantum potential is the medium through which influences on distant parts of
a correlated quantum system are transmitted. The measurement of some property (such
as vertical polarization) of one of a pair of correlated photons instantaneously changes
the quantum potential in a non-local manner, so that the other particle takes on the re-
quired properties without the need for a collapse of the wavefunction....such an instan-
taneous transmission cannot be exploited to send coded information, and so conflict
41
J. C. Polkinghorne, The Quantum World (Princeton, N. J., 1984), pp. 41f.
42
Quantum Theory, p. 621.
43
In the brief account that follows my guide is Baggott, pp. 162-5.
52
with the postulates of special relativity might in principle be avoided....In Bohm's the-
ory, changing the measuring device...instantaneously changes the wavefunction and
hence the quantum potential: all future trajectories of quantum particles passing through
the apparatus are thus predetermined. The quantum potential effectively interconnects
every region of space into an inseparable whole."44
theory of "implicate order," the basic idea of which is that observable reality depends,
for its order and causal relations, partly upon a hidden or implicate level of reality,
Bohm did not attempt to relate this to the ancient doctrine of a potential principle com-
mon to all physical being, namely prime matter. It is worth noting how far Bohm was
willing to go in his holistic ruminations, in light of what we will be saying in later chap-
By modifying the equations of quantum field theory, he has done away with the need to
invoke the existence of independent, objectively real particles. Instead, particle-like be-
haviour results from the convergence of waves at particular points in space. The waves
repeatedly spread out and reconverge, producing 'average' particle-like properties, cor-
responding to the constant enfoldment and unfoldment of the wavefunction. This
'breathing' motion is governed by a super quantum potential, related to the wavefunc-
tion of the whole universe.45
If Bohm was impressed to a nearly mystical degree with the wholeness implied
by hidden levels of order, Bohr and the Copenhagen theorists were no less committed to
Many physicists were more inclined to adopt the epistemologically vacant Copenhagen
approach, leaving aside the question of what the wavefunction "really" signifies, than to
could, in principle, give the statistical results of quantum mechanics: thus the choice
a "realistic" quantum physics. I will not attempt to reproduce Bell's reasoning here. Es-
sentially, Bell's theorem states that the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics (for
of any locally-real model; this so-called Bell inequality need not obtain if and only if
I find curious, as well as inconsistent, many physicists' vaunted dislike of hidden variables
and ad hoc suppositions. Curious, because the value of such theoretical entities in at least push-
ing empirical science forward should be obvious, and inconsistent, because the "received doc-
trine" at any given time typically includes any number of such constructs accepted with little or
no protest - one thinks, for instance, of the currently prevalent notions of "dark matter" and
"dark energy" in cosmology.
47
Experiments by Alain Aspect and others, beginning in 1981, seem to verify Bell's theorem;
the experiments, it should be noted, are fraught with technical difficulties. See papers by Aspect
etal. in Physical Review Letters Al (1981): 460; 49 (1982): 91; 49 (1982): 1804, etc.
54
Hundreds of published works will discuss its history, its benchmark experiments, its
mathematical formalisms, its "deeper significance" and its titillating "weirdness," with-
out saying just what quantum physics really is. To say that quantum theory presents the
world as radically discontinuous at the most fundamental level is not definitive; there is,
after all, a physics of the discrete, an atomism even, that is entirely Aristotelian, and an-
other that is Galilean or at any rate Newtonian - nothing decisively new there. To say
that quantum physics deals with probabilities (leaving aside the most extreme formula-
tions of QED, which reify those probabilities) is not yet to distinguish it from statistical
sight into material being. Although some see the "essence" of quantum theory in the
wave-particle duality and still others in Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, it can also
be said that de Broglie's was the genetic insight: light and atomic matter, and all things
studied under physics, constitute a single order of being, dual in aspect and convertible,
From this identification the rest will be seen to follow: the complementary mani-
festations of continuous and discrete, according to the kind of interactions and observa-
tions being made; the probabilistic nature of our descriptions; the uncertainty relation
lous" behaviors and the macroscopic world with which classical physics and everyday
experience is familiar.
55
distinguishes it from the physics that had gone before - 1 submit this: quantum physics
is the attempt to comprehend nature at a level so basic that its potential aspect figures
The elements of this formulation are chosen with some care. In the last chapter I will
Quantum physics is a physics of the very small; more precisely, the physics
whose distinctive character is most prominently disclosed in the realm of the very small.
Yet "smallness" as a spatial measure is not the primary criterion, though it is closely
related (as a proper accident) to that which is the primary criterion of quantum phenom-
ena as such, namely elementarity in the sense of "closeness to prime matter." At the
significance than they do at higher levels of physical structure. At those higher levels,
all motion or change is still "driven" by the potentiality of prime matter; but the potenti-
prominence of the potential that gives quantum phenomena their distinctive characteris-
tics: distinctive both in contrast to the world encountered in sensation, and in contrast to
Having glanced at all three phases of the discipline known historically by the
one name, physics, it is opportune to compare them. Such a comparison can only be
56
provisional inasmuch as I have not plumbed the depths of the content and method of
each phase. But at a sufficiently general level I believe we can note the following.
Ancient physics was a science of motion in terms of causes inferred, at the sub-
stantial level, from the flux of accidental being. It recognized the quantitative aspects of
mobile being as the subject matter of a scientia media that was properly scientific (i.e.,
proceeding demonstratively from true and certain principles) in its mathematical as-
pects, but dependent, materially speaking, on analogical (and therefore always partial)
insights into natures themselves. While the scientia media was understood to have its
underlying substances, the variability and contingency of those same accidents militated
against the kind of physical certitude in quantitative analyses that was understood to
The rise of classical physics, on the other hand, was largely a matter of derogat-
ing from causal analysis as such (although it remained more or less implicit throughout
the classical era), and of focusing on the quantitative analysis of accidental features of
mobile being. Since the quantitative is only accidentally referred to substantial causes,
and is indiscriminate with respect to each of them, mathematical methods could not di-
rectly reveal the causal fabric of cosmic being.48 This was a relatively minor concern as
long as physics dealt with objects at higher (non-elementary) structural levels. At such
48
Thus the distinction between cause and effect is not expressed by any of the equations cited in
Section C above, but only "read into" those equations; the mathematics as such describes only
spatiotemporal relations. The causal ambiguity of mathematical physics is strikingly evident in
the correspondence between Newtonian and Einsteinian accounts of gravitation, or, within gen-
eral relativity itself, in the equivalence of gravitational and accelerative force.
57
levels the continuity afforded by subordinate "layers" of structure allowed for the dis-
causality. One could describe the acceleration or specific heat or refractive index of a
body with equations based on physical laws, because the body in its formal integrity
was presupposed, i.e., was understood to maintain a certain coherence and permanence
through space and time. The light whose velocity was measured as far back as the sev-
space, and so on. In other words, the dynamism of mobile being implied something es-
sentially constant at a deeper level. Only this implication made any sense of mathemati-
cally expressed laws of nature. At the same time, mathematical formulas depended for
there is no equation for the potential as such. Yet motion itself is an existential condi-
tion intimately bound up with potentiality and contingency. Paradoxically, then, mathe-
matical physics is not adequate to the expression of precisely that which gives rise to its
subject matter.
The era of quantum physics brought scientific analysis down to the level of ele-
mental structures where there was no longer a continuum of actual being on which to
base deterministic quantitative descriptions of the changes that were occurring. The ob-
jects of physics at this level no longer exhibited trajectories in space and time that
Probabilities loomed large, and apparently discrete phenomena could be united only via
statistical methods. Thus far the break with classical physics would seem to be deep and
58
irrevocable; but as I hope to show, what was really occurring was a confrontation, at the
new levels of physical analysis, with matter's radically potential aspect - an aspect not
through probabilities. But this does not imply a failure of classical physics, except in the
sense that it was a partial and not a comprehensive view of nature; the very existence of
the continuous, in mathematical physics, presupposed what the quantum physics would
titative expression, which turns out to be none other than prime matter in the old Aristo-
telian sense.
With the rediscovery of matter (in Aristotle's sense) we mark a return to the
broader and deeper causal analysis of ancient physics, although married, so far as possi-
ble, to the mathematical understanding and technique inherited and developed from
mathematical, partakes of the strengths and weaknesses mentioned earlier vis-a-vis the
scientia media. But in so far as it acknowledges the potentiality at the heart of material
being, it is poised to become more scientific in the traditional sense, rather than less so.
The present thesis is conceived as a study of matter (and, secondarily, of form) in the
Aristotelian sense, with an ancillary view to showing its applicability to some topics in
quantum physics. If the complete resolution of any of the quantum enigmas is a rather
too ambitious undertaking, at least I hope to show that the conceptual apparatus of the
59
and indeed provides an unexcelled basis for attacking those very enigmas. Having re-
viewed some key ideas of quantum theory, I now list five concerns as deserving special
Of course there is a great deal more to quantum physics than is contained under these
headings, but they are paradigmatic, as well as being among the major issues discussed
nature of entities at the quantum level, or to the relation between different modes of
those elemental entities; the second to the formal causality underlying changes at the
quantum level; and the third to the material causality underlying those changes. The
fourth and fifth topics are perhaps more complex, in that they entail epistemological as
well as ontological considerations; but I will suggest that they are closely related to the
first. There is, of course, some overlap in the principles that must be brought to bear on
With this in mind, I select the following aporiai for particular consideration.
[1] The wave-particle duality. Gone is the classical dichotomy whereby some
physical entities are reducible to waves, others to particles. Instead, entities which are
evidently, or at least presumably, one in nature are found to exhibit both characteristics
- and this goes for both matter and "radiant energy." Historically, this discovery began
60
netic radiation (of course, corpuscular theories of light had been around long before
this, but apparently had been laid to rest via Maxwell's electromagnetic theory), and in
the 1920s found a complement in de Broglie's hypothesis about the wave nature of elec-
trons. The wave-particle duality would become more intriguing as it was perceived that
entities are only wavelike or particlelike, never both at once, and especially problematic
with the growing realization that entities reveal wavelike or particlelike characteristics
depending on how the observations are conducted. The aporia facing us, then, is: How
can a physical being exhibit properties that are so incompatible as those of wave and
particle? And, as a corollary: How can the act of observation itself determine which
[2] Discontinuity. Gone is the classical understanding that events in space and
other states with no "in between." As a photon is released from an atom, one electron
energy level with its well defined spatial characteristics yields instantaneously to an-
other with rather different spatial characteristics, and so on. The temporal instantaneity
of the transition, though not insignificant, is perhaps not as dramatic as the spatial in-
stantaneity: one "shaped volume" is succeeded by a different one, without any process
The aporia for us: How can there be temporal transition from one spatial condition to
[3, 4] Probabilism and uncertainty. Gone is the classical worldview in which de-
terministic trajectories in space and time yield certitude, at least in principle, about
when, where, how and what physical events will occur. There are now only probabili-
ties about such occurrences, even if these probabilities are closely defined in a statistical
sense. Moreover, it appears that events in the quantum realm are such that in so far as
we determine one property - in any of those paired properties related as conjugate vari-
ables - some other property becomes less determinate (and therefore less knowable),
and vice versa. Nature will not yield the entirety of itself to our probing, but only a cer-
tain maximum of information governed by the uncertainty relation. The aporiai here:
How can individual physical states be realized in seemingly random fashion, given the
causal influences which seem to be implied in the statistical laws by which those reali-
zations are described? And: Why must a greater determinacy in one conjugate property
standing of instantaneous action at a distance - namely, that "it cannot occur." Quantum
phenomena give evidence of being correlated in ways that imply either a bizarre effect
of the very act of observation upon the outcome, or instantaneous communication be-
tween parts of the quantum system itself- in a word, action at a distance or "nonlocal"
action. The aporia would appear to be: How can either of these options comport with an
These problems and their like arise from the heart of quantum physics. As noted
earlier, the avenues by which physicists have approached such problems vary consid-
62
erably, even if the great majority have chosen one main avenue, that of Bohr-Born-
Feynman et al., rather than others. We shall adopt the realistic path of an Aristotelian-
and entitative indeterminacy; these should be seen as rather desperate notions that
In the next two chapters I will present the doctrine of matter and its correlative,
material form, respectively, with a view to showing its synthetic cogency. I will not ex-
plicitly address our quantum-physical topics until the final chapter, when it will be my
task to apply some of the conclusions of Chapters Three and Four to the preceding apo-
riai. In so doing I will hope not only to point the way to a consistent understanding of
"quantum reality," but also to make plausible a doctrine which, more venerable than
mathematical physics as such, would be abandoned by the latter only at the cost of pre-
A. Introductory
In the preceding chapter I traced three main conceptions of physics, highlighting their
differences as I established some aporiai for the present study. But the commonality
among them, in virtue of which all can lay claim to the name of "physics" despite their
differences, was also evident in the comparisons; and that commonality may fairly be
understanding of physics.
sensible. These notae are grounded in its being material - and in fact physics is often
science of "matter in motion." But what is matter? In taking up this deceptively simple
question, or the closely related one, How is material being constituted?, we are at the
heart of man's coming to terms with the cosmos and with his own existence.
exaggeration as the attempt to think through matter and its implications. At its
inception, the Ionian physicalists are attempting to explain all things through some
Parmenides startles us to this day with a "grand unified theory" that ignores the
pressing demands of material being on our senses. For Democritus, all is matter and its
negation, void; Plato, wedded to his Forms, can only introduce them as explanatory
chora or receptacle which has so many of the characterizations that Aristotle would as-
sign to hyle, matter properly speaking. With Aristotle and his successors over two mil-
lennia, a theory of matter as a principle that is intrinsic even while transcending the
visible order takes its place at the foundations of philosophical thought - as implied in
the very division of the sciences. Modern science, all but dominating the intellectual
scene in the last few centuries, makes a certain conception of matter central to all else;
and philosophers of the same era do not always resist the temptation to erect materialis-
What we call matter is so fundamental that, while everyone "knows" what it is,
Modern physics has a definition, a primordial one, for mass, but a concept of matter
scarcely more refined than that of the common man. And for the physicist, mass is - in
material being in their worldview, we must note that matter is also, and especially,
apprehended in contrast to that which is its opposite. If there is no kind of being other
than the material, why speak of matter at all? Why is it not synonymous with being?
Yet the common experience of mankind discerns a level of being that is contraposed to
matter: an order of being that is not sensible, measurable, quantifiable, spatial or even
temporal - what is designated as the immaterial, or spiritual. With realities falling under
this latter head my inquiry is not concerned; but they do constitute a backdrop to that
inquiry In starting an investigation as deep as that into the nature of matter, we can do
no better than to trace, however briefly, the historical path of the philosophers - indeed
wise. It is not an a priori concept of matter that we seek, but that which validates the
common experience of man, as confronted in and disclosed through the senses. Reflec-
tion upon the sense datum issued, eventually, in a concept of matter that, for all its elu-
The physical impulse that arose with the Ionian thinkers and continued down to the time
of Aristotle is more remarkable for unity of purpose than for the diversity of its mani-
festations. Always the underlying concern is to explain the world of experience in terms
of first principles. To explain: things are not self-proclaiming, but point inevitably be-
yond themselves, refusing to stand alone in our awareness. The world of experience: it
66
is that which falls within the realm of the sensible that first and always demands expla-
nation, even if thinkers commonly discern a supra-sensible order of being, lurking be-
hind what is seen, as well. In terms of first principles: each explanation leads to a new
level of questioning, and a deeper level of explanation; the philosopher is drawn toward
ever more prior principles of explanation, seeking greater unity through paucity of prin-
Aristotle, more than his master Plato, was wont to trace with care the opinions of
his predecessors, as in the dialectical first books of his Physics and Metaphysics: these
references now constitute a main source for the physical opinions of the earliest Greek
thought concerning matter, in the very place where he is tracing the order of material
1
Summa theologiae la, 44.2: "dicendum quod antiqui philosophi paulatim, et quasi pede-
tentim, intraverunt in cognitionem veritatis. A principio enim, quasi grossiores existentes, non
existimabant esse entia nisi corpora sensibilia. Quorum qui ponebant in eis motum, non consid-
erabant motum nisi secundum aliqua accidentia, ut puta secundum raritatem et densitatem, con-
gregationem et segregationem. Et supponentes ipsam substantiam corporum increatam,
assignabant aliquas causas huiusmodi accidentalium transmutationum, ut puta amicitiam, litem,
intellectum, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Ulterius vero procedentes, distinxerunt per intellectum inter
formam substantialem et materiam, quam ponebant increatam; et perceperunt transmutationem
fieri in corporibus secundum formas essentiales. Quarum transmutationum quasdam causas uni-
versaliores ponebant, ut obliquum circulum, secundum Aristotelem, vel ideas, secundum Pla-
tonem. Sed considerandum est quod materia per formam contrahitur ad determinatam speciem;
sicut substantia alicuius speciei per accidens ei adveniens contrahitur ad determinatum modum
essendi, ut homo contrahitur per album. Utrique igitur consideraverunt ens particulari quadam
consideratione, vel inquantum est hoc ens, vel inquantum est tale ens. Et sic rebus causas agen-
tes particulares assignaverunt. Et ulterius aliqui erexerunt se ad considerandum ens inquantum
est ens, et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt haec vel talia, sed
secundum quod sunt entia. Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse
causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt talia per formas accidentales, nee secundum
quod sunt haec per formas substantiales, sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse
67
calists more often than not answered to a truly philosophical spirit of inquiry. Too many
histories of science fail to credit the ancients with penetrating vision: but when Thales,
for example, says that "all is water" he is not offering a mere story, but has reflected
deeply on the constitution of things and concluded that those features of being which
are most manifest in water are the principles needed to account for water, and all else.
Aristotle notes that Thales made water primordial, "getting the notion perhaps from see-
tion, one signaling the difficulty of completing the transition from a sensible to an intel-
lectual grasp of reality: their first principles tend to be either very close to the sensible
order, or very far removed from it. These extremes are paradoxically related, for both,
as I see it, reflect taking an "easy way out" - to see, either in certain features of sensible
reality or in its simple negation, the explanans one is driven to find. To be hesitant in
enough. But once there exists a realization that that move is called for, an outright nega-
illorum quocumque modo. Et sic oportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam ab universali
causa entium." Leonine edition, vol. 4, pages 457-8 (hereafter thus: Leon. 4.457-8).
2
Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.3 (983b20-24). All translations of Aristotle will be from Richard
McKeon's The Basic Works of Aristotle, translated by various authors (New York: Random
House, 1941). Cf. Heraclitus Homericus, Homeric Questions 22: "For moist natural substance,
since it is easily formed into each different thing, is accustomed to undergo very various
changes....Therefore Thales declared that water, of the four elements, was the most active, as it
were, as a cause." Cited in G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philoso-
phers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1983) (hereafter KRS),
p. 92. Thales may have also posited an immaterial principle, soul, based on the attractive prop-
erties of magnetic stones (cf. Aristotle, De anima, 405al9), but this has more the aspect of effi-
cient cause.
68
tion of the sensible order will occur more readily than nuanced distinctions, as it is prior
The basic element, which for Thales was "water," would be designated by
less monistic, if more subtle, as he said "that the principle and element is the Indefinite
(apeiron), not distinguishing air or water or anything else."4 This apeiron was by no
means immaterial, but simply a stuff which of itself had no specification.5 Xenophanes
took up a popular idea when he reduced all mutable being to earth and water.6 Empedo-
cles would apparently be the first to identify four "roots," presented as gods, but already
understood by his contemporaries to be earth, water, air and fire.7 The impulse toward
recognizing a plurality of elements is easily understood; unity of itself cannot give rise
to plurality.
For Anaxagoras there will be no warrant for either a single element or any finite
number of them: every kind of cosmic being is represented in kind at the elemental
own, but constituting the various kinds of being when they come together in sufficient
3
KRS, p. 598.
*KRS,p. 100.
5
KRS, p. 110.
6
KRS, p. 176; cf. Iliad 7.99.
7
KRS, p. 286.
69
numbers, being more or less "sifted" from those of unlike kind: all things have a portion
of everything.8
longer distinguished as to kind, but quantitatively: they are infinitely varied in shape
In contrast to the material preoccupations mentioned thus far were the emphases
placed upon form or structure by some thinkers. Heraclitus, though recognizing three
elements (fire, water or "sea," and earth - with fire clearly being given a primal role), is
above all attentive to the logos or formal arrangement of things.10 The composition and
re-arrangement of opposing principles, made possible only by the divinely unifying lo-
gos. Pythagoras and his followers seem to have displaced material considerations even
more completely in their mystagogic focus upon number and harmony in all things.
Parmenides likewise will have no use for a "stuff in any material sense. Like
Pythagoras, he offers no natural philosophy to speak of; he wrests the observed world of
change to an intellectual standstill by insisting on the unity of all being, and a conse-
quent skepticism as to the evidence of the senses: "light" and "dark," though introduced
as cosmic elements, are but inventions to save the appearances; they belong only to the
8
KRS, p. 358.
9
itf,pp.414f.
10
KRS, pp. 198f.
n
KRS, pp. 255-1.
70
principle, void not only seemed to resolve a problem concerning the possibility of
ity in being that would not be liable to the charge of infinite regress (if being A specifies
or individuates being B, what specifies or individuates being AT), and allowed for main-
In this brief survey of physical principles before Plato we should mention also
the varied roles occasionally played by an agent principle. Implicitly or explicitly asso-
ciated with divine activity in several of these early thinkers, the role would be expressly
scarcely distinguished from the subject particles themselves, being reduced to properties
ples, in relatively few instances supported by more formal considerations, and but sel-
dom juxtaposed with a principle of motion distinct from the material principle itself.
When such a motive principle is intrinsic, it is not distinguished from the actuality of
the material component as such. The unifying principles sought by the physicalists
tended to be material in the sense that they constituted simply the "stuff of the uni-
12
Although this reification of nonbeing, assigning to "nothing" distinct features such as spatial-
ity and dimension, would not withstand the critique of Aristotle, it would remain very much a
part of the thought of so great a physicist as Newton.
71
verse, in no further need of formal principles distinct from the stuff itself. "Of the first
philosophers, then, most thought the principles which were of the nature of matter were
the only principles of all things....and therefore they think nothing is either generated or
destroyed, since this sort of entity is always conserved.... Yet they do not all agree as to
the number and the nature of these principles."13 The being of the elements is always
conceived, though not of course articulated, only as actual, even if indeterminately so.
C. Plato's chora
With Socrates and Plato the emphasis of philosophy shifts to the ethical and political,
and natural philosophy recedes well into the background. But Plato, in Timaeus, does
metaphysical in tone (as well as being couched in the mythical language that Plato re-
serves for the most difficult and obscure areas of philosophic inquiry). I submit that his
granted.14
Everything that comes to be is a copy of its maker's own goodness and perfec-
tion: this is "the supremely valid principle of becoming and of the order of the world"
(29E). This work of Reason, of intelligibility - the burden of the first main part of Ti-
The second main part (47E-69A) deals with the contrasting principle of Neces-
sity, which is opposed to freedom (and hence, it would seem, to goodness). As J. Sallis
has observed, the "new beginning" in which Timaeus ventures to discourse upon a sec-
ond kind of things, those which involve necessity, is heralded by the term chalepon -
in the almost faltering pages that ensue: in the wide range of metaphors that are used to
circumlocute the chora, the principle of necessity, itself; in the designation of the kind
At first one might suppose Necessity, that which is juxtaposed with Reason, to
be "that which cannot be other than it is," but it soon becomes clear that the opposite is
somehow the case: necessity is what can only be other than it is, nothing at all in its own
right, an entity in flux, or rather a manifestation, and as such wholly subordinate and
determination, contraposed, in other words, to the freedom whereby the Good commu-
What is first introduced in terms of necessity is also denoted, from the beginning
of this new phase of the discourse (48 A), as the Errant Cause. I believe this means sim-
ply that what is clearly a "cause," in the sense of being a sine qua non of cosmogenesis,
is at the same time infinitely malleable, determinable: involving in some sense the pos-
15
John Sallis, Chorology: On Beginning in Plato's Timaeus (Bloomington, Ind., 1999), p. 12.
73
cession of Forms in themselves. Inquiring more deeply into this mysterious passivity,
Plato begins with a series of metaphors which depict "a form difficult and obscure,"
which "more than anything else...is the Receptacle (hypodoche) - as it were, the Nurse
- of all Becoming" (49A). The "elements" as cognized by his predecessors cannot com-
prise the deepest principles of cosmic being. They cannot be identified with any sensi-
ble substances, every single one of which is manifestly in constant flux; rather, the so-
course, the passivity which we have already assigned to the order of things-becoming,
and this is corroborated by a number of the images that will follow. But "nurse" may
seem anomalous. Why would Plato resort to an image that hardly seems primordial
image of the nurse - and specifically of the wet-nurse, with its connotations of nourish-
ing (and so enabling) life while not actually bringing it forth (the prerogative of the
mother) - is well suited to depicting a principle which, although a sine qua non of form-
Plato then likens the substrate successively to gold, fashionable into infinitely
varied shapes; to a mother, whose reception of the paternal likeness gives rise to his off-
spring; to the neutral base used by parfumiers; and to the shapeless wax which receives
all shapes (50B-51A). Finally, having reiterated that "we shall not be deceived if we call
way of the intelligible and very hard to apprehend" (5 IB), Plato introduces the notion of
the chora, a word which can be variously translated but for which "space" is a good
74
situation for all things that come into being, itself apprehended without the senses by a
sort of bastard reasoning, scarcely an object even of opinion (51E-52B). It is further lik-
ened to what we behold in a dream, where place is not really place - not a thing, nor yet
nothing. What precisely is this choral Some commentators would equate it with the
space of everyday experience, or that in which mathematical entities are posited; but
this is too facile. Would such a space really tax Timaeus's powers of understanding and
articulation to the utmost? Would it call forth such repeated warnings of difficulty, not
space for what it is worth, but it remains only an image. Chora designates primarily not
just space, but space as that in which something occurs, or is brought about.
from the eternal Forms. But what distinguishes the impermanent from the permanent is
simply the negation of the permanent's permanence. The Receptacle, it seems to me, is
posited as the principle of negation of the permanence of the Forms - the negation, not
of the permanence of the Forms of course, but of the permanence of the Forms-as-
mordial ontological principles, this principle of negation must be none other than the
principle of manifestation itself. It is precisely in the manifesting of the Forms that the
ceivedness," of the Forms that constitutes their likenesses or appearances in the sensible
order.
75
If we look for a common meaning in all of Timaeus's metaphors for the Recep-
teristic of a recipient, inasmuch as what is merely passive cannot "hold on" to any
in the order of being-becoming. To say that the not-formness of the Forms, or the im-
permanence of the permanent, is what constitutes the "third kind" in Timaeus's cosmol-
ogy, is to say that we are at the limit of intelligible discourse altogether. It is not merely
because Plato's Timaeus has brought us to the threshold of intelligibility that the discus-
sion of the chora is fraught with elusive and metaphorical language. That threshold is
the meeting-point of a certain kind of being and non-being. Underneath all appearances
As noted above, the pre-Socratic physical thinkers, while animated by a search for unity
of underlying principle, generally failed to make a crucial distinction within that realm
of being that they sought to explain: their principles, however concrete or abstract in
concept, were in every case either actual (i.e., no less actual than that to which they
stood as principles), or an absolute negation of that actuality (cf. the void of the ato-
mists). Opposed to these variants on the physicalist theme were the "escape routes" of
the metaphysicians: Parmenides especially, and - more subtly - Plato himself. I include
76
Plato here in so far as his emphasis on the reality of the supra-sensible order, and even
his resorting to myth in such works as the Timaeus, impede his analysis of nature prop-
erly speaking. Nevertheless, as we have seen, his presentation of the obscure, unintelli-
gible yet (almost) intrinsic nature of the chora places him well beyond the earlier
thinkers. In a word, Plato offers a distinction between levels or grades of reality that
It is Aristotle whose relentless analysis, first of changes in being and then of be-
ing itself, will result in a fully articulated understanding of matter as a principle of the
real, rather than a being in its own right. Yet this principle is located solidly in the heart
of being, as truly constitutive of it: matter enters into a real ontological composition,
The notion of matter which enters Aristotle's philosophy by the twofold route of
physics and metaphysics (thereafter to permeate much of his thinking in one analogical
guise or another) serves to distinguish the three great realms of scientific thought (epis-
teme) according to their objects and the way in which those objects are known: physics,
these domains, in a way that his predecessors never did, without discerning the role of
matter in its radical primacy, as constituting the difference between the human intellect,
with its ordering to being as such, and cosmic flux, the appearing and disappearing of
Despite, or rather because of, the very fundamental role played by the Aristote-
lian doctrine of matter, authentic expression of that doctrine has been controverted al-
77
most from the beginning. Perhaps no feature of Aristotle's physics and metaphysics is
more revolutionary with respect to his own intellectual antecedents, or more charged
with implications for the rest of philosophy. In identifying matter as an ultimate sub-
strate, beyond the threshold of being itself so to speak, Aristotle brings us to the limit of
intelligibility. Devoid of nearly all the positive characteristics that its analogues had en-
joyed in the thought of his predecessors (Plato's chora being the notable exception),
matter as conceived by Aristotle would nonetheless enter deeply into his metaphysical
fabric - to say nothing of its role in the posterior sciences, which treat of material being
specifically.
Physics and Metaphysics. (His further treatment of this topic in On generation and cor-
ruption and On heaven and earth is occasionally more lucid, but adds nothing substan-
tially different.)
by his predecessors, rejects them one by one on his way to the dialectical conclusion
that the principles of mobile (changing) being must be plural but not infinite (Chapters
3, 4), must be contraries (Chapter 5), and need not be more than three in number (Chap-
ter 6). His reasoning, in a nutshell, is that a mere pairing of principles, one acting on the
other, would seem to yield nothing more than an opposition from which no new thing
could issue. But to invoke more than three principles, on the other hand, is to multiply
78
commonly understood in one sense to perdure through the change, and in another sense
not.17 In the case of an accidental change it is apparent that the substance remains while
one accident succeeds another.18 But even substantial changes require, by analogical
inference, a substrate.19 This is a crucial point whose proof is left to the Metaphysics,20
but which is indicated in the Physics by reference to the instance of plants and animals
coming from "seed." (What Aristotle has in mind here, apparently, is seed as being sub-
stantially different from the developed organism: perhaps in the sense of "sperm" rather
than "embryo.")
dary matter: these are only analogically related, the latter being informed matter and to
that extent radically distinct from primary matter, which is utterly formless. The infer-
ence to prime matter is what sets Aristotle firmly in opposition to his forbears who, al-
though preoccupied - we may even say to excess - with what Aristotle will call the
material cause, nevertheless do not proceed beyond what, for Aristotle, must remain
might speculate as to his motivation, in the context of an apparent conviction of both the
eternity of the world and the analogical continuity of all cosmic being, speculation it
Aristotle acknowledges that earlier thinkers were right in denying that anything
can come from sheer nonbeing. But where the physicalists and atomists only conceive
of "being" under one or another aspect, however elementary (an aspect always actual,
though of course they do not denote it thus) - such that every cosmic being is under-
stood to arise only from pre-existent being - Aristotle posited a qualified nonbeing, and
First there is a purely potential principle of being which is matter - a ground de-
void of actuality, incapable of existence in its own right, yet a factor in existent being,
process ex nihild).
totle notes that this is not one of the "contraries" demanded by his earlier analysis: these
are, rather, form and privation (Chapter 7). Form is the principle of specificity and intel-
ligibility, the "whatness" of an existent. It is the principle which terminates every proc-
ess of change, but is immutable in and of itself (Aristotle shares Plato's deep conviction
21
Physics 192a2-34.
80
that cosmic becoming is refractory to intelligibility). Along with matter, form is a posi-
tive principle of motion since its real presence in the mobile is a per se cause of mobil-
ity. But matter cannot be one of the contrary principles required by motion, because it
perdures. The principle which stands as contrary to form, the terminus ad quern of mo-
tion considered precisely as not present in the mobile, is of the formal order though not
of matter's potentiality, arising in virtue of a. present form, but in the matter. It is the ab-
sence of a certain form which, as all our experience of change testifies, "directs" change
in one course rather than another. (In the acorn is a negation of everything except
Aware that his introduction of both matter (as a principle of receptivity to form)
and privation (as a specific principle of the nonexistence of form) marks a decisive
break with his precursors, Aristotle is at pains to distinguish the two (Chapter 9).
doxically similar and dissimilar. Neither can be identified v/ith form as a present actual-
ity; but while privation differs from form in being not present, matter differs from form
in being not actual. How, then, can Aristotle go on to say that matter, but not privation,
190b23.
192a2-6.
192a5.
81
existent being, while privation is not. To say that matter is not actual is not to deprive it
of all hold on reality: it is a real lack of a certain actuality, which is to say a potentiality,
in the concrete existent, nor as such is it incompatible with form as the present actuality.
Actuality as such does not preclude receptivity to further actuality, and such receptivity
Although privation shares with the form the note of formality, of being a
"what," it is one in subject with matter.25 The material principle is, in its own right, a
receptivity; but its receptivity is with respect to a form - more particularly, the form re-
ferred to under the aspect of privation. It is not form which has the inclination to be re-
placed by other form; nothing in form's intelligibility implies this; rather, it is matter
which "desires the form".26 Hence privation is "in" a subject which is identified as mat-
ter.
The Aristotelian analysis of change in terms of matter and privation, act and po-
tency, is presented in the context of resolving the impasse into which physical specula-
tion had hitherto been led; all the quandaries of earlier thinkers concerning the roles of
being and nonbeing in change or coming-to-be are dispensed with, through Aristotle's
recognition of qualified nonbeing. "It was through failure to make this distinction [be-
tween absolute and relative non-being] that those thinkers gave the matter up, and
190b23ff.
192al7-24.
82
through this error that they went so much farther astray as to suppose that nothing else
comes to be or exists apart from Being itself, thus doing away with all becoming."27
Since matter is the ultimate substrate, it cannot have come into being, nor can it
pass out of being, since its nature is precisely to be ultimate, i.e., to presuppose no fur-
ther subject in which to inhere. But without a subject (here we again note Aristotle's
In Book II of the Physics Aristotle identifies matter as one of the four causes -
two intrinsic (material and formal cause) and two extrinsic (efficient and final cause).
Further, having shown that all motion, even that occurring "by chance," is for an end,
he shows that there is a necessity in the mobile but this necessity is not that of the end;
rather, the principle of necessity is identified with matter itself.29 This may seem strange
for a principle of indeterminate receptivity, but the necessity Aristotle refers to is only a
conditional or hypothetical necessity: given such and such an end, then such and such
will be necessitated with respect to the matter. (The bell need not come into being, but if
it is coming to be, then bronze is indispensable.) Broadly stated: matter is necessary for
any change whatever, but the nature of the change is not determined by the matter, but
anism of several earlier philosophers, as well as that necessity associated by Plato with
191M0-13.
192a25-34.
200al5.
83
the chora. The relation of necessity to matter's ratio as substrate will be evident: if no
In Book III Aristotle defines motion as "the act of the potential as potential."30
He acknowledges the difficulty of this formulation, a difficulty that arises from its pri-
mordiality - it is concerned with what is barely actual. Motion clearly involves both ac-
tuality and potentiality; it is neither potentiality alone, which is prior to motion (as
terminus a quo), nor actuality alone, which is posterior to motion (as terminus ad
quern). To speak only of "the act of the potential" - except, as Aristotle occasionally
uses it, as a shorthand expression for "act of the potential as potential" - would be in-
adequate. For, in the cosmic order, every act presupposes a potentiality, and every po-
tentiality is so with respect to some act: so that every hylomorphic being is "the act of a
potential." Thus far only stasis is indicated, but we want to express the dynamism of
motion.
Bearing in mind that motion is from one state of being to another, i.e., from one
accidental level), we discern in mobile being both a potentiality (in virtue of its material
principle) and an actuality (in virtue of its formal principle). It is the dynamism which
such a being possesses with respect to further information that Aristotle seeks to convey
fuller expression of his meaning would be "actuality of the potential to be what is po-
201al0; Hardie and Gaye's "fulfilment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists poten-
tially" (McKeon ed., p. 254) reads too much into the Aristotelian text. Cf. 202a7.
84
tential," taking "potential" in the first usage with a purely existential connotation, and in
Language is being strained, to be sure, but we should expect no less. What is ac-
tual in motion is the ability-to-be of what is not (yet). What the definition seeks to con-
vey is a state midway between potency and act, using only "potency" and "act" as
suitably prior elements of the definition. What characterizes motion is that it is neither
merely potential, nor fully actual, in terms of that to which it tends. Eliminate either as-
One of the difficulties in grasping the definition is that the notion of end, which
definition: it is implied in the notion of "potential" (as that term first appears in the
definition). It is only with respect to an end, a "toward which," that potentiality can be
understood. Aristotle seems to express this role of the final cause in a word of his own
are calling "actuality." The roots of the word indicate "holding the end," which I take to
What is the role of matter with respect to motion? Matter is the intrinsic source
of the mobile's potentiality, but is not itself a per se moving cause. As Aristotle shows
immediately after presenting the definition of motion (Chapter 3), motion does not oc-
cur except through the agency of an extrinsic mover (efficient cause). This agency in
31
In an "existential" formulation there is less ambiguity: "existence of the existibility of the
existible." Or again, "the be-ing of the can be of what can be."
85
turn is only in virtue of an end; so all four causes must be brought in, in a full account
of motion. There is a correlation between the agent and material causes: the cause of
matter alone - despite the nature of matter as potency - it would seem not. This is due
to the need of an actuating or efficient cause in motion. Of course the analysis of mobile
being in the Physics is just that, an investigation into being as mobile, so we would not
expect it to address being in a way not involving motion. We do not find, nor is it mean-
ingful to conceptualize, any "material being" within the physical realm that has no ex-
trinsic cause, actuating matter's potency.32 It will remain for metaphysics to address
In Metaphysics Book III, Aristotle places matter squarely among those things
whose investigation belongs to a science of being as such.33 All the theories of the pre-
Socratics, down to that of his own teacher Plato, are here put in question: are cosmic
existents composite, or not? Is there an order of causality beyond that of brute matter (in
Aristotle will situate his discussion of matter in the context of discerning the
fourfold causal fabric of the universe, a fabric considerably more intricate than hitherto
supposed. In Book V, the Lexicon, he presents the notions of matter as cause (Chapter
2), as natural principle (Chapter 4), as substance (Chapter 8), as potency (Chapter 12),34
such - having already, in the last book of the Physics, concluded to the existence of an
order of being transcending matter and mobility - Aristotle nonetheless anchors even
his metaphysical investigation in the data that are best known to us, i.e. in the realm of
material substances.35
dicates that of four (or more) senses in which the term is applied, "substrate"
(hypokeimenon) is prior to the others (ousia, kath' auto, genos); but substrate in turn can
be resolved into substrate proper (hyle), form (morphe), and the combination of these
of, beings discloses the primordiality of hyle: "When all else is stripped off evidently
nothing but matter remains.. ..By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particu-
lar thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any of the other categories by which
being is determined. For there is something of which each of these is predicated, whose
34
See 1019al 5-20.
35
Thus it is bodies to which substance "is thought to belong most obviously" (1028b8-9);
"Some of the sensible substances are generally admitted to be substances, so that we must look
first among these....For learning proceeds for all in this way - through that which is less know-
able by nature to that which is more knowable" (1029a35-b 5).
36
1042a25-27.
37
1029a3-4.
87
being is different from that of each of the predicates (for the predicates other than sub-
Where the analysis of mobile being as mobile had pointed, by way of analogy,
being which entails, by the way of predication, a material substrate as ne plus ultra of
our understanding. (Note that the two approaches are related: predication supposes a
knowledge of cosmic being which is gained, ultimately, through abstraction from the
conditions of mobility, as the mind moves from the level of sensation to properly intel-
lectual knowing.)
