Franklin Drilon, Oscar Franklin Tan - Essays On Congress' and The President's Duty To Interpret The Constitution (2014)

PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL
Congress Duty to Interpret the Constitution

The 2004 Canvass: It is Emphatically
Judging Congress the Province and Duty of Congress to
on Congress duty to interpret the Constitution
Published 79 PHIL. L.J. 35 (2004) Say What Congress Is
on Congress duty to interpret the Constitution
A Foreword by Franklin M. Drilon Published 79 PHIL. L.J. 39 (2004)
Senate President (2000; 2001-2006; 2013-2016) First Place, 2004 Philippine Law Journal Examinations
Chair, Liberal Party First Awardee, Violeta Calvo-Drilon-ACCRALAW
Editor, PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL (1968) Scholarship for Legal Writing
Third Place, Philippine Bar Examinations (1969) First Two-Time Awardee, Justice Irene R. Cortes Prize for
Bachelor of Laws, University of the Philippines (1969) Best Paper in Constitutional Law
How the President and Congress Resist Judicial Review

The New Philippine Separation of Powers: Guarding the Guardians:
How the Rulemaking Power Addressing the Post-1987
May Expand Judicial Review Into True Imbalance of Presidential Power
Judicial Supremacy and Judicial Review
on the invisible expansion of the Supreme Courts powers on the limits of judicial review of the President
Published 83 PHIL. L.J. 868 (2008) Published 86 PHIL. L.J. 523 (2012)
Oscar Franklin B. Tan

Chair, PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL (2005)
Columnist, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
The Outstanding Young Men Awardee for Law (2014)
Co-Chair, Committee on Constitutional Law, Philippine Bar Association (2013-2015)
Master of Laws, Harvard Law School (2007)
Bachelor of Laws, University of the Philippines (2005)
JUDGING CONGRESS *
Franklin M. Drilon **
Time and again, the Supreme Court has been the last resort for any legis-
lator whose interpretation of the Constitution, a law or a rule is not sustained in his
own chamber. The Court has treated many of these last resorts to judicial interp-
retation as reviews of Congress internal rules.
The power of internal regulation and discipline is inherent in any legislative

body. Thus, the Constitution empowers Congress to determine the rules regarding
its own proceedings, 1 the rules on impeachment when it exercises its constitutional
duty to impeach certain officers, 2 and the rules for canvassing the votes cast for
President and Vice President. 3 What stands out from well-entrenched jurisprudence
on this subject is that, except for minimal limitations of detail found in the
Constitution itself, there is a clear recognition of the legislatures overall autonomy
both in the formulation and in the application of its rules. Clearly, the power to
make rules is not one which is exhausted once exercised. It is a continuous power,
always to be exercised by the House within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal. 4
We observe, however, that the Supreme Court steps in when parties

outside Congress or public rights are involved. When it intervenes, it does so with
great deference to the co-equal political branches, but it nevertheless reserves the
power to make the final, binding judgment to itself. While it has upheld such
internal rules and other acts on many occasions, it has never enunciated an explicit
duty of Constitutional interpretation on the parts of both Congress and the
President.
The phrase loyalty to the Constitution is heard every time a supposed

Constitutional crisis is about to break out, but one wonders what it precisely means
for each speaker. While Congress is by nature a body where partisan interests are
pronounced, individual legislators in many instances transcend these out of a deeper
* A reaction to the editorial exam submission of Oscar Franklin B. Tan. The 2004 Canvass: It is
Emphatically the Duty and Province of Congress to Say What Congress Is, 79 PHIL. L.J. 38 (2004). Cite as Franklin
Drilon, Judging Congress, 79 PHIL. L.J. 35, (page cited) (2004).
** Member, Student Editorial Board, PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL (1968). President, Senate of the
Philippines (2000, 2001-present). Chair, Liberal Party (2003-present). Ll.B., University of the Philippines
(1969). B.A., University of the Philippines (1965). Third Place, 1969 Bar Examinations. Bar Examiner on
Labor and Social Legislation (1984, 1979). Associate Editor, Philippine Collegian. Councilor, University
Student Council. Member, Sigma Rho Fraternity.
1 CONST. art. VI, 16(3).
4 Comment of the Senate filed before the Supreme Court in Lopez v.. Senate of the Philippines. G.R. No.
163556, June 8, 2004.
35
36 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [VOL 79
respect for the Rule of Law. For example, I can attest that during the Impeachment
Trial of former President Joseph Estrada, the non-lawyer senators at that time took
it upon themselves to learn the relevant legal doctrines. And legislators to a man
profess the utmost respect for the Court, as evidenced, for example, by the abrupt
halt of all debate on the impeachment case filed against Chief Justice Hilario Davide
after Francisco v. House of Representatives 5 was handed down by the Court. However, it
is a powerful concept for a legislator to be conscious that he is actually responsible
for the meaning of the Constitution he claims loyalty to, and that the Rule of Law
may be served as faithfully by proposing alternative interpretations of the funda-
mental document.
The separation of powers exists for more than just the check of abuse.
When a court tackles an issue, for example, it has to take a very immediate view.
Concern for precedent aside, it is inherent in judicial power to render justice to two
adverse parties. Now, when the President tackles an issue, she likewise takes a very
immediate view. Executive power is precisely consolidated in the Chief Executive
to allow swift action to meet the exigencies of the moment, to deal with the
problems of the present.
Congress, however, is duty bound to take a much broader view in both

senses. Its every action binds eighty million Filipinos, and binds them for decades
until a future Congress decides otherwise. Thus, its every action necessarily involves
negotiation and compromise. The restraints on legislators are inherent in repre-
sentative democracy. We strive to lead in consensus-building, and cannot simply
impose our wills on those who voted for us.
Given this, it is empowering to realize that answers to difficult consti-

tutional questions may arise from this perpetual search for common ground. It is
even more empowering to realize that Congress may even be the branch most
appropriate to draw out many of these answers. One takes pride in the proposition
that an institutional competence in feeling the pulse of the people may prove more
effective than intellect on many occasions. Law, after all, must mirror culture.
As Senate President, I will be the first to admit that Congress may have
been a source of impatience, frustration and disappointment on several occasions. I
will even concede that some of our countrymen view the Presidency and Congress
as damaged institutions. However, political maturity cannot come from just any
one branch; it must characterize the entire government, as well as the electorate. At
heart, every legislator wants to effect some good for his constituents during his
term, and the idea that he has a direct role in the constitutions evolution sets this
intent against a larger background.
Oscar Franklin Tans thesis in his editorial examination submission is all

the more important in this first year of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyos fresh
term. We have to determine our foreign policy, our direction with respect to
5 G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.
2004] JUDGING CONGRESS 37
globalization, and our macroeconomic, investment, energy, and taxation policies.

Congress has a direct role in all these, and must lead society towards a difficult
consensus to hurdle the challenges the country presently faces. However, against
the constitutional backdrop, there is the equally important challenge of reconciling
the policies formed with the many vision statements of the 1987 Constitution.
When we bring these challenges before the people, we certainly have to bring the
Constitution to them as well. Already, for example, we are seeing the beginning of a
healthy debate between the executive and the judiciary regarding economic policy.
I wish Chair Oscar Franklin Tan, Vice-Chair Gerard Chan, and the new
student editorial board all the best for Volume 79 of the PHILIPPINE LAW
JOURNAL. I certainly hope the lessons they drew from the 2004 Canvass seep into
the consciousness of our legislators, that we may do our share as the Courts
partners in developing our constitutional tradition.
- o0o -
THE 2004 CANVASS: IT IS EMPHATICALLY THE PROVINCE AND
DUTY OF CONGRESS TO SAY WHAT CONGRESS IS
Oscar Franklin B. Tan
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE TRIPARTITE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, PHILIPPINE STYLE 41
I. THE STAGE CONGRESS SET FOR THE 2004 CANVASS... 45

Factual background.. 45
Question 1: What kind of body is the National Board?..... 47
Question 2: Was the 22-Man Canvass Committee valid?.. 48
Question 3: Could the Canvass Committee still function? 49
Question 4a: Is the Presidential Canvass a ministerial task?.. 50
Question 4b: But should the Board nevertheless exercise discretion?... 53
II. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS AND THE ROOTS OF REPUBLICANISM.. 56
III. THAYER AND THE POLITICAL BRANCHES CONCURRENT DUTY 61

A. Thayers original conception... 61
B. Historical Examples: Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. 67
IV. APPLYING COORDINACY THEORY TO THE 2004 CANVASS... 73

A. Reconciling Coordinacy and the Political Question. 73
B. The Political Question doctrines merits.. 76
C. Political Question decisions through the lens of Coordinacy... 80
1. The Presidents powers of veto and pardon 82
2. Social justice and State policies... 82
3. The President as Commander-in-Chief... 85
4. The President as appointing authority. 88
5. The President as prime mover in foreign affairs.. 89
6. Congress and economic policy 91
7. Congress and its internal workings.. 94
8. Transitions in the Presidency.. 97
D. Reconciling Coordinacy and Philippine judicial review.. 98
CONCLUSION 100
38
THE 2004 CANVASS: IT IS EMPHATICALLY THE PROVINCE AND
DUTY OF CONGRESS TO SAY WHAT CONGRESS IS *
Oscar Franklin B. Tan **
Some play must be allowed for the joints of the machine, and it must
be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties
and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Missouri,
Kansas and Tennessee Railroad v. May (1904) 1
[Coordinacy theory] recognizes that the President and Congress also

have an obligation to interpret the Constitution. Coordinacy means
courts listen to the voice of the President and Congress but their voice
does not silence the judiciary.
Justice Reynato Puno,
Francisco v. House of Representatives 2
Dred Scott v. Sandford is a grim illustration of how catastrophic

improvident judicial incursions into the legislative domain could be.
Justice Josue Bellosillo 3
Standing over the body of Julius Caesar, Marcus Junius Brutus told the
assembled crowd:
* It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). This article was awarded First Place in the PHILIPPINE LAW
JOURNALs 2004 Editorial Examination. Cite as Oscar Franklin Tan, The 2004 Canvass: It is Emphatically the
Province and Duty of Congress to Say What Congress Is, 79 PHIL. L.J. 39, (page cited) (2004).
** Chair, PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL (2005); Member, Student Editorial Board (2004). Fourth Year,
Ll.B., University of the Philippines (2005 expected). B.S. Management Engineering / A.B. Economics
Honors Program, Cum Laude, Ateneo de Manila University (2001). First Freshman Awardee, Justice Irene R.
Cortes Prize for Best Paper in Constitutional Law (2002); Awardee, Professor Araceli T. Baviera Prize for
Best Paper in Civil Law (2003); First awardee, Professor Bienvenido C. Ambion Prize for Best Paper in
Private International Law (2004).
The author would like to acknowledge his informal Constitutional Law professors: Carmelo Sison,
Salvador Carlota, Marvic Leonen, Rudyard Avila, and Florin Hilbay. He would also like to present the piece as
a tribute to the positions taken by Francisco v. House of Representatives amici curiae Deans Pacifico Agabin and Raul
Pangalangan, his Constitutional Law I and II professors, respectively. This paper would not have come into
being without the spark lit by these two great scholars during the authors freshman year, nor without the
opportunity to carry their papers and watch from the gallery during the Francisco hearings. This author would
also like to dedicate this piece to the late Professor Samilo Barlongay, whose gentle presence will be missed.
This author would also like to thank Atty. Rodel Cruz, then an undersecretary in the Office of the
Presidential Legal Counsel, for his incisive, Bickel-esque political commentary during the Francisco hearings.
Finally, the author still insists to the beautiful people of the Class of 06, Section B that he also mentioned the
1987 Constitutions changed wording when he showed them Avelino v. Cuenco, shortly before Dean Agabins
2002 midterm.
This author thanks Josh Trocino and GJ Jumamil, his PLJ interns from the Class of 08, for double-
checking the handful of sources cited here after the article was submitted for publication.
1 194 U.S. 267 (1904).
2 Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003 (hereinafter Francisco)
(Puno, J., concurring and dissenting).

3 Francisco (Bellosillo, J., separate opinion).
39
As Caesar loved me, I weep for him;

As he was fortunate, I rejoice at it;
As he was valiant, I honour him;
But as he was ambitious, I slew him. 4
Citing his experience with Francisco v. House of Representatives and the

impeachment case filed against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Senator Aquilino
Pimentel expressed confidence that the Supreme Court would rule on the
oppositions petition to stop the 2004 presidential canvass. 5 Perhaps a prudent slave
slipped a timely whisper in the Justices ears, 6 however, for the Court refused to
intervene. As Dean Raul Pangalangan wrote:
I was asked whether Filipinos would have accepted a Bush vs. Gore
decision. I said no, I didnt think we would have. I felt that Americas
devotion to law, its secular religion, had saved it in its crisis of legitimacy. I
doubted then that law had become a secular religion for us, or if we had
clung on to the real religion by which our bishops today purport to proclaim
to us the mandate of heaven. 7
Not that the Court must be slain, of course. Rather, under the 1987
Constitution, judicial supremacy arguably elevates the Court to a Caesar-like, First
Among Equals stature in the States Triumvirate, 8 and the results may counsel a
closer balance instead. As Dean Pacifico Agabin warned in 1989:
Our experience under martial law has swung the pendulum of judicial power
to the other extreme where the Supreme Court can now sit as superlegis-
lature and superpresident. If there is such a thing as judicial supremacy,
then this is it. 9
The very recent Francisco and the Canvass Resolutions 10 both involved
powers textually committed by the Constitution to Congress, but led to different
4 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, Act III, Scene 2, Lines 25-27, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 250 (hereinafter SHAKESPEARE) (Kingsport Press, Cambridge University text
1983).
5 Philip Tubeza, SC wont stop canvass, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 5, 2004, at A8.
6 For over a thousand years, Roman conquerors returning from the wars enjoyed the honor of a
triumph a tumultuous parade The conqueror rode in a triumphal chariot, the dazed prisoners walking in
chains before him A slave stood behind the conqueror, holding a golden crown, and whispering in his ear a
warning: that all glory is fleeting. Internet Movie Database, Inc., Memorable Quotes from Patton (1970) at
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0066206/quotes (last visited Jul. 4, 2004).
7 Raul Pangalangan, Passion for Reason: Bush vs. Gore, Philippine Version?, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 4,
2004, 8 at http://www.inq7.net/opi/2004/jun/04/text/opi_rpangalangan-1-p.htm. For a history of the

Philippine electorate, see Anna Castaneda, Philippine Elections: The Right to Political Participation in an Elite
Democracy, 41 ATENEO L.J. 314 (1997).
8 In 60 B.C., Julius Caesar allied with Marcus Licinius Crassus and Gnaeus Pompey to form the First
Triumvirate that ruled Rome. Caesar eventually consolidated his power, and defeated Pompeys army in
Pharsalus, Greece in 48 B.C. Julius Caesar, in 3 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 13 (World Book, Inc.,
1985).
9 Pacifico Agabin, The Politics of Judicial Review Over Executive Action: The Supreme Court and Social Change, 64
PHIL. L.J. 189, 209-10 (1989).

10 Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163556, Jun. 8, 2004 (hereinafter Ruy Lopez);
Pimentel v. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for President and Vice-President in the
2004] THE DUTY OF CONGRESS TO SAY WHAT CONGRESS IS 41
outcomes. This presents a rare opportunity to scrutinize the same Benchs mix of
fortune, valor, and a lack of restraint criticized by some as seeming ambition.
THE TRIPARTITE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, PHILIPPINE STYLE
The separation of powers that underlies Philippine society today differs

greatly from its original incarnation. 11 In his landmark treatise, Baron de
Montesquieu identified the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, and the evil
sought to be avoided:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or
in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because
apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact
tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. 12
James Madison later proposed the same formula for a fledgling America. 13
However, Montesquieu himself opined, Of the three powers above mentioned, the
judiciary is in some measure next to nothing. 14 In practical terms, Alexander
Hamilton explained it was the least dangerous 15 branch because it has no
influence over either the sword or the purse, 16 and even ultimately depends upon
the executive for the efficacy of its judgments. 17 The deeper weakness, however, is
seen in how Hamilton took for granted that judicial independence entailed
insulation from ill humours 18 and a disposition to consult popularity. 19 The
judiciary is thus necessarily counter-majoritarian. 20 Justice Felix Frankfurter argues
May 10, 2004 Elections, G.R. No. 163783, Jun. 22, 2004 (hereinafter Pimentel). These refer to the slip
opinions released by the Court in booklet form.
11 Enrique Fernando, The Doctrine of Separation of Powers: Its Past Primacy and its Present Relevance, 24 U.S.T.
L.J. 8, 17-19 (1974).

12 CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, Book XI, Chap. 6, in 38 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 70 (hereinafter GREAT BOOKS) (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., Maynard Hutchins ed.
1982). Sir William Blackstone similarly pointed to the combination of executive and legislative in a single
entity. Steven Calabresi & Saikrishna Prakesh, The Presidents Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 605
(1994).
13 JAMES MADISON, The Federalist No. 47 (The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution
of Power Among Its Different Parts), in 43 GREAT BOOKS 153.

14 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 12, at 71-72.
15 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, The Federalist No. 78 (The Judiciary Department), in 43 GREAT BOOKS 230.
See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS (1986).
16 The Federalist No. 78, supra note 15, at 230.
17 Mark Graber, Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 1789, 38 TULSA L. REV. 609, 617
(2003).
19 Id. at 233.
20 Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334 n.1 (1998). Id. at 335, citing ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (The root difficulty is that judicial review is a
counter-majoritarian force). See Julian Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1513-17
(1990); Martin Redish, Taking a Stroll Through Jurassic Park: Neutral Principles and the Originalist-Minimalist Fallacy in
Constitutional Interpretation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 165, 171-74 (1993); Jeffrey Stempel, Malignant Democracy: Core
Fallacies Underlying Election of the Judiciary, 4 NEV. L.J. 35 (2003).
41
it ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction 21 in lieu of

a popular mandate. 22 Thus, in the greater context of republicanism, each
institutional check upon the electoral victors 23 deserves serious thought by the
citizenry and electorate. 24
However judicial supremacy has evolved in the United States, 25 it was

textually strengthened in the Philippines when the expanded certiorari
jurisdiction 26 was engraved onto the 1987 Constitution in reaction to Martial Law
abuses. Further, a mere simple majority was allowed to declare a law or regulation
unconstitutional. 27 This textual augmentation is all the more pronounced when the
current provision on jurisdiction is compared to its American forebear, 28 which
does not explicitly assign the power of constitutional interpretation. 29 Further,
judicial review was explicitly denominated as a duty more than a power, 30 as
Francisco quotes convention delegate Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.:
21 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Bickel said as much. Stephen Carter,
Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821,
843 (1985). See Benjamin Handler, Abandoning the Cause: An Interstate Comparison of Candidate Withdrawal and
Replacement Laws, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 413, 439 (2004).
22 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992). Unlike the
political branches, a Court thus weakened could not seek to regain its position with a new mandate from the
voters, and even if the Court could somehow go to the polls, the loss of its principled character could not be
retrieved by the casting of so many votes. Like the character of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court must
be earned over time. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 20, at 112. the self-doubt of an
institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.
23 Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 463 (1989). Ackerman
counts many distinguished thinkers in this restraint-oriented school of thought, such as Woodrow Wilson,
James Bradley Thayer, Charles Beard, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Robert Jackson, Alexander Bickel, and John
Ely.
24 Robert Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7
(2003); Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1975); Robert Bennett, Counter-
Conservationalism and the Sense of Difficulty, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 845, 846-47 (2001).
25 See Rachel Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002); Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The
Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C.L. REV. 1203 (2002); Robert Nagel,
Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643 (1989).
26 See Co v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 92191, 199 SCRA 692, Jul. 30, 1991.
27 Agabin, supra note 9, at 209, citing CONST. art. VIII, 4(2).
28 Unlike the 1987 Constitution, the American Constitutions framers and ratifiers never understood the
Supreme Court as textually designated to be the supreme Constitutional interpreter. In the American tradition,
this authority is grounded in later acceptance by the citizenry and in jurisprudence. Larry Alexander &
Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 459-60 (2000).
29 Compare CONST. art. VIII, 1 and UNITED STATES CONST. art. III, 1. Larry Alexander & Frederick
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Intrpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1369 (1997); Barkow, supra note
25, at 253; Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 952 (2004); John Harrison, The
Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371, 373-74 (1988).
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-6 (1959); Peter Mulhern,
In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 100-01 (1988). Both quote LEARNED HAND,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
30 CONST. art. VIII, 1; Francisco, citing I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 434-36
(1986).
[J]urisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be

renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of
duty. 31
The Philippine Court has boldly wielded this broad jurisdiction even with
respect to executive and legislative acts. It has consequently attracted controversy in
recent years, not in the least when it declared that former President Joseph Estrada
had resigned in 2001 and paved the way for the Macapagal-Arroyo administration. 32
In 2003 alone, it nullified the contract for the new Ninoy Aquino International
Airport terminal 33 and evoked shadows of the 1997 Manila Prince Hotel decision, 34
ordered the Manila Electric Company to refund P28 billion in excess charges, 35 and
blocked the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide. 36
Francisco and the Canvass Resolutions, however, set themselves apart

because they both addressed acts of Congress itself whose legality hinged on the
minutiae of Constitutional powers textually committed to the legislature. Several
amici curiae and Justices counseled judicial restraint in Francisco, also considering the
possibilities that the House might withdraw the complaint, or that the Senate might
reject it. 37 Justice Reynato Puno was the strongest voice for such deferment:
Coordinacy theory rests on the premise that within the constitutional system,
each branch of government has an independent obligation to interpret the
Constitution....

[The] correct calibration will compel the conclusion that this Court should
defer the exercise of its ultimate jurisdiction and respect to the initial
exercise by the legislature of its jurisdiction over impeachment
proceedings. At its core, impeachment is political in nature and hence its
initiation and decision are best left, at least initially, to Congress, a political
organ of government. 38
Moving to the Canvass Resolutions and beyond the textbook discussions

of political question doctrine, it is argued that Justice Punos coordinacy theory is
the best foundation for the Courts nonintervention. Had the Court instead
imposed its own Constitutional construction, this would have at best been a
counter-majoritarian intrusion into the most political of exercises, the presidential
elections. At worst, the Court would have left itself vulnerable to accusations of
31 Francisco. The case also cited Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710, 356 SCRA 108, 155-56, Mar. 2,
2001; Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 83767, 166 SCRA 651 Oct., 27, 1988; Vargas v. Rilloraza,
80 Phil. 297, 315-16 Feb. 26, 1948; Planas v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 35925, 49 SCRA 105, January
22, 1973 (Concepcion, J., concurring).
32 Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710, 356 SCRA 108, 141, Mar. 2, 2001.
33 Agan v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., G.R. No. 155001, 402 SCRA 612, 664, May
5, 2003.
34 Manila Prince Hotel v. Govt Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 122156, 267 SCRA 408, Feb. 3,
1997.
35 Energy Regulatory Board v. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. 141314, 401 SCRA 130, 143, Apr. 9, 2003.
36 Francisco.
37 Id. (Puno, J., concurring and dissenting).
38 Id.
43
reckless partisanship, a la Bush v. Gore. 39 As Yale Professor Jack Balkin pointedly

summarized the Courts credibility at the time:
[O]ne member of the majority, Associate Justice Clarence Thomas, addressed

a group of students in the Washington, D.C., area. He told them that he
believed that the work of the Court was not in any way influenced by politics
or partisan considerations Afterwards the question on many legal scholars
minds was not whether Justice Thomas had in fact made these statements.
The question was whether he also told the students that he believed in Santa
Claus, the Easter Bunny, and the Tooth Fairy. (internal citations omitted) 40
This paper seeks to use the 2004 Canvass to emphasize the need for a
greater emphasis on Congresss role in Constitutional interpretation. First, it shall
discuss the background facts and how both the majority and the minority bloc
positions were within the Constitutions plausible range. Second, it shall discuss
Congresss majoritarian, consensus-building nature, and the significance of
delegating the canvass to it in particular. Third, it shall discuss the basis of
coordinacy theory, trace it back to James Bradley Thayers landmark Harvard Law
Review essay in 1893, and discuss recent political question scenarios in a coordinate
interpretation context. It shall then conclude that the Court could have refrained
from intervening, as it in fact did not, but could also have pointed to Congressional
action as a conscious interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, it shall conclude
that such coordinate interpretation has many positive consequences for the rule of
law.
Reacting to Bush, Professor Larry Kramer cautioned, To nudge popular

institutions out of the life of the Constitution is to impoverish both the
Constitution and the republican system it is meant to establish. 41 For the
Philippines, it must be emphasized that this is especially important given the 1987
Constitutions many expansive policy statements that are not deemed self-executing,
and have yet to be given cohesive interpretation. 42
39 See Non Sub Homine? A Survery and Analysis of the Legal Resolution of Election 2000, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2170 (2001).
40 Jack Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1407 (2001). See
Lawrence Tribe, Erog v. Hsub: Freeing Bush v. Gore from its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170 (2001); Peter
Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore Undermined the Federal Right to Vote for Presidential Electors, 29 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 535 (2001); David Coar, It is Emphatically the Province and Duty of the Judicial Department to Say
Who the President Is?, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121 (2002).
41 The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We The Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16 (2001).
42 See Tanada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, 272 SCRA 18, 54, May 2, 1997; Manila Prince Hotel v. Govt
Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 122156, 267 SCRA 408, 431, Feb. 3, 1997; Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No.
101083, 224 SCRA 792, 805, Jul. 30, 1993.
I. THE STAGE CONGRESS SET FOR THE 2004 CANVASS

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The 2004 canvassing of votes was arguably a drawn-out albeit televised

agony dubbed daldal-bawas, 43 perhaps a maddening wait for Birnam wood to
come to Dunsinane:
Lifes but a walking shadow, a poor player

That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is heard no more: it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing. 44
The nature of the sessions made it difficult to extract the precise legal
issues raised and the positions taken. Some points arguably strutted about, but were
mere posturing full of sound and fury and were quickly heard no more. The
canvass is governed by the Constitution:
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not
later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in
the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public
session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President
or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. 45
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166 supplements this provision, which

gives the phrase determination and due execution thereof was a limited
interpretation. 46
In practice, Congress assigns a joint committee to perform the actual

canvass, 47 as seen in 1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1992, and 1998. 48 Canvassing done
43 Carlito Pablo, New buzzword in Congress: Daldal-bawas, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 10, 2004, at A1.
44 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, Act V, Scene 5, Lines 24-28, in SHAKESPEARE 880. At one
point, a bored Congressman simply offered to help carry ballot boxes so as not to fall asleep during the
proceedings. PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 2, 2004, at A1 (front page photo by Edwin Bacasmas).
45 CONST. art. VII, 4(4), 4(6)-4(7).
46 Rep. Act. No. 7166, 30 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for
Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefore, and for Other Purposes).

47 Philip Tubeza, Junk oppositions canvass petition, SC asked, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 22, 2004, at A1.
48 Ruy Lopez, at 36 (Quisumbing, J., separate opinion).
45
this way took less than a month in 1992, and three days in 1998 after Speaker Jose
de Venecia conceded defeat early. 49
For the 2004 canvass, Congress convened in joint session on June 1, but
even before this, opposition legislators already claimed the dominant administration
parties would manipulate it in favor of incumbent President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo. Senator Edgardo Angara opined, The proposed rules are so written that it
ensures a railroading. 50 Other opposition leaders planned to question irregularities
in several Certificates of Canvass (CoCs), 51 while Rep. Bellaflor Angara-Castillo
disclosed plans to have the Supreme Court declare the proposed rules
unconstitutional. 52
On June 2, Davao Rep. Ruy Elias Lopez petitioned the Supreme Court to
declare the 22-man canvassing panel that was formed unconstitutional, arguing that
only the plenary can canvass the votes. 53 The Senate half of the panel was split
between the administration and the opposition, while eight out of eleven members
of the House half represented the administration. 54 Senator Angara proposed,
instead, that a tabulation committee count the votes while the entire Congress
approved the canvass. 55 On June 8, the Court unanimously ruled that Lopez had
failed to show that Congress gravely abused its discretion and dismissed his
petition. 56 That same day, accusations that the opposition was attempting to delay
the canvass came to a head as Senator Pimentel engaged in a four-hour filibuster, 57
and fears were voiced that a president might not be proclaimed before Arroyos
term ended on June 30. 58
On June 17, Senator Pimentel filed a second petition with the Court, this
time alleging that the canvass committee had become a legal non-entity and
likewise passed out of legal existence 59 with the 12th Congresss adjournment on
June 11. He added that the canvass was a matter for the next term. The next day,
lawyers for opposition standard bearer Fernando Poe, Jr. withdrew from the
49 Christine Avendano et al., Poe camp cries foul over joint committee, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 1, 2004, at
A14.
50Carlito Pablo et al., Canvass rules favor GMA, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, May 30, 2004, at A1.
51Paolo Romero, Opposition to question up to 25 COCs, The Philippine Star, Jun. 2, 2004, at 1.
52Id. at A22.
53 Philip Tubeza, Canvassing rules challenged at high court, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 3, 2004, at A1.
54 Cynthia Balana & Christine Avendano, Opposition to ask SC to stop canvass, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun.
2, 2004, at A21.
55 Cynthia Balana & Christine Avendano, Opposition to propose 25-member tabulation committee, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, Jun. 4, 2004, at A1.

56 Philip Tubeza & Cynthia Balana, SC upholds tally by 22-man panel, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 9, 2004,
at A1.
57 Carlito Pablo, Sin to Pimentel: Stop filibustering, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 10, 2004, at A1.
58 Carlito Pablo & Christine Avendano, Canvassing entering critical week, says solons, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER,
Jun. 14, 2004, at A1.

59 Philip Tubeza & Cynthia Balana, Stop canvassing, Poe ally asks SC, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 18,
2004, at A1.
canvass sessions, citing harassment and bias. 60 On June 22, the Court dismissed
the second petition as baseless. 61
The canvass finished at 8:21 PM of June 20, and 180 Certificates of

Canvass showed Arroyo winning over Poe by 1,123,576 votes. 62 A last motion to
open the election returns of three provinces with allegedly questionable CoCs was
voted down. 63 By June 22, Arroyos proclamation was deemed unstoppable, and
the United States announced it was sending a high-level delegation. 64
From this tale full of sound and fury, one distills four main legal questions,
some proving weighty, and others actually signifying nothing in the end. A
necessary fifth, the political question doctrine, will be discussed separately and in
greater detail, later in this paper.
QUESTION 1: WHAT KIND OF BODY IS THE NATIONAL BOARD?
One must begin by settling the preliminary issue of the National Board of
Canvassers genus and species. An Ateneo Law professor, for example, discussed
Republic Act No. 7166 and opined the Board was an administrative body and no
longer a legislative body or co-equal branch of government. 65 This, however, flies
in the face of Kenneth Culp Daviss classic definition:
[A] governmental authority other than the court and other than a legislative body,
which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-
making. (emphasis added) 66
Rather, the Board, with a membership and leadership identical to

Congress, must be nothing other than Congress itself, designated with an additional,
non-legislative function. 67 This follows, by parallel application, from Lopez v. Roxas,
where the Presidential Electoral Tribunal was deemed the Supreme Court itself with
additional functions assigned by Republic Act No. 1793. 68 Simply, there can be only
one Supreme Court, as held in Vargas v. Rilloraza 69 where an attempt was made to
60 TJ Burgonio et al., After pullout, FPJ lawyers assail canvass, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 20, 2004, at A18.
61 Philip Tubeza et al., GMA proclamation a go, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 23, 2004, at A1.
62 Christine Avendano et al., Plenary session seen as next battleground, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 21, 2004,
at A1.
63 Fe Zamora & Blanche Rivera, Bid to open ballot boxes holding ERs voted down, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER,
Jun. 21, 2004, at A1.

64 Philip Tubeza et al., GMA proclamation a go, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 23, 2004, at A1.
65 Cynthia Balana & Christine Avendano, Opposition to ask SC to stop canvass, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun.
2, 2004, at A21.
66 The Court has adopted: A government body charged with administering and implementing particular
legislation. Examples are workers compensation commissions... and the like. ... The term agency includes
any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority board or bureau...
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 90482, 200 SCRA 226, 237 Aug. 5, 1991. Both
definitions necessarily imply that Congress is not an administrative agency.
67 Stephen Siegel, The Conscientious Congressmans Guide to the Electoral Count Act of 1887, 56 FLA. L. REV.
541, 567 (2004).

68 Lopez v. Roxas, G.R. No. 25716, 17 SCRA 756, 762, Jul. 28, 1966.
69 Vargas v. Rilloraza, 80 Phil. 297, 318 (1948).
47
replace some Justices in certain cases, and in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation
Co. 70 where the Justices were asked to sit as a board of arbitrators. In the same vein,
the powers of veto and pardon partake of the legislative and the judicial powers,
respectively, but the President cannot conceivably be anyone other than the Chief
Executive when he exercises these. All the Ruy Lopez opinions concur in this; and
when Justice Puno opined that Congress as the Board and as a lawmaking body are
different, it was only to counsel that the legislators ought to set aside partisan
interests in the former function. 71
Thus, if the Board is clearly Congress itself, then it remains a co-equal

branch whose acts deserve utmost deference, and are canalized 72 only by the
Constitutions text itself.
QUESTION 2: WAS THE 22-MAN CANVASS COMMITTEE VALID?
One moves to the first question the opposition raised: Were the rules that
created the preliminary joint canvass committee invalid? 73 The question defeats itself,
since Rules VIII-X regarding the joint committee left final approval of the canvass
results and the actual proclamation to Congress. 74 Thus, there was no invalid
delegation to speak of, as no discretion was actually transferred to another officer or
body, and delegation of mere preliminary fact-finding is not the kind of delegation
the Constitution would proscribe. 75 As the Court held:
The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment
and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical
administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to
him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is
sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the
officer authorized by law. 76
Otherwise, the President would be precluded from retaining advisers who

make preliminary studies, and neither should the Court leave a single ponente to
frame a decision it will be adopting. 77 In fact, as legislatures grew more complex,
70 Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Trans. Co., 57 Phil. 600, 602 (1932).
71 Ruy Lopez, at 26-27 (Puno, J., separate opinion).
72 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1933) (Cardozo, J., dissenting); ALA Schecter Poultry,
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
73 Ruy Lopez, at 1.
74 Id. at 16-19 (Puno, J., separate opinion); Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 249 SCRA 628,
Oct. 30, 1995.

75 Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No. 17821, 9 SCRA 557, 561, Nov. 29, 1963; Taleon v. Sec. of Public Works
and Commns, G.R. No. 24281, 20 SCRA 69, 73, May 16, 1967; Santos v. Sec. of Public Works and Commns,
G.R. No. 16949, 19 SCRA 637, 642, Mar. 18, 1967; Philippine Assn of Labor Unions v. Sec. of Labor, G.R.
No. 22228, Feb. 27, 1969; Pastoral v. Sec. of Public Works and Communications, G.R. No. 44485, 162 SCRA
619, 626, Jun. 27, 1988. See Cardona v. Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547, 549 (1917).
76 American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents, G.R. No. 26803, 67 SCRA, 287, 295, Oct. 13, 1975,
quoted in Skyworld Condominium Owners Assn, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commn, G.R. No. 95778,
211 SCRA 565, 576, Jul. 17, 1992; Mollaneda v. Umacob, G.R. No. 140128, 358 SCRA 537, 547-48, Jun. 6,
2001.
77 SHEILA CORONEL, The High Price of Justice, in PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM,
BETRAYALS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST 226-27 (Shiela Coronel ed. 2000).

committees evolved from ad hoc bodies to the basic structure of Congress by the
19th century, 78 and todays bicameral conference committees wield great influence
even though the actual drafting is performed by only a fraction of Congresss
membership. 79 Justice Leonardo Quisumbing goes so far as to argue that depriving
the Board of a committee system amounts to obstructing its work. 80
Ruy Lopez unanimously dismissed this question, with some Justices further
noting that joint committees had been employed after past elections without a hint
of protest. 81
QUESTION 3: COULD THE CANVASS COMMITTEE FUNCTION

AFTER CONGRESS HAD ALREADY ADJOURNED?
One then turns to Senator Pimentels eleventh hour objection: Should the
canvass have been turned over to the next term because Congress had already
adjourned on June 11 and passed out of legal existence? 82 The question is again
misleading, because the legislators terms lapsed only on June 30. 83 Although the
Constitution has a mandatory 30-day recess prior to the next term, this deals only
with lawmaking sessions and does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as
the Board. 84 This is supported by the fact that Congress is given thirty days after
the elections, held on the second Monday of May, to begin the canvass, and it could
easily remain uncompleted when the mandatory recess takes effect. 85 Moreover,
while some non-legislative functions such as the Commission on Appointments and
initiation and trial of impeachment may only be performed when Congress is in
session, others clearly do not, such as when the President transmits a declaration
that he is unable to exercise his powers, suspends the privilege of the write of habeas
corpus, declares martial law, or declares a state of war. 86
Pimentels petition was unanimously dismissed. Pimentel even implied that

the Board might be forced to continue canvassing even if its members terms
expired, 87 citing Pelayo v. Commission on Elections. 88
78 MATTHEW MOEN & GARY COPELAND, THE CONTEMPORARY CONGRESS 95 (1999).

79 Id. at 105-08; Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 249 SCRA 628, Sep. 23, 1995; Ruy
Lopez, at 53 (Carpio-Morales, J., separate concurring opinion), citing Philippine Judges Assn v. Prado, G.R. No.
105371, 227 SCRA 703, Nov. 11, 1993.
80 Ruy Lopez, at 37 (Quisumbing, J., separate opinion). See, however, Matthew Adler & Michael Dorf,
Constitional Existence Conditions and Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1182-84 (2003). The article discusses
Nixon v. United States, and the validity of an impeachment before a panel, which was deemed to be a political
question.
81 Ruy Lopez, at 14 (Davide, C.J., separate opinion); Id. at 36 (Quisumbing, J., separate opinion).
82 Pimentel, at 1.
83 CONST. art. VI, 4; Pimentel, at 5.
84 CONST. art. VI, 15; Pimentel, at 5; Id. at 8-10 (Davide, C.J., separate opinion); Id. at 14 (Puno, J., separate
opinion); Id. at 20 (Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., separate opinion); Id. at 37 (Azcuna, J., separate opinion); Id. at 39 (Tinga,
J., separate opinion).
85 CONST. art. VII, 4; Pimentel, at 10 (Davide, C.J., separate opinion).
86 CONST. art. VI, 18, 23, Art. VII, 11, 18, Art. XI, 3; Pimentel, at 27 (Carpio-Morales, J., separate
opinion); Id. at 37 (Azcuna, J., separate opinion).

