LIMITED VS TOTAL WAR

Wednesday, March 06, 2013 Filed

in: Causes, Practices & Effects of War
The concept of limited war can best be understood by the conditions
set by the belligerents in defining the scope and scale of the conflict.
In this context, the Korean War can be identified as a limited war
because both sides were limited by either their own political/economic
constraints or by the constraints placed upon them by their partner.
We can best identify the limited nature of the Korean War from three
perspectives: military commitment, political/economic commitment
and objectives.

While the Soviet supported North may have been committed to

waging an all out war against the American supported South, they
could hardly claim the same level of commitment from their allies.
Stalin supported the Northern invasion of the South but only under
certain conditions, one of which was the promise of Chinese support.
Stalin was not prepared to commit the Soviet Union to yet another
drawn out struggle only five years after the Patriotic War that had all
but devastated the Soviet Union. Soviet military commitment took the
form of mostly World War II surplus weapons and a few military
advisors to provide moral and tactical support to the North. Stalin was
more focused on events in Europe and was also unwilling to widen
the conflict beyond the borders of the Korean peninsula. The only
significant exception to this model of support was the Soviet provision
of high performance Mig 15 fighters to the conflict. Most North Korean
air defenses were manned by Russian pilots however, Stalin was not
prepared to throw wave upon wave of Red Army recruits into land
battles against the American supported South. The inclusion of Mig air
defenses are better understood as a Soviet training ground for jet
tactics under extreme combat conditions.
American military commitment was also limited by a variety of factors,
not least of which was the fact that the Americans had dramatically
reduced their available forces after World War II. On the surface the
Americans appear to have a stronger military commitment to the
Korean conflict by virtue of the numbered of ground forces made
available for the war. Despite this fact, president Truman offers clear
evidence that he was unwilling to expand the war into China thereby
escalating matters, when he fired Douglas Macarthur from his
command position. This move alone offers excellent evidence
that the American strategy was not a crusade against all communism
in Asia but rather a focused response of "containment" limited to the
Korean peninsula. Truman's refusal to allow bombing raids to cross
the vital Yalu River border placed firm military and strategic limitations
on his own options.

Within the political/economic spheres, neither side was willing to

engage in the rigors of a total war. From the perspective of the Soviet
Union, the Korean War might serve as a diversion and one which
would drain American resolve in the pacific region but the Soviets
could ill afford a prolonged engagement at the expense of rebuilding
their own nation and controlling their European satellites. The
Americans too faced a political dilemma at home in a number of
areas. Few Americans felt the sense of immediate threat from the
spread of communism in Korea and there were few parallels to the
war with Japan. Americans were tired of conflict. At the same time,
the Americans were facing a growing tide of unrest at home with the
beginnings of a strong civil rights movement. The preservation of
South Korean independence might be a worthwhile endeavor but an
all out Asian war was not a serious option. For both sides, the Korean
War could serve as a proxy war that would limit competing ambitions.

The Chinese too, were hardly in a position to fight an all out assault
on American power in the region. While geography favored China in
the Korean peninsula, the Chinese actions prevented further
significant developments in their plans to "liberate" Taiwan. Also, the
Chinese may have been able to drive the Americans from continental
mainland of Asia but they had neither the economic nor military
strength to remove America from Japan. Their commitment of
significant ground forces was grist for their own rhetorical mill but
otherwise did not provide China with significant political or economic
advantage.

The final aspect of the Korean conflict that firmly establishes it as a

limited war is the question of objectives. For both sides, the scope and
scale of the war was limited to the Korean peninsula. Neither the
Soviets nor Americans were willing to expand the ideological
battleground to their respective European spheres of influence.
Instead they were both satisfied to maintain a strategic remove from
the battleground. China too may have played a more intense game of
rhetoric but China was unwilling to encourage an American invasion
of their mainland. The result was a resolution without solution. Unlike
the previous war in which unconditional surrender was the only
available option, the Korean War found its resolution in the
reestablishment of status quo ante.

Despite it's longterm repercussions, the Krean War serves as an

excellent example of Cold War maneuvering and proxy warfare in the
interest of avoiding greater all out war.