Matter, having appeared in an ultimate role in the deepening search for what is
first, turns out not to be the "ultimate substance" since it lacks, by virtue of its sheer in-
determinacy, the "separability and 'thisness' [which] are thought to belong especially to
substance."39 Analysis per viam predicationis has taken us too far, in view of Aristotle's
"[A]ll things produced either by nature or by art have matter; for each of them is
capable both of being and of not being, and this capacity is the matter in each."40 Again,
"by matter I mean that which, not being a 'this' actually, is potentially a 'this'." 41 These
38
1029al3-14, 20-24. Aristotle, here as elsewhere, is not indulging in an "analytical" exercise
in the modern sense, beyond what is entailed in the recognition that all our knowledge of the
world is our knowledge. The universal apprehensions of mankind are indispensable in attaining
to a properly human and communicable episteme.
39
1029a27-28.
40
1032a20-22.
41
1042a27-28.
88
are key texts in any understanding of Aristotle's doctrine of matter. Not only is matter
that which perdures through change, securing continuity; it is the very possibility of
change, the potency to newness-in-being. This note of potency emerges directly neither
from the analysis of change, nor from the analysis of predication. How is matter's char-
than intrinsic causes. Nothing moves itself, whence there must be efficient or agent cau-
sality; and no agent cause acts but for an end, as evidenced in the directedness of every
even in "chance" events) is due primarily to extrinsic factors, but entails an intrinsic co-
principle as well: the activity of the agent implies the passivity, the ability to be acted
upon, of a patient.
Now Aristotle explicitly denies that the potentiality of matter, dynamis, can be
unity: "of the things that are thought to be substances, most are only potencies [dy-
nameis] - both the parts of animals (for none of them exists separately; and when they
are separated, then too they exist, all of them, merely as matter), and earth and fire and
air."42 He notes also that since "'unity' is used like the term 'being', and the substance
of that which is one is one, and things whose substance is numerically one are numeri-
cally one, evidently neither unity nor being can be the substance of things."43 But - and
here is Aristotle's key insight - where logical circularity forbids that the principle of
1040b5-8.
1040b16-19.
89
substantial unity should itself be a unity, dynamis is not being but a potency to being,
What Aristotle discerns, through mobile being, is that a "can be" coexists with
what "is." Privation of form alone is not a cause of change, since a non-existent form
cannot be a source of activity. This is why Aristotle calls privation a principle only per
accidens, and not a cause. But matter, "the possibility to be and not to be," is a dynamic
tendency toward otherness in the existing being. Privation is a specification of that oth-
erness, hence of the formal order; matter is the possibility of privation's realization.
And while matter is completely indeterminate in itself, it is always conjoined with form,
(ousia), Aristotle says that "clearly the question is why the matter is some definite
thing."44 Why does he frame the question in this way, taking matter for granted, as it
were? The approach by way of removing predicates left him with a principle described
spects the treatment in Physics II, makes it clear that matter is the existential possibility
of form, and whatever realizes this mere potency of the substrate will be substance in
the primary sense. "Thus what we are seeking is the cause [i.e., the form] in virtue of
which the matter is a definite thing; and this is the substance of the thing."46
A "definite thing": this implies unity, the unity of "separability and individual-
ity," and Aristotle will at once begin to speak of "that which is compounded...so that
the whole is one, not like a heap but like a syllable."47 Moving beyond the quantitative-
configuration accounts of substance which his Eleatic predecessors had offered (and
which the atomistic reductionism of our own era too often embraces), but which proved
incapable of explaining the true unity of composite being, Aristotle uses the analogy of
something better known to us, the constitution of a syllable out of its letters. The point
is, of course, that a syllable as such transcends its material elements (letters) to consti-
tute a unity defined by a particular telos (intelligible communication). That the combi-
nation of multiple letters and more besides (a formal principle) should add up to a unity
does violence to a naive conception. Only the relative nonbeing of material parts con-
sidered as dynameis saves Aristotle from contradiction, and saves natural philosophy
from the contradictions and inadequacies that had burdened it thus far.
None of this is to suggest that form and matter are entities somehow melded to-
gether. Form has been adduced by Aristotle as the very unifying of the matter,48 a mat-
ter whose actual (formal) multiplicity at a lower of level of being serves as a mere
potency to higher actual unity. The insight which Plato and the materialist reductionists
had failed to arrive at is this: with respect to being X, the constituent parts, metaphysi-
46
1041b8-9.
47
1041M2-13.
48
1041M-12.
91
cally speaking, are only in potency thereto. Actual unity is composed of a plurality of
principles having no actuality in their own right.49 Relative non-being must be recog-
nized in order that the unity of being itself be preserved; the alternatives, expressed all
too clearly by Heraclitus, Parmenides, and even Plato, only replace a difficult concept
E. Neoplatonic commentators
Between the epoch of Aristotle and that of his rediscovery in thirteenth-century Europe,
the main developments in the consideration of matter were at the hands of the Neopla-
tonists, especially Simplicius and John Philoponus, whose views I will here take as rep-
Aristotelian and Platonic perspectives, it will not be surprising that, in their commentar-
ies on Aristotle's treatment of prime matter, Simplicius and Philoponus are largely oc-
cupied with ideas of extension and spatiality, the latter being a chief connotation of the
Platonic chora. But how much foundation is there in the Aristotelian corpus for assign-
ing such notes to matter? Almost none, except the rather obscure passage in Metaphys-
ics VII (Z), concerned with the mind's attainment of prime matter through the removal
This applies to form no less than matter, though the point is often overlooked. Apart from its
materiation, form has no existence a la Plato; form, though it can be apprehended apart from
matter, may be thought of metaphysically (not physically) as a potency to existence. This will
be made clearer in the thought of Aquinas.
50
A good overview and analysis, and my guide in what follows, is Richard Sorabji, Matter,
Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and their Sequel (London, 1988).
92
of predicates: "when length and breadth and depth are taken away we see nothing left
his Commentary on the Physics, a theory of prime matter as indefinite extension (di-
astema aoristori).52 As we have seen, Aristotle observed in Physics IV.2, when discuss-
ing the nature of place, that if place were identified with the extension of a thing's
magnitude (rather than with the magnitude itself, as a delimitation), then place would be
matter. "Matter or the indeterminate is of this nature; when the boundary and attributes
of a sphere are taken away, nothing but the matter is left."53 Aristotle is on his way here
to the conclusion that place cannot be matter (or form); the context clearly suggests that
logical priority to matter. (As Sorabji notes, Aristotle may not even be going this far, if
the phrase here translated "of this nature" denotes only a likeness.)54
magnitude (magnitude being an accident rather than pertaining to a subject), and there-
fore without extension,55 Simplicius says prime matter can be construed as extension
will see that Aquinas's own account of matter as ground of dimensive quantity is mid-
51
1029al6-18.
52
cf. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, p. 21.
53
209b9-10.
54
Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, p. 9.
55
Cf. Sorabji, p. 10.
93
little justified by Aristotle's numerous other references to matter, upon a text in which
Aristotle is manifestly describing a view not his own. "In so far as place is thought [i.e.,
matter. For the extension is distinct from [i.e., prior to] the magnitude; it is embraced
and made definite by form, for example by a surface and a perimeter. And that is what
matter and indefinite things are like. For when . . . nothing is left except matter."56 Even
if "are like" denotes "of the same nature" unequivocally, the natural reading of the pas-
which for Aristotle is only posited in the mind. Substantial form, it is abundantly clear
elsewhere in Aristotle, is much more than what extension "is embraced and made defi-
nite by."
what we have of his writing on matter as extension is based (tenuously) on Physics IV.
as equating extension and matter in Metaphysics VII. 3. His views developed consid-
erably over his lifetime; early on, he held that quantity, constituted by the three dimen-
sions, is the first thing to inhere in prime matter (making extended matter a "second
subject," the recipient of all further accidents).57 Later, however, Philoponus, still ap-
parently basing himself on that text in the Metaphysics, regards prime matter (the "first
subject") as already three-dimensional - albeit indefinitely so, thus coming into substan-
with the primal notion of matter's potency was a significant step on the part of these
thinkers, and constitutes, may we say, a tribute to the insight of Plato himself - an in-
sight which, albeit transformed, will not disappear altogether from the Thomistic doc-
A cursory examination (with the help of Busa's Index Thomisticus) of the more than
300 references to materia prima (prima materia) in Aquinas's writings turns up a wide
array of conceptions, attributes, nuances. On the one hand this should not be surprising:
if substantial or prime matter, as we have seen, is indeed a first principle of all cosmic
being, why should we not expect to find it being alluded to under a variety ofrationesl
On the other hand, its very status as primordial, as standing at the threshold of transcen-
dence, implies that we should be able to predicate nothing of it in direct fashion. Thus
grounded in matter's cosmic primacy - such that all aspects of physical being can be
referred ultimately to the primal material principle. At the same time, all discourse on
prime matter proceeds by way of analogy and negation, indirectly, in terms of matter's
co-principle, form.
58
See Sorabji, pp. 29f.
95
philosopher, for whom unity must ever be a sign of understanding and of truth. Until
these diverse references can be brought together under a unified conception, ordered in
an intelligible sequence, we cannot yet claim to have invested "prime matter" with a
sufficiently fundamental meaning. It will be part of my task to collate the different ra-
tiones of prime matter in Aquinas and to show their relationship in terms of priority and
first principle of physical and sensible being. I begin with a condensed survey of Tho-
For Aquinas (the remarkable consistency of whose doctrine, across the 18-year
of span of his writing, is well established), prime matter is what must underlie genera-
tion and mutation;59 found only in physical substances,60 it is the first material princi-
ple,61 receptive of, or in potency to, natural forms62 (all of them63) in a certain order64 -
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4 ("materia prima, quae generationi substat" -
Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 25); Summa theologiae la q. 16, a. 8 ("id quod remanet post omnem
mutationem, est immutabile: sicut prima materia est ingenita et incorruptibilis, quia remanet
post omnem generationem et corruptionem" - Leon. 4.216); In libros De generatione et corrup-
tione lib. 1, lect. 10 ("hyle, sive materia prima, est maxime proprium subiectum susceptibile
generationis et corruptionis" - Leon. 3.301); In libros Physicorum I, lect. 13 ("natura quae
primo subiicitur mutationi, idest materia prima" - Leon. 2.46).
60
De substantiis separatis c. 7 ("non potest esse prima materia spiritualis et intellectualis
substantiae" - Leon. 40.D52:70-72).
61
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 4 ("materia prima dicitur dupliciter: vel ita
quod primum importet ordinem naturae; vel ita quod importet ordinem temporis. Secundum
quod importat ordinem naturae, materia prima est illud in quo ultimo stat resolutio corporum
naturalium" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 313); De principiis naturae c. 2 ("Ipsa autem materia
que intelligitur sine qualibet forma et priuatione, sed subiecta forme et priuationi, dicitur mate-
ria prima, propter hoc quod ante ipsam non est alia materia" - Leon. 43.41:74-78); Sententia
libri Metaphysicae VIII, lect. 4.
96
tain the "seminal reasons" of things. 67 It receives but one form at a time, 68 this form
rather than form understood universally; 69 as subject of privation, 70 as the common sub-
62
Summa contra gentiles II, c. 76 ("formae naturales recipiuntur in materia prima" - Leon.
13.480:3la-32a); III, c. 22 ("materia prima est in potentia primo ad formam elementi" - Leon.
14.53:9b-llb).
63
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4 ("omnes formae sunt in potentia in materia
prima" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 27); d. 12, q. 1, a. 1 ("materia prima secundum se consider-
ata sit in potentia ad omnes formas naturales" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 302); Scriptum super
Sententiis Liber III, d. 31, q. 2, a. 4 ("se habet intellectus ejus possibilis ad omnia intelligibilia,
sicut se habet materia prima ad omnes formas sensibiles" - Moos ed., vol. 3, p. 996); Summa
contra gentiles IV c. 89 ("potentia quae est in prima materia ad omnem formam" - Leon.
15.279:26b-27b); Quaestiones disputatae de malo q. 6 ("materia prima que est in potentia ad
diuersas formas" - Leon. 23.152:657-658).
64
Sententia libri Metaphysicae XII, lect. 2 ("materia prima sit in potentia ad omnes formas,
tamen quodam ordine suscipit eas. Per prius enim est in potentia" - Marietti ed., 2438, p. 572).
65
Summa theologiae Iallae q. 50, a. 6 ("Intellectus enim humanus, cum sit infimus in ordine
intellectuum, est in potentia respectu omnium intelligibilium, sicut materia prima respectu om-
nium formarum sensibilium" - Leon. 6.323); Quaestio disputata de veritate q. 10, a. 8 ("materia
prima est in potentia ad omnes formas sensibiles" - Leon. 22.2.322:262-263); Quaestio dispu-
tata de anima q. 2 ("materia prima non habet aliquam formam sensibilem actu" - Leon.
24.1.14:117-118).
66
Quaestiones disputatae de anima q. 2 ("forme intelligibiles non possunt recipi a materia
prima" - Leon. 24.1.15:147-148); Summa theologiae la q. 75, a. 5 ("materia prima recipit for-
mas individuales, intellectus autem recipit formas absolutas" - Leon. 5.202).
67
Quaestio disputata de veritate q. 2, a. 9 ("rationes seminales rerum sunt in prima materia sed
rationes causales sunt in deo" - Leon. 22.1.72:91-93); q. 5, a. 9 ("rationes seminales in-
choationes formarum quae sunt in materia prima secundum quod est in potentia ad omnes for-
mas"-Leon. 22.1.166:414-416).
68
Quaestiones disputatae de anima q. 18 ("materia prima simul et semel non informatur nisi
una forma" - Leon. 24.1.159:414-416).
69
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1 ("materia enim prima recipit formam, non
prout est forma simpliciter, sed prout est hoc, unde per materiam individuate" - Mandonnet
ed., vol. 2, pp. 88-89).
70
In libros De generatione et corruptione lib. 1, lect. 10 ("privationis, cuius subiectum est
prima materia" - Leon. 3.301); In libros Physicorum V, lect. 9 ("privatio formae substantialis
est in materia prima" - Leon. 2.261).
97
to privation of form, i.e. to those forms which are educed by nature. Not being m act
itself77 - in other words, having neither form nor privation of form in its own right 78 - it
71
In libros De generatione et corruptione lib. 1, lect. 14 ("commune omnium generabilium et
corruptibilium, scilicet materia prima" - Leon. 3.311); Sententia libri Metaphysicae VIII, lect. 4
("prima materia est una omnium generabilium et corruptibilium; sed propriae materiae sunt di-
versae diversarum" - Marietti ed., 1730, p. 414).
72
Summa theologiae la q. 66, a. 1 ("materia prima neque ruit creata omnino sine forma, neque
sub forma una communi, sed sub formis distinctis" - Leon. 5.154).
73
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber I, d. 43, q. 1, a. 1 ("materia prima, quae de se est indifferens
ad omnes formas, unde et infinita dicitur" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 1003); Summa contra
gentiles I, c. 43 ("materia prima sit infinita in sua potentialitate" - Leon. 13.124:16b-17b); III, c.
23 ("Corpus autem celeste, secundum suam substantiam consideratum, invenitur ut in potentia
indifferenter se habens ad quodlibet ubi, sicut materia prima ad quamlibet formam" - Leon.
14.58:13a-16a); Quaes-tiones disputatae de veritate q. 2, a. 9 ("in materia prima sunt inflnitae
formae in potentia" - Leon. 22.1.72:93-94).
74
Quaestiones disputatae de anima q.12 ("materia prima est in potentia ad actum substantialem
qui est forma" - Leon. 24.1.111:306-308); Sententia libri Metaphysicae VII, lect. 13 ("materia
prima 'subiicitur actui,' idest formae substantiali de se nullam habens formam" - Marietti ed.,
1568, p. 378).
75
Sentencia libri secundi De anima, cap.14 ("materia prima est ut potencia respectu forme et
priuationis" - Leon. 45.1.125:119-120).
6
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber HI, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3 ("materia prima est in naturali potentia
tantum ad illas formas quae per agens naturale produci possunt" - Moos ed., vol. 3, 134, p.
457).
77
Quaestiones disputatae de potentia q. 1, a. 1 ("prima materia secundum essentiam suam
considerata, est denudata ab omni actu" - Marietti ed., p. 8); De principiis naturae c. 2
("quicquid est actu, non potest dici materia prima").
8
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 4 ("materia prima sic accepta, non habeat
aliquam formam partem essentiae suae, nunquam tamen dividitur ab omni forma" - Mandonnet
ed., vol. 2, p. 313); Sententia libri Metaphysicae VIII, lect. 4 ("omnia sint ex eodem primo ma-
teriali principio, quod est materia prima de se nullam habens formam" - Marietti ed., 1729, p.
414).
98
is always conjoined with form 79 and the privation of form. 80 Nor did it pre-exist form
"being" (or "good," etc.) only in potency, 85 as containing all potency, 86 even (in a sense)
79
Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis a. 1 ("semper in materia prima est aliqua forma"
-Leon. 24.2.12:11).
80
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1 ("materia prima quae est in inferioribus,
nunquam separatur a privatione formae" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 302); In libros Physicorum
V, lect. 2 ("ens in potentia tantum, scilicet materia prima, quae in principio generationis est sub
privatione, in fine autem sub forma" [this said with respect to any particular generation] - Leon.
2.233).
81
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 4 ("materia prima sic accepta, non potuit esse
duratione ante corpora ex ea formata" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 313); Summa contra gentiles
IV, c. 63 ("prima materia sine forma esse non possit" - Leon. 15.201:32a-33a); Quaestiones
disputatae de veritate q. 3, a. 5 ("materia prima nee est per se separata existens neque esse
potest"-Leon. 22.1.111:13-14).
2
Summa theologiae la q. 84, a. 3 ("materia prima est creata a deo sub formis ad quas est in
potentia" - Leon. 5.317); Quaestiones disputatae de potentia q. 3, a. 5 ("materia prima per se
non creatur; sed ex hoc non sequitur quod non creetur sub forma; sic enim habet esse in actu" -
Marietti ed., p. 49).
83
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber III, d. 14, q. 1, a. 4 ("materia prima in qua non est activa po-
tentia" - Moos ed., vol. 3, 174, p. 464).
84
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1 ("prima materia, quae est pura potentia" -
Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 59); Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1 ("potentia pura,
quia sic non differret a materia prima" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 85); Summa contra gentiles I
c. 43 ("In rebus invenitur aliquid quod est potentia tantum, ut materia prima" - Leon.
13.124:10b-lib); Quaestiones disputatae de potentia q. 1, a. 1 ("sicut materia prima est pura
potentia, ita deus est purus actus" - Marietti ed., p. 8).
85
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber I, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2 ("quod est tantum in potentia sicut materia
prima" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 934); Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 34, q. 1, a. 4
("subjectum cujus est in potentia tantum, scilicet materia prima, quae sicut est ens incompletum
et in potentia" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 884); Quaestiones disputatae de veritate q. 21, a. 2
("sicut materia prima est ens in potentia et non in actu, ita est perfecta in potentia et non in actu,
bona in potentia et non in actu" - Leon. 22.3.597:117-120); Quaestiones disputatae de malo q.
1, a. 2 ("materia prima non dicitur ens nisi in potentia et esse sinpliciter habet per formam" -
Leon. 23.11:164-165).
86
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber I, d. 36, q. 2, a. 1 ("sicut omnes formae sunt in potentia in
prima materia, ita sunt in actu in primo motore" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 839).
99
as "its own potency."87 It is the first potency88 or recipient,89 that which first receives
terminate,93 lacking all diversity in itself,94 one,95 and uniform.96 It is immobile, incor-
87
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber I, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2 ("materia est ipsa sua potentia"; "material est
sua potentia passiva, sicut et Deus sua potentia activa" - both Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 117);
Summa theologiae la q. 77, a. 1 ("potentia materiae non est aliud quam eius essentia" - Leon.
5.237); Quaestiones disputatae de anima q. 12 ("materia prima est sua potentia" - Leon.
24.1.107:76-78).
88
Summa theologiae la q. 75, a. 5 ("prima potentia est materia prima" - Leon. 5.201).
89
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber I, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2 ("materia prima, quae est primum recipiens"
- Mandonnet ed., vol.1, p. 117); Summa theologiae la q. 44, a. 2 ("primum principium passi-
vum est materia" - Leon. 4.457).
90
Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis a. 1 ("materia prima, que omnino sine forma
consideratur, primo recipit formam substantiae" - Leon. 24.2.17:552-554).
91
Summa contra gentiles III c. 22 ("materia prima est in potentia primo ad formam elementi" -
Leon. 14.53:9b-l lb).
92
Quaestiones disputatae de veritate q. 5, a. 9 ("earum simplicitas est propter earum imperfec-
tionem, sicut et materia prima est simplex" - Leon. 22.1.166:419-421).
93
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1 ("intellectus possibilis qui de se indeter-
minatus, sicut materia prima" - Moos ed., vol. 3, 23, p. 699).
94
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2 ("materia prima, prout consideratur nuda ab
omni forma, non habet aliquam diversitatem" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 228); Scriptum super
Sententiis Liber II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1 ("in materia prima non sit ulla diversitas" - Mandonnet ed.,
vol. 2, p. 87).
95
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 4 ("ilia materia prima quae una numero est in
omnibus elementis ut pars essentiae eorum, est omnino informis in sua essentia considerata" -
Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 315); Quaestiones disputatae de anima q. 2 ("materia prima est una
respectu omnium formarum sensibilium" - Leon. 24.1.21:497-498); De principiis naturae c. 2
("materia prima dicitur una numero in omnibus" - Leon. 43.41:98-99).
96
Summa theologiae la q. 23, a. 5 ("prima materia tota sit in se uniformis" - Leon. 4.278).
97
Summa contra gentiles II, c. 55 ("in substantiis corruptibilibus materia prima est incorruptibi-
lis" - Leon. 13.394:3a-4a); Summa theologiae la q. 16, a. 8 ("prima materia est ingenita et in-
corruptibilis, quia remanet post omnem generationem et corruptionem" - Leon. 4.216); q. 76, a.
4 ("materia prima non potest moveri" - Leon. 5.223); q. 103, a. 1 ("in omnibus rebus creatis est
aliquid stabile, ad minus prima materia" - Leon. 5.453); De principiis naturae c. 2 ("materia
prima, et etiam forma, non generatur neque corrumpitur" - Leon. 43.41:90-91); In libros Physi-
100
Prime matter is in every b o d y " and is everywhere 100 - though this last is said
itself103 but being in potency to quantity (in conjunction with substantial form); 104 that
corum I, lect. 15 ("si materia prima corrumpatur, erit corrupta antequam corrumpatur, quod est
impossibile" - Leon. 2.54).
98
Sententia libri Metaphysicae V, lect. 4 ("differt elementum a materia prima, qua nullam spe-
ciem habet" - Marietti ed., 798, p. 218).
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber I, d. 37, q. 2, a. 2 ("materia prima, quae est in omni corpore,
quo omnis locus impletur" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 864); Summa contra gentiles II, c. 44
("materia prima, quae est omnibus corporibus communis sed sub una tantum forma" - Leon.
13.370:4a-6a).
100
Summa theologiae la q. 8, a. 4 ("universale et materia prima sunt quidem ubique, sed non
secundum idem esse" - Leon. 4.89).
101
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber I, d. 37, q. 3, a. 1 ("omnino absolutum est a situ et dimen-
sione, non debetur locus nisi per accidens, sicut patet de materia prima" - Mandonnet ed., vol.
l,p. 869).
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 1 ("aliquid quod non est compositum...deficit
a simplicitate primi...vel quia est divisibile in potentia vel per accidens, sicut materia prima" -
Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 227).
103
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 30, q. 2, a. 1 ("prima materia, prout in se consideratur,
nullam quantitatem habeat" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 781); In libros De generatione et cor-
ruptione lib. 1, lect. 14 ("materia prima, sit separatum ab omni quantitate corporali" - Leon.
3.311).
104
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 30, q. 2, a. 1 ("oportet quod materia prima ad nullam
quantitatem sit in potentia, nisi quae competat formae naturali" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p.
781); Sententia libri Metaphysicae VII, lect. 2 ("quantitates et qualitates, quorum subiectum
proprium non est materia prima, sed substantia composita quae est substantia in actu" - Marietti
ed., 1284, p. 322).
105
In libros Physicorum III, lect. 12 ("non enim est in materia prima potentia nisi ad determi-
natum quantitatem" - Leon. 2.140).
106
Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis a. 1 ("materia prima recipit formam contra-
hendo ipsam ad esse individuale" - Leon. 24.2.13:343-344).
107
Super librum De causis lect. 9 ("materia prima in rebus corporalibus quae est principium
singularitatis" - Marietti ed., 235, p. 63).
101
"incomplete being,"111 "in act" only through its correlative principle of substantial
form;112 again, it "acts" or "is perfected" only through form,113 and it is said to have
entirely actualized116 is more a statement about its composition with form than about
description of matter conjoined with form. It is not improper to speak of prime matter as
not being.117 Nevertheless in some sense it comes from God;118 it has some likeness to
108
Quaestiones disputatae de veritate q. 5, a. 9 ("in his inferioribus id quod est eis commune,
scilicet materia prima" - Leon. 22.2.164:276-277); Super Ioannem c. 5, lect. 5 ("in istis inferi-
oribus materia prima existens accipit formam, et subiectum subiicitur accidenti" - Marietti ed.,
782, p. 148).
109
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1 ("material prima quae est in inferioribus,
nunquam separatur a privatione formae...privatio autem adjuncta materiae, inducit corruptibili-
tatem" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 302).
110
Summa theologiae la q. 14, a. 2 ("Intellectus autem noster possibilis se habet in ordine intel-
ligibilium, sicut materia prima in ordine rerum naturalium: eo quod est in potentia ad intelligi-
bilia, sicut materia prima ad naturalia" - Leon. 4.169).
111
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, 34, q. 1, a. 4 ("materia prima, quae sicut est ens incom-
pletum et in potentia" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 884).
112
Summa contra gentiles II, c. 98 ("materia prima fit actu in esse sensibili per formam natu-
ralem"-Leon. 13.580:14a-15a).
113
Summa contra gentiles II, c. 76 ("materia prima perficitur per formas naturales" - Leon.
13.480:28a-29a); Quaestiones disputatae de veritate q. 8, a. 6 ("materia prima non potest agere
aliquam actionem nisi perficiatur per formam" - Leon. 22.2.238:162-163).
114
Summa theologiae la q. 84, a. 3 ("materia prima habet esse substantiale per formam" - Leon.
5.318).
115
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber I, d. 8, q. 3, a. 2 ("materia prima et universale non habent in
se esse completum" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 215); Quaestiones disputatae de veritate q. 2, a.
5 ("materia prima habet minimum de esse" - Leon. 22.1.60:23-24).
116
Summa contra gentiles III, c. 39 ("Aliquid vero cuius potentia tota non potest simul in actum
reduci, sicut patet de materia prima" - Leon. 14.96:24b-26b).
117
Super De divinis nominibus c. 4, lect. 13 ("id quod non-est, scilicet materia prima" - Marietti
ed., 463, p. 161).
102
less in some sense it comes from God;118 it has some likeness to God119 and corresponds
to an idea in God,120 though it is not merely different, but diverse from Him.121
Prime matter, understood absolutely rather than secundum quid, is not intelligi-
ble in itself,123 but is known through analogy124 via its association with form. Although
described as "first" in the order of effects,125 i.e. in the order of nature or time,126 this is
118
Summa theologiae la q. 44, a. 4 ("cum Deus sit causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis omnium
rerum, et materia prima sit ab ipso, sequitur quod primum principium omnium rerum sit unum
tantum secundum rem" - Leon. 4.462).
119
Quaestiones disputatae depotentia q. 3, a. 1 ("materia prima habet similitudinem cum deo in
quantum participat de ente....ita materia prima habet similitudinem cum Deo in quantum ens,
non in quantum est ens actu" - Marietti ed., p. 41); Super De divinis nominibus c. 4, lect. 2
("materia prima, inquantum desiderat formam quae est similitudo divini esse" - Marietti ed.,
298, p. 97).
120
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber I, d. 36, q. 2, a. 3 ("cum materia prima a deo sit, oportet
ideam ejus aliqualiter in Deo esse" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 844); Quaestiones disputatae de
veritate q. 3, a. 5 ("si proprie de idea loquamur, non potest poni quod materia prima habeat per
se ideam in Deo distinctam ab idea formae vel compositi" - Leon. 22.1.112:40-43).
Summa theologiae la q. 3, a. 8 ("materia prima et Deus non differunt, sed sunt diversa seip-
sis" - Leon. 4.48).
122
Summa theologiae la q. 5, a. 2 ("Nam materia prima participat bonum, cum appetat ipsum
(nihil autem appetit nisi simile sibi)" - Leon. 4.58); Super De divinis nominibus c. 4, lect. 2
("Omne autem causatum convertitur in suam causam per desiderium, unde materia prima desid-
erat bonum" - Marietti ed., 296, p. 96); lect. 5 ("non-existens, idest materia prima participat
pulchro et bono" - Marietti ed., 355, p. 115).
123
De principiis naturae c. 2 ("materia prima per se non potest cognosci uel difiniri sed per
comparationem" - Leon. 43.41:80-81); In libros Physicorum I, lect. 13 ("natura quae primo su-
biicitur mutationi, idest materia prima, non potest sciri per ipsam" - Leon. 2.46).
124
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 4 ("quia omnis cognitio est per formam,
haec materia prima est scibilis, ut dicit Philosophus in I Physic, text. 69, secundum analogiam
tantum" - Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 313); In libros Physicorum I, lect. 15 ("materia prima scibi-
lis est secundum proportionem" - Leon. 2.54).
125
Super De divinis nominibus c. 4, lect. 2 ("id quod est primum subiectum in effectibus, idest
materia prima" - Marietti ed., 296, p. 96).
126
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 4 ("materia prima dicitur dupliciter: vel ita
quod 'primum' importet ordinem naturae, vel ita quod importet ordinem temporis" - Mandon-
net ed., vol. 2, p. 313).
103
Aquinas's most sustained discussion of matter, apart from his Aristotelian com-
mentaries, appears in the De principiis naturae; the order of exposition in that work
largely follows that of Aristotle in the Physics. Now the main aspects under which
lows. (1) Prime matter is the subject of natural form and the principle of continuity in
every generation and corruption. As such, it is in potency not only to substantial forms
through substantial form, of which it is the potency. These first two headings comprise
totle's account above, in Section D, I will not go over the ground again. But in the re-
Aristotle. (3) Matter is a principle of individuation and the ground of extension or spati-
ality, i.e. of dimensive quantity. (See below, sections G, H, and M.) (4) It is a principle
of corruptibility - i.e., not only the principle of continuity in change, but in some way a
cause of change. (Section I.) (5) It is, at the deepest metaphysical level, a modality of
esse itself. (Sections J, K.) (6) Unintelligible in itself, it is the ground and sine qua non
Throughout this dissertation I generally assume and imply parity between the
Aristotelian and Thomistic doctrines concerning the attributes of matter. In fact I will
use the terms "Aristotelian" and "Thomistic" interchangeably at times, in lieu of the
tial difference in their doctrine. Aquinas does, however, go significantly beyond Aris-
totle in his account of individuation; and our later attempts to construe matter along
Thomistic metaphysical lines would be harder to press into a pure Aristotelian mold.
But the emphasis of this dissertation is not on shades of meaning between Aristotle and
Aquinas, so much as upon the applicability of their doctrine, taken in its generality, to a
allusion to matter, I may disappoint the reader by not sticking to a rigidly textual
development in the sequel. My thought is guided by, and I trust not inconsonant with,
that of Aquinas, but textual exegesis is not my aim. Rather, thinking apud Thomam, I
wish to present an account that emphasizes synthesis more than analysis, for reasons
noted in Chapter One; which does not mean, of course, that certain points will not
appropriately be dealt with rather more closely as we proceed - beginning with a topic
105
be dealt with rather more closely as we proceed - beginning with a topic where the dif-
one expression of the problem of one versus many which characterizes philosophy from
its inception. In the question of what constitutes an individual we see at work the deep-
the factor common to most formulations is, not too surprisingly, what is most prior in
what is indivisum in se et divisum ab alio: a single being, not confused with other be-
unity amid plurality, first as substantial unity underlying accidental plurality, and then,
in each case being taken in Aristotle's primary sense of "a this." Considering concrete
existents in the light of their specific unity, the mind can then frame the question, what
makes conspecifics - beings with identical intelligibility - distinct from one another?132
prehend plurality in things), the question already implies another, namely: what consti-
tutes an individual as a this rather than a these, a unity indivisum in sel By this is meant,
not what differentiates a given being from its constituent parts, as for example "dog"
from "tail, paws, etc.," but what constitutes a being one with respect to other beings of
its kind-e.g., what makes a dog one dog. The distinction of "this being" from others of
it were. Divisum ab alio and indivisum in se are complementary in that each implies the
other: a being which is existentially distinct from those of its kind is a being precisely
through being essentially distinct from any plurality of parts constitutive of it (and
Notwithstanding that the question arises in a cosmic context of multiplied beings, none of
which appears to be the sole representative of its species, nothing prevents the mind from later
recognizing the possibility of species consisting of a single being.
133
Among several notae associated with individuation by different philosophers, that of "iden-
tity through accidental changes" is not primordial but a corollary of a thing's definitional integ-
rity, i.e. of being undivided in itself. Similarly, the note of "noninstantiability" (whereby this
107
ideas or concepts that is at issue, but of concrete hylomorphic existents. What is con-
tained in the mind singly and universally (say, "tree") is seen to be multiplied, outside
the mind, in a way that does not involve its intelligibility (this tree, and this tree, and
this tree). The species which is a unity essentially speaking is divided existentially.134 At
the same time, that which is existentially multiplied is, in each of its instantiations, a
single being existentially ("tree" is one), though its parts must be distinguished on the
essential side ("leaf," "stem," etc. have different definitions than "tree").135
course, he is referring to individuals as such whenever he uses the term "a this" - from
the Categories onward - but he hardly touches on the cause of individuation. Neverthe-
less, when he does, there is nothing tentative about it: his brevity cloaks his conviction,
warrant no more attention than is already implied in his carefully enunciated doctrine of
the formation of universals in mente. For to have resolved one issue is to have resolved
the other: they are complementary. Universals, in being abstracted from material exis-
tence, are abstracted from the multiplicity of individuals, while individuals, though in-
being is not replicable) is but a corollary of the thing's existential unicity, or being distinct from
other beings.
134
The "division of species" which is yet another note considered as definitive of individuation
is thus seen to be but a corollary of the existential aspect of individuation.
135
It is because the individual is division ab alio existentially that it is "impredicable," to cite
yet another note sometimes employed in defining individuation.
108
The most direct textual evidence, then, for Aristotle on the individuation of cos-
mic being is a mention almost en passant: "But all things which are many in number
have matter; for many individuals have one and the same [intelligible content], for ex-
ample, man, whereas Socrates is one...." 136 The idea is that multiple instantiations can-
not be due to form, since form is wholly present in each existent and therefore does not
In Aquinas the Aristotelian teaching will reach much fuller development. Aqui-
quires refinements that not only resolve the shortcomings of Aristotle's simple
invocation of "matter" alone, but also allow it to dovetail better into a complementary
The problem for Aquinas and other mediaeval Aristotelians is this: individuation
of hylomorphic substances cannot be due to the form, for reasons I gave above; nor can
it be due to matter, since matter is indeterminate in itself and cannot be a cause of de-
termination; nor can it be due to anything accidental, since the individual substance per-
136
Metaphysics XII.8 (1074a33ff.). Similarly Book VII.8 (1034a7ff): "And when the whole is
such and such a form in this flesh and these bones, this is Callias or Socrates; and they differ in
their matter (for the matter of each is different) but are the same in form, because form is indi-
visible." Cf. X.9.
137
On individuation in Aquinas see, inter alia, Joseph Bobik, "Dimensions in the individuation
of bodily substances," Philosophical Studies 4 (1954): 60-79; Joseph Owens, "Thomas Aqui-
nas: dimensive quantity as individuating principle," Mediaeval Studies 50 (1988): 279-310; Jean
R. Rosenberg, The Principle of Individuation: A Comparative Study of St. Thomas, Scotus, and
Suarez (Ph.D. diss.: Washington, D. C, 1950); Kevin White, "Individuation in Aquinas's Super
Boetium De Trinitate, Q. 4," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995): 543-56.
109
dures through accidental change.138 We have, then, a trilemma; let us see how Aquinas
Form is the intelligible principle of a being: that aspect which, residing in (and
constitutive of) the existent as the form of'the existent's matter, can also be taken imma-
terially into the mind. Conceived first as intelligibility, form is seen nonetheless to be a
real ontological principle, rather than a congeries of accidents, through its persistence in
time (amid the flux of the accidental) and its commonality in multiple existents. If form
were an individuating principle, then it obviously would not be common to more than
one individual; part of a thing's very intelligibility would be "to be this and not other."
pertains to existents, i.e., to beings in which form is conjoined with matter; moreover,
bearing in mind that prime matter has only analogous similarity to secondary matter, we
Fido and to Rover, the matter of the one is clearly not the matter of the other. Yet as
Aquinas notes, there is a deep problem here: "Therefore matter is not the principle of
diversity in number, and neither is form . . . ." What is indeterminate cannot be, in and
138
"Praeterea. In indiuiduo nichil inuenitur nisi forma et materia et accidentia. Set diuersitas
forme non facit diversitatem secundum numerum set secundum speciem Set materia invenitur
communis in diversis secundum speciem; quia eadem materia formis contrariis subditur, alias
habentia contrarias formas non transmutarentur invicem; ergo materia non est principium diver-
sitatis secundum numerum" {Super Boetium De Trinitate q. 4, a. 2, set contra 2 et 3 - Leon.
50.123:51-54, 65-70); "dimensiones cum sint accidentia, per se non possunt esse principium
unitatis indiuidue substantia; set materia prout talibus dimensionibus subest intelligitur esse
principium talis unitatis et multitudinis" {ibid., ad 2 - Leon. 50.125:253-257).
110
forms, it does not possess any feature whereby it would contract form to this existent
Aquinas pushes on. "Form is rendered individual through being received in mat-
ter. [We can't ignore the evidence of our senses.] But because matter in itself lacks all
differentiation, it can individuate the received form only in so far as it bears some dis-
received in this particular matter, determined to this place and time."139 Here we seem
"this particular matter." How can matter be particularized if its ratio is to be utterly in-
determinate?
As Aquinas goes on to say, in the passage just cited, "Matter, however, is divisi-
ble only through quantity [i.e., dimensions]" - but since "dimensions are accidents,
they cannot by themselves be the source of the unity of an individual substance."140 The
accidental is posterior to the substantial, and cannot constitute the existential unity of
the latter. Whence the trilemma I have alluded to: neither form, nor matter, nor acci-
"...forma fit hec per hoc quod recipitur in materia. Set cum materia in se sit indistincta, non
potest esse quod formam receptam indiuiduet nisi secundum quod est distinguibilis: non enim
forma indiuiduatur per hoc quod recipitur in materia nisi quatenus recipitur in hac materia dis-
tincta et determinata ad hie et nunc." Super Boetium De Trinitate q. 4, a. 2 (Leon. 50.125:202-
208).
140
Ibid., ad 2: "dimensiones, cum sint accidentia, per se non possunt esse principium unitatis
individuae substantie" (Leon. 50.125:253-258).