87 Pimentel, at 5-6; Id. at 14 (Puno, J., separate opinion); Id. at 32 (Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., separate opinion).
49
QUESTION 4A: IS THE PRESIDENTIAL CANVASS A MINISTERIAL TASK?
Outside the petitions to the Court pundit Amando Doronilla called the
first a cheap delaying tactic 89 the above legal points were never seriously
considered. Rather, the oppositions sole recurring refrain was that source
documents should be reviewed, given their allegations of fraud. 90 The joint
committees minority report, in fact, claimed that a conspiracy was hatched long
before the first election return was manufactured in order to inflict on the nation
an Arroyo victory through a majority report proclaiming a bogus election tally. 91
Should Congress should have gone beyond the summaries in the CoCs? In legal
terms, this asks whether Congress was charged with a ministerial, mechanical review
of the returns, or held the discretion to investigate more thoroughly.
Intriguingly, while the manner of canvass was never raised this way in Ruy
Lopez, the Justices nonetheless discussed the issue while taking up delegation.
Davide and Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales and Dante Tinga argued the Board
had but ministerial duties. This view is adopted by Constitutional Law
commentators, 92 which cite the 1966 case Lopez v. Roxas:
Congress merely acts as a national board of canvassers, charged with the

ministerial and executive duty to make said declaration, on the basis of the
election returns [T]he Presidential Electoral Tribunal has the judicial
power to determine whether or not said duly certified election returns have
been irregularly made or tampered with, or reflect the true result of the
elections in the areas covered by each, and, if not, to recount the ballots cast,
and, incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine
whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose
favor 93
Although Lopez was decided under the 1935 Constitution, several

deliberations in the 1986 Constitutional Commission records explicitly referred to
the case and assumed it as the general understanding. 94 Fr. Bernas further explains
that the changed wording of the 1987 Constitution serves only to empower
Congress to specify what flaws in CoCs should be taken cognizance of by the Board
88 G.R. No. 28869, 23 SCRA 1374, 1385, Jun. 29, 1968.

89 Amando Doronilla, Poes pals must stop delaying canvassing, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 7, 2004, at A4.
90 Christine Avendano, Angara: It wouldve been different story if we opened ERs, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun.
23, 2004, at A10.
91 Christine Avendano, Minority report says Poe had won, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 24, 2004, at A6.
92 JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 812 (2003
ed.); HECTOR DE LEON, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND CASES 249 (1999). Justice
Isagani Cruz takes the same view, but without citing Lopez v. Roxas. PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 187 (6th ed.
2001 prtg.).
93 Lopez v. Roxas, G.R. No. 25716, 17 SCRA 756, 769, Jul. 28, 1966.
94 II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 390, 413, 775 (Constitutional Commission of
1986, 1986). Some of these deliberations are cited in Ruy Lopez, at 12 (Davide, C.J., separate opinion); Id. at 46
(Carpio-Morales, J., separate opinion); BERNAS, supra note 92, at 813. Ambiguity in the Constitution must be
interpreted according to the framers intent, since it is assumed that the peoples adoption was guided by their
understanding of the text. Francisco; Civil Liberties Union v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 83896, 194 SCRA 317, 325,
Feb. 22, 1991; Nitafan v. Commission on Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 78780, 152 SCRA 284, 291, Jul. 23,
1987.
in determining authenticity and due execution, and the addition does not alter the
canvasss ministerial nature. 95 Justice Carpio-Morales stated that Republic Act No.
7166 removes all doubt when it promulgated a purely mechanical list: 96
Congress shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificate
of canvass for President and Vice-President as accomplished and transmitted
to it by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each certificate
of canvass was executed, signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and
members of the board of canvassers and transmitted or caused to be
transmitted to Congress by them; (2) each certificate of canvass contains the
names of all of the candidates for President and Vice-President and their
corresponding votes in words and in figures; and (3) there exists no
discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificate of canvass or
discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the
certificate.
Finally, she added that the Rules for the joint committee itself focus on
tabulation and counting, and even empower the committee to avail of an
independent accounting/auditing firm. 97
Even a broader examination of legal material bears out this argument. The
Court strives to interpret words in Constitutional provisions using their plain
meaning, 98 and Blacks Law Dictionary defines canvass as the act of counting
returns to determine authenticity. 99 Philippine Election Law has always held the
function of provincial, city, and municipal canvassers as purely ministerial, 100 and
the same has been true of most American jurisdictions, 101 even when the canvass is
performed by a Speaker of the House. 102 This understanding has been taken for
granted in even the most recent Supreme Court cases. Philippine Election Law
commentaries on the canvass of votes for president, in fact, cite only the above
mechanical section of Republic Act No. 7166. 103 Finally, to cite American practice,
the United States Electoral Count Act (ECA) of 1887 prohibits objections
addressed to the joint session, requires these to instead be reduced to writing, and
95 BERNAS, supra note 92, at 813, citing II RECORD, supra note 30, at 391. See Ruy Lopez, at 47 (Carpio-
Morales, J., separate opinion).

96 Rep. Act. No. 7166, 30; Ruy Lopez, at 47 (Carpio-Morales, J., separate opinion).
97 Ruy Lopez, at 49 (Carpio-Morales, J., separate opinion).
98 Francisco; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064, 31 SCRA 413,
Jun. 30, 1970.

99 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 207 (6th ed. 1990).
100 ANTONIO NACHURA, OUTLINE REVIWER IN POLITICAL LAW 442-43 (2002), citing Guiao v. Commn
on Elections, 137 SCRA 366. HECTOR DE LEON & HECTOR DE LEON, JR., THE LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
AND ELECTION LAW 701-02 (5th ed. 2003), citing Lucman v. Dimaporo, G.R. No. 31558, 33 SCRA 388, May
29, 1970; Abes v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 28348, 21 SCRA 1252, Dec. 15, 1967.
101 26 AM. JUR. 2D 123, 300, citing Kindel v. Le Bert, 23 Colo. 385, 48 P. 641; Thompson v. Talmadge,
201 Ga. 867, 41 SE2d 883; People ex rel. Woods v. Green, 265 Ill. 39, 106 NE 304; Jay v. ODonnell, 178 Ind.
282, 98 NE 349; Rosenthal v. State Canvassers, 50 Kan. 129, 32 P. 129; People ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Van
Cleve, 1 Mich 362; State ex rel. Carpenter v. Sup. Ct. 118 Wash. 664, 204 P. 797.
102 26 AM. JUR. 2D 123 n.14, citing State ex rel. Donnell v. Osburn, 347 Mo. 469, 147 SW2d 1065, 136
ALR 667.
103 NACHURA, supra note 100, at 442-43; DE LEON, supra note 100, at 718-19.
51
even limits the time for debate in separate sessions to discuss these. It even limits
the presiding officers role to one as ministerial as possible. 104
Speaking in terms of public interest, the evil to be avoided is undue delay,

which Justice Carpio-Morales opined frustrates the will of the people as surely as
electoral fraud. 105 This is precisely the reason a canvass is left a ministerial task, as
held by a century-old New York opinion:
[T]he necessity for a speedy disposition of the question of which candidate is

entitled to the office is of far more importance than whether the person
elected shall lose it. 106
Accordingly, the Court has deemed canvass proceedings summary in

nature to avoid vacancies in key positions, 107 and has ruled that canvassers should
not look beyond returns that appear authentic and duly accomplished. 108 This
policy goal is further reflected in Republic Act No. 7166, 109 which prohibits a
number of pre-proclamation cases with respect to the presidential elections; and
even, more generally, in the Election Code, 110 which requires trial courts to give
preference to election cases.
As Lopez v. Roxas outlined, the more time-consuming objections and

investigations should be ventilated in an election protest. 111 Indeed, Rep.
Constantino Jaraula proclaimed, We will not allow the conversion of the
[canvassing committee] into an electoral tribunal, 112 and that issues of fraud
should be reserved for the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. 113 More practically, the
judicial body has the greater institutional capacity, and time for that matter, to
investigate. 114 The Tribunal and the Board must be seen as two parts of a single
whole, as Senator George Edmunds explained with respect to the American ECA:
[I]n the presidential election process, ministerial decisions should be prima

facie binding; only judicial determinations may bind finally. Edmundss
104 Siegel, supra note 67, at 635, 641-45.

105 Ruy Lopez, at 58 (Carpio-Morales, J., separate opinion). See id. at 68 (Tinga, J., separate opinion); Id. at 38
(Quisumbing, J., separate opinion).

106 People ex rel. Brink v. Way, 179 N.Y. 174, 181, 71 N.E. 756, 758 (1904), quoted in Leslie Southwick, A
Judge Runs for President, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 37, 40 (2001). It referred to canvass proceedings as ministerial,
largely exempt from judicial review.
107 Siquian v. Commn on Elections, 320 SCRA 440, 443, G.R. No. 135627, Dec. 9, 1999; Sandoval v.
Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 133842, 323 SCRA 403, 418, Jan. 26, 2000; Baltazar v. Commn on
Elections, G.R. No. 140158, 350 SCRA 518, 527, Jan. 29, 2001
108 Loong v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 107814, 257 SCRA 1, 29, May 16, 1996; Balindong v.
Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 124041, 260 SCRA 494, 500, Aug. 9, 1996; Lee v. Commn on Elections,
G.R. No. 157004, Jul. 4, 2003.
109 15, quoted in Sandoval v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 133842, 323 SCRA 403, 418, Jan. 26,
2000.
110 258, quoted in Baltazar v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 140158, Jan. 29, 2001. 350 SCRA 518,
526, See Quintos v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 149800, 392 SCRA 489, 502, Nov. 21, 2002.
111 See Velayo v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 135613, 327 SCRA 729, 732 Mar. 9, 2000, citing Rep.
Act. No. 7166, 18.

112 Carlito Pablo et al., 24 ballot boxes opened; 199 to go, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 1, 2004, at A14.
113 CONST. art. VII, 4(7).
114 Siegel, supra note 67, at 576.
belief was that [t]he experience of governments seems to have proved that,
on the whole, judicial tribunals are best calculated to hear and decide
disputed questions of law and fact, although they may involve inquiries
extending into the domain of politics and the decision of the fact of an
election. 115
The findings of Philippine canvassers are held merely prima facie evidence
of a victors title, following this logic. 116
Indeed, some feared the canvass might not be completed before the new
presidents term began, 117 something the ECA sought to avoid. 118 A lawyer for
President Arroyo even estimated that allowing the opposition to challenge just 25
CoCs would entail a review of 60,000 election returns and take roughly two years.119
Parenthetically, the Court cautioned in the past against candidates who feel that
the only way to fight for a lost cause is to delay the proclamation of the winner. 120
Finally, on another policy point, the 2004 presidential canvass cost half a million
pesos a day, based only on legislators and staff members basic salaries.
QUESTION 4B: BUT SHOULD THE NATIONAL BOARD OF

CANVASSERS NEVERTHELESS EXERCISE DISCRETION?
Despite the precedents, framers deliberations, and ancient policy goals

arrayed against him, Justice Punos widely-quoted separate opinion bewailed a
canvass done in a robotic manner, with lawmakers as unthinking slot
machines. 121 He called for the judicious exercise of discretion beyond Congress
acting as a mere rubber stamp, 122 arguing that accuracy was the canvass primary
consideration even if it entailed full-blown debate on the CoCs due execution and
authenticity:
The need to fast track the determination of the will of the people pales in
comparison with [accuracy] The nation can endure a slow but trustworthy
tally. It may not survive an indefensible count, however speedy it might be. 123
However, the last part of Justice Punos opinion was bereft of all legal
citation, and rested only on its eloquence and indubitable postulates. 124 Justice
115 Id. at 599 quoting George Edmunds, Presidential Elections, 12 AM. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1877).
116 DE LEON, supra note 100, at 701-02, citing FLOYD MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC
OFFICES AND OFFICERS 138-39 (1890).
117 Carlito Pablo &Christine Avendano, Canvassing entering critical week, says solons, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER,
Jun. 14, 2004, A1.

118 Siegel, supra note 67, at 634, citing John Burgess, The Law of the Electoral Count, 5 POL. SCI. Q. 633, 651-
52 (1888).
119 Carlito Pablo & Christine Avendano, Canvassing entering critical week, says solons, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER,
Jun. 14, 2004, at A4 (quoting Atty. Romulo Macalintal).

120 Siquian v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 135627, 320 SCRA 440, 443, Dec. 9, 1999.
121 Lopez, 27 (Puno, J., separate opinion), quoted in Ducky Paredes, The church and politics, Malaya, Jun. 12,
2004, at http://www.malaya.com.ph/jun12/edducky.htm; Raul Pangalangan, Passion for Reason: Philippine

democracy: Bushed but not gored, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 18, 2004, at
http://www.inq7.net/opi/2004/jun/18/text/opi_rpangalangan-1-p.htm.
122 Blanco v. Board of Examiners, G.R. No. 22911, 46 Phil. 190, 192, Sep. 23, 1924.
123 Ruy Lopez, at 28 (Puno, J., separate opinion).
53
Puno was joined only by Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr., who cited the same
Constitutional Commission deliberations that explained Congresss expanded
authority to scrutinize due execution. 125 Contrary to Fr. Bernass and other Justices
conclusions, he argued the expansion meant canvassing could not be a purely
ministerial duty. 126 He quoted:
[C]anvassers are given quasi-judicial powers to determine whether the return
is genuine and to disregard one which is obviously a forgery. 127
Again, however, the general jurisprudential and statutory rule is that

Philippine boards of canvass possess only ministerial duties, and may only correct
errors in their tallies that do not involve a reexamination of the ballots, such as in
cases of manifest mathematical error. Such boards have quasi-judicial functions only
in the limited sense that they may reject election returns that are patently forged or
spurious, are illegible, or in other cases where it is unsatisfied that they are
genuine. 128 Thus, Justice Callejo actually cites the exception, not the rule. With the
legality of the 22-man canvassing panel settled, and with both the opposition and
the press doggedly guarding its every move, one must accept the majority
conclusion that no CoC contained irregularity so blatant that the exception would
have to be invoked.
Nevertheless, one might argue that had the majority instead chosen to
delve into the CoCs source documents, no one could have stopped them. Again, as
the Board is Congress and no mere administrative agency, it is a co-equal branch
whose acts are accorded great respect. Thus, an oppositor who questions its
authority bears the burden of showing a proscription or restraint against it. One
may, for example, argue that greater scrutiny of election documents partakes of a
judicial function which the Constitution has left to the Supreme Court acting as
Presidential Electoral Tribunal. However, one may be rebuffed by pointing out that
the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals are not composed solely of Justices, 129
and that in any case, the canvass results are merely prima facie and not the actual
adjudication. The clearest Constitutional bar is the implicit June 30 deadline, which
arguably leaves Congress with a good deal of latitude with respect to the actual
canvass. An oppositor might cite, finally, Republic Act No. 7166, but one might
argue that Section 30 is addressed only to Congress and is thus an internal rule in
124 Id. at 26.

125 II RECORD, supra note 30, at 390-91.
126 Ruy Lopez, at 60-61 (Callejo, Sr., J., separate opinion).
127 Lopez, 61 (Callejo, Sr., J., separate opinion) quoting Espino v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. 22325, 21 SCRA 1204,
Dec. 11, 1967; Salvacion v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 84673, 170 SCRA 513, Feb. 2, 1989.
128 DE LEON, supra note 100, at 721-22, citing MECHEM, supra note 116, at 135, 137-38; Purisima v.
Salanga, G.R. No. 22335, 15 SCRA 704, Dec. 31, 1965; Lagumbay v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 25444,
16 SCRA 175, Jan. 31, 1966; Abes v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 28348, 21 SCRA 1252, Dec. 15, 1967;
Espino v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. 22325, 21 SCRA 1204, Dec. 11, 1967; Ong v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No.
28415, 22 SCRA 241, Jan. 29, 1968; Felix v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 28378, 23 SCRA 1288, Jun. 29,
1968; Lucman v. Dimaporo, G.R. No. 31558, 33 SCRA 387, May 29, 1970; Abella v. Larrazabal, G.R. Nos.
87721, 180 SCRA 509, Dec. 21 1989; Tatlonghari v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 86645, 199 SCRA 849,
Jul. 31, 1991; Grego v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, 274 SCRA 481, Jun. 19, 1997.
129 CONST. art. VI, 17.
statute form, much like the American ECA is considered to be. 130 Congress is free
to change its rules, and is in any case free to repeal that particular provision.
Justice Punos postulate is grounded on a deeper, residual authority that a

co-equal branch can appeal to. This was a view taken even by 19th century
American congressmen:
Congress was a political body reviewing, on behalf of the nation and all the
states Some nationalistic congressmen took this difference to mean that
Congress was not bound by the norms of administrative law and could go
behind both ministerial and discretionary decisions of state officials to police
the purity of national elections. 131
This view was sharpened by Justice Puno in Pimentel. For example, he cited
Benito v. COMELEC, which held that in an election, the peoples choice is the
paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at times, be given effect. 132
Thus, in a democracy, Congress would be well-justified to exert whatever effort it
wishes to ascertain the truth lest the sovereignty reposed in the people be
undermined by an erroneous proclamation. 133 Justice Puno ended his Pimentel
opinion, half the truth is a full lie. 134 Moreover, humanities professor Felipe de
Leon, Jr. theorized that Filipinos have a very trusting, personal, and transparent
approach to conflict, and the prolonged canvass caused tensions because the
majority was perceived as having something to hide. 135
It must be emphasized, nevertheless, that it remains unsettled whether the

National Canvass proceedings are ministerial or discretionary in nature. Both
petitions were dismissed and neither, in any case, squarely raised the issue.
Moreover, both sides are legally defensible. One further notes that Justice
Quisumbing deemed the issue one that need not preoccupy us now, 136 while
Justice Dante Tinga felt it was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
to Congress the Court should not make a pronouncement on. 137
II. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS AND THE ROOTS OF REPUBLICANISM
Amidst the subtle ministerial versus discretionary debate, Justice Puno

hinted at a much deeper issue:
The Judiciary is composed of unelected members and by its nature, is unfit to

discharge the duty of canvassing which is basically non-judicial in nature
130 Siegel, supra note 67, at 546

131 Id. at 574.
132 Pimentel, at 17 (Puno, J., separate opinion) quoting Benito v. Commn on Elections, 235 SCRA 436, 441
(1994).
133 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 257-58 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
134 Pimentel, at 17 (Puno, J., separate opinion).
135 Volt Contreras, Canvass feud? Experts point to Pinoy psyche, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 21, 2004, at A1.
137 Id. at 64 (Tinga, J., separate opinion).
55
As direct representatives of the people, the members of Congress are better

suited to determine their sovereign will as expressed through the ballot. 138
Taking another perspective, Professor Perfecto Fernandez outlined that

the executive power involves mobilizing administration, the legislative power
involves creating general duties by passing laws, and the judicial power involves
creating specific duties through adjudication. 139 One then inquires into the
significance of assigning the canvass to the political, consensus-building branch.
Certainly, it is no accident of history, since the American Congress is given the same
task, and past proposals to transfer this to a tribunal were never acted on. 140
John Locke began such an inquiry into political power from the premise
that all men are naturally in a state of freedom. 141 However:
[M]en give up all their natural power to the society they enter into, and the
community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with
this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace,
quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty as it was in the state of
Nature. 142
Similarly, James Madison began with the postulate that it is in mans nature
to fall into faction; Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without
which it instantly expires. 143 He nevertheless embraces this tendency, and instead
counsels:
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests;
you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common
motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive
exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own
strength. 144
Thus, the toll for entering ordered society is a sacrifice of freedom, one
that arises from acquiescence to the majority, as determined by the refined forms of
power struggle in modern society. 145 And so Locke called the consensus-building
legislature the supreme power in every commonwealth. 146 Of course, a
Constitution is inherently a restraint on power, and has always protected minority
and individual rights:
138 Pimentel, at 16 (Puno, J., separate opinion).

139 Perfecto Fernandez, The Philippine Legal System and its Adjuncts: Pathways to Development, 67 PHIL. L.J. 21,
32 (1992). See M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1172
(2000).
140 Siegel, supra note 67, at 586 n.278; Barkow, supra note 25, at 288-89.
141 JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government, in 35 GREAT
BOOKS 25.
142 Id. at 56.
143 James Madison, The Federalist No. 10 (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection,
Continued) in 43 GREAT BOOKS 50. Madison also notes that representative government may be traced even to
ancient societies. The Federalist No. 63 (The Senate, Continued) in 43 GREAT BOOKS 193-94.
144 Id. at 52.
145 Agabin, supra note 9, at 189.
146 LOCKE, supra note 141, at 55.
[T]he purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts Laski proclaimed that the happiness of the individual, not
the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behavior was to be
judged. (internal citations omitted) 147
In this vein, some of the greatest Constitutional moments were played out
by judiciaries in a counter-majoritarian role. For example, the Negro has made his
greatest gains by way of the courts rather than legislatures. 148 However, there are
many cases that are distant from democracys supposed fundamental tension with
minority rights. 149 One may thus take the well-accepted thesis that the Court
primarily safeguards individuals and minorities when majoritarian political processes
cannot, 150 and group decisions that do this into the first of two categories. 151
Instead of the citizen attempting to shut the door of his humble cottage in
the face of the monarch, 152 the second category of decisions deal with
undercurrents at the highest echelons of government and the ripples caused by the
actions of broad sectors. These would be the most political and decidedly
majoritarian aspects of democracy, of which the national elections are the prime
example. Unlike in the first, counter-majoritarian judicial maneuvers here must be
conducted with the utmost caution. 153
Thus, the role of the States most majoritarian branch in the peoples most
majoritarian exercise is not difficult to infer. Simply, it is the ultimate arbiter of the
peoples will, the body tasked to determine its expression because it is in theory the
147 Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., G.R. No.
31195, 51 SCRA 191, 201, Jun. 5, 1973.

148 Thomas Christopher, Segregation in the Public Schools: Introduction, 3 J. PUB. L. 5, 6 (1954), quoted in Barry
Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE
L.J. 153, 187 n.137 (2002). See Albert Sacks, The Supreme Court, 1953 Term Foreword, 68 HARV. L. REV. 96, 96
(1954). Note, however, that the justices have also been criticized for inserting its moral views into supposed
liberal defenses of individual rights. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 15-132 (1990).
149 Morton Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 TermForeword: The Constitution of Change: Legal
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 62-63 (1993).

150 Henry Monaghan, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of
the Supreme Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 246, 297-98, 308 (1980) (book review); Robert Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and
Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 393, 501-02 (1996); William Eskridge, Jr., Some
Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062,
2402-05 (2002); Dworkin, supra note 24, at 1063-64. See Cruz v. Sec. of Envt and Natural Resources, G.R.
No. 135385, 347 SCRA 128, Dec. 6, 2000 (Mendoza, J., separate opinion). Calabresi puts it in practical terms:
such entities tend to be less important in winning re-election. Steven Calabresi, Thayers Clear Mistake, 88
NW. U. L. REV. 269, 273 (1993).
151 However, Monaghan argues Congress has greater institutional competence in protecting civil
liberties. Henry Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1975). Redish
points out that the Bill of Rights was not in the original American Constitution, so judicial review could not
have been primarily contemplated for it. Martin Redish & Karen Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial
Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1987).
152 United States v. Arceo, 3 Phil. 381, 384 (1904).
153 Dworkin, however, posits that judicial decisions are political decisions in a broader sense in that they
must show coherence with a larger societal backdrop. Dworkin, supra note 24, at 1065, 1079-82. See Michael
Klarman, Whats So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 192 (1998).
57
branch able to plead their cause most successfully with the people. 154 The
canvass remains part of a political exercise, although it is all too tempting to
demand that an absolute ideal of impartiality underlie it. Indeed, framing the
century-old rules for the American canvass, Senator Benjamin Hill noted:
[Rather than] rise above party and remember [their] country and only [their]
country, [a]ble men, learned men, distinguished men, great men in the eyes
of the nation, seemed intent only on accomplishing a party triumph, without
regard to the consequences to the country. That is human nature. That is,
unfortunately, party nature. 155
Representative Thomas Browne added he would even:
fear myself if I were supreme judge upon such a question. I should fear to
take upon myself the responsibility of settling a question of this character; I
should fear that my judgment might be found in the line of my political
convictions and party prejudices. 156
In summary:
Congress faced a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, in determining the

outcome of a closely contested presidential election, Congress knew that
there had to be a final decision-maker, be it a person, tribunal, or institution.
As Senator Thomas Bayard reminded his colleagues near the outset of
Congresss long struggle to enact the ECA, [e]very human dispute, every
human right, however important, must reach a finality to be controlled by
human methods. On the other hand, Congress also knew that in a close
presidential election, no decision-maker, be it a person, tribunal, or
institution, could be trusted to render a neutral decision according to rules
laid down in advance. 157
Given human frailties, Congress thus plays a legitimizing role in the most
essential of democratic exercises, and by its very nature, it is the only body capable
of doing so. 158 Indeed, few matters of statecraft were more important than public
confidence in the legitima[cy] of the transmission of the supreme executive
authority from one person to another. 159 This is readily illustrated in Bush v.
Gore, 160 where the United States Supreme Court tread on Congressional ground and
154 ALEXANDER HAMILTON OR JAMES MADISON, The Federalist No. 49 (Method of Guarding Against the
Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention), in 43 GREAT
BOOKS 160.
155 Siegel, supra note 67, at 548.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 547.
158 See id. at 555. They regarded the only arbiter that had ever been appointed the Electoral
Commission of 1877 on which five Supreme Court justices held the deciding votes as a dismal failure never
to be repeated. As Senator George Hoar, one of the ECAs main proponents, concluded: [I]n the present
state of political and public sentiment, it was impossible to expect an agreement on an arbiter between the
two branches of Congress. There was simply no person or institution that could be trusted.
159 Id. at 547.
160 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
ended up transforming a majoritarian electoral exercise into a counter-majoritarian

equal-protection question. 161
As Justice Stephen Breyer wrote:
Of course, the selection of the President is of fundamental national

importance. But that importance is political, not legal. And this Court should
resist the temptation unnecessarily to resolve tangential legal disputes, where
doing so threatens to determine the outcome of the election. 162
The decision by both the Constitutions Framers and the 1886 Congress to
minimize this Court's role in resolving close federal Presidential elections is
as wise as it is clear. However awkward or difficult it may be for Congress to
resolve difficult electoral disputes, Congress, being a political body, expresses
the peoples will far more accurately than does an unelected Court. And the
people's will is what elections are about. 163
Justice Ruth Joan Ginsberg added:
In sum, the Courts conclusion that a constitutionally adequate recount is

impractical is a prophecy the Courts own judgment will not allow to be
tested. Such an untested prophecy should not decide the Presidency of the
United States. 164
Taking the opposite end of the Courts lack of a popular mandate, such
intervention is especially high-handed because Justices are not directly accountable
to the electorate. Where fixed terms and reelection are a requisite for the legislature
by its nature, tenure is precisely granted to judges because of the judiciarys
nature. 165 Thus, in the end, Bush v. Gore tainted the American Court with the
partisanship they were supposed to be above, allowed five Justices to effectively
overturn an entire electorate, 166 and leveraged Republican control of the judiciary
to secure control of another branch, 167 playing the Consitution as the trump card
in American politics. 168 However, nothing short of impeachment could rein the
Justices back in.
Finally, Justice Breyer outlined the Hayes-Tilden controversy in 1886,

where Supreme Court Justice Joseph Bradley was forced to cast the deciding vote
between two presidential candidates:
161 This invited a new generation of constitutional challenges to the electoral process. Southwest Voter
Registration Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003), 117 HARV. L. REV. 2023, 2023 (2004).
162 Bush, 531 U.S. at 152 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 155.
164 Id. at 144 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
165 Federalist No. 78, supra note 15, at 230; Balkin, supra note 40, at 1432.
166 Russel Miller, Lords of Democracy: The Judicialization of Pure Politics in the United States and Germany, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 587, 589 (2004).

167 Balkin, supra note 40, at 1455.
168 BORK, supra note 148, at 3.
59
The Commission divided along partisan lines, and the responsibility to cast
the deciding vote fell to Justice Bradley. He decided to accept the votes by
the Republican electors, and thereby awarded the Presidency to Hayes.
Justice Bradley immediately became the subject of vociferous attacks. Bradley

was accused of accepting bribes, of being captured by railroad interests, and
of an eleventh-hour change in position after a night in which his house was
surrounded by the carriages of Republican partisans and railroad officials.
Many years later, Professor Bickel concluded that Bradley was honest and
impartial. He thought that the great question for Bradley was, in fact,
whether Congress was entitled to go behind election returns or had to accept
them as certified by state authorities, an issue of principle. Nonetheless,
Bickel points out, the legal question upon which Justice Bradley's decision
turned was not very important in the contemporaneous political context. He
says that in the circumstances the issue of principle was trivial, it was
overwhelmed by all that hung in the balance, and it should not have been
decisive. (internal citations omitted) 169
Justice Breyer concluded that the involvement of Supreme Court Justices

added no legitimacy to the process, and served only to embroil them in politics and
undermine the judiciary. After the Hayes-Tilden affair, Congress enacted the ECA,
which greatly diminished the Courts role. 170
The gravity of a Bush-Gore or Hayes-Tilden scenario recalls Dean

Agabins words:
The judiciary is in politics because it cannot avoid it. The fact that it makes
important decisions which impinge on the interests of the most powerful
segments of society necessarily involves it in power politics. 171
III. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER AND THE POLITICAL BRANCHES

CONCURRENT DUTY TO INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION
The Bush v. Gore scenario only becomes more distasteful when one realizes
it occurred precisely under the auspices of judicial review and the famous Carolene
Products footnote ironically hints that judicial review is a tool against political
entrenchment by Hamilton feared. 172 Many seeming policy doctrines have been
imposed by the judiciary in the guise of constitutional interpretation. One has
Lochner v. New York 173 and People v. Pomar, 174 where Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. protested the seeming engraftment of Herbert Spencers Social Statics onto the
Constitution. 175 One even has the Legal Tender cases 176 and the conclusion against
169 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 154-57 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See Barkow, supra note 25, at 290.
170 Tribe, supra note 40, at 281.
172 Balkin, supra note 40, at 1455, citing United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938);
Jack Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. L. REV. 275 (1989).

173 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
174 46 Phil. 440, 456 (1924).
175 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
176 Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869); Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870);
Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884).

the use of paper money which Holmes criticized as the curious spectacle of the
Supreme Court reversing the determination of Congress on a point of political
economy. 177 Bush v. Gore, however, amounted to a far more direct usurpation of a
Congressional power, and the American Congress had in fact enacted laws in 1845
and in 1887 to guide its handling of such a close presidential contest. 178 In the
context of such overreach in the guise of interpretation, Justice Punos thesis of
coordinate constitutional interpretation becomes all the more attractive. It must be
noted that although Ruy Lopez curtly dismissed the opposition petition, the Justices
were arguably close to Bush v. Gore with their individual pronouncements, and Bush
v. Gore was in fact cited by one opinion. 179
A. THAYERS ORIGINAL CONCEPTION
Coordinacy theory is summarized:
Under the coordinacy theory, a distinction exists between the Constitution

and the judicial construction of the Constitution. The Judiciary is not the
exclusive oracle of constitutional meaning. Other branches may interpret the
Constitution independently of the Judiciary. 180
It is reconciled with judicial supremacy by qualifying that the Supreme

Court need not provide the Constitutional interpretation in every question; 181
although the Courts interpretation is the one that will finally bind, it may always
choose to defer or to uphold another branchs construction just as it may reject
them. 182 Justice Puno discusses the underpinnings of deference, linking coordinacy
theory directly to the majoritarian concerns discussed in the preceding section:
As a judicial stance, it is anchored on a heightened regard for democracy. It

accords intrinsic value to democracy based on the belief that democracy is an
extension of liberty into the realm of social decision-making. Deference to
the majority rule constitutes the flagship argument of judicial restraint which
177 Thomas Grey, Thayers Doctrine: Notes on its Origin, Scope, and Present Implications, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 28,
34 (1993).
178 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 153-54 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Balkin, supra note 40, at 1433. See
Barkow, supra note 25, at 290-91; William Josephson & Beverly Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, 22 J. LEGIS.
145, 184 (1996). See also Russel Miller, supra note 166, at 620.
180 Robert Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretative Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 656, 662-63 (2000). See Edwin Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 981
(1987); Gary Apfel, Whose Constitution Is It Anyway? The Authority of the Judiciarys Interpretation of the Constitution,
46 Rutgers L. REV. 771, 773 (1994).
181 See, however, Alexander & Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy, supra note 28, at 1387. If we can expect
legally and constitutionally trained lower court judges to subjugate their best professional judgment about
constitutional interpretation to the judgments of those who happen to sit above them, then expecting the
same of nonjudicial officials is an affront neither to morality nor to constititionalism. It is but the recognition
that at times good institutional design requires norms that compel decisionmakers to defer to the judgments
of others with which they disagree. Some call this positivism. Others call it formalism. We call it law.
182 Schapiro, supra note 180, at 665-66.
61
emphasizes that in democratic governance, majority rule is a necessary

principle. 183
The theory traces its roots to a brief but influential 1893 essay by James
Bradley Thayer: 184
[T]he court was so to discharge its office as not to deprive another

department of any of its proper power, or to limit it in the proper range of its
discretion [T]hey require an allowance to be made by the judges for the
vast and not definable range of legislative power and choice, for that wide
margin of consideration which address themselves only to the practical
judgment of a legislative body. Within that margin, as among all these
legislative considerations, the constitutional law-makers must be allowed a
free foot. 185
He continues that the legislature, not the judiciary, is the Constitutions

primary interpreter, in the sense that it continually enacts laws that affect every
aspect of daily life, yet whose constitutionality will not be reviewed unless brought
to a court. 186 Had the judiciary been intended for the primary role, it would have
more than a belated power of review. The Executive may be viewed similarly, and
Professor Fernandez likewise distinguished that judicial power may only be
exercised when a Primary Duty is violated, unlike executive power. 187 Thus,
judicial review is arguably best employed narrowly. 188
As a corollary, as Justice Tinga in fact pointed out, 189 the parameters

mapped out by Constitutional provisions may contain a range of possibilities and
different interpretations, and when appropriate, the Court should stop review when
it is satisfied that the act in question is within those parameters, rather than
imposing its own interpretation. Put another way, The judicial function is merely
that of fixing the outside border of reasonable legislative action; 190 otherwise the
legislature might divide its duty with the judges. 191 As Justice Holmes quoted an
old bishops sermon:
183 Francisco (Puno, J., separate opinion).

184 Over a century later, this early essay on judicial restraint continues to spark debate. Henry Monaghan,
Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1983); One Hundred Years of Judicial Review: The
Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 NW. U. L. REV. v, v (1993); Jay Hook, A Brief Life of James Bradley Thayer, 88
NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (1993).
185 James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 135 (1893).

186 See Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L.
REV. 57, 64 (1986); Mark Tushnet, Thayers Target: Judicial Review or Democracy?, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 9, 24-25
(1993); G. Edward White, Revisiting James Bradley Thayer, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 48, 75 (1993); Tolentino v. Sec. of
Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 249 SCRA 628, Sep. 23, 1995.
187 Perfecto Fernandez, Separation of Powers as Juristic Imperative, 58 PHIL. L.J. 245, 248-49 (1983).
188 Thayer, supra note 185, at 136-37.
189 Ruy Lopez, at 64 (Tinga, J., separate opinion).
190 Thayer, supra note 185, at 148.
191 Id.
Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws,

it is he who is truly the lawgiver, to all intents and purposes, and not the
person who first wrote or spoke them. 192
As another corollary, a judge should make the hammer fall, and

heavily 193 only when legislatures have not merely made a mistake, but have made
a very clear one,so clear that it is not open to rational question, 194 considering
its acts must be carried by a majority. 195 The ultimate question is not what is the
true meaning of the constitution, but whether legislation is sustainable or not. 196
Thus, it should be possible for the judiciary to leave a legislative act untouched not
because they believe it represents the best Constitutional interpretation, but merely
because they have doubts as to its error. 197
Finally, it is submitted that Thayers ideas did not contradict Marbury v.

Madison, which he referred to. 198 Marburys oft-quoted pronouncement read:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say

what the law is. 199
However, Marbury preceded this statement with:

The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals,
not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in
which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court. 200
Alexander Hamilton, in fact, had already laid the seeds of this thought:
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges
of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is
conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered that this cannot
be the natural presumption where it is not to be collected from any particular
192 Bishop Hoadlys Sermon on The Nature of the Kingdom or Church of Christ, Mar. 31, 1717
(London, James Knapton 1717), quoted in Thayer, supra note 185, at 152. See Cruz v. Sec. of Envt and Natural
Resources, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000 (Mendoza, J., separate opinion).
193 Assn of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, 175
SCRA 343, 365, Jul. 14, 1989, quoted by Osmena v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 100318, 199 SCRA 750,
Jul. 30, 1991; Fernandez v. Sec. of Labor, G.R. No. 102940, Nov. 6, 1992 (Cruz, J., concurring).
194 Thayer, supra note 185, at 144. See Schapiro, supra note 180, at 668; Thomas Merrill, Marbury v.
Madison as the First Great Administrative Law Decision, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 481, 522 (2004); Robert Nagel,
Name-Calling and the Clear Error Rule, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 193, 200-02 (1993).
195 Thayer, supra note 185, at 145-46.
196 Id. at 150.
197 Id. at 151; Martin Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1828 (1996).
198 See Barkow, supra note 25, at 239; Monaghan, Marbury, supra note 184, at 7-8. See, however, Gary
Lawson, Thayer v. Marshall, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 221, 224-25 (1993).

199 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
200 Id. at 170. Marshall did not take that approach because he understood that the important, essential
corollary to judicial review was judicial self-restraint. He knew that if the Court did not defer on occasion to
Congresss determinations, that rather than being the co-equal branch that Charles Hobson described, the
Court would start to become more than equal; the Supreme Court would truly become supreme. Susan
Herman, Splitting the Atom of Marshalls Wisdom, 16 ST. JOHNS J. LEGAL COMMENT. 371, 375 (2002).
63
provisions in the Constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed that the

Constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people to
substitute their will to that of their constituents. 201
James Madison likewise stated that each [branch] must in the exercise of
its functions be guided by the text of the Constitution according to its own
interpretation of it. 202
Thayer influenced Holmes, 203 and wisps of his ideas float in some of his
decisions:
While the courts must exercise a judgment of their own, it by no means is

true that every law is void which may seem to the judges who pass upon it
excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or based upon conceptions of
morality with which they disagree. Considerable latitude must be allowed for
differences of view, as well as for possible peculiar conditions which this
court can know but imperfectly, if at all. Otherwise a constitution, instead of
embodying only relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally understood
by all English-speaking communities, would become the partisan of a
particular set of ethical or economical opinions, which by no means are held
semper ubique et ab omnibus. 204
Later adherents included Louis Brandeis, 205 Felix Frankfurter, 206 John
Harlan, 207 and Learned Hand. 208 More recently, this sort of judicial minimalism has
been associated with Alexander Bickel 209 and Cass Sunstein. 210 Support for
Thayers brand of judicial deference today may also be gleaned from parallel
201 Federalist No. 78, supra note 15, at 231.
202 Brian Feldman, Evaluating Public Endorsement of the Weak and the Strong Forms of Judicial Supremacy, 89 VA.
L. REV. 979, 982 (2003). I acknowledge, in the ordinary course of Government, that the exposition of the
laws and Constitution devolves upon the Judiciary. But I beg to know, upon what principle it can be
contended, that any one department draws from the Constitution greater powers than another, in marking out
the limits of the powers of the several departments? The Constitution is the charter of the people to the
Government; it specifies certain great powers as absolutely granted, and marks out the departments to
exercise them. If the Constitutional boundary of either be brought into question, I do not see that any one of
these independent departments has more right than another to declare their sentiments on that point. Brest,
supra note 186, at 84 (quoting James Madison).
203 Grey, Thayers Doctrine, supra note 177, at 35.
204 Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1903).
205 Francisco (Puno, J., concurring); Louis Jaffe, Comment, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for
Intermediate Premises, 80 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1967); Morton Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 63 (1993); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
206 Francisco (Puno, J., concurring); Hook, supra note 184, at 8; Schapiro, supra note 180, at 668, citing
Wallace Mendelson, The Influence of James B. Thayer upon the Work of Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 VAND.
L. REV. 71, 71 (1978); Colegrove v. Green, 328 US 549, 556 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.); Graves v. New York ex
rel. OKeefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.). [T]he ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is
the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it.
207 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207 (Harlan, J., concurring).
208 Edward Purcell, Learned Hand: The Jurisprudential Trajectory of an Old Progressive, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 873,
874 (1995). HAND, supra note 29.