Ill
The Thomistic solution, hinted at in the text just cited, avoids taking any of these
principles singly, instead invoking all three of them, albeit in a certain ontological order.
throughout his career.141 And while some authors142 have discerned a marked evolution
in his thought - alleging that he invokes an Avicennian forma corporeitatis in the Sen-
De trinitate, and finally determinate dimensions alone in his last writing on the subject
- it is also possible to read all of his texts on individuation as expressing but one main
insight: that individuation occurs always through determinate dimensions, which are
E.g., De ente et essentia (c. 1256), Scriptum super libros Sententiarum /Scriptum super Sen-
tentiis (c. 1256), Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (c. 1259), Super Boetium De Trinitate (c.
1261), Summa contra gentiles (c. 1263), Quaestio disputata de anima (1267), and Summa the-
ologiae (c. 1272).
142
E.g., J. Rosenberg, The Principle ofIndividuation.
112
cannot be the individuating principle, for two reasons: the first, cited earlier, is the pos-
teriority of accidents to substance, and the second, given in the passage just quoted, is
that the individual unity of a substance would depend on its being under just one set of
determinate dimensions, with the result that new and distinct individual substance
ciple of determination? No more than to say that color as such is necessary for vision,
though it never exists save as this color or that. Just as "color" as such (not "green" or
and-such dimensions) what grounds individuation. Only the actual being, the existent, is
Super Boetium De Trinitate q. 4, a. 2: "Materia autem non est diuisibilis nisi per quanti-
tatem....et ideo materia efficitur hec et signata secundum quod subest dimensionibus. Dimen-
siones autem istae possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo secundum earum terminationem; -
et dico eas terminari secundum determinatam mensuram et figuram, et sic ut entia perfecta col-
locantur in genere quantitatis - ; et sic non possunt esse principium indiuiduationis, quia cum
talis terminatio dimensionum uarieturfrequentercirca indiuiduum, sequeretur quod indiuiduum
non remaneret semper idem numero. Alio modo possunt considerari sine ista determinatione, in
natura dimensionis tantum, quamuis numquam sine aliqua determinatione esse possint, sicut nee
natura coloris sine determinatione albi et nigri; et sic collocantur in genere quantitatis ut imper-
fectum, et ex his dimensionibus interminatis materia efficitur hec materia signata, et sic indi-
uiduat formam....Et ideo, cum hee dimensiones sint de genere accidentium, quandoque
diuersitas secundum numerum reducitur in diuersitatem materie, quandoque in diuersitatem ac-
cidentis, et hoc ratione dimensionum predictarum" (Leon. 50.125:209-210, 212-230, 238-242).
Translation from the Maurer edition, pp. 97-98.
144
We see a green thing, not because it is green, but because it has color: otherwise we would
not see a yellow thing, since it is not green.
113
dents, of which the first, ontologically, are dimensions, located in the category of quan-
tity. But quantity is radicated in matter. In other words, it is intrinsic to the potency of
matter to be in potency to dimensions.145 Matter has no dimensions in its own right, but
of various dimensions even for a given substantial form: a horse may be smaller or
larger, while retaining its individual identity. But the horse cannot be dimensionless,
and its dimensionality results, not from its horseness, but from its materiality, albeit in a
Yet Aquinas was quite explicit when affirming, a few years previously, that
[T]he matter which is the principle of individuation is not just any matter, but
only designated matter {materia signata). By designated matter I mean that
which is considered under determined dimensions.146
Has he reversed himself completely? While allowing for the possibility that his thought
was clarified over time, I believe it is easy enough to see the same basic idea through-
out. His earlier concern was with the cause of individuation in actu, which obviously
cannot be a mere potentiality, while in the earlier text he was thinking of the deeper
ground of that cause of individuation. Evidence for this is that in different places in one
and the same work he will say, first that "indefinite" and later that "definite" dimen-
145
"...dimensiones praeintelliguntur in materia non in actu completo ante formas naturales sed
in actu incompleto, et ideo sunt prius in via materiae et generationis; sed forma est prior in via
complementi" Quaestiones disputatae de veritate q. 5, a. 9 ad 6 (Leon. 22.1.165:357-362).
146
De ente et essentia, 2: "materia non quolibet modo accepta est individuationis principium,
sed solum materia signata. Et dico materiam signatam, quae sub determinatis dimensionibus
consideratur" (Leon. 43.371:73-77). Cf. Scriptum super Sententiis Liber III, d. 1, q. 2, a. 5 ad 1:
"principium individuationis sit materia aliquo modo sub dimensionibus terminatis considerata"
(Moos ed., vol. 3, 145, p. 45).
114
sions are the cause of individuation. And in yet another place in the same Commen-
ality] that matter [when informed] is made to be 'this designated [i.e., specifically di-
mensive] matter,' thus rendering the form individual [in its concrete existence] . . . ."
the whole by a part: matter can be called the principle of individuation inasmuch as it is
quantitative extension) can be called the principle of individuation inasmuch as the in-
speak of unsigned and signed (undesignated and designated) matter: "What we must
realize is that the matter which is the principle of individuation is not just any matter,
but only designated matter. By designated matter I mean that which is considered under
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 30, q. 2, a. 1, solutio; Scriptum super Sententiis Liber
III,d. l,q.2,a. 5 a d l .
148
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber IV, d. 12, q. 1, a. 3: "primum individuationis principium est
materia, qua acquiritur esse in actu cuilibet tali formae sive substantiali sive accidentali. Et
secundarium principium individuationis est dimensio, quia ex ipsa habet materia quod divida-
tur." Moos ed., vol. 4, 49, p. 503.
149
Besides texts already cited, see Scriptum super Sententiis Liber I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1; Scriptum
super Sententiis Liber II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1 ad 3.
115
determined dimensions."150 "I call matter designated if it is considered together with the
determination of its dimensions, that is, with these or those dimensions. I call it not des-
Numerous texts in Aquinas affirm the role of matter and of dimensions in indi-
viduation.152 But a survey of these texts points up more than one apparent inconsis-
tency. I have already observed that the whole may be referred to under the ratio of now
one part, now another - when the individuating factor is described as simply "matter"
(in terms of its ontological ground) or as "determinate dimensions" (in terms of the ac-
De ente et essentia, c. 2: "materia non quolibet modo accepta est individuationis principium,
sed solum materia signata; et dico materiam signatam que sub determinatis dimensionibus con-
siderate." Leon. 43.371:73-77.
151
Quaestiones disputatae de veritate q. 2, a. 6 ad 1: "dico signatam secundum quod considera-
te cum determinatione dimensionum harum scilicet vel illarum, non signatam autem quae sine
determinatione dimensionum considerate. Secundum hoc igitur sciendum est quod materia sig-
nata est individuationis principium" (Leon. 22.1.66:103-109).
152
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, d. 3. q.l; d. 30, q. 2; Scriptum super Sententiis Liber III,
d. 1, q. 2; Scriptum super Sententiis Liber IV, d. 12, q.l, a. 1; Super Boetium De Trinitate q. 4, a.
2 ad 3; Summa contra gentiles II, c. 50, c. 93; IV, c. 65; Quaestio disputata de anima a. 9;
Summa theologiae la q. 7, a. 3; q. 50, a. 2, etc. Form also plays a role in individuation, since
"through form, which actualizes matter, matter becomes an actual thing and this particular
thing" (per formam enim, quae est actus materie, materia efficitur ens actu et hoc aliquid). (De
ente et essentia, c. 2; Leon. 43.370:31-32.) Note the analogical flexibility whereby Aquinas, in
treating of the complementary principles of unitary being, can say both this and "form is ren-
dered individual through being received in matter" (forma fit hec per hoc quod recipitur in ma-
teria). Super Boetium De Trinitate q. 4, a. 2 (Leon. 50.125:202-203).
116
matter, and again certain texts in which he invokes a formal principle, rather than a ma-
Although Aquinas is quite emphatic in singling out materia signata and deter-
minate dimensions as the individuating factor, he is also capable of saying that "division
takes place in matter only in so far as it is considered under dimensions, at least inde-
terminate ones,"154 and, more directly, "the matter which is the principle of individua-
tion is not just any matter, but only designated matter."155 But I say that this need not
represent a wavering conviction on his part. Rather, in his occasional allusion to the role
the seat of determinate dimensions. From the standpoint of the mind's consideration,
actualization (through the union of matter and form) introduces a difference between
undesignated and designated matter, effectuating the latter, is clearly what Aquinas
The "material" and "quantitative" (dimensive) accounts are brought together in several
places (e.g., Scriptum super Sententiis Liber IV, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1; Super Boetium De Trinitate q.
4, a. 2). Always the underlying thought is the same: only dimensions have the requisite charac-
teristic - parts outside of parts - through which individuation can be accomplished; but dimen-
sions can only inhere in matter.
154
"Divisio autem non accidit materiae, nisi secundum quod consideratur sub dimensionibus
saltern interminatis: quia remota quantitate, ut in 1 Physic, text. 15, dicitur, substantia erit indi-
visibile." Scriptum super Sententiis Liber II, 30.2 (Mandonnet ed., vol. 2, p. 781).
155
".. .materia non quolibet modo accepta est individuationis principium, sed solum materia sig-
nata." De ente et essentia, c. 2 (Leon. 43.371:73-75).
117
means in saying "before the advent of natural forms, dimensions are presupposed as ex-
As a summary of much that has been said thus far I cite the following extract:
By definition the individual is undivided in itself and divided from other things
by the last of all divisions. Now among accidents quantity alone has of itself the
special characteristic of division. So dimensions of themselves have a certain
character of being individual with reference to a definite position, position be-
ing a quantitative difference . . . . So it rightly belongs to matter to individuate
all other forms because it is the subject of that form which of itself has the trait
of being individual. Indeed even determinate dimensions themselves, which are
grounded in an already completed subject, are in a sense individuated by matter
that has been rendered individual by the indeterminate dimensions that we con-
ceive beforehand in matter.i57
found in Summa theologiae: "Every natural body has some determined substantial form.
Since therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is necessary that de-
terminate accidents should follow upon a determinate form, and among these accidents
is quantity."158 Again, quantity is grounded in the matter, but is only actualized through
"...dimensiones praeintelliguntur in materia, non in actu completo ante formas naturales, sed
in actu incompleto," Quaestiones disputatae de veritate q. 5 a. 9 ad 6 (Leon. 22.1.165:357-360).
See also Scriptum super Sententiis Liber I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1: "quidquid est ejusdem speciei, non
dividitur secundum numerum, nisi secundum divisionem materiae vel alicujus potentialitatis,"
where division of the potential is an actuation thereof. Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 60.
Super Boetium De Trinitate q. 4, a. 2 ad 3 (Maurer trans., p. 99). "Ad tertium dicendum,
quod de ratione indiuidui est quod sit in se indiuisum et ab aliis ultima diuisione diuisum. Nul-
lum autem accidens habet ex se propriam rationem diuisionis nisi quantitas; unde dimensiones
ex se ipsis habent quandam rationem indiuiduationis secundum determinatum situm, prout situs
est differentia quantitatis....Et ideo recte materie conuenit indiuiduare omnes alias formas, ex
hoc quod subditur illi forme que ex se ipsa habet indiuiduationis rationem, ita quod etiam ipse
dimensiones terminate, que fundantur in subiecto iam completo, indiuiduantur quodammodo ex
materia individuata per dimensiones interminatas preintellectas in materia." Leon. 50.125:258-
265, 270-277.
158
Summa theologiae la, q. 7, a. 3: "omne corpus naturale aliquam formam substantialem habet
determinatam, cum igitur ad formam substantialem consequantur accidentia, necesse est quod
ad determinatam formam consequantur determinata accidentia; inter quae est quantitas." Leon.
4.75.
118
the form. Other accidents, likewise actualized through form, are also grounded in the
form. Thus it is because of matter that form actualizes dimensionality, but because of
Early in his career Aquinas made use of the Avicennian notion of forma cor-
poreitatis.159 But there is no pressing need to suppose that he regarded this as a form
distinct from either the substantial form (the unicity of which Aquinas always main-
tained vigorously) or the accidental form of quantity. Granted, that Aquinas abandoned
his early use of Avicenna's term. But it may be that a trace of what Avicenna had meant
- and perhaps all that Aquinas had ever meant in using Avicenna's terminology - re-
mained as Aquinas would refer, even in the comparatively late Quaestio disputata de
anima, to "that form which of itself has the trait of being individual," i.e., quantity. For
Aquinas to say that "matter does not have division in virtue of the quiddity of substance,
but in virtue of the corporeity upon which the dimensions of quantity follow in actual-
ity,"160 may be nothing less than to affirm, albeit less directly than he will do later, that
upon matter.
Let us now turn to a key text from the Quaestiones disputatae de anima, q. 9:
From the fact that matter is known to have a certain substantial mode of exist-
ing, matter can be understood to receive accidents by which it is disposed to a
higher perfection, so far as it is fittingly disposed to receive that higher perfec-
tion. Moreover dispositions of this kind are understood to exist in matter prior
to the form, inasmuch as they are given existence in matter by an agent, al-
159
"Sed prima forma quae recipitur in materia, est corporeitas, a qua nunquam denudatur,"
Scriptum super Sententiis Liber I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2. Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 229.
160
"...ex quidditate substantiae materia non habet divisionem, sed ex corporeitate, quam conse-
quuntur dimensiones quantitatis in actu," ibid.
119
though there are some improper accidents of the form that are caused in the
matter only by the form itself. Hence such accidents are not understood to exist
as dispositions in matter prior to the form; rather is the form understood to be
prior to the proper accidents as a cause is to its effects.161
At first it may seem that Aquinas is allowing for certain "dispositions" (i.e., inclinations
to receive this form rather than that one) to inhere in matter prior to its information. But
this would not comport with the indeterminacy of matter vis-a-vis all forms. (The only
"determinacy" we can ascribe to matter, that is consonant with Aquinas's usage, is its
pertain to matter as such, and other dispositions which are consequent only upon this
form or that. But even the former do not pre-exist form; rather, they "are understood to
exist [in potency] in matter prior to the form," such that they cannot but come into being
viduation, it is not clear, from the several texts we have considered, whether one or both
of these notae is involved in his fully developed account. Does designated matter - i.e.,
determinate dimensions grounded in matter - bring about the divisum ab alio, the indi-
visum in se, or both? I submit that materia signata certainly gives rise to divisum ab
alio. For what constitutes the hylomorphic existent as distinct from other such existents
161
"Et ulterius, ex quo materia intelligitur constituta in esse quodam substantiali, intelligi potest
ut susceptiua accidentium quibus disponitur ad ulteriorem perfectionem, secundum quam mate-
ria fit propria ad alteriorem perfectionem suscipiendam. Huiusmodi autem dispositiones prein-
telliguntur forme ut inducte ab agente in materiam, licet sint quedam accidentia ita propria
forme quod non nisi ex ipsa forma causentur in materia. Unde non preintelliguntur in materia
forme quasi dispositiones, sed magis forma preintelligitur eis, sicut causa effectui" (Leon.
24.1.81:217-229).
120
is its "having" a matter that they do not have. (I am not supposing matter as such to
have extension; rather, as the ground of extendedness it bestows on each existent a di-
mensionality which other existents by definition cannot share, since it is of the nature of
But what about indivisum in sel Here matter, signed or otherwise, would appear
to be insufficient. In fact, given the function of matter to ground the actuality of "parts
outside of parts," the hylomorphic being's unity would seem to be compromised so far
as its material principle is concerned. For such a being is made up of parts, beginning
with the elements, which are distinct from one another through their diversity of place
and position. (One manifestation of the corruption of a substance is the tendency of its
parts to break down into new wholes.) Yet what holds together the diversity of parts in a
substantial unity is the form, which in turn implies unity of function toward an end (en-
telechy). Hence indivisum in se seems to be due to the formal principle, leaving only
Form and matter are complementary in such a way that each one's ratio is in-
volved, to some extent, in the other's. And just as indivisum in se and divisum ab alio
imply each other, so with respect to form and matter: it is because matter is a principle
of extension that form provides unity, and because form is indefinitely realizable that
The question of individuation arises at the level of sensible being. Our aware-
ness of individuality is, in the first instance, based on what is seen and felt; it is spatial.
Things are perceived as distinct to the extent that they are perceived to have different
121
places, i.e. to occupy different parts of the extended order of being. Intellect then deter-
We have seen that Aquinas invokes the quantitative potency of prime matter, the
actualizing disposition of the substantial form, and the determinate accidents of exten-
sive quantity in his account of so-called "individuation by matter." Matter as the root
principle is in fact the ground of extendedness, such that hylomorphic being may be de-
braced by Descartes and, long before him, by various pre-Socratic and Neoplatonic
thinkers. Matter's pure and substantial potency must not be overlooked. Matter is a po-
tency to form's existence, and that existence, in virtue of materiality itself, is in an ex-
tended mode. (The same form can exist immaterially, without extension, in the intellect.
Were it not the same form, knowledge of essences would not be possible.) Hence, at the
understood to mean "that whereby a thing can have dimensions" - more precisely, "the
what analogously to the use of term "mass" in relation to weight. Mass is not at all syn-
onymous with weight: a massive body can be weightless. But in a gravitational field the
massive body, in virtue of its mass, albeit not without the gravitational "actualization,"
will possess weight - a weight which can vary infinitely for that body depending on the
materiality can, upon actualization by substantial form, give rise to dimensions - which
vary depending upon the forms, substantial and accidental, which actualize them.
thing is extended. But is this not to say that matter is extension? Again no. Matter en-
tails extension, but is not extension - it is the principle of extension. Only in conjunc-
tion with form does extension become actuated, and even then its precise determination
falls under the accidental mode of quantity, variable within limits set by the substantial
formal principle.
sions to be the principle of divisum ab alio, then we need look no further for the radical
explanation of unilocality162 - the impossibility of more than one material being occu-
pying a given place. For one place - "the innermost immobile boundary of the sur-
rounding body," for Aristotle and Aquinas - is distinguished from another abstractly by
the non-coincidence of their parts, and concretely by the nonidentity of the beings
which occupy them. Substantial being is prior in the real order to quantity, an accident,
so the reason why two bodies cannot occupy the same place is that their respective acts
of being are distinct. Therefore the extensive or dimensive attributes of those acts are
distinct, and to be distinct with respect to extension is none other than for one to be out-
"Can two bodies occupy the same place?" is thus seen to be oxymoronic in its very
162
A neologism for which I should make apologies, but there seems to be no terser expression.
123
formulation: it amounts to "Can those things which must occupy two distinct places oc-
cupy one place?" So fundamental is this approach that we can use it as a basis on which
through glass, occupy the same place as the glass?" - in the negative. For if light is a
physical being, as evidenced by its sensibility, its local motion, its transformability into
more obviously corporeal forms of being, then it cannot, per the definition and essence
The heart of the preceding argument may be summed up thus: No spatially indi-
viduated things are collocated (this from the definition of individuation); but all material
beings are spatially individuated (this from Aquinas's argument for the role of matter as
The terms "place" and "space" are sometimes confused or used interchangeably, and
Aristotle notes the kinship between the concepts, at least in common usage.164 But a
close analysis of place ends in its being attributed only to a body in terms of other body,
while space is seen to have, as its nominal definition, place with no body in it.165 The
Aristotelian - and, by extension, the Thomistic - treatment of place is much more de-
163
Allowance must be made, initial appearances notwithstanding, either for some sort of adja-
cent coexistence (as water in a sponge), or for a transient unitary existence (light "becoming"
glass or vice versa, analogous to water freezing into hail and then reverting to liquid water as it
passes through different strata of the atmosphere), rather than a true collocation of distinct enti-
ties.
164
Physics IV. 6.
165
72>zVUV.7,214a5-18.
124
tailed than the treatment of space. This is largely due to the fact that space is, for these
thinkers, only ens rationis, its real existence an impossibility. Place, on the other hand,
is a real mode of being, conceptualized directly from the sense data prior to any mathe-
Several Greek terms are nearly synonymous: what is perhaps closest to our Eng-
lish "space" is chora,166 which we have seen variously explicated in Plato's Timaeus,
while "void," kenon, is less likely to carry the note of extension in addition to "empti-
ness." "Extension" itself, diastema, is also used occasionally in contexts where Aris-
Proceeding, as usual, from the more known to the less, Aristotle first defines
place (IV. 1-4) before attacking the possibility of subsistent dimension or void space
(IV. 6-9). Nevertheless the definition of place implies the impossibility of void; what is
prior in order of discovery is posterior in order of causality and explanation. The analy-
dates. It cannot be either matter or form, as these are principles intrinsic to a thing
which is in place;168 when a body moves to or from a place, the least we must affirm is
that the body has not taken its place with it.
There remain two possibilities extrinsic to the mobile body. The first of these is
dimensionality or space, i.e. "the extension [diastema] between the extremities [of the
208b32,209a8,209bl2-18.
213a33,213b26ff., 214a5-18; 214M8.
IV. 2, 209b21-34.
125
emplaced body]."169 Aristotle's arguments against identifying place with (what amounts
to) merely the space it occupies are difficult,170 nor is Aquinas's extended commentary
The final possibility, on which Aristotle will settle as the appropriate definition
of place, is "the limit of the containing body" - further specified, in view of considera-
tions of relative and absolute place, as "the innermost motionless boundary of what con-
tains."172 Without going into the particularities of Aristotle's cosmic scheme, which
make untenable some of his conclusions about absolute and relative place and the role
they play in natural motion,173 we can note that place, the basis of Aristotle's all-
ings - within the order that characterizes them precisely as bodies. For extendedness,
which might seem prima facie to be a very tenuous or abstract analogue for body (given
the latter's connotations of solidity), will be seen in its ontological fullness to be the
The science of physics is concerned with mobile being: this is what first con-
fronts us as sensible in virtue of its extendedness (and resulting connaturality with our
169
211bl4.
170
211bl8-29.
171
211M4-29; In libros Physicorum IV, lect. 6 (461-3).
172
212a20.
173
But I will caution against a too facile conclusion that Aristotle's doctrine of natural place was
"naive"; differing only in terminology and "location," but not in essence (since force remained
only a quantifiable inclination), would be Newton's idea that bodies are accelerated toward a
gravitational center, or Einstein's idea that they tend along a spacetime geodesic, in accordance
with their mass.
126
sense organs), and is then determined to be material. What does it mean, then, to affirm
that physical substances are spatiotemporal? Is this merely a statement of the brute fact,
both; what is first apprehended via external and internal senses as temporal (i.e. mobile)
is seen, on analysis, to be extended and temporal in virtue of its material principle, i.e.
through its very nature and definition. This is an instance of the demonstrative regres-
sus: the intellectual process of discovery or resolution brings us to prime matter, which
At this point we can affirm that material being is per essentiam spatiotemporal,
and, given our starting-point in the regressus (which was not this extended mobile being
or that, but extended mobile being as such), we have convertibility. Spatiotemporal be-
brings forward arguments from motion, and then from the definition of void itself. The
main argument from motion is this: there could be no motion in a void space because
such space is undifferentiated and thus cannot intelligibly ground the locomotion of any
body within it.174 There would be no reason for a body to move in one direction rather
than another, or to move at all. (Nor, we might add, can sufficient reason be found in
the mobile as such, because at any moment it exists only in the present; past and future,
which define the mobile's trajectory, are not actual qua past and future. Even appeal to
174
214bl2-215al4.
127
an extrinsic motor cause, with its implication of finality, does not circumvent the unin-
Even if the void were extension, existing per impossibile without a subject, there
could be nothing in the nature of its quantitative differentiation that would influence a
mobile body on one course through the void rather than another, since in respect of such
cally equivalent.175
The argument against void based on motion is a properly physical argument, and
as such seems to lack adequate universality to rule out the possibility of void altogether.
But Aristotle goes on176 to base a metaphysical argument against void on the
very concept of void. Since it is the nature only of body to be displaceable by another
body, then placement of a body in void space would not displace the void; instead the
latter [in its dimensionality] would "penetrate" the emplaced body. Hence there must
be, in the volume occupied by the body, two identical magnitudes - that of the body it-
self and that of the void occupied by the body. But to have two identical magnitudes in
one place is absurd.177 "How then will the body of the cube [which Aristotle is using as
an example of a displacing body] differ from the void or place that is equal to it?"178
The argument is not trivial. Were nothing more meant by "body" than some-
thing which can be measured through spatial coincidence, it might seem a trivial thing
to object that a body should be considered to have the same dimensions as the place in
which it is located (rather like objecting that a line should be one foot long and also
bodies - in virtue of which they displace one another - is due precisely to their dimen-
prime matter. In other words, quantity does not exist except in virtue of matter, and it is
the nature of quantity so existing (real extension, as opposed to its abstract analogue in
the mind) to be exclusive in all its parts. Extension, grounded in matter, is what indi-
viduates physical being. Hence by whatever means a body were understood to coincide
with the dimensionality of void space, two bodies - or indefinitely many - could also
The argument just presented is reminiscent of the one Aristotle had advanced in
rejecting void space as a candidate for "place." In the earlier case he had reduced the
hypothesis to the absurdity of having infinite places in one place, while here it is re-
216a26-216bl2.
129
The persistence through history of the concept of void space, not to mention its
the power of intellectual abstraction and the risk we run of mistaking the conceptual for
the real. At a pre-philosophical level it should already be obvious that nothingness can-
not be; if there is dimensionality, then there is something, not nothingness; and to reify
virtue of which inertial motion can be determined (Newton) or as that in virtue of which
every motion occurs (Einstein) - is simply to indulge the myopia of mistaking the part
for the whole, in the manner of the proverbial blind men severally declaring the ele-
phant to be a wall, a tree, or a rope, depending on whatever part of the beast each one
had encountered.
Whatever is extended in re, is material being; and spatiality is its very extendedness in
might, by stretching common usage a bit, consider it "the extendedness of material be-
ing," or better still, material being under the aspect of its extendedness.
Informed matter - the only matter that constitutes existents - can thus be said to
constitute space, in the only sense in which space is real. But it seems one could also
say, correctly, that prime matter is space, taking advantage of Aristotle's recognition of
potency as Plato (and Descartes, for that matter) did not. For if "space" cannot exist as
such, it is akin to matter in precisely this regard, i.e., not existing as such, but only as
130
informed. I do not mean to say that matter and space are convertible, for space denotes
only one aspect of matter; but it does seem to be synonymous with that aspect.
Because "space" denotes something which can only stand as a potency to actual
dimensiveness, Aristotle rightly criticized Plato for any suggestion of reifying the chora
on its own. And Descartes is seen to have perpetrated a similar (and rather more ex-
Descartes' account, for properly distinguishing the potential and formal principles of
substance; but only through such a distinction can extension avoid being confused with
form.
As the instant is to duration in the temporal order, so is place to space in the spa-
tial order. Only the now, and only place, entail actual existence with reference to real
- and space, apprehended by us as a manifold of all places, are not present to our intel-
The subject of Euclidian versus non-Euclidian "space" is, in any physical con-
text, likewise chimerical - a question of geometries rather than of space as such. Spati-
ality is mere extendedness, the condition of having parts outside of parts, and
irreducibly three-dimensional; the properties of points, lines, surfaces and other geomet-
rical entities are abstracted from bodies (spatial beings) and posited in the mathematical
material origins that they can take on a "life of their own," submitting to manipulations
which are simply not possible at the primordial level of abstraction. But it is well worth
131
noting that such manipulations, in so far as they remain logically connected (at however
great a remove) to their point of origin, cannot represent a complete departure from the
natural foundation whence their progenitors, so to speak, were drawn. So long as there
is no break in the logical succession of abstractions (such that each is defined, positively
or negatively, in terms of what precedes it), it can hardly be said that later abstractions
represent other than an evolution of what was implicit from the beginning. There is no
concept in non-Euclidian geometry, for example, that cannot be defined in terms that
The limitless variety of mathematical formalisms, not a few of them now having
proved their worth upon retrospective application to the physical world, follows from
the continuity and indeterminacy of the extended order as such. No mathematics will
ever prove uniquely adequate to the possibilities inherent in the material or cosmic or-
der.
I. Principle of corruptibility
Perhaps no aspect of matter has drawn philosophers' attention more than its role in the
comparable to that of the universe itself. It is precisely the corruptibility of material be-
ing that throws into relief the immutability of essences. The formal principle, that which
primarily characterizes the essence, cannot be a cause of its own demise. Nothing in
what constitutes form as form entails or indicates cessation of existence. On the con-
132
trary; the activity by which form manifests itself is in every case a perfective and pre-
agent and end? This will not suffice either - not if we are interrogating the world phi-
causality alone were responsible for the flux of cosmic being, there would be no suffi-
cient reason (that we could discern) for things to change in a certain way rather than in
another, or in any orderly fashion. The world would present itself as no more than an
occasion for the play of divine free will, and our explanations would still be at the level
of myth.
is, however, not to be found in mobile being itself. (Here, as in so many other arenas of
given order of intelligibles cannot yield the principles of intelligibility.) This is a topic
requiring further exploration than we can pursue here, but we may say briefly that when
Aristotle, and still more explicitly Aquinas, traces each of the four causes to a First, he
need not assume that the order of causation in question is intelligible through itself. The
ground of intelligibility does not enter into consideration at this point; only the fact of
But once each line of causation is traced to a First, and those "Firsts" are seen to
be one, and are identified with the creative Origin of the universe, then we discern an
epistemic basis for the intelligibility of each causal influence. There is reason not to
133
posit absolute unintelligibility of anything issuing from the creative Intellect. For Aqui-
nas, it is part of the created perfection of the universe that the rationality of its Origin
and End be reflected throughout its fabric. We become philosophically certain of what
was known pre-philosophically: that cosmic being in itself, and not only through its ex-
And so I return to corruptibility, and the search for its intrinsic cause(s). Must it
not be matter? This is not to suggest that we should see, in matter, a causality "dis-
played" for our full comprehension; matter, as pure potency, remains unintelligible to
us. (My implication, in the preceding paragraph, of matter's inherent intelligibility, did
not entail intelligibility with respect to the human knower, nor of the quidditative or-
der.) Yet perhaps we could at least see in matter the source of a thing's instability in ex-
But such an hypothesis falters on more than one count. First, since matter is in-
determinately receptive of form, there would be no sufficient reason for it, considered in
its own right, to be receptive of one form rather than another - in other words, no reason
being, matter cannot be implicated, any more than form, as a positive factor in its own
destruction. The principles that give rise to materiated being cannot also be the princi-
The solution to our problem - what is the intrinsic cause of corruption? - must
be drawn, not from any one of the causes, but from all four mutatis mutandis. Due to the
consideration just mentioned, intrinsic factors will not suffice, but we must look to ex-
134
trinsic ones. Yet to avoid intrinsic unintelligibility we will also invoke matter and form,
Let us look at form first. Form is an active principle of corruption - but of be-
ings other than the one of which it is constitutive. A being's formal principle certainly
does not act against its own existential integrity; but it can, in virtue of secondary activ-
ity through its accidental modifications, impugn the existence of other hylomorphic be-
ing. This is occasioned and occurs via spatial contiguity. (As cause of corruption in
other beings, form of course operates under the aspect of agent cause.)
But how does one formal principle act to "eliminate" another from existence?
There is, to be sure, a cosmic mystery here: somehow, in ways we designate quantita-
tively with terms like "force" and "energy," there is a prioritization or hierarchy of exis-
tents, so that some of them succumb to others, rather than the other way around, as the
cosmic dynamism plays itself out. A formal principle that is "dominant" amid one con-
stellation of accidents (its own and others') will not be so in another. But to the activity
of one formal principle there must correspond the "passivity" of another. I put the word
in quotes, because this is only a relative characterization; every form is properly an ac-
tive principle. What is it, then, that causes mobile being to undergo the substantial
change called corruption, under the agent and teleological influences of other mobile
beings?
It is the passivity or potentiality of matter that enables the "other" formal princi-
ple to act on the composite undergoing corruption. This matter is just as receptive of a
new form as it is of the form that currently inheres in it - more properly, by the acci-
135
dents grounded in that form. We say that prime matter's receptivity is absolute and un-
differentiated - but that is to speak of it in the abstract. In the concrete existent, matter's
potentiality is limited, conditioned, predisposed, by the form which inheres in it. Here is
where we find the only role of form in its self-destruction, so to speak - not as a cause,
ration of its matter and form, only so far as its material principle is receptive of forms
other forms.) But the same being will, under the influence of extrinsic causes, corrupt
only in certain ways and not others, thanks to the directive influence (or dispositio ma-
teriae) constituted by the accidents of the formed matter. Thus the substance known as
table salt, while not inclined to ^e^-destruct, will, under sufficiently strong extrinsic in-
fluence (e.g., a powerful electric current), corrupt - not into nitrogen or argon, however,
dispositive, there is another sense in which form can be spoken of as a more direct
principle of corruption. But this is a negative role, not a positive one. Hence we cannot
call it a cause under this aspect. I mean, of course, the privation identified by Aristotle
as one of the three intrinsic principles of change. Privation is the absence of a form , not
just any form, but a form toward which the present form is disposed.
upon by other being. Its matter renders it susceptible to corruption, not directly but indi-
179
See next chapter, section G.
136
rectly inasmuch as matter is indifferently receptive to all forms. Its present form consti-
in any corruption that does occur. The object of this disposition - the absent or future
form to which the present form is said to be disposed - is called the "form" simply, as
terminus of the change. But the absence of that form, considered as "present" in the
mobile being, is called the privation. Because form as such is not inclined toward non-
existence (its very ratio is that of existential specification), the present form of an exis-
tent X is not included by Aristotle or Aquinas among the intrinsic principles of change.
When we frame our investigation in terms of the most radical metaphysical prin-
ciple, we find it natural to express the relation between matter and privation thus: as
esse is to form, so is matter to privation. Matter is the not-yet of existential act, a certain
dynamism of esse, while privation is the not-yet of form or intelligibility, a certain in-
clination to other form. To the consideration of matter and esse I now turn.
when that foundation does not come into explicit consideration during the analysis. Our
philosophical principles would remain incomplete if we did not indicate the metaphysi-
The doctrine of matter, as taken over by Aquinas from Aristotle's natural phi-
losophy, could not but be adapted in accordance with Aquinas's clarification of the Ar-
137
istotelian approach. This modification, perhaps the greatest single advance in the history
of philosophy, is a recognition of the distinct roles of essence and the act of essence in
the metaphysical analysis. What was relatively obscure in Aristotle would become quite
clear in the thought of Avicenna, and central in the philosophy of Aquinas: that every
finite ens is composite, with the existential act or esse being the ground, in the compos-
essence and esse (N.B. that "real" does not connote that these principles are real in and
of themselves, but that their composition gives rise to ens reale) is the notion, largely a
product of the lO^-century revival in Thomism, that esse has primacy to the extent that
In so far as all finite being flows in its entirety from God who is pure act, ipsum
esse subsistens, there can be nothing in finite being which is not derived from divine
esse. Now that which limits this participated esse, and which we know as essence, can-
not itself be esse, nor can it be "something else." In the first case, that which limits esse
would itself be esse, existence limiting existence, the unlimited limiting the unlimited -
both meaningless conclusions. In the second case, the "something" would either lack
esse, so that the nonexistent would constitute a limitation upon existence, or it would
"have" esse, which would involve circularity. Hence what limits esse in the order of real
being is neither esse itself nor anything else which has esse; the limiting principle is not
real sense, "nothing." Any other conclusion, ascribing to essence even the slightest enti-
138
tative or existential character in its own right, fails to do justice to the primacy of the
actualitas omnium actuum, existence considered as what sets off beings from their mere
possibilities.
Indeed, the way in which we are compelled to think about esse can easily mis-
lead us into treating it as a quasi-essence, when it is simply the existential principle. The
only thing (ens rationis) which can delimit esse is non-esse, and this is what essence
must be: none other than the limitation of esse. Contrary to the fears of some Thomists,
that an existentialist account of essence must impugn the doctrine of the "real distinc-
tion" of essence and esse, there is in fact no contradiction in maintaining such a real dis-
tinction even though the principles so distinguished are existence and its delimitation.
(Analogously, there is a real distinction between every spatial being and its spatial
boundary, though that boundary is not a separate entity, but simply "where the being
ends." We cannot predicate of the boundary what we predicate of the being, and vice
versa. Yet the being cannot exist without its boundary, and vice versa.) It is noteworthy
that, while Aquinas doubtless holds for the real distinction which in later times would
become so closely identified with his metaphysics, he is not given to using the term -
perhaps because he prefers to avoid any implication that the principles really distin-
Now the essence comprises, in hylomorphic being, both formal and material
principles. If essence is a limitation upon existence, such that every finite existent, an
essence-e^e composite, is a limited participation in esse, then both form and matter as
co-principles of essence must be referred to esse as its limitation. Form, for both sepa-
139
rated and hylomorphic substances, is a primary principle of limitation, and as such the
limitation while remaining distinct from the primary limiting principle within the es-
sence. We have seen that matter enters into the essence inasmuch as material beings
must be defined with reference to matter; that it is the ground of individuation, and of
extension; that it is the substantial principle which enables corruption. All of these notae
can readily be grasped under an existential aspect. The material essence is precisely one
of existence whereby individuals are at once distinct and interactive (corrupting and
existibility of the species, since the individual existent does not exhaust the existibility
of its essence.
ter" that the agent cause brings them into the order of existence. In other words: certain
kinds of form are only able to exist contingently. Clearly matter exercises a causality
which is existential rather than essential, in so far as it is not directly intelligible. Its role
in the essence is that of conditio sine qua non - just as form is a kind of limitation of
secondary limitation that emerges from the dynamism of hylomorphic esse. Hence
matter is included, in a division of the four causes, with the agent as an existential-order
180
Angelic being remains incomprehensible to us because, firstly, it exceeds the capacity of our
lower intellects and, secondly, it is not conjoined with matter - abstraction from which being
the only human mode of knowing in statu viae.
140
is included, in a division of the four causes, with the agent as an existential-order cause,
essence. Form, in limiting esse, brings about intelligibility, while matter re-introduces
unintelligibility to the extent that it "opposes" form's hold on existence.182 The unintel-
ligibility of esse is tantamount to the unreplicability, by the human knower, of the crea-
tive act in which esse is imparted; the unintelligibility of matter is that of the dynamism
or contingency of that imparting. Both esse and materia evoke the Creator's power.
Among those who have tried to express a neo-Thomist understanding of matter in terms
of esse was William Carlo, whose contributions in this regard exhibited both the bold-
ness and the weaknesses of a pioneer's effort. Carlo's overriding thesis is indicated by
the title of his full-length study, The Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to Existence in
existential act, he alleged certain texts in Aquinas which admit of apparently contradic-
tory interpretations. Among these, he said, are passages which treat of esse now as pri-
181
See Appendix 2.
182
It may be speculated that, were matter a principle only of individuation through unilocality, it
need not be an impediment to intelligibility; but since its role is also that of substratum of
change, entailing a passive potency to new informations (corresponding to the active potency in
the agent cause of those informations), all material being is dynamic and mutant. In abstracting
from matter the intellect is abstracting from both matter as mode of existence and matter as in-
determinate.
141
receptive of esse, yet as nonbeing; and those which portray matter also as nonbeing,
pure potentiality, stripped of all determination, deprived of all form but none-
theless combined with form, exerting a real causal efficiency in order to limit it.
This principle is in the genus of substance but it does not exist except under
form. It is so completely bare of intelligibility that even God does not know
matter: He does not have a divine idea of matter except in the composite, under
form....It is non-being or nihil. But in other texts it has a form of its own. It is
without qualification but it is a similitudo and has a being of a sort, a weak esse
and an incomplete esse. It is almost nothing, yet it is a being. These apparently
contradictory texts are the same kind which we find in the doctrine of the pos-
sible essence.183
The hypothesis whereby such contradictions can be resolved at the metaphysical level is
presented in negative terms: "any attempt to explain the ontological location of prime
matter without reducing it to a mode of esse is ultimately fruitless and eventually ends
in the kind of discussion that consists in repeating over and over again the simple ele-
ments of the definition of prime matter"184 - i.e., such an attempt does not move beyond
the physical to a properly metaphysical ground. Again, "since matter is a mode of being
we should be able to explain the doctrine of matter with all its application without using
the term matter itself, but substituting a metaphysical language of esse plus some adjec-
tive or group of modifiers in lieu of a definition."185 He rightly observes that the "test
case problems of the doctrine of matter ... would include historically: the substratum
was at times only minimally philosophical. Trying to formulate a thesis that has not
hitherto been widely excogitated, Carlo wrote in a far from linear fashion and was much
given to vague and repetitive assertion, with a tendency to intimate abundant textual
corroborations of his thesis though never adducing many texts. "When Aristotle arrived
at the idea of prime matter by a progressive process of abstracting all positive determi-
nations from the substratum underlying change, is it possible that, as he peeled away
form after form, he arrived at a reality that was, but was not conceptualizable?"188 This
rooted in esse.... And just as essence and existence are not reciprocal causes but essence
is reducible to existence, so matter is the limitation of form, the place where form stops,
l
*"Op.cit., p. 123.
187
Op. cit., p. 124.
188
Ibid.
189
Op. cit., pp. 124f. The last qualification is extreme; we are certainly not doing away with
matter when interpreting it as a modality of esse; but perhaps Carlo had in mind "immaterial"
with reference to a quasi-formal, essentialist conception of matter.
143
Carlo asks: what does it mean? If it cannot entail, absurdly, that matter somehow pre-
exists form, "does it simply mean that form as the concrete existent is that in which
matter has existence as a privation of some sort?"191 By privation he means, not the
principle of generation identified by Aristotle (that principle is of the formal order, al-
beit per accidens), but a lack or receptiveness in the existential order, what we may call
sponding principle (in virtue of the universal complementarity of potential and actual
principles) in the privation of esse. But the privation of form is apprehended only
such) through the sheer dynamism of hylomorphic being - not what it changes into, but
"Esse thus provides an ontological status for matter outside of form but still
within being as the phenomenon of the 'elasticity of ewe.'" 192 Again, each hylomorphic
existent shares in "the causal efficacy of Ipsum Esse Subsistens. The whole universe of
190
Cf. De ente et essentia, c. 4: "illud quod habet rationem causae potest habere esse sine altero,
sed non conuertitur. Talis autem inuenitur habitudo materie et forme quod forma dat esse ma-
terie, et ideo impossibile est esse materiam sine aliqua forma" (Leon. 43.376:43-48); Deprin-
cipiis naturae c. 1: "Sed materia habet esse ex eo quod ei aduenit, quia de se habet esse
incompletum. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, forma dat esse materiae" (Leon. 43.39:30-32);
Quaestiones disputatae de anima, q. 10 ad 2: "cum materia sit propter formam, hoc modo forma
dat esse et speciem materie" (Leon. 24.1.92:286-288), etc.
191
Ultimate Reducibility, p. 125.
192
Op. cit, p. 126.
144
esse is an elastic thing, each component acting on the other, the constituents sharing
their basic acts of existence. Each thing desires esse....The movement of the material
being to add to its esse has a very illuminating parallel for St. Thomas with the ampli-
tude of the intellectual being"193 - since the soul "is the least in the order of intellectual
substances, as prime matter is least in the order of sensibles."194 "Matter is not esse it-
self, nor the determination or limit of esse, nor the absence of esse purely and simply,
but 'the esse itself as somehow deficient,' but deficient precisely in what is not owed to
it by its nature ... but in what it could receive from secondary causes."195
This is perhaps the heart of Carlo's attempt to understand prime matter in terms of esse.
"Essences are the primal stages of esse, and make things to be the kind of things they
are. But within this primal stage there is a secondary stage which enables a thing to be
more or less what it is, to increase in being without becoming other than what it is."
In this last, and some other related remarks, Carlo seems to have had in view
only accidental change. But, as he elsewhere makes clear, the same understanding of
Iy3
Op. cit, p. 127.
194
St. Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae De anima, cap. 8: "[anima] sit infima in ordine intellec-
tualium substantiarum, sicut materia prima est infima in ordine rerum sensibilium" (Leon.
24.1.66:185-187).
195
Carlo, p. 128. Another instance of Carlo's lapsing from rigorous terminology is his saying,
when describing matter as ens in potentia, that it is "an existent which is capable of perfecting
itself or being perfected by the reception of esse to the aggrandizement and completion of its
original esse, precisely because it lacks esse" {ibid.) - the problem here being denoting matter
as an "existent" (it is only & principle of the existent). Of course, Carlo is following Aquinas's
lead, and the constraints of ordinary language, in referring to matter's "reception" of esse.
196
Carlo, p. 135.
197
Ibid. If I may suggest a simpler way of putting it: form is a delimitation of esse; matter is
variability in the esse thus delimited; the form-matter composite is "esse delimited variably."
145
matter applies to substantial change. Not only does the esse of a hylomorphic being ad-
mit of accidental variation, but it entails the existential vulnerability of the entire sub-
stance. To say that form is the actuating principle of a hylomorphic being is to say that
istence by another formal determination thereof, through the cosmic interaction pro-
The esse debile of hylomorphic beings entails their mutual susceptibility and
spatiality, unilocality, and mutual interaction.198 The existence of all finite being is con-
tingent on the agent cause; the contingency of hylomorphic being, unlike that of sepa-
rate substances, is mediated, even at the substantial level, by other hylomorphic beings.
Matter's "potency to form" (the very phrase an artifact, I make bold to say, of a some-
Now matter thus considered emerges first from an analysis of mobile being: it is,
in other words, a properly physical principle. But once we have situated it in its meta-
physical context as the modality under which spatiotemporal beings have their esse, we
are in position to examine further this ratio of potency. I now address the following
questions: (1) What does it mean to describe prime matter as pure potency? (2) What
does it mean to speak of prime matter as esse or as having esse? (3) What does it mean,
198
Carlo was given to using the phrase esse debile to denote matter, but Aquinas in fact never
does so; the closest he comes is in Quaestiones disputatae de veritate q. 3, a. 5 ad 1: "quamvis
materia prima sit informis, tamen inest ei imitatio primae formae: quantumcumque enim debile
esse habeat, illud tamen est imitatio primi entis." Leon. 22.1.112:56-60.
146
to speak of prime matter as "receiving" esse from form? (4) How is prime matter to be
(1) When matter is apprehended under the aspect of potency, two distinct con-
siderations arise: [a] the ground or subject of this potency, and [b] its term or object.
The two taken together give us the ratio we are seeking. As to the first consideration,
clearly it cannot be the form, as though the hylomorphic form were in its essence or-
dained to self-destruction. Nor can "matter" coherently be said to be the subject of its
own potency. Its subject must rather be the composite being as such: we predicate po-
tency, not of matter simply (except convertibly), nor of form, but of the hylomorphic
ens as a whole. And the object, or that to which the potency is ordered, is the existence
of further formal perfection. In the next chapter we will examine the role of form in dis-
posing every hylomorphic composite to receive certain forms and not others. But with
its potency could only come about through a principle of actual limitation, namely its
(2) Now esse is act, the actualitas omnium actuum, and as such is immediately
contrasted with the potentiality of matter. It would seem that there could be no admis-
sion of esse with respect to matter; and whatever is distinguished from esse is non-esse.
Is matter, then, nonbeing? Have we defined it out of existence? And if so, how can it
have a ratio, or any bearing on reality? It is this phantom character of the material prin-
ciple which, when it has been rightly grasped at all by philosophers, has led to skepti-
Let it be recalled that we prescind to matter, on both the physical and meta-
in the one case, an unintelligible basis of substantial predication in the other. These
essence more broadly considered: that it is a "not" at the heart of the "what." We are
back to the realization of matter as limit, as "where form stops." The notion is by no
means confined to the primordial principles of being. Even at the sensible level we are
of negation: the boundary of a plane figure is the very negation of the figure, it is where
the figure terminates or "is no more" - standing, in regard to the figure, not as part but
as principle. (Thus circles and squares are areas, but they are determined by lines which
have no area. The lines which define them do not have the properties of circles and
squares as such.) The existentialist grasp of reality, far from losing coherence through
paucity of principle, is inexhaustibly rich through its referral of all to the ultimate onto-
logical principle, (participated) esse. All else - essence, form, matter, substance, acci-
148
dents - is constituted of, or in relation to, existential act through a variety of principles
of limitation. Hence none of the principles of Thomistic metaphysics save esse alone
has "independent" positive content, yet all are ineluctably real in that they are determi-
esse in its very ratio. And because the intellect, mirror of reality, apprehends all in
terms of esse, its approach to matter cannot but be in those terms. We cannot abrogate
all reference to esse in our discourse on matter; that were to abrogate knowledge and
discourse altogether. "Prime matter" is an ens rationis, inasmuch as it does not enter
into the fabric of reality on its own but only as an existential condition of form; but that
all positivity in our deepest analysis. The analogical flexibility whereby we treat of mat-
ter as a sort of esse, or as having esse, even while knowing that it is not and has not, is
not alien to Aquinas's modus dicendi: he is known to speak even of God, ipsum esse
subsistens, as supra existentia.199 This does not mean that matter, rightly conceived, is
other than a lack of esse. But it is a lack that presupposes that which it lacks. It will be
recalled that matter is not identified with a simple negation of esse, nor with the priva-
tion of that first determination of esse which constitutes the essence. It is, rather, the ne-
"Deus non est existens, sed supra existentia, ut dicit Dionysius." Summa theologiae la q. 12,
a. 1, obj. 3 (Leon. 4.114). Cf. numerous references to this theme in In De divinis nominibus.
149
and hence as in some way as being or having esse, it will also be the case that prime
matter is spoken of, context permitting, as "receiving" esse through form or from form.
Clearly Aquinas is employing a figure of speech and cannot mean literally that form
"has" esse to "give." And Thomistic analysis of hylomorphic being never construes the
matter as "having" an esse distinct from that of the form; but if matter's esse is in some
way that of the form, how can matter and form be distinct principles? What we must
avoid at all costs is an excessive ontologizing of either the material or the formal princi-
ple: both are aspects of esse, while neither is esse as such. But since our notion of mat-
ter is first derived from secondary matter, which is really formed matter and hence only
prime matter in the terms which were first appropriated through our reflection on sec-
ondary matter.
What does it mean, then, to say forma dot esse materiael Bearing in mind that
esse here can only refer to the existence of the fully constituted being, no an actuality
proper to matter in its own right - we must understand that form is that whereby matter
enters into the order of existents. Yet it is no less true that matter is that whereby form
enters into existence. The two are coexistent and concreated. The esse of the hylomor-
phic composite, Aquinas says in a key passage,200 consists in the joining of form and
"...esse substantie composite non est tantum forme neque tantum materie, sed ipsius compo-
siti." De ente et essentia c. 2 (Leon. 43.371:51-53).
150
matter. Why do we not find in Aquinas an expression of this correlative principle, "ma-
mination of creatural esse, it would not be Aquinas's way, I submit, to assign matter any
active role such as is connoted by the verb "give." In the constituted being it is form that
is the principle of all activity (even though all activity is a consequence, ultimately, of
the existential act of which form constitutes the specification, and even though such ac-
tivity occurs only in virtue of the material constitution, the "materiation," of the form).
In other words, it is due primarily to the form, rather than the matter, that any activity
occurs. Since our denomination of the roles of matter and form is from what is posterior
and more known to us, it is appropriate that we should say forma dat esse materiae
rather than materia dat esse, even making allowance for the faltering nature of language
(4) We come finally to the question of matter and God. Aquinas is careful al-
ways to distance the two as much as possible, yet he does so with varying emphasis de-
pending on context. It is easy to pit the two as being at opposite poles, through the
radical contrast between act and potency: God is pure act, and matter pure potency, so
how more opposed could two principles be? Although this is true, it must also be re-
membered that potency is not absolute nonbeing, but a privative aspect of being, and
hence cannot be opposed to God as absolutely as "pure nonbeing" could be. Within the
vast range of being, God and prime matter are as opposed as opposed can be; but mat-
151
ter, whatever it is, is o/God, though the "least aspect," so to speak, of that which is of
God - being merely a tendency to otherness within one realm of created being.
As coming from God, matter is intelligible to Him in a way that completely es-
capes us. Matter is unintelligible to us because our intellects, proportioned to finite be-
ing within a certain order, fail before the indeterminacy of matter, which is correlative
to the freedom of the divine agent cause (active potency). Such indeterminacy does not
connote unintelligibility in the divine intellect, however. Although it must be said that
God Himself does not know matter except in relation to form (since that pertains to the
ratio of matter, as three sides pertain to the ratio of a triangle), the divine knowledge
and providence, from the standpoint of the eternal now, compasses all possibilities with
respect to that relation. Is there, then, a divine Idea corresponding to matter? Aquinas
answers yes, and notes that the Idea of matter in God is not other than that of matter as
In bringing the analysis of material being back to God as first principle, Aquinas
employs his usual caution. As he traces each of the four causes back to God, only the
material cause is not predicated of Him.201 Unlike the extrinsic lines of causality, agent
and end, which can terminate in God "within" their own order, the intrinsic causes (be-
cause they are intrinsic in ratio), in being traced to a First, require to be "supplemented"
by considerations outside their own order: thus Aquinas's Third and Fourth Ways,
based (as I have argued elsewhere)202 on material and formal causality respectively,
must advert to agent causality in order to complete their arguments for God.
It is through matter that we confront one of the most mysterious aspects of our own be-
ing, the complementarity of the transient and the transcendent, of contingency and per-
manence. Such a confrontation is, of course, an intellectual activity, already the sign of
a certain "detachment" from the cosmic milieu. It is the pre-eminent activity of human
beings, and of philosophers especially, to work out the implications of our materialized
existence.
of sensible species" is none other than what modern science describes in terms of mo-
lecular interactions, light absorption, electrical impulses and so on: a brute contact be-
tween matter and matter - the matter of what is sensed (as it emits or reflects light,
the matter that is first involved in the sensing (biological structures, tissues, cells).
At a certain point in the ensuing process, as raw sense stimuli are submitted to
the internal activities of imagination, memory and intellection, the purely material na-
ture of the original data is transcended and the intellect forms, through abstraction from
matter, what is proper to its own nature as immaterial. The concept is born. And it is
intellect, actualized thus, which returns our attention to the material world from which
202
"Five Ways through Four Causes," M.A. thesis, The Catholic University of America, 2001.
153
sensation began, and conceives a paradox. For the content of what the intellect had en-
gendered is at once like and unlike the reality that is presented to sense. The being
which "entered" into the order of thought lost, in the process, its materiality, though not
all recognizability. Why is the thought, the concept, not the same as that which gave rise
to it?
With this question emerges the sense of wonder - intellect, having been set in
motion so to speak, now perpetuates the cycle. No sooner does the mind conceive "dog"
as an intelligible, than the next real dog encountered provokes interrogation: what, in
the nature that I have apprehended as "dog," is the place of this or that feature, aspect,
behavior of the dog I now behold? For the mind compares the intelligible content which
it has already abstracted, with the thing from which it abstracted that content, and finds
the thing itself ever richer, ontologically, than what has yet been conceived with respect
to it. In some mysterious way, in "taking" that thing into itself suo modo, i.e., without
matter, the intellect has left behind something of precisely what it was seeking to know.
The mind knows, then, through immaterial concepts, but it does not know those con-
cepts - the Kantian attempt to maintain otherwise is a tragedy now two centuries run-
ning - rather, by means of the immaterial concept the mind seeks to "become" the
material thing. The proper object of the human intellect is the material existent, and
there is set in motion a kind of oscillation: from concrete existent, tantalizing in its par-
(This is of course only the barest sketch of human knowing: the fact that knowl-
edge and truth are ordered in the first place to materiated sensible being does not ex-
154
elude the intellect's ascent, through subsequent analogy and negation, to a consideration
of being which is altogether beyond matter. But even in regard to a metaphysical and
theological subject-matter, truth is always had via explicit or implicit reversion to the
sensible order.)
Why, then, does the mind seek to possess precisely that which somehow eludes
possession? Why is matter at once the sine qua non of human knowing, and the cosmic
in its first attainment, per viam analogiae, to matter as substrate of substantial change,
the mind found itself with a concept unintelligible. It is one thing to know that some-
thing is, and another to know what it is, to grasp it as a definable essence. Not only does
physical analysis fail to yield a definition of that to whose underlying presence, amid
from flux or motion at all that the mind can even discern essences. Perhaps no one has
ever been more deeply affected by the realization man Plato, but it is an Aristotelian and
Thomistic realization as well: that essences are atemporal, and grasped only in disjunc-
removing analysis of what we know of material being - the intellect came no closer to
nothing could in turn be predicated. Once again, just as in its role as physical substrate,
to form - which is that of potency to act - sheds a further light on its unintelligibility:
for only what is actual is knowable, and the potential as such is beyond the intellect's
grasp.
gible: the mind, knowing things immaterially, knows them universally, that is to say in
precisely that mode whereby the one concept is applicable to many instances without
alteration or diminution.
The mind, then, in abstracting from what is given it through sensation and other
faculties, conceives that which is disjunct from matter as principle of change, from mat-
ter as merely potential correlative of form, from matter as that which is opposed to uni-
versality. Let us, in continuing to follow this trajectory, press on to the metaphysical
tion, it is seen that essence, the intelligible principle, is intelligible precisely as a limita-
tion of participated (created) esse. This is to say that existential act is not what our mind
grasps or possesses; rather, it is only the limitedness of that act. Again, we must beware
of a spurious "reifying" of the essence. The essence without its act of existence is noth-
ing; we say that it is "that which can exist," quod quid erat esse; but if the "that" which
can exist is itself utterly without existence in its own right, then what does it "bring" to
Now essence, or the limitation of esse, "where esse stops," is primarily the form
- such that, in angelic being, essence is only form (for which reason we cannot know
such being abstractively, but only through analogy and negation). But the essence of
hylomorphic being also includes matter; and as we have seen, this is constituted, in
terms of esse, as an existential limitation upon form. In other words, just as form entails
form's limiting activity, the mode of existence of form - asserts the dynamism of esse
over and against such limitation. Matter, as a mode of that very esse whose limitation
notions we seek to illustrate thereby. But we might offer, as the merest suggestion, the
following. Let a blank expanse of paper, of indefinite dimension, represent created esse;
then figures which are drawn on that expanse - circles, triangles, and so on - can repre-
sent so many essences, formal limitations (infinitely replicable) upon inherently unlim-
ited esse. Now, if we imagine any of these figures as being variable in size, or shape,
then the array of different sizes and shapes which results from this variation can repre-
sent sequences of new forms (accidental or substantial, as we will). But the variability
of the area within those diverse figures - not their area, but the variability of their area,
Part of the resistance to "existential" Thomism may be due to the long continuance of an es-
sentialist vocabulary: merely to call esse the act o/form is to prioritize, in our consciousness,
that (form) which is really posterior.
157
For esse is unintelligible to us: how could it be otherwise? Esse is the be-ing, the
very act of the Agent Cause present in that which it causes. It is, in a word, the being-
created of the thing, or even its "createdness." It is senseless to suppose a thing's esse as
other than in the thing, instantiating the thing, constituting it as "not non-being." The
most radically constitutes them as beings, their actus essendi, and this includes the ma-
lied to the unintelligibility of esse itself; that the mind, by taking in form, takes in noth-
ing of what pertains to that form's existence or the modality thereof; that what
inalienable and certainly not granted "admission" to the knowing intellect. Individuals
as such are unintelligible because it is precisely as existents that they are individuated:
matter, the ground of quantitative individuation, is again seen in this role to be an exis-
tential principle within essence. Mobiles as such are unintelligible, because mobility is
If esse, in its material mode, is what constitutes the difference between a being
and our knowledge of that being; while that same esse is indeed "the thing" in its posi-
tivity, its not-nothingness, so that it is true (and most profoundly so!) to say that created
being participates through its esse in God, but through its essence only in some manifes-
158
tation of not-Godness, then it is small wonder that the mind of man, having begun
return to that source, dimly aware that its knowledge is not yet a knowledge of what is
most intimately constituent of things - their esse, unintelligible (to us) simpliciter and in
viewed in light of its relation to its correlative extrinsic (non-causal) principle, active
potency in the agent cause. As esse is the intrinsic correlate to agent cause - the act of
the agent in the patient - so is matter, the dynamism of esse so to speak, the intrinsic
whereby esse is imparted, so is agent potency that whereby "further" esse can be im-
as only quoad nos, which will prove of significance in the course of our physical inves-
tigation. Aristotle was the first to reduce the apparent acausality of chance events to a
nature of chance occurrences is due, not to a failure of causality but to a defect of our
i.e., of the material factor as such. Because matter is indeterminately receptive of form,
159
sense that all events are caused and therefore in principle knowable; but it is not a
"strict" determinism because the number of possibilities and variables stemming from
the potential aspect of hylomorphic being far exceeds our capability of knowing.
Such an obstacle to knowing does not, of course, exist with respect to an infinite
Intellect, a fortiori the Intellect which is the creative origin of all material being in its
very materiality. From the standpoint of divine ultimate causality all is foreseen, deter-
mined, caused.204 Indeed, "chance" becomes, for an all-knowing and provident God, the
whose causality, partly hidden from us, appears largely as chance, than in the most de-
As for the reason why the Author of the universe would build chance into its
fabric, I refer the reader to Appendix 3, on cosmic becoming as the condition for the
exercise of human free will. Surely an analogous situation obtains in the present regard
the correlative potencies of matter and the divine agency, is the appropriate context in
which human will assumes its self-determining role. In a strictly deterministic universe
there would be no scope for properly human acts; man need be no more than a passive
participant amid cosmic flux, at no point asserting moral causality on his own part.
204
Human free will constitutes a supervening factor on "brute nature," and a source of further
unpredictability, but does not on that account escape the universal causality of the First Cause.
160
The consideration of the radical intelligibility of all being, even if it is not an in-
telligibility quoad nos, leads to a second observation: the causality which cannot but be
operative at levels beyond our direct access, can and does manifest itself even in cir-
cumstances where there is (to us) only a partial intelligibility. Thus, to cite an example
which I have mentioned before, the radioactivity of unstable atoms exhibits utter unpre-
in the aggregate. Such statistically coherent behavior cannot but be due to causalities
that remain hidden to us, and only the most benighted positivism will pretend otherwise.
M. Three-dimensionality as primordial
I return, briefly, to the datum from which we began as knowers, the realm of sensible
being - extended, individuated, spatial. This spatiality is grounded in, and the very
intimately constitutive of cosmic being. It is not too much to say that a being's spatiality
is the way in which it participates in the very being of God (since esse is precisely that
participation, and matter is the hylomorphic "way" of esse). Small wonder that matter
entails mystery: and I invite the reader to ponder, in the awareness of that mystery, the
is to compare - to hold two things in the mind together, so their similarities and dissimi-
larities are seen modo universale. Hence dimension is an ens rationis, like "equality" or
"duration," yet, like these and many other concepts, rooted in the extramental reality.
161
That dimensionality is radicated in beings themselves, despite its formal existence only
Why three dimensions? To science and philosophy there can be, I suspect, no
beyond predication, beyond direct intelligibility: it is the brute fact, the absolute given.
At most we can say, perhaps, that - given the very nature of extension as "parts outside
of parts" - no fewer than three dimensions are required to answer to the notion of
"parts," while more than three cannot be conceived without implying rationes other
than that of "part" simpliciter. Here the restless impulse of man as interrogator of the
universe seems to be thwarted. At this last threshold, which was also the first beginning,
of intelligibility, we are confronted with an inexplicable but undeniable feature: that the
very extendedness of a certain kind of being, which proves to be the ground of our
knowing anything at all, cannot be adequately grasped except as "three," even while it
is one. Nothing distinguishes one dimension from another, except their distinctness.
None can "exist" without the others except in artificial mathematical abstraction; no
Note that I am not considering the question of "Euclidian" versus "Non-Euclidian" spaces
here. Any geometry which limits itself to just the spatial, as abstracted from physical reality,
can be reduced to a Euclidian (flat) space, even if this is not the most efficient way mathemati-
cally speaking.
162
Having in mind the various notae of matter as elucidated by Aristotle and Aquinas, we
causeless process in which creation and annihilation would occur unintelligibly. This is
[2] Its ratio as substantial co-principle with form is discerned, quite apart from
its role as principle of continuity in change, through analysis of our intellectual appre-
understood to be one and the same principle, there being no reason to posit a difference:
the substantial form apprehended metaphysice is that which is initially inferred physice,
but whereas form is only considered in abstraction (abstractio formae) from matter (as
tio) from matter in metaphysics, such that formal and material principles can be consid-
ered under the latter perspective without reference to their role in change.
ing understood as a potency to dimensive quantity (the first of accidents) such that by
penetrability (collocality). The full analysis as presented by Aquinas takes into account
which material existents are both agents and patients of motion through formal princi-
ples acting via spatial contiguity afforded by matter. Through motions at the accidental
level (all such motions or changes involving, directly or indirectly, local motion206),
substantial changes are also educed. The material order consists of extended being and,
The spatial continuum, constituted by hylomorphic being through its materiality, is, by
virtue of the individuation arising from materia quantitate signata, contiguously filled
with existents. That which serves as the principle of divisum ab alio also entails conti-
guity (adjacency) among the alia, in virtue of which formal principles can exercise re-
ciprocal activity.
[4] Corruptibility is due to matter, not directly (since then a being would be
composed of contrary principles, one seeking to maintain its unity and one seeking to
destroy it), but indirectly, inasmuch as matter is a principle of potency to other forms'
existence. Every corruption is, sub alio aspectu, a generation, and form is the principle
of the action involved. Materiality is the existential precondition, necessary but not suf-
206
Physics VIII.7, 260a27-bl4.
207
Were there, per impossibile, but one hylomorphic being comprising the universe, it would be
incorruptible since there would be no other contiguous being, in virtue of whose material prin-
ciple either being might undergo mutation.
164
[5] At the deepest level of metaphysical analysis, matter is just that modality of
esse which constitutes a being as contingent, not absolutely (this is due to the essence-
esse composition per prius), but secundum quid, namely through the action of other
composite beings. Hylomorphic being is dependent, in both its accidental and its sub-
dependence is radicated in matter itself, prior to the reception of any accidents; the ex-
tracosmic possibility seems to remain, that hylomorphic being, existing without certain
accidents that condition and induce substantial change, could be spatial without being
mobile - i.e., its substantial and causal relationships, as entailed by materiality, having
an atemporal mode.) Matter is to the existential aspect of hylomorphic being what pri-
vation is to the formal aspect: privation is the not-yet of form, matter the not-yet of exis-
tence - privation the what and matter the can be of "what can be." As one form can
yield existence to another, so does one act of esse {esse proprium, actus essendi) yield
esse itself arises from not being limited by form, so does the unintelligibility of matter
itself arise from not being limited by form; both indeterminacies are existential in na-
ture, but the one is absolute and the other relative. Esse and matter are both potentially
208
Separated substance is dependent on other finite existents only in its accidental being.
165
infinite, but the one transcends an order (that of cosmic being) within which the other is
grounds the possibility of intelligibility through abstraction from the sensible order;
bles.209
always matter as such, "pure" or prime matter, that we have had chiefly in view - can
we reduce the whole to a single affirmation, in which all else is somehow implied? That
would be too ambitious; the relation of subordination among the sciences requires that
distinct principles be enunciated for each. But I submit that, having tried to follow in the
footsteps of Aristotle and Aquinas (ad mentem when not ad litteram), we are in a posi-
tion to state that, physically speaking, matter is that intrinsic aspect of substances
whereby they can act on each other both accidentally and substantially, while in meta-
contingent. Matter is a certain kind of potentiality in a certain kind of being, that consti-
And so we leave our consideration of pure matter to take up, in Chapter Four,
several topics with respect to informed or secondary matter. In particular, with a view to
resolving our physical aporiai, we shall examine form in so far as it is the basis of struc-
ture in the extended cosmic order of being. The material aspects of "formed matter" will
209
This obtains with respect to the abstractive mode of human knowing in statu viae. A very
different mode of knowing obtains for disembodied intellects, and for man in the beatific vision,
etc. Moreover, our knowledge of immaterial being - angels and God - occurs not through ab-
straction and conceptualization alone but through analogy and negation as well.
166
never be outside our purview, but the analogy between prime matter and informed mat-
ter will always be as important for what it leaves out, as for what it contributes toward
succession which present themselves to us through the senses. This occurs on different
levels. To begin with, change as such (implied in every act of sensation) can only be
concepts which, having been abstracted from experience, are adverted to as "here," "at
that time," "green," and so on. These first conceptualizations are of accidental forms. At
a deeper level, the mind grasps a unity that underlies various constellations of accidental
change; the accidents, for one thing, change only within certain limits, and moreover
they evidence a functional coherence or unity, which gives rise to the inference of
substance. (Accident and substance are apprehended formally in virtue of one another,
actualizing principle distinct from the principle of instability or potentiality. Thus does
167
168
The mind's inherent activity moves it, then, from "accidents" to "substance,"
and thence to "form" as the actualizing principle thereof; but this is not to say that sub-
stantial forms are easily defined. Since they are always and only inferred through an
defining (most) natural substances as we are certain about their reality.1 The objective
reality of form, especially substantial form, is questioned or denied by those who are
uneasy in moving beyond the certitude proper to the order of sense knowing. Tradition-
ally, the realist's attempt to address such skepticism has begun with reflection on what
we know best - ourselves and other higher organisms, in which the form or soul seems
most evidently greater than the sum of the material parts. But such attempts, while in-
herently most suitable to the task, suffer when pitted against ingrained prejudice in fa-
vor of mechanistic and atomistic reductionism. Perhaps we do well to tackle the issue
where it would seem most germane to the modern mind: at the primordial physical
level.
tial as the case may be, is that which "makes a thing to be in act" (forma facit esse in
actu),2 and is the end-result of every generation, or process of change (generatio est mo-
The inevitable tension in this situation has led to oversimplifications on the part of both scien-
tists who deny the existence or relevance of substance as such, and others who rebuke scientists
for an exclusive preoccupation with sensible reality.
2
De principiis naturae, c. 3. The language is interesting: there is no direct object serving as sub-
ject of the infinitive ("form makes Xto be in act"), but esse more plausibly serves as the direct
object ("form brings about esse in act"), without undue strain on St. Thomas's Latin. Either
way, form cannot be understood here as an efficient cause of esse, which would be nonsensical,
but simply as the formal sine qua non of finite being's realization.
169
tus adformam).3 One of the three principles of every generation,4 form (along with mat-
ter) is properly denoted as (intrinsic) cause,5 one which can coincide in re though not,
of course, in ratio with either the efficient or the final cause,6 and its own incorruptibil-
Against Plato, Aquinas like Aristotle is insistent on the intrinsicity of form. Matter as
such is only potentiality; hence form is not "in" an already-formed substrate, but is the
form " o f that substrate.8 Matter and form are correlative and existentially inseparable.
Neither can pre-exist the other; neither is a being, but only a principle of being.9
Although esse is the ultimate ground of all activity, form is understood to be the
actualizing principle, first in its juxtaposition to matter, which is a passive and potential
principle within the essence; secondly, as the determination of existential act whereby
this kind and not that is realized; and thirdly, as the determinant of a thing's operations
motion and rest they single out form as being nature "most of all."
3
Deprincipiis naturae, c. 4.
4
Ibid., c. 6.
5
Ibid., c. 17.
6
Ibid., c. 25.
1
Ibid., c. 12.
8
Ibid., c. 22; cf. Aristotle's fifth sense of "in," Physics IV.3 (210al4-24).
9
Ibid., c. 23. On the separability (because of incorruptibility) of the human form see Summa
theologiae la, q. 75, a. 7.
170
Aquinas, especially, is most insistent upon the unicity of substantial form as en-
tailed by a thing's ontological unity.10 Plurality of accidental forms does not compro-
mise this essential ontological unity; an accident is by its very nature not a distinct
being, having no esse of its own, but is a modification of the substantial esse. Thus ac-
cidents contribute to an entity formally but not essentially; through them a substance
physical order, is dependent, both in fieri and in esse, on an extrinsic agent cause, which
in turn acts toward an end (final cause). In what does the esse of the composite consist?
Aquinas' answer to this question is that neither form nor matter alone can have esse; the
esse of the composite, rather, arises through the union of form and matter.11 We might
say that "for form and matter to be united is for each to come into existence." Nor does
the preceding chapter. Form exists precisely through the act whereby it "receives" esse
from an agent cause;12 and matter exists precisely in so far as it is the modality of the
He faced a much more vigorous debate on the topic than Aristotle could have, with Averroes
and Avicenna being two major protagonists. John F. Wippel has a thorough summary of Aqui-
nas's arguments on this point in The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.
C., 2000), pp. 327-351.
11
De ente et essentia c. 2: "Huic etiam ratio concordat, quia esse substantie composite non est
tantum forme neque tantum materie, sed ipsius compositi; essentia autem est secundum quam
res esse dicitur: unde oportet ut essentia qua res denominatur ens non tantum sit forma, neque
tantum materia, sed utrumque, quamuis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit causa" (Leon.
43.371:50-57).
Cf. Summa theologiae la, q. 50, a. 5: "Esse autem secundum se competit formae: unumquod-
que enim est ens actu secundum quod habet formam. Materia vero est ens actu per formam."
Leon. 5.12. Cf. Summa contra gentiles II, c. 71.
171
esse which form has received. It is meaningless to suppose form as in any way "exist-
Yet the language of Thomistic philosophy is notable for such locutions as forma
dat esse materiae: how is this to be construed? We name according to what we know
first or best. Matter as such is unintelligible, requiring form for understanding no less
than for real existence. Form, on the other hand, can exist without matter (though not in
of esse without regard to mode, while matter as one mode of esse presupposes a certain
kind of form. Secondary matter, then, is given esse (in the sense of "is taken up into the
existence of a new being") when it is newly informed; when the form brings about a
new act, in some cases literally "a new life." It is only a step from this to the limiting
case of prime matter (granted, that language is always stretched in such descriptions):
form "gives existence" to matter in so far as matter does not enter into the order of exis-
tents except as conjoined with form. Does it then make sense to say that matter gives
existence to form? Although Aquinas does not use this phrase, I do not see why it can-
not be employed, save that it is more awkward in reference to the first-encountered case
of secondary matter. We might not say "the wood made the chair's form an existent
chair" quite as readily as "the chair's form made the wood an existent chair" - but no
inherent impossibility impedes us even at this level, and a fortiori at the level of prime
A further objection, however, is this: how can form "give" esse to that which, on
our existential reading of Aquinas, is itself a modality of esse, i.e. esse under a certain
172
aspect of variability? Again, forma dat esse materiae means, both in the absolute case
and analogously with respect to accidental being, that a contingent existent comes to be
with a given form. Form is the "kind" of the existent which the agent cause effects in
material mode; it is the sine qua non, the condition, of any imparting of esse; without
form, no esse. Thus forma dat esse materiae can be understood to mean that the mate-
rial existent presupposes form as a co-principle in its very existence and in the very ma-
form as principle of intelligibility. The psychology of human knowing begins with the
reception of sense data from material existents; what is "abstracted" from the sensible
form or species is called the intelligible form (species) and is understood to be none
other than that form which determines the being in re. This account, besides maintain-
ing knowledge as a knowledge of the real {contra the circumventions of idealists) lo-
cates, in the very immateriality ("ex-materiality") of the known qua known, its
universal character. And so the eternality of form, and the possibility of an unchanging
truth, are associated with the doctrine of abstraction. (In a profound analysis that goes
well beyond Aristotle, Aquinas would show that this process of abstraction, under the
illuminative activity of the agent intellect, is ultimately due to the activity of God -
Quaestiones disputatae De veritate q. 28, a. 7 ("materia est causa formae aliquo modo in
quantum sustinet formam, et forma est aliquo modo causa materiae in quantum dat materiae
esse actu"). Leon. 22.3.840:147-150.
173
Abstraction occurs at two levels or moments. The first, "abstraction of the uni-
versal" {abstractio universalis a particular?) is as just described, and the basis of all in-
tellective thought. The second, "abstraction of the form" properly so called (abstractio
formae a materia sensibili)14, is a further act whereby the mind focuses only on the
quantitative forms of things, disregarding their physical matter.15 When a third intellec-
tual distinction, that whereby a thing's relation to esse itself (as opposed to matter, a
particular mode of esse) is discerned - this process goes by the technical name of sepa-
ratio - we have the Thomistic basis for the complete Aristotelian division of the sci-
ences: physics is the science of material being as material, mathematics is the science of
material being without reference to its materiality as such but considering only the
quantitative in abstraction, and metaphysics is the science of being without any regard,
Super Boetium De Trinitate q. 5, a. 3: "Sic ergo in operatione intellectus triplex distinctio inu-
enitur: una secundum operationem intellectus components et diuidentis, que separatio dicitur
proprie, et hec competit scientie diuine siue metaphysice; alia secundum operationem qua for-
mantur quiditates rerum, que est abstractio formae a materia sensibili, et haec competit mathe-
matice; tertia, secundum eandem operationem, uniuersalis a particulari, et hec competit etiam
phisice et est communis omnibus scientiis, quia in omni scientia pretermittitur quod per ac-
cidens est et accipitur quod per se est." (Leon. 50.149:275-286.)
5
These forms must nonetheless inhere in some intellectual quasi-matter, since it is not in their
nature to exist altogether immaterially; Aquinas follows Aristotle in positing an "intelligible
matter" as that which receives the abstract mathematical forms. Summa theologiae la, q. 85, a. 1
ad 2: "Species autem mathematicae possunt abstrahi per intellectum a materia sensibili non
solum individuali, sed etiam communi; non tamen a materia intelligibili communi, sed solum
individuali. Materia enim sensibilis dicitur materia corporalis secundum quod subiacet qualita-
tibus sensibilibus, scilicet calido et frigido, duro et molli, et huiusmodi. Materia vero intelligibi-
lis dicitur substantia secundum quod subiacet quantitati." Leon. 5.331.
16
On the notion of scientia media see supra, Chapter 2, n. 22.
174
B. What is form?
It seems that the notion of form - despite 2300 years' gestation in the tradition of the
philosophia perennis - remains as obscure today as it has ever been. In the interest of
providing a suitably primordial account of the cosmic role of matter, it will be desirable
to be as clear as possible on the role of form as well. For one thing, it is impossible to
treat adequately of the one principle without continual reference to the other. Moreover,
a truly metaphysical account of matter, taking it back to the primal principle of esse,
will stand or fall according as the complementary account of form stands or falls
thereby.
the knowing subject is not on that account committed to a denial of the intellect's role in
determining the knowability of objects. In other words, one need not (and, for Aristotle
and Aquinas, must not) maintain an "absolute" objectivity of the thing known, as if "the
thing known" were in no way the thing as known. This would in fact undermine any
some mysterious way, to assimilate to oneself what is known. The known becomes the
knower, albeit without undergoing essential modification in its own right. Unlike the
case of corporeal assimilation, in which the assimilated loses its own substance in being
assimilated into the substance of the assimilator, that which is known enters into the be-
ing of the knower, i.e. the intellect, without substantial alteration. Clearly this is an im-
material activity, yet it cannot be any the less real on this account. We must explain
knowledge in such a way as to secure both the immateriality and the reality of the act.