209 J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 774
(1971); Anthony Kronman, Alexander Bickels Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1569 (1985). See
Alexander Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
210 Michael Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 893 (2003); Cass
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 103 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987).
practices. Courts, for example, often defer to administrative agencies legal

interpretations, owing to the latters specialized knowledge and particular
expertise: 211
Courts should not intervene in that administrative process, save upon a very
clear showing of serious violation of law or of fraud, personal malice or
wanton oppression. Courts have none of the technical and economic or
financial competence which specialized administrative agencies have at their
disposal, and in particular must be wary of intervening in matters which are
at their core technical and economic in nature but disguised, more or less
artfully, in the habiliments of a question of legal interpretation. 212
The Court has, further, specifically upheld the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction:
The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning
activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction
of mineral resources like coal It behooves the courts to stand aside even
when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the
primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency. 213
[I]f the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized
skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical
matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by
the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 214
This line of discussion has been extended to the Constitutional

Commissions. For example, Macalintal v. Commision on Elections 215 held:
The Commission on Elections should be allowed considerable latitude in

devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great
211 Schapiro, supra note 180, at 680-81; Thomas Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE
L.J. 969, 1032-33 (1992); Peter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Courts
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121-22 (1987); Cass Sunstein,
Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2093-94 (1990); Kevin Saunders, Interpretative
Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and a Proposal for Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 356-58;
Nicholas Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers and the Preferred Scope of Judicial Review, 88 NW. U. L. REV.
296, 321-25 (1993); Robert Anthony, Why Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and Courts, 7 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 7 (1990); Kenneth Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 292-95 (1986);
Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452,
453 (1989); Note, Powers of Congress and the Court Regarding the Availability and Scope of Review, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1551, 1560-61 (2001); Laurence Silberman, ChevronThe Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
821, 823 (1990); Frank Easterbrook, The Demand for Judicial Review, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 372, 372 (1993). See
Linda Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 646, 685-
86 (1988); Richard Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537,
1582-87 (1983).
212 Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Natl Telecommns Commn, G.R. No. 94374, 241 SCRA
486, 500, Feb. 21, 1995.

213 Philippine Natl Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118357, 272 SCRA 291, 309, May 6, 1997.
214 Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88550, 184 SCRA 426, 431-32, Apr. 18,
1990, citing United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59.
215 G.R. No. 157013, 405 SCRA 614, Jul. 10, 2003.
65
objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest elections. We
may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly
illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere.
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with
realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on
Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political
strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with
political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide
complex political questions. 216
AKBAYAN v. Commission on Elections 217 similarly accorded great weight to

the Commission on Elections conclusion that an extended registration for new
voters was infeasible, and even phrased this, The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility. Significantly, the recent case of Pimentel v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal 218 explicitly applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to the
House.
Finally, courts may defer out of a belief that the legislature intended to vest
jurisdiction over the matter in the agency when it created the latter.219
B. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT
United States Senator Sam Ervin professed:
[E]very Congressman is bound by his oath to support the Constitution, and

to determine to the best of his ability whether proposed legislation is
constitutional when he casts his vote in respect to it. 220
Coordinate interpretation might be inferred from laws, executive

regulations, and other acts, but the United States has actually experienced titanic,
inter-branch Constitutional debates. Quite unlike the Constitutional crisis that has
become a media buzzword in recent years, these episodes have involved the
political branches respecting a Supreme Court decision, but publicly challenging its
logic.
Coordinacy takes on a very practical significance with respect to the

Presidents powers of veto and pardon. In 1804, to cite an early example, Thomas
Jefferson pardoned several people convicted for libeling John Adams under the
Alien and Sedition Act of 1801. He later explained to Abigail Adams that he felt the
law was unconstitutional and should not be enforced, and that:
216 Id.
217 G.R. No. 147066, 355 SCRA 318, 342, Mar. 26, 2001.
218 G.R. No. 141489, 393 SCRA 227, 237, Nov. 29, 2002.
219 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516-17.
220 P. SCHUCK, THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEES 175 (1975), quoted in Brest, supra note 186, at 61. This
follows from the Constitution itself. Congress draws its lawmaking power from the fundamental document,
and must refer to it to gauge the scope of the power conferred. For example, the Constitution prohibits
specific enactments, such as bills of attainder. Id. at 63.
[N]othing in the Constitution has given [the judiciary] a right to decide for
the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for them. Both
magistrates are equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to them.
The judges, believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence
But the executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, were bound to
remit the execution of it; because that power had been confined to them by
the Constitution [T]he opinion which gives to the judges the right to
decide what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in
their own sphere of action, but for the legislature and executive also, in their
spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch. 221
Jefferson would repeat this practice several times. 222 Similarly, in 1832,
Andrew Jackson vetoed the renewal of the Bank of the United States charter, citing
not sound economics but a belief that such was unconstitutional despite the
positive ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland. 223 He stated:
The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to

control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative
capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may
deserve. 224
Dred Scott v. Sandford 225 held that Congress could not prevent slavery in the
territories, and further held that blacks could not qualify for citizenship. In doing
so, it sparked what Attorney General Edwin Meese called the greatest political
debate 226 in American history. Stephen Douglas, Abraham Lincolns opponent in
the 1858 Senate campaign, defended Dred Scott and further argued that it was final
and binding on the government and all citizens. Lincoln, however, responded that
judicial review and the peoples inherent right to self-governance could function
together. He argued that while Dred Scott was binding on the parties concerned,
We nevertheless do oppose [Dred Scott] as a political rule which shall be

binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be
221 Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1490 (2003). See
Brest, supra note 186, at 67; Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707,
712 (1985). David Engdahl, John Marshalls Jeffersonian Concept of Judicial Review, 42 DUKE L.J. 279, 338 (1992).
Jefferson added:
[T]he constitution moreover, as a further security for itself, ... has provided for its own reintegration by
a change of the persons exercising the functions of those department. Succeeding functionaries have the
same right to judge of the conformity or non-conformity of an act with the constitution, as their predecessors
who past it.
222 Mulhern, supra note 29, at 125.
223 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
224 White, Constitutional Journey, supra note 221, at 1495; Brest, supra note 186, at 67-68; Mulhern, supra
note 29, at 126; Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 221, at 713-14.
225 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
226 Meese, supra note 180, at 984. This 1986 address at Tulane University sparked intense debate.
Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 29, at 1360-61; Samuel Estreicher & Richard
Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 Yale L.J. 679, 723 (1989); Sanford Levinson, Could
Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (1987); Mulhern, supra note 29, at 126-27; Burt
Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TUL. L. REV. 991, 991-93 (1987); Michel Rosenfeld,
Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law: Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation
of Powers, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 137, 137-38 (1993).
67
binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no measure

that does not actually concur with the principles of that decision. 227
Following Lincolns formulation, Meese would distinguish the Constitution

itself from Constitutional Law, that body of law that has resulted from the
Supreme Courts adjudications involving disputes over constitutional provisions or
doctrines. 228 Otherwise, as Lincoln argued, the people would cease to govern
themselves and practically allow government to lapse solely into the Courts
hands. 229
President Franklin Delano Roosevelts New Deal provided the backdrop

for another passionate Constitutional clash. When new laws expanding the federal
governments role in the economy were passed, a Court resting on its laissez-faire
influenced jurisprudence struck them down. 230 Roosevelt responded by debating
the decisions in public, arguing not the outcomes, but dissecting the Courts own
Constitutional reasoning. Reacting to Schechter Poultry, for example, he quipped, We
have been relegated to the horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce, 231
an expression soon repeated by newspapers. Taking up this refrain, he insisted in
his inaugural State of the Union address that means must be found to adapt our
legal forms and our judicial interpretation to the actual present national needs of the
largest progressive democracy in the modern world. 232
Eventually, this line of criticism found its way into letters and the Senate
halls, and the criticism was vividly captured by the label nine old men, after the
title of a book by Drew Pearson and Robert Allen. Practically taking his questions
of Constitutional interpretation to the electorate, Roosevelt won a broad mandate in
1936, and quickly sprang the Court-packing plan that would add a justice to the
Court for every justice over seventy that failed to retire. With the switch in time
that saved nine, the Court eventually changed its philosophy and the impasse was
broken. 233
Columbia professor Bruce Ackerman distinguishes between ordinary,

everyday politics, and a higher form of constitutional politics, 234 a view traced back
to The Federalist itself, which speaks of a constitutional road to the decision of the
227 Meese, supra note 226, at 985.

228 Id. at 981.
229 Brest, supra note 186, at 77-78 quoting Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861)
reprinted in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 585 (Basler ed. 1969). Fisher, Constitutional
Interpretation, supra note 221, at 714-15; Mulhern, supra note 29, at 126.
230 See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388
(1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
231 Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Laws Politics, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 971, 1019 (2000).

232 Id.
233 Id. at 1020-31; Salvador Esguerra, The Need for a New Perspective on the Power of Judicial Review, 28 U.S.T.
L.J. 4, 10-11 (1977). See Mulhern, supra note 29, at 126.

234 The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1039 (1984).
people ought to be marked out and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary
occasions. 235
Ackerman further argues that the Constitutional thinking that won out in
the New Deal was an example of a pivotal, transformational Constitutional moment
as important as the original ratification itself. 236 Nevertheless, the above examples
also highlight that the political branches have specific Constitutional tools with
which to debate the judiciary on Constitutional interpretation, tools found in
ordinary politics and debates, and well short of rallying the electorate to amend the
charter. Specifically, Congress can actually enact laws designed to subvert a judicial
holding without challenging it head on, 237 including the explicit power to contract
courts subject matter jurisdiction, 238 or impeach Justices outright. 239 Less directly,
it maintains its own legal advisers, and may summon legal experts and advocates to
Congressional hearings. 240
The President, on the other hand, may veto laws that support a particular
holding, 241 refuse to enforce such laws 242 or judgments, 243 pardon individuals
convicted under a particular law upheld by the Court, 244 or influence agency-level
legal interpretation and rulemaking. 245 In this last respect, it thus helps to look at
agents such as the Secretary of Justice, Presidential Legal Counsel, and Solicitor
General as holding a significant interpretative role, and focusing on their inherent
lack of independence and insulation from political factors misses the point since the
political branches necessarily do not function like the judiciary. 246 Finally, he may

236 Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note 23, at 503-07; Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our
Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 476, 568-73 (1995).

237 Brest, supra note 186, at 93-97. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56-AUT
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273 (1993); Peter Strauss, Comment, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater?, A Comment
on the Supreme Courts Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789.
238 CONST. art. VIII, 2; Lawrence Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 TermForeword: Constitutional
Limitations on Congress Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 18 (1981);
Steven Calabresi & Kevin Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1153, 1175 (1992); Mulhern, supra note 29, at 122; Abner Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and
Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 589 (1983); Roger Davidson, The Lawmaking Congress, 56-AUT
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 99-100 (1993).
239 CONST. art. XI, 3.
240 Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 221, at 729-30. See Michael Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A
Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1988).
241 CONST. art. VI, 27; Michael Rappaport, The Presidents Veto and the Constitution, 87 NW. U. L. REV.
735, 766-71 (1993).

242 Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and Practice: Two Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen
and One for His Critics, 83 GEO. L.J. 373, 378-80 (1994); Geoffrey Miller, The Presidents Power of Interpretation:
Implications of a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law, 56-AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 50-51 (1993); Gary
Lawson & Christopher Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1286-88
(1996); Christopher May, Presidential Defiance of Unconstitutional Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 865, 992-93 (1994).
243 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law is, 83 GEO. L.J.
217, 251 (1994).

244 CONST. art. VII, 19.
245 CONST. art. VII, 16-17. See Lawrence Lessig, Readings by our Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
175, 186-89 (1993).

246 John McGinnis, Review Essay, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor Generals Office in Constitutional and
Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799, 801-04 (1992); John McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the
69
also appoint judges who support a particular interpretation, 247 a process heavily
scrutinized in the United States by the media and lobby groups alike, 248 and
highlighted by Judge Robert Borks blocked confirmation. 249
It also follows that the Executive and Legislative may challenge each
others interpretations; 250 for example, Congress can overrule an Executive Order
simply by passing a law on the subject, which the President may opt to veto. This,
in turn, follows the larger pattern of judicial noninterference in constitutional claims
of these two branches against each other. Such claims are often part of the political
bargaining between the two, and are rarely meant to be resolved before a judge
rather than through political tools, such as threats by Congress not to pass the
national budget. 251
Of course, the political branches and the President in particular, may

simply refuse to enforce a decision of the least dangerous branch, 252 reminiscent of
Andrew Jacksons retort to Worcester v. Georgia: 253 John Marshall has made his
decision; now let him enforce it! 254 When practiced by administrative agencies, this
has been called nonacquiescence. For example, the American Social Security
Administration blatantly disregarded late 1970s appellate court rulings that would
make it more difficult for the agency to reduce the number of its beneficiaries, to
the point that the Ninth Circuit promulgated a statewide injunction and Congress
considered legislation to put an end to the conflict. 255 In the Philippines, one can
glean its existence from rulings such as Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission:
We note with stern disapproval that the Civil Service Commission has once
again directed the appointment of its own choice in the case at bar. We must
Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 378-406 (1993);
Samuel Alito, Jr., Change in Continuity at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 507, 510-11 (1993);
Jeremy Rabkin, At the Presidents Side: The Role of the White House Counsel in Constitutional Policy, 56-AUT LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 63-64 (1993); Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 267-70 (1993); Douglas Kmiec, OLCs Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a
Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337, 338-39 (1993); Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of the Legal
Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 488 (1993). Moreover, only the judiciary issues its interpretations
systematically. Rogers Smith, The American Creed and Constitutional Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1694-95
(1982) (book review).
247 CONST. art. VIII, 9. See Vik Amar, The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. 1111, 1119-20 (1988).
Amar states that American Senators, as confirming authorities, have a duty to scrutinize the constitutional
viewpoints of appointees.
248 Stephen Wermiel, Confirming the Constitution: The Role of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 56-AUT LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 121, 122-25 (1993); John McGinnis, The President, The Senate, The Constitution, and the
Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 652-59 (1993).
249 Bruce Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1164-70 (1988); Walter
Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 985, 986-87 (1990).
250 See Thomas Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 430 (1987).

251 Monaghan, Judicial Review, supra note 150, at 302.
252 See Dawn Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63-SPG LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2000).

253 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (Marshall, C.J.).
254 I HORACE GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CONFLICT, A HISTORY OF THE GREAT REBELLION 106
(1864).
255 Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 226, at 681-82, 703; Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir., 1984).
therefore make the following injunctions which the Commission must note
well and follow strictly.
Up to this point, the Court has leniently regarded the attitude of the public
respondent on this matter as imputable to a lack of comprehension and not
to intentional intransigence. But we are no longer disposed to indulge that
fiction. Henceforth, departure from the mandate of Luego by the Civil Service
Commission after the date of the promulgation of this decision shall be
considered contempt of this Court

The Commission on Civil Service has been duly warned. Henceforth, it
disobeys at its peril. 256
Nonacquiescence may persist in part because a single court branch or

division will rarely exercise exclusive jurisdiction over an agency, short of the
Supreme Court itself, in part because of multiple decisionmakers in an agency, and
in part because the government is not estopped from relitigating issues short of a
Supreme Court ruling. 257 This brand of defiance can be very effective when one
considers that unless an administrative decision is brought to a court, the agency is
effectively the final interpreter of the subject. Nevertheless, New York University
professors Samuel Estreicher and Richard Revesz propose that prior to a final
pronouncement by the Supreme Court, nonacquiescence has the positive effect of
sharpening issues by giving different courts the opportunity to rule on them, and
allows an agency greater latitude in seeking to validate its legal position. 258
History bears out that the United States benefited from the dissent voiced
at the highest levels, 259 the right to dissent is close to the crux of democracy after
all. Arguably, the Philippines has not experienced the brand of sustained debate
described, despite several controversial decisions including a number that touched
on economic policy. Perhaps the country comes closest when legislators intervene
before the Court and speak there. Senator Pimentel did this, for example, in the
hearings for Francisco, and bluntly opined to the Court that it had no authority to tell
the House it was mistaken in its interpretation of the Constitution. He even assured
the Justices Davide would receive an impartial trial at the Senate if it came to
that. 260
In Francisco, Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago opined, The common-law

principle of judicial restraint serves the public interest by allowing the political
processes to operate without undue interference, 261 a good argument for
256 Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 96298, 197 SCRA 106, 113-14, May 14, 1991.
Lapinids scathing rebuke was reiterated three years later in Mauna v. Civil Service Commission. G.R. No. 97794,
232 SCRA 388, 396-97, May 13, 1994.
257 Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 226, at 684-85, 690-92; United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154
(1984).
258 Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 226, at 737, 771.
259 Bernard Bell, Marbury v. Madison and the Madisonian Vision, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 204-08 (2003).
260 Inquirer News Service, Contrasting views given at Supreme Court hearing, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Nov. 7,
2003 at http://www.inq7.net/nat/2003/nov/07/text/nat_4-1-p.htm.
261 Francisco (Ynares-Santiago, J., concurring and dissenting). See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1225 (1978).
71
coordinacy in this context. 262 Moreover, Judge Abner Mikva argues that legislatures
should not take the more politically convenient course of rerouting difficult moral
debates to the judiciary, and the Supreme Court should not allow the resulting
political pressure to be shunted onto it. 263
IV. APPLYING COORDINACY THEORY TO THE 2004 CANVASS
A. RECONCILING COORDINACY AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION
Columbia professor Herbert Wechslers reconciliation of the political

question doctrine and an absolute view of judicial review readily applies to
coordinacy:
[T]he only proper judgment that may lead to an abstention from decision is
that the Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to
another agency of government than the courts. what is involved is in itself
an act of constitutional interpretation That, I submit, is toto caelo different
from a broad discretion to abstain or intervene. 264
It must be emphatically asserted that coordinate constitutional

interpretation is closely related, but is not identical, to the political question
doctrine, or at the very least takes a very different perspective. The former is
founded on the political branches positive duty of contemporaneous interpretation,
and fits within the expanded certiorari jurisdiction because the Court need only check
if the interpretation is permissible and thus not a grave abuse of discretion. The
latter is one of the means of declining jurisdiction Alexander Bickel enumerated. 265
This subtle distinction is reflected in Justice Punos Francisco separate opinion, which
also mirrors Wechslers framework:
[T]he 1987 Constitution adopted neither judicial restraint nor judicial

activism as a political philosophy to the exclusion of each other. The
expanded definition of judicial power gives the Court enough elbow room to
be more activist in dealing with political questions but did not necessarily
junk restraint in resolving them.
The antagonism between judicial restraint and judicial activism is avoided by

the coordinacy theory of constitutional interpretation. This coordinacy
theory gives room for judicial restraint without allowing the judiciary to
abdicate its constitutionally mandated duty to interpret the constitution. 266
262 The counterargument against coordinacy is the opposite of this kind of flexible, dynamic
interpretation. Law, it is argued, must have authority and the ability to foster uniform action given a
multiplicity of views. Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 29, at 1375-79; Alexander &
Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy, supra note 28, at 482; Allan Ides, Essay, Judicial Supremacy and the Law of the
Constitution, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 491, 514-17 (1999).
263 Mikva, Support and Defend, supra note 238, at 588-89.
264 Wechsler, supra note 29, at 9.
265 Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40
(1961). The other passive virtues are the standing, actual case and controversy, and ripeness requirements.
266 Francisco (Puno, J., concurring).
However, the political question doctrine reflects a constitutional design

that does not require the judiciary to supply the substantive content of all the
Constitutions provisions, 267 and in this sense, lays a foundation for coordinate
interpretation. Indeed, the more positive nature of coordinacy beautifully undercuts
the two principal assumptions used to disbelieve the political question doctrine: 1)
that the judiciary has a monopoly on Constitutional interpretation; and 2) even
assuming it does not, attempting to restrict its power of interpretation has dire
consequences. 268 Further:
It is no coincidence that judges and scholars have relied on the existence of

the political question doctrine to support their theories that other branches
are charged with the responsibility of interpreting the Constitution. Justice
Scalia has cited the political question doctrine to support the argument that
not all constitutional violations must be remediable in the courts. Paul Brest,
arguing against a theory of judicial exclusivity in interpretation, notes that
such a theory takes no account of so-called political questions. Lawrence
Sager has observed that [t]he very existence of the political question doctrine
in our constitutional jurisprudence thus reflects a partial recognition of his
thesis of judicially underenforced constitutional norms. Erwin Chemerinsky
has similarly relied on the political question doctrine to support his claim
that for each part of the Constitution one branch of government is assigned
the role of final arbiter of disputes. Archibald Cox has asserted that [t]he
underlying considerations are hardly different between the deference
accorded political determinations under the commerce, due process or equal
protection clauses, and the determination whether a question is political.
Michael McConnell has used political question doctrine cases to support his
view that Congress has the power to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to
enforce Section 5 of that amendment. (internal citations omitted) 269
The problem with this foundation is that it has been all but eroded in
practice. 270 In the United States, for example, one need look no further than Bush v.
Gore. 271 However, this is only the culmination of a trend that began with the Warren
and Burger Courts, until the Rehnquist Court adhered to an absolutist sense of
judicial supremacy. 272 For example:
[T]he Framers, Rehnquist wrote, crafted the federal system of

government so that the peoples rights would be secured by the division of
power. They were concerned that the Constitutions provisions not be
defined solely by the political branches nor the scope of legislative power
267 Barkow, supra note 25, at 239.

268 Mulhern, supra note 29, at 100-01.
269 Id. at 318. Compare id. and Francisco (Puno, J., concurring). Coordinacy theory rests on the premise that
within the constitutional system, each branch of government has an independent obligation to interpret the
Constitution. This obligation is rooted on the system of separation of powers. The oath to support this
Constitution, proves this independent obligation.
270 Melissa Blair, Terrorism, Americas Porous Borders, and the Role of the Invasion Clause Post-9/11/2001, 87
MARQ. L. REV. 167, 196 (2003).

271 Spencer Overton, Restraint and Responsibility: Judicial Review of Campaign Reform, 61 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 663, 675 n.38 (2004). Professor Sanford Levinson goes so far as to call it a judicial putsch. Why I Still
Wont Teach Marbury (Except in a Seminar), 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 588, 600 (2004).
272 Barkow, supra note 25, at 302-03; Theodore Ruger, A Question Which Convulses the Nation: The Early
Republics Greatest Debate About the Judicial Review Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 826, 896-97 (2004).
73
limited only by public opinion and the legislature's self-restraint. For those
propositions Rehnquist cited Marbury v. Madison. No doubt the political
branches have a role in interpreting and applying the Constitution,
Rehnquist noted, but ever since Marbury this Court has remained the
ultimate expositor of the constitutional text. 273
The same is true in the Philippines, considering heavy blows dealt it by the
stigma of Martial Law abuses such as Javellana v. Executive Secretary 274 and the
expanded certiorari jurisdiction. 275 Cases such as Tanada v. Cuenco remain good law,
and this decision held:
It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province
of the judiciary It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie
outside the scope of the judicial questions, which under the constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. 276
This formulation was honed in Baker v. Carr:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is

found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 277
Francisco and Lopez were both covered by the first phrase. As Justice Tinga
argued in Lopez, the Court should have determined whether the act alleged went
outside the texts bounds, and then stop if it did not. Criticizing the methodology of
these cases, however, they all appear to parade political question precedents by rote,
and proceed to give the doctrine short shrift so long as some violation of a specific
Constitutional provision is alleged. Justice Puno, for example, simply wrote in
Lopez:
273 White, Constitutional Journey, supra note 221, at 1466 quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000).
274 Francisco; Javellana v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 36142, 50 SCRA 30, Mar. 31, 1973.
275 Francisco; Cruz v. Sec. of Envt and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, 347 SCRA 128, Dec. 6,
2000 (Mendoza, J., separate opinion).

276 Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051, 1067 (1957).
277 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), quoted in Francisco; Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710,
353 SCRA 452, 490, Mar. 2, 2001. Baker is cited in many other Philippine precedents, down to its expression
political thicket.
We have a continuous river of rulings that the political question doctrine

cannot be invoked when the issue is whether an executive act or a law
violates the Constitution. 278
Francisco distinguished between truly political and not truly political

questions. However, despite the clear textual assignment of a power to Congress in
all three cases, the Court almost automatically asserted a not truly political
scenario given a specific provision raised in the pleadings. Thus, in Francisco, the
Court promulgated a very detailed interpretation regarding the filing and initiation
of impeachment complaints, such that there could only be one possible
interpretation regarding a second impeachment complaint. Impeachment is the
prototypical 279 political question, and [i]f the political question doctrine has no
force where the Constitution has explicitly committed a power to a coordinate
branch and where the need for finality is extreme, then it is surely dead.280
Nevertheless, Francisco merely distinguished impeachment under the Philippine
Constitution by citing additional restrictions not applicable to the American model.
As for Ruy Lopez and Pimentel, every separate opinion claimed an assumption of
jurisdiction would be proper, and proceeded to volunteer an interpretation.
B. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINES MERITS
As the dark shroud of Martial Law slowly dissipates and fades into the
mists of history, it is imperative that the Court reevaluate the positive but now
overlooked reasons for the political question doctrines existence. Due to its
relation with this doctrine, coordinacy shares many of the same forgotten merits.
Fr. Bernas culls three kinds of political questions from Baker:
1) textual: where there is found a textually demonstrable constitutional

commitment of the issue to a political department.
2) functional: where there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable

standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.
3) prudential: where there is the impossibility of a courts undertaking

independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question. 281
278 Lopez, 20 (Puno, J., separate opinion), citing Gonzales v. Commn on Elections, 129 Phil. 7 (1967).
279 Ronald Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 KY. L.J. 707, 728
(1988).
280 Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 246 (D.C. Cir., 1991).
281 BERNAS, supra note 92, at 953-54; Janice Ramirez, Congress as a Constituent Assembly: Examining the
Extent of its Discretion in the Amendatory Procedure, 48 ATENEO L.J. 506, 528-29, 545-47 (2003). See Joaquin
Bernas, S.J., Separation of Powers: The Supreme Court and the Political Departments, 11 ATENEO L.J. 1, 8-29 (1961);
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., The Faces and Uses of the Political Questions Doctrine: Reflections on Habeas Corpus, the PCO
and Bail, 28 ATENEO L.J. 1, 1-9 (1983).
75
The first textual question is arguably the most familiar segment of Baker in
Philippine jurisprudence, 282 an observation borne out by Franciscos focus on its
truly political and not truly political distinction. Its rationale is simply the
majoritarian nature of textual commitments to political branches argued in this
article, including the importance of promoting political debate outside the courts.
This has been effectively rejected by the Court, again, by pointing to a specific
Constitutional provision put in issue by a party and its own duty to delimit the
Consitution. 283 Further, this approach has been expansive in practice. Marcos v.
Manglapus, for example, resolved the broad question of whether or not there was
any legal foundation for the President to bar the Marcoses return, without focusing
on any particular provision. 284
The second functional question is the inverse of the first, 285 where a lack
of explicit rules implies a Constitutional leave to those concerned to act as they see
fit. 286 This author proposes, however, that this is the same line of political question
whose academic foundations were laid by Wechsler. 287 As Bernass designation
implies, these are questions better answered by a political branch with greater
institutional competence in a particular task. 288 This also goes back to majoritarian
concerns, since these branches enjoy greater proximity and direct accountability to
the electorate in the Madisonian vision. 289 One also recalls Thayers proposition
that Congress actually functions as the fundamental laws primary interpreter. 290
The functional argument is more visible in judicial deference to administrative
agencies, which it admits are intrinsically more capable of handling technical issues
in specialized fields.
Bernas declares the third prudential question extinct under the 1987
Constitution, 291 which holds judicial review as a duty more than a power. These are
the questions which Professor Erwin Chemerinsky states are declined in
282 Scrutinize, for example, the line of cases cited in the preliminary discussion of the doctrine in Estrada
v. Desierto. G.R. No. 146710, 356 SCRA 452, Mar. 2, 2001. This mirrors the preliminary discussion of other
precedents.
283 Francisco cited post-1987 examples given by Dean Pacifico Agabin during the oral arguments.
Francisco, citing Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 177 SCRA 668, 695, Sep. 15, 1989; Bengzon v. Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89914, 203 SCRA 767, 776, Nov. 20, 1991; Daza v. Singson, G.R. No.
86344, 180 SCRA 496, 501, Dec. 21, 1989.
284 Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 177 SCRA 668, 696, Sep. 15, 1989.
285 BERNAS, supra note 92, at 956.
286 See Peter Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987).

287 Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 444
(2004).
288 Christopher Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347,
352 (1994); Charles Tiefer, The Flag-Burning Controversy of 1989-1990: Congress Valid Role in Constitutional Dialogue,
29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 357, 380-82 (1992).
289 Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1341 (2001). Sherry,
however, argues that the American Founders distrusted the common people. Suzanna Sherry, An Originalist
Understanding of Minimalism, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 175, 176 (1993).
290 Schapiro, supra note 180, at 700-08; Jonathan Macey, Thayer, Nagel, and the Founders Design: A Comment,
88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226, 231 (1993).

preservation of the judiciarys political capital, 292 when a case is simply beyond a
courts practical limits to adjudicate. 293 The significance of prudential concerns were
most famously articulated by Bickel, who posited that abstention is appropriate
when the sheer momentousness of a decision unbalances judgment and prevents
one from subsuming the normal calculations of probabilities. 294 He proposed
adherence to the passive virtues because:
It follows that courts may give no opinions, even in a concrete case, which
are advisory because they are not finally decisive, the power of ultimate
disposition of the case having been reserved elsewhere These are ideas at
the heart of the reasoning in Marbury v. Madison. They constitute not so much
limitations of the power of judicial review as necessary supports for the
argument which established it. 295
Bickel subsumed these virtues into the words of art that are
shorthand, 296 the case and controversy and the standing requirements,297 and the
Courts increasing liberality in taking jurisdiction has not gone without protest. For
example, Justice Puno criticized Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona: 298
By its decision, the majority has entertained a public action to annul a private
contract. In so doing, the majority may have given sixty (60) million Filipinos
the standing to assail contracts of government and its agencies. This is an
invitation for chaos to visit our law on contract 299
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza likewise criticized Cruz v. Secretary of

Environment and Natural Resources:
To decline the exercise of jurisdiction in this case is no more a cop out or

a sign of timidity than it was for Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison
to declare in the end that after all mandamus did not lie

To decline, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine
controversy is not to show timidity but respect for the judgment of a coequal
292 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and the Role of the Academic Commentator, 40 S.
TEX. L. REV. 943, 948 (1999). See Harold Hongju Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel From Itself, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 513, 514-15 (1993). Koh reasons that the American Presidents Office of Legal Counsel
must preserve its political capital as well. See Tom Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1994).
293 Scott Birkey, Gordon v. Texas and the Prudential Approach to Political Questions, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1265, 1266
(1999).
294 Barkow, supra note 25, at 295. See Fritz Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional
Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 566-83 (1966); Martin Redish, Judicial Review and the Political Question, 79 NW. U. L.
REV. 1031, 1032 (1984).
295 Bickel, supra note 265, at 42.
296 Id. See Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, 232 SCRA 110, May 5, 1994 (Puno, J.,
dissenting).
297 Professor Simard argues that the political question doctrine may be subsumed into standing. Linda
Sandstrom Simard, Standing Alone: Do We Still Need the Political Question Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REV. 303, 333
(1996).
298 G.R. No. 113375, 232 SCRA 110, May 5, 1994.
299 Id. at 178.
77
department of government whose acts, unless shown to be clearly repugnant

to the fundamental law, are presumed to be valid. 300
Nevertheless, returning to the prudential arguments specifically, the Court

has squarely rejected the notion that it may be powerless in reality to render a
decision. Francisco most recently stated: Justices cannot abandon their consti-
tutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis. 301 This
cavalier bravado would, despite Bickels arguments, have the Court theoretically
standing fast in the face of, John Marshall has made his decision; now let him
enforce it! 302
This type of reasoning entered jurisprudence very shortly after the 1987
Constitution took effect. Marcos v. Manglapus, for example, held:
The framers of the Constitution believed that the free use of the political
question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos years to fall back on
prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of
consequences or a fear that it was extravagantly extending judicial power in
the cases where it refused to examine and strike down an exercise of
authoritarian power The Constitution was accordingly amended. We are
now precluded by its mandate from refusing to invalidate a political use of
power through a convenient resort to the question doctrine. 303
More vividly, Bondoc v. Pineda 304 opened:
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of
our Government, was all too willing to avoid a political confrontation with
the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like in the sands of the
political question doctrine. 305
As already discussed, citations of Justice Concepcions comments during

the Constitutional deliberations were cited all the way to Francisco, and the specter of
Martial Law seems to explain why even invocations of non-prudential questions are
routinely rejected. 306 Seemingly, only the formation of a revolutionary
government 307 could be a prudential concern momentous enough to validly give
300 Cruz v. Sec. of Envt and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, 347 SCRA 128, Dec. 6, 2000
(Mendoza, J., separate opinion). The majority opinion explicitly made the separate opinion an integral part of it.
301 Francisco. Redish argues, The moral cost of such a result, both to society in general and to the
Supreme Court in particular, far outweighs whatever benefits are thought to derive from the judicial
abdication of the review function. Redish, supra note 294, at 1059-60.
302 I GREELEY, supra note 254, at 106 (quoting Andrew Jackson). See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515
(1832).
303 Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 177 SCRA 668, 695, Sep. 15, 1989. Compare Justice Irene
Cortess phrasing to that of Bickels.

304 G.R. No. 97710, 201 SCRA 792, Sep. 26, 1991.
305 Id. at 795.
306 See BERNAS, supra note 92, at 959-61; Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224 SCRA 792, Jul. 30,
1993; Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 249 SCRA 628, Sep. 23, 1995; Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, 338 SCRA 81, Aug. 15, 2000.
307 See Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986.
rise to a political question, as implied by Estrada v. Desierto 308 and its citation of how
the Freedom Constitution explicitly stated defiance to the 1973 Constitution.
Finally, there is intangible merit in effectively postponing a judicial

declaration for a better time, one when a clearer precedent might be penned. As
Justice Robert Jackson wrote in Korematsu v. United States, echoing Thayer:
But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it
conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show
that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has
validated the principle The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim
of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our
law and thinking and expands it to new purposes. All who observe the work
of courts are familiar with what Judge Cardozo described as the tendency of
a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic But if we review and
approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution.
There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its
own image. Nothing better illustrates this danger than does the Courts
opinion in this case. 309
For example, after the Court took jurisdiction in Estrada v. Desierto, Justice
Ynares-Santiago wrote:
It cannot be overlooked that this Courts legitimation through sufferance of the change of
administration may have the effect of encouraging People Power Three, People Power Four,
and People Power ad infinitum. It will promote the use of force and mob
coercion by activist groups expert in propaganda warfare to intimidate
government officials to resolve national problems only in the way the group
wants them to be settled. Even now, this Court is threatened with the use of
mob action if it does not immediately proclaim respondent Arroyo as a
permanent and de jure President. (emphasis in original) 310
C. POLITICAL QUESTION DECISIONS THROUGH THE LENS OF COORDINACY
The political question doctrine presents a seeming enigma: indubitable

merits on the one hand, and the 1987 Constitutions near absolute bar on the other.
Again, because coordinacy shares the same merits but arguably not the Marcos
dictatorships stigma, one wonders whether recent landmark decisions could have
instead been decided from the coordinacy perspective. Perhaps one also wonders
whether the Court consciously or unconsciously recognizes these merits but
achieves similar results by framing decisions using other grounds, in which case
coordinacy might be a more palatable solution that avoids the embedding Justice
Jackson cautions against. One recalls the dictum in Estrada v. Desierto:
To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political
question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed
308 Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710, 356 SCRA 452, 492, Mar. 2, 2001.
309 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
310 Estrada, 356 SCRA at 570 (Ynares-Santiago, J., separate opinion).
79
by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests
on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations,
continue to be refined in the mills constitutional law. 311
The sections that follow seek to revisit each of the Courts post-1987
political question pronouncements, but focuses on those dealing with the President
or Congress. 312 Preliminarily, the discussion excludes the many decisions that refer
to Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 313 since these involved not constitutional
interpretation but the discretion of appointing authorities. 314 It likewise excludes
decisions made directly by the electorate, such as those made pursuant to the
plebiscite requirement, 315 or expressing loss of confidence through recall elections
under the Local Government Code:
[T]his Court issued a TRO but the signing of the petition for recall took
place just the same on the scheduled date through no fault of the respondent
COMELEC

Whether or not the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost confidence
in the incumbent mayor is a political question. The constituents have made
a judgment and their will to recall the incumbent mayor (Evardone) has
already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. 316
It also excludes a handful of other miscellaneous issues, such as the

demarcation of boundaries between municipalities. 317 On the other hand, given the
waning invocation of the political question doctrine after the early 90s, it includes
cases with hints of the doctrine but no explicit mention of it.
311 Id. at 490.

312 For a thorough discussion of judicial interference in Philippine executive and legislative action, see
Agabin, supra note 9, at 193-208.

313 G.R. No. 69137, 143 SCRA 327, Aug. 5, 1986.
314 The power of appointment is essentially a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide. Central Bank v. Civil Service Commn, G.R. No. 80455, 171
SCRA 744, Apr. 10, 1989. Patagoc v. Civil Service Commn, G.R. No. 90229, 185 SCRA 411, May 14, 1990;
Teologo v. Civil Service Commn , G.R. No. 92103, 191 SCRA 238, Nov. 8, 1990; Lopez v. Civil Service
Commn, G.R. No. 92140, 194 SCRA 269, Feb. 19, 1991; Cortez v. Civil Service Commn, G.R. No. 92673,
195 SCRA 216, Mar. 13, 1991; Lapinid v. Civil Service Commn, G.R. No. 96298, 197 SCRA 106, May 14,
1991; Abila v. Civil Service Commn, G.R. No. 92573, 198 SCRA 102, Jun. 3, 1991; Barrozo v. Civil Service
Commn, G.R. No. 93479, 198 SCRA 487, Jun. 25, 1991; Lusterio v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
74814, 199 SCRA 255, Jul. 16, 1991; Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 201 SCRA 210, Sep. 3, 1991;
Dela Cruz v. Civil Service Commn, G.R. No. 88333, 204 SCRA 419, Dec. 2, 1991; Espanol v. Civil Service
Commn, G.R. No. 85479, 206 SCRA 715, Mar. 3, 1992; Medalla, Jr. v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 94255, 208
SCRA 351, May 5, 1992; Home Insurance and Guaranty Corp. v. Civil Service Commn, G.R. No. 95450, 220
SCRA 148, Mar. 19, 1993; Felix v. Buenasada, G.R. No. 109704, 240 SCRA 139, Jan. 17, 1995.
315 Miranda v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133064, 314 SCRA 603, Sep. 16, 1999. The Court struck down a law
converting an independent component city into a component city without the Constitutionally required
plebiscite, and ruled this did not involve a political question. This was only proper in the sense that the
Constitution vested discretion in the city residents and not in Congress.
316 Evardone v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 94010, 204 SCRA 464, 471-72, Dec. 2, 1991. See Garcia
v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 111511, 227 SCRA 100, 118, Oct. 5, 1993.
317 Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya, G.R. No. 41322, 166 SCRA 70, Sep. 29, 1988.
1. The Presidents Powers of Veto and Pardon

Gonzales v. Macaraig 318 upheld President Corazon Aquinos veto of specific
provisions in the General Appropriations Bill for 1989, despite a Senate resolution
that opined this was unconstitutional. The Court cited jurisprudence under the 1935
Constitution and held these still applicable to the 1987 Constitution, 319 and noted
that some portions of the bill were Constitutionally inappropriate for an
appropriations bill. The case appears laudable from the point of view of coordinacy
as both political branches had made their interpretations very clear and the Court
intervened when congressmen sought a final ruling from it. Further, the decision
reminded Congress that it had the option to override the Presidents veto if it truly
believed it was unconstitutional, but made no attempt to do so. Finally, the decision
hardly strayed into an evaluation of the soundness of either sides proposed policy,
a restraint not all later decisions up to the Canvass Resolutions adhered to.
Llamas v. Orbos 320 upheld President Aquinos pardon of Governor Mariano

Ocampo III in an administrative case, holding that the Constitution only qualified
the power to pardon by excluding impeachment cases from it. In a similar
discussion, it found no grave abuse of discretion.
2. Social Justice and State Policies

Assn of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 321
was one of the earliest pronouncements on the 1987 Constitutions Social Justice
provisions, 322 and upheld President Aquinos agrarian reform program and the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Among other things, it upheld the
expropriation of privately-owned land for redistribution, and upheld the public
purpose claimed. The Court may be said to have deferred to the political branches
united interpretation:
The legislature and the executive have seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in
the CARP the redistribution of private landholdings The Court sees no
justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert only if we believe
that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be
so. 323
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources 324 could have been a
rough parallel 325 of Assn of Small Landowners, but the Court split 7-7 and dismissed
the case. Six Justices voted to sustain the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
based on what seemed to be their positions regarding the laws provisions, the
318 G.R. No. 87836, 191 SCRA 450, 464, Nov. 19, 1990.
319 Bengson v. Sec. of Justice, 62 Phil. 912, 915 (1936); Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia, G.R. No. 20740,
11 SCRA 486, 493, Jun. 30, 1964.

320 G.R. No. 99031, 202 SCRA 844, 857, Oct. 15, 1991.
SCRA 343, Jul. 14, 1989.

322 CONST. art. XIII, 4.
323 Assn of Small Landowners, 175 SCRA at 377-78.
324 Cruz v. Sec. of Envt and Natural Resources, 347 SCRA 128, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000.
325 CONST. art. II, 22; Art. XII 5; Art. XIII 1, 6; Art. XIV 17; Art. XVI 12.
81
Constitution, and ancestral domains vis--vis the Regalian doctrine. 326 Reference to
Congress Constitutional vision was limited to excerpts from the laws legislative
deliberations. Seven Justices voted to strike down the law with a similar
methodology, 327 while Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the case because the
petitioners had no standing.
Unlike in Assn of Small Landowners, one might criticize the Justices for
going well beyond determining whether the IPRA was passed arbitrarily and
straying well into the realm of policymaking. 328 Justice Artemio Panganiban, for
example, wrote:
Based on ethnographic surveys, the solicitor general estimates that ancestral

domains cover 80 percent of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10
million of the 30 million hectares of land in the country. This means that four
fifths of its natural resources and one third of the country's land will be concentrated among
12 million Filipinos constituting 110 ICCs, while over 60 million other Filipinos
constituting the overwhelming majority will have to share the remaining. These figures
indicate a violation of the constitutional principle of a more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth among Filipinos. 329
The Constitutions Social Justice provisions were meant to be realized

through majoritarian legislation and not through judicial fiat. 330 Judge Bork quotes
Justice Holmes as explaining it was never his job to render justice, but to apply the
law, and restates this thesis:
[W]e administer justice according to law. Justice in a larger sense, justice
according to morality, is for Congress and the President to administer, if they
see fit, through the creation of new law. 331
Again, the Courts expanded jurisdiction coupled with the 1987

Constitutions many policy statements that can be casually invoked, as the above
excerpt does, and makes it all too tempting to engage in what Bork decries as
disguised activism, 332 or the application of social preconceptions in what purport
to be interpretations of law and Constitution. 333 Bickel likewise decried this as
irreconcilable with political democracy, 334 and makes it all too easy to upset
326 Cruz v. Sec. (Kapunan, J.); id. (Puno, J.)
327 Id. (Panganiban, J.); id. (Vitug, J.).
328 Dworkin proposes a framework for distinguishing policymaking from principle. The latter demand
consistency, hence the importance of precedent in the judiciary, while the former may be left to have an
aggregative influence on decisionmaking. Dworkin, supra note 24, at 1064.
329 Id. at 333 (Panganiban, J.).
330 Alberto Muyot, Social Justice and the 1987 Constitution: Aiming for Utopia?, 70 PHIL. L.J. 310, 354 (1996);
Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 241, 254-55 (1993).
331 Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d 304, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., dissenting), quoted in BORK, supra
note 148, at 6.
332 Id. at 70. See Lino Graglia, Interpreting the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1041
(1992).
333 Thomas Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1984); Lino Graglia, Essay,
Constitutional Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 631, 636 (1993). See Philip Kurland, Book Review, Earl
Warren: Master of the Revels, 96 HARV. L. REV. 331, 338 (1982). Warren thus equated judicial lawmaking with
his own reconstruction of the ethical structure of the Constitution.
334 BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 20, at 80, quoted in BORK, supra note 148, at 71.
legislative compromises. Parenthetically, this was arguably not a case where the
Court needed to protect a minoritys rights from majority action, since the petition
sought to nullify a law that embodied the majority action for their benefit.
Arguably, the expanded certiorari jurisdiction can prove a textual trap for
the Court, and its refusal to invoke the political question has led it to use the other
Bickelian escape tools in some cases. For example, the 2002 decision Montesclaros v.
Commission on Elections 335 involved an invocation of the Constitutional policy on
youth against a Congressional plan to postpone the Sangguniang Kabataan
elections, but the Court held that there was no actual justiciable controversy
because the petitioners were assailing a bill that had not yet been passed. It also held
that the petitioners would be overaged for the SK and thus no longer had a
personal interest in the issue. While the Constitutional question tangentially put
forth was unassailably resolved by noting that it is up to Congress to define a youth
for SK purposes and that no one has a proprietary right to public office, one does
note Justice Antonio Carpios use of these jurisdictional issues after so many liberal
precedents on standing.
Finally, one might expect the intervening case Oposa v. Factoran 336 to be
examined as the above cases were. However, Oposa is arguably different in that it
involved not a challenge against a law, but a group of minors asserting the concept
of inter-generational rights and a new right to a healthful ecology under the 1987
Constitution. Justice Davide wrote:
Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches
of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is
the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed
in legislation. 337
Oposa, it might further be argued, carefully stopped after establishing the

existence of the right claimed, and left much room for the political branches to
determine environmental policy from the Constitutional foundation it outlined.
This is gleaned from Justice Florentino Felicianos concurrence:
There is no question that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is

fundamental and that, accordingly, it has been constitutionalized. But
although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that
it cannot be characterized as specific, without doing excessive violence to
language

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential
component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than
a constitutional or statutory policy unless the legal right claimed to have
been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
335 G.R. No. 152295, 384 SCRA 269, Jul. 9, 2002.

336 Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224 SCRA 792, Jul. 30, 1993.
337 Id. at 809.
83
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and

effectively 338
Thus, there was no identifiable majoritarian action directly scrutinized by

Oposa, though the petitioners there did display the methodology of canvassing every
relevant Constitutional provision, one criticized for leading to strained results later
in this article.
3. The President as Commander-in-Chief

Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora 339 upheld President Joseph Estradas
deployment of Marines in shopping malls, to augment police forces preserving
peace and order. The Court held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and
from the text of the Constitution itself. However, this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion. 340
Thus, the Court went on to assert jurisdiction over what it readily admitted
was a purely political decision. It eventually stated that the petitioner had brought
no evidence that the President had acted arbitrarily, concluding, To doubt is to
sustain. 341
IBP v. Zamora is interesting from a political question perspective, because

one argues that the Court applied the doctrine in all but name. However, the
prudential question is extinct, and the functional question was declined due to the
qualifier, to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, even
though the Court readily admitted the Presidents institutional competence in
questions of national security:
[T]he President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to

gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or
affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-
spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations 342
The Court thus had to go through the belabored textual acrobatics of

upholding what Dean Pacifico Agabin jokingly refers to as the power to call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in the central business
district. It was arguably forced into this when it refused to find a textual question
with respect to the Integrated Bars tying of the issue onto the text:
338 Id. at 815 (Feliciano, J., concurring in the result).

339 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, 338 SCRA 81, Aug. 15, 2000.
340 Id. at 106-07.
341 Id. at 107.
342 Id. at 111.
[T]he IBP admits that the deployment of the military personnel falls under
the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President What the IBP
questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under the
aforestated provision. According to the IBP no lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of the Marines. 343
Applying coordinacy, this author ventures that the Court may simply have
accepted the Presidents interpretation of his Commander-in-Chief powers 344 or the
role of the Armed Forces as protector of the people and the State 345 as within the
Constitutionally permissible range. Certainly, using the Marines to increase police
visibility was far more benign than the Martial Law situation the framers feared.
The coordinate alternative is arguably closer to the approach in the earlier

national security case, Marcos v. Manglapus. 346 In upholding President Aquinos
refusal to allow the Marcos family to return to the country, Justice Irene Cortes
took the approach IBP v. Zamora used:
[T]he question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist
factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest
to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National
Security Adviser there exist factual bases for the President's decision. 347
However, in finding that the power involved was the Presidents residual
power to protect the general welfare of the people, Marcos v. Manglapus evidenced
great deference to the Presidents interpretation of her powers, and spoke of an
exercise of a broader discretion 348 on her part. The decision even opened with a
quote from Schlesinger:
[T]he American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution... more than

most agencies of government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos
according to the man in charge The executive branch, said Clark Clifford,
was a chameleon, taking its color from the character and personality of the
President. The thrust of the office, its impact on the constitutional order,
therefore altered from President to President. 349
It may be argued that IBP v. Zamora quoted Marcos v. Manglapus

pronouncement on the Presidents wide discretion on one hand, yet insisted on
justifying itself with a reading of the narrower phrase, to suppress lawless
violence. The arguably strained handling of IBP v. Zamora may be a cause for
343 Id. at 102.

345 CONST. art. II, 3.
346 Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 177 SCRA 668, Sep. 15, 1989.
347 Id. at 697.
348 Id. at 694.
349 Id. at 690-91.
85
concern because the Presidents power to call out the armed forces is a stones
throw from his role as Commander-in-Chief in times of war. Given that such
decisions made in that wartime role are classic political questions, 350 how might the
Court, for example, handle a hypothetical wartime petition against what is alleged to
be an offensive action? Note, for example, Arroyo v. De Venecias 351 citation of
Marcos v. Manglapus in its statement:
For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to
national security, it has not altogether done away with political questions.
(emphasis added) 352
Again, such a petitioner easily quotes the Constitutional renunciation of

war 353 to establish a not truly political question, and invoke the Courts own
transcendental interest doctrine to sidestep a challenge to standing. This situation,
moreover, is the most vivid example of prudential concerns, and one where the
Court would inevitably be told, Now let him enforce it! 354
Further, the Philippine Constitutional policy against war aside, Berkeley

professor John Yoo proposes that the President has the initiative in prosecuting
war, and is checked by Congress power over the purse. The other political branch
and not the judiciary is the real counterweight, 355 and the latter was not intended to
have a role in a flexible decision-making process intentionally left without textual
standards. 356 This framework reflects even Montesquieus ancient one. 357 And while
Yoo considers himself a pro-Executive scholar, compared to pro-Congress
thinkers such as Louis Henkin, John Hart Ely, Louis Fisher, Michael Glennon, and
Harold Koh, all argue over the degree of Congressional oversight and agree that the
courts have a decreased role in the highly political business of war. 358 Further,
Ackerman proposes that the judiciarys role comes after the crisis, during
reappraisal and correction of individual abuses. 359 He also proposes that
350 Abner Mikva, The Political Question Revisited: War Powers and the Zone of Twilight, 76 KY. L.J. 329
(1987); John McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of
Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56-AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 311-14 (1993).
351 G.R. No. 127255, 277 SCRA 268, Aug. 14, 1997.
352 Id. at 289-90.
353 CONST. art. II, 2.
354 See, however, Michael Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine, 83 AM. J. INTL L. 814,
817 (1989). [I]t must be remembered that not to stop an illegal war can also be a politically loaded task. It is
not self-evident that public respect for the courts would be enhanced if the courts sat idly by in the face of a
manifest constitutional violation.
355 Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J.
1011, 1034 (2003).

356 John Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 167, 295, 300 (1996); John Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1683-84 (2002).
357 See Fernandez, supra note 187, at 249-50; ALEXANDER HAMILTON OR JAMES MADISON, The Federalist
No. 51 (The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different
Departments), in 43 GREAT BOOKS 163.
358 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-
Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1339-40 (1988); Michael Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1543, 1544-46 (2002).
359 Bruce Ackerman, This is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1894-95 (2004).
Constitutional design must both allow the Executive to respond decisively to

exigencies such as war and allow the Court to prevent emergency powers from
becoming long-term entrenchments. 360
IBP v. Zamora was most recently cited in Lacson v. Perez, 361 where the Court
was invited to rule on the so-called EDSA 3 and President Arroyos declaration
of a state of rebellion. Lacson likewise hinted that the Court would take
jurisdiction over a war powers question. However, while it declined the political
question, it employed the rest of the passive virtues arsenal. First, it cited IBPs
recognition of the Presidents wide discretion and greater competence in
responding swiftly with the military. Then, it stated that individuals facing
warrantless arrest enjoy other safeguards, that no charges had been filed against
Senator Panfilo Lacson and company, that the government had categorically stated
that Senator Miriam Santiago would not be arrested without a warrant, that the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party was not a real party in interest, and that it
was no longer feasible to examine the factual basis for declaring a state of
rebellion as this had been lifted.
Arguably, this was another invocation of the political question in all but
name, and again, the coordinacy perspective may have been less awkward than
these Bickelian escape devices. Note was there no longer any mention of the
transcendental exception to standing, for example.
4. The President as Appointing Authority

Cayetano v. Monsod 362 upheld Christian Monsods appointment to the
Commission on Elections despite allegations that he was a lawyer who had not
engaged in the practice of law as required by the Constitution. 363 Specifically,
after a stint in his fathers law firm, Monsod worked in the World Bank, in the
Manila Electric Co., as chief executive officer of an investment bank, and as a
national chair of NAMFREL. The Court impliedly declined the prudential and
functional questions, and the textual as well. This made for a colorful decision that
belabored the idea that the modern lawyer need not fit the television litigator
stereotype, complete with citations to periodicals and an interview of Washington
SyCip.
Again, the desired result might have been reached without as much
awkwardness had the Court simply deemed the Presidents interpretation of the
Constitutions prescribed qualifications permissible, and Monsod was at the very
least a lawyer. This could have avoided the strained reiterations that a World Bank
employee acquaints himself with the laws of other countries, and that a NAMFREL
officer familiarizes himself with election law. One notes Cayetano v. Monsod quoted in
360 Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1042-43 (2004). See Neal Katyal &
Lawrence Tribe, Essay, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1284-85
(2002).
361 G.R. No. 147780, 357 SCRA 756, May 10, 2001.
362 Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 201 SCRA 210, Sep. 3, 1991.
363 CONST. art. IX-C, 1.
87
passing the Luego holding that an appointment is discretionary and a political

question.
5. The President as Prime Mover in Foreign Affairs

Strangely enough, although the Court was ready to make inroads into
highly political powers such as the Presidents role as Commander-in-Chief and the
power to initiate impeachment, there remains one realm where the political question
doctrine might be allowed to freely rear its perceived ugly head.364 This is foreign
affairs, one characterized by the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations 365 and where the separation of powers finds far less application. 366 Early
dicta already cited examples of truly political questions from this sphere:
[T]here remain issues beyond the Courts jurisdiction We cannot, for

example, question the Presidents recognition of a foreign government We cannot
set aside a presidential pardon Nor can we amend the Constitution under
the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is
reserved to the people. (emphasis added) 367
More recently, Arroyo v. De Venecia 368 reiterated:
[W]hile Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry it has not
altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in the
field of foreign relations. 369
Thus, International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja 370 readily conceded:
The foregoing opinions constitute a categorical recognition by the Executive

Branch of the Government that ICMC and IRRI enjoy immunities accorded
to international organizations, which determination has been held to be a
political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a
political department of Government. 371
Holy See v. Rosario, 372 Lasco v. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural
Resources Exploration, 373 Callado v. International Rice Research Institute, 374 and Dept of
Foreign Affairs v. National Labor Relations Commission 375 all reiterated the same holding,
364 Spiro, however, argues this is less necessary in an age of globalization. Peter Spiro, Globalization and the
(Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 653 (2002).

365 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). See Ruth Wedgwood, The
Uncertain Career of Executive Power, 25 YALE J. INTL L. 310, 311, 314 (2000); Linda Champlin & Alan Schwarz,
Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 215, 216 (1985). See, however,
Saikrishna Prakash & Michael Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 237 (2001).
366 Id. at 316.
368 G.R. No. 127255, 277 SCRA 268, Aug. 14, 1997.
369 Id. at 289-90.
370 G.R. No. 85750, 190 SCRA, 130, Sep. 28, 1990.
371 Id. at 140.
372 G.R. No. 101949, 238 SCRA 524, Dec. 1, 1994.
373 G.R. No. 109095, 241 SCRA 681, Feb. 23, 1995.
374 G.R. No. 106483, 241 SCRA 681, May 22, 1995.
375 G.R. No. 113191, 262 SCRA 38, Sep. 18, 1996.
and all five quoted the pre-1987 Constitution decision World Health Organization v.
Aquino. 376 The broad ICMC ruling was only restricted by Liang v. People 377 when it
refused to recognize diplomatic immunity extended to defeat a criminal charge
against a Chinese Asian Development Bank economist:
[T]he slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling

within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and
personnel. 378
Liang may even be interpreted as reversing the preceding line of political

question rulings, noting the phrasing of the first Liang decision:
The DFAs determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is

only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. 379
This is dictum, however, because Liang accepted that ADB enjoyed

immunity; the holding cited the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and it
did not extend immunity beyond official functions, which slander was clearly not.
Thus, assuming foreign affairs presents political questions last refuge, one must
analyze what makes this area different.
Arguably, it is because the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly deal with
the Presidents power over foreign affairs, and the closest are his explicit power to
contract foreign loans, appoint ambassadors, and set tariffs, and his implicit power
to conclude treaties. 380 Bernas thus considers the ICMC ruling not as invoking a
textual question, but a related matter traditionally vested in the Executive, and
implies that it may be a functional one. 381 Further, ICMCs phrasing reflects a clear
prudential concern from Baker as well, although this is now supposedly impossible.
One might thus argue that the political question is preserved in foreign
affairs only because, for all its length, the 1987 Constitution failed to elaborate on it.
Liang may be interpreted as a foreign affairs scenario that nevertheless involved
manageable standards, such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 382
or an implied finding of grave abuse of discretion. This seems to be borne out by
Tanada v. Angara, 383 where the Court took jurisdiction over a treaty because the
petitioners invoked the Constitutions new nationalist economic clauses. Tanada,
nevertheless, is readily read from coordinacys perspective. It concluded:
As to whether [consenting to the World Trade Organization agreement] was

wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review.
376 G.R. No. 35131, 48 SCRA 242, Nov. 29, 1972.

377 G.R. No. 125865, 355 SCRA 125, Mar. 26, 2001. This Liang decision dealt with the Motion for
Reconsideration.
378 Id. at 133.
379 Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865, 323 SCRA 692, 695, Jan. 28, 2000.
380 CONST. art. VII, 16, 20-21, Art. VI, 28(2); Louis Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public
Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1302-03 (1961).

381 BERNAS, supra note 92, at 955-56.
382 Id. at 955.
383 G.R. No. 118295, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997.
89
That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to
whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade
liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should
determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement
allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a
member. 384
Tanada held that many of the 1987 Constitutions policy statements served
as guidelines for the legislature as well as the judiciary to actualize, and it is
submitted that this is a prudent, coordinate interpretation. One may argue that
Tanada found a political question in all but name and used the non self-executing
holding as a Bickelian escape device, but assuming it was, the coordinate view casts
this more positively. One may further argue that such a device was not available in
Lim v. Executive Secretary 385 where the Balikatan military exercises with the United
States were assailed using the Constitutional policy against war. 386 Lim actually
employed another escape device, first discussing Balikatans Terms of Reference
and concluding they did not violate the Constitution in theory, then declining to rule
on whether the exercises in fact violated the Constitution, as it is not a trier of facts.
And even then, the decision inserted a kernel of doubt into itself:
Yet a nagging question remains: are American troops actively engaged

in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training
and assistance exercise? we cannot accept, in the absence of concrete
proof, petitioners allegation that the Arroyo government is engaged in
doublespeak in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive
effort by foreign troops on native soil. The petitions invite us to speculate
on what is really happening. 387
Lim eventually dismissed the petition because it found no grave abuse of

discretion on the Presidents part, similar to Marcos v. Manglapus. It is again
submitted that had the Court not wanted to call it a political question, then perhaps
it would have been less awkward to use coordinacy and rule it was Constitutionally
permissible for the President to interpret her Commander-in-Chief and foreign
affairs powers as allowing joint military exercises in Mindanao, or that the state
policy against war did not preclude these.
6. Congress and Economic Policy

Examining Tanada v. Angara, one notes that many early cases relating to
economic policy do not discuss the political question outright, but rephrase the
doctrine by concluding the matter is best left to the wisdom of legislators, and that
laws enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. This was how Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corp. 388 handled assertions that gamblings legalization
through the formation of PAGCOR contravened the Constitutional policies in
384 Id. at 81.

385 G.R. No. 151445, 380 SCRA 739, Apr. 11, 2002.
386 CONST. art. II, 2. The case also tackled CONST. art. II, 7-8.
387 Lim v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 151445, 380 SCRA 739, 759-60, Apr. 11, 2002.
388 G.R. No. 91649, 197 SCRA 52, May 14, 1991.
favor of the family and youth. 389 Basco also squarely held that the degree of
decentralization pursuant to the Constitutions Local Autonomy clauses 390 was a
political question, and Congress had the sole prerogative of how to apportion the
power to tax gambling. These holdings mesh perfectly with a consciously
coordinate framework.
Similarly, Guingona v. Carague 391 ruled that Congress did not contravene the
Constitutional priority on education merely by allotting to it a third of the amount
allocated to debt servicing. This was clearly more deferential to Congress
interpretation of the policys degree of priority compared to Justice Parass one-
sentence dissent: Any law that undermines our economy and therefore our security
is per se unconstitutional. 392
Next, Garcia v. Executive Secretary 393 declined to strike down the Foreign
Investments Act of 1991 394 as contravening the Constitutions nationalist economic
provisions:
[W]e find that the constitutional challenge must be rejected for failure to
show that there is an indubitable ground for it, not to say even a necessity to
resolve it the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a
clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain

The petitioner is commended for his high civic spirit and his zeal in the
protection of the Filipino investors against unfair foreign competition But
his views are expressed in the wrong forum. The Court is not a political
arena. His objections to the law are better heard by his colleagues in the
Congress of the Philippines, who have the power to rewrite it, if they so
please, in the fashion he suggests. 395
Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization 396 took a similar approach to a

challenge against the privatization of Petron Corp., as did Lim v. Pacquing 397 dealing
with a jai alai franchise. Both did not explicitly mention the political question
doctrine.
The judicial trajectory veered off sharply, however, with Tatad v. Secretary of
Energy 398 and its nullification of the Oil Deregulation Act 399 vis--vis the
389 CONST. art. II, 11-13. The case also raised CONST. art. XIII, 1; CONST. art. XIV, 2.
390 CONST. art. X, 5.
391 G.R. No. 94571, 196 SCRA 221, Apr. 22, 1991.
392 Id. at 239 (Paras, J., dissenting).
393 G.R. No. 100883, 204 SCRA 516, Dec. 2, 1991.
394 Rep. Act. No. 7042.
395 Garcia v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 100883, 204 SCRA 516, 522-23, 524, Dec. 2, 1991.
396 G.R. No. 112399, 246 SCRA 334, Jul. 14, 1995.
397 G.R. No. 115044, 240 SCRA 649, Jan. 27, 1995.
398 G.R. No. 124360, 281 SCRA 330, Nov. 5, 1997.
399 Rep. Act. No. 8180.
91
Constitutional policy against monopolies. 400 Amidst dissents that vigorously

invoked the separation of powers, Tatad described its methodology:
Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we shall proceed to examine

whether the provisions of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential, inventory
reserves, and predatory prices imposed substantial barriers to the entry and
exit of new players in our downstream oil industry. If they do, they have to
be struck down for they will necessarily inhibit the formation of a truly
competitive market. 401
Not only did the dissenters argue that this was taking the wisdom of the
law into the majoritys hands, but Tatad attempted to explain:
With this Decision, some circles will chide the Court for interfering with an
economic decision of Congress. Such criticism is charmless for the Court is
annulling R.A. No. 8180 not because it disagrees with deregulation as an
economic policy but because as cobbled by Congress in its present form, the
law violates the Constitution. The right call therefor should be for Congress
to write a new oil deregulation law that conforms with the Constitution and
not for this Court to shirk its duty of striking down a law that offends the
Constitution. 402
Moreover, one can almost hear a cry against Herbert Spencers Social
Statics 403 in the face of:
Kayat sa mga kababayan nating kapitalista at may kapangyarihan, nararapat lamang

na makiisa tayo sa mga walang palad at mahihirap sa mga araw ng pangangailangan.
Huwag na nating ipagdiinan ang kawalan ng tubo, o maging ang panandaliang
pagkalugi. At sa mga mangangalakal na ganid at walang puso: hirap na hirap na po ang
ating mga kababayan. Makonsiyensya naman kayo! (emphasis in original) 404
Shortly before Tatad, the Court also nullified the sale of a majority share of
the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian bidder, invoking the Constitutional policy that gave
preference to qualified Filipinos. 405 The political question was not raised in Manila
Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, 406 however, and it dealt with an
agency and not Congress. Most recently, anti-monopoly Constitutional provisions
were also raised in the nullification of the PIATCO contract for the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Terminal 3. 407
400 CONST. art. XII, 19.

401 Tatad v. Sec. of Energy, G.R. No. 124360, 281 SCRA 330, 359, Nov. 5, 1997.
402 Id. at 370.
403 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
404 Tatad, 281 SCRA at 379 (Panganiban, J., concurring). To our capitalist and influential countrymen, it is
but right that you express solidarity with the poor in times of need. Let us not emphasize a lack of profit or
temporary losses. To unscrupulous and heartless businessmen: our countrymen are in dire straits. Listen to
your consciences!
406 G.R. No. 122156, 267 SCRA 408, Feb. 3, 1997.
407 Agan v. Philippine International Air Teinals Co., Inc., G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003.
From a coordinacy perspective, these much-criticized economic decisions

might be assailed for no longer just searching for grave abuse of discretion, but in
handing down the meaning of economic policy statements arguably addressed to
Congress. One notes, however, that the 2003 decision Eastern Assurance and Surety
Corp. v. Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board 408 returns to the Marcos v.
Manglapus framework of merely searching for grave abuse. Here, Justice Panganiban
held that given reports of unscrupulous tactics by insurance agents, there was
factual basis for the agency involved to authorize two consortia of insurance
companies to issue passenger insurance, and this did not amount to a violation of
the Constitutions policy against monopolies. However, one may also argue that this
framework is now being used only when the Court decides not to strike down an
economic decision. 409
7. Congress and its Internal Workings

Fr. Bernas wrote:
The firm direction now, in fact, in quite a number of decisions of the

Supreme Court is towards assumption of jurisdiction whenever the Court
finds constitutionally-imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. This direction will affect even those which in the past were
seen as beyond judicial reach such as disciplinary action over members of
Congress. 410
This is, in part, due to additional phrases in the 1987 Constitution that
pertain to the structure of Congress. For example, Avelino v. Cuenco 411 contained
dicta regarding the counting of a Senate quorum under the 1935 Constitution
provision:
(1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its
Speaker. Each House shall choose such other officers as may be required. 412
The 1987 Constitution, however, now has a slightly

more detailed provision:
(1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. 413
Clearly, in addition to the Courts expanded jurisdiction, the framers

intended such a change to remove the matter from Congress discretion, making it a
408 G.R. No. 149717, Oct. 7, 2003.

409 Of course, one must note the proposition that law is not a product of majoritarian consensus, but an
imposition by a ruling elite onto the majority, especially considering the present concentration of Philippine
economic power in the hands of a few. See, e.g., Pacifico Agabin, Economic Interest Groups and Power Politics in the
Philippines, 70 PHIL. L.J. 291, 308-309 (1996). For what is law among friends? Id. at 309.
411 83 Phil. 17 (1949).
412 1935 CONST. art. VI, 10.
93
readily justiciable issue. The political question decisions regarding Congress internal
structure are hardly the most controversial, since many turn on whether or not a
straightforward Constitution provision may be referred to, and the Court is forced
to make an adjudication between two conflicting interpretations from different
factions.
Coseteng v. Mitra, 414 for example, was straightforward in holding that a party
that represented 0.4% of the House membership was not entitled to one of twelve
Commission on Appointments seats. This follows from the most logical,
mathematical meaning of proportional in the Constitutions proportional
representation requirement. Applying similar basic mathematics, the Court was
constrained to rule against the recognition of half-seats for Senator-Commissioners
in Guingona v. Gonzales, 415 since there was no way to split a seat between two parties
equally entitled to it. Bondoc v. Pineda 416 held that a House Electoral Tribunal
member could not be replaced because he displeased his party with his vote in a
case, because of a tribunals inherent need for independence and insulation from
majoritarian politics. Arroyo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal was a simple
matter of finding grave abuse of discretion:
[T]he procedural flaws which marred the proceedings render the public
respondent HRETs majority decision a complete nullity. The persistent
and deliberate violation of the Tribunals own governing rules and of even
the most basic rules of evidence cannot be justified by simply invoking that
procedural rules should be liberally construed. 417
Sandoval v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal 418 had a similar rationale.
In the cases, however, where the textual support is not as straightforward,

the Court has impliedly respected coordinacy in the sense that it upheld
interpretations that favor the majority in that majoritarian body. Even Avelino, for
example, dismissed a petition by a claimant to the Senate presidency who was
backed by only eleven out of twenty-three senators, noting that the majority could
change the Senate President at any time it desired. Thus, Daza v. Singson 419 upheld
the reorganization of the Commission on Appointments to reflect permanent
political realignments in Congress instead of insisting that representatives of a party
whose membership was drastically reduced retain their posts.
Finally, it was Arroyo v. De Venecia 420 that ruled:
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure
made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in
414 G.R. No. 86649, 187 SCRA 377, Jul. 12, 1990.
415 G.R. No. 106971, 214 SCRA 789, Oct. 20, 1992.
416 G.R. No. 97710, 201 SCRA 792, Sep. 26, 1991.
417 Id. at 808.
418 G.R. No. 149380, 383 SCRA 770, Jul. 3, 2002.
419 G.R. No. 86344, 180 SCRA 496, Dec. 21, 1989.
420 G.R. No. 127255, 277 SCRA 268, Aug. 14, 1997.
which a branch of the government has gone beyond the constitutional limits
of its jurisdiction so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII. 1 power. 421
It recognized a political question with respect to House internal rules,

unless these violated Constitutional restraints or fundamental rights, 422 particularly
if third persons were involved. 423 Curiously, however, Santiago v. Guingona 424 did not
follow Justice Mendozas methodology and insisted on taking jurisdiction, only to
conclude that there were no Constitutional standards that could govern the election
of the Senate Minority Leader:
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate

President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of
selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress To our mind,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative
of the exercise of the prerogative Therefore, such method must be
prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court. 425
It is again submitted that the coordinate approach, or the finding of a

political question for lack of manageable standards as in Arroyo, would have
obviated the need for a lengthy discourse on what a majority and a minority are.
More recently in Pimentel v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 426

Justice Carpio used the Bickelian escape device of ripeness to give the House the
first opportunity to determine how to count party-list representatives under the
Constitutions proportional representation requirement. He wrote:
[T]heir primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives
Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on
proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can
the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of
judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to
the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the
court. 427
This arguably simulated the political question since there is no explicit

guideline, for example, on how party-list groups may form alliances to nominate
common nominees for themselves. However, one may also argue this illustrates the
positive aspects of coordinacy theory, beyond the political question, since the Court
gives way to Congress initial interpretation, but clearly reserves the power to make
a final judgment if warranted later.
421 Id. at 290.

422 Id., citing United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. 5 (1891).
423 Arroyo (Puno, J., concurring), citing United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932).
424 G.R. No. 134577, 298 SCRA 756, Nov. 18, 1998.
425 Id. at 780.
426 G.R. No. 141489, 393 SCRA 227, Nov. 29, 2002.
427 Id. at 237.
95
8. Transitions in the Presidency

Fr. Bernas ends his textbooks discussion of the political question with
three of the most important political transitions in recent history: 1) the 1973
Constitutions ratification; 428 2) the 1986 People Power overthrow of Ferdinand
Marcos and the installation of Corazon Aquinos revolutionary government; 429 and
3) the EDSA II protests that ended Joseph Estradas presidency. 430
The Court declined the political question doctrine in the third, and
emphasized that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo had not formed a revolutionary
government. Thus, Estrada v. Desierto failed to produce a majority explanation, with
the various opinions split on resignation, permanent disability, and a simple
acceptance of reality. 431 All appeared strained reasoning as Estrada had left
Malacanang Palace with no explicit indication of resignation and healthy. Estradas
majority opinion settled on resignation, anchored on excerpts from the diary of
Estradas Executive Secretary that were published in a newspaper. The decisions
totality test and rationale remain heavily criticized until today, albeit not its result.
It is argued that Estrada was really a case involving truly momentous

prudential factors, yet the Court felt that the Constitution had taken away the
prudential question option. 432 Estradas separate opinions indicated that Arroyo had
already taken control of the government, many countries had already recognized her
administration, and a majority of the population had acquiesced to her ascension.
Moreover, a ruling in favor of Estrada would have been like putting out a fire with
gasoline, given the polarized state of the population in the aftermath of Estradas
highly-publicized, aborted impeachment trial.
It is submitted that coordinacy might have been a tempered solution, and

the Court might have honored Arroyos recognition by both the Senate and the
House, finding no grave abuse in their action under the extenuating circumstances,
for any of the many reasons put forward. At the very least, this would have avoided
further complicating the issues with its new doctrines on evidence and resignation.
D. RECONCILING COORDINACY AND PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL REVIEW
To summarize Philippine political question doctrine as applied in Francisco

and the Canvass Resolutions, Justice Holmes bad man 433 would surmise that the
Court will almost automatically take jurisdiction so long as the petitioner points to a
428 Javellana v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 36142, 50 SCRA 30, Mar. 31, 1973.
429 Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986.
430 Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710, 356 SCRA 108, 155-56, Mar. 2, 2001
431 Id.; BERNAS, supra note 92, at 817-27.
432 See Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 639 (2001), quoting Colegrove v.
Green, 328 US 549, 556 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.). [T]he Constitution has left the performance of many duties
in our governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of the executive and legislative action and, ultimately,
on the vigilance of the people in exercising their political rights.
433 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, in LAW: A TREASURY OF ART AND LITERATURE 276
(Hugh Lauter Levin Associates, 1990).

specific Constitutional provision. 434 It will then beat its breast, refuse to decline to
exercise jurisdiction, and then discuss its interpretation. 435 In theory, coordinacy
should nevertheless fit will in the Philippine framework because all the Court has to
do is find that a political branchs Constitutional interpretation is within the
permissible range, hence no grave abuse of discretion is properly found. 436 While
this was observed in early post-1987 cases, wily petitioners soon learned to cite
whatever Constitutional provision in the long 1987 document was arguably
relevant, and force the Court into strained textual acrobatics.
Especially when dealing with textually committed powers which are

extremely political in nature, such a result stands to be dangerously high-handed
and counter-majoritarian. 437 This also flirts with Bush v. Gore, and one might argue
that a Philippine Bush was avoided by the expedient of having the official
resolutions merely state that no grave abuse of discretion was found. It is in this
context that the political question doctrine and its respect for majority action
practically lose all meaning.
These were precisely Kramers criticisms regarding Bush v. Gore, related to

popular constitutionalism:
If the Justices truly were serious in their admiration of the Constitution's

design, they could have allowed the process that had been created for
precisely this sort of problem to run its course, in which case the dispute
eventually would have been decided by Congress. But that would have left
the Court on the sidelines, trusting other, more democratic institutions to
solve a constitutional dilemma. And that is something these Justices do not
like to do. 438
Further, he argues:
The Founding generation did not solve the problem of constitutional

interpretation and enforcement by delegating it to judges. Their thinking was
more complex and, frankly, more imaginative than that. They were too
steeped in republicanism to think that the solution to the problem of
republican politics was to chop it off at the knees. Their structural solutions
were meant to operate in politics: elections, bicameralism, an executive veto,
political connections between state and national governments, and, above all,
434 Parallel to this, many American decisions have likewise been criticized for merely quoting Baker v.
Carr and its requisites, without more incisive analysis. Nzelibe, supra note 29, at 963; Mulhern, supra note 29, at
107-08. If a strategy for judicial review is to be truly deferential, it will cause those using it to appear
deferential. Such an appearance can always cloak intentional deviations from deference or mislead nondevious
judges into a sense of self-satisfaction and, therefore, unwarranted deviations from deference. Neil Komesar,
Slow Learning in Constitutional Analysis, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 212, 213 (1993).
435 Parenthetically, Marbury enlightens law students regarding the irony that the landmark case on judicial
supremacy is also a landmark case grounded on politics. Consciously or unconsciously, the judiciary does act
politically, and has perhaps done so since the very dawn of judicial supremacy. Agabin, supra note 9, at 191;
Eric Segall, Why I Still Teach Marbury (And So Should You): A Response to Professor Levinson, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
573, 582 (2004).
436 See Mulhern, supra note 29, at 129-30.
437 Russel Miller, supra note 166, at 596-97, 624.
438 Kramer, supra note 41, at 157-58.
97
the capacity of politicians with competing interests to appeal for support to

the people who made the Constitution. 439
Thus, the challenge is to stay loyal to the duty of judicial review, while
maintaining the will of the majority and the accountability of the political branches
officials. 440 It is submitted that Justice Punos coordinacy theory would have also
hurdled this enigma in Francisco and the Canvass Resolutions. In all these, the Court
could have assumed jurisdiction as they already did, but instead of handing down its
own interpretation, it may be more inclined to point to the political branchs actions
as permissible under the Constitution.
Thus, with respect to impeachment, the Court could have given the
legislators the benefit of the allegedly vague provision contested in Francisco, then
wait for the Senate to decide the validity of the second impeachment
complaint. 441 Since it has full discretion in interpreting the Constitutions grounds
for impeachment, 442 it would hardly have been unreasonable to allow the Senate to
interpret the provisions governing submission of an impeachment complaint to it as
well. This would mirror Justice Carpios application of the primary jurisdiction in
Pimentel v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. 443 The actual Francisco decision
could well be criticized by setting it against Thayers philosophy and Justice Isagani
Cruzs early pronouncement:
[The expanded certiorari jurisdiction] should not be construed as a license for
us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may not
coincide with ours. 444
With respect to the national canvass, the Court could have left Congress to
make a permissible interpretation as to the ministerial or discretionary nature of its
tasks, aside from dismissing the opposition petitions. In fact, the Canvass
Resolutions repeatedly cited Congresss power to make its own rules and Arroyo v.
De Venecia, 445 but it is submitted that the better outcome was to treat Congress
actions as constitutive of constitutional norms, especially when they pointed to
Congress long standing canvass practices. There is no abdication of duty as
impliedly proscribed by the 1987 Constitution, yet neither does the Court venture
close to the legislative power through interpretation, as Thayer cautioned.
439 Id. at 162. See Martin Redish & Elizabeth Cisar, If Angels Were to Govern: The Need for Pragmatic
Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 461 (1991). Further, Mark Tushnet argues that even
without courts, Congress would be held in check by democratic accountability. Joan Larsen, Book Review,
Constitutionalism Without Courts?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 983, 993 (2000). See John Yoo, Lawyers in Congress, 61-SPG
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 19 (1998).
440 See Stephen Goldberg, Putting the Supreme Court Back in its Place: Ideology, Yes; Agenda, No, 17 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 175, 176 (2004); Lawrence Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 897-98
(1990).
441 This was, in fact, the position taken by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, who filed a comment in Francisco.
Nov. 3, 2003, at http://www.nenepimentel.org/speeches/20031103_Comment.asp.