175
physical communion. Matter does not enter into the intellect; matter, as noted in the
ent reason, to esse proprium or actus essendi. But that which is known is identified, in
the Aristotelian tradition, as the form - the same form which constitutes the actualizing
principle of the essence. How do we account for the intelligibility of form? How can
that which is the determinative principle of the thing itself come to inhere in the intel-
lect? It would be senseless to say that knower and known become wholly identified
through the act of knowing. Yet something - not the object's being as such, but a real
aspect or principle of that being - must be truly and univocally common to object and
subject.
knowledge to reality. If the form in mente is even slightly other than, or less real than,
the same form in re, then the mens has not truly assimilated the res. Moreover, we must
look first to the intellect, to whatever characteristics intelligible content as such displays
to reflective inquiry. This may seem un-Aristotelian, to the extent that one begins with
intellect rather than thing; but such is not the case. It is not to embrace a Kantian or
skeptical approach, which would discern in knowledge nothing more than a certain
modification of intellect pursuant to its own nature. It is to recognize, rather, that while
But are there suitably prior categories, in terms of which so fundamental an in-
quiry can proceed? Can the mind experience being in a way which serves to ground an
apodictic account of "form" as the "intelligible content" of being? In order for knowl-
edge to be true and certain, the knower must know that he knows, must have metascien-
tific access to the reality he would grasp scientifically. An adequate account of form as
the principle of intelligibility must be able to show that the intelligible content is indeed
one with the actuality of what is known. Otherwise we are faced with the subjective fal-
lacy and the radical circularity of the claim that truth, a correspondence between mind
We must somehow get outside the mind, then - understanding by "mind" the
noted, in the philosophical tradition, as the first operation of the intellect, the grasping
of universal content in the act of understanding sensu strictu. This act involves the illu-
mination by agent intellect of the "sensible species" and the consequent derivation of
This "getting outside" occurs via the mind's second operation, the judgment,
form's role in knowledge. Only through judgment does the intellect compare its appre-
hension of the thing to the thing itself and verify its apprehension. A full defense of this
177
thesis would take me far afield from the present study; let the following summary suf-
fice.
Knowledge begins with the senses, but the psychology of human knowing, be-
ginning with external sensation and proceeding with the "illumination" of intelligible
content in the sensible species as mentioned above, involves no less a return to the sen-
sible by way of "completing" the cognitive act. This does not mean that every act of the
intellect is void of truth-content unless referred directly to sensible reality. But such re-
Only in referring one's concept - the universal, intelligible content, i.e. form as
abstracted and apprehended in the first operation - to the concrete existent in its materi-
ality and particularity, via the second operation, does one proceed to satisfy the primor-
dial urge to know things in their existential integrity. The esse of the thing, in its
material mode, eludes us in so far as it is not commensurable with the human intellect.
But that esse is experienced through the commensurability of material sensible object
and material sense-organ, the genetic relation between sensible and intelligible species,
and the judgmental act whereby intellect reverts, so to speak, to its original datum.
other than thing-in-itself. Since thing-as-known is neither the esse of the thing (that
would mean, inter alia, that the thing now subsists, by its intrinsic act of being, in the
mind, which is patently false), nor its matter (matter being the existential condition of
the thing and, as discussed in the previous chapter, that which constitutes its spatiality
178
and unilocality, as well as its contingency, etc.), it can only be the form. And form, of
course, is considered synonymous with essence and nature, which in turn are expressed
by the definition.
But it is one thing to say that what is known conceptually is form rather than
some other ontological principle; it remains, after our epistemological detour, to state
just what form is, that could allow of the dual role which belongs to it as principle of
both thing and concept. What is the role of form vis-a-vis the esse and the matter of the
real entity on the one hand, and vis-a-vis the intellectual entity on the other? What pre-
cisely is the knowing faculty "taking in"? What is being "illumined" by the agent intel-
lect?
It will be that which, if given its own esse, would be none other than the thing it-
self. It will be everything except the esse and, in the case of hylomorphic being, the in-
We have considered already how essence serves to determine the act of exis-
tence; it is the limiting of esse to this rather than that creatural expression of a divine
the primary principle of the essence - the only substantial principle, in the case of sepa-
rated substances. Indeed it is only because essence is the limitation of esse that it is at
all intelligible quoad nos, esse as such being unlimited. Form, then, to repeat, is the
limitation of existential act, while matter is the condition of existential act whereby a
certain form can be iterated, constituting multiple interactive instantiations of the es-
with respect to others. There is no other prior principle whereby we can apprehend es-
negative (in the sense of delimiting) as well. But if form is the "limitation of esse" in re,
what does it delimit in mentel The delimiting as such must be taken univocally, for rea-
sons set forth above. Only in what is delimited can diversity be admitted. But what can
esse subsistens). But esse is, after all, an analogical term no less than are its many es-
sential determinations. The esse proprium of the material existent is not univocal with
the esse of the intellect itself. It is true that the intellect, in so far as it comes to know,
i.e., be informed by, things through their formal principles, is modified existentially.
But this can only be through the acquisition of accidental modifications grounded in the
intellect's own esse. Somehow, that which determines esse in the order of existents,
thereby constituting real beings, also determines esse intellectus, thereby constituting
things-known. But the form is substantially determinative of its own esse in the one
This is all rather abstract and may seem to afford little foothold for a discussion
are the implications, for our study of material being, of the notion of form here put for-
matter and its potentiality at every level of analysis. Without a suitably metaphysical
foundation, the physical concept of form (and matter) cannot regain the position of cen-
tral importance that it formerly (and appropriately) held among philosophers. It may
seem paradoxical that I appeal to the metaphysical, in an age which traduces metaphys-
ics, in order to validate a physical doctrine. But as I shall argue in the final chapter,
there is abundant evidence for the conclusion that physics itself has lately gone astray,
The complex array of changing sensible forms before us is seen, on reflection, to be or-
dered according to "centers" of activity, first in terms of persistent spatial congruity and
continuity (these "brown furry barking wagging" forms are clearly united, here and
there, now and then), and secondly in terms of unified functions revealing themselves
as goal-directed (the aforesaid group of forms moves together, sustains itself, chases
balls and buries bones, all as a unity). So decisively does this underlying unity impress
itself upon us that we continue to advert to it even when a good many (though never all)
of the sensible forms are removed or modified. And thus we apprehend the difference
Having in view the distinction between essence and the act thereof {esse pro-
prium, actus essendi) as co-principles of being (ens), and appropriately leaving esse out
181
whose nature is to be not in another," and accident "a thing whose nature it is to be in
another."18
mination of the totality of sensibilia presented to it. Accidental being is not accidental
because sensible (it is not absurd to conceive of a universe in which substances would
be directly sensed), but sensible because accidental. More properly, it is because certain
accidental modes of being - quantity and those qualities which are grounded in quan-
tity, i.e., extendedness - are connatural with our sense organs, that they partake of the
sensible.19 This does not imply that every such accident must fall within the range of
our sense powers; some are accessible only through instrumental assistance, others not
at all, owing to natural limits set by the material nature of the sense organs.
Esse taken modo universale is common to all that is, and therefore not a principle of defini-
tion; taken modo particulare it is absolutely proper to each existent, and as such not available
for definition, or even intelligible in the sense that essences are.
18
Quodlibet IX, q. 3, ad 2: "hec non est uera diffinitio substancie: 'Substancia est quod per se
est', uel <accidentis>: 'Accidens est quod est in alio', set est circumlocutio uerae descriptionis,
quae talis intelligitur: 'Substancia est res cuius nature debetur esse non in alio'; 'Accidens uero
est res cuius nature debetur esse in alio'." (Leon. 25.1.99:84-90.)
19
A detailed study remains to be written, on how the modern scientific account of light, sound,
molecular theory, and human physiology fits perfectly with the Aristotelian analysis of sensa-
tion. Essentially, the physical continuum represented by the sensed object, medium of transmis-
sion (light, sound waves, etc.), sense organ and its biochemical modifications under stimulus -
all now described in great detail by the sciences of physics, chemistry and biology - serves to
anchor our knowledge in the act of sensation and even to validate Aristotle's insight that sense-
knowledge is inerrant in its own order.
182
Against various contemporaries and predecessors, Aquinas was at pains to defend the
absolute unicity of the substantial form in any existent. Not only must a being be deter-
mined by a single substantial form, but even its accidents, each constituted by an
accidental form, are but modifications or aspects of the one substance.20 The basis for
this position is his understanding that substance is the most prior category of being, that
substantial form therefore gives esse to matter, and that there can be only one act of ex-
Among the several arguments for unicity of substantial form which Aquinas
employs at various points in his works, I single out the one based on predication. Our
grasp of being allows us to predicate one formality of another either per accidens ox per
se, the former when the forms are not intrinsically ordered to each other, the latter when
they are so ordered. But per se predication occurs in two modes. The first mode, when a
predicate is included in the definition of the subject (as when we say "The dog is an
animal"), necessarily involves predicating a sameness on the side of form - only the
ratio differs between the two terms. But in the second mode, when a subject is included
in the definition of the predicate (as when we say "The animal is a dog"), there is a di-
versity such that the predicate is not implied by the subject. (Aquinas observes that such
20
"Surely no other name in thirteenth-century philosophy is more closely associated with this
theory than that of Aquinas." John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p.
333.
21
Cf. De principiis naturae, c. 1: "quod vero est in potentia ad esse substantiate dicitur proprie
materia....Unde simpliciter loquendo forma dat esse materiae" (Leon. 43.39:21-23, 32-33). See
also Scriptum super Sententiis Liber I, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, etc.
22
Summa theologiae la, q. 76, a. 3, second argument in corp.; cf. also Expositio libri Posteri-
oruml, 10.
183
predication is based on material causality; the subject stands to the predicate as specifi-
able to specifying, as matter to form. In the real order, of course, this kind of predication
can only refer to an existential situation in which the individuating role of matter is pre-
sent.)
This being the case, what if different substantial predicates are attributed to a
subject (e.g., "dog" and "animal")? If each of these predicates were based on a distinct
form, then they (the predicates) would be related to each other only per accidens, which
second mode, which is likewise inadmissible (since the formality of "dog" includes that
of animal). Hence, the argument concludes, the substantial predicates must be based on
the context of the human form or soul, and the idea has crucial implications for various
theological doctrines concerning man's relation to God. But his arguments are couched
in universal terms, and he clearly displays the strongest commitment to this unicity as a
deep awareness of the form as that which "gives" esse to the composite, and as that
which, consequently, is the principle of unified activity (operatio sequitur esse). And it
leads him to develop a distinctive and fruitful doctrine concerning the multiform com-
There arises a formidable difficulty, vis-a-vis the unicity of being, when we consider the
obvious plurality of parts in any material entity. Clearly these parts are in some way de-
finable; in many cases they existed before, or can exist independently of, the substantial
being of which they are now form parts. How can the unicity of being through substan-
tial form be maintained in the face of this obvious multiplicity of parts? To simply af-
firm that parts are to the whole as accidents to substance would beg the question. The
very reality of the accidental as such - that is, of an order of being distinct from, and
which never have existence outside the composite (for instance the organs of a living
body) from parts that are known to exist independently (as for instance atoms and their
constituent particles). It is worth observing that a hand, for example, is not found except
in association with certain kinds of organisms; we might call a severed hand a "hand,"
hand. Its activity, its existential mode, is no longer that of "hand," which is really to say
that it is no longer that of the organism to which the hand belonged. A severed hand's
activity is that of its constituent atoms and molecules; it is now a soros,"heap," neither
caught up into a higher substantial unity nor serving as a real principle of unity for its
components.
Of an organic part such as a hand, therefore, it must be said that it has no inde-
pendent formal unity; and lacking this, it is perhaps not difficult to see how it may be
185
subsumed into another formal unity, that of the organism. But a rather different situa-
tion arises with respect to parts that do exist independently. Let us consider molecules
and atoms. It is a bedrock tenet of modern physics and chemistry that all matter is par-
ticulate in structure; a vast body of experimental proof puts this tenet beyond serious
challenge. Protons, electrons and neutrons form atoms; atoms enter into molecules (or
ionic compounds); these in turn comprise more complex structures - in the case of liv-
ing matter, the ascending ladder of organization includes molecular "fabrics" (mem-
And yet let us ask a seemingly anachronistic question: has any scientist ever iso-
is trivial to extract some part of an organism and identify in that part a particular mo-
lecular structure. Nor would it be realistic to deny that the organism's structure and
function require certain chemical inputs, even as they yield certain chemical outputs; or
that certain parts of a living body may be chemically analyzed in situ with no apparent
alteration in their formal constitution (hair, nails, teeth, etc.). But are these parts living,
or rather nonliving adjuncts to a living body? As for the manifestly living parts, i.e.,
those which function differently than they would in segregation from the organism - let
us take, for instance, a muscle-tissue cell - it should strike us as remarkable that no ex-
periment resolving the cell to its component parts has done so while preserving the
character of those parts as living, i.e., as partaking of the life imparted to them by the
cell.
186
Passing down into the inorganic realm we confront a no less startling observa-
stantial unity has ever been observed to exhibit the very same properties qua component
that it exhibits independently. Thus the properties of sodium chloride are clearly the re-
sult of a union of sodium and chlorine, and in some quantitative sense they are but the
sum of the properties of the latter taken severally (the formula weight of NaCl is the
sum of the atomic weights of Na and CI); and yet the properties of the compound are
also so qualitatively new as to suggest that a new substance has been generated in the
What is the significance of this state of affairs, replicated across the entire physi-
cal realm? Why is it that the law of composition, whereby lesser entities coalesce into
greater, is not a law of simple addition or the "heaping" of parts, but of the trans-
formative union of those parts into something that is at once themselves and something
other? The answer to this physical question will be the same as the answer to the meta-
physical dilemma posed above - how can entitative (substantial) unity be maintained in
which eludes the method of modern physical investigation), reduces every composition
in nature to a simple addition of actual parts (e.g. of elementary particles, in the case of
187
atoms; atoms, in the case of molecules; organelles, in the case of living cells; cells, in
Now there is a class of sense observations which suggest that each entity is sim-
ply the sum of its parts. We may view an "equation" such as 2Eb + O2 -* 2H2O as
"complete"; we tend to regard the oxygen nucleus as "consisting o f just 8 protons and
some neutrons; and so on. But while such "constitutive compositions" are valid on one
level - the conservation laws in physics are a fundamental manifestation of this - they
are not complete since they do not express the entirety of the synthesis represented by
each such composition. The combination of hydrogen and oxygen to form water is not
merely a matter of atomic adherence and the addition of masses; it is not even merely a
matter of interatomic bonds resulting in new spatial configurations and hence in the
constellation of new properties associated with water (together with the abolition of
properties specific to hydrogen and oxygen as such). What is not described by an equa-
tion like that instanced is precisely the unification of the parts, the fact that they have
given up something of their former individuality in the very act of entering into a new
and composite unity. This is a subtle point, but a crucial one. Are the hydrogen and
oxygen atoms, once they have combined into the water molecule, no different except in
regard to their conjoining? To 19th century atomists this was the case, but quantum
chemistry places before us a very different picture. If the atoms remain distinguishable
after their combination, it is now as parts rather than as conjoined wholes, and this
takes the form of their being qualitatively different (in size, shape, charge distribution,
etc.) than they were prior to combination. The atoms have entered into the molecule
188
natural order: one in which the component parts (as organs in an organism) do not pos-
sess their intrinsic "natures" outside the composite, and another in which the component
parts (as atoms in a molecule) do not retain their intrinsic natures within the composite.
It turns out on further analysis that these two "kinds" are reducible to one. Recall that an
organ as such does not pre-exist its organism; what, then, is the prior form of what, in
the composite, will become an organ? It is, as we noted, multiple - the forms of the
In general, then, we find that elements, on entering into a composite unity, lose
some but not all of their former identity, and this regardless of whether the composite in
question involves those elements mediately (by way of "organs" or something analo-
form in composite beings - which is also the answer to my question about transforma-
tive union - we must consider his understanding of "element." It is evident that there
are hierarchical levels of structure and composition in nature. We have already alluded
and so on. The question arises, is there a least kind of structure in the natural order, or
Here we are concerned, not with the so-called "natural minimum" or atomos as
it applies within any given species (such that any given individual of a given kind en-
tails, in its actuality, certain limits with respect to its dimensions, parts and proportions).
Such a minimum is established physically through the requirement of the mutual apti-
tude of matter and form (any form, implying as it does a finite range of properties and
operations within the spatiotemporal order, must be conjoined with matter - the princi-
Rather, is there a nature which is the irreducible minimum qua nature - which is
a composition of principles - matter and form, essence and esse - but the notion of
"physical nature" does not entail, of necessity, a composition of prior actualities such as
One trained in physical thinking today may find it odd, and anachronistic, that we (following
Aristotle and Aquinas) extend this hierarchical scheme from the inorganic into the living realm
(after molecules would come organic fabrics, organelles, cells, etc., in ascending order). It is
"odd" only from a reductionist standpoint that regards living systems as no different in kind
than non-living. A realist application of the principles of hylomorphism, on the other hand, must
discern in the various levels of living matter a continuation of the ascending formal order.
24
It is well established in biology (see, for a famous treatment, D'Arcy Thompson, On Growth
and Form [1917]) that organisms of a given kind - whether bacteria or bactrian camels - cannot
function and do not exist below a certain threshold size determined by anatomical and metabolic
requirements of the species. At deeper (inorganic) levels, the structural constraints are even
more rigid: there is no reason to suppose that the accidents of molecules, atoms and their com-
ponents are not narrowly determined in accordance with their relatively simple ontological
status.
190
nite regress in material causality no less than in the other kinds.25 From the finite num-
ber of natural kinds it follows that there is a "cosmic minimum," i.e. a simplest level of
hylomorphic being, and such a being, irreducibly simple in composition, is what Aris-
Few doctrines of ancient and medieval physics are treated more condescendingly today
than that of the "four elements" (earth, water, air and fire - celestial matter being ac-
the theory of elements as such, and a particular empirical enumeration of them. The four
elements of the ancients are long gone, but the Thomistic elucidation of "element" is so
insightful as to have survived not only the ancient tetrad, but also the 1 ^-century pre-
occupation with chemical elements, and to have found corroboration in our era of parti-
cle physics.
sis of matter, Aquinas says that "Element is said properly only of those causes out of
which the composition of a thing arises, and which are properly material. And not just
of any material causes, but those out of which the thing's primary [i.e., irreducible]
nition of element as that "from which a thing is primarily composed, which is immanent
25
Metaphysics II.2 (994al-6).
26
De principiis naturae, 3 ("Elementum uero non dicitur proprie nisi de causis ex quibus est
compositio rei, que proprie sunt materials; et iterum non de qualibet causa materiali, sed de ilia
ex qua est prima compositio"). Leon. 43.43:86-89.
191
in the thing, and which is indivisible according to form,"27 Aquinas shows that this
definition of element sets it off from principles which contribute to a thing's being but
lose their own form entirely (i.e. are entirely corrupted) in so doing: "Elements must
remain in some way, since they are not entirely corrupted, as is said in [Aristotle's]
totle's definition, "indivisible according to form," Aquinas says this need not imply a
quantitative indivisibility; in other words, he leaves open here the question concerning
Note also, that "element" is distinct from matter as such, i.e. the potential prin-
ciple in physical being. An element is already formed matter, secondary matter, albeit
that whose formality subsumes no other.29 Now it is one thing to admit, philosophically,
the necessity of element(s) so defined - and another to identify which is or are the ele-
ments in reality. Clearly "element" in the absolute sense will not be applicable to the
100+ elements of classical chemistry (these are elements only relatively speaking, i.e.
with reference to the processes studied in chemistry), and not even to all the particle
types "immediately" comprising the chemical elements (protons and neutrons, for in-
11
Metaphysics V.3 (1014a26-27).
28
De principiis naturae, c. 3 ("elementa oportet aliquo modo manere, cum non corrumpantur, ut
dicitur in libra De generatione"). Leon. 43.43:107-109.
29
"The material component of an element must be absolutely formless, i.e., must be prime mat-
ter. And its formal component, therefore, must be a form which is proportioned to absolutely
formless matter, i.e., a substantial form...." Joseph Bobik, Aquinas on Matter and Form and the
Elements: A Translation and Interpretation of the De Principiis Naturae and the De Mixtione
Elementorum of St. Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, Ind., 1998), p. 54. This latter consideration
will prove important in the sequel, especially Chapter 5.
192
stance, are known to be composed of lesser entities, the quarks). In current theory, cer-
tain particles have a stronger claim to "elementarity": quarks and leptons, for example.
It will be one of my main objectives in the closing chapter to suggest that the
quantum phenomena involving these particles do imply a true elementarity. But a word
of caution may as well be inserted here: prima facie it seems difficult, if not impossible,
one could only know empirically (i.e., in the mode of modern physical science) that one
were dealing with elemental beings through a complete exclusion of other possibilities -
implying a perspective transcending that of empirical science itself. And from a system-
atic standpoint, one would have to be able to conclude that the putative element(s)
manifested all those, and only those, properties of "element" precisely as such, in order
may be called a transformative union (not his term) as maintaining the unicity of sub-
stantial form. This is his doctrine of virtual presence - really Aristotle's doctrine - and
No arbitrary or ad hoc considerations give rise to the doctrine, but only the logi-
cal inescapability of having to resolve two opposing data: the substantial unity of the
composite, manifested in its proper functionality (finality) and distinctive properties, all
qualitatively different from those of the components; and the remanent evidence, dis-
cerned through those same properties of the composite, of its having been composed
from prior entities. For the properties of the component elements do not disappear en-
193
tirely; they remain, says Aquinas, in a "mean" form, as black and white "remain" in
shades of gray. Moreover (Aquinas doesn't address this explicitly in the text we are
about to examine, but does so elsewhere), the composite cannot have "lost" its elemen-
tal components so completely that there does not remain a tendency for the composite to
revert, on corruption, to just those elemental forms. Neither a mere aggregation of com-
thinkers. One, that the substantial forms of the elements remain in the composite while
their qualitative accidents are altered somehow into a mean, with respect to the ele-
later chemist or physicist would have expressed, had he resorted to the medieval termi-
nology, in explicitating the views of his own day. The argument for this view, which is
basically that of Avicenna, is that unless the substantial forms of the elements remain in
the composite, the elements themselves would seem to have corrupted rather than
blended together, and indeed to have lost their character of element altogether (particu-
larly with respect to "remaining in" the composite). This last point is important (an ob-
jector might argue) because elemental composition, unlike composition from secondary
rebuttal to this first position is that multiple forms - and, a fortiori, forms which are
contraries - cannot inhere in one and the same substantial matter; and if received by di-
30
Thus water, on decomposition, unfailingly reverts to oxygen and hydrogen (or to oxygen and
the hydroxyl ion), whereas an organism does not revert, upon decomposition, to self-constituted
organs and tissues.
194
verse parts of matter, the result would be multiple individuals rather than one - in other
words, what a chemist today would call a mixture rather than a compound.
The second position reviewed and rejected by Aquinas is that the elemental
forms, being somehow inferior to other substantial forms because of their proximity to
prime matter, do not possess the mutual exclusivity proper to substantial forms as such,
and accordingly admit of a kind of mean, as do accidental forms. The response to this
second position (which is that of Averroes) is, inter alia, that it opposes the principle of
which depend on [1] the non-relation between things not in the same genus, [2] the non-
continuity of substantial change, and [3] the correspondence between substantial form
Aquinas then proffers his resolution, essentially this: the elemental components
are understood to have undergone substantial change, such that the substantial form of
each element exists no more, but a new substantial principle informs the composite
whole, while the accidents of that new substance are none other than the means into
The accidents are proper to the new substance, since every distinct substance has
its own proper accidents, but the elements are such as to leave their "signatures" even
when caught up into a higher form. Here we have unity and indeed radical newness of
substance, coupled with an accidental succession in which there is distinctness with re-
lation. (A not unhelpful analogy would be that afforded by the genotype and phenotype
195
the two parents, and strong similarities between child and parent are often phenotypi-
cally noted; but no trait - no phenotypic element - is absolutely identical to that ex-
self, together with the (related) succession of qualities through their quantitative com-
time >
Let the rectangles represent groups of qualities associated with three substances,
"black," "white," and "gray," the first two combining, as we move from left to right, to
form the third. (The paper itself can represent the prime matter which is continuous
throughout.) Although there is a discrete change in the accidents associated with the
substantial change (black and white become gray), simultaneous with the substantial
change itself, something of both the black and the white remain, without interruption, in
Now Aquinas speaks of "a certain mean quality" as being constituted out of the
contrary qualities of the elements.31 This mean is the "proper quality of a mixed body
[i.e., of what today's chemist would call a compound, rather than a mixture], a quality
31
"Sic igitur remissis excellentis qualitatum elementarium, constituitur ex hiis quedam qualitas
media que est propria qualitas corporis mixti, differens tamen in diuersis secundum diuersum
mixtionis proportionem; et hec quidem qualitas est propria dispositio ad formam corporis mixti,
sicut qualitas simplex ad formam corporis simplicis." De mixtione elementorum (Leon.
43.156:130-136).
196
which differs . . . in diverse mixed bodies in accord with diverse proportions of mixing.
And this mean quality is the proper disposition to the form of a mixed body.. ,."32
meanwhile, that, for Aquinas as for Aristotle, the simultaneous presence of contrary
qualities would be inadmissible in one and the same substance sub eodem aspectu; the
mean here referred to is not a blend, but a new single entity arising from the contraries.
Next comes what is the crux, but also perhaps the most difficult part, of the doctrine of
De mixtione elementorum:
Though the quality of a simple body is indeed other than its substantial form, it
acts nonetheless in the power of the substantial form. Otherwise, all that heat
would do is make things hot, and a substantial form would not be brought to a
state of actuality by its action, since nothing acts beyond the limits of its spe-
cies. It is in this way, therefore, that the powers of the substantial forms of sim-
ple bodies are preserved in mixed bodies.
The forms of the elements, therefore, are in mixed bodies; not indeed actu-
ally, but virtually (by their power).33
It would not be enough to say that the qualities of a compound substance are derived,
with modification, from those of the composing elements. This would be an accurate
description, but would not express the causal ground. Aquinas's contention is stronger.
The elemental qualities that enter into the mean acted, in doing so, in virtue of their un-
derlying substances (since an accident as such is not a center of activity), and in the cor-
ruption of those former substances to yield a single composite substance the qualities
only through its accidents, in virtue of extension and contiguity.) In other words, the
elements themselves could not have come together to form the composite, had their
qualities not remained present as the media through which they acted.34
the element Fire] would do is make things hot, and a substantial form [i.e., of some
higher composite into which the element Fire enters] would not be brought to a state of
actuality by its [heat's] action [on the prior substance(s)], since nothing acts beyond the
limit of its species [thus no accident as such can effect substantial change, but only as
As the elemental substances act in bringing about the composite, they cannot
disappear "without a trace," that is to say, in both their substantial and their accidental
reality. In the instant that elements X and Y cease to exist substantially, substance Z
taking their place - a "reversible instant," we might add, since every physical substance
can corrupt into its elements - there cannot be absolute discontinuity in the accidents
themselves, or there would be no continuity at all between the prior and posterior actu-
34
Let me use a mathematical analogy. In adding 7 and 3 to get 10, we have the analogue of a
substantial change: for "7" and "3" as such have now disappeared, resulting in the new "10."
And the properties of the new "substance" are different than those of its components; 3 and 7
are odd and prime, while 10 is neither. Nevertheless, the properties of 10 are clearly based on
those of 3 and 7; were 3 or 7 other than they are, 10 would necessarily also be other than it is.
198
it seems to me, is "echoing" the physical argument for prime matter. Recall that prime
matter itself is the seat of dimensionality, and the incorruptibility of prime matter entails
involved with extension. Thus there is a certain qualitative continuity even as the mean
Aquinas's all too brief text is of central importance in any realist account of the
preserving substantial unity, he accounts, in the only logically possible way, for the ob-
served fact that material beings above the level of the elements not only retain some-
thing of the qualities of the component elements, but also a potency for reverting to
those elements on corruption. Clearly the distinction between substance and accidents is
prominent in his account; the whole point is to give a philosophically valid description
of the former while not explaining away the data of observation in regard to the latter.
obviously, do not discuss qualities and contraries and powers, let alone substances, in
any metaphysical sense. But I submit that the indications of modern physics and chem-
istry are such as to bolster, rather than undermine, the doctrine. The modus operandi of
physical science is, as we have noted, mathematical; that is to say, that the quantitative
aspects of mobile being are related through formulas which are considered as express-
ing natural laws. These formulations express different qualitative aspects of formed
199
the inevitable connection between the accidents of quality and quantity. (So intimate is
this connection that it is not possible for us to grasp the quantitative except through the
qualitative; abstract quantity is just that, abstracted from the sensible.) Thus physics
does not formulate "yellow" or "hot" as such; it works with frequencies and wave-
lengths, with degrees of molecular kinetic activity and of infrared energy as the quanti-
to every qualitative change - let us say, from "yellow" to "red," or from "hot" to "hot-
ter." An object changes color because something has changed in its molecular structure
to reflect or refract the impinging light waves differently. The relation between ab-
sorbed and reflected frequencies undergoes an alteration, since the electronic "surface"
presented to the incoming light is now such as to interact differently with those photons.
Photon energies that were formerly ejected from the surface molecules may now be ab-
sorbed, or vice versa. Again, this is not to deny the reality of the qualitative forms "yel-
low" and "red" as unitive principles at the accidental level; but we are focusing on the
atomic/molecular arrangement that reflects "yellow" and that which reflects "red" there
apple turns from yellow to red. It is still a "sea of electrons" that, surrounding each atom
or molecule, reflects or absorbs the incident light. But the electrons present a spatially
200
continuous, by virtue of their very spatiality. And it can hardly be denied, whatever
any two quantitative states there cannot but be a mean, whether broadly or narrowly de-
Not only the material substrate, materia prima (the very ground of extendedness
in hylomorphic being), but extendedness itself- not a particular dimensionality, but di-
whale in all its majesty instantly reverting to individual atoms in a Pacific thermonu-
clear test, the formal component(s), before and after, are always ontologically located
under determinate dimensions, dimensions which are moreover to some extent conspa-
turn related, i.e., continuous, through this shared, i.e., successive, dimensionality.
caught up into a higher unity - when elements form composite beings - the previous
forms no longer subsist, but the accidents associated with those forms remain, in a mean
configuration, in the new substance. That they constitute a new "mean" signalizes that
201
they are proper to the composite rather than to the elements; that the "mean" is only
constituted as such from its precursors, and is resolvable to them alone, establishes con-
F. Dispositions of matter
Prime matter's first aptitude is for elemental form; there can be no information onto-
logically prior to that of the elements. And as each higher substantial information oc-
curs, the "powers" (and qualities) of the lower forms are preserved in a sort of
modification, even though the lower forms themselves cannot remain and the higher
changes, in contrast, are radicated in the existing subject, an ens rather than aprincip-
ium entis), it does not on that account have an absolutely indeterminate character; prime
matter, it is true, is a pure potency, but substance or formed matter is disposed, in virtue
of its form (and, more particularly, of the accidental forms grounded in it) toward cer-
This is known as the disposition of matter (dispositio materiae), but the term is
used properly only of secondary matter, because even though disposition (to the recep-
tion of a certain form and not others) is referred to matter - matter being, of course, the
principle that "receives" form - it belongs to matter only in virtue of that matter's prior
conjunction with a form. In most general terms we say that matter is not receptive of
form at all, except in so far as it is already a component of some ens; which is to say,
202
that matter does not pre-exist real being, and it is meaningless to speak of matter except
The whole range of cosmic being is structured in accordance with the disposi-
tiones. So-called elementary particles only enter, in virtue of their properties, into cer-
tain configurations and not others; one thinks, for example, of the specific nuclear and
electronic arrangements comprising atomic matter. Atoms, in turn, only enter into so
many well-defined molecular and other compounds; they do not combine randomly.
And so on all the way up the scale of being. In the living realm, nothing is more obvious
than the highly specific inclinations each cell, tissue, and organ displays in the course of
the same, yet very early in an organism's history, when the cells are less differentiated,
stages of development.35
only briefly iterate here, that every hylomorphic substance acts through its accidents.
These accidents, qualities inhering in the form but inseparable from the extendedness
radicated in prime matter, are the expression of materiality itself and the mutual sub-
stantial influence characteristic of material being. Hence substances act on one another
through their accidents, and in virtue of the spatial contiguity which those accidents,
Appropriation of the concept of dispositio materiae would go a long way toward obviating
concerns with the role of "blind chance" in evolutionary biology.
203
knows reductively as forces, at once effect physical change and predetermine it to some
extent. The marvelous tapestry of particles, forces and fields that is the stuff of today's
physics offers dramatic corroboration of the ancient picture of cosmic beings interacting
according to quantum principles - London forces, etc. - based in turn on the previous
charge distributions within the atoms), that they can and do interact with other mole-
cules in such and such ways to form more complex structures right up through the bio-
chemical domain. Since every hylomorphic substance acts through its accidents, it is
clear that elements enter into composite beings through spatiotemporal interaction; they
are "disposed" toward such and such higher informations, either mediately or immedi-
But the disposition works in "reverse" as well. Since the accidents of a higher
substance are constituted as the mean vis-a-vis the accidents of the elements, the higher
elements which pre-existed it: as if to say that gray can be resolved into black and white
again, or pink into white and red. Moreover, such dispositions are so precisely consti-
energy: at the level of the chemical elements, compounds are invariably resolvable (in
204
principle) into the same constituents from which they were formed. Thus (even though
volved):
6C + 12H + 60 ** C 6 Hi 2 0 6 ,
atoms, 12 of hydrogen, and 6 of oxygen, no more and no less. (At a level deeper than
obtains: thus atoms broken down in nuclear fission reactions can be reconstituted in fu-
sion reactions, and at a still deeper level, 2 "up" quarks plus 1 "down" quark are under-
stood to comprise the proton, while today's highly consistent theory construes those
quarks as having had - or, conversely, being able to have again - independent existence
at energies of the order of 1 GeV [corresponding to 10"2 sec, in the early universe].)
its accidents, they must be proportioned to it, within certain limits, and once the acci-
dents are altered beyond a certain threshold corresponding to those limits (through be-
ing acted upon by another substance, through its accidents), the underlying substance
There is some dispute as to whether the constituents (atoms, in terms of contemporary dis-
course) can be numerically the same; Aristotle's view, expressed in On Generation and Corrup-
tion II.7, would seem to be negative: "it is evident that those things whose 'substance' - that
which is undergoing the process - is imperishable, will be numerically, as well as specifically,
the same in their recurrence: for the character of the process is determined by the character of
that which undergoes it. Those things, on the other hand, whose 'substance' is perishable (not
imperishable) must 'return upon themselves' in the sense that what recurs, though specifically
the same, is not the same numerically" (338M3-18; McKeon ed., p. 531). But a closer study of
this question would entail, not only a resolution of the "reality of atoms" issue, but also a mate-
rial definition of just what specifies an atom: is it finally just the proton number, or must neu-
trons and/or electrons be considered as well?
205
will fail of existence and its "place" in the material continuum be taken by another sub-
stance, or substances, to which the previous substance's matter, in virtue of its form,
was disposed.
i.e. to a being's openness to substantial change, since it is precisely the latter to which
they are dispositive; an accidental being considered merely as such could not be a cause
of substantial change. Nor could we say that the other substantial principle, form, is
precisely that which terminates change as such. Aquinas speaks regularly of both
(genitivfe). Concluding that dispositions toward substantial change are radicated in mat-
ter, there are two other errors to be avoided. First, as was discussed in our chapter on
constituent, since this would make substance inherently self-destructive. Rather, matter
a kind of "superiority" of activity, can supplant that form with which matter is at any
37
See, e.g., Summa theologiae Iallae, q. 112, a. 3 ad 3 ("in rebus naturalibus dispositio materiae
non ex necessitate consequitur formam, nisi per virtutem agentis qui dispositionem causat" -
Leon. 7.325); Ilia, q. 77, a. 2 ("prima dispositio materiae est quantitas dimensiva" - Leon.
12.196); la, q. 76, a. 4 ad 4 ("Manent enim qualitates propriae elementorum, licet remissae, in
quibus est virtus formarum elementarium. Et huiusmodi qualitas mixtionis est propria dispositio
ad formam substantialem corporis mixti, puta formam lapidis, vel animae cuiuscumque" -
Leon. 5.224).
206
moment conjoined. Secondly, since matter as such is indeterminate, its dispositive role
(which implies always some determination) must occur in virtue of its information.
Matter, we might say, is a "source" of receptivity to forms other than that to which it is
at a given moment conjoined; but the specificity of this receptivity is due to its present
form.
Thus when dispositiones materiae are referred to, it is with matter's primal po-
tency in view; but when dispositiones adformam are under consideration, it is really the
in Question Nine of his Quaestiones disputatae de anima. I will summarize the body of
It is the substantial form which, as that which gives existence absolutely speak-
ing, first comes to prime matter and is in it most intimately. Nor can there be more
than one substantial form. Hence even in higher grades of natural things, where there
are more perfections than in the lower grades, all of the perfections (as corporeality and
life and rationality, in the case of man) are due to one and the same substantial form. A
more perfect form, then, in so far as it constitutes with matter a composite of lower per-
fection, is material with respect to greater perfection.40 And so a given form, qua consti-
38
1 am guided here also by William A. Wallace, "Thomistic Reflections on The Modeling of
Nature: Science, Philosophy, and Theology" (unpublished paper [1997], 49 pp.), pp. 5ff.
39
"Est autem hoc proprium formae substantial quod det materiae esse simpliciter," Quaes-
tiones disputatae de anima q. 9 (Leon. 24.1.79:145-80.146).
40
Ibid.: "...forma perfectior, secundum quod constituit materiam in perfectione inferioris
gradus, simul cum materia composita intelligatur ut materiale respectu ulterioris perfectionis, et
sic ulterius procedendo" (Leon. 24.1.80:191-195).
207
tutive of a lower grade of being, is in some sense a mean between matter itself and the
Let us pause at this subtle passage. Aquinas is certainly not saying that one and
the same form can have different manifestations - now as a being of lower grade, now
as a higher one - in any genetic or successive sense. Rather, since a form, in constitut-
ing a higher being, also constitutes, as aspects of that being, what would be complete
formalities at a lower level of being, one may think of those aspects (coexisting with
and in the substance) as a sort of mean - as dependent existents - between the sheer po-
tentiality of matter and the independent existence given by the substantial form in ques-
A Bi B2
Let the equal bases of each figure represent prime matter, common to each successive
information, and the shapes of the figures represent the forms, with substantial form A
yielding to substantial form B. The form which is entirely constitutive of A must enter
accidentally into the higher substance informed by B. Hence Bi does not represent as
well as B2 the actual composite.
Ibid.: "Et sic quodammodo una et eadem forma, secundum quod constituit materiam in actu
inferioris gradus, est media inter materiam et se ipsam, secundum quod constituit earn in actu
superioris gradus" (Leon. 24.1.81:201-205).