442 Vik Amar, supra note 247, at 1114-15.
443 G.R. No. 141489, 393 SCRA 227, Nov. 29, 2002.
SCRA 343, 377, Jul. 14, 1989 (Cruz, J.).

445 G.R. No. 127255, 277 SCRA 268, Aug. 14, 1997.
A review of political question decisions shows that the initial bravado

surrounding the Courts descriptions of its expanded jurisdiction have at times
degenerated into strained sounding decisions, such as Cayetano v. Monsod, IBP v.
Zamora, and Estrada v. Desierto. To avoid being ensnared in textual traps canny
petitioners and jurisprudence force onto the Court, one also sees a recent
curtailment of liberal standing rules, particularly the standing and actual controversy
ruling in Lacson v. Perez. Again, this author humbly submits that Justice Punos
coordinacy doctrine may achieve the same results less awkwardly and with more
intellectuall fulfillment than dismissals due to lack of standing. There may even be
more interpretative material from the political branches than apparent, though
academically invisible 446 due to the increased emphasis on judicial supremacy today.
CONCLUSION
The Bard wrote:
Not all the water in the rough rude sea

Can wash the balm from an anointed king;
The breath of worldly men cannot depose
The deputy elected by the Lord. 447
Likewise, our government is structured such that the boisterous sea of

liberty 448 is fed by a tripartite tributary system, and none of the three great branches
may be cleansed of its responsibility to the sovereign people. Our democracy has
the inherent tension of possessing both majoritarian and counter-majoritarian
aspects, and likewise majoritarian and counter-majoritarian powers and institutions.
In the general sense, Congress is its supreme majoritarian institution, while the
Supreme Court is the often counter-majoritarian body. 449 Armed with this nature
and a broad mandate from the electorate, it falls to Congress to canvass the votes
for the presidential elections, that it may act as the ultimate arbiter and legitimizing
body in the political exercise.
Setting aside the lesser questions raised in the 2004 canvass, one asks the
central question: Should the committee have gone beyond the CoCs? Framed
legally, was a ministerial or a discretionary task lain on Congresss shoulders?
Both are plausible conclusions. The weight of precedent, statute, framers

deliberations, and even foreign jurisprudence argue for a relatively mechanical
count, with a premium placed on speed. On the other hand, one can claim an
exception to the general rule that canvass proceedings are ministerial, and a co-
equal branch with broad powers may justify further investigation to ascertain the
446 Vik Amar, supra note 247, at 1112. See Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52
STAN. L. REV. 353, 375 (2000).

447 William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of King Richard II, Act III, Scene 2, Lines 56-59 in SHAKESPEARE
417.
448 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Philip Mazzei, Apr. 24, 1796, available at
http://www.wccusd.k12.ca.us/elcerrito/history/jefferson.htm.
449 Michael Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 492-93
(1997).
99
true will of the electorate, from whom governments authority emanates. The
premium here is placed on certitude.
With respect to the canvass, the Court spurned its suitors, and left
individual Justices to write opinions that offered glimpses into its frame of mind.
Following the coordinacy theory given newfound emphasis by Justice Puno in
Francisco, however, all branches have a duty to interpret the Constitution upon
which they exist. Such judicial deference is based on the importance of majoritarian
consensus in the political branches, among other factors, and it is ultimately the
electorate who are the final interpreters of the fundamental law because they have
the power to amend it. As Ackerman wrote:
When the Court tests some recent congressional initiative against its
interpretation of past constitutional solutions, it is not engaged in an anti-
democratic form of ancestor worship It is signaling to the mass of private
citizens that their would-be representatives are attempting to legislate in
ways that few political movements in American history have done with
credibility; and that the moment has come, once again, to determine whether
our generation will respond by making the political effort required to
redefine, as private citizens, our collective identity.
[O]nce a movement has succeeded in enacting a constitutional

amendment, it will no longer be obliged to call so extravagantly upon the
political energies of the American people. 450
Certainly, constructing a Constitutional tradition is not easy:
To interpret the document, or the doctrine for that matter, is to engage in an

act of construction; the interpreter tries to weave together a coherent account
from tangled data. Further wrinkles arise when the faithful interpreter tries
to apply the document's precepts to a world that is in many respects different
from the world that generated the constitutional texts in question even
interpreters who fundamentally agree (in step one) about the dictates of the
document as written and amended may disagree (in step two) about how best
to apply those dictates to a changed world. 451
Thus, beyond textbook discussions of the separation of powers, it is

important for this endeavor to harness the political branches institutional
competencies, and the collective judgment of the sovereign people. Given this, it is
not as important whether Congress has a ministerial or a discretionary task as much
as it is for Congress to interpret its own role as final, legitimizing arbiter. The
canvass remains part of the most political of democratic exercises, and the judiciary
should keep its distance lest it become embroiled in another Hayes-Tilden or Bush-
450 Ackerman, supra note 360, at 1050. As the people are the only legitimate fountains of power, and it
is from them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of government hold their
power, is derived The Federalist No. 49, supra note 154, at 151. However, Yale professor Owen Fiss opines
that legislatures are not ideologically committed or institutionally suited to search for the meaning of
constitutional values, but instead see their primary function in terms of registering the actual, occurrent
preferences of the peoplewhat they want and what they believe should be done. Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1979).
451 Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 53 (2000).
Gore controversy. Again, both answers are plausible and emphasize different
policies, leaving Congress to determine its own course within James Bradley
Thayers range of Constitutionally permissible options. This kind of interpretation
respects the values embraced by the majority as well as the accountability of its
chosen representatives, yet does not result in the dereliction of judicial duty the
framers of the 1987 Constitution feared.
Such a conclusion impacts on other powers textually committed to the

political branches. Francisco recognized that impeachment is predominantly political,
and it is submitted that Congress should have been allowed to come to its own final
decision regarding the submission and trial of the impeachment complaint in
question. While the Courts decision did in fact resolve the tensions that arose, the
counter-majoritarian blow arguably sapped some democratic vigor in the long run
and abruptly ended the frenetic debate. Such actions also open the door for those
who cannot triumph in the political arenas to try their luck in the courtrooms, 452
precisely the damning criticism leveled against Bush v. Gore.
Many other powers beyond canvass and impeachment are textually

committed to the political branches, and the fullness of each is realized if the
wielder itself is empowered to hazard an interpretation, beyond the mere talk of
internal rules and enumerations of years seen in the Canvass Resolutions. Justice
Roberto Regala once enumerated the Rule of Laws components: 1) separation of
powers; 2) degree of objectivity in human relations; 3) limited government; 4) basic
fairness; and 5) independent judiciary. 453 Although society strives towards a rule of
laws and not of men, one can never set aside the majoritarian aspect of
republicanism, and laws are themselves an expression of majority rule. While the
West may see law as restraint, it is more Oriental to see it as stable foundation, and
from here, the consensus of men may take their place in the Rule of Law beside
neutral principles. Not only is such consensus important in mapping the metes and
bounds of the political branches powers, it is also crucial in interpreting the 1987
Constitutions many policy statements, especially those not deemed self-executing.
Previously, part of the restraint that allowed the political branches to

present their initial interpretations came from the political question doctrine, but
this was radically curtailed by the 1987 Constitution. However, when one sets the
stigma of Martial Law aside, its merits remain perfectly valid, and there are times
when the political branches should enjoy wide discretion in the textual powers
committed to them, powers they are institutionally more competent to wield. More-
over, there are also times when the Court simply must disentangle itself from a case
out of prudence. When a selection of the lengthy 1987 Constitutions provisions are
invoked in tandem with the expanded certiorari jurisdiction, petitioners sometimes
force the Court into textual traps, with results as arguably awkward as Cayetano v.
Monsod, IBP v. Zamora, and Estrada v. Desierto. Otherwise, the Court is forced to duck
452 MALCOLM JEWELL & SAMUEL PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES
475 (1977); BORK, supra note 148, at 70; Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 221, at 730-31.
453 Roberto Regala, Expanding Frontiers of the Rule of Law, 14 LAW REV. 239, 239 (1964).
101
the issue through the other Bickelian tools in the standing and actual case and
controversy armories. It is proposed that coordinacy theory, with its more positive
perspective, better avoids these problems, and enriches the Constitutional tradition
by explicitly recognizing the political branches role in its formation.
Certainly, it cannot be said that the political actors are unconscious of the
Constitution. Recently, for example, new Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo
cited during his turnover rites:
In the conduct of foreign policy, my guidepost and lodestar is no less than

the Constitution with its clear mandate to pursue an independent foreign
policy with paramount consideration being national sovereignty, territorial
integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination. 454
To cite another example, when Budget Secretary Emilia Boncodin

presented the Arroyo administrations new fiscal program, Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago asked for the executives interpretation of the provision that no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury, except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law, 455 in the context of automatic budget appropriations. She added that
former Budget Secretary Benjamin Diokno had proposed that reenactment of a
budget only affected current operating expenditures. 456
Perhaps the last question, then, is what if the Constitutional interpretation

put forward is a product of error, and what if time proves Justice Puno preaching
from the Bench the wiser all along? The answer is simply that legislatures and
majorities alike have a right to be wrong, or certainly more a right than a judge has
to be correct on a question he is incompetent to rule on. 457 Yale Professor Akhil
Reed Amar argues that a Constitution is seen more significantly from the eyes of
the electorate that ratified it amidst trying times and great challenges, and articulates:
Two heads are often better than one, and multitudes may be far wiser than
five or nine The Constitution should be read as collecting the solemn
judgments of this Court, inscribing the lived experiences and wisdom the
reason and not merely the will or whim of a great many people. 458
Moreover, Dean Agabin cautions:
454 TJ Burgonio, Mending tattered US ties Romulos priority at DFA, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Aug. 25, 2004,
at A2.
455 CONST. art. VI, 29(1).
456 Michael Lim Ubac & Christine Avendano, Govt prescribes higher power rates, new taxes, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, Aug. 31, 2004, at A5.

457 See, however, Alexander & Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy, supra note 28, at 1383. They argue that
for every Dred Scott v. Sandford, there is a Brown v. Board of Education, and the majority of officials at the time
believed the latter morally or constitutionally wrong. See Lawrence Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 893, 957 (1990).
458 Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword, supra note 451, at 43. Amar quotes Bickel: Most of us did not fully wake
up to the immorality of the war in Vietnam until we were shown pictures of Vietnamese children being
scalded by American napalm It is thus no surprise that the case that our isolated judiciary has done a better
job of speaking for our better moral selves turns out to be very shaky historically. Id. at 44-45.
Judicial review, like most things in life, is double-edged. In our political

life, it can cut both ways: it can protect human rights, but it can also prevent
social reforms. With its new found strength and its expanded power, the
judiciary is no longer the least dangerous branch of our government. [I]t
may yet evolve to be the most dangerous branch. 459
It is more in keeping with democracy to have to constantly raise ones

voice and have a hand in charting ones course, rather than to stand in the shadow
of a too-powerful Caesar and a seeming Pax Romana that thinly veils decadence and
complacency.
One should not forget it is a Constitution we are expounding, 460 and

that the Constitution is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. 461
- o0o -

460 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.).
461 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
103
fSO YOl bSTWTbbTYOeObKdKfTaY aP balOdeF Sem fSO
dhWOXKVTYR balOd XKn OmbKYN UhNTMTKW
dOiTOl
TYfa fdhO UhNTMTKW
ehbdOXKMn
T3fSO PhdfSOd OmbKYNON MOdfTadKdT balOd 3
84 MahYfOd2XKUadTf KdTKY balOd KYN PhYNKXOYfKW

dOefdTMfTaY 3
L3 dOWKmKfTaY aP dOefdKTYfe hYNOd fSO 7EDC
MaYefTfhfTaY 3 77/
41 baWTfTMKWchOefTaY NaMfdTYO KYN OmbKYNON
77/
MOdfTadKdT UhdTeNTMfTaY 3
51 efKYNTYR dhWOe KYN fSO fdKYeMOYNOYfKW
TXbadfKYMO NaMfdTYO 3
61 fSO 7EDCMaYefTfhfTaY,e eSOOd efdOYRfS 3
I1 IZ IPiZL/rZKM aSDfMnfUUrR1 IZKR SaRsefR S_ r"!"
XITM ReeiMe SiefSKUvrPURu ()l

J1 IZ MnfdMXMUo fNnki/rS/Sef XRZLeMf ()%
K1 LRUifRaZ *mfPM fRUrLRfSaZ/rULaiPeS)C
efIZLIdL aRDSiLRKeIU dMlRMm
L1 RZlaKIfSaZ aN KiefaXbrdo RZfR)CdZIfRaZ/rU

H-)[V 8/0
e4 fSO dhWOXKVTYR balOd 3 8/2
I1 eiXSrU rdRpRZK fR f Mnb/rZLML eKabe)CaSD
bRSeURbbfZMSiLeKScrU dMlssbrn!
A- Mnb/rZeSlM UIZLXIdT r)l)Rif aN IXb_ rda
SiP1RebdiLMZKR)C
HH-HRRTDR?QHRHMFEQNL SGD DWO?MCDC ITCHBH?K ONVDQ-------- 8/5
?- QTKDL?JHMF9 OQNBDCTQ?K NQ RTARS?MSHUD> 8/6
A- SGD BNTQS ?R DWONRHSNQNE RNBHDSxsRU?KTDR------------- 80/
B- HM?AHKHSX
SN QDBNFMHYDSGD BNMSDWS NE ?LDQHB?M
SGDNQHDR---------------------------------------------------------------- 804
TTT3
G?MCKHMF SGD QTKD L?JHMF ONVDQ- --| --------- 806
?- SGD MDDC SN L?HMS?HM ITQHROQTCDMSH?K
SQ?IDBSNQHDR------ ---| --------- -----| ------------- -| ---- 806
A- SGD MDDC SN ?UNHC DWO?MCHMFRTARS?MBD HM
QTKDR----------------------------------------------------- -------| -------- 808
B- SGD MDDC SN ?UNHC OQDDLOSHMF HMSDQOQDS?SHNMNE
QHFGSR------------------------------------------------------------------- 811
C- SGD MDDC SN BNMRDQUD ONKHSHB?KB?OHS?K---------------- 814
fSO YOl bSTWTbbTYO eObKdKfTaY aP balOdeF Sem fSO
dhWOXKVTYR balOd XKn OmbKYN UhNTMTKW
dOiTOl
TYfa fdhO UhNTMTKW
ehbdOXKMn0
&(slkhidvllqdwlqj wklj derxw wkhTxsuhph Drxuwkdv ehhq wkdwlweohqgv

ruwkrgr{ mxgllldo ixqfwlrqv oslwksrolu}-pdnlqj ixqfwlrqv lq d l(rpsoh{
pl{wxuh. Bqg wkh Drxuw(vsrzhu lv dxrxqwhg iru } wkhidl(w wkdwwkh
pl{wxuh lv pdlqwdlqhg lq d qlfh edodqd; exw wkhidg wkdwlw ltrs eh
pdlqwdlqhg lq vxfk d edodqfhd,(l(rwwqwv
)ru wkholplwdwlrqvri wkdws01shu."
-Qurihvvru SrehuwNl(Dorvnh}(
&sDljrrg mxgjh lv d mxgjh zkr, zlwklq wkh erxqgv ri wkh ohjlwlpdwh

srvvlelolwlhvdwklv glvsrvdo, pdnhv wkhodz wkdw,pruh wkdq rwkhuodz kh lv
Dlwh_-q'(b_q Eq_mjkhmS_m) Ukh Ohz Qklolsslqh Thsdudwlrq 0/ Qrzhu,.: (-orz wkhSKJ/hpdnlq. Qrzhu N,,*(
,;:"sdpo/xgl"d! SwJ(lhzJqwrUJ[h.ixgoll,,! Txsuhp(K>K(,72 OHhkK-I-I 7/R) 'o_fd bhsdc( '1//7(- Sgh _qshbkdh_ qd_bshnm
sn sgd dchsnqh_kdw_l _qshbkdne Unktld 72 Bg_hqIt_m O_nkn E_i_qcn) Ukh mxgl,(d! Soo/h-pd/flqj Gooqglrq:.k Orq-
Jiowh,!,q-wl,h
Qpshgluh wrwkhSroh r/wkh.ixg",du}, 70 OGHk-- 0---I-Y,8 (311;,/
Sgh _tsgnq _bjmnvkdcfd gh oqnedrnqr9Itrshbd UhbdmsdU- Ldmcny_) Cd_m Hgqsnknld B_q_kd)
Cd_m LdqkhmL_f_kknm_)?q_bdkhA_uhdq_)Cnlhmfn Chrhmh)B_qldkn Rhrnm)Lxqm_ Edkhbh_mn) Dct_qcn 0-_ahs_f)
Dll_mtdk Edqm_mcn) ?msnmhn A_tshrs_) Dkhy_adsg ?&0thkhmf,O_mf_k_mf_m) C_mhIn Bnmbdobhnm) Qnfdkhn
Uhmkt_m)Sdqdrhs_ Gdqanr_) Q_e_dk Lnq_kd) Uhbdmsd?l_cnq) RxkudssdS_mjh_mf) Rtr_m Uhkk_mtdu_)Eq_mbhr
Rnaqduhm_)?m_bkdsn "Atsbg" Ch_y) Qtcx_qc ?uhk_) G- G_qqx Qnptd) BnmbkobhnmI_qcdkdy_) ?msnmhn R_msn)
O_sqhbh_C_v_x) Fvdm Fqdbh_,Cd Udq_) II Chrhmh)A_qqx Ftshdqqdy) Eknqhmk,Iika_x)L_))0/0h_L_adk Lnuhcn)
Rnknlnm Ktla_) _mc Dc Qnakdr) _r vdkk _r ghr G_qu_qc K_v Rbgnnk oqnedrrnqr K_tqdmbd Sqhad) Eq_mj
Lhbgdkl_m) _mc Itrshbd Qhbg_qc Fnkcrsnmd ne sgd Rntsg ?eqhb_m Bnmrshstshnm_kBntqs- Sghr _tsgnq lnrs
drodbh_kkxCd_mr O_bhehbn?f_ahm _mc Q_tk O_mf_k_mf_mvgn ehqrsdmbntq_fdc H):l sn s_jd to kdf_k vqhshmf
ctqhmf gh eqdgl_m xd_q-Sghr _tsgnq _krn _bjmnvkdcfdr ghr l_mx ldmsnqr hm?BBQ?I-9[ V) sgd fqd_sdrs ne
vgnl ))"esdc ghl vhsg _ ))&e_bhntronqsq_x_khmghr Qklolsslqh (Koz.iPoopd! notr9 Inrd Bnmbdobhnm) Mwk,(:,.dxg
F{fho!hp".!lKu[PVo)Bxr,ldwh.u lq _q.uwlwoowlrqd!
odz E)ql-q) 70 OGHk-- K--I-110 '1///(-
Sgh _tsgnq _krn sg_mj Bg_hq E_i_qcn _mc Inrdog ?jkdm U_klnmsd ne sgd Unktld 72 dchsnqh_k
an_qc enq sgdhqhmu_kt_akdrtoonqs) _r vdkk_r sgd enkknvhmfvgn qduhdvdc _mc _rrhrsdc hmehm_khyhmf sghr _qshbkd9
Unktld 70 Bg_hq Kd_mcqn ?fthqqd) Fdq_qc Inrdog Itl_lhk) _mc An Shni_mbn- 0[00dqqn" qdl_hm sgd _tsgnq&r
_knmd-
Bg_hq) OIGKHOOSD Ueee) INTQ:[I-HK'1//4(- ?rrnbh_sd 'Hmsdqm_shnm_k B_ohs_k L_qjdsr() ?kkdm (
Nudqx 0-0-0&-KK-L-) G_qu_qc K_v Rbgnnk 'Bnlldmbdldms Rod_jdq( '1//6(- k-K-A-) Tmhudqrhqxne sgd
Oghkhoohmdr'1//4(- A-R- L_m_fdldms Dm))"mddqhmf . ?-A- Dbnmnm,tbr Gnmnqr) e[sdmdn cd L_mhk_ Tmhudqrhsx
'1//0(-
Ehqrs Uhnkds_B_jn,Cqhknm,s[BBQI[K? V Rbgnk_q enq Kdf_k Vqhshmf '1//3(- Ehqrs Eqdrgl_m _mc
EhqrsSvn,Shld ?v_qcdd) Itrshbd HqdmdQ- Bnqsdr Oqhk-denq Ads O_odq hmBnmrshstshnm_kK_v '1//1) 1'/4(-
Ehqrs I[v_mIdd) Itrshbd UhbdmsdU- Ldmcny_ Oqhydenq Adrs Bqhshb_k?m_kxrhr ne _ Rtoqdld Bntqs Cdbhrhnm
'1//4(- Oqnedrrnq I[kxqdr R- LbCntf_k Oqhydenq Adrs O_odq hmOtakhb Hmsdl_s:nm_kK_v _mc Itqhoqtcdmbd
'1//4(- Ehqrs I[v_qcdd) Oqnedrrnq B:n0k$_knS- R_msnr)Iq- Oqhydenq Adrs O_odq hmRdbtqhshdrI -_v '1//4(- e&hqrs
_v_qcdd) OqnedrnqAhdmudmhcnB- I[lahnm Oqhydenq Adrs 0[kodqhmH&qh"_sd Hmsdqm_s:nm_k
K_v '1//3(- Oqnedrrnq
Drsda_m A- A_tshrs_ Oqhydenq Adrs O_odq hmHmsdkkdbst_k Oqnodqsx K_v '1//4(- Ehqrs Rnognlnqd ![v_qcdd)
Oqnedrrnq s[q_bdIhS- A_[&hdq_ Oqhydenq Adrs O_odqhmBhuhkK_v '1/l(-
4 QNkkDQ&!&HkbBKNRJDX)0h&SD s[SDQHB-M RK&OQDSD BNTQS 01 '2qc bc- 1'//(-
dxwkrul~hdwrpdnh, ehvweulgjhv wkhjds ehwzhhqodz dqg vrflh dqg ehvw
surwhfwvwkhw"rqvwlwxwlrq
dqg lwvydoxhv."
-Bkdurq Cdudn, Gruphu Quhvlghqwri wkhTxsuhph Drxuwri Jvudho
(Pxu h{shulhqfh xqghu pduwldo odz kdv vzxqj wkhshqgxoxp rmmxglu;ldo

srzhu wr wkh rwkhuh{wuhph zkhuh wkh Txsuhph Drxuw pq qrz vlw dv
(vxshu/hjlvodwxuh(
dqg (vxshusuhvlghqw.(
Ji wkhuhlv vxfk d wklqj dvmxgloldo
vxsuhpdu}, wkhqwklvlv lw."
0
-Ehdq Qdflilz Bjdelq. Vqlyhuv/ ri wkhQklolsslqhv Droohjhri Mdz
"_,i7khwkhuuhvsrqghqwGhuqdqgr Qrh, Ku. lv txdolilhg wr uxq iru Quhvlghqw

lqyroyhvd zqvwlwxwlrqdolvvxh exwlwvsrolwlpo wrqhlv qr ohvvgrplqdqw. Ukh
DPoluwlv vsolwgrzq wkhplggoh rq wkhwlwl~hqvklsri uhvsrqghqwQrh....
Hlyhq wkhlqghwlvlyhqhvv ri wkhyrwhvri wkhphpehuv ri wklvDPoouw, wkhehwwhu
srolu} dssurdwk lv wrohwwkhshrsoh ghwlgh.... Gru rq srolwlfdotVhKwlrqv,wklT
DPoluwpt} huu eoowwkh vryhuhljq shrsoh zl/J qrw. Ur eh KVuh, wkh
Drqvwlwxwlrqglg qrwjudqw wrwkhJJqhohlohg phpehuv ri wklvDrxuwwkhuljkw
wrhohfwlq ehkdoiri wkhshrsoh."
-KoovwlfhSh}qdwr Qxqr, Uho(Trq0(- DPNFMFD
Bghde\ trshbd Qdxm_snOtm_ _rrtldc sgd qnkdne lncdqm oqnogds hm

1//6) _mc) rddlhmfkx hmbg_q_bsdq)hm_ roddbg dmshskdcUkh Wlhz iurp weh
Nrxqwdlqwrs, oqnbk_hldc _ fqd_s mdv enqbdb_kkdcsgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq- Sgd
mdv unhbd hm sgd cdrdqs bqhdc nts sg_s sgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnmq_chb_kkx
sq_mrenqldc sgd itchbh_konvdq) _mc sg_s _ jdx bg_mfdv_r gnv9
ZS\gd o_tbhsx ne onvdq ne sgd Itchbh_qx hmbgdbjhmf

gtl_m qhfgsr uhnk_shnmr v_r qdldchdc ax
rsqdsbghmfhsr qtkd l_jhmf oqdqnf_shud-0[qshbkdUHHH)
rdbshnm 4 '4( dlonvdqr sgd Rtoqdld Bntqs sn
&oqnltkf_sd qtkdr bnmbdqmhmfsgd oqnsdbshnm _mc
dmenqbdldms ne bnmrshstshnm_kqhfgsr ww w-& -)
Hmdwo_mchmfsgd itchbh_kqtkd l_jhmf _tsgnqhsx sn

dmg_mbd sgd oqnsdbshnm _mc dmenqbdldms ne
bnmrshstshnm_k qhfgsr) ntq Bnmrshstshnm_k
Bnllhrrhnmdqr vdqd dmcnvdc vhsg oqnogdshb
dxdr- Enq svn cdb_cdr k_sdq)vd vntkc ad adcduhkdc
SIkD-kk&CBD
?Hk9HQNG-HQHH&) 9=/6'1//F(-
H-HCTHNBQ9HBX
o(dgilp /Jjdeloo, Ukh Qrolol,,1(r/./xglgdooholhz Pq,u k{hpol,(f /Jglroo: &w&urT"s"ph F(Oy202 doogTr,ldo DkdoY,
0--)0 078)1/8,0/ '0878(-
53 OHHkI--
) Sbbrnm o1 Bnll&m nm I9kbb-)
':-Q- Mn- 0')039=3)313 RdQ? 166) 3/0) L_q- 9=)1//3-
ax dwsq_itchbh_k jhkkhmfr _mc enqbdc chr_ood_q_mbdr
sg_s vntkc dwonrd sgd eq_hkshdrne ntq eqddcnl) sgd
hm_cdpt_bx ne ntq k_vr he mns sgd hmtshkhsxne ntq
rxrsdl ne itrshbd- Fhudm sgdrd utkmdq_ahkhshdr)sgd
Itchbh_qx) nm hsr o_qs) g_r cdbhcdc sn tmrgd_sg hsr
tmtrdc onvdq sn dm_bs qtkdr --- -r
Itrshbd UhbdmsdU- Ldmcny_ vntkc kdbstqd "sg_s k_v g_r svn

dkdldmsr9knfhb_mc qgdsnqhb-Gd rs_sdc sg_s knfhbenqlr sgd adcqnbj ne ntq
itqhroqtcdmbd)ats hshr qgdsnqhbsg_s l_jdr Bnmrshstshnm_k
K_v rn onsdms_mc
rn rdctbshud- Sg_s hr)gd b_tshnmdc)nmdltrs qd_c b_rdr vhsg fqd_s b_qd)kdrs
nmd ad dmrnqbdkkdcax sgd qgdsnqhb_mc lhrr sgd _bst_k 0/fhb-"5 Hsvntkc
rddl) mdudqsgdkdrr)sg_s k_v oqnedrrnqr g_ud addm dmrnqbdkkdc
_knmfvhsg sgd
ldch_ ax sgd knesx qgdsnqhbgdq_kchmfsgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq&r rtoonrdc
_09ehu_k
hm_kkats _ bg_qhnsne ehqd-
Hshr itudmhkdsn adkhdudsg_s rsq_xrtqoktr_fd hmsgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnm

k_x cnql_ms enq svn cdb_cdr sgdm rtccdmkx sq_mrenqldc sgd e_bd ne
Oghkhoohmd Bnmrshstshnm_kK_v- Bntqsr g_ud g_c onvdq sn oqnltkf_sd
oqnbdctq_k qtkdr enq bdmstqhdr_mc l_mx qtkdr ne duhcdmbd_mc vqhsr g_ud
_mbhdmsqnnsr- Sgd Nludqgd7 qtkd vdkk dmsqdmbgdchm onotk_q ldch_ _mc
bgddrx onkhbdlnuhdr qdekdbsrsgd dwsdms_mc _bbdos_mbdne sghr onvdq- Mnq
rgntkc _mxk_v rstcdms ad rtqoqhrdc sg_s bntqsr _bs vhsg fqd_sdqkdfhshl_bx
vgdm sgdx _bs sn oqnsdbs gtl_m qhfgsr) _r sghr oqnonrhshnmfqntmcr sgd
bk_rrhbchrbtrrhnmr ne itchbh_kqduhdvne Oqnedrrnqr?kdw_mcdqAhbjdk)Bg_qkdr
Ak_bj) Iq-) Idrrd Bgnodq) O_tk Eqdtmc _mc Lhbg_dk Odqqx)Itcfd Kd_qmdc
G_mc _mcItrshbd Ldmcny_- Hmrgnqs) _ rstcdms ne Bnmrshstshnm_k K_v rtqdkx
qd_khydrsg_s sgd Bntqs bntkc "oqnltkf_sd qtkdr bnmbdqmhmf sgd oqnsdbshnm
_mcdmenqbdldmsne gtl_m qhfgsr" dudmzlwkrxw _qshbkd UHHH) rdbshnm4'4(-
Qdedqdmbdrsn _qshbkdUHHH)rdbshnm4'4( _qd ldqdkx rntmc ahsdr sn

bqxrs_kkhydsq_chshnm_k
kdf_k cnbsqhmdenq sgd ldch_ hmsnvg_s hr mnv sgd
Bntqs&r"mdv" "qtkdl_jhmf onvdq-" Rnld g_ud adbnld snn b_tfgs to hm
sghroqno_f_mc_ rn _r sn hlokx dudmhmkdf_k_m_kxrhrsg_s _qshbkd
UHHH)rdbshnm
4'4( hr _ mdv _mc qdunktshnm_qxsdwst_k_mbgnq)_mc hmcnhmf rn qdlnud hs
eqnl sgd bnmsdwsne hsrtmcdqkxhmf_mc drs_akhrgdccnbsqhmdr-Sghr rtodqehbh_k
Qdxm_sn H&tmn)Sgd Uhdv eqnl sgd Lntms_hmsno) Jdxmnsd h[IIqbrr _s sgd M_shnm_kBNkkRtks_sh"d
Rtllhs nm Dwsq_itIhbh_kJhkkhmf_mI DmenqbdI Chr_ood_q_mbdr)Bdmsdmmh_k H!_kk)k[I_mhk;k Hknsdk)&0&0 1,2) _s 3,4
PtH 05) 1'/6(-
" Nrb_q Eq_mjkhmS_m) Enqd[UnqI) Tl!K(il/lwJ .z..J.M1qKpo,QoouoJW: -0&0(&.& Joqg Jkh T,gwof/lrq rm(J!" .aywospqf JM0MM2-
68 OHGH-KI 765) 765 '1//3(-
7 8HHLJAOOHPHTDAAZL
@
Q@ [dS` AS O4 8d[ka` S2 U?e K4I4 eU020^^1010^15: F5 34AIJ 4Sdf4 @@@2 u AB0A14
nardrrhnm vhsg sdwst_k_tsgnqhsxl_jdr hs_kksnn d_rx sn nudqknnj ghrsnqhb_k
_mc rsqtbstq_k bnmsdws)7
_mc onsdmsh_kkx)
sn nudqknnj sgd oqdrdmsrs_sd ne sgd
Oghkhoohmdr&rdo_q_shnmne onvdqr cnbsqhmd-
Sghr qd_bshnmsn sgd vhmmhmfdchsnqh_kdw_l drr_x ne It_m O_nkn

E_i_qcn rdqudr _r ansg _ sqhatsd _mc _ mnsdne b_tshnmsn sgd mdv Bg_hqne
sgd Qklolsslqh Mdz Krxuqdo(v Unktld A61 Ehqrs)hs rddjr sn drs_akhrg sg_s sgd
itchbh_k onvdq tmcdq sgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnmhr oqdrdmskx aqn_cdq hm
_ookhb_shnm sg_meqdrgl_m xd_qBnmrshstshnm_k K_v bk_rrdr l_jd hsnts sn ad)
dudm_bbntmshmfenq sgd dwo_mcdcbdqshnq_qh onvdq hm_qshbkd UHHH) rdbshnm0-
Lnrs qdbdmskx)sgd "qtkdl_jhmf onvdq" g_r dwo_mcdc sgd itchbh_konvdq)
adhmf _ aqn_c dwbdoshnmsn sgd b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrxqdpthqdldms sg_s hr sgd
bdmsq_kqdrsqhbshnm sn sgd itchbh_konvdq&r _ookhb_shnm- Rdbnmc)hs rddjr sn
rgnv sg_s sgd Bntqs&r aqn_cdq "rxlankhb" qnkdhmcdlnbq_shb fnudqmldms
l_x mns ad _r hcd_k_ itrshehb_shnm enq sghrdwo_mcdcitchbh_konvdq _r Bg_hq
E_i_qcn l_jdr hsnts sn ad- Sghqc)hsrddjr sn chrbtrr sgd rsqtbstq_k oqnakdlr
sg_s l_x onsdmsh_kkxqdrtks eqnl sghrfqd_skxdwo_mcdcitchbh_konvdq _mc sgd
e_hktqdsn qdbnfmhydhsrsqtd dwsdms-
?s sgd ntsrds) gnvdudq) sgdqd _qd bdqs_hmbnmbdosr sg_s sghr _qshbkd

cndr qrw oqnonrd- Hscndr mns rddj sn _qftd sg_s sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq hr
hkkdfhshl_sd)_r hs adfhmr vhsg sgd sgntfgs sg_s sgd Bntqs bntkc _qft_akx
oqnltkf_sd _kkhsr qdbdmsoqnbdctq_k qtkdr dudmvhsgnts _qshbkdUHHH) rdbshnm
4'4(- Mnq cndr hsrddj sn bqhshbhyd_mxne sgdrd qdbdmshmhsh_shudr
_r sgd fqd_s
fnnc _bghdudcax sgd Otmn Bntqs sgqntfg _kksgdrd g_r addm tmlhrs_j_akd-
Sghr _qshbkd)gnvdudq) rddjr sn bqhshbhyd gnv rnld bnlldms_snqr

vntkc g_ud eqdrgl_m k_v rstcdmsr ad rtqoqhrdc sg_s sgd Rtoqdld Bntqs hr
dlonvdqdc sn oqnsdbs gtl_m qhfgsr _mc sg_s sgd "qtkdl_jhmf onvdq" hr
rnld mnudkenqbdsg_s k_xcnql_ms hmsgd qdbdrrdr ne sgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnm
enq svn cdb_cdr _mc g_r mnv qdrg_odc sgd e_bdne Bnmrshstshnm_k K_v- Hshr
sdkkhmfgnv _kk bqhshbhrl ne sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq hr btqqdmskx rn
tme_rghnm_akdsg_s hsb_mad chrlhrrdc rhlokx ax _qfthmf sg_shshr hmctahs_akd
sg_s sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq hr dwokhbhskx_tsgnqhydc ax sgd Bnmrshstshnm&r
udqx
sdws-Sgd ehqrsotakhb bqhshbhrlv_r l_cd ax Cd_m Q_tk O_mf_k_mf_m) vgn
vqnsd _ants sgd fthcdkhmdsn oqdedq sgd hlonrhshnm ne ehmdrq_sgdq sg_m
hloqhrnmldms hmkhadkb_rdr hmghr Jqtxluhu bnktlm _mc_qftdc9
ZS\gd Rtoqdld Bntqs) vgdm hsv_msr sn rg_od gnv
knvdq bntqsr cdbhcd _bst_k b_rdr) rod_jr sgqntfg
oqdbdcdms)mns sgqntfg fthcdkhmdr-Hmnsgdq vnqcr)
Bnmfqdrr r_hc sgqntfg k_v9 Otmhrg vhsg oqhrnm)nq
eHmd)nq ansg- Mnv sgd Bntqs r_xr uh_ ldln9
?lnmf _kkne sgd _anud) trd b_rg eHmdr_r e_q _r
onrrhakd-B
BghdeItrshbd Otmn qdronmcdc sn sghr o_qshbtk_qonhmsax bhshmfsgd

qdbdmscdbhrhnmrbhsdcax sgd fthcdkhmdr)_mc sgdmdmcdc9
Sgd enqldq cd_m g_r mn qd_rnm sn k_ldms sgd

rgnqs,bhqbthshmf ne sgd oqhmbhokdne rdo_q_shnm ne
onvdqr _mc sgd dqnrhnm ne sgd qtkd ne k_v- Sgd
Bhqbtk_qcndr mns uhnk_sdsgd cnbsqhmone rdo_q_shnm
ne onvdqr adb_trd hshr a_rdc nm b_rdr cdbhcdc ax
sgd Bntqs hm sgd bnmrshstshnm_kdwdqbhrd ne hsr
onvdq sn hmsdqoqdsntq k_vr- Hscndr mns dqncd sgd
qtkd ne k_v ats rsqdmfsgdmrhsr rhmdvr) enq hsenkknvr
sgd _qbghsdbstqd ne ntq Bnmrshstshnm sg_s fhudr
oqdedqqdc rs_str sn eqddcnl ne roddbg _mc ne sgd
oqdrr-kN
Oqnakdl_shb_kkx)
dwbdossn bhsdsgd cdbhrhnmrdbgndc ax sgd fthcdkhmdr
, _mc Cd_m O_mf_k_mf_m g_c dlog_rhydc sg_s gd bqhshbhydcsgd oqnbdctq_k
qtkd&rtrd dudmsgntfg sghrbnmenqldc sn itqhroqtcdmbd, BghdeItrshbd Otmn
_ood_qdc sn fknrr nudq sgd bdmsq_k
bqhshbhrl9
Sg_s sgd Bntqs g_c oqnltkf_sdc
_ cnbsqhmdnm khadkntsrhcd sgd b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrxqdrsqhbshnmrn bdmsq_k hm
sgd Bnmrshstshnm&roqnuhrhnmnmitchbh_kqduhdv-
Sghr _oo_qdmsnlhrrhnm qdl_hmr tmrdsskdctmshksnc_x) _mc ghfgkhfgsr

sg_s qdf_qckdrrne vg_s nmd sghmjr ne sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq _mc hsr oqdrdms
trd) hs ltrs ad _m_kxydchmhsr oqnodq bnmsdws_mc hsr hlo_bs nm oqdrdms
cnbsqhmdltrs ad bkd_qkx hcdmshehdc-
?r sghr_qshbkdgnodr sn ntskhmd)tmbqhshb_k
_bbdos_mbdne sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq rhlokx adb_trd hs _mc BghdeItrshbd
Otmn g_ud _bghdudc tmlhrs_j_akd fnnc hm_ onkhshb_k rxrsdl vgdqd rtbg hr
rb_qbdl_x qdrtkshmlnqd knmf,sdql g_ql sg_mhroqdrdmskx_oo_qdms-
Q_tk O_mf_k_mf_m)QduKlrqmlKuShdurq: Kxgogdo Bgl,l,up dqg hsI J-lplw.o;OGHK-CIHHKXHMPTHQDQ) Eda- 0)