208
Returning to our paraphrase of the text: prime matter, entering into a being of a
lower grade, is the subject of proper accidents and of dimensions, whereby it is divisible
into parts receptive of accidental forms. Such accidents include those whereby the mat-
ter is disposed and made suited to further perfection. The dispositions due to these acci-
dents are thought of before the form itself, as having been induced into the matter (by
the agent cause), even though they are in fact so proper to the form as never to exist in
matter except through that form.42 (In other words, the dispositions cannot pre-exist the
form with which they are uniquely associated, but inasmuch as the form depends, in its
own continued existence, on the presence of those dispositions, they may be thought of,
in a way, as prior to the form.) The form of a higher being, then, did not exist in the
previously formed being as a disposition; it can exist only in its proper, fully constituted
Unicity of substantial form is thus maintained at all times, with higher informa-
tions incorporating the perfections of the lower. And it is appropriate to think of the
prime matter together with its lower perfections as dispositive toward its substantial per-
fection. Since Aquinas is treating of the human soul, he uses this as concrete example:
although it is the rational soul which, as man's unique substantial form, gives to man
sensation and nutritive powers and corporeality, still it is reasonable to speak of these
Question Nine, though he does not use the term here. What holds of the parts as such,
he continues, holds no less of their operations: activities that were primarily characteris-
tic of lower forms remain, even in higher grades of being (and, we may assume, in a
modified or "mean" mode), as secondarily characteristic. (And so, we can say, a living
organism manifests, albeit in a somewhat modified way, the activities proper to, say,
An important distinction is introduced here, one which we have already had oc-
casion to consider, namely that between least parts or elements, and complex parts or
organs. With respect to the former, diversity of activity requires no more than a diver-
sity of accidents - i.e., those characteristic of the elements as such; but with respect to
the latter there are levels of complexity of operation beyond the merely elemental. Since
the complexity of the organ is not self-constituted, but arises only through the unifying
substantial form of that to which the organ belongs, corruption of the substance must
result, not in the organ's acquiring its own substantial existence, but in a reduction all
Finally, the fact that the substantial form gives existence immediately to all parts
of the composite whole does not entail that the operations of those parts proceed like-
wise. On the contrary, there is, among the operations of the parts of a composite being,
an ordering such that one is caused by another, and that by still another, etc. It will be
210
seen that matter, so far from being an "inert" principle of receptivity, is intimately in-
volved in the dynamism of change. Put simply, without matter there is neither corrup-
tion nor generation; form, the principle of activity properly speaking, acts only in virtue
o/its being enmattered - and this, not merely in the sense that matter is the conditio sine
qua non of form's activity (as proximity is the condition of seeing or hearing anything),
but in the deeper sense that form is the act of matter, the "expression" or determination
I now return to a theme sounded before: the relation between qualitative and
quantitative, as one key to a rapprochement between the Aristotelian physics and the
modern. Aquinas and others in the Aristotelian tradition did not excogitate the doctrine
of dispositiones materiae on the basis of any quantitative analysis, nor would it have
occurred to them to do so (their concern in science was with substances more than with
accidents). But the results of their analysis - bringing into a single coherent account the
unity of being, the diversity of its parts, and the patterns of succession in a changing
For if it is not often evident (as noted in regard to the virtual presence of ele-
ments) that such and such qualities stand as "contraries" vis-a-vis the "mean" qualities
of a new substance, still less is it evident that they are dispositive to this or that new
substance - for example, that the metallicity of sodium or the gaseous state, yellow-
green color and corrosive odor of chlorine are dispositive to common table salt. We can
43
See, e.g., Metaphysics IX. 1 (1046al9-25).
211
level (where science, in Aristotle's sense, occurs) we cannot conclude otherwise, given
the elemental or substantial natures of sodium, chlorine, and sodium chloride, the dis-
tinction between substances and their accidents, and the necessary role of the latter in
imaginable, if no more certain, grasp of relationships between the quantities that ground
elemental and substantial accidents - not an identity of "space occupied," but a com-
monality or "overlap." The volumes, shapes and spatial orientations of sodium and
chlorine atoms (for example) can be directly related to the volume, shape and orienta-
tion of sodium chloride molecules (empirical units). And while some sensible qualities
seem to remain beyond our analysis - the taste or smell of salt, for instance - other
qualities, such as its crystal shape, density, solubility and color, find a very straightfor-
atoms as they merge into a new unity. (At this level the alterations are discerned in
terms of electron configurations and charge distribution, entailing new spatial relations
between the atomic nuclei themselves and new modes of interaction with incident pho-
tons, etc.) Again, there cannot but be some commonality in the "space occupied" by re-
actants and their products, even at the level of the least particles.
212
I have used a chemical example, but the same kind of reasoning applies at the
subatomic level. A pair of deuterium nuclei does not have the same quantitative charac-
teristics as a helium nucleus - that is why deuterium is deuterium, and helium helium -
yet there is enough commonality between them - i.e., between (2H+)2 and 4He - to serve
tive features. (With respect to both atomic and subatomic configurations, some of the
quantitative relationships will occur at the level of energetics - we take into account not
only the "apparent" differences of particle arrangement, but also the energies implied in
In closing this section I iterate caution against taking the quantitative analysis
for a holistic view. No purely quantitative relating between the prior and posterior states
of a physical system will explain the formal unities implied in those states.
G. Entia vialia
I have reviewed, and noted the metaphysical foundations for, the basic structure of
physical being in terms of its potential and actual principles, giving attention also to the
relation between its substantial and accidental aspects, and to the ordering between
more and less complex beings (through virtual presence and the dispositions of matter).
Throughout we have seen the role of form as the determining factor, exercising its
specificity amid the flux and variety that are radicated in matter.
In an initial grasp of all this we can abstract from close consideration of form's
to the radical dynamism afforded by the material principle. But the question of perma-
nence entails, not only temporal comparisons but an examination of the relatedness
For however atemporal form may seem in juxtaposition to the dynamism of mat-
ter, the fact is that forms ceaselessly yield existence to other forms, and in a completely
ordered (which is not to say deterministic) way. It does not void our concept of nature
to regard the seedling-form as ordered essentially toward the mature plant-form. But
what about the ordering of one organism's form toward another's, further along the evo-
lutionary sequence? And, in the present moment, should we regard the form of sodium
each other in the phenomena of light absorption and emission? Is the distinctness be-
tween formal principles in all such instances univocal - or are some distinctions more
with others, thinkers in the scholastic tradition have enunciated the notion of ens in via
{ens viale), or "transient being."44 A question most germane in this regard is: on what
basis should certain natures be classified as "transient"? If the notion of ens in via is to
44
"Now, among the great discoveries of modern science is its uncovering an astounding number
of transient entities in the physical universe. I refer to the world of elementary particles, most of
which have a transitory existence....A realist philosopher of science thinks of these as more
than entia rationis, as having some mode of existence outside the mind. Do they also have na-
tures? On the basis of my model for inorganic natures I would tend to answer in the affirma-
tive....but I would not regard them as having stable natures, like those of elements and
compounds. Rather they are transient forms that emerge from the potency of protomatter under
more or less violent conditions and then recede back into that potency, only to be replaced by
other emergent forms." William A. Wallace, "Thomistic Reflections," pp. 7f. Wallace's discus-
sion of transient natures is a main inspiration behind the following reflections.
214
have ontological validity it must exclude two reductionisms: on the one hand, that
whereby all natures are considered as substantially and genetically independent, and
only accidentally susceptible of mutual transformation; and on the other hand, that
whereby all natures are equally "dependent" in the sense of being ordered toward other
natures - in other words, the extremes of apotheosizing being and becoming respec-
tively.
being and activity) have a more tenacious hold on existence than others. Nor is this pri-
marily a matter of temporal duration, even though shorter durations are often associated
with what we are calling the transient natures. Rather, it is a matter of whether a certain
fullness or perfection of being is attained by the nature in question. Some simple inver-
tebrates have lifespans measured in days, some bacteria lifespans measured in hours or
even minutes. Yet these organisms seem to have reached a certain completeness, includ-
ing reproducibility, in their allotted spans.45 On the other hand, whatever form is pos-
sessed by (say) a mammalian embryo, or even by the egg and sperm before fertilization,
may be retained, to all appearances, on timescales considerably longer than the entire
lifespans alluded to above; yet it would hardly occur to anyone to posit "completeness"
The succession of forms over evolutionary timescales, and its implications for an Aristotelian
philosophy of stable natures, is an important and closely related topic, beyond the scope of this
thesis. I only observe in passing that the teleological approach which alone makes biological
evolution meaningful - a thought worth pondering by evolutionists and anti-evolutionists alike
- implies in its very notion a terminus ad quern, such that even in a thoroughly evolutionary
universe not everything can be in transition.
215
At the level of physical and chemical analysis, and particularly with reference to
particle physics, the difficulties only increase. Convention may assign "stability" to cer-
tain particles and not others, based on measured lifetimes. But nothing is exempt from
the law of decay; so where is the line to be drawn? Is the proton to be considered a "na-
ture" in the full sense because, in the current cosmic environment, it appears capable of
existing on the order of at least 1032 years, while neutral Jt-mesons are better regarded as
transient because of their evanescent half-lives on the order of 10"16 seconds? Or, to take
some instances from the radioactive decay series for uranium-238: is there a difference
ences, seems arbitrary, given the considerable overlap between "lifetimes" that are de-
would be that based on the "direction" of actualization: there is a clear distinction, in the
natural world, between developmental processes that are reversible and those that are
not. Thus an embryo is only ordered toward becoming a mature organism, and not the
other way around - whereas the "ordering" of sodium and chlorine toward sodium chlo-
ride may, with appropriate inputs of energy, be exactly reversed. Hence the embryonic
and chlorine are not. As for the case of radioactive decay products, it seems that a de-
termination of whether any such are "transient" or "stable" might have to take into ac-
count the possibility of some sort of reversibility, at least in principle - and so, mutatis
216
mutandis, for the case of "elementary" particles which are to all appearances stable, but
are theorized not to have been so at an earlier stage of cosmogenesis, and again of parti-
cles, such as quarks, which today seem to exist only virtually, but are presumed to have
Perhaps the distinction between transient and stable natures is of only secondary
importance, in view of the overriding consideration that they are in any case natures,
serving as specifying principles regardless of their relative duration.46 Whatever the on-
tological status of entia vialia, they give positive evidence, however fleetingly, of acting
in virtue of intrinsic principles of functional unity, i.e., of forms, which govern the mere
H. Minima naturalia
Aquinas devotes little attention to the question of natural limits (spatiotemporal minima
and maxima), but he clearly acknowledges their existence and necessity. The topic
would be addressed more intently by late medieval thinkers.47 Here I wish to bring to-
gether two main considerations: the reality of natural minima or least dimensions, and
the impossibility of an actual infinite in the order of cosmic being. These considerations
46
See Wallace, "Thomistic Reflections," p. 8.
47
See John E. Murdoch, "The Medieval and Late Renaissance Tradition of Minima Naturalia",
pp. 91-131 in Late Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories, ed. C. Liithy, J.
E. Murdoch and W. R. Newman (Leiden, 2001), which includes a survey of recent historiogra-
phy on the subject, and the fine collection of Duhem's writings in English translation, Medieval
Cosmology: Theories of Infinity, Place, Time, Void, and the Plurality of Worlds, ed. Roger
Ariew (Chicago, 1985), esp. Chapter 1.
217
will enable us to acknowledge, in the next section, that the physical continuum has a
radically atomic structure that is most explicit at the deepest level of physical analysis.
"The ultimate source for the conception of minima naturalia is a text in the
fourth chapter of the first book of Aristotle's Physics" where he is refuting Anax-
If the parts of a whole do not have a determinate quantity, either great or small,
but can be any size, either great or small, it is not necessary that the whole have
a determinate greatness or smallness. This is so because the quantity of the
whole comes from the parts. (But this must be understood of the parts existing
in act in the whole, as flesh and nerve and bone exist in an animal. Hence he
says, " . . . by parts I mean components into which a whole can be divided and
which are actually present in it." And by this he excludes the parts of a continu-
ous whole which are in the whole in potency.
But it is impossible that an animal or a plant or some such thing be re-
lated indeterminately to any size, whether great or small, For there is some
quantity so large that no animal exceeds it in size. So also there is some quan-
tity so small that no animal is found to be smaller. And the same must be said
of plants. Therefore by denying the consequent it follows that the parts are not
of indeterminate quantity. For what is true of the whole is true of the parts. But
flesh and bone and things of this sort are parts of an animal, and fruits are parts
of plants. Therefore it is impossible that flesh and bone and such things should
have an indeterminate quantity, either greater or smaller. Therefore it is not
possible that there should be certain parts of flesh or bone which are non-
sensible because of smallness.49
48
Murdoch, p. 91; cf. Physics 187M3-21: "if the parts of a whole may be of any size in the
direction either of greatness or of smallness (by 'parts' I mean components into which a whole
can be divided and which are actually present in it), it is necessary that the whole thing itself
may be of any size. Clearly, therefore, since it is impossible for an animal or plant to be indefi-
nitely big or small, neither can its parts be such" (McKeon ed., p. 225).
49
In libros Physicorum I, lect. 9: "Si alicuius totius partes non habent aliquam determinatam
quantitatem, sive magnitudinem vel parvitatem, sed contingit eas quantascumque esse vel
secundum magnitudinem vel secundum parvitatem; necesse est quod totum non habeat determi-
natam magnitudinem vel parvitatem, sed contingat totum esse cuiuscumque magnitudinis vel
parvitatis: et hoc ideo, quia quantitas totius consurgit ex partibus. (Sed hoc intelligendum est de
partibus existentibus actu in toto, sicut caro, nervus et os existunt in animali: et hoc est quod
dicit, dico autem talium aliquam partium, in quam cum insit, scilicet actu, dividitur aliquod to-
tum: et per hoc excluduntur partes totius continui, quae sunt potentia in ipso). Sed impossibile
est quod animal vel planta vel aliquod huiusmodi habeat se indeterminate ad quantamcumque
218
The argument is this: actual parts comprising a whole are either determinate or indeter-
minate in size. If indeterminate, then the whole cannot be likewise. But a natural thing
(whole) cannot be of indeterminate size, because there is some quantity so large that no
natural thing exceeds it, and again some quantity so small that no natural thing is
smaller. (Implied here is that there cannot be an infinite number of natural things. If the
implied premise were that natures must exist within certain size limits, the argument
would fail by petitio principii.) Therefore, modus tollens, the actual parts of a natural
The last part of Aquinas's conclusion, "it is not possible that there should be cer-
tain parts of flesh or bone which are non-sensible because of smallness," must be under-
stood in the context of the Anaxagoran doctrine to which Aristotle was responding:
"[The physicists thought] that things come into being out of existent things, i.e., out of
things already present, but imperceptible to our senses because of the smallness of their
insensible even en masse. I do not think Aquinas meant something so obviously unten-
able as a denial of the possibility of particles that are beneath the threshold of sensibility
magnitudinem vel parvitatem: est enim aliqua quantitas ita magna, ultra quam nullum animal
extenditur, et aliqua ita parva, infra quam nullum animal invenitur; et similiter dicendum est de
planta. Ergo sequitur ad destructionem consequentis, quod neque aliqua partium sit indetermi-
natae quantitatis, quia simile est de toto et de partibus. Sed caro et os et huiusmodi sunt partes
animalis, et fructus sunt partes plantarum: impossibile est igitur quod caro et os et huiusmodi
habeant indeterminatam quantitatem vel secundum maius vel secundum minus. Non ergo est
possibile quod sint aliquae partes carnis aut ossis quae sint insensibiles propter parvitatem."
Leon. 2.29; English translation from Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, translated by Richard
J. Blackwell, Richard J. Spath, and W. Edmund Thirlkel (Notre Dame, Ind., 1999), pp. 36f.
50
187a35-187bl.
219
considered individually. Nothing in the context warrants reading anything more into
It seems, however, that what is said here is contrary to the statement that a con-
tinuum is divisible to infinity. For if the continuous is divisible to infinity, and
flesh is, indeed, a kind of continuum, it seems that flesh is indivisible to infin-
ity. Therefore, some part of flesh, according to a division to infinity, goes be-
yond every determinate smallness.
But it must be pointed out that although a body, considered mathemati-
cally, is divisible to infinity, the natural body is not divisible to infinity. For in a
mathematical body nothing but quantity is considered. And in this there is noth-
ing repugnant to division to infinity. But in a natural body the form also is con-
sidered, which form requires a determinate quantity and also other accidents.
Whence it is not possible for quantity to be found in the species offleshexcept
as determined within some termini.52
This argument based on the determinateness of quantity inhering in any finite substance
is found elsewhere.53 Interestingly, Aquinas, having just argued for natural minima (de-
51
Cf. Aquinas, Sentencia De sensu tract. 1, cap. 18, where he distinguishes two kinds of
indivisibility, that according to the nature of a thing itself, and that according to its sensibility:
"set aliquando indiuisibile, uidet autem non indiuisibile. Quod potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno
modo secundum quod indiuisibile dicitur aliquod corpus naturale minimum, quod non potest
diuidi ulterius quin corrumpatur et tunc resoluitur in corpus continens; et tunc sensus erit, quod
corpus indiuisibile est quidem in se ipso sensibile, set tamen huiusmodi indiuisibile sensus
uidere non potest. Alio modo potest intelligi indiuisibile quod non est actu diuisum, sicut pars
continui; et huiusmodi indiuisibile non uidet sensus in actu." Leon. 45.95:197-208. This
passage, incidentally, is the only one in St. Thomas that I have found (using R. Busa's Index
thomisticus) where the term naturale minimum appears.
52
In libros Physicorum I, lect. 9: "Videtur autem quod hie dicitur, contrarium esse divisioni
continui in infinitum. Si enim continuum in infinitum divisibile est, caro autem continuum
quoddam est; videtur quod sit in infinitum divisibilis. Omnem igitur parvitatem determinatam
transcendet pars carnis secundum divisionem infinitam. Sed dicendum quod licet corpus,
mathematice acceptum, sit divisibile in infinitum, corpus tamen naturale non est divisibile in
infinitum. In corpore enim mathematico non consideratur nisi quantitas, in qua nihil invenitur
divisioni in infinitum repugnans; sed in corpore naturali consideratur forma naturalis, quae re-
quirit determinatam quantitatem sicut et alia accidentia. Unde non potest inveniri quantitas in
specie carnis nisi infra aliquos terminos determinata." Leon. 2.29; Eng. trans., op. cit. p. 37.
5
See Summa theologiae la q. 7, a. 3, where the reasoning is more explicit: "de corpore quidem
naturali, quod non possit esse infinitum in actu, manifestum est. Nam omne corpus naturale ali-
quam formam substantialem habet determinatam, cum igitur ad formam substantialem conse-
quantur accidentia, necesse est quod ad determinatam formam consequantur determinata
accidentia; inter quae est quantitas. Unde omne corpus naturale habet determinatam quantitatem
220
terminate least dimensions) on the presupposition (as I read it) of the finite number of
natural existents, now responds to an objection by arguing for natural minima on the
presupposition (as I read it) of the finite nature of substantial form. The arguments are
distinct, each standing on its own, and it seems the latter could as well have been made
a primary argument in the rebuttal of Anaxagoras. But of course Aristotle did not do
this, although Aquinas for his part elsewhere relies on the argument from form alone.54
phic being; this important Aristotelian and Thomistic doctrine is established, inter alia,
in Physics I. 4. Aristotle there first gives an argument against infinite body, based on the
multitude, based on innumerability.55 These are only dialectical arguments, but they are
followed by arguments proper to natural philosophy, though even the first of these is
premised upon the existence of a finite number of elements.56 "After the Philosopher
has shown, upon the supposition that the elements are finite, that there is no infinite
sensible body, he here57 shows the same thing without qualification and without any
et in maius et in minus. Unde impossibile est aliquod corpus naturale infinitum esse." Leon.
4.75.
54
See preceding note.
55
204b4-10; cf. Aquinas's Commentary, Book III, lect. 8 (Eng. trans., op. cit. pp. 175ff.).
56
204bl0-205a7.
57
At 205a9ff.
58
Commentary, op. cit. p. 180.
221
either finite parts, or infinite kinds of parts, neither of which is admissible. (The argu-
ment, even in Aquinas' s explication, is dense and I make no attempt to replicate it here.)
distinguished from any other part, and hence natures would not tend toward one attrac-
tor rather than another. (This is a modernized interpretation on my part, to eliminate the
distracting, but by no means essential, references to natural place that are the burden of
ancient and medieval cosmologies. The argument holds no less with respect to any par-
ticular determination of a place ad quern, e.g. the centers of gravitating masses, etc.)59
(205b31-35) Third argument: In our three-dimensional world there are six orien-
these; but such would be meaningless in an infinite world. This argument is related to
the preceding; but where that one dealt with the natural significance of place, this one
place, which is impossible because the very notion of place entails limit.
the infinite is taken very seriously as the now-finite, as that which is beyond quantity,
59
Interestingly, this argument can be said to adumbrate modern formulations of Olbers' para-
dox, in both its "light" and "gravitation" expressions. See Stanley L. Jaki, The Paradox of Ol-
bers ' Paradox (New York, 1969).
222
finite, however indefinitely large or small; the confusion between uncounted and un-
which amounts to the same thing and is what Aquinas means)60 is, as I mentioned, al-
ready implicit in the Aristotelian argument against infinite divisibility of natures. Now
if we take the argument against infinite divisibility of bodies (based on the finitude of
substantial form) in conjunction with the disproof of an infinite number of bodies just
surveyed, we conclude that, in the cosmic range of being, there is no process ad infini-
tum in smallness of bodies; there is, in a word, a least (atomic) level of hylomorphic
structure.
MacKinnon61 which seem to me particularly relevant to our concerns in the present the-
sis. Much of what MacKinnon discussed had to do with elementarity as such (i.e., the
characteristics of being at the infima level of natures), rather than the indivisibility or
In libros Physicorum III, lect. 9: "in toto universo determinate sursum et deorsum secundum
motum gravium et levium: secundum autem motum caeli determinatur dextrum oriens, sinis-
trum occidens; ante vero hemisphaerium superius, retro vero hemisphaerium inferius; sursum
vero meridies, deorsum vero septentrio. Haec autem non possunt determinari in corpore infinito:
impossibile est ergo totum universum esse infinitum." Leon. 2.130.
61
"Thomism and Atomism," The Modern Schoolman 38 (1961): 121-141.
223
minimality implied by the "atomism" of his title, through of course the two are closely
associated.
mental reality, by considering certain theses derived qualitatively from modern physics,
in the light of basic metaphysical analyses. These positiones (so called in reference to
their status as physical principles, imported, without the physical formalism in which
they possess their full intelligibility, into the arena of metaphysical investigation) are
the following:
Commencing with some epistemological observations, MacKinnon noted that the ap-
parent blurring of the distinction between subject and object in quantum-physical ob-
servations does not warrant a lapse into sheer equivocity or operational definitions;
critical realism can offer a solution through the appropriate application of analogous
concepts.62 This is not to say that there is no difficulty in deriving and applying the
analogies in question; on the contrary, even when physical and metaphysical proposi-
tions are materially the same, formal relatability is possible only if they are framed with
enough generality (though not, of course, at the expense of verity) to allow of epistemic
62
Op. cit., pp. 125-7. The second part of his paper, synopsized below, essays just such an appli-
cation. A much more wide-ranging and comprehensive approach to the analogical harmoniza-
tion of science and philosophy, though focusing more on natural philosophy than on
metaphysics, would be William A. Wallace, The Modeling of Nature: Philosophy of Science
and Philosophy of Nature in Synthesis (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 1997).
224
couched in the mathematical language of physics - not only is the mathematical lan-
guage itself proper to the subordinate science, but it also cloaks an epistemological di-
vide between statements concerning the external world and those which concern only
the mind's constructs (a divide which perennially bedevils attempts to understand the
world mathematically). On the other hand, since metaphysical principles "are validly
developed from an analysis of the objects more immediately known and of the knowing
accident. "What we hope to obtain from our experiment are some philosophical conclu-
sions concerning elements which may be compared with the scientific positiones con-
(1) Aquinas bases the notion of perfection in being on a thing's relation to its
first Cause, which is ipsum esse subsistens. "Things are perfect according to the mode
in which they exist," i.e., to the degree to which they enjoy actuality rather than
potentiality.64 Thus, says MacKinnon, with his eye on elemental existents, "[t]he least
being has the least self-identity [or ontological unity, which is convertible with being
TTOsJis" an apt
especially in Chapter 5.
64
"Omnium autem perfectiones pertinent ad perfectionem essendi, secundum hoc enim aliqua
perfecta sunt, quod aliquo modo esse habent." Summa theologiae la q. 4, a. 2 (Leon. 4.52); cf.
Summa contra gentiles II, c. 90. The "degree of actuality" implies, of course, the determinative
role of essence, itself considered as a potency with respect to existential act.
225
hence with actuality] . . . . It should be so merged with its environment [the extended
(2) At the level of the matter-form complementarity, MacKinnon again has fore-
most in view Aquinas's prioritization of act over potency. Elemental being "is the one
closest to prime matter; that is, most in potency and least in act. It is reasonable to
expect that such an element is highly mutable and easily transformed."66 Moreover,
given that a thing only acts according to the actuality which it possesses, an element
should manifest the "least perfect action" - however that should be defined. MacKinnon
proposes that the criterion of perfection in actions is the degree of immanence. "God is
have the least degree of immanence. More concretely, we might surmise that the proper
that any distinction between the activities of the particle and those of the associated
gles out, for consideration in this regard, efficient causality) implies a correlative de-
pendence upon extrinsic influences: "the weak causal efficacy of an individual element
must be supplemented by the causal determination given by other agents. More con-
greater degree than occurs higher on the ontological scale, every action entails a related
"reaction": "When A acts on B, its very activity must be strongly influenced by the reac-
tion ofB."70 MacKinnon is careful to note that none of these considerations vitiates the
principle of causality; nothing (I will interpolate) is ever cause and effect sub eodem
aspectu; but there is an indeterminacy in individual causal activity that (I take it) places
it at the opposite pole from the supremely determinate causality of the Creator, which
MacKinnon closes his remarks on matter and form with the observation that the
simplest composites would be expected to evidence "properties not too different from
those which we have ascribed to the elements."71 Although he does not mention virtual
"Two elements combine by acting upon each other and so altering each other's disposi-
tion that a new third body arises which combines the qualities of its two progenitors in a
unified way."72
existence is minimal the substance must be minimal in some sense of the word. Since
substance acts as potency with respect to accidents and an element is close to pure po-
69
MacKinnon, p. 135.
70
Ibid.
71
MacKinnon, p. 136.
72
MacKinnon, p. 137. He cites P. Hoenen, Cosmologia (4th ed.: Rome, 1949), p. 349.
227
tency, we would expect an element to have such little substantial unity that it would al-
proper accidents (those which flow "from the essence of a being inasmuch as the being
cause."74 "The being least in act, an element, should have the fewest and least deter-
mined proper accidents. For example, we might expect that an element's size and shape
[i.e., that of the naturale minimum] would be determined in a general way by the nature
of the element.... However, the precise determination of this size and shape would be
a common accident and thus dependent upon the causes acting upon it."75 Acts of
measurement, MacKinnon notes, "would supply just such an extrinsic cause" - and with
this, I will interject, a great deal of the vaunted "quantum weirdness," which historically
engendered the "Copenhagen interpretation" and ever more bizarre offshoots, suddenly
properties and characteristics 'proper' to the particle itself from those determined by the
MacKinnon concluded his fruitful reflections with a reminder that the positiv-
particles, on the other hand - one anchored in awareness of the ordering of the entire
73
MacKinnon, ibid.
74
MacKinnon, p. 138.
75
MacKinnon, ibid.
76
MacKinnon, p. 139.
228
cosmos to its Creator - can make meaningful statements about the elements (whatever
these should turn out to be), while acknowledging inherent limitations to our knowledge
of them, due to their primitive place in the scale of being and actuality.
the foregoing, here are some principles to keep in mind as we return to quantum physics
vis-a-vis its hylomorphic environment; it will be most mutable, most reciprocal (de-
pendent on external agencies) in its on activity, and most subject to accidental varia-
tions. All of this, I think, we will find evidence at the quantum level.
Every hylomorphic nature is extended and has quantitative limits. Since every nature is
either elemental or composite, and the composite ones are virtually (and therefore
reductively, upon decomposition) elemental, it may be concluded that the elemental en-
tities, whatever they are, are the atoms of Aristotle and Aquinas. These are naturally
indivisible, in the sense that they cannot be divided without destroying their nature and
(at the very least) becoming something else - but this transformation cannot occur ad
229
infinitum.17 As elements, they are indeed the least actualities, the most prior entities, in
the universe.
Thus the Democritean insight, that matter consists of irreducible particles, was
in fact embraced by the greatest of those who are generally represented as being anti-
conception. In the first place, as we have noted, there can be no question of "atoms and
the void," void being a metaphysical impossibility. Rather, the atoms of Aristotelian
realism must form a plenum, a "contiguum." Secondly, the elemental atoms are, like
every other hylomorphic composite, mutable: not however in the sense of being able to
decompose into prior entities, since they are in essence irreducible, but in the sense of
being able to yield their substantial forms to one another, or to higher forms in compos-
ites, while "persisting," virtualiter, through the modified accidents of the higher form.
and most modern physicists, recognizes no such transformation: atoms (meaning not
just the entities conventionally called atoms today, but any "elementary particles" in
physics) are held to be always present, as actual constituents, in higher composites. And
in keeping with this, such reductionisms can admit no higher principles of unity, no
dant evidence to the contrary from both everyday and laboratory perspectives.
the elemental or atomic. The inexorable conclusion, from the Thomistic synthesis of
substantial unicity, virtual presence and elemental atomicity, is that the cosmic beings
of our everyday experience are not composed of "heaps" of atoms - that the substantial
natures of the atoms are not actually present precisely in so far as they compose (i.e.,
predictable enough, from those who take the methodology of modern physics for a phi-
have confirmed the reality of atoms as universally and actually present constituents; no
medieval head-games should disabuse us of that fact. But again I note, leaving it for far-
sighted physicists to demonstrate mathematically, that no atom has ever been observed,
directly or indirectly, precisely qua component of any higher actuality; every conceiv-
able "observation" upon elemental units has been carried out in a setting in which the
entity in question is isolated from whatever composite it may otherwise have belonged
to virtually.
atomic units; but philosophy cannot identify them. An interesting question is whether
identify them? There seems to be no reason a priori why the methods of physical analy-
231
sis cannot reach the very deepest level of a finitely structured actuality; but how would
science know if it had penetrated thus far? Godel's theorem, mentioned earlier in these
pages, serves to remind us that such knowledge is beyond reach. Science would have to
compass every last aspect of the universe, past and present, and know moreover that it
had achieved just this comprehension, in order to identify "the elements" positively. It
regimes, and therefore, in a cosmological context, among different epochs in the puta-
tive history of the universe (at least where the "standard model" of big-bang cos-
mogenesis is concerned). In a word, the "permanence" of the elements may well turn
lutionary context. But this is not a Heraclitean situation; we have learned to discern,
amid the universal evolutionary flux, natures which are specifying even if only dubi-
ously "stable" - and, in their specificity, the very principles of instability (every change
motion and its causes, but he must be read with care. Among other subtleties, he makes
explicit reference to, and bases some of his conclusions on, the physical continuum un-
derstood as infinitely divisible, i.e., as a continuum strictly speaking. But infinite divisi-
bility in the abstract, in virtue of its quantitative nature, is by no means the sole
232
It must be noted that Aristotle has proven in Book VI that in motion there is no
first either in respect to the mobile object or in respect to the time or in respect
to that in which the motion occurs, especially in increase and in local motion.
This is so because he was then speaking about motion in general and about mo-
bile objects in so far as they are continuous, not yet applying his remarks to de-
79
terminate natures.
visibility: this applies to spatial distance, body, motion itself, and time. But motion in
hended except in virtue of formal principles which are motive only above some infima
spatial level. To divide the continuum beyond a certain point is to destroy the possibility
of existence of any nature which presupposes an extension greater than what remains
from the division.80 Although I do not find Aristotle's argument altogether clear in this
On what follows see Richard F. Hassing, "Thomas Aquinas on Phys. VII. 1 and the Aristote-
lian Science of the Physical Continuum," pp. 109-156 in Nature and Scientific Method, ed. Dan-
iel O. Dahlstrom (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 22, ed. Jude
Dougherty), (Washington, DC, 1991). Hassing singles out (p. 114), among recent commentators
on Physics VII. 1, William A. Wallace (his mentor and mine): "Cosmological Arguments and
Scientific Concepts" in Wallace's From a Realist Point of View (Washington, D.C., 1979), pp.
313-327.
79
In libros Physicorum VIII, lect. 11: "Ubi considerandum est quod Aristoteles prius in sexto
probavit quod in motu non est aliquid primum, neque ex parte mobilis neque ex parte temporis
neque ex parte rei in qua est motus, praecipue in augmento et motu locali: et hoc ideo, quia tunc
loquebatur de motu in communi, et de mobili secundum quod est quoddam continuum, nondum
applicando ad determinatas naturas." Leon. 2.406; Eng. trans., op, cit. p. 565.
8
"Sed tamen possibile est quod aliquod continuum, sive sit movens sive motum, habeat talem
naturam, ut non possit actu dividi, sicut patet de corpore solis. Et si contingat quod aliquod con-
tinuum dividatur, non retinebit eandem potentiam ad hoc quod moveat vel moveatur, quam
prius habebat; quia huiusmodi potentia sequitur aliquam formam; forma autem naturalis requirit
quantitatem determinatam." In libros Physicorum VIII, lect. 11 (Leon. 2.406).
233
regard, the distinction between the physical continuum considered only in its quantita-
tive aspect, and the continuum - really a "contiguum," as will be explained shortly -
alone brings coherence to Aristotle's difficult and subtle account of the first intrinsic
motor principle.
son finds the crucial distinction which Aristotle "presupposes, but does not explicitly
"three kinds of magnitude: (1) mathematical continuum, (2) physical continuum, and
the difference between the first two. I now summarize Pearson's synopsis of Aquinas's
commentary.
Things are said to be continuous, broadly speaking, if their boundaries are one.
on a line or surfaces on a body.) But "one" can be understood in different ways. Thus
the unity of boundaries which are both in the same position (a boundary cannot be in a
"place" since it is not a body) is different from the unity of boundaries which are nu-
81
"St. Thomas on the Continuum: The Nature of Points in Physics and Geometry," Aquinas
35/3
82
(1992), pp. 673-683.
Hassing, op. cit. p. 125, n. 45.
234
merically one, i.e., identical (and two only in notion).83 In mathematics, which deals
only with the abstract order of pure quantity, there is no "nature" other than continuous
and discrete quantities themselves; and since what distinguishes continuous quantities is
none other than position, two points (or lines, or surfaces) which coincide positionally
can only be identical. They are, at most, notionally different. If a point C is located
along line segment AB, the segments AC and CB are continuous, C being "really" one
and the same; the line AB is not "really" divided, but only in our consideration thereof.
"The fact that a point, considered geometrically, is identifiable with its position is the
foundation of St. Thomas' argument, at the beginning of Book 6, that a line cannot be
composed of points, for between any two positions, there exists always another posi-
tion."84
Unlike mathematical entities, which exist per se in the mind, the boundaries of
But an accident is distinguished from another accident of the same kind, a nu-
merical distinction, only in relation to the subject in which the accident inheres.
An accident which is numerically one can exist in one and only one subject.
Once it is granted that ultima have an accidental reality in nature, it follows
necessarily that one point can function as the ultimum or terminus of one and
only one thing, for it belongs to that thing according to the manner of an acci-
dent belonging to a subject.85
Hence wherever two hylomorphic beings are in contact, their boundaries must remain
numerically two even though sharing one and the same position. This constitutes
83
Cf. In libros Physicorum V, lect. 5.
84
Pearson, "St. Thomas on the Continuum," p. 678; cf. In libros Physicorum VI, lect. 1.
85
Pearson, pp. 678-9.
235
A cosmic plenum, in which there is no void space but only extended, contiguous, non-
the Aristotelian explanation of local motion. Aristotle's definition of motion, taken over
unreservedly by Aquinas, is among the most fundamental, most difficult, and most ne-
glected features of his natural philosophy. Every mobile being or "nature" is understood
to have, as intrinsic principles of its mobility (and rest), form, matter, and privation. But
motion itself, the effect, so to speak, of these as well as of extrinsic causal principles,
broad enough to include all of its species, and vague enough to reflect, perhaps, Aris-
totle's relatively inchoate distinction of essence and existence. For as he observes after
grasp what motion is. It is necessary to class it with privation or with potentiality or
the three terms are rightly grasped. Granted that the deflniendum is so fundamental that
its deflnientes can only be primordial ontological terms - representing principles of be-
ing, rather than entities themselves - there remains the difficulty of sorting out what
sense is being accorded to each of these terms. For there is a twofold possibility of onto-
A mobile being is a "between" being, on the way from one definable state to an-
other, and the process is, to all appearances, a continuous one (we are not considering
substantial change, but only motion properly speaking). The question to address is: what
phic being, within whose essence the actual principle is form, and the potential principle
is matter. It is important to note, however, that act and potency are broader in meaning:
for form is understood as the potential principle in reference to existence or esse, and,
completing the symmetry, matter is what I shall call quasi-actual, denoting a "kind" or
tence a hylomorphic being enjoys.) So to speak merely of "the act" or "the potential"
But we can be more precise. One way is to begin with the apparent redundancy
mere emphasis' sake here; loquens formaliter, we will rather expect one referent to be,
as noted above, existential and the other essential. This leaves us with two options: "po-
tential as potential" will mean either "the ability to be, as what is able to be" (existential
+ essential referents, respectively), or "what is able to be, as able to be" (essential + ex-
istential referents). The former makes no sense. Shifting our focus now to the first part
of Aristotle's formulation, "act" in the abstract could mean either "existence" or "form"
being, rather than a kind of being - an existential mode, rather than an essential one -
we complete our analysis in the recognition that "act of the potential," in order to avoid
contradiction, must also involve two different orders of reference - bringing us, again,
to the conclusion that "act" is existential and "of the potential" is of the essential order.
Aristotle's definition then becomes luminous: motion is "the act [understood ex-
stood existentially]." In slightly less abstract terms, motion is "the existence of the
"can be" - not as the "can be" of matter, understood as an ordering to form (in other
words, privation: this marble block can be a statue), but the "can be" which is the order-
ing itself (marble simply speaking is not statue-becoming; but marble under the sculp-
tor's chiseling is existentially, and not just essentially, ordered toward the statue).
(again, I am limiting discussion to the intrinsic principles of change), that motion, "the
ability to be this," can be realized. What is in motion exists, not as the terminus a quo or
quo and ad quern. To be material is in fact to be mobile, since mobility is the very rai-
son d'etre of matter; motion is the actuating of some material potency, under the extrin-
sic influence of the agent cause (and all else that is thereby implied).
only as a partial insight and not as the comprehensive one that he intended it to be,
Heraclitus's assertion that "all is flux"), presents us with a subtle problem in accounting
238
for the reality of motion. Precisely this reality is under attack in the paradoxes of Zeno.
Recognizing that the mobile must traverse a magnitude that is infinitely divisible, he
presented scenarios in which the "impossibility" of local motion arises from the sheer
infinity of spatial intervals (those lying between infinitely many pairs of points) that
Zeno's error was to confuse the divisibility of a continuum with actual divided-
ness, or infinity by division with infinity by addition. Aristotle's and Aquinas's analyses
therein (as well as of time, the mind's measure of the traversal), as being potentially in-
finite but never actually so. Thus, while the mind could divide ad infinitum the continua
associated with local motion, such motion does in fact proceed to its terminus, inas-
much as (and here is the startlingly bold feature of the Aristotelian analysis) there is no
question of the real traversal of an actual infinite. Rather, the nature of motion as actus
imperfectus is such that the mobile never exists "in" a place while en route, but only
"through" each place. Precisely in that regard in which the mobile is mobile, its exis-
tence is, as we noted, only "toward" a not-yet. Imagination trips us up here: we see a
ball flying through the air and want to insist that the ball at every moment exists there,
there, there. But no: while the ball certainly exists - and this we rightly apprehend,
through intellectual abstraction from the flux presented to the senses - we cannot by the
same token affirm that "the ball there" (or there or there) exists. Did it exist in any one
place, the mobile would in an instant be immobile, its "ability to be" no longer actual,
It is not an actual infinite that the mobile traverses; its motion is not an actual in-
finite; the duration of that motion, the time required for its accomplishment, is not an
actual infinite. These are, with respect to the mind's apprehension of them, only poten-
tion of the choral Has Aristotle escaped the Parmenidean and Heraclitean extremes
only by dissolving reality itself? It would be one thing if his solution reduced the mobile
in its entirety to a shadowy "inclination to being," but such is not the case. Every mobile
being is being as well as mobile; its substance maintains a certain constancy even as the
accidents mutate. The projectile body which cannot be said to be actually "in" any place
along its path is a body nonetheless, with characteristics as determinate as its place is
indeterminate.