1//Q) _s wa03) &Z5) _u_hk_akd _s gsso9.._ohmhnm-hmpthqbq-mds.hlkthqdqnohmhnm.bnktlmr.uhbv.1//G/1/0,
00'&'('08.Itchbh_k,_bshuhrl,_mc,hsr,khlhsr- Thh Qb(&m_snOtm_) FthIbkhmbr hm sgb Narbm&_mbb ne _ Qtkb ne
Oqdedqbmbdhmsgd Hlonrhshnm ne Odm_kshdr hmKhadkB_rdr) ?Il- Bhqb-NQ,1//G) )Z4)-I_m-14- 1//G-
000 Q_tk O_m.,)=_k_mf_m) o(do(.olupmlKu
Shd.zq: Ukh Dklh/KxKwl," ShsolhK, 0&0HHK-C- [ HH-[&
Hh['THQDQ) H&ba-6) 1//G)
_s 9[03) &004)_u_hk_akd_s gsso9..nohmhnm-hmxthqdq-mds.h00kHthqbqnohmhnm. bnktlmrg&hdv .1//G/1/6,006341.Sgd,
Bghbe,-Itrshbd,qdokhdr-
Sgd Otmn Bntqs&r qdbdmshmhsh_shudr
_qd entmcdc nm _ aqn_cdmdc
bnmbdoshnmne itchbh_k onvdq- Sghr hr adrs dmb_ortk_sdc hm sgd kdf_k
eq_ldvnqj oqdrdmsdc ax Bghde Itrshbd Otmn _s sgd k_mcl_qj M_shnm_k
Bnmrtks_shudRtllhs nm Dwsq_itchbh_k
Jhkkhmf_mc DmenqbdcChr_ood_q_mbdr
hm1//69
Sghr oqd,dlhmdms oqditchbd hm e_unq ne gtl_m

qhfgsr hmctbdc ntq bnmrshstshnm_kbnllhrrhnmdqr sn
qddw_lhmd sgd a_k_mbd ne onvdq _lnmf sgd sgqdd
fqd_s aq_mbgdr ne fnudqmldms,sgd dwdbtshud) sgd
kdfhrk_stqd) _mc sgd itchbh_qx- ZN\tq
Bnmrshstshnm_kBnllhrrhnmdqr) cddldc hs vhrd sn
rsqdmfsgdm sgd onvdqr ne sgd Itchbh_qx ---- Ehqrs)sgd
itchbh_k onvdq v_r dwo_mcdc sn hmbktcd sgd ctsx ne
sgd bntqsr ne itrshbd sn rdsskd _bst_k bnmsqnudqrhdr
hmunkuhmfqhfgsr vghbg _qd kdf_kkxcdl_mc_akd _mc
dmenqbd_akd_mc sn cdsdqlhmd vgdsgdq nq mns sgdqd
g_r addm _ fq_ud _atrd ne chrbqdshnm_lntmshmf sn
k_bj nq dwbdrr ne itqhrchbshnm nm sgd o_qs ne _mx
aq_mbg nq hmrsqtldms_khsx ne sgd fnudqmldms- Hm
sgd k_mcl_qj b_rd ne Urohwowlqry. T hhuhwdu}ri Glqdqfh,
H l_cd sgd rtalhrrhnm sg_s "hm hlonrhmf sn sghr
Bntqs sgd ctsx sn _mmtk _bsr ne fnudqmldms
bnllhssdc vhsg fq_ud _atrd ne chrbqdshnm)sgd mdv
Bnmrshstshnm sq_mrenqldc sgd Bntqs eqnl o_rrhuhsx
sn _bshuhrl- Sghr sq_mrenql_shnm) chbs_sdc ax ntq
chrshmbs dwodqhdmbd _r _ m_shnm) hr mns ldqdkx
dunktshnm_qx ats qdunktshnm_qx---- Rdbnmckx) sgd
o_tbhsx ne onvdq ne sgd Itchbh_qx hm bgdbjhmf
gtl_m qhfgsr uhnk_shnmr v_r qdldchdc nl
rsqdsbghmf hsr qtkd l_jhmf oqdqnf_shud- ?-qshbkdUHHH)
rdbshnm 4 '4( dlonvdqr sgd Rtoqdld Bntqs sn
oqnltkf_sd qtkdr bnmbdqmhmfsgd oqnsdbshnm _mc
dmenqbdldms ne bnmrshstshnm_kqhfgsr-&kk
Sghr eq_ldvnqj hr rkhfgcx qduhrhnm_qx)_ksgntfg mns mdbdrr_qhkx

hm_bbtq_sd-Nmd ltrs _m_kxydsgd bnlonmdms entmc_shnmr ne Oghkhoohmd
itchbh_kqduhdv hmchuhct_kkx _mc f_tfd sgd hmchuhct_kvdhfgs ne d_bg) kdrs
rl_kk ats bqtbh_kcds_hkrad nudqknnjdc vgdm sgdrd ldqfd hmsn_ bnlokdw _mc
bnmrs_mskxdunkuhmfvgnkd- Rtbg cds_hkrhlokx sg_s sgd oqdrdms rbnod ne
itchbh_konvdq hr aqn_cdq sg_mdudm BghdeItrshbd Otmn&r_kqd_cxdwo_mrhud
Hshr hmctahs_akdsg_s cdlnbq_bx hr bg_q_bsdqhydcax l_inqhsx qtkd-
Mdudqsgdkdrr)ntq Bnmrshstshnmdwokhbhskx _tsgnqhydr sgd itchbh_qx sn rsqhjd
cnvm _m _bs ne sgd odnokd&rdkdbsdc qdoqdrdms_shudr-Sgtr) Oqnedrrnq
?kdw_mcdqAhbjdk k_adkdc itchbh_kqduhdv _ "cduh_ms hmrshstshnm"01 _mc _
"bntmsdq,l_inqhs_qh_menqbd"02hmcdlnbq_bx-
Rbgnk_qrg_ud rsqtffkdc hmsgd lnqd sg_m svn gtmcqdc xd_qr rhmbd

Ndueoou} y. Ndglvrq26 v_r oqnltkf_sdc sn dwok_hm "sgd qnns cheehbtksx/ sg_s
itchbh_kqduhdvhr _ bntmsdq,l_inqhs_qh_menqbdhmntq rxrsdl-"04 BghdeItrshbd
Ingm L_qrg_kkghlrdke qd_rnmdcsg_s _ bnmrshstshnm hmsgd ?ldqhb_m sq_chshnm
hr ld_ms sn ad _ookhdcax sgd itchbh_qx_mc s_jdr oqdbdcdmbdnudq _mx_bs ne
sgd Oqdrhcdmsnq Bnmfqdrr rgntkc sgd svn bnmekhbs-Gd vqnsd9
Hshr dlog_shb_kkx sgd oqnuhmbd_mc ctsx ne sgd

itchbh_k cdo_qsldms sn r_x vg_s sgd k_v hr- Sgnrd
vgn _ookx sgd qtkd sn o_qshbtk_q b_rdr) ltrs ne
mdbdrrhsx dwontmc _mc hmsdqoqdssg_s qtkd- He svn
k_vr bnmekhbsvhsg d_bg nsgdq) sgd bntqsr ltrs
cdbhcd nm sgd nodq_shnmne d_bg-
Rn he _ k_v ad hm noonrhshnm sn sgd

bnmrshstshnm:he ansg sgd k_v _mc sgd bnmrshstshnm
_ookx sn _ o_qshbtk_qb_rd) rn sg_s sgd bntqs ltrs
dhsgdq cdbhcd sg_s b_rd bnmenql_akx sn sgd k_v)
chrqdf_qchmf sgd bnmrshstshnm: nq bnmenql_akx sn
sgd bnmrshstshnm) chrqdf_qchmf sgd k_v: sgd bntqs
ltrs cdsdqlhmd vghbg ne sgdrd bnmekhbshmfqtkdr
fnudqmr sgd b_rd- Sghr hr ne sgd udqx drrdmbd ne
itchbh_kctsx-
He sgdm sgd bntqsr _qd sn qdf_qc sgd

bnmrshstshnm: _mc sgd bnmrshstshnm hr rtodqhnq sn
_mx nqchm_qx_bs ne sgd kdfhrk_stqd:sgd bnmrshstshnm)
-[KD9W-H\(DQ
AHBI--9DH-)
SHkD KD)HRSC?L:DQNTR AQ"BG 07 '0851(-
cp _s Rbb1
4 T-R- 'H Bq_mbg( 026) HQ/2 VH- 7k(-'07/2(-
AqBI--9DH-)
/ehc0'(O mnsb) _s 05-
_mc mns rtbg nqchm_qx_bs) ltrs fnudl sgd b_rd sn
vghbg sgdx ansg _ookxk5
Td _cchshnm)Bghde Itrshbd L_qrg_kk hlokhbhskx_qftdc sg_s itchbh_k

qduhdv cndr mns dkdu_sdsgd Rtoqdld Bntqs _anud nsgdq aq_mbgdr adb_trd
sgd Bnmrshstshnmahmcr _kkne sgdl) _m _qftldms l_cd dwokhbhs hm sgd
OghkhoohmdrhmBqjdud y. FohfwrudoDrpplvvlrq. H> Etqsgdq) ?kdw_mcdqG_lhksnm
vqnsd9
Sgd bnlokdsd hmcdodmcdmbdne sgd bntqsr ne

itrshbd HR odbtkh_qkx drrdmsh_k Hm _ khlhsdc
Bnmrshstshnm---- Khlhs_shnmr ne sghr jhmc b_m ad
oqdrdqudc hm oq_bshbdmn nsgdq v_x sg_m sgqntfg
sgd ldchtl ne bntqsr ne itrshbd) vgnrd ctsx hs
ltrs ad sn cdbk_qd_kk_bsr bnmsq_qxsn sgd l_mhedrs
sdmnq ne sgd Bnmrshstshnm unhc- Vhsgnts sghr) _kk
sgd qdrdqu_shnmr ne o_qshbtk_q qhfgsr nq oqhuhkdfdr
vntkc _lntms sn mnsghmf-HR
G_lhksnm qd_rnmdcsg_s sgd itchbh_qxv_r hmrshstshnm_kkxdpthoodc sn

tognkc sgd oqnonrdc edcdq_kbnmrshstshnm) ctd sn hsr b_o_bhsxenq oqhmbhokdc
qdekdbshnm_mc khed sdmtqd) vghbg chrs_mbdc itcfdr eqnl onotk_q _mc
rnldshldr ehbjkdrdmshldms-08
Oqdbhrdkxadb_trd itchbh_kqduhdv&raqd_csg hr rn chroqnonqshnm_sdsn

sgd itchbh_qx&rchqdbs _bbntms_ahkhsxsn sgd odnokd) hs g_r _kv_xr addm
etmc_ldms_kkx qdrsqhbsdcax sgd b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrxqdrsqhbshnm- Sghr hr
qdekdbsdchm sgd dwbdqoseqnl Nduexu} _anud _mc hr dmb_ortk_sdc hm sgd
bk_rrhbo_q_fq_og eqnl Itrshbd Inrd O-K_tqdk9
gdm sgd itchbh_qx ldch_sdr sn _kknb_sd

bnmrshgkshnm_kantmc_qhdr) hs cndr mns _rrdqs _mx
rtodqhnqhsx nudq sgd nsgdq cdo_qsldmsr: hscndr mns
") L_qatqx) 4 T-R- _s 066,67-

06 52 Oghk028 '0825(-
4d ?kdw_mcdq G_lhksnm) Ukh GhghudoliwOr. 600)(Ukh .oxg~llp} J*hsduwphqw(*, HMCDODMCDMS INKIQM?K
'Rs_sd ne Mdv Xnqj() 006)Itm- 03) H67G-
sn "Sgd Bntqs&r _knnemdrr eqnl sgd onkhshb_krxrsdl _mc sgd Itrshbdr& k_bj ne tdodmcdmbd enq
l_hmsdm_mbd hm neehbd nm sgd onotk_qhsx ne _ o_qshbtk_q qtkhmf oqnlhrd _m naidbshuhsx sg_s dHdbsdt
qdoqdrdms_shudr_qb mns,_mt rgntkc mns ad,_r b_o_akd ne _bghd[&hmf)" IDRRH&9BI kNODQ)ITCHBH?KQD[&HDV
-[MH( SGD M9[SHN=)?KONKHSHB?KH&QNBERR 57 '08GN(- Thh, kP"(woyu, K-[QQX Tenh 0Sef/ SGD ODNOKD
SHHDkRDKUDR9 ONOTK?QB9'(MRSHSTSHNM9[KkR0 9[:&/:0( ITCHBK&[K
QHBUHD[[& 7/,70 '1//3() Cd_m Jq_ldq _qftdr
j^tj ? JH 5 HGHTDPKTN; QL CD ekjb_dxw t cehx jfTewvhd f ei _j_ed ed `kw_v_tb hvo_xm tdw _d i jhedxh btdktx j^td
fdmdq_konrs,Qdxnktshnm sghmjhmfhm0677- Etqsgdq) Ukh G(;,w!hudoliw
Or. 600v_r otakhrgdc snn k_sdsn hmektdmbd
7775ej htj_yo_d vabbr,xdj_edi tdw _ji f hxi xdj vtded_vtb i jtjki xdbxhxw tyjxh j^x hd_jxU ejtjxi Medi j_jkj_ed mti
q_shehdt)
hm qd_khsx mtkkhex nq hmu_khc_sd _m _bs ne sgd
kdfhrk_stqd)ats nmkx_rrdqsr sgd rnkdlm _mc r_bqdc
nakhf_shnm _rrhfmdc sn hs ax sgd Bnmrshstshnm sn
cdsdqlhmd bnmekhbshmf bk_hlr ne _tsgnqhsx tmcdq sgd
Bnmrshstshnm _mc sn drs_akhrg enq sgd o_qshdr hm_m
_bst_k bnmsqnudqrx sgd qhfgsr vghbg sg_s hmrsqtldms
rdbtqdr _mc ft_q_msddr sn sgdl- 000hrhr hmsqtsg _kk
sg_s hr hmunkudc hm vg_s hr sdqldc "itchbh_k
rtoqdl_bx" vghbg oqnodqkx hr sgd onvdq ne itchbh_k
qduhdv tmcdq sgd Bnmrshstshnm- Dudm sgdm) sghr
onvdq ne itchbh_k qduhdv hr khlhsdc sn _bst_k b_rdr
_mc bnmsqnudqrhdr sn ad dwdqbhrdc _esdq etkk
noonqstmhsx ne _qftldms ax sgd o_qshdr) _mc
khlhsdc etqsgdq sn sgd bnmrshstshnm_kptdrshnm q_hrdc
nq sgd udqx ol} prwd oqdrdmsdc- ?mx _ssdlos _s
_arsq_bshnmbntkc nmkxkd_c sn ch_kdbshbr_mc a_qqdm
kdf_kptdrshnmr _mc sn rsdqhkdb&nmbktrhnmr tmqdk_sdc
sn _bst_khshdr1/
Itrshbd UhbdmsdU- Ldmcny_) ptnshmf ghr cd_q eqhdmcO_tk Eqdtmc)

_qshbtk_sdrsgd l_mx bnqnkk_qhdrne _kknvhmfqduhdv nmkxhmbnmbqdsdb_rdr9
ZS\gdx gdko sn dwok_hmsgd tkshl_sd o_q_cnw ne sgd

Bntqs&r onvdq) sgd onvdq ne _ rl_kk fqnto ne
itcfdr) _oonhmsdc enq khed)sn rds _rhcd sgd _bsr ne
sgd qdoqdrdms_shudrne sgd odnokd hm_ cdlnbq_bx-
Sgd qtkdr ne &b_rdnq bnmsqnudqrx&b_m ad rddm _r
sgd mdbdrr_qx bnqnkk_qx ne sghr u_rs onvdq ,
mdbdrr_qx enq hsr vhrd dwdqbhrd _mc hsr onotk_q
_bbdos_mbd-Ax cdbkhmhmfsn fhud _cuhrnqx nohmhnmr)
sgd Bntqs qdeq_hmr eqnl hmsqtrhnm kmsn sgd
k_vl_jhmf oqnbdrr- Ax qdpthqhmf _ bnmbqdsd b_rd
vhsg khshf_msr_cudqrdkx _eedbsdc) sgd Bntqs gdkor
hsrdke sn _unhc oqdl_stqd) _arsq_bs) hkk,hmenqldc
itcfldmsr- Ax ok_bhmf _ cdbhrhnm nm _ mnm,
bnmrshstshnm_k fqntmc vgdmdudq onrrhakd) sgd
Bntqs fhudr sgd kdfhrk_stqd _m noonqstmhsx enq
rnadq rdbnmc sgntfgs) _m noonqstmhsx sn _ldmc
sgd rs_stsd sn nauh_sd sgd bnmrshstshnm_kptdrshnm) _
bg_mbd sn dwdqbhrdsg_s rohqhsne rdke,rbqtshmx _mc
10& 9[mf_q_)')0 Oghk-_s HRG-Sgd k_rsrdmsdmbdhr _bst_Ikx eqnl EdkhwEq_mjetqsdq) Dp&'>//---,' Pslqlrq,a(, lq I
DH&BXBKNODCKH
NHSHHD
RNBk-&HI- 364) 36G '080/()
RBkH&RBh&9R toor/hg lq JRKTRS1//syMcemmnsd) _s khG-
rdke,bnqqdbshnmvghbg lv sgd drrdmbd ne _ rtbbdrretk
cdlnbq_shb rxrsdl54
Sgd hmrshstshnm_krsqdmfsgr sg_s rths sgd itchbh_qx sn oqhmbhokdc

_m_kxrhr_qd hsr udqx vd_jmdrrdr ntsrhcd _m _bst_k b_rd- "Sgdhq hmrtk_shnm_mc
sgd l_qudkntr lxrsdqx ne shld fhud bntqsr sgd b_o_bhsx sn _ood_k sn ldm&r
adssdq m_stqdr) sn b_kkenqsg sgdhq_rohq_shnmr)vghbg l_x g_ud addm enqfnssdm
hm sgd lnldms&r gtd _mc bqx-"11 Tmkhjd ldladqr ne Bnmfqdrr) itcfdr _qd
mns bnlodkkdc ax eqdptdms qddkdbshnmsn rs_x _sstmdc sn sgd dkdbsnq_sd mnq
dpthoodc sn hmudrshf_sd)bnkkdbsc_s_ nm _mc cda_sd aqn_c hrrtdr-12 Ehm_kkx)hm
dwsq_bshmfsgd b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrx qdpthqdldms eqnl Nduexu}, Oqnedrrnq
Ahbjdk dwok_hmr9
Sgd bnmbdosr ne "rs_mchmf" _mc "b_rd _mc

bnmsqnudqrx" enkknv--- enq qd_rnmr mns chrrhlhk_q
sn sgnrd bhsdc ax L_qrg_kk- Nmd ne sgd bghde
e_btkshdr ne sgd itchbh_qx) vghbg hr k_bjhmf hm sgd
kdfhrk_stqd _mc vghbg ehsr sgd bntqsr enq sgd
etmbshnm ne dunkuhmf _mc _ookxhmf bnmrshstshnm_k
oqhmbhokdr)hr sg_s sgd itcfldms ne sgd bntqsr b_m
bnld k_sdq) _esdq sgd gnodr _mc oqnogdbhdr
dwoqdrrdc hm kdfhrk_shnmg_ud addm sdrsdc hm sgd
_bst_k vnqjhmfr ne ntq rnbhdsx: sgd itcfldms ne
bntqsr l_x ad g_c hmbnmbqdsdb_rdr sg_s dwdlokhex
sgd _bst_k bnmrdptdmbdr ne kdfhrk_shudnq dwdbtshud
_bshnmr504
Cdrohsd sghr ok_trhakd svn,gtmcqdc xd_q nkc dwok_m_shnmne ntq

fnudqmldms&r rsqtbstq_k cdrhfm) nmd ltrs mdudq _kknv nmdrdke sn ad
cdrdmrhshydc sn sgd e_bs sg_s ehudtmdkdbsdc Itrshbdr ne sgd Rtoqdld Bntqs ne
sgd Oghkhoohmdr_qd _tsgnqhydc sn qdudqrd sgd cdbhrhnmr ne qdoqdrdms_shudr
dkdbsdc ax sgd dmshqdm_shnm-?r Itcfd G_mc vqnsd9
ZH\svntkc ad lnrs hqjrnld sn ad lkdc ax _ adux

ne Ok_snmhb Ft_qch_mr dudm he H jmdv gnv sn
bgnnrd sgdl) vghbg H _rrtqdckx cn mns- He sgdx
vdqd hmbg_qfd) Hrgntkc plvv sgd rshltktr ne khuhmf
54 UHBH)MSD U- LDH&CN9!--H)-kKCkBH-HH-
QDXHDHUNE BN:,9RSHSk-&SHNM9HH-
PTH&RI&kN:,9R9
'&040&4 :HMC
H[KHSDQkbkI-R
76 '1/'G() (1")*/l)*O_tk Eqdtmt) qKh Tolsuhph HKoou/,lq &0&)HH-N9R
/0& )[[ZKQH;9-HM0--000 0&0'Qd[&) bc-
43<5,1 Oqnedrrnq Ak_bj khrsr rhlhk_q tbrhq_akb pt_khshdr hm _ bnmrshstshnm_k tlohqd) BqH-HQKH&9R
AH--HBn9)-HHB)
Shkk&-
0&Z&9/0&0-0&
-HMCSZHH)9TVQS9 -kkCHBH-HH- QkdH&HDHH&
HM-0 CTHNBHKHBX 3/ '0/'&'(-
BB ?@
: ] K42 8VRTD ` afW45 .@
f B014
1& R/1/u
119[Hb_mtbq G_lhksnm nq -H-0ldr H[k_chrnm) Golh !(l,gh/oKJw
z./ /"a(0, u; 2 '"H !MM' .Jyrz!h )poo/loooohg*"*,
HMkIk)H&H&RCkbUH--k/kQM-00-
'Rs_sd ne Mdv Xnqj() H[k_q-0)060&0&-
&" AHT&9H&9H-)
-)&HH.lkmnsd)_s 004-
hm _ rnbhdsx vgdqd H g_ud) _s kd_rs sgdnqdshb_kkx)
rnld o_qs hmsgd chqdbshnmne otakhb _ee_hqr1r
Hs g_r adbnld e_rghnm_akd hm qdbdms xd_qr sn sdql sgd 0876

Bnmrshstshnm _m "_bshuhrs bnmrshstshnm)" _ksgntfg "_bshuhrs" hmBnmrshstshnm_k
K_v hr _m nes,lhrtrdc sdql vhsg _ ltkshstcd ne ld_mhmfr-15 Hm sgd 0876
Bnmrshstshnm&rbnmsdws)"_bshuhrs" oqhl_qhkx qdedqr sn sgd dwokhbhsqdk_w_shnmne
itchbh_k qduhdv&r sq_chshnm_kqdrsq_hmsr)sgtr aqn_cdmhmf hsr rbnod-16 Sgdrd
sq_chshnm_kqdrsq_hmsr_qd bnmrnkhc_sdc hmsnsgqdd bnmbdosr9 "Sgd vnqcr ne _qs
sg_s _qd rgnqsg_mc enq sgdrd hcd_r _qd &b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrx& _mc
&rs_mchmf"&1G_mc sgd onkhshb_kptdrshnm cnbsqhmd-
Sgd onkhshb_kptdrshnm cnbsqhmdg_r lnrs uhrhakxaddm bhqbtlrbqhadc

ax sgd "dwo_mcdc bdqshnq_qhitqhrchbshnm-"1 Hm dwo_mchmf sgd oqdrdms
cdehmhshnmne itchbh_k onvdq) enqldq Bghde Itrshbd _mc Bnmrshstshnm_k
Bnllhrrhnmdq Qnadqsn Bnmbdobhnm dwok_hmdc9
kSkghr hr _bst_kkx _ oqnctbs ne ntq dwodmdmbd

ctqhmf l_qsh_k k_v- ZB\dqs_hm oqhmbhokdr
bnmbdqmhmfo_qshbtk_qkxsgd vqhs ne g_ad_r bnqotr)
sg_s hr) sgd _tsgnqhsx ne bntqsr sn nqcdq sgd qdkd_rd
ne onkhshb_kcds_hmddr)_mc nsgdq l_ssdqr qdk_sdc sn
sgd nodq_shnm _mc deedbs ne l_qsh_k k_v e_hkdc
adb_trd sgd fnudqmldms rds to sgd cdedmrd ne
onkhshb_kptdrshnm- --- Sgd Bnllhssdd nm sgd
Itchbh_qx eddkr sg_s sghr v_r mns _ oqnodq rnktshnm
ne sgd ptdrshnmr hmunkudc- Hs chc mns ldqdkx
qdptdrs _m dmbqn_bgldms tonm sgd qhfgsr ne sgd
odnokd) ats hs) 000 deedbs) dmbntq_fdc etqsgdq
" KD9HQ9"T( 00-00&0()fbee)GHH-K NE Qks:H,HSR 62 '084G() txrwhg looGHBDK) .uloo(((( mnsd) _s 1/-
5E/ Enq dw_lokd) _bshXhrl hm Oghkhoohmd sghmjhmf hr _=rnbh_sdc vhsg khadq_k qd_chmfr ne sgd
Medi j_jkj_ed1 hxi kbj_d _d yy_ay"3F vnf tdi _ov i vef xi yeh vedi j_jkj_edtb h_^ji 3 Yxl xhj^xbxi i 1 Nxtd Ue^d Sthj 7,F7.,
oqdrdmsdc Itrshbd I ktfn Ak_bj _r sgd "&Ithmsdrrdmsh_k hmsdqoqdshxhrs" vgn vntkc _mbgnq cnbsqhmd nm sdws) xds
bkd_qkx _ onkhshb_k khadq_k--0/009,,0 HH-HQSDH-X)CCHNBHKHBX -09,,000 CHRSQTRS 1 '08GN(- Enq _ lncdqm) bnlo_q_shXd
w_i vki i _ed. i xx L3rd1rV1OTVRTD dejx1 v^tf 3 7A3
16 MT/ ?qsdlhn O_mg")mha_m) mxglfldo /oglol.uoooM wkh Qklolso(lqh.z.. 6G 0&0000
-- U,1 154) 15G '1/'(3(- "Gx
hlonrhmf tonm _kk itcfdr 'mns itrs sgd _oodkk_sd itrshbdr( sgd ctsx sn cdsdqlhmd hrrtdr ne -0)&ql&B
_atrd ne
w_i vhj3Fj_ed1ekh Medi j_jkj_ed 2 _d co r,_vm 2 ^ti j^Myvul ctdwtjxw j^xc je uHFtvj_r,_i ji 3 `
" AHBDK) /sd2'''' mnsd) _s004- &
" Eq_mbhrbn X- HknKkrdne Qdoqdrdms_sh[&dr) F-Q- Mm- yf38 0)304 e^dDr 33) 013) M")- 0/) 1//2-
-- ZS\gd itchbh_qx hr sgd ehm_k _qahsdq nm sgd
ptdrshnm vgdsgdq nq mns _ aq_mbg ne fnudqmldms
nq _mx ne hsr neehbh_krg_r _bsdc vhsgnts itqhrchbshnm
nq hmdwbdrr ne itqhrchbshnm)nq rn b_oqhbhntrkx _r sn
bnmrshstsd _m _atrd ne chrbqdshnm _lntmshmf sn
dwbdrr ne itqhrchbshnmnq k_bj ne itqhrchbshnm- Sghr
,h&r&,
mns nmkx _ itchbh_k onvdq ats _ ctsx sn o_rr
itcfldms nm l_ssdqr ne sghr m_stqd-nn
Mn onrs,0876 cdbhrhnmhkktrsq_sdrsgd mdv itchbh_konvdq&r dwsdms

tmcdq _qs- UHHH) 0 lnqd uhuhckxsg_m Gudqflvfr y. -irzh p! ShsuhKhqwdwlyhK,
vgdqd sgd Bntqs rsqtbj cnvm _mhlod_bgldms bg_qfd _f_hmrshsr nvm Bghde
Itrshbd) Ghk_qhnC_uhcd)Iq- Qdekdbshmf
sq_chshnm_kcnbsqhmd)sgd TmhsdcRs_sdr
Rtoqdld Bntqs gdkc)ptnshmf G_lhksnm)sg_s9
Hm ntq bnmrshstshnm_k rxrsdl) hlod_bgldms v_r

cdrhfmdc sn ad sgd nmkx bgdbj nm sgd Itchbh_k
Aq_mbg ax sgd Kdfhrk_stqd----
Itchbh_k hmunkudldms Hm hlod_bgldms

oqnbddchmfr) dudm he nmkx enq otqonrdr ne itchbh_k
qduhdv) HR bntmsdqhmsthshud adb_trd hs vntkc
duhrbdq_sd sgd "hlonqs_ms bnmrshstshnm_k bgdbj"
ok_bdc nm sgd Itchbh_qx ax sgd Eq_ldqr-=k
Hlod_bgldms hr sgd "oqnsnsxohb_k" onkhshb_k

ptdrshnm) _mc "Zh\e sgd onkhshb_kptdrshnm cnbsqhmd
g_r mn enqbd vgdqd sgd Bnmrshstshnm g_r dwokhbhskx
bnllhssdc _ onvdq sn _ bnnqchm_sd aq_mbg _mc
vgdqd sgd mddc enq ehm_khsx hr dwsqdld) sgdm hs hr
rtqdkx cd_c-" 'hmsdqm_kbhs_shnmrnlhssdc(&1
GudplKfr cheedqdmsh_sdc
hsrdkeeqnl Ol{rq H&-Vqlwhg Twdnh _mc cdb_cdr
ne oqdbdcdmsax bhshmf"sgd bnmrshstshnm_k
oqnghahshnm _f_hmrssgd hmhsh_shnm
ne
(" Jg. _s 014) to))Kol,)0 QDBNQCnkm Rb)CBNMRSHSTSHN!&HK BN[KI0RRHN& 33,30'( '08G5(-

20 Mhwnm kc/ TmhsdI Rs_sdr) ei*, T-R- 113) 124)002 e1^f/ 621) 62/ '0/;(2(-
01 Nrb_q Eq_mjkhmS_m) Ukh 200-!- D"qpuu: JJ l z.1(J11/?k"ol,,,oo}
Jkh o(uu1olqd"qw! )*xo} rm(Hpjuuuu 10 Kd} Ykdo
K--I- 8) 64 '1//3() t1irol,) Qnm_kcQnstmc_) .hm Mh-|q"(&
DopjuuuuIq)68 OHHkk-- - rq Jkh (sz sJ,/xolroodoo(dudpflhq
/ rm(o;hw!o(udo
Jpshdfkphqo, 65 Jx- K-I- 6/6) 61G '087G(: Mhwnmu- Tmhsdc Rs_sdr- 8G 0:-1c 18) 13'( 'C-B- Bhq-) 0880(- Sgd
sgd rstcdms _rrhrs_ms ne Cd_m Q_tk O_mf_k_mf_kk- nmd ne sgd beegb\b
_tsgnq [u_r) _s sgd sh0SHd) btqh_d hm Isfympe((,/
hlod_bgldms oqnbddchmfr _f_hmrs sgd r_ld hlod_bg_akd neehbdqvhsghm_
nmd,xd_q odqhnc"22_ccdc sn sgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnm-Sgd Bntqs dmcdc hsr
cdbhrhnm9
Sghr Bntqs chc mns gddc sgd b_kksn _cnos _

g_mcr,nee rs_mbd---- Z0kgd Bntqs entmc sgd
dwhrsdmbdhmetkk ne _kksgd qdpthrhsd bnmchshnmrenq
hsr dwdqbhrdne hsr bnmrshstshnm_kkx
udrsdc onvdq _mc
ctsx ne itchbh_k qduhdv nudq _m hrrtd vgnrd
qdrnktshnm oqdbhrdkxb_kkdc enq sgd bnmrsqtbshnm nq
hmsdqoqds_shnmne _ oqnuhrhnm ne sgd etmc_ldms_k
k_v ne sgd k_mc- [&')&g_skhdrhmgdqd hr _m hrrtd ne _
fdmthmd bnmrshstshnm_k l_sdqh_k vghb!I nmkx sghr
Bntqs b_m oqnodqkx _mc bnlodsdmskx _ccqdrr _mc
_citchb_sd 000 _bbnqc_mbd vhsg sgd bkd_q,bts
_kknb_shnm ne onvdqr tmcdq ntq rxrsdl ne
fnudqmldms- E_bd,sn,e_bd sgtr vhsg _ l_ssdq nq
oqnakdl sg_s rpt_qdkx e_kkr tmcdq sgd Bntqs&r
itqhrchbshnm)mn nsgdq bntqrd ne _bshnmb_m ad g_c
ats enq hssn o_rr tonm sg_s oqnakdl gd_c nm-),H
Hmcddc)sgd Bntqs&r enqbdetkqdhmenqbdldmsne dwo_mcdc bdqshnq_qh

itqhrchbshnmdbgndc) hevhsg kdrr khsdq_qx
ekntqhrg)Itrshbd K_tqdkhmBqjdud:
Sgd bk_hl) sgdqdenqd) sg_s sghr Bntqs ax

itchbh_kkx dms_mfkhmfhsrdke vhsg sgd oqnbdrr ne
hlod_bgldms g_r deedbshudkxrds to _ qdfhld ne
itchbh_k rtoqdl-_bx) hr o_sdmskxvhsgnts a_rhr hme_bs
_mc hmk_v-
Sgd hmrshstshnmsg_s hr sgd Rtoqdld Bntqs

snfdsgdq vhsg _kknsgdq bntqsr g_r knmf gdkc _mc
addm dmsqtrsdc vhsg sgd itchbh_k onvdq sn qdrnkud
bnmekhbshmf kdf_k qhfgsr qdf_qckdrr ne sgd
odqrnm_khshdrhmunkudc hm sgd rthsr nq _bshnmr-
Vgx b_m hs mns mnv ad sqtrsdc sn vhdkc itchbh_k
onvdq hm sgdrd odshshnmr itrs adb_trd hs hr sgd
ghfgdrs q_mjhmfl_fhrsq_sd vgn hr hmunkudcvgdm hs
hr _m hmbnmsqnudqshakde_bs sg_s sgd etmc_ldms_k
hrrtd hr mns ghl ats sgd u_khchsxne _ fnudqmldms
Eq_mbhrbn) 304 e^dI _s 065-

Mp_s 066-
aq_mbg&rneehbh_k_bs _r sdrsdc ax sgd khlhsr rds ax
sgd Bnmrshstshnm>&:
?esdq GudplK)(P, Itrshbd ?msnmhn B_qohn&rankc onmdmbh_hmMdpeloor H(-

Drpp(q rq FohfwlrooKy36 chr_kknvdc _ odshshnm sn rtalhs bnmrshstshnm_k
_ldmcldmsr sn _ okdahrbhsd ax _m _kkdfdc rhw lhkkhnm qdfhrsdqdc unsdqr-
Mdpelqr enkknvdc sgd qd_rnmhmf hmGudqfl.o(DP,sg_s vgdsgdq sgd odshshnmlds
kdf_k qdpthqdldmsr hr cheedqdms eqnl vgdsgdq sgd oqnonrdc _ldmcldmsr
rgntkc ad _bbdosdc) sgd enqldq adhmf _ "mns sqtkx" onkhshb_kptdrshnm)
Mdudqsgdkdrr) rnld Mdpelqr itrshbdr rdqhntrkx bnmrhcdqdc sgd onkhshb_k
ptdrshnm&r cnbsqhmdX
HmGudplKfr:u _esdql_sg) sgd onkhshb_kptdrshnm cnbsqhmd hr cd_c enq _kk

oq_bshb_kotqonrdr) _ksgntfg sgd fnudqmldms vhkkl_jd _ snjdm hmunb_shnm_s
d_bg noonqstmhsx-2P ?knmf sgd khmdrne Cdnhu y. Dduu,3W sghr _tsgnq&r oqduhntr
_qshbkd_m_kxydconkhshb_kptdrshnmr hmsgqdd b_sdfnqhdr9
0( sdwst_k9vgdqd sgdqd "hr entmc _ sdwst_kkx

cdlnmrsq_akd bnmrshstshnm_kbnllhsldms ne sgd
hrrtd sn _ onkhshb_k
cdo_qsldms-"
1( etmbshnm_k9vgdqd sgdqd HR "_ k_bj ne

itchbh_kkx chrbnudq_akd _mc l_m_fd_akd rs_mc_qcr
enq qdrnkuhmf hs: nq sgd hlonrrhahkhsx ne cdbhchmf
vhsgnts _m hmhsh_k onkhbx cdsdqlhm_shnm ne _ jhmc
bkd_qkxenq mnm,itchbh_kchrbqdshnm)"
2( oqtcdmsh_k9vgdqd sgdqd hr "sgd hlonrrhahkhsx

ne _ bntqs&r tmcdqs_jhmf hmcdodmcdms qdrnktshnm
vhsgnts dwoqdrrhmf k_bj ne qdrodbs ctd bnnqchm_sd
aq_mbgdr ne fnudqmldms: nq _m tmtrt_k mddc eNdk
tmptdrshnmhmf _cgdqdmbd sn _ onkhshb_kcdbhrhnm
_kqd_cx l_cd: nq sgd onsdmsh_khsxne dla_qq_rrldms
" Bnll&m- ')2 Oghkgu/04G '082')(-