Does the Aristotelian and Thomistic insistence on the continuity of motion (and
hence its imperfect existential status) preclude any kind of discrete momenta in the
course of the movement? At first it may seem so; the discrete, after all, is definitionally
opposed to the continuous. Yet here again the distinction between essence and existence
(at the accidental level) may enable us to resolve what would otherwise amount to a
contradiction.
Natural motions must involve, as termini ad quo and ad quern, moments of rest
in which the accidental formalities of being are realized: only such end-points bring in-
teleological. If there were not at least these fleetingly discernible "constants" amid the
accidental flux, it is difficult to say how we could be other than Heracliteans after all.
(Yet one must acknowledge profound difficulties: for example, we abstract pure quanti-
ties from the material world, and posit such relations as equality or straightness among
them: but where is absolute dimensive equality or straightness to be found in re? In an-
swer to this I point the reader to earlier remarks on what the intellect is doing in discern-
What is the relation of a mobile body to the medium within which it moves?
How exactly is "within" to be understood? Let us accept that the physical universe is,
pace Newton and Einstein, a plenum whose parts are quantitatively continuous and
physically contiguous. Now in order for motion to occur through such a continuum, we
These are the only logical possibilities that accord with observation (i.e., with
the evidence that a mobile body comes to be, in some real sense, in a location that was
previously occupied by other bodies). But the second one must be ruled out as inconso-
Motion strictly speaking involves only the accidents of physical bodies. But we
need to distinguish the motion of a. body from motion in a body; and to do this, it will be
helpful to remember that a body is a material being considered as extended. The exten-
the absence of form, which determines). A body can change location as a whole, in
which case the substance itself, through its constellation of accidents, becomes
differently situated in terms of its ability to interact with other hylomorphic substances.
Alternatively, a body can remain at rest vis-a-vis adjacent bodies (i.e., those with which
it can interact), while undergoing some change in itself (granted, that every kind of
accidental change is reductively local). And since bodies - more properly, hylomorphic
substances - influence each other through their accidents and by contiguity, a physical
influence can propagate "through" the continuum either with its associated body, as the
latter itself moves, orfrombody to body as they each remain in place. As illustrations of
the two kinds of movement we may compare convective and conductive heat transfer.
In the former case molecules move from one place to another, carrying thermal (vibra-
tional) energy with them; and this is restricted to fluids. In the latter case molecules vi-
brate more or less in place, each one by vibrating causing its neighbors to vibrate, with
thermal energy thereby being transmitted from molecule to molecule; and this is re-
stricted to liquids and solids, the molecules of a gas not being sufficiently in contact for
it to occur. In either case we say that there is heating - a transfer of thermal energy.
242
here are our first and third logical possibilities listed above. But a further precision must
be introduced, which renders my question all the more pointed. For it would seem, at
least in the abstract, that the "becoming" which is involved in local motion according to
our third logical possibility could be of two kinds: [a] that whereby the units comprising
the continuum are changed only accidentally (as would seem to be the case in my ex-
ample of conductive heat transfer), as a physical influence is being propagated from unit
to unit; or, more radically, that whereby the units comprising the physical continuum
enter into a new substantial configuration, that of the mobile body, as the mobile en-
counters and, so to speak, "engulfs" them - so that the units under consideration,
whether actually or virtually present in the informed continuum beforehand, are now
gous to what is seen on a marquee sign, in which the words are "moving" in virtue of
different light bulbs (the "units of the medium") successively being illuminated, "enter-
It is important to note that such a theory of corporeal motion through the physi-
cal continuum, like its marquee analogue (where the "actuality" is that of the illumi-
The substantial and corporeal form is really being conjoined with a succession of mat-
ters (which, in itself, is hardly repugnant to hylomorphic theory), such that the compos-
ite being truly moves from place to place. One feature of this mode of motion, however,
243
is that it could only occur by discrete steps, rather than continuously. More precisely,
such a motion must be divisible into component motions, in which accidental (or even
substantial) corruptions and accidental generations have occurred, even if these mo-
How far may that which, at the level of the senses, is taken to be "one motion,"
be resolved into a series of motions and rests, a sort of "stepped motion" whose com-
posite character falls below the threshold of sensibility? Weaning ourselves from exces-
trajectory should consist in a vast sum of motions and rests, than that a butterfly's nec-
motion: (1) What would account for the evident unity of the motions, such that we are
certainly inclined to call them one motion; and (2) Why posit the multiplicity of mo-
tions in the first place, since the unity of motion taken as a whole seems evident? I be-
lieve the first question is answered by appeal to the underlying continuity of matter, in
conjunction with the persistence of agent causality as it enters into the complete account
of a given series of motions. Moments of rest on the way to a particular telos need not
destroy a certain overarching unity among the "interrupted motions," inasmuch as the
power of a moving cause proves sufficient to co-ordinate those motions, as when mar-
ble is removed chip by chip in the "movement" toward statuehood, or when a body of
The second question brings us back to the consideration about kinds of local
motion in a discretely structured continuum. For while any number of natural motions
give evidence of occurring by displacement of other bodies - one thinks of air flowing
around an airplane, or a piece of wood splitting before the advancing wedge - at deeper
levels of structure the "marquee theory" begins to seem more plausible. There is ex-
perimental reason to suppose, for instance, that as light passes through transparent mat-
ter it is being absorbed and re-emitted by the constituent atoms of that medium.
certain elasticity of the medium. Were the structural units of the medium inflexible, mo-
tion simply could not occur because there would be no way for the units to "move
aside" - there being no three-dimensional (or even two-dimensional) geometry that al-
sort of "Chinese puzzle" problem: absent a void somewhere, how could motion be initi-
ated, since no displaced part of the medium would have any "where" to go? Thus the
least parts of the medium would seem to have to be, not rigid, but compressible: vari-
able enough in their dimensions to allow a body to "squeeze" them aside in its own pro-
gress. (Think of a room full of inflated balloons, wall to wall and floor to ceiling,
packed so closely that there is no space whatever between the balloons. The only way
an extraneous object - say, a marble - could make its way through the massed balloons
For all the difficulty attendant on a displacive theory of local motion, the other
idea, that a mobile could be "actuating" the surrounding medium, least part by least
245
part, in defiance of all sensible evidence, must sound like rant. Yet the problem of mo-
ics, demands solution. As I will have occasion to suggest in the final chapter, there is a
largely displacive, since it is "furthest" from the substantial in its accidentality, while
motions at the quantum level may turn out to be transformative or marquee-like, at least
L. Action at a distance
Once the possibility of void space is ruled out ontologically (pace Newton), the vexed
question of whether there can be "action at a distance" resolves into this: can one body
act upon another, that is not in spatial contact with it, without regard for any intervening
matter, i.e., as */nothing intervened? The question thus expressed admits of two parts:
[a] can a physical influence propagate across a distance independently of what consti-
tutes the intervening plenum? and [b] can a physical influence be instantaneous, i.e.,
non-propagating?88
"No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except
through a medium."89 What does it mean for one hylomorphic substance to act on an-
88
On the history and philosophy of actio in distans see Mary B. Hesse, Forces and Fields: The
Concept of Action at a Distance in the History of Physics (New York, 1962). Much useful sci-
entific material on the subject, blended with decidedly unAristotelian philosophizing, is found
in Marc Lange, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics: Locality, Fields, Energy and
Mass (Oxford, 2002).
89
Summa theologiae la, q. 8, a. 1 ad 3 ("nullius agentis, quantumcumque virtuosi, actio procedit
ad aliquid distans, nisi inquantum in illud per media agit" - Leon. 4.82).
246
other? It is for the one to effect accidental or (by way of the accidental) substantial
change in the other. As the accidents involved are inseparable from spatiality or exten-
sion, so must be the operations which occur through them. That is to say, that the inter-
spatiotemporal): they involve that which characterizes the spatial as such, i.e., "parts
outside parts," extendedness and adjacency. For one hylomorphic being to act on an-
other (and for that other to "receive" the action of the one), there must be an ontological
ground or commonality which is located precisely in their spatiality; they must "share
space," not in violation of the principle of unilocality but along a common boundary,
thereby forming a unity through relation, i.e., "existing with respect to one another."
Since body is by definition a substance which has extension, bodies which are related
m
James Tallarico ("Action at a Distance," The Thomist 25 [1962], pp. 252-292) presents (p.
257) a reduction argument from P. Henry Van Laer (Philosophico-Scientifw Problems, trans-
lated by Henry J. Koren [Pittsburgh, 1953], pp. 59-114) against action at a distance, which I
here paraphrase with some modification: Suppose that body A is located in void space, and that
body P is now brought into its vicinity. If P is acted on by A, then either A's activity "across"
the intervening space pre-existed P's arrival, in which case an action existed without an object
and without a correlative passion, both of which run counter to the ratio of action; or A's activ-
ity only occurred when P became present to it, in which case A would somehow have to have
"known" P's becoming present, which is not consonant with the nature of mere body as such. (I
have modified the argument to refer to "object" and "passion" where Van Laer and Tallarico
had "an accident. . . existing] without a substantial support." For, while the latter is no less
inadmissible in natural philosophy, and would certainly invalidate the idea of action at a dis-
tance, it is more properly the premise of a prior argument, that against void as such.)
Unfortunately Tallarico goes on to develop a faulty critique of Van Laer's argument to
the effect that, having made spatial contiguity a prerequisite for the "quantitative whole" im-
plied in a hylomorphic relation, Van Laer has reduced relation, in this case, to contiguity - or at
least made relation as such dependent on contiguity - rendering the argument against action at a
distance circular (pp. 259f.).
In an attempt to "understand the truth which Van Laer touches upon but does not
honor" (p. 262), Tallarico argues that relation between two things entails a new formal effect in
247
sharply delineated in the sense of Newton's "hard, massy particles." On the contrary,
within an extended (conspecific) field tapering off indefinitely in the surrounding space
makes all the more plausible a theory of physical contact as prerequisite for interaction.
Particles can, in theory, be "in contact" (and therefore potentially interactive) at arbitrar-
ily great distances, yet undergo specific changes only at some threshold distance which
cles, whether molecules or planets) are local in nature, a further question is, how local-
ized is the interaction between two bodies, as compared with their spatial extent as
bodies?
The recognition that form is the principle of activity - operatio sequitur formae
- precludes any necessity of identifying the locus of activity with the full extent or locus
each thing related ("Relation depends upon existence, not upon surface contact," p. 270), and
that this formality pre-empts mere contact to the extent that any two bodies that are related are
by that fact not "at a distance" but capable of transient action/passion. "Of course we have had
to recast such notions as distance, direction, medium [construing all of these non-spatially!]; but
evidently, this can be done in such a way that inherent absurdity and self-contradiction are re-
moved from the notion of 'action at a distance without the use of a medium'" (pp. 290f.).
Tallarico's concern to justify action at a distance is based on his reading of texts in
Aquinas that make action essentially dependent on power, not contact. But he gives a strained
interpretation, it seems to me, in so far as he attempts to read quantitative (extensive, spatial)
aspects out of consideration altogether. What is true of the divine agency (which Tallarico ana-
lyzes at length, pp. 283-290) is not necessarily true of hylomorphic agency.
In fact a more careful reading of Van Laer discloses that even though "agent and recipi-
ent cannot form one quantitative whole unless they are locally related to one another (cited in
Tallarico, p. 256), the conclusion is simply that "for the interaction of bodies material contact is
a necessary condition" (ibid). This does not obviate the existential relation between two bodies,
in virtue of their respective formal principles, as the root cause of their interactions, while ac-
knowledging spatial contiguity as necessary condition of that interaction.
248
of the body as such. A whole can act through one of its parts. (Were those "parts," on
the other hand, only so many wholes, independent members of an aggregate, the aggre-
gate could not "act" except via the combined actions of its members.) This observation
is trivial at the level of sensible being: every interaction of (say) a being with its envi-
ronment is more localized than the being itself, even when it involves the being as a
the same. A being with formally distinct parts or organs acts only through those parts;
this is because the being's interactions with other beings are specialized in accordance
with the powers of the several organs or parts. A simple being, on the other hand - 1 am
thinking of "element" under some form - having extension but no distinction of parts
according to function, can only act as a whole. But there is, even in this case, no a priori
reason why its locus of activity cannot be more restricted than its locus qua being.
Hence a particle of volume X may act upon another particle of volume Y some-
where "within" the volume Z, even though the entirety of Xand Tare substantially or
speak of the whole acting through the part in composite beings, we are invariably de-
scribing accidental changes directly, even if substantial changes are indirectly conse-
249
quent (and attendant) on them. But at the truly elemental level, there are (I propose) no
purely accidental changes; every change, even though disposed and effected through the
formally distinct parts, there can be no possibility of parts acting as such.) Hence X and
7 must act as wholes, not as when one part of a body moves the whole per accidens, but
M. Conclusion
This chapter's survey of the formal structure of hylomorphic beings has had as its aim,
not any new development of the doctrine of the philosophic* perennis in this regard, but
simply the compilation of those features of a coherent account which may cast the Aris-
lar may enable us to apply the doctrine, as set forth in the previous chapter, to some
A. Introductory
In the two preceding chapters, I have sought to present and reflect upon the Aristotelian-
Thomistic understanding of matter and form as a coherent analysis of cosmic being. Now let
us see how this understanding can be brought to bear upon certain features of quantum
I am not "doing physics" in this chapter - not, that is, in the sense that a quantum
Rather, the goal is interpretation of some key elements of a scientific theory that has
abundantly proven its worth as a physical construct - here, again, taking "physical" with its
mobile being." The philosophical approach which I take cannot of course advance this kind
of physics in a direct sense; but it is my hope that the approach will be seen as indicating a
deeper basis for understanding what quantum physics is concerned with - and, in so doing, at
least hint at what, in quantum theory, needs closer examination, in the interest of attaining a
250
251
cations of mobility as such, and thus looks at change and motion from a perspective that
is different from, and complementary to, that of mathematical physics which works out
the two approaches are compatible because every mobile being, in virtue of its material-
ity, is extended, and, in virtue of its specific nature, exists under a specific range of
sight, albeit a partial one, into its nature. Nowhere is this truer than in respect of entities
In undertaking this rapprochement of the ancient physics and the new, I also
bility. I will not "conclude," for instance, that photons are substantial particles, because
I am doing philosophy, not physics, and photons as such are only accessible to the
measuring apparatus and techniques of physics. One can hardly draw philosophical
conclusions, which are by nature certain and immutable, from data which are by no
means certain and immutable. What one can do, and what I try to do in the sequel, is to
show that such and such physical data are, or are not, illuminated and rendered more
1
For original statement of the aporiai to be addressed in the next five sections, see Chapter
Two, section L.
252
This is the central fact that gave rise to quantum physics: that spatiotemporal being
exhibits both wavelike (continuous) features, and particlelike (discrete) features. The
seeming paradox of this duality - since a wave is manifestly not a particle, and vice
positivist cast, with operationalist overtones at best and wild subjectivism in more ex-
of quantum mechanics, simply posits that the two manifestations must be taken at face
value, not as coexistent so much as equally plausible - with the kind of observation
made being assigned a determinative role vis-a-vis the features that exhibit themselves
two are simply understood as different modes of being at the substantial or quasi-
substantial level.
entities such as electrons and photons are not resolvable into subordinate levels of struc-
ture (virtually present forms), they would be expected to exhibit properties that are "di-
rectly" radicated in their substantial character. Of course, all such entities are observed
precisely through their accidents; but those accidents will be relatively few and rela-
tively invariant, inasmuch as they do not represent the virtual presence of other forms
253
(the elements being infima forms). (Analogy: a tree can exhibit a wide range of acciden-
tal determinations compatible with its substantial unity, whereas a one-celled alga is
much more restricted in this regard, and a chlorophyll molecule more restricted still.) In
short, quantum particles such as photons or electrons seem to exhibit properties charac-
But the ratio of element does not preclude all corruptibility, inasmuch as they
are material.2 That the elements cannot, by definition, corrupt into lower beings that
were virtually present does not rule out their being transformed into other elemental be-
ings, beings essentially distinct but on more or less the same (i.e., "primordial") onto-
logical level, under the influence of extrinsic causes. Whether the termini a quo et ad
ence of mode - something not investigated in the present study - might be analogous to,
say, a butterfly existing in either the butterfly or the caterpillar mode, or sulfur existing
under different allotropic forms, where only the arrangement of the atoms differs, re-
one substance, or substantial mode, to another - a transition which involves the infima
level of accidents grounded in the substance - elements will not only exhibit different
sets of properties, but will also effect the reverse transition with relative ease, since the
substance itself, being elemental, was not resolvable into multiple component forms
2
Summa contra gentiles III, c. 23: "elementorum corpora sunt simplicia, et non est in eis com-
positio nisi materiae et formae." Leon. 14.57:38a-40a.
254
each with its own potential claim on existence. In other words, we would expect that
truly elemental entities will act, not like an elephant which, having died, permanently
reverts to a plethora of lower forms, but more like a water molecule which, however
often it decomposes into hydrogen and oxygen atoms, can return, with relatively little
difficulty or unlikelihood, in its original (though perhaps not numerically identical) es-
sence. The further removed from elementarity and prime matter is a given composite,
is due to a sort of "entropy" principle: cosmic beings, in virtue of their material princi-
ple which is a potency to numerous forms, decompose into that which is now poised to
become any of numerous of kinds of being, and not just the one from which it derived
is an existential openness to many kinds of information. Beings very close to the ele-
mental level, on the other hand, can only decompose minimally, and are ontologically
closer to the entities into which they have decomposed. And elements themselves,
changes within the one substantial identity, constitute the "limiting case" in this regard:
they corrupt (rather than "decompose") into beings that are, if not essentially the same,
at least on the same ontological level qua elements and therefore most likely candidates
for "recomposition."
There is also the question of efficient causality here, as in all cases of change:
the efficient causes operative at or near the infima level are themselves so general that
they are maximally "available" for reversible elemental transitions, whereas the effi-
255
cient cause that can bring, say, an elephant back from its heap of elephant-matter is so
highly specified in its action that it can only operate under conditions that are far re-
entity and therefore as displaying substantial characteristics (or, more precisely, the ac-
cidental characteristics most proper to substance), can either (a) corrupt, reversibly and
relatively easily, into a related element, or (b) pass between different modalities of the
one elemental substance, again reversibly, under some (not necessarily specified) agent
causality. These two modes of elementary existence (for as such I will posit them) are
none other than the wavelike and particlelike manifestations. The two, per the intima-
tions of modern theory, are certainly not wholly unlike, since the "particle" is most often
Schrodinger's physical interpretation of the "wave packet," but there are also other in-
terpretative avenues assigning to "particles" something of a wave nature), and the wave
appears to have a quantized (i.e., discrete) aspect, even as wave. ("Discrete" aspects of
material being, in other words, are not absolutely opposed to "continuous," though the
convenient terminology might suggest as much; rather, there is a question of the degree
On this hypothesis there is no mystery in the disparity between wave and parti-
cle properties - no more, at any rate, than between the properties of, say, ice and water
vapor: wave and particle are modalities of the one elemental substance, or closely re-
lated (because both elemental) substances, perhaps in one or the other case best de-
256
scribed as ens in via, with their duality of manifestation following easily from the re-
evidently quite general, the wave mode readily shifts into the particle mode and vice
has ever shown complete randomness in the exhibition of the wave or particle properties
respectively; certain situations entail the one behavior, and certain other situations entail
the other, univocally and consistently. What the Copenhagen theorists tend to describe
interaction with other entities" (as, for instance, whether a given interaction with matter
is causing light to be refracted, dispersed, absorbed, etc.). Some kinds of interaction will
engender the wave mode, others the particle mode. The two can be essentially one but
existentially exclusive, in the sense that water vapor and ice are exclusive; either one
exists or the other, however easily each state may revert to the other.
Of course the observing apparatus, and therefore the observations being made in
the laboratory, affect the modality of the elementary entity under examination; but this
need call for no bizarre theory of observer intervention as somehow "producing" the
reality of what is observed, nor for an elaborately holistic account of the "implicate or-
der" with its not-so-different subjectivist baggage. The recognition suffices, that if you
do x to electrons they become X, and if you do y to them they become Y instead, with X
now continuous properties, now discrete, despite the evident contradictions - depending
simply on how our observations are conducted. Against Bohm and most "hidden vari-
ables" theorists: the apparently incompatible sets of properties need not be supposed to
coexist in virtue of an underlying ontological stratum which in some unknown way ne-
Rather, the two sets of properties belong to modes of being, which do not coex-
ist and therefore do not entail contradiction, even as they freely interchange in virtue of
their material principle and formal dispositions, under the appropriate conditions of ex-
physics.)
digmatic example of photons and electrons, there is a connaturality between them. The
mere fact that light interacts with matter in so many ways indicates, even at the macro-
scopic level, a relatedness between them; and the realization that photons are closely
and emission by atomic matter, drives the point home. It should strike us as no more
surprising, in a word, that a photon can have both wavelike and particlelike manifesta-
tions, than that light can be absorbed (not "stored," but somehow transmuted) and then
sense, that is hardly less remarkable than the one contemplated by quantum physicists,
In closing this section, I glance at one of the most vexed instances of so-called
complementarity, the two-slit experiment discussed in Chapter Two. How can we inter-
pret, on the account offered here, the appearance of interference bands from single pho-
tons traversing the apparatus? Again, I am not presuming to play the physicist, but I
through both slits, and thereby engendering interference inasmuch as it is still a wave-
like entity, while its energy is quantized such that it will leave but one highly localized
trace when it reaches the recording end of the apparatus and, in virtue of the kind of in-
teraction occasioned by the recorder itself, reverts to the discrete or localized mode. (It
need hardly be emphasized, that there must be, in virtue of the continuity of matter,
some spatial continuity: the particle cannot be located outside the spatial region previ-
ously occupied by the wave.) The "mystery" of the two-slit experiment, dramatized for
Indeed let us go further and suggest that the real "anomaly" in conventional at-
tempts to explain two-slit interference phenomena has been the tacit supposition that
only wave properties might be exhibited. We cannot import into our analysis of light
waves the analogy of constructive and destructive interference as it applies to, say, wa-
ter waves, because water waves are composed of many particles. Theories of light, on
the other hand, have proposed either a continuous (non-particulate) medium, or a par-
3
See Chapter Two supra, p. 42 and n. 37.
259
waves (and which, so far as I know, makes no sense in the theory of light), neither of
the proposed structures can possibly account for interference phenomena at all; both are
between continuous and discrete states. There is both a spatial and a temporal aspect to
these discontinuities.
matter (absorption/emission) via the Compton effect, discrete spectral lines (frequen-
cies), and so on. Between the discrete energy states there seems to be no continuum;
transitions between states either occur or do not occur in toto, no "partial transitions"
being recorded. Moreover, transitions which are quantized as to energy values (includ-
ing mass, charge, and so on) are also instantaneous with respect to time, at least to
within current errors of measurement. Perhaps most striking, the spatial configurations
electron is boosted to a higher energy level within an atom, as a photon is absorbed), the
volume, shape, charge distribution and other parameters do not "swell" or "shrink" from
one state to the next; they simply are in one state and then, in an instant, are in another.
260
cases of substantial change, which is not motion in the strict sense. Between successive
substantial informations there is not, and cannot be, an observable continuity, there be-
ing no possibility of an entity which is partly one substance and partly another. (Thus
when an elephant dies, reverting to the atomic and molecular entities whose forms had
been present virtually in the living organism, there is no period of time when "elephant"
is partly there and partly not. There is no "time during which" the substantial change is
occurring; the accidents may evolve continuously - although there is reason for doubt-
ing this as well - but in any event the substantial transition can only occur instantane-
ously. Nevertheless, when a composite substance (by which I mean one into which prior
forms had entered virtually) decomposes, its successor substances will not vary initially
in their spatial configuration, until their own principles of activity cause dispersal and
reformation. The reason is that the quantitative accidents which now serve to individu-
ate and determine the lower entities in their own right also served to determine the
higher composite per accidens, as we have seen. The volume that becomes collectively
proper to all the substances into which an elephant has just decomposed is the volume
that was proper to the elephant alone, in virtue of those numerous substances having
But when dealing with structures at the inflma level, there are no virtual entities
to carry on, as it were, the spatial characteristics of the prior entity once it has corrupted;
it cannot be resolved into inferior beings, but yields absolutely to the accidental deter-
minations of the new substance. This situation entails the possibility of a spatial discon-
261
which" every motion is understood to occur; but we have seen that such space is an ens
On this account there is no inconsistency in, say, a larger entity resulting from a smaller
one, without any process of growth between the two. Each entity entails its own spatial-
ity, its own extension and quantitative determinations, and apart from any dispositiones
materiae that may be present it is under no constraints arising spuriously from space as
such.
transitions in spatial configuration, energy level, and other physical parameters (as evi-
nature of those entities and the transitions between them. More particularly, it is be-
cause the informations giving rise to successive quantum states are substantial or quasi-
into mode - that (a) the states themselves must not admit of a continuum of partial re-
alizations, (b) the transitions must be instantaneous rather than temporal, and (c) the
spatial configurations, like the energy and other physical parameters, must also vary
discontinuously.
always accidental in nature - not just in the general sense, noted in Chapter 2, that
262
physical science is concerned only with quantities and therefore with accidental mani-
festations of being, but in the narrower sense as well, that the changes which were being
investigated per accidens were themselves accidental changes, specifically local motion
At the quantum level (since it is, on my hypothesis, a deeper level than those in-
volving virtual composition of complex beings) we now confront change that is sub-
substantial rather than merely accidental forms, and hence not simply to local motions
which suppose substantial continuity. In this realm quantitative accidents are still what
the physicist investigates, but they are no longer the accidents associated only with ac-
cidental change. Physics has confronted substance almost head-on, and the mathematics
The preceding will, I hope, give an idea of the relevance of the Aristotelian sub-
transitions that should appear "strange" only in the context of classical physics' prema-
ture reification of the continuous in nature. If I may single out an instance in quantum
formal determination: consider Bohr's atomic model (long since abandoned, of course,
but not without its heuristic value, especially in view of the need for a reassessment of
quantum theory). He postulated that the quantization of orbital energies (as evidenced in
the Balmer line series) implied a prohibition of any orbits not satisfying the discrete en-
263
ergy parameters; thus he sidestepped the radiative-loss problem that was plaguing the
"planetary orbits" theory of atomic electrons. If, I suggest, electronic energy levels are
ontological basis for the quantitative discontinuities which Bohr could only posit ad
hoc.
qualification mentioned above: even if we are not dealing with substantial (elemental)
changes in the strictest sense, but with modal changes within a given substantial con-
figuration, similar principles may obtain, since there need be no continuum between dif-
There are two kinds of probability-governed events in physics. One, which already
dominated the statistical mechanics of Boltzmann et al., involves the probabilities asso-
ciated with one event from among a (typically vast) number whose parameters (trajec-
tory, energy, etc.) are distributed randomly over a range of real values. Probability in
this sense does not connote indeterminism of a radical sort; in principle each compo-
nent, e.g., each trajectory leading to a given event could be known, though in practice
the task exceeds our capacities through the sheer number and complexity of the interac-
tions. (Today's "chaos theory" seems to be an extension of this.) Fortunately, given ap-
propriate boundary conditions, even the most complex of these many-factored systems
264
can be reduced to statistical laws. (The same type of probability and statistical analysis
governs affairs in the everyday world, such as gambler's odds or actuarial studies.)
But another, albeit related, kind of probabilism is associated with events whose
several parameters we do not know entirely, even in theory. Probabilities of this sort are
not usually recognized at the level of ordinary sensible being, although in fact they un-
derlie the first kind of probability. But they do assume prominence in the quantum
the preponderance of individually unknown factors; but whereas, in the first category,
the factors are knowable even if unknown, in the second category the factors considered
This can arise only through a principle refractory to intelligibility; and this we
have seen to be prime matter. Indeed, in accordance with principles laid down earlier,
we must expect to find the potentiality which is grounded in prime matter come into
potentiality, i.e., less mediately constitutive as form. (Conversely, the more numerous
the prior informations that stand "between" a substantial form and its matter, the more
"layers" of virtual presence that dispose the matter and thereby restrict or determine its
components but only into other elements, with minimal spatiotemporal continuity. Since
their changes are both substantial (precluding the continuity of an underlying subject, as
in local motion) and elementary (precluding the continuity afforded by the virtual-to-
265
real analogy of primitive forms in higher substantial changes), there is relatively little of
mative events at this level must have a correspondingly high degree of spatiotemporal
unpredictability.
And this is, of course, the hallmark of certain quantum events: considered indi-
vidually, they are highly indeterminate in the sense of resisting our predictions as to
when and how they will occur. Yet the statistical laws governing the occurrence of
In fact, both individual unpredictability and statistical laws are consonant with
necessarily low. But because every potency is a potency to some actuality, i.e., is not
general way, and here we invoke the fixity of probabilistic laws. The precisely defined
purely epistemological role in the Copenhagen interpretation beginning with Born. And
de Broglie and others sought to give it an ill-fated physical interpretation (the "pilot
had the advantage of aiming at scientific realism. But if we view continuous and dis-
266
than) probabilities can be seen as grounded, physically, in the relative absence of dispo-
. Uncertainty relations
Thus far I have suggested solutions to three aporiai, in what I take to be a natural onto-
logical order: (a) that of the wave-particle duality is referred to the substantial nature of
referred to the role of substantial form in those transitions, and (c) that of probability in
individual outcomes is referred to prime matter. Let us now turn to a fourth topic, that
of the Heisenberg uncertainty relation that obtains between conjugate quantum parame-
ters. This is one of the more problematic issues in quantum interpretation, if not for be-
ing intrinsically more difficult, at least for having led thinkers into the most varied, and
The centrality of the uncertainty problem was highlighted early on, as we have
tional and novel philosophical implication, seemingly of a piece with the more properly
scientific, but no less revolutionary, conclusions of quantum theory - and one to which
the positivism of the early quantum theorists left them vulnerable - uncertainty in
267
physical phenomena became an unabashedly philosophical issue. But the problem can
thus. Note that this would not mean that the problem is unreal; it would not entail rele-
is entirely possible in principle that our means of observing and measuring phenomena
at the quantum level are such that they inevitably disturb the system being measured.
In any event, opinion polarized toward more extreme views. For the Copenha-
interaction with quantum phenomena, but of quantum states themselves, which cannot
but be reflected in any attempt to perform measurements. For "hidden variables" theo-
rists, on the other hand, such an ontological uncertainty is anathema: they tend to be
convinced that a deeper level of quantum reality will restore deterministic intelligibility
On the basis of what has been said about elemental substantial being and the role
of quantum phenomena, but is due to the potential nature of the material substrate,
rather than to any indeterminateness in being fully constituted as such. Hence the great
268
With Bohr and his followers, the Aristotelian-Thomist can readily grant a meas-
ure of objective indeterminacy to being itself; this is the indeterminacy that underlies all
contingency and chance in the material world, but it is an indeterminacy that is mani-
fested only in becoming, not in being as such, and a fortiori there is no question of its
describing the reality. With Einstein and his allies, on the other hand, the realist phi-
losopher can as easily discern an objective "hiddenness" in nature; but since this is un-
derstood of the material principle, rather than of lower levels of actual being, it is a
hiddenness that is inevitable and insuperable. I propose, in brief, the following indica-
\ 7
b. observation determines reality d. reality hiddenfromobservation
in the literature of the subject, occur on what is to me an alien soil, the terra incognita
of post-Kantian philosophy; too often they are fueled, not by the data of quantum phys-
ics, but by the anti-metaphysical suppositions of quantum physicists. Here, at the epi-
center of the debate, I will simply invoke, as a most plausible foundation for the
between two quantum states. And I submit further that the uncertainty relation does not
govern pairs of variables which are both associated with a continuous mode, or both
associated with a discrete mode only, but only with pairs of which one member is asso-
ciated with the continuous and one with the discrete mode. But I have posited that con-
tinuous and discrete are related as substantial modes or even as distinct substances; and
hence they transform in ways characteristic of substantial change, with concomitant dis-
continuities and probabilities as noted above. It then becomes plausible to suppose that
through two slits. Traditionally this has not been considered problematic except in the
case of single photons. I submit that the only way to understand it aright is in the con-
text of photons acting singly. A single photon is often thought of as a finite bundle of
energy, but the language intimating particulateness should be reserved for those situa-
tions in which the particulate (highly localized) nature is in fact displayed. A light quan-
270
turn in transit, interacting with matter (e.g., double slits in an interferometer) in a non-
particulate way, manifests its discrete energy through its frequency, frequency being of
course a wave characteristic, and waves being extended phenomena which are capable
of interference. As a finite amount of radiant energy propagates toward and through the
double slits, it does what any wave is expected to do - it diffracts while passing through
the slits, and to some extent self-interferes on leaving them. And so a complex pattern
of wavelets is now heading for the recording apparatus ("screen"). There the wave is
atom, due to the physical nature of the recording. And the precise locus of the particu-
larization depends upon the quantitative characteristics of the incoming wave, the wave-
function familiar from quantum mechanics, in other words, but here given a purely
physical rather than probabilistic interpretation. In other words, the dynamics of the
wave unfolding through time are such that they entail a wide range of possible localiza-
tions - not because the particle "existed" in superposed states only to have one of these
cause the potential existence of the particle is predisposed by the actual characteristics
of the wave and how it interacts with the matter of the recording apparatus.
Since the wave represents a wide range of potential localizations, one cannot
say, from knowing the wave as such, precisely which localization will result. To the
extent that one knows the momentum, a continuous parameter of the wave as such, one
will not be able to anticipate the position of the particle when it is formed. Conversely,
one cannot say, from observing the locus of the resultant particle, what its momentum in
271
the wave mode is, or rather was. For there is no momentum associated with position as
such. Similar reasoning holds with respect to other conjugate variables, either directly
or indirectly: the knowledge of one variable precludes knowledge of the other, because
the one pertains to one mode and the other toward another mode of being, each standing
to the other as potency to act. The light wave is in potency (not is a potency, but has a
tion, as disposed or determined by the formed matter of the wave - is finite, and this
range is represented statistically by solutions of the wave equation. Given enough pho-
tons passing through the slits, more and more of the probabilities are statistically real-
ized and so the "interference pattern" builds up. Interestingly enough, the interference
screen), but only as statistically revealed. It remains to be seen whether theory will
eventually identify the mechanism whereby an extended entity in wave mode collapses
to this point and not some other. It would have to do, I believe, with the principle al-
luded to in Chapter 4, whereby an extended being acts as a whole within a more cir-
4
While on the topic, another example of the uncertainty relation: the length of time during
which an atom remains in the excited state before the electron drops to a lower level and a pho-
ton is released is related to the excitation energy of the electron. This energy is subject to tiny
variations, and the range of variation is related to the excitation time by Heisenberg's principle.
Again, the half-life of a radioactive particle, which is only an averaged lifetime of many similar
particles, is related by Heisenberg's principle to the mass of the particle, or rather to the varia-
tions in that mass.
272
Again, it is not our task to "do physics" here; but it can be noted in passing that
the quantitative form of the uncertainty relation, expressed in terms of Planck's constant
(the quantum of action), is a consequence and a sign of the quantization of energies and
analogous physical quantities. It stands to reason that since the elements exist under fi-
nite and quantified determinations, whether in particulate or extended mode, their recip-
Uncertainty, then, is posited, in accordance with what was said in the three pre-
versa, a reduction which in the nature of things must involve a range of possibilities
which are so many finite (quantifiable) expressions of the potentiality of the material
being. If my underlying assumption seems too bold, I only ask to see an instance of
such exhibiting discrete aspects. But such instances do not exist, however facile trans-
In closing this all too brief discussion I will emphasize that throughout I am talk-
ing of the potential aspects of actual being in virtue of its material principle. At no point
are we suggesting that prime matter has independent existence; anything whatsoever
that is spoken of in quantitative terms, however abstract, is by that token already forme d
matter (secondary matter): this would apply to fields, for instance, as well as to forces
and to wave phenomena. To refer once again to our concrete example, the light wave is
not the potentiality of'the localized energy of the atom, but an entity bearing that poten-
F. (Non)Iocality
It will be evident, from my thinking in the realist tradition of Aquinas and Aristotle, that
are philosophical anathema. At the same time, it is to be conceded that the Copenhagen
potentiality in nature. That same potentiality precludes, on the other hand, a "complete"
description of physical reality in the sense that Einstein and Bohm evidently wanted,
while the "hiddenness" of their hidden variables seems to be referable to matter prop-
erly understood.
In view of this proposed guide to a resolution of the dilemma that has polarized
should begin by noting that neither the Copenhagen theories (on epistemological princi-
ple), nor the hidden-variables theories (per Bell's theorem, with its apparent experimen-
tal confirmation) can be local theories as that term is commonly construed - i.e., as
expanse of space. I observe further, that neither the several quantum theories themselves
(so far as I am aware), nor the philosophical interpretation here being proposed, offers -
at least directly - a solution to the locality conundrum. But we can rule out one evident
extravagance, and eliminate also a couple of the leading "obstacles" to a nonlocal solu-
tion.
principle, whereby one spatially separated entity should be expected or even hypothe-
ity, we can still point to a couple of real weaknesses in the Einstein-Bohm rejection of
nonlocality. The first of these is primarily physical, though not without philosophical
implications, namely the question of the status of special relativity and thus in what
context the speed of light, c, really is a limiting velocity. A treatment of this problem is
beyond the scope of this dissertation; suffice it to say that, in the face of what appears to
be experimental support for quantum "entanglement" we cannot rule out the possibility
quantum system to another - again, on the supposition that such an influence would
have to be entirely physical in the sense of satisfying an exclusion principle, rather than
Secondly, and more in line with the analysis I have presented in Chapter Four,
the possibility must be entertained that any "quantum system," for example one consist-
ing of two entangled "particles," is arbitrarily larger than we are accustomed to think-
ing. That is to say, that on the hypothesis that entangled entities are more extended,
perhaps much more extended, than they have typically been supposed to be, their
275
"sphere of influence," or the region within which they can act instantaneously on each
tailed by the principles of material interaction set forth in Chapter Four. What we view
words, a local theory of interactivity, but it supposes that quantum entities are constitu-
tive in some way of what we call space, rather than merely existing therein. There is no
located in a relatively tiny region of space (e.g., the region in which a pointlike event is
recorded). This would be, not the quantum-mechanical "collapse of the wavefunction"
but a purely physical analogue - the localized effect of a materiated active principle
It may be added, that conceiving of quantum systems as thus extended into the
being collocal. The natural philosopher can establish the possibility of such existence; it
remains for the mathematical physicist to determine whether such a configuration ob-
tains in fact.
5
A fruitful field for Thomistic exploration remains the "holistic" conception of a physical uni-
verse actively unified through its conspatiality. Is the universe itself, after all, only a barely con-
nected "heap," a sorosl One need not embrace the diametrically opposite view of an organismic
cosmos in order to conceive the possibility of cosmic cause-effect relations on a scale un-
dreamed of by mechanistically-minded scientists and philosophers. Nor are the holistic implica-
tions for the metaphysics (and ultimately the theology) of human nature to be overlooked.