&[mf_q_[&-0&9kdbsnq_k
0') B:-Q- Mn- 06304-[ 4/4 eKd_ r Hz)'( Nbs- 14) 1'G(') -
-06 D--)K_lahmn 'Pthrtlahmf- S/ ..-usd("owr/,lqlrq*, 4/4 RBkK[ _s $3-
& y>v/-t- Rtokhbn [" M_s&kk)bn&bCbx&s -[tsgnqhsx) B:-Q- Mn- 00GG2/) -Ht[- 03) 10000R 'sgd .)&0&0&9
Mehf ehtj_ed vti x.3
4), G_jbq
o1 B_qq) $8 T-R- 0G'&)106 'H$1() txrohg Eq_mbhrbn)304 RBkYh[_s 040: H&9rsq_I_
vyy x Ck&rhbqsn)
KDem
Mn- 03')6kT) 242 RBQ? 341) 30H))[Ksb 1- 1000k0)
eqnl ltkshe_qhntr oqnmntmbdldmsr wr u_qhntr
cdo_qsldmsr nm nmd ptdrshnm-"n
Sgd "sdwst_k" ptdrshnm chdc cdehmhshudkx hm Gudqfl}fr, vgdqd sgd Bntqs

snnj itqhrchbshnmnudq hmsdqoqds_shnm ne hlod_bgldms oqnuhrhnmr) tmcdqrsnnc
sn ad _ bk_rrhb "sdwst_kkx cdlnmrsq_akd bnmrshstshnm_kbnllhsldms)" _r _
l_ssdq ne bnmrshstshnm_kctsx- Gudqg[fr gdkc sg_s sgdqd _qd "sqtkx onkhshb_k"
_mc "mns sqtkx onkhshb_k"ptdrshnmr) sgd k_ssdq adhmf ptdrshnmr vgdqd sgd
hmsdqoqds_shnmne bnmrshstshnm_koqnuhrhnmr hr ots rpt_qdkx hmhrrtd 'nq dudm
b_rdr vgdqd sgd cdl_qb_shnm ne bnmrshstshnm_konvdqr hmfdmdq_k hr _s hrrtd
ats mn o_qshbtk_q oqnuhrhnm hr aqntfgs sn sgd enqd) _r hm Ndufr} y.
NdqjodsowT+(*. Fhudm sgd _ooqn_bg hmGudpl}fr, hs qdl_hmr tmjmnvm vg_s sgd
tmcntasdckx m_qqnv q_mfd ne "sqtkx onkhshb_k"ptdrshnmr bnudqr-31 'Sghr
_tsgnq _krn oqduhntrkx chrbtrrdc sgdm Itrshbd Otmn&r rdo_q_sd nohmhnm
qdf_qchmf bnnqchm_sd bnmrshstshnm_khmsdqoqds_shnmhmrsd_c ne _ookxhmf sgd
onkhshb_kptdrshnm cnbsqhmd)_ onhms sg_s sghr _qshbkdvhkkqdstqm sn-(
Sgd "etmbshnm_k" ptdrshnm _ood_qr _khud_mc _ookhb_akd sn b_rdr mns

dwokhbhskx bnudqdc ax bnmrshstshnm_koqnuhrhnmr) vgdqd sgd rtaidbsr hmunkudc
vdqd _qft_akx kdesnodm ax sgd eq_ldqr sn ad qdrnkudc ax sgd aq_mbg vhsg sgd
fqd_sdrs hmrshstshnm_kbnlodsdmbd enq sgd s_rj _s g_mc- Hmoq_bshbd)gnvdudq)
rn ltbg sdws v_r _ccdc sn sgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnm sg_s sgdqd vhkk_kv_xr ad
"itchbh_kkxchrbnudq_akd _mc l_m_fd_akd rs_mc_qcr" nq _s kd_rs _m _rohq_shnm_k
oqnuhrhnm qdekdbshmf_m "hmhsh_k onkhbx cdsdqlhm_shnm-" Enqdhfm _ee_hqr hr sgd
nmd _qd_ vgdqd sgd onkhshb_kptdrshnm hr qdbnfmhydc) "sgd udqx cdkhb_sd)
okdm_qx _mc dwbktrhud onvdq ne sgd Oqdrhcdms _r sgd rnkd nqf_m ne sgd 3
fnudqmldms hm sgd ehdkc ne hmsdqm_shnm_k qdk_shnmr-"32Dudm sghr hr mns
_arnktsd- Mldqj 0(- Qhrsoh/./ sqd_sdc sgd Cdo_qsldms ne Enqdhfm ?ee_hqr&
cdsdqlhm_shnm ne hlltmhsx _r ldqdkx oqdkhlhm_qx _mc l_cd _m _m_kxrhr
3fV ftd1 77 KLN9CS VNY(RO9I RAA] UJH ($X#$AT77(##A

* 7* 8KA ; YR
A_T UPC F(woppe('(e * ) 8I L$T @EA8DN F(,gpperOr/eTh1'XZVS dejx1 tj CA1
txrolo-H'(-H'k-kk"GDQ"!-HR) RI) )4)444)C \&(G6 BN&,&RHSktSHN" 34/) Shkk9 0&HHHH-H0&0&H""R9 4r BN[k[H.RI&-HQX &(42,43
'1//2 bc-(
" HHe_qbnr"- h[H_mfk_okkr)':)Q- Mn) GG1h0- 066 RBkY[ ')')G) ),(K)" Rdo- 04)0878
P HHhe eqskdo~"d1e( Jkh o(J["l(k(h dqg PVo} rm Be("-HUI-q10 Kd} Ykdo
Eq_mbhrbn) 304 RBQq[ ns 038: &H&_m)
D)*q,uh.u.u /.", OTUURTDdejx tj 1 0^4
A
P Tmhsdc Rs_sdr "- Btqshrr,Vqhfgs i&9wonqsBnqo-) 188 T-R- 2/3) 21/ '08))')(- Sgd _ookhb_shnm ne sgd
f eb_j_vtb ^4\gUeffa` wevjh_dx _d yehx_d tyyt_hi _i hvvey1hd_pvw _d vti xi tyy_hd7_d vnvvkj_r,v wb,jb,hdb3_dF7j_kbbe ey
rN[&dqd::)") hlltmhsx9 Hms&k Bnsgnkhb H[kkfq_shkImBkIll&m X- b-kkkk&i_) B:-Q- Mn- G4640h) 08/ RTK[) 02/) 03/- Rdo-
1G) 088T: H,HkIkxRdd o1 QkIr:kqhkI-B-Q- Mn- kT0838) 12G RBQ))[ 413) Cdd- 0) 0883: K_rbkI o1 Tmhsdc M_shkIk0R
Qdxng,hmf 0"K0mcBnq M_stq_k Qdrntqbdr 0&9woknk&;0shnm)
':-Hs Mn) 0/8sk&!4) 130 RTs[ '(GH) H"da- 12) 08&(4: B_kk_cn
X- Hms&k Qhbd Qdrd_qbg Hmrshstsd) ':-Q- Mn) 0N'(3G-[ 130 RTs[ nWH) k[0_x 11) 0884: Ck&o&sne Enqdhfm )[ee_hqr )&)
M_s&kK_a- Qdh Bnll&m) B:-Q- MkI- 002080)1')1 RBQ? 2G- Rdo kG- 08$-
&" Kh_mf [& H&dnokd-B-Q- MkI- 014Gn4) ))12 RBQ)[ n-'O3- n-'O7/ H_m)1G) 1//0h- Khh B:-Q- MkI) 237Le-7- 577
RBQ? 014) h[I_q- 1')- 1//k 'cdbhchmf sgd H[knshnmenq Qdbnmrhcdq_shnm() &
tmcdq sgd Uhdmm_Bnmudmshnmnm Choknl_shb Qdk_shnmr-Etqsgdq) sgd Bntqs
chc mns cdbkhmditqhrchbshnm nudq sgd Oghkhoohmdr& _bbdrrhnm sn sgd [W!nqkc
Sq_cd Nqf_mhy_shnm 'VSN( hm Udqdgd y. Bqjdud A nq N[&dqsgd A_khj_s_m
y
lhkhs_qx dwdqbhrdr hm Mlp y. F{hDowwl~Kh

Thfuhwdu}.+,
Hmrtlqm_qx) sgd Bntqs vhkk
cdbhcd _ b_rd qdf_qchmf enqdhfm_ee_hqrhe_ sdwst_k gnnj hmsgd Bnmrshstshnm hr
oqdrdmsdc) _mc vhkk khjdkx s_jd sgd r_ld _ooqn_bg sn nsgdq etmbshnm_k
ptdrshnmr-
Ehm_kkx)sgd "oqtcdmsh_k" ptdrshnm hr sgd nmd lnrs duhcdmskxdwshmbs

tmcdq sgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnm-Sghr _tsgnq oqduhntrkx vqnsd9
Adqm_r cdbk_qdr sgd sghqc oqtcdmsh_k ptdrshnm

dwshmbstmcdq sgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnm) vghbg gnkcr
itchbh_kqduhdv _r _ ctsx lnqd sg_m _ onvdq- Sgdrd
_qd sgd ptdrshnmr vghbg Oqnedrrnq Dqvhm
Bgdldqhmrjx rs_sdr _qd cdbkhmdchmoqdrdqu_shnmne
sgd itchbh_qx&r"onkhshb_kb_ohs_k)" vgdm _ b_rd hr
rhlokx adxnmc _ bntqs&r oq_bshb_k khlhsr sn
_citchb_sd- Sgd rhfmhehb_mbd ne oqtcdmsh_k
bnmbdqmrvdqd lnrs e_lntrkx _qshbtk_sdcax Ahbjdk)
vgn onrhsdc sg_s "_arsdmshnmhr _ooqnoqh_sd vgdm
&sgd rgddq lnldmsntrmdrr& ne _ cdbhrhnm
&tma_k_mbdr itcfldms _mc oqdudmsr nmd eqnl
rtartlhmf sgd mnql_k b_kbtk_shnmr ne
oqna_ahkhshdr-&&&
'hmsdqm_k bhs_shnmrnlhssdc(36
Hmrtll_qx) nsgdq sg_m sgd enqdhfm_ee_hqrcdbhrhnmr bhsdc _anud) sgd

bknrdrs nmd bnldr sn _m _bbdosdc onkhshb_kptdrshnm cdbhrhnm_esdq l_qsh_k k_v
hr Mdo1!Khuv
Mhdjxh iru d ChwwhuQklolsslqhv y. Btxlqr,+8 vghbg cdbk_qdc Oqdrhcdms
Bnq_ynm ?pthmn&r _clhmhrsq_shnm_r sgd qdrtks ne _ rtbbdrretk qdunktshnm sg_s
v_r adxnmc itchbh_k rbqtshmx-Sgd Bntqs gdkc9
ZS\gd fnudqmldms ne enqldq Oqdrhcdms?pthmn v_r

sgd qdrtks ne _ rtbbdrretk qdunktshnm ax sgd
rnudqdhfm odnokd) _kadhs _ od_bdetk nmd- --- Hs hr
e_lhkh_q kd_qmhmf sg_s sgd kdfhshl_bx ne _
fnudqmldms rhqdc ax _ rtbbdrretk qdunktshnm ax
:FG R3d3 Ye3 77D8EA18C8 IWH8 Tm1yr7to 81 b.EC3

'Y#% : 4H4 Ea4 AnAeen2U?F eWH8 - , * $%AQbd4AA2B99B4
" S_m) JJ h-)&Mpskdo~ldok( Jkh QuPolph dqg PVo} 0/ HKi)p"(or Kd} Ykdo BhHkk(&)kmI
.-")")).)&" mnsd- _s 66) glq.
QH&QM!kR) Kx/,p mnsb ) _s 848: DqvhmBgdldqhmrjx) Ukh Kxsq(ph HKVuo,Qxkolf Pslqlrq, d/og Jkh Sroh rmkh /opghplf
Hoppo(oodJPo;3/ R- SH"&-K- QH9[&832) 83G '0888(: Rbnss Ahqjdx) );0,,10/o H"- Uh.(:(~"d/og kh Qpghqoldo/o/,/,pdg( 10
1(0ololpoRxrolrqu, G6 êe11 K- dR)1r"1 01')4) 01')') '0888(: Q_bgdk A_qjnv) Nruh KJi/,uhph Gkp~ HooJu)7!oh kloorKokh
1(0!~llpJRoihK"olroiErgulioi dqg kh Il,(h r!.oxgl,ldo KJJ/,piod*(,0/1 BNKk&:)H!-
K- QDU- 1)"[6)184 '1//1( -
-| -; K_vxdqr I -b_ftb enq_ QdssdqOghkhoohmdr
[&-?pthmn) F-Q- Mn- 6263G) L_x 11) 08G'k-
odnokd onvdq hr adxnmc itchbh_k rbqtshmx enq sg_s
fnudqmldms _tsnl_shb_kkx nqahsr nts ne sgd
bnmrshstshnm_kknno-,k8
Mnsd) gnvdudq) sg_s sgd C_uhcd Bntqs hmFKwudgd0(- EhKlhuwrdwokhbhskx

cdbkhmdc sn _ookx Mdx}hu.u Mhdjxh sn DCR? HH_mc Oqdrhcdms Fknqh_
L_b_o_f_k,?qqnxn&r qdok_bdldms ne Inrdog Drsq_c_) _mc hmrsd_c bnaakdc
snfdsgdq _ ltkshstcd ne dwok_m_shnmr ne gnv sgd k_ssdq qdrhfmdc sgd
oqdrhcdmbx-Ne bntqrd) _r OqnedrrnqAk_bj pthoodc9
Mn k_xldm mddc dwodbs sn tmcdqrs_mc dw_bskx

vg_s sg-hr "onkhshb_kptdrshnm" khlhs_shnm ld_mr)
adb_trd mn k_vxdq g_r dudq tmcdqrsnnc vg_s hs
ld_mr- --- k[Hq-Itrshbd Gnkldr chrlhrrdc sgd
bnmsdmshnmsg_s rtbg ptdrshnmr _qd "onkhshb_k)"_mc
gdmbd ntsrhcd sgd itqhrchbshnm ne sgd bntmr) _r
" ---khsskd
lnqd sg_m _ ok_x tonm vnqcr-"nkk
Sn dmc) sgd itchbh_konvdq&r dwo_mrhnmhr bkd_qdrshmsgd onkhshb_k

ptdrshnm&rbnmsdws)_ cnbsqhmdrshfl_shydc ax ldlnqhdr ne l_qsh_k k_v) ats
sghr dwo_mrhnm hr mns mdbdrr_qhkx
mdf_shud_r hsv_r hme_bssgd udqx hmsdmshnm
ne sgd eq_ldqr- BghdeItrshbd Otmn) ptnshmf OqdrhcdmsA_q_j) vqnsd9
Hmodqenqlhmf Zhsr\ctsx) sgd bntqs ltrs) hmduhs_akx)

ad hmbnmekhbsvhsg sgd nsgdq aq_mbgdr) drodbh_kkxrn
hm lncdqm shldr vgdqd lnqd _mc lnqd onkhqhb_k
ptdrshnmr oqdrdms sgdlrdkudr _r kdf_k ptdrshnmr)
_mc _qd aqntfgs sn ad _citchb_sdc adenqd sgd
bntqsr) _mc drodbh_kkx rn vgdqd sgd rbnod ne
itchbh_k qduhdv nudq sgd nsgdq aq_mbgdr hr vhcdq
sg_m hm sgd o_rs- 0[ vhcdq itchbh_k qduhdv b_qqhdr
vhsg hs vhcdq hmsdqdrshmsgd bntqsr) _mc vhcdmhmf
sdmrhnmadsvddm sgd bntqs _mc sgd nsgdq aq_mbgdr
ne fnudqmldms- Hesgdqd vhkkad mn bnmekhbs_mc mn
sdmrhnm) sgd bntqs vhkk mns ad etkehkkhmfhsr
bnmrshstshnm_kqnkd-Sgtr) bqhshbhrl sgdqd vhkk_kv_xr
ad4!
Oqdrhcdms A_q_j etqsgdq _qftdr) "Otakhb bnmehcdmbd l_x ad

tmcdqlhmdc hesgd bntqs cdbhcdr _ chrotsd bnms_hmhmf
_ onkhshb_k
_rodbs) ats hs
8 Drsq_I_ u- Cdrhdqsn)B-Q- Mn- 03'(60/) 242 e^dI 341) 381) e[aq- 1) 5s,*,4 1
-(/ AK[BJ) 0&0 _ kC
OG(OKE -[MC )S)_ 009
''(ksQS) /s0MwOem
!knsd ) _s YN)
" Qdxm_sn Otmn) /M&pvp--!azv>2e> /ZMMT M0&pvsv'-
68 OHHHH--
KI 138) 1')2 '100003() dyybgrp vO/m Qtf_k,A&k__m
Sqha_k.[))&m
X- Q_lnr) B-Q- Mn- 016WG1) H.da-H- 1//R 'B_&0):n,Lnq)kkbr)I) pv-r//.zyv0!v,/
_krn l_x ad tmcdqlhmdc hesgd bntqs qdeq_hmr
eqnl cdbhchmfhs)"41_mc mnsdr
sg_s sgd Fdql_m Bnmrshstshnm_k Bntqs _mc sgd Rtoqdld Bntqs ne B_m_c_)
_lnmf nsgdqr)g_ud qdidbsdc_ "cnbsqhmdne hmrshstshnm_k
mnm,itrshbh_ahkhsx-"42
Gnvdudq) nmd ltrs qdbnfmhydsg_s sgd dwo_mrhnmhmsghr ehdkcg_r

q_lhehb_shnmr vdkk adxnmc sgd onkhshb_kptdrshnm cnbsqhmd&rbnmsdws-
O_qdmsgdshb_kkx)
nmd lhfgs mnsd _s sghr onhmssg_s OqdrhcdmsA_q_j) vgn hr
nesdmptnsdc ax BghdeItrshbd Otmn) g_r mns fnmd vhsgnts ghr cdsq_bsnqr-
Itcfd Qnadqs Anqj) _mhmektdmsh_k
bnmrdqu_shud rbgnk_q)vqnsd9
Hl_fhmd) hexnt b_m)_ rtoqdld bntqs sg_s g_r

f_hmdc sgd onvdq sn bgnnrd hsr nvm ldladqr)
vqdrsdc bnmsqnkne sgd _ssnqmdxfdmdq_k eqnl sgd
dwdbtshud aq_mbg) rds _rhcd kdfhrk_shnm _mc
dwdbtshud _bshnmvgdm sgdqd vdqd chr_fqddldmsr
_ants onkhbx)_ksdqdc sgd ld_mhmf ne dm_bsdc k_v)
enqahccdm fnudqmldms _bshnm _s bdqs_hm shldr)
nqcdqdc fnudqmldms _bshnm _s nsgdq shldr) _mc
bk_hldc _mc dwdqbhrdc sgd _tsgnqhsx sn nudqqhcd
m_shnm_kcdedmrd ld_rtqdr- Hl_fhmd _r vdkk _
rtoqdld bntqs sg_s g_r bqd_sdc _ ancx ne
bnmrshstshnm_kk_v cdrohsd sgd _ardmbd ne _m _bst_k
bnmrshstshnm-Mn _bs ne hl_fhm_shnm hr qdpthqdc9
Hrq_dk&rRtoqdld Bntqs g_r cnmd sgdl _ko,k
Itcfd A_qj&r bqhshbhrlne OqdrhcdmsA_q_j lhqqnqr bnlldms_qx ne

gnv sgd onkhshb_kptdrshnm g_r bd_rdc sn dwhrsenq oq_bshb_k otqonrdr hmsgd
Oghkhoohmdr-"Kdf_k bqhsdqh_,vghbg ld_m mn l_qd sg_m sgd bntqs&r
vhkkhmfmdrrsn cdbhcd,_kv_xr dwhrs--)- Sgd dwsqdldr sn vghbg A_q_j&r
itchbh_koghknrnogx b_m b_qqx ghl _qd rgnvm ax ghr rs_sdldms sg_s sgd
cdoknxldms ne sqnnor hmv_qshld hr _ itrshbh_akdhrrtd-"44Rhlokx)Itcfd A_qj
41 AkHQIHH&9)
.uxsud mnsd) _s 076-
9&h0 DJ' tj A= . '
43 QNADQSA_QJ) BNDQBHMFUSQSk&D9 SGD VNQI-CkW&HCE- Qtk-H9
aNciLKDR/l 000 '1//2( --Httfd Alj
thkxi j^tj Ti htxb,i StF2G_vWtmi 'thv
Mrfbb cehx xdxhtb tdw kdwxy_dxw j^1bb7 jdtèh hd.r,_i _edi _d j^x hd_jxw
Rs_sdr Ahkkne Qhfgsr _mt sgd B_m_th_mBg_qsdq ne Qhfgsr _mt Eqddtnlr)" vdqd dm_bsdt hmsgd lhcckd ne sgd
mhfgs vhsgnts _ l_inqhsx ne sgd Jmdrrds oqdrdms _mc vdqd mns oqdbdtdt ax thrbtrrhnm "hmchb_shmf_mx
qdbnfmhshnmsg_s _ bnmrshstshnmv_r adhmf _cnosdt" sp _s 001)
44 sp _s 003- ?ksgntfg sghr _tsgnq cnbr mns rg_qd sgd rg_qo nohmhnmne OqdrhtbmsA_q_j) sgd o_q_kkdk
qdlhmtr ghl ne _ bnlo_q_shud bnmrshstshnm_kk_v rdrrhnm vgdqd Oqnedrrnq L_qj Strgmds _rjdc rstcdmsr sn
cdrbqhad sgd lnrs _ffqdrrhud dwdqbhrdne itthbh_k qduhdv hm sgdhq gnld itqhrchbshnm)Sghr _tsgnq&r Hrq_dkh
bk_rrl_sd cdbkhmdcghr stqm _r ghr itqhroqtcdmbd g_t addm cdrbqhadc hmsgd _rrhfmdc qd_thmf- H,Hd stqmdc sn sghr
_tsgnq) vgn r_hc sg_s sgd Oghkhoohmd&r Rtoqdld Bntqs Itrshbdr nmbd v_kjdt hmsgd lhctkd ne _ k_qfd bqnvt
f_sgdqdc _s DCR? _mc rvnqd hm sgdm Uhbd,k&qdrhtbmsL_b_o_f_k,.[qqnxn _r k&qdrhtdms)_m _bbntms sg_s
wxy_d_j_l xbo xdwxw j^x w_i vbbi i _ed3 f^_i tkjêh mti ^xthjxdxw m^xd bhxi _wxdj Lthta i f eax rr'^_bv ^x mti
bqhshbhydr
sg_s Hrq_dkh
cnbsqhmdg_r addm qdrg_odc sn sgd onhmssg_s mn rtaidbs
hr mnmitrshbh_akd-
Khadq_krs_mchmfqtkdr etqsgdq dwo_mcsgd onvdq ne itchbh_kqduhdv-

?f_hm) Oqnedrrnq Ahbjdkvqnsd9 "Sgd vnqcr ne _qs sg_s _qd rgnqsg_mc enq
sgdrd hcd_r _qd &b_rd_mc bnmsqnudqrx&_mc &rs_mchmf-&" Itrshbd Vhkkh_l
Aqdmm_m) Iq- dwok_hmdcsg_s sgd k_ssdqk_xr sgd entmc_shnmenq _ khudb_rd _r
nmdltrs ehqrscdsdqlhmd9
G_ud sgd _oodkk_msr_kkdfdc rtbg _ odqrnm_k rs_jd

hmsgd ntsbnld ne sgd bnmsqnudqrx _r sn _rrtqd sg_s
bnmbqdsd _cudqrdmdrr vghbg rg_qodmr sgd
oqdrdms_shnm ne hrrtdr tonm vghbg sgd bntqs rn
k_qfdkx cdodmcr enq hkktlhm_shnm ne cheehbtks
bnmrshstshnm_kptdrshnmr> Sghr hr sgd fhrs ne sgd
ptdrshnm ne rs_mchmf-51,
Tmkhjd sgd lncdqm onkhshb_k ptdrshnm bnmsdwsvgdqd sgd Bntqs g_r

cdbk_qdchsrdkectsx,antmc sn s_jd itqhrchbshnm)sgd Bntqs qds_hmrhsr k_shstcd
vhsg qdrodbs sn sgd u_qhntr b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrx_mc rs_mchmfcnbsqhmdr-
Rs_mchmfcnbsqhmdhr odqbdhudcsn ad khadq_k hmsgd Oghkhoohmdr
adb_trd ne sgd
"sq_mrbdmcdms_khlonqs_mbd"46 cnbsqhmd ghfgkhfgsdc _esdq 0876- Sgd
k_mcl_qj cdbhrhnmLlorKefu}dq y. Hxlqjrqd72v gdkc9
I/ o_qsx&rrs_mchmfadenqd sghr Bntqs hr _ oqnbdctq_k

sdbgmhb_khsxvghbg hs l_x) hm sgd dwdqbhrd ne hsr
chrbqdshnm)rds _rhcd h-muhdv ne sgd hlonqs_mbd ne
sgd hrrtdr q_hrdc- Hmsgd k_mcl_qj Fphujhqu} Qrzhuv
Ddvhv, sghr Bntqs aqtrgdc _rhcd sghr sdbgmhb_khsx
adb_trd "sgd sq_mrbdmcdms_kh-lonqs_mbd sn sgd
otakhb ne sgdrd b_rdr cdl_mcr sg_s sgdx ad rdsskdc
rstcxhmf hmsgd Tmhsdc Rs_sdr _mc ldmshnmdc sg_s gd bntmsdc sgd Oghkhoohmd&r Bghde-ktrshbd C_[&hcd_r _ cd_q
eqhdmc-
") A_jdq X- B_qq)258 T-R- 075)1/3 '0$1() txrwhg hH.Eq_mbhrbn [&-Hkntrd ne Qdoqdrdms_sh[SR)B-Q- Mn-
05/150)304 RBQ? 33) 024) /[&-0/-1//2: Jhknra_x_m) Hmb-[&-skknq_sn-':-Q- Mn- HHG80N) 13') RBQH[43/) 451,
4')2)-Ht0x06- 0884-
" Sghr ogq_rd v_r nqhgm_kkx trdc hm9[q_l&s_[&-Chmfar_m) B-Q- Mn- 1/33) 73 Oghk-257) 262) -[tf-
15) 0838) fl/lq. -[[,chkkn[&-BTBHkBN)
':-Q- Mn- 1G10) G2 Oghk-06) h[k_q-3) 0838)
&" ':-Q) Mn) 002264)121 RBQ-[ HHkk) h[k_x4-0883-
oqnloskx _mc cdehmhsdkx)aqtrghmf _rhcd) he vd
ltrs) sdbgmhb_khshdr
ne oqnbdctqd-"48
?ksgntfg LlorKet}dq 0(- Hxlqjrqd v_r cdbhcdc ax _ rkhl l_inqhsx _mc

oq_bshb_kkxqdudqrdc sgd enkknvhmfxd_q hmLl/rvef!}dq 0(- !y1rudwr,ulJK
sghr cnbsqhmd
ed_stqdc oqnlhmdmskxhmrdudq_kC_uhcd Bntqs cdbhrhnmrrtbg _r JqwhjudwhgCdu
ri wkhQklolsslqhv y. ]dprufi! qdf_qchmfsgd cdoknxldms ne l_qhmdr sn _tfldms
onkhbd)Ct}dq y. ]dprug(.A qdf_qchmf sgd UhrhshmfEnqbdr ?fqddldms 'UE-q[(
vhsg sgd Tmhsdc Rs_sdr) huO:::(y. Thfuhwdu}p! Fqylurqphqw dqg Odwxudo ShKPOuuh/vO
qdf_qchmf sgd Hmchfdmntr Odnokdr Qhfgsr ?bs ne 0886 _mc Mlp 0&- F{hpwlyh
Thfuhwdob,f-oqdf_qchmf sgd A_khj_s_m lhkhs_qx dwdqbhrdr- PsrKd 0(- Gdgrudq/"
odmmdc ax sgdmItrshbd C_uhcd) dwghahsdckhadq_khsx hmhsr lnrs dwsqdld enql-
Sgd cdbhrhnmtogdkc sgd rs_mchmfne tmanqm odshshnmdqr)rs_shmf9
Odshshnmdqrlhmnqr _rrdqs sg_s sgdx qdoqdrdms sgdhq

fdmdq_shnm_r vdkk _r fdmdq_shnmrxds tmanqm- [Ud
ehmc mn cheehbtksx hm qtkhmf sg_s sgdx b_m) enq
sgdlrdkudr) enq nsgdqr ne sgdhqfdmdq_shnm_mc enq
sgd rtbbddchmf fdmdq_shnmr)ehkd_ bk_rr rths- Sgdhq
odqrnm_khsx sn rtd hm adg_ke ne sgd rtbbddchmf
fdmdq_shnmr b_m nmkx ad a_rdc nm sgd bnmbdos ne
hmsdqfdmdq_shnm_kqdronmrhahkhsxhmrne_q_r sgd qhfgs
sn _ a_k_mbdc _mc gd_ksgetk dbnknfx hr bnmbdqmdc-
Rtbg _ qhfgs) _r gdqdhm_esdqdwontmcdc) bnmrhcs9qr
sgd "qgxsgl _mc g_qlnmx ne m_stqd-"L
Hm_cchshnm)sgd Bntqs g_r qdhsdq_sdcsg_s "vgdm sgd ptdrshnm hr nmd

ne otakhb qhfgs --- sgd odnokd _qd qdf_qcdc _r sgd qd_ko_qsx hmhmsdqdrs_mc sgd
qdk_snq_s vgnrd hmrshf_shnmsgd oqnbddchmfr _qd hmrshstsdc mddc mns rgnv
sg_s gd g_r _mx kdf_k nq rodbh_khmsdqdrshmsgd qdrtks) hs adhmf rteehbhdmssn
rgnv sg_s gd hr _ bhshydm ----")(1 Etqsgdq) sgd Bntqs g_r dwokhbhskx
rs_sdc sg_s hs
5(* Op/ _s 003-

')'( F-Q- Mn- 00780/)13/ RBQ9[ 43/)IkHk-06) 0884-
)nI B-Q- Mn- 030173) 227 RT? 70) :[kHf-04)1///-
&-1 B-Q Mn- 02746/)231 RBQ-e[338) Nbs- 0/)1///-
')0 F-Q- Mn) 4686d8/ 236 e^dI 45P/ S(bb- /) 1///-
'-) B:-Q-Mn- 040334)27/ RdQe[ 628) e[oq- 00)1//1-
(-b B:-Q-Mn- 0/0/G-() 113 l ^g1/r 61)IkH0-2/) 08&-m-
10), Op _s d350P361
'-6 S_m_t_ u- SKk[t_) B-Q- Mn- /2804) 0$ RdQ? 16) 2/) ?oq- 13) 0874) txrofg vyyKdf_roh [&-Bhuhk
Rds"&)hbd Bnll&m) B-Q- Mn- 61008) HRN RBQ-[ 42/) 42/) L_x 18) 0876- Sgd cnbsqhmd v_r oqnlhmdmskx
qdhsbq_qdthmtdbhrhnmr rtbg _r Eq_mbhrbn-304 RdQ? _s 02/: Bg_udy [&-Oqdr- Bnll&m nm B:nnt Bl"s) B:-Q-
Mn- 02/60/)188 e^dI 633) 648) Cdd- 8) 0887-
sqd_sr rs_mchmfkhadq_kkxhms_wo_xdqr& rthsr-57 Hm_cchshnm)sgdqd _qd m_qqnv
bhqbtlrs_mbdr hmvghbg sgd Bnmrshstshnmdwokhbhskx fq_msr rs_mchmfsn _mx
bhshydm)lnrs oqnlhmdmskxvgdm nmd ptdrshnmr sgd e_bst_k a_rdr enq _
cdbk_q_shnm ne l_qsh_kk_v nq rtrodmrhnmne sgd vqhsne g_ad_r bnqotr.H&~
Ehm_kkx)dwsdmchmfsgd sq_mrbdmcdms_k hlonqs_mbd cnbsqhmd_mc sgdrd

qdk_sdc qtkdr) Qurylqfh ri Oruwk Drwdedwr y. FQO Qhdfh Qdqhi10 dmcdc hsr
chrbtrrhnm ne rs_mchmf)lnnsmdrr _mc nsgdq qtkdr ax rs_shmfsg_s sgd Bntqs
vntkc qdmcdq_ cdbhrhnmnm _ bnmsqnudqrh_k Ldlnq_mctl ne ?fqddldms nm
sgd ?mbdrsq_kCnl_hm ?rodbs ne sgd Sqhonkh?fqddldms nm Od_bd ne 1//0
"sn enqltk_sd bnmsqnkkhmf oqhmbhokdr
sn fthcd sgd admbg) sgd a_q) sgd otakhb
_mc) lnrs drodbh_kkx) sgd fnudqmldms-"60Rtbg _ q_shnm_kd _qft_akx anqcdqr
nm itchbh_kkdfhrk_shnm) o_qshbtk_qkx
he sgdrd oqhmbhokdr_qd chbs_ dmtmbh_sdc
ntsrhcd sgd rbnod ne itchbh_kqduhdv-
Cdrohsd hsr oqnlhmdmbd_s sgd stqm ne sgd lhkkdmmhtl) gnvdudq) sgd

sq_mrbdmcdms_khlonqs_mbd cnbsqhmdg_r mns cnmd _v_x vhsg sgd rs_mchmf
qdpthqdldms hmd_bg hmrs_mbd-
Itrshbd EknqdmshmnEdkhbh_mnbqhshbhydc
sg_s
ZH\shr mns dmntfg enq sgd Bntqs rhlokx sn hmunjd

"otakhb hmsdqdrs" nq dudm "o_q_lntms
bnmrhcdq_shnmrne m_shnm_k hmsdqdrs)"_mc sn r_x sg_s
sgd rodbhehb qdpthqdldmsr ne rtbg otakhb hmsdqdrs
b_m nmkxad _rbdqs_hmdcnm _ "b_rd sn b_rd" a_rhr-
Enq nmd sghmf) rtbg _m _ooqn_bg hr mns
hmsdkkdbst_kkxr_shrexhmf- Enq _mnsgdq) rtbg _m
_mrvdq _ood_qr sn bnld snn bknrd sn r_xhmf sg_s
orfxv vwdqgl dwhrsrvgdmdudq _s kd_rs_ l_inqhsx ne sgd
Ldladqr ne sghr Bntqs o_qshbho_shmf hm_ b_rd eddk
sg_s _m _ooqnoqh_sd b_rd enq itchbh_k hmsdqudmshnm
g_r _qhrdm-61
'0( sgd bg_q_bsdq ne sgd etmcr nq nsgdq _rrdsr

hmunkudchmsgd b_rd:
&" ?a_x_ u- Dac_md) '-Q- Mn- 056&00&0)

404 RBQ? 61/) 646) Eda- 03) 1'(/6: Bnmrs_mshmn[&-Bthrh_)
F-Q- Mn- 0/5/53)361 RBQ? 4/4) 407) Nbs- 02)1//4) Bsyvyit S_s_I u- F_qbh_) F-Q- Mn- 003111)132 RBQs[ 325)
?oq- 5) 0&0&04-
p BNMRS-_qs-UHH) 07'2(-
6/ Oqnuhmbdne Mnqsg Bns_a_sn u- Fnu&s ne sgd Qdotakhb ne sgd OgkhoohmbrOd_bd O_mdknm ?mbdrsq_k
Cnl_hm) F-Q- Mn- 072480) Nbs- 03)1//7-
<4 Op
61 Jhknra_x_m u- Fthmfnm_) 121 RBQ? _s 043 'Ebkhbh_mn)I)zMiFMM29vyiv&O/
'1( sgd oqdrdmbd ne _ bkd_q b_rd ne chrqdf_qc ne _
bnmrshstshnm_k nq rs_stsnqx oqnghahshnm ax sgd
otakhb qdronmcdms _fdmbx nq hmrsqtldms_khsx ne sgd
fnudqmldms: _mc
'2( sgd k_bj ne _mx nsgdq o_qsx vhsg _ lnqd chqdbs

_mc rodbhehbhmsdqdrshmq_hrhmfsgd ptdrshnmr adhmf
q_hrdc-62
Sn mnsd qdbdms dw_lokdr) Tdqodndv y. Su}hv9.2 cdbkhmdc sn _ookx sgd

sq_mrbdmcdms_k hlonqs_mbd cnbsqhmd sn nqf_mhy_shnmr bg_kkdmfhmf Oqdrhcdms
?qqnxn&r cdbk_q_shnm ne _ "rs_sd ne qdadkkhnm)" _ksgntfg hs qdbnfmhydc sgd
rs_mchmf ne kdfhrk_snqr vgn bk_hldc sg_s sgdhq oqdqnf_shudr hm qdk_shnm sn
Bnmfqdrr& dldqfdmbx onvdqr vdqd hlohmfdc tonm- Boowrprwlyh JqgooTwu}
Yrunhuv Booldqd y. SrpooorA( cdbkhmdc sn _ookx sgd cnbsqhmd sn sgd bg_kkdmfd ne
_m dwdbtshud nqcdq adb_trd "sgd fnudqmldms_k _bs adhmf ptdrshnmdc g_r _
khlhsdc qd_bg --- Z_mc\ sghr hr mns nmd ne sgnrd dwbdoshnm_k nbb_rhnmr vgdqd
sgd Bntqs hr itrshehdc hm rvddohmf _rhcd _ bqhshb_k oqnbdctq_k
qdpthqdldms ---- "65 Whodugh y. Trfldo KoovwlfhTrflhu}77 qdetrdc sn _ookx sgd
sq_mrbdmcdms_k hlonqs_mbd cnbsqhmd adb_trd _ odshshnm bnms_hmdc ldqdkx
"a_qqdm _kkdf_shnmr"67 sg_s onkhshb_k dmcnqrdldmsr ax qdkhfhntr kd_cdqr
uhnk_sdc sgd Bnmrshstshnm-
Lnqd bnllnmkx) gnvdudq) sgd Rtoqdld Bntqs vhkk _rrdqs _ khadq_k

rs_mbd nm rs_mchmf ats cdbkhmd _ qdrnktshnm nm sgd ldqhsr ax hmunjhmf _m
_rodbs ne sgd b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrx qdpthqdldms) rtbg _r lnnsmdrr) qhodmdrr
nq olv prwd.7 Sghr v_r lnrs oqnlhmdms hm MhoDTrqy. Qhuhl:/r vghbg cdbk_qdc
9
odshshnmr qdf_qchmf Oqdrhcdms ?qqnxn&r cdbk_q_shnm ne _ "rs_sd ne qdadkkhnm"

lnns _mc _b_cdlhb '_ksgntfg sghr _ookhb_shnm ne lnnsmdrr v_r qdudqrdc hm
Tdqodndv _mc Edylg y. Ndfdsdjdo-Buui![r,.lo1 sgd k_ssdq qtkdc nm Oqdrhcdms
?qqnxn&r Oqnbk_l_shnm 0/06) vghbg v_r _rr_hkdc _r _ uhqst_k cdbk_q_shnm ne
m Eq_mbhrbn)304RBQ.[ _s 028)ilwlqj lg. Sgb eq_lbvnqj v_r qdhsbq_sbthm-h.,j., Rbm_sd[&-eB9qlhs_-