276
I am occupied in this study with a perspective on reality that, while already meaningful
after all, no radical break between the kinds of changes occurring in the quantum do-
main and those occurring at higher levels of cosmic structure. The principles of material
and corruptibility, all converging in the doctrine of matter as presented by Aristotle and
Aquinas, are wedded to the principles of elemental form, virtual presence, and disposi-
derstood as a principle of physical being rather than its actuality, one might reasonably
ity, which serves to condition every determination brought about through formal activ-
ity.
cosmic being; and physics, in the modern sense, is the quantitative study of that being.
Matter and form as such are not quantitative, but in cosmic being they are inevitably
associated with the quantitative, such that a close study of the quantitative provides a
real, though partial, insight into the essential natures, activities, and relations among
things. This quantitative insight becomes more problematic and less determinative as
277
the potential aspect of matter becomes more prominent, i.e., at ontological levels closer
to prime matter itself. Classical physics, in departing resoundingly from the Aristotelian
paradigm, lost a viable conception of existential potentiality and reduced matter to the
status of a basic "stuff," always and only actual, the elements being irreducible particles
of that stuff. Quantum physics has driven us back, once again, to embrace the concep-
put forward in Chapter Two. There I suggested that quantum physics has to do with en-
tities so close to the primordial level of physical being that their interactions are ordered
Thus expressed, I believe that all four causal elements of a complete definition
are present. The matter of the definition is "physical entities" (i.e., mobile being qua
mobile), and its formal specification is "primordial" - what I have elsewhere referred to
as the elementary or inflma level of structure. The efficient cause appears in the defini-
tion as "interacting," since it is only through interaction (always involving motion, and
indeed local motion) that physical entities fall under scientific consideration at all. And
because every change, quantum or otherwise, is ordered to an end and the end in this
case is, per my thesis, the realization of substantial rather than merely accidental form,
The material and efficient causes in this definition do not of themselves delimit
the subject matter of quantum physics. But the two essential-order causes, formal and
278
final (i.e., "elemental" and "substantial," as these terms are used in the definition), when
taken together, give us the aforementioned subject matter; and they point the way, in so
doing, to an understanding of what distinguishes quantum physics from its classical pre-
cursor.
In Chapter Two David Bohm's name was mentioned in connection with a realist (hid-
quantum physics and the philosophical interpretation thereof is much too great to be
dealt with adequately in these pages. But now that we are approaching the end of my
own attempt to highlight the relevance of matter as the potential aspect of cosmic being,
it will be appropriate to at least sketch Bohm's own handling of the idea of potentiality.
In his Quantum Theory, written just before he parted ways with the Kopenha-
gener Geist, Bohm used the term "potentiality" in a sense that seems easily reconciled
Although this sounds like Bohr's complementarity, it is rather less positivist in tone,
with its focus on the apparatus of observation instead of the act of observation. Indeed,
modes of being, is essentially akin to Bohm's in this respect. The Copenhagen influence
The quantum properties of the electron differ from those described in classical
theory not only in that they are latent potentialities, but also in that these poten-
tialities refer to developments, the precise outcome of which is not related
completely deterministically to the state of the electron before it interacts with
the apparatus....Thus, before the electron has interacted with a measuring appa-
ratus, the wave function defines two important kinds of probability; namely, the
probability of a given position and the probability of a given momentum. But
the wave function by itself does not tell us which of these two mutually incom-
patible probability functions is the appropriate one. This question can be an-
swered only when we specify whether the electron interacts with a position-
measuring device or with a momentum-measuring device. We conclude that, al-
though the wave function certainly contains the most complete possible de-
scription of the electron that can be obtained by referring to variables belonging
to the electron alone, this description is incapable of defining the general form
(wave or particle) in which the electron will manifest itself.7
Here we see an intimate dependence of the quantum system upon the macroscopic
measuring apparatus with which it happens to be interacting, such that the quantum sys-
upon it - not because they are measurements (the pure Copenhagen approach), but be-
6
David Bohm, Quantum Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1951), p. 132.
7
pp. 132f. Compare, inter alia, p. 385: "Thus, each observable has two aspects, since it may
exist either in a definite form or as an incompletely defined potentiality"; p. 415: "a quantum
system should be described in terms of incompletely defined potentialities, which are more
definitely realized only in interaction with appropriate external systems."
280
cause the macroscopic measuring apparatus is holistically bound up with the quantum-
would Bohm develop an approach based on hidden variables, through which the need of
quantum state, would be obviated. As of 1951, Bohm's idea of potentiality was still
such as to rule out hidden variables, on the premise that the latter are not "potentialities"
but actualities:
Wefirstnote that the assumption that there are separately existing and precisely
defined elements of reality would be at the base of any precise causal descrip-
tion in terms of hidden variables; for without such elements there would be
nothing to which a precise causal description would apply....Thus, the analysis
of the world into precisely defined elements and the synthesis of these elements
according to precise causal laws must stand or fall together.9
By the time his mature reflections on quantum reality had been incorporated into
The Undivided Universe, Bohm saw fit to make only glancing reference to his own
potentialities.10 The term "potentiality" appears but seldom in Undivided Universe, and
Bohm {op. cit., pp. 609f.) makes his objectivism clear: "a quantum-mechanical system can
produce classically describable effects, not only in measuring apparatus, but also in all kinds of
systems that are not actually being used for the purpose of making measurements. Thus, under
all circumstances, we picture the electron as something that is itself not very definite in nature
but that is continually producing effects which, whether they are actually observed by any hu-
man observers or not, call for the interpretation that the electron has a nature that varies in re-
sponse to the environment."
9
Bohm, p. 622f.
10
David Bohm and Basil Hiley, The Undivided Universe (London, 1993), p. 18. To a brief dis-
cussion of Heisenberg's idea we find appended - perhaps by Hiley, since the work appeared
after Bohm's death - the still briefer footnote: "This point of view was indeed proposed earlier
by Bohm," with a reference to his 1951 treatise.
281
Meanwhile, a third of a century after having made his own seminal contributions
to quantum theory, Werner Heisenberg - who had remained a proponent of the Copen-
hagen interpretation - penned some few but widely noticed remarks on the fruitfulness
physics.12 "The probability wave... .was a quantitative version of the old concept of 'po-
tween the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in
the middle between possibility and actuality."13 Heisenberg observed that the notion of
potentia is an entirely objective one, not dependent on the intervention of the observer
as such; for him, it enters nevertheless into the probability function as understood by the
Copenhagen theorists - along with a subjective element, just as it had for the early
Bohm. "The observation itself changes the probability function discontinuously; it se-
lects of all possible events the actual one that has taken place. Since through the obser-
vation our knowledge of the system has changed discontinuously, its mathematical
representation also has undergone the discontinuous change and we speak of a 'quan-
11
See for instance pp. 107f. Also p. 25: "It is true that in some sense, at least, the quantum of
action is neither divisible nor analysable at the level of the phenomena....Vrom this however it
does not follow that there is no more complete description perhaps at a deeper more complex
level in which this process can be treated as continuous and analysable."
12
Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science (New York, 1958), pp. 40f., 53f.,
147f., 160.
13
Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, p. 41.
282
turn jump.'" 14 Here we can see that the objective role of potentia is implicit in the no-
tion of "all possible events" - a range that is finite, not infinite. Thus far we can indeed
Heisenberg is no less correct in recognizing later that Aristotle's matter is "in it-
self not a reality but only a possibility, a 'potentia'; it exists only by means of form."15
But having come so tantalizingly close to a principle that could provide the solution to
dilemmas he discusses so lucidly, Heisenberg stops short of the full Aristotelian insight.
The problem with Heisenberg's formulation is that it does not sufficiently divest matter
standing for a wide range of entities precisely in their capacity of interacting with one
another. Hence "energy" seems very closely allied to "matter" in the sense in which I
use the term in these pages. But energy is quantifiable, while matter is not. "Energy,"
polyvalent concept that it is, denotes an actuality - even though its actuality is appre-
14
p. 54.
15
p. 147; cf. p. 148: "The matter of Aristotle is certainly not a specific matter like water or air,
nor is it simply empty space; it is a kind of indefinite corporeal substratum, embodying the pos-
sibility of passing over into actuality by means of the form." It is not clear whether Heisenberg
understands by "corporeal" here any degree of actuality at all - which would be inconsonant
with Aristotle rightly understood.
16
p. 160.
283
hended as a potentiality to some other actuality. It is, in a word, secondary matter, not
the "mere potentia" to which Heisenberg has been making reference. We may concede
that all elementary particles "are made of the same substance, which we may call en-
ergy" - but we are already at least one structural level above that of prime matter.
One need not make too much of Heisenberg's terminology; clearly he found Ar-
istotle's thought appropriately suggestive; but in any event he went no further with it
than my citations have indicated. Absent a more developed doctrine of form and the
several interwoven concepts that we have presented in Chapters Three and Four, Heis-
enberg could not have been in a position to make Aristotle's matter constitute an essen-
tial basis for understanding quantum phenomena, as being no different in kind (but only
Such is not the case for William A. Wallace, who since the 1960s has worked
fronts. In papers published a few years after Heisenberg's comments appeared, Wallace
Rephrasing Heisenberg's solution, one could say that the explanation of mas-
sive, kinetic, and electromagnetic phenomena, all of which may be regarded as
real, requires some underlying substrate or ultimate matter or protomatter that
itself is real but only in a potential way. This ultimate level of ontological depth
is, of course, unpicturable, unvisualizable, and unobservable. One might almost
say it is unintelligible, if by this is meant that it is in itself unintelligible and
only intelligible in terms of the various forms or determinations it can be made
to assume. Similarly, it is not existent in itself, and in this sense is not fully real
and actual, as are tables and chairs and other determinate objects.17
"Elementarity and Reality in Particle Physics," reprinted in From a Realist Point of View:
Essays on the Philosophy of Science, 2nd edition (Lanham, Md., 1983; this essay originally pub-
lished 1968), p. 204.
284
ity to the so-called elementary particles: "the forms or determinations that this proto-
matter can be made to assume are what we now know as elementary particles, and thus
they are a second-level manifestation of the basic elementarity that is protomatter it-
self."18 I submit that a qualification is in order, namely, that the term "particle," with its
we need not posit a mysterious coexistence of particle and wave, as long as the alternat-
ing-modes model has not been definitively ruled out. The foundational level of in-
The sense in which these are elementary or primary states of matter can be fur-
ther clarified by inquiring whether all the so-called elementary particles are
truly elementary or whether some are more fundamental than others. Heisen-
berg uses the term elementary to designate the primary manifestations of a ba-
sic potency represented by the psi-function. Thus he does not deny that
elementary particles can be divided. They can be divided, and still remain ele-
mentary, if the fragments into which they divide have characteristics similar to
their own, enabling these in turn to be called elementary particles. On this
broad interpretation, it is possible to refer to all the particles of which physicists
speak as truly elementary.19
the 1968 article I have cited, commented (letter to E. K. Gora, December 3, 1965) that
Loc. cit.
19
"Are Elementary Particles Real?" reprinted in From a Realist Point of View (this essay origi-
nally published 1964), p. 181. Wallace also cites V. Weisskopf, as distinguishing "between par-
ticles that represent fundamental states of matter and those that are named particles but are in
reality field quanta. The most familiar field quantum is the photon. Just as this is the light quan-
tum of the electromagnetic field, so Weisskopf identifies the pi-meson and the k-meson as
quanta of the nuclear field. He also suspects, somewhat along the lines suggested by Heisen-
berg, that underlying both is something different from the particle and from the field. This he
describes as 'some new thing, which is as farfromthefieldas the field isfromthe particle, con-
sequently something new, but that embraces the whole'," loc. cit.
285
"I have read the manuscript of Father Wallace's lecture with interest, and have not
really felt any need for serious protest." But he added that "neither my studies of Aris-
totle nor of Aquinas have been thorough enough to permit me the formulation of a well-
For Wallace, the discussion of potentiality was situated in the context of chart-
ing a realist course between the extremes of neo-empiricism on the one hand, with its
data,"21 and a strong realism such as that of N. R. Hanson, for whom every physical ac-
tuality could only find explanation in some other order of physical actuality.22 It is my
hope that the present study will in some small way advance Wallace's basic insight and
conviction concerning the relevance of a realist doctrine of nature to the fuller under-
W. Smith's The Quantum Enigma is perhaps the most sustained effort since Bohm's to
re-interpret quantum physics in terms of ontology, rather than "mere" (and therefore
more or less positivistic) epistemology. This book has the merit, which Bohm's work
20
Cited in an Appendix to Wallace, "Elementarily and Reality," p. 208.
21
Op. cit., p. 185.
22
Op. cit., pp. 190-2. On his "dematerialization" thesis - which seems sound in so far as it dis-
cerns the need of avoiding circularity in explaining features of physical entities, but (I believe)
goes too far in refusing to acknowledge any univocity between the macroscopic and micro-
scopic domains - see N. R. Hanson, "The Dematerialization of Matter," Philosophy of Science
29 (1962): 27-38.
286
however, Smith also blends in ideas from what appear to be the phenomenological as
well as Platonic traditions; and we shall find him less than entirely Thomistic as he
of Smith's thought; but I came to realize that his contribution is better viewed in con-
trast to what I am attempting. Still, given the significance of that contribution and the
Smith begins from the "startling fact.. .that every quantum-reality position thus
far enumerated hinges upon one and the same ontological presupposition," namely the
Cartesian division of the world into res externa and res cogitans, with implications
must pave the way to a solution of the quantum-reality problem, which is "beyond
doubt the most universally significant question hard science has ever posed."24
For Smith, removal of the Cartesian dichotomy will take the form of a holistic
terms (which he does not always use consistently), the form of things really is grasped
by the knowing intellect.25 Since the res externa can no longer be treated, in virtue of
23
Wolfgang Smith, The Quantum Enigma: Finding the Hidden Key (Peru, 111., 1995), pp. If.
24
Smith, Quantum Enigma, pp. i-iii. "At the top of the list of 'strange facts' that demand an ex-
planation stands the phenomenon of state vector collapse, which could be well be termed the
central enigma of quantum physics," p. ii.
25
Op. cit., pp. 14f.: "In the perceptual act the image is viewed, not as image, but as a part or
aspect of the object; it is seen, in other words, as something that belongs to the object....We
have as a rule forgotten that there is an intelligence which is intuitive, direct and instantaneous
287
mane and indeed essential to recognize, within the order of objects themselves {res ex-
tensae), a different and most significant dichotomy. Thus Smith will distinguish, in
order to unite, the "corporeal world" of direct perception and the "physical universe"
tion" of an associated physical object, and emphasizes that scientific observation is con-
cerned with correspondences between the two.27 "There can be no knowledge of the
physical domain without presentation - even as there can be no knowledge of the corpo-
real world in the absence of sense perception."28 As for the "resemblance" - what might
also be called the analogy - between the two, i.e., the connection that will obviate a new
i.e., the evident fact that what is perceived and what submits to scientific measurement
in its operation, an intelligence which has no need for dialectic or discursive thought, but flies
straight to the mark like an arrow; and much less do we realize that this high and forgotten fac-
ulty - which the ancients termed 'intellect' - is operative and indeed plays the essential role in
the act of sense perception."
26
"It appears as though physics, at long last, has broken through to its own fundamental level; it
has discovered what I shall henceforth term the physical universe - a world that seems to defy
some of our most basic conceptions. It is a world (if we may call it such) that can be neither per-
ceived nor imagined, but only described in abstract mathematical terms." Wolfgang Smith,
"From SchrQdinger's Cat to Thomistic Ontology," The Thomist 61 (1999): 49-63, cited text p.
51. Cf. Smith, Quantum Enigma, p. 25: "Strictly speaking, no one has ever perceived a physical
object, and no one ever will." An apple, for example, "is once again recognized as an external
object. That perceptible entity, moreover, is to be distinguished from what may be called the
'molecular apple,' a thing that, clearly, cannot be perceived, but can be known only through the
methods of physics." "From Schrodinger's Cat," p. 56.
27
Quantum Enigma, pp. 27-30.
28
p. 31.
288
can be shown to occupy one and the same space.29 The spatial connection does not suf-
fice, however; "the very apprehension of the model or representation entails a certain
intellective insight, and thus involves the intellect" - in a way often singled out, I might
physical object, i.e. the direct inference from mathematical entity to physical entity, "is
ously projects sensible qualities into a domain where such qualities have no place. In a
confounds the physical with the corporeal plane."31 This illegitimate reification "was
rife throughout the Newtonian era," and it is one of Smith's main contentions that ex-
cessive reification of mechanical models (as opposed to a necessary and fruitful use of
those models as models) became a habit of scientific thought that still remains to be
shaken of, if we are to gain insight into the mysteries of the quantum realm. By virtue of
tured as waves. Consequently they cannot be pictured at all - and this is precisely what
puzzles us....It has yet to be recognized that there is an ontological difference between
the physical and the corporeal domains, and that the gap cannot be closed through the
29
pp. 3If.
p. 35.
31
pp. 37f.
32
pp. 4If.
289
which I shall turn in a moment. But it is relevant to ask here: is his distinction between
the perceived and the measured - between corporeal and physical reality - as essential
as he would make it? Granted, that the reality contemplated by physics is radically be-
yond our powers of sense-perception, and can only be indirectly attained through in-
struments which serve as a sort of bridge between sensible and insensible; I do not see
that this line of demarcation can be considered as other than accidental or relative in
nature. That is to say, that even a permanent direct inaccessibility of the "physical uni-
verse" to our senses, operating as they do on the "corporeal" plane, does not entail an
ontological divide between "physical" and "corporeal" - any more than would exist,
say, because someone's eyes were so hypersensitized to light that he must always view
the world through a dark filter and learn to make appropriate "corrections" to the altered
sense data thereby received. The use of instruments in physical science accomplishes
two things: it extends the natural range of the senses within a given qualitative order
(e.g., the use of optical equipment to gather more light and provide magnification), and
it "translates" other qualitative aspects of being that elude primary sensibility into sec-
ondary manifestations that can be sensed (e.g., the use of Geiger counters to "detect"
radiation via its effects). The relation between the quantitative and qualitative is not
simply that between what is measurable and what is not, but between one aspect of the
Smith's duality, though it is not the bifurcating one of Cartesianism, and indeed
is posited against the latter, is nonetheless a duality which is overcome only in and
290
qualitative (which is measured) and the quantitative (which is only inferred). It is our
contention, in a more Aristotelian vein, that this appeal to the measurement process is
not necessary in order to maintain a unity of sensible and physical experience: that a
primitive "physical" (i.e. quantitative) experience is already occurring when one "sees "
the difference in speed of two moving objects, ox feels the difference in heft (mass) of
two bodies, and that the corporeal-physical dichotomy should rather be drawn in terms
of a proportion, or lack thereof, between the range of physical objects and the functional
To return, then, to an area of physics where Smith expects his dichotomy to shed
the most light: his argument in Chapter III, "Microworld and Indeterminacy," begins
For example, it is by no means the case that the electron is sometimes a particle
and sometimes a wave, or that it is somehow particle and wave at once, or that
it "jumps" erratically from point to point, and so on. For indeed, this kind of
"quantum strangeness" stems quite simply from a failure to distinguish between
the microsystem as such and its observables (the electron, in this instance, and
its position, momentum, and other dynamic variables). In effect, one treats the
latter as classical attributes of the electron, which they are not, and cannot be.
Or to put it another way, one spuriously projects the results of distinct and in-
terfering measurements upon the electron itself, which consequently seems to
combine logically incompatible attributes. It is thus that the electron may ap-
pear to be both wave and particle, or to engage in a regimen of "jumping"
which does indeed defy comprehension. One could say that this kind of "quan-
tum strangeness" results from an uncritical and spurious realism - a realism
which in effect confounds the physical and corporeal planes.33
pp. 48f.; cf. "From Schrodinger's Cat," p. 57: "What is special about measurement is the fact
that it realizes an ontological transition from the physical to the corporeal domain....State vector
collapse is inexplicable on a physical basis because it resultsfromthe act of a corporeal entity."
291
The indeterminacy of quantum phenomena, then, arises from the juxtaposition (effected
through observation) of physical and corporeal domains. As for the former, so far from
by the Schrodinger equation itself: "To be precise, it is the Schrodinger equation that
As Smith develops his analysis, it is evident that he places much weight on the primor-
There are, then, these two ontological planes, and there is a transitionfromthe
physical to the corporeal resulting in the collapse of the state vector. The col-
lapse, one could say, betokens - not an indeterminism on the physical level -
but a discontinuity, precisely, between the physical and the corporeal planes.35
The first thing to note in this analysis is its startling concession of the reality of quan-
Smith's solution to the conundrum thus posed is to identify the reality of superposition
with that of potentia, thereby wedding ontology and mathematical physics. But it will
not do; the invocation of Aristotle is premature. First of all, the very determinacy im-
such. In other words, eigenstates are themselves quantitatively determinate: at most they
which are actually formal in character, and not to matter (potentia) as such. Secondly,
even if we see in his use of the term "measurement" the purely objective connotation of
the "collapse of the state vector" to situations involving measurement. (Here we are
back to my earlier criticism, that the boundary between sensible and measurable is in-
correctly drawn by Smith.) Even less satisfactory is Smith's remark that we "do not
know" how the transition from potential to actual comes about. Not that one can rea-
this point stems from his view that the potency which is being realized in the act of
other words, it is a potency, as he elsewhere makes clear, on the part of that which is
nothing in the state vector itself that could explain or account for this determi-
native act....[T]he transition from potency to actuality requires invariably a
creative act - a creative flat, one could say - which nothing in the domain of
potency can account for or explain. Nothing within the physical plane, there-
fore, could cause a state vector to collapse - distressing as this fact may be to
those who imagine that there is nothing beyond the physical.39
I fail to see the cogency in this. Granted that no potency explains its own actualization,
and that quantum mechanics cannot be expected to include, any more than any other
physical theory could include, a description of efficient causality as such (since efficient
studied in physics), it seems all too apparent that "state vector collapse" can be (and
laboratory or on the other side of the galaxy far from any human intervention, one out
39
Quantum Enigma, pp. 57f.
294
causalities, to actuality. There is hardly a need to move conceptually from the efficient
Smith appears to have absorbed that very preoccupation with the subject, or inability to
consider physical phenomena in abstraction from the act of observation, that character-
izes the Copenhagen theorists he set out to criticize; I shall return to this in a moment.
What I am saying of Smith, it will be evident, applies no less to Heisenberg (with whose
Furthermore: there is no compelling basis for relating Smith's physical and cor-
poreal domains as potency and actuality respectively. They can be so related only with
reference to an observing subject, and this is not the basis on which Aristotle distin-
guishes potential from actual in physics. Smith rightly opposes himself to Heisenberg's
view that (as Smith puts it) "the transition from the 'possible' to the 'actual' is effected
simply by the 'physical act of observation'" - since this forces Heisenberg "to conclude
Speaking of the paradigmatic wave-particle transition, Smith says ("From Schrodinger's Cat,"
p. 53): "Prior to this interaction, the particle will in general be in a superposition state involving
multiple positions; we must think of it as spread out over some region of space....At the mo-
ment of impact, however, this deterministic Schrodinger evolution is superseded by another
quantum-mechanical law, a so-called projection, which singles out one of the positions repre-
sented in the given superposition state - apparently for no good reason! - and instantly assigns
the particle to the chosen location....It is as though the trajectory of the particle, let us say, were
suddenly altered without an assignable cause."
41
Quantum Enigma, pp. 63f.: "Thus far Heisenberg's position and my own appear to be very
close indeed - to the point of being indistinguishable. Is not Heisenberg's 'world of potentia'
tantamount to the microworld, as I have conceived of it? And his realm of 'things and facts' to
what I term the corporeal world?" "Upon closer examination, however, a major difference
comes into view. The crux of the matter is this: In the philosophy of Heisenberg we find no
sharp distinction between the physical universe on a macroscopic scale and the corporeal world,
properly so called. The distinction between the world of potentia and the actual world must con-
sequently be understood in terms of size or scale alone....I maintain that the descent from actu-
ality to potency takes place already on a macroscopic level: it takes place the moment we pass
from a corporeal object X to its associated subcorporeal object SX....This is just the crucial
point, to say it once more: SX exists as a potency, whereas X exists as a 'thing or fact.'"
295
that the physical act cannot explain the so-called collapse of the state vector; for this he
needs to bring 'the mind of the observer' into the picture:"42 but Smith's distinguishing
point: not in the act of observing, but in the definition of the observable as such. Physi-
cal is in potency to corporeal because the quantitative as such is in potency to the sensi-
In Chapter IV Smith pursues this line of thought further and observes that "we
have been led to distinguish between the physical and the corporeal planes; and now, it
seems, a third ontological stratum has come into view - which in fact appears to be
more fundamental, more basic than the two aforementioned planes [since it grounds the
unity between them]. What, then, is the nature of this third domain?"43
In the conviction that we are looking "beyond the space-time continuum" to find
the fundamental domain we seek, Smith cites the nonlocality implied in entanglement
everything points to the fact that a particle cannot be fully known by empirical
means....a particle may transcend its manifested locus, and thus its phenomenal
identity as well. In a word, there may be more to the particle than meets the sci-
entific eye - and by the same token, more than can be made to fit into a four-
dimensional continuum. I should make it clear, however, that what stands at is-
sue here is not the dimensionality of the containing manifold, but the absolute-
ness or relativity of containment itself....It boils down to this: Nature, though
not spatio-temporal in its own right, presents itself as spatio-temporal under ob-
servation.44
p. 68
296
"thing" in its own right, though it is known "by way of the spatio-temporal universe."45
After reminding us that these last are related as the physical and the corporeal
respectively, Smith completes his Aristotelian analysis with an analogy between physi-
cal/corporeal and matter/form. It is this analogy which had earlier led him to posit the
act of measurement (i.e., that whereby the physical is rendered corporeal) as an actuali-
zation. Now he can (rightly) conclude that, inasmuch as the corporeal is concerned with
the qualitative, and therefore with form or essence as such (since the category of quality
is radicated ex parte formae), the Cartesian bifurcation can be seen most ominously as a
With all this I stand in agreement. I find Smith's analysis in places difficult of
access; working from the standpoint of the mathematical physicist, he seems to have
presented Smith's argument at length to better enable the reader to see if I will have
done justice to it, when I say that it falters earlier, in regard to its assessment of the
45
p. 71. The physical object as such is "a particular manifestation of the total reality," ibid.
46
p. 78. In adding that "Nature, thus, turns out to be a materia quantitate signata" (ibid.), Smith
is careful to note that his use of this term is not precisely that of Aquinas.
297
\ T
quantitative (theoretical) = "physical"
\ Nature /
(Form - Matter)
Here I try to indicate that, while Smith understands (with Aristotle and Aquinas) that
the qualitative and quantitative are grounded in the formal and material aspects, respec-
tively, of underlying substance or "Nature" (thin arrows), he also wants to have the
quantitative and qualitative ordered as potency and act, and to be realized as such in the
cognitive act (that would be the positivist-Copenhagen interpretation), but because the
text entails, by nature (although somewhat mysteriously) a transposition from one onto-
logical plane to another - from that which we can only infer to that which we sense
directly.
that the superposition of eigenstates stands for all possible localizations of that which
cannot be observed to be other than in one location. Wresting, in the spirit of Heisen-
298
berg and others, the wave-particle duality unto some semblance of intelligibility without
giving up the simultaneous reality of the wave and particle aspects - and compounding,
laudably enough, his difficulties by refusing to walk with Heisenberg down the path of
raw subjectivism, Smith locates the "hidden key" to understanding the quantum enigma
And this is where I cannot follow him; for the ontological relation of quantita-
tive to qualitative - despite their being radicated in matter and form respectively - is not
such that the one stands in potency to become the other, but rather that the one is recep-
tive of the other in the simultaneity of their composition. It is not a dynamic ordering,
but a constitutive one; not like the potency-act relation that obtains between, say, a fac-
ulty and its exercise, but like that which obtains between an essence and its existence.
Quantity does not pre-exist the qualities that manifest it - but this is exactly what Smith,
it seems to me, is driven to say. No wonder that he must express puzzlement as to how
the manifestation comes about in the process of measurement, i.e., in the projection of
Smith's understanding comes close to that presented earlier in this thesis; but the
differences are significant. It will be recalled that I conceive the continuous and discrete
aspects of quantum reality to be related to one another as potency and act only in the
sense that either can transform, elementally or quasi-elementally, into the other, as their
respective material principles subject them to the activity of other hylomorphic entities,
299
and the dispositiones of their matter (i.e., forms virtually present in them) condition
them toward one transformation or another. On my reading there need be, and perhaps
can be, no "more" of inherent potentia in the continuous than there is in the discrete
manifestations of quantum reality (we must not, in other words, allow the purely
ous and discrete are relative and not absolute, there being no such thing as a discrete
does not "privilege" either complementary aspect, as Smith's seems to do. Both aspects
being. The unobservability of the one in comparison to that of the other is a matter only
In summary, then: while following Heisenberg's lead in supposing a role for Ar-
istotelian potentia, and agreeing in considerable measure with Wolfgang Smith who has
position, I submit nonetheless that we can make even better sense of the quantum world
a dynamism that pre-exists all our attempts to observe and measure it.
J. Conclusion
matter not only as consistent and insightful in its own right, but as fruitful with respect
300
matter" at the elemental level will exhibit more strongly those characteristics grounded
in prime matter itself, potentia pura, should inspire confidence in the intelligibility of
and spatiality, and even of intelligibility, enables us to apprehend the fabric of spatio-
temporal being as entirely causal, even if it is not - contra the presumptions of earlier
Given the impossibility of void, and the constitution of cosmic "space" as materialized
being in its extended totality, I offer an argument concerning its own boundary. To
begin with, the Aristotelian-Thomistic argument against an infinite space will be seen to
Some have tried to draw the same conclusion from the standpoint of quantitative
physics: the mass of the universe, it is said, must be either finite or infinite. But if the
mass is infinite, then the net gravitational potential must be infinite, contrary to
experience. If the mass is finite, then the net gravitational potential, in a Newtonian
(Euclidian) universe, must be such that all the mass of the universe would be collapsed
in the center, again contrary to experience. Finally, in the finite but unbounded universe
of Einstein and Minkowski, this paradox would be resolved through the peculiarities of
All three conclusions, however plausible, suffer from defects proper to the order
of mobile being as such. For given the possibility (not ruled out by physics) of a
universe of finite age, there may not have accrued enough time for the gravitational
potential to have "reached" infinity (under the first scenario) or to have effected the
collapse of the universe (second scenario). As for the third conclusion, it suffers from
the fallacy of reification of a purely geometrical order of being and drawing from it
1
See Chapter Four, Section H.
2
See, inter alia, Stanley Jaki, The Paradox ofOlbers' Paradox.
301
conclusions of physical significance. The fact that Riemannian geometry may be most
convenient for the description of spacetime in relativistic cosmology does not mean that
spatiality, the extendedness of cosmic being, is in fact other than what it appears
Here is a different approach. The sum total of cosmic being is finite, and this
means, in accordance with the very nature of spatiality, that it has finite dimensions.
The boundary of the cosmos will be "where" dimensionality ceases. (The universe, of
course, cannot really have a place, a "surrounding body," since it includes every body.)
cannot be nothing, "nothing" being an ens rationis. Therefore it is something. But since
logical standpoint this could be angelic (separate) substance. Thus far the philosopher
Even armed with the philosophical conclusions that the universe depends upon a
creative cause "which all men call God," I do not see how we can conclude that this
First Cause is what constitutes the delimitation of the physical order. It seems that the
cosmos could terminate "in" angelic being, even as both the material and the immaterial
302
are created and conserved in being by God, angels not being implicated in the creative
activity.
But it is surely intriguing that, as man extends his vision further and further into
space, and so (it would seem) draws ever closer to the boundary thereof, he
coming from those cosmic depths with finite velocity - is "taken" further and further
into the past, perceiving an ever younger cosmos. Any "line of sight," speaking loosely,
which thus takes the observer further into the distance and into the past must, in
"furthest" in both space and time. This ne plus ultra of cosmological penetration, the
point where matter and time end - or, seen in the perspective of coming-to-be, begin -
seems readily identifiable with the creation point, creation being the moment in which
the universe comes to be, a boundary between its non-existence and its existence. But
again, to conclude that, at this boundary between cosmic being and non-being, one
necessarily encounters God (in the creative moment) rather than finite immaterial
substance (as somehow present at the creative moment) is more than I am prepared to
say.
3
Paradoxically, the further we see "out" in every direction, the smaller the universe we are
seeing; the cosmic expansion, an expansion of spatial being as such (not of "things in space"), is
extrapolated backward to a singularity, a dimensionless point.
303
Appendix 2: On Matter's Place in a Larger Scheme
of Ontological Principles
I here introduce a schema collating the various principles of hylomorphic being - those
which are called causes and those which are not - in order to situate matter as
are readily divided into intrinsic and extrinsic, and cross-divided into essential-order
and existential-order causes. (This division is not affected by variations in how the
Extrinsic Intrinsic
The placing of form as an essential cause, and agent as existential cause, should not
occasion controversy among Thomists. The other two placements are validated thus, [a]
The end, even considered as forma ad quern, is nonetheless extrinsic to the being of
which it is the final cause, considered not absolutely but in fieri (i.e., as constituted hie
et nunc)} [b] As discussed in Chapter Three, matter, though no more "existential" than
form considered with reference to the existential act that is distinguished from essence
1
Deprincipiis naturae 3: "Materia et forma dicuntur intrinsece rei eo quod sunt partes
constituentes rem, efficiens et finalis dicuntur extrinsece, quia sunt extra rem" (Leon. 43.42:48-
51).
304
at the foundational ontological level, is, considered within the hylomorphic essence and
constitutes, not the intelligible determination but the existential condition thereof -
namely, the dynamic, mediately dependent, and contingent mode of existing peculiar to
Now there are other principles of hylomorphic being which, though entering into
the Thomistic metaphysical analysis, have been called "cause" either problematically or
not at all. One of these, privation, was distinguished by Aristotle from the properly
causal principles of nature on the basis of functioning per accidens while they (matter
and form) are per se principles of change. Another principle, whose "causal" status has
been much debated, is the exemplar which Aquinas readily adopts from Neoplatonic
thought. Then there is esse itself, surely not to be denied the status of "principle of
there is the active potency in the agent, a principle that must be distinguished from, as it
My thesis is a simple one: I offer a schema in which each of the four Aristotelian
causes (to which all other causes are reducible), together with each of these four non-
accomplish this all eight principles are unified, even as they are divided, by three
divisions, and a third one according to being and becoming. This latter principle of
305
division is warranted on the basis of the discernment, in our intellectual apprehension of
being, of principles which are not present across the whole range of finite being but
Taking all three pairings into account we find that they constitute a symmetrical
"eightfold way." There are far too many interrelations among the eight principles to
include within the compass of a single diagram, but I hope the fruitfulness of such a
diagram, with respect to the ordered analysis of cosmic being, will be evident:
Extrinsic Intrinsic
Existential:
of being EFFICIENT esse
Essential:
The role of the three principles of division, cross-dividing the eight principles, can be
in all three dimensions, yielding eight smaller cubes. Those on the upper half, say, can
be represented as intrinsic, those on the lower half as extrinsic; those on the right half as
existential, those on the left half as essential; and those on the front half as referred to
Among the aporiai which call for resolution in the presentation of such a
schema are: Why are four, or five (if we count the exemplar) of these eight principles
306
traditionally called causes? Can the designation "cause" apply properly to any of the
Aquinas defines cause as "a per se principle of the existence of a thing." His
definition can be validated in all its parts by dialectical investigation; that is, the
these parts. They are, in fact, the causal elements of the very definition of "cause":
Now each of the four traditional causes answers to all four notae of the
definition. Each is a cause through its own quasi-essence, not in virtue of something
else with which it is associated. Each is a principle contributing to existence, rather than
existence itself. Each is a factor with reference to the esse immediately, not merely with
each is (analogously) a cause with respect to the thing itself, not through some other
thing.
How do the other four principles fall short of this full definition of cause? Again
very briefly, I note that: privation, as Aristotle argued, is not a per se principle; esse is
not a principle of existence, but existential act itself; the exemplar is not directly
referred to the existence of the thing caused, but only indirectly through form's
participation in it; and active potency in the agent is not referred directly to the thing
2
De principiis naturae, 18: "causa dicitur solum de illo primo, ex quo consequitur esse
posterioris."
307
caused, but to some other thing that could supplant it in existence. Thus each of the four
non-causal principles, as I am calling them, falls short with respect to one of the
number of times he discusses this principle in his works. A full defense of my position
would entail showing that, inter alia, [1] "cause" is used with analogical flexibility in
Aquinas's lexicon, as evidenced by his describing the exemplar now as formal, now as
final cause - when these causes clearly have different rationes in his most formal
discourse; and [2] some of the texts about the exemplar refer to a principle that is causal
I leave it to the reader to trace the many reciprocal relationships that clamor for
attention in the diagram here presented. The fuller development of this schema and the
symmetrical relations implied in it can only shed further light on the nature of causality
and the interconnections among all the great metaphysical principles - to say nothing of
308
Appendix 3: Materiality and Temporality
well as accidentally)1 through interaction with other finite beings, then it need not fol-
morphic being exists in such a way that its being is not fully present to itself, but is dis-
tended, through imperfect actualization, in what we know as time. But the ratio of
can exist in substantial dependence upon the causality of other finite beings, without
such dependence being constituted through the "act of the potential as such" that de-
fines change or coming-to-be. The universe as constituted in the present instant is the
result of all the motion that has characterized it from the beginning; could that instant be
frozen, all the relations of causality that presently obtain in time would still obtain in
Such considerations take on more than abstract significance in view of the ques-
tion, why is there a temporal order? What could temporal succession add to the brute
1
1 say "substantially as well as accidentally" because the Angels or separate substances, accord-
ing to Aquinas, exist with accidental dependence upon one another: they mediate knowledge,
and thus accidental perfections, in hierarchical order to one another. But material beings come
to be and pass out of being not only with respect to accidents but also in their substantial whole-
ness through the causal action of other beings - certainly material beings, and perhaps angelic
as well. Man, of course, is a special case inasmuch as he possesses an immortal form. The
Church teaches that each human soul is a direct creation, not educed from pre-existing matter.
309
materiality of the cosmos? It does not enrich the being of a material thing to be "dis-
tended" through time; no ontological advantage accrues to the thing itself, nor (adopting
a theological perspective) would there seem to be, from the standpoint of the Creator,
summary existence in the moment - all is present to God. He knows the material being
no less fully, in the eternal creative instant, than he knows the immaterial and atempo-
ral.
The irrational creature, not knowing itself intellectually, cannot compare itself
through time, and therefore knows itself neither as imperfect nor as perfect. But with
man the case is different. For man, possessed of an intellectual principle which tran-
scends the material order, possesses an awareness of being, including his own, which
takes into account not only the present but also the past and (contingently) the future; so
that he can act with reference to not only the present, but also the past and (contin-
gently) the future. So while God knows man and all creatures fully in their ultimate re-
alization, and while irrational creatures know themselves not at all, man knows himself
- yet, in statu viae, only as imperfectly realized, through a comparison that takes into
account past and future as well as present. It is precisely through knowing himself as
imperfect (ontologically imperfect, even before moral imperfection enters the scene)
that man acts toward his own perfection, consonant with his possessing intellect and
will. And corollary to this is that the cosmic order of flux and temporality is constituted
as that whereby man's self-perfection occurs. In other words, the temporal order of be-
ing is that manifestation of the material (and spatial) order of being whereby man's
310
spiritual nature, his intellect and will, perfect (or fail to perfect) themselves, under di-
vine agency. More briefly still: the cosmos is spatiotemporal for the sake of man's self-
perfective activity. I leave it to the theologians to consider whether time will exist in "a
new heaven and a new earth," i.e., whether matter will remain as a principle of corrup-
311
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