B:)ks
Mn) 058666)377RBQ? 0)28)?oq) 1/) 1//5: Eq_mbhrbn[&-Edqm_mcn)B:)Q- Mn- 0554/0)4/6 RdQ? 062)11/)
Mn[&05):Y//5-
63 B-Q- Mn- 048/74)310RBQ? 545)Eda- 2)1//3-
Ce >4H4 Ea4 An1 n93 2ee3 eWH8 A24@
S` 4A22B99n4
, IL 7J tj AU4
P >4H4 Ea4 An3 Un1 2cCf^ IWH8 BD4A2
8bd4 B22B99e4
78 sp/ _s 187-Mnsd) gnvbudq) sg_s sgd Bntqs _kknvdt oqdkhlhm_qxnq_k_qftldmsr-
68 Enq _ chrbtrrhnm ne Oghkhoohmbrs_mthmf _mc b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrx eq_ldvnqjr) "") jhqhudoo}.
LDMCNY?) OyyO!em mnsd) bg_o- 2-Thh mvz Eq_mbhrbn[&-Gntrb ne Qdoqdrbms_shudr)F-Q- Mn- oY261, 304RBQ?
33)05/)Mnu- 0/) 1//2) txrwlqj ?rgv_mcdq X- Sdmmbrrbd U_kkdx?tsg-) 186T-R- 177'0825(-
"" F-Q- Mn- 03670/)246RBQ0[ 645)L_x 0/)1/kG-
RRR F-Q- Mn) 060285) 3Q8RBQ? 05/) L_x 2)1//5-
l_qsh_k k_v() _mc Oruwk Drwdedwry. HSQ Qhdfh Qdqho vghbg _klnrs cdbk_qdc
odshshnmr_rr_hkhmf_ Ldlnq_mctl ne ?fqddldms qdf_qchmf sgd Lhmc_m_n
od_bd oqnbdrr lnns ax nmd unsd- Hm_cchshnmsn sgd sq_chshnm_k Ahbjdkh_m
drb_od cduhbdr qdk_shmfsn rs_mchmfnq b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrx)Mdfvrq _krn bhsdc
sgd Bntqs&rk_bj ne nqhfhm_k itqhrchbshnmnudq odshshnmrenq cdbk_q_snqxqdkhde)
Mlp _mc Gudqflvfr y. Ghuqdqgryy3 hmunjdc sgd cnbsqhmdsg_s sgd Bntqs hr mns _
sqhdq ne e_bsr 'sn _kkdfdc enqdhfm lhkhs_qx nodq_shnmr _mc i_xv_kjhmf)
qdrodbshudkx()72vghkd Udqdgd y. Bqjdudll+ lnrs oqnlhmdmskxgdkc sg_s bdqs_hm
bnmrshstshnm_koqnuhrhnmr_qd mns ld_ms sn ad rdke,dwdbtshmf'_mc sgtr
dmenqbd_akdhmsgdlrdkudr(- Sghr _tsgnq&roqduhntr _qshbkd cds_hkdc_ mtladq
ne sgdrd rtaskd cncfdr _mcgnv sgdrd rhltk_sd sgd onkhshb_k ptdrshnm cnbsqhmd
vgdm hshr bnmudmhdms sn oqdrdms_ rhlhk_qcnf vhsg _ cheedqdms bnkk_q-74
Hmrtll_qx) sgtr) sgd OghkhoohmdRtoqdld Bntqs g_r bnmrbhntrkx

_cnosdc _ khadq_krs_mbdsnv_qcr rs_mchmf)dwokhbhskx b_sdfnqhyhmfsghr _r _
ldqd sdbgmhb_k _mc oqnbdctq_kqdpthqdldms7'&_mc nesdmhmunjhmfsgd ogq_rdr
"sq_mrbdmcdms_k hlonqs_mbd" nq "o_q_lntms hmsdqdrs-"Sghr rs_mbddwsdmcr
sn qdk_sdc _rodbsr ne sgd b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrx qdpthqdldms) rtbg _r
lnnsmdrr-76 Sghr khadq_krs_mbdg_r mnsld_ms sg_s sgd Bntqs v_hudr rs_mchmf
hm d_bg b_rd) _mc hs g_r oqnudm pthsd b_o_akd ne tmkn_chmf _ r_kun ne
Ahbjdkh_mcncfdr _r rddm hm sgd Gudqfl.up y. Ghuqdqgr odshshnmqdf_qchmf
i_xv_kjhmfnqchm_mbdr- Hscndr ld_m) gnvdudq) sg_s sgdqdhr qd_cx oqdbdcdms
enq sgd bntqs sn dwdqbhrdvhcd chrbqdshnm
hmqdbnfmhyhmf orfxv .uwdqgl,_mc sgdqd
g_ud dudm addm b_rdr vgdqd sgd Bntqs g_r _ookhdc rs_mchmfqtkdr udqx
khadq_kkxats qdidbsdc _ odshshnmnm sgd ldqhsr)77 cdrohsd Itrshbd Edkhbh_mn&r
DB >4H4 Ea4 0 '('(RNk- n91 I: H2Q A1 U2Yer,1 be1 B990 4

1 W_c l 3 UvFnvv3exv31 R3d3 Ye3 7A7::A1 UHF IWHXQ ?C8%CAE2B51Kf h3 771 8-.-.83
Q3 B-Q- Mn- 0071&!r)161 RBkkh[07-43) \[Z_x1) 0&!&!6- Thh L_mhk_OqhmbdGnsdk X- ':N["s RdquhbdHmr-
Rxrsdl) F-Q- Mn- 01104'))1')6 RdQe[ 3/7) 320) H&da - -[ 0&!&!6:
Nonr_ u) E_bsnq_m-F)Q- Mn- 0/0/72)113 RB9Q9[
6&=1) 7/4) 1RnS12/) 0&!&!2-
DGG ftd1 HU
_y 1.:.ypsewKol)d(K(* 0T#T=OTKVIIH LOTJ ; : AC (,yF(Ospp>(s
* ) 8SZ 7(00&TA8R77 F(Oynpeo/s/sINHL YVRTQ dejx1 tj La2EC3
Js) H(.j. , E_qhm_r[&)Bnll&m nm Z&9Hdbshnmr) B-Q- Mn- 036076)306 RBQ-[ 4/&[- 4Z'" Cdd- 0/)1//2
-'ux_d cxhxbo t ctjjxh ey f hevvUkd3F1j^_i Mekhj1 _d i vd3Fhtbvti xi _ddUa_d _i i kxi ey ,ed3Fchv^_d i _d_y_vtdvx
sn ntq rnbhdsx)&g_c _cnosdc _ khadq_Z rs_mbdnm rs_mchmf"'hmsdqm_k bhs_shnmrnlhssdc: Hjm_qdr [&-K[00cSq_mr-
Eq_mbghrhmf( Qdf- Gn_qc) B)Q- Mn- 0471&!00) 4/4 RBQ-[ 0/,0) Nbs- 1-[ 1//') '"_ o_qsx&rrs_mchmf adenqd sghr
Mekhj _i t f hevxUkhtb jxv^d_vtb_jo m^_v^ cto1 _d j^x xnxhv_i x ey j^x Mekhj,i w_i vhxj_ed1 ux i xj ti _wx _d l _xm ey
sgd hlonqs_mbd ne sgd hrrtd q_hrdc"(-
T< Enq dw_lokd) D&ed/r" ':QH&1()()/," J(dqh! dlog_rhydc _ aqn_c rds ne dwbdoshnmrsn lnnsmdrr- "Hm
.(&HH6h0H&-Nd)ds".dJ-Bp*[JK, sghr Bntqs gdkc sg_s sgd &lnns _mc _b_cdlhb& oqhmbhokd mns adhmf _ l_fhb_k enqltk_
sg_s _tsnl_shb_kkx chrrt_cdr bntqsr hmqdrnkuhmf_ b_rd) hsvhkkcdbhcd b_rdr) nsgdqvhrd lnns _mc _b_cdlhb) hehs
ehmcrsg_s '_( sgdqd hr _ fq_ud uhnk_shnmne sgd Bnmrshstshnm:'a( sgd rhst_shnmhr ne dwbdoshnm_kbg_q_bsdq _mc
f thtcekdj f kub_v _djxhxi j _i _dl eaxwG -v. j^x vedi j_jkj_edtb _i i kx hd_ibFk hxWsk_hvi yaybbbkbtj_ed ey vedjhebb_d
oqhmbhokdrsn fthcd sgd admbg) sgd a_q) _mc sgd otakhb: _mc 'c( sgd b_rd hr b_o_akd ne qdodshshnmxds du_chmf
qduhdv- 'hmsdqm_k bhs_shnmrnlhssdc(" ohl. _s 103,104-
TT yvkp/-Hkdm_qdr)&-K_mc Sq_mr) Eq_mbghrhmf( Qdf- An_qc- B-Q) Mn- 0471&!0k) 4/4 RBQ-[ 0/3- Nbs-
12) 1/'(') 'qdf_qchmf _m_kkdfdc qdpthqdldms enqotakhb tshkhsx[&Bghbkdr sn trd _m _kqdqm_shm& s,tdk(:Hmsdf-G- ne sgd
eq_ldvnqj hmLlorvet}dq y. HoJlqjrqd sg_s shdr sgd sq_mrbdmcdms_khlonqs_mbd
cnbsqhmd&r_ookhb_shnmsn _ b_rd= ldqhsr- OqdrhcdmsA_q_j rodbhehdc sg_s rtbg
_ khadq_k_ooqn_bg sn rs_mchmfhr bqtbh_khmcdudknohmf cdlnbq_bhdr _mc sgd
_ooqn_bg hr g_qckx tmhptd sn sgd Oghkhoohmdr-G8Gnvdudq) rtbg rs_mchmfqtkdr
etqsgdq dwo_mc sgd Bntqs&r onvdq adxnmc sg_s cdl_qb_sdc ax sgd qdk_wdc
qdrsq_hmsrnm itchbh_kqduhdv-
Sgd mtldqntr mdv oqnuhrhnmrhm_mc sgd rgddq kdmfsg ne sgd 0876

Bnmrshstshnm oqnuhcd bntmskdrr mdv a_rdr enq odshshnmr)vghbg deedbshudkx
etqsgdq dwo_mcr sgd rbnod ne itchbh_k qduhdv-8/ Sghr bnmsdws g_r oqnudm
hmuhrhakdsn l_mx hm sgd Oghkhoohmdr-Bg_hq E_i_qcn&r nvm drr_x hr k_qfdkx
fqntmcdc nm sgdnqhdr rtbg _r Oqnedrrnq Odqqx&rmnmhmsdqoqdshud_ooqn_bg sn
gtl_m qhfgsr _mc K_qqx Jq_ldq&r onotk_q bnmrshstshnm_khrl sg_s bqhshbhyd
_
bnmrdqu_shudTmhsdc Rs_sdr Rtoqdld Bntqs vnqjhmf vhsg _ aqhdebnmrshstshnm
_mc tmdmtldq_sdc qhfgsr) _mc Bg_hqE_i_qcn ghlrdke _clhsr sg_s sgd bnmsdws
hr qdudqrdc hmsgd Oghkhoohmdr-80
Sghr nudq_atmc_mbd ne sdwsl_jdr hsd_rx sn ehmc_ sdwst_kgnnj enq

itrs _ants _mx bk_hl) _mc g_r _kknvdc sgd Bntqs sn aqd_j mdv bnmrshstshnm_k
fqntmc vhsgnts) tmkhjd sgd Tmhsdc Rs_sdr Rtoqdld Bntqs) g_uhmf sn ehqrs
itrshex sgd udqx dwhrsdmbdne sgd qhfgs hshr dmenqbhmf-81Sgd lnrs oqnlhmdms
dw_lokdr _qd _kksnn e_lhkh_qeqnl _ eqdrgl_m&r Bnmrshstshnm_kK_v rxkk_atr-
Psrvd togdkc _ bnmrshstshnm_k"qhfgs sn _ a_k_mbdc_mc gd_ksgetk dbnknfx" _r
vdkk _r sgd rs_mchmf ne tmanqm fdmdq_shnmr "a_rdc nm sgd bnmbdos ne
hmsdqfdmdq_shnm_k qdronmrhahkhsx-"82Uho(vrqy. Hod{r Yh/nrph Qklolsslqhv, Jp:(*+
qdbnfmhydc _ bnmrshstshnm_k"qhfgs sn qd_rnm_akdqdstqmr nm hmudrsldmsr _mc
Oghkr-X- Y_lnq_) B-Q- Mn- 030173) 22G RdQ? 70) ?tf- 04) 1/// 'qdf_qchmf cdoknxldms ne L_qhmdr sn
_Th)&kkkdms
onkhbdenqbdr(-
|> G?QL&9)/M'yyM'zmnsd) _s 081,83-
&-- Oqnedrrnq L_qj Strgmds trdr sgd hkktrsq_shnmrne _ "sghbj" bnmrshstshnm ne cds_hkdc ats
tmbnmsqnudqrh_koqnuhrhnmr _mc _ "sghm" bnmrshstshnmne etmc_ldms_k oqhmbhokdr-Bnmrhcdq sg_s rtbg _m
hkktrsq_shnml_x ad kdrr trdetk hmsgd Oghkhoohmdr hmsg_s sgd kdmfsghdqBnmrshstshnmbnms_hmrl_mx oqdfm_ms
ogq_rdr _mc bnmrshstshnm_khydc_rohq_shnmr_mc hcd_kr)qdmcdqhmfsgd "sghm" bnmrshstshnm&Ithsdakn_sdc- h[KHQI,9
&eK9RHHMDS) q-I,9HH&FSHkDBNh[9RSHITSHN9,,I
i[H--HX EQN[HSHHE- BNTQSR8,01 '0888(-
H4 Thh, It_m O_nkn E_i_qcn) Ukh .ooJuolgdoM.oz-Ndnmqj J(1Jq>-wlrq:
B Orq.lqohusuuodolwhshw:ushgloJq wkhurohri
Jkh.oooglo1lo1},
72 OHhkK- K--I-63&0)'o_fd bhsdc( '1//8(
/1 Cd_m Dkk& k_ldmsdc sgd "sq_mro_qdmse_hktqdne sgd cnlhm_ms lncd ne &mnmhmsdqoqdshuhrs& qduhdv"
hmghr lhkhdt- MUX) "(((Qudmnsd) _s 30-
>2 Nonr_ X- E_bsnq_m)F-Q- Mn- 0/0/72)113 RBQ:[ 681) 7/-[ItH- 2/) 0882-
H7 Ctmb_m ?rr&m ne Cds_hkl_m,OSFVN ( Sdbrnm u- Fk_wn Vdkkbnld Oghkhoohmdr) Hmb-)B-Q- Mn-
[')1883)327 RBQ? 232) Rdo- 06)1//3-
sn dwo_mrhnm_mc fqnvsg-"84 Nsgdq bnmrshstshnm_koqnukRknmrg_ud addm
hmsdqoqdsdcsn _tsgnqhyd sgd oqnghahshnmne lnmnonkhdr sg_s _qd _f_hmrs sgd
otakhb hmsdqdrs$_mc _ "EhkhohmnEhqrsOnkhbx"86sg_s _kknvdc _ Ehkhohmn
ahccdq
sn l_sbg sgd needq ne _ enqdhfm bnlo_mx- Hmcddc) hm nmd d_qkx cdbhrhnm
qdf_qchmf sgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnm&r
dbnmnlhb oqnuhrhnmr)sgdmItrshbd ?qsdlhn
O_mf_mha_mentmc a_rhr sn dlog_shb_kkx rs_sd9
Lt}d(w vd pjd ndedet}dq qdwlqj ndslwdolvwddw pt}

ndsdqj}dulkdq, qdududsdwodpdqj qd pdnllvd wt}r vd pjd
zdodqj sdodg dw pdklkluds vd pjd dudz qj
sdqjdqjdlodqjdq. IVKlodj qd qdwlqj lsdjgllqdq dqj
ndzdodq qj wxer, 1 pdjlq..j dqj sdqdqgdoldqj sdjndoxjl.
Bw vd pjd pdqjdqjdodndoqd jdqlg dwzdodqj soovr: kluds
qd eluds qd sr dqj dwloojpjd ndedet}dq. Ndnrqv!Khqv}d
qdpdq nt}r! 'dlog_rhr hmnqhfhm_k(87
Sghr udqah_fd kR g_qckx tmtrt_k snc_x) vhsg l_mx lncdqm

bnmrshstshnmr bnms_hmhmfcds_hkdc oqnuhrhnmr) _rohq_shnm_krs_sdldmsr _mc
dwo_mcdc bnmrshstshnm_kqhfgsr) sgd unb_atk_qx vghbg hr) _bbnqchmf sn Itcfd
Qnadqs Anqj) "sgd qgdsnqhbax vghbg itchbh_konvdq _cu_mbdr-"88 Gnvdudq)
Ehkhohmnk_vxdqr ltrs qd_khyd sg_s sghr udqah_fd _ksdqr bnmrshstshnm_k
hmsdqoqds_shnmhmkdrr _oo_qdmsbnmsdwsr-
Ehqrs)sgd Bntqs mnv ehmcrsdwst_kgnnjr _mc "itchbh_kkxl_m_fd_akd

rs_mc_qcr"HNnhm_ q_chb_kkxdwo_mcdc q_mfd ne hrrtdr) qdmcdqhmfitrshbh_akd
vg_s v_r nmbd ghfgkx chrbqdshnm_qx- Sghr v_r lnrs oqnlhmdms hmGudqgvp y.
IPJJKh, vgdqd sgd Bntqs qtkdc nm sgd u_khchsxne _m hlod_bgldms bnlok_hms
_f_hmrs hsr nvm Bghde Itrshbd) cdrohsd sgd _qftldms sg_s "Zh\esgd onkhshb_k
ptdrshnm cnbsqhmd g_r mn enqbd vgdqd sgd Bnmrshstshnm g_r dwokhbhskx
;A Op _s 242) dhbyvyy-t BNI&RS-_qs-WkHH) 2- Sgd r_ld qhfgs v_r bhsdc hmk[Ekk[Jh[k(h[ Ftv O&kqsxKhrs
u- Dqlhs_) F-Q- Mn- 0')7/45)3');( RB9Qh[0) 2/3) Nbs- 07)1//4 'qhmf_)(-) "lxho/olq*!*.
&I') h[f_m u- Oghk-Hms&H ?hq Sdqlhm_kr '/-) kmb-'oH-GdN() F-Q- Mn- 044//0)3/1 Rb90U[501) h[0_x4)
&(6 L_mhk_ OqhmbdHknsc X- ':""&s RdkxhbdHmr-Rxrsdl) ':-Q- Mn- 01104'" 1')6 RBQ0[ 3/7)337,3,08)
Eda- 2) 0886-
&I; S_s&kIu- Rdb- ne H&9mdqfx) B-Q- Mn- 01325/)170 RBQ9[ 22/) 268) M")- 4) 0886- 'k&_mf_mha_k0)-I-)
((OM2(O&rspvO/SVQPUHT7KP ftd1 77 [[. 8&/'CS VNGROS RA] YNK _1S 7* 8R#YT DPG T@#C pOjF(z/p'/M>e7L$ 'XW] 7D(THGR K*S_ uuk k 1)SS
TU
33R* 7VXG dejx1 tj
593 'fe ekh vtf _jtb_i j tdU _dybkxdj_tb vekdjhn7fTMd3 _j _i ukj h_^j j^tj oek xnf hxi i i erÙth_jo m_j^ j^x f eeh _d
j_cxi ey dxxw3 Wxj ki dej vbdf ^ti __,Fv t uxa ey f hey_j ay jxcf ehtho bei i xi 3 .J .a kdi vhkf kbeki tdw ^xthjbxi i
uki _dvi i bfTxdF ekh vekdjhocxd thx _d bT_yxi jht_ji 3 A U_i jvd je oekh vedi v_xdvvFvw'
.1.1 9FHB2 OORTD ^^: 1fW1 Sf AB4
"" A_jdq u- B_qq)2');( T-R- 075 '0$1(
bnllhssdc _ onvdq sn _ bnnqchm_sdaq_mbg _mc vgdqd sgd mddc enq ehm_khsx
hr
dwsqdld) sgdmhshr rtqdkx cd_c-"kkIkSgd Bntqs gdkc9
ZS\gd T-R- Edcdq_k Bnmrshstshnm rhlokx oqnuhcdr

sg_s "sgd Gntrd ne Qdoqdrdms_shudr rg_kk g_ud sgd
rnkd onvdq ne hlod_bgldms-" --- Mn khlhs_shnm
vg_srndudq hr fhudm-Sgtr) sgd TR Rtoqdld Bntqs
bnmbktcdc sg_s sgdqd v_r _ sdwst_kkxcdlnmrsq_akd
bnmrshstshnm_kbnllhsldms ---- Sghr qd_rnmhmfcndr
mns gnkc vhsg qdf_qc sn hlod_bgldms onvdq ne sgd
OghkhoohmdGntrd ne Qdoqdrdms_shudr rhmbd ntq
Bnmrshstshnm) _r d_qkhdq dmtldq_sdc) etqmhrgdr
rdudq_k oqnuhrhnmr _qshbtk_shmfgnv sg_s "dwbktrhud
onvdq" hr sn ad dwdqbhrdc-0/1
Bkd_qkx)sghr _rrdqshnmne itchbh_kqduhdv cndr mns _qhrd otqdkx eqnl

sgd dwo_mcdc bdqshnq_qhitqhrchbshnm:hs hr _krn fqntmcdc nm _cchshnm_ksdws-
Nsgdq dw_lokdr hmbktcd sgnrd eqnl sgd d_qkhdqchrbtrrhnm ne sgd onkhshb_k
ptdrshnm cnbsqhmd)rtbg _r Mdpelqr y. Drpp(q rq FihglrqKJ03 nm odshshnmrenq
bnmrshstshnm_k_ldmcldmsr _mc Udqdgd y. BqjdudoP.i. _mc Mlp y. F{hfxwlyh
nm enqdhfm_ee_hqr-
Thfuhwdu}105
Rdbnmc) sgd nudqkxsdwst_khrslhmcrds sg_s oqdu_hkrhmOghkhoohmd kdf_k

sghmjhmf ctd sn sgd itqhrchbshnm&rbhuhkk_v qnnsr kd_cr sn sdwst_k gnnjr
hmsdqoqdsdchm_m nudqkx khsdq_kl_mmdq) nakhuhntr sn bnmsdws_mc rsqtbstqd
_mc anqcdqhmf nm rsq_hmdc_qftldms- Oqnedrrnq Ak_bj vqnsd sg_s "&rsqhbs&
bnmrsqtbshnmhrl hr snc_x _r cd_c _r B_sn sgd Dkcdq) sgntfg hsr hl_fd hr rshkk
b_qqhdchmo_q_cdr nm qhst_knbb_rhnmr-"0// Rtbg o_q_cdr qd_chkx_qhrdhmsgd
Oghkhoohmdrvgdqd vg_s hr k_adkdc bnmrsqtbshnmhrl hr rsqdsbgdc aqn_ckx nmbd
rnld sdwst_k_mbgnq hr entmc-0/6 Cdrohsd sgd vhcd _qq_xne sdwst_k_mbgnqr hm
sgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnm)Oqnedrrnq Odqqx&rnardqu_shnmqdl_hmr qdkdu_ms9
@
^^" Y_ned l 3 hd_jxw Rs_sb-E9D P38w 89E1 8:-` 0;4: 4 M_h3 A03 A14
0001 k&q_mbh#bn
X- 0ZNT#B
meQdoqb#dms_shxb#)
O1d1 Mn- 0//1'),') 304 e^d_ r 33-064,06/) Mnx- 000-1//0-
@
^` >4H4 Ea4 A1 eAnU2n9n IWH8 A0 92FUf4 Bn2B01010\4
Rreu >4?44Ea2 Â?B3 n2 B1 B eWH
8 ^N2 RQXSjB2A3 3 1 4
A945 >4H4 Ea2 AnAeen2 UHF eWH8 1 U3 28bd4 AA2B99B4
ba-1 9A24 Q: B2J ?< G<FGC< 4QE; J @
@< : FKH
J 2 'RCY7VXG ` afW2 Sf 1 A4
brbC f^_i _i dej kd_gkx je j^x Oghkhoohmbr yeh t i kcctho ey vbti i _v Kjb7vh_vHbd w_i vekhi v3Fi ed uhetw
hmsdqoqds_shnm) .uhh KRRabMd/ .uoosud mnsd) _s 63,64- Sgd Oghkhoohmd onrhshnm)gnv dxdq) l_x ad odqbdhxdc :[# rshkk
_ adW44xnf tdi _rvx3
Sgd Bntqs dmf_fdr hmmnmhmsdqoqdshud qduhdv
vgdm hs l_jdr sgd cdsdqlhm_shnm ne
bnmrshstshnm_khsxax qdedqdmbdsn _ u_ktd itcfldms
nsgdq sg_m nmd bnmrshstshnm_khydcax eq_ldqr- Rtbg
qduhdv hr "mnmhmsdqoqdshud"adb_trd sgd Bntqs
qd_bgdr cdbhrhnm vhsgnts qd_kkxhmsdqoqdshmf_mx
oqnuhrhnm ne sgd bnmrshstshnm_ksdws 'nq _mx _rodbs
ne fnudqmldms_k rsqtbstqd(,_ksgntfg) sn ad rtqd)
sgd Bntqs l_x dwok_hmhsr cdbhrhnm vhsg qgdsnqhb
cdrhfmdc sn bqd_sd sgd hkktrhnmsg_s hs hr ldqdkx
"hmsdqoqdshmf"nq "_ookxhmf" rnld bnmrshstshnm_k
oqnuhrhnm-0/7
?mc sn ptnsd Oqdrhcdms A_q_j) "0 qdidbs sgd bnmsdmshnm sg_s sgd
itcfd ldqdkx rs_sdr sgd k_v _mc cndr mns bqd_sd hs- Hs hr _ ehbshshntr) dudm
bghkchrg _ooqn_bg-"0/8
Dt}hwdqr y. Nrq.urgooP qtkdc sg_s k_vxdq Bgqhrsh_m Lnmrnc&r

dwodqhdmbdhm u_qhntr a_mjr _mc mnm,fnudqmldms_k nqf_mhy_shnmr lds sgd
qdpthqdldms sg_s _ Bnllhrrhnm nm Dkdbshnmr bnllhrrhnmdq rgntkc g_ud
addm "dmf_fdc hm sgd oq_bshbd ne k_v enq _s kd_rs sdm xd_qr-"000 Hmrsd_c ne
rhlokx qtkhmf sg_s sgd _oonhmsldms k_x vhsghm sgd Oqdrhcdms&rchrbqdshnm _r
_oonhmshmf _tsgnqhsx) sgd Bntqs cdkhudqdc _m dk_anq_sd chrrdbshnm ne sgd
ogq_rd "oq_bshbd ne k_v)" bnlokdsd vhsg ptnsdr eqnl l_f_yhmd _qshbkdr_mc
rsq_hmdc dwok_m_shnmrne gnv _ Vnqkc A_mj k_vxdq dmbntmsdqr sgd k_vr ne
nsgdq bntmsqhdr _mc _ M_shnm_k Lnudldms enq Eqdd Dkdbshnmr bg_hq
dmbntmsdqr dkdbshnmk_v hrrtdrk01
Sghr "ehmchmf bnmbqdsd bnll_mcldmsr hm sgd Bnmrshstshnm&r

l_idrshb_kkx u_ftd _clnmhshnmr"k02 lts_sdc hmsn_ fdmqd ne sdwst_khrsnudqjhkk
g_r hlo_bs adxnmc bqd_shmf mddckdrr atqcdm enq eqdrgl_m k_v rstcdmsr-
JqwhjudwhgCdu ri wkh Qklolsslqh.u y. ]dprudoo-o qdidbsdc _ bg_kkdmfd sn Oqdrhcdms
Inrdog Drsq_c_&r cdoknxldms ne L_qhmdr hm rgnoohmf l_kkr sn rtoonqs
onkhbdldm _mc dmg_mbd sgd k_ssdq&ruhrhahkhsx-Hmrsd_c ne rhlokx qtkhmf sg_s
sghr v_r vhsghm sgd oqdrhcdms&rchrbqdshnm_r bnll_mcdq,hm,bghde) o_qshbtk_qkx
fhudm sgd aqn_c chrbtrrhnm ne sgdrd hmNdufr.u y. Kyodqjodsx.u"; ax Itrshbd Hqdmd
Q\':HHSR 00'0871(-
LHBHH?DKODQQX) ShkD BNMRSHSK9SHNM)SGD BNk-9QSR)-HMC Renr!""/
A?HKJ) Kxsud mns) _s wh"-
B_xds_mn u- LnmvI) F-Q- Mn- 0//002)1/0 RdQ? 10/)Ro- 2)0880-
Blrq- _qs-HW,B) 0'0(-
S_m) KJ l z.Fpskdolfdoo} okh UchOyv------22M2/*,,(} r/Dr"(,""or Sv,) 00600))0 JO2!p&'/h .-q)-|"sud
- mnsd) _s 77-
K-HTQD&,9BD ( RreRn
&mTHkD H-HD!-
CNQ&&&) 6'0880(-
aZ QD-HCHMFSGH&BNMRSHSK9SHN&,9
[&-Y_lnq_) B-Q- Mn- 030173)227
Hmjf- A- ne sgd Og-hkr- RBQ![ 70)?tf- 04)1/mn-
L_qbn) "- H[!_mfk_otr)B-Q Mn- 77100) 066RBQ? L07) Rbon04)08Q8-
Bnqsdr) sgd Bntqs rodbhehb_kkx
fqntmcdc hsr qtkhmfnm _ kdmfsgx_m_kxrhrne _
rodbhehbogq_rd _tsgnqhyhmfsgd oqdrhcdmssn "b_kknts rtbg _qldc enqbdr sn
oqdudmsnq rtooqdrr k_vkdrr uhnkdmbd)hmu_rhnmnq qdadkkhnm-"kk')
&,&Sgd
Bntqs
sgtr g_c sn fn sgqntfg sgd adk_anqdc sdwst_k_bqna_shbrne tognkchmf vg_s
Cd_m O_bhehbn?f_ahm injhmfkxqdedqrsn _r &sgdonvdq sn b_kknts rtbg _qldc
enqbdr sn oqdudms nq rtooqdrr k_vkdrr uhnkdmbdhm sgd bdmsq_katrhmdrr
bkhr
sqhbs-
&&&006
Sgd rtbbddchmf cdbhrhnmr qdf_qchmf sgd "b_kkhmfnts" onvdq)

gnvdudq) vdqd e_qqdlnudc eqnl JFQ y. ]dprud(v admhfmbnmsdws-Mfx"Trq y.
Qhuh:y"{ _mc Tdq/dndv y. S}hvoo(Kcd_ksvhsg Oqdrhcdms?qqnxn&rcdbk_q_shnmr ne
_ "rs_sd ne dldqfdmbx" _mc dbgndc JFQ y. ]dprud(v aqn_c chrbtrrhnm ne sgd
Oqdrhcdms&r chrbqdshnm_mc hmsdkkhfdmbd f_sgdqhmfb_o_ahkhsx hmqdk_shnm sn sgd
b_kkhmf nts onvdq- Tdq/dndv, cd_khmfvhsg sgd rn,b_kkdc"N_jvnnc ltshmx" ne
_ants 2// rnkchdqr)gdkc sg_s _ "rs_sd ne dldqfdmbx" hr "_m tssdq rtodqekthsx"
sg_s "l_x vqd_j dlnshnm_k deedbsrtonm sgd odqbdhudcdmdlhdr ne sgd Rs_sd)
dudmnm sgd dmshqdm_shnm"01/ ats hr ne mn kdf_kbnmrdptdmbd-Ax 1//5) Edylg
U/ Ndfdsdjd/-Buut}r232 _ookhdcsgd r_ld chrbtrrhnm ne sgd b_kkhmf nts onvdq sn
Oqdrhcdms?qqnxn&rOqnbk_l_shnm0/06 _mc_ rdqhdrne v_qq_mskdrr_qqdrsrsg_s
hs cdbk_qdc tmbnmrshstshnm_k- Edylg(v snmd bkheedqdcuhrhakx _mc hmrsd_c
dlog_rhydc sgd qdrsqhbshnmr nm sgd b_kkhmf nts onvdq- Mdfvrq, Tdq/dndv _mc
Edylg _kkcd_ksvhsg vg_s vdqd _rr_hkdc_r uhqst_kcdbk_q_shnmr ne l_qsh_kk_v) _
bnmrshstshnm_kkx vdhfgshdq rbdm_qhnsg_m OqdrhcdmsDrsq_c_&r _ssdlos sn
dmg_mbdonkhbd uhrhahkhsx- Ehm_kkx)Qurylqfh ti Oruwk Drwdedwr y. HSQ Qhdwh
Qdqhi/22 qdf_qbkhmfsgd od_bd oqnbdrr snnj sghr oqnfqdrrhnm _mc l_cd _
rddlhmf bkhrshmbshnm vhsgnts _ cheedqdmbd9 "?r BghdeDwdbtshud)sgd Oqdrhcdms
g_r sgd fdmdq_kqdronmrhahkhsx sn oqnlnsd otakhb od_bd) _mc _r Bnll_mcdq,
hm,Bghde)rgd g_r sgd lnqd rodbhehbctsx sn oqdudms_mc rtooqdrr qdadkkhnm
Ree1 BNk&RS-_qs-UHH) 07-

44< S_m) JJ b_ Mpsoo/Jl",!(Jkh i(uplqoA doog Chkk(&
rm\kS,uug)S_
10 OMMhY(eoooK1kReuukkC1kS
e-q).uo/sudmnsd) _s 74- Mnsd
sg_s sEs'&//-doqruw!oqdkhlhm_qhkx rs_sdc sg_s "vghkd sgd o_qshdr_qd hm_fqddldms sg_s sgd onvdq dwdqbhrdcax sgd
Oqdrhcdmshr sgd onvdq sn b_kknts sgd _qldc enqbdr) sgd Bntqs hr ne sgd "hdv sg_s sgd onvdq hl&ng&dcl_x ad
mn lnqd sg_m sgd l_hmsdm_mbdne od_bd _mc nqcdq _mc oqnlnshnm ne sgd fdmdq_kvdke_qd-" 227 RdQ? _s 0/2-
HZnvdudq) sgd cdbhrhnmhr bhsdc mmsenq sghr rs_sdldms) ats enq sgd kdmfsgxchrbtrrhnm ne sgd b_kkhmfnts onvdq
sg_s enkknvdc-
00- B-Q- Mn- 03670/) 246 RBQ? 64') s,-k_x0/) 1/sG - .ohh S_m) JJ he i(.psedolwd!!} vyyB 2'&&&&/ doog Eloo} ri
F12ppz/s10I_x oedo FzpzO e-q) .uxsud mnsd) _s 76,77-
44B B-Q- Mn- 048/74)310 RBQ? 540h)Eda- 2) 1//3-
&& Mp/?s kh66-
010 B-Q- Mn- 0602$)378 RBQ? kkhN)L_x 2) 1//5
011 OqN[hmbd ne Mnqsg Bns_a_sm u- Bn))&sne sgd QdotaIib ne sgd OghHr-Od_bd O_mdknm ![mbdrsq_k
\(nl_hm) B:-Q-Mn- 072480) 4kh7RNt[ 3/1- Nbs- 03)1//7-
Sgd Bntqs&r lhmcrds hr sgtr sg_s hshr bnlodkkdc sn cdkhudq_ rodbhehb)
cds_hkdc qtkhmf d_bg shld hs hr oqdrdmsdc vhsg _ bnmrshstshnm_k oqnuhrhnm
_rrdqsdc sn ad qdkdu_mssn _ cdbhrhnm-Sghr _ooqn_bg g_r oqnudm tmsdm_akd _s
bqtbh_k itmbshnmr ne ntq bnmrshstshnm_k ghrsnqx- Hm Udqdgd y. Bqjdud,12-J
odshshnmdqr _qftdc sg_s sgd Oghkhoohmdr& _bbdrrhnm sn sgd [[0ncc Sq_cd
Nqf_mhy_shnm v_r tmbnmrshstshnm_k) adhmf bnmsq_qx sn "_ rdke,qdkh_ms_mc
hmcdodmcdms m_shnm_kdbnmnlx deedbshudkxbnmsqnkkdc ax Ehkhohmnr"014_mc
qdk_sdc m_shnm_khrsdbnmnlhb oqnuhrhnmr- Sghr ots sgd Bntqs hm_ cnbsqhm_kkx
cheehbtks onrhshnm adb_trd sgd oqdbdchmf cdbhrhnm Ndqlod Qulqfh Irwho y.
HTJT126 cdbk_qdc nmd ne sgdrd oqnuhrhnmr _r "bnlokdsd hm hsrdke&016_mc
dmenqbd_akd) _mc aknbjdc sgd r_kd ne _ cdbk_qdc bnlonmdms ne sgd m_shnm_k
o_sqhlnmx sn _ enqdhfm bnqonq_shnm- Udqdgd cheedqdmsh_sdchsr rbdm_qhn eqnl
Ndqlod Qulqfh Irwho _mc cdbk_qdc sgd m_shnm_khrs oqnuhrhnmr hmunjdc _r "mns
hmsdmcdc sn ad rdke,dwdbtshmf oqhmbhokdrqd_cx enq dmenqbdldms sgqntfg sgd
bntqsr" _mc _r ldqd "fthcdkhmdr enq kdfhrk_shnm-"017Hqnmhb_kkx) sgd rsqnmf
sdwst_khrs_ooqn_bg qdrtksdc hm_ chktshnm_mc vd_jdmhmf ne sgdrd oqnuhrhnmr-
"ZN\kc sdwst_khrl hr a_rdc nm sgd hmbnqqdbs uhdv ne khmfthrshbr _mc
itqhroqtcdmbd ax vghbg sgd sdws b_m ad bkd_qvhsgnts dw_lhmhmf hsr bnmsdws-
Itcfd Kd_qmdc G_mc v_r qhfgs hmr_xhmf) &Sgdqdhr mn rtqdq v_x sn lhrqd_c
_mx cnbtldms sg_m sn qd_c hskhsdq_kkx-&&&018
Sgd dwsqdld enql ne sdwst_khrl hr
bnmsq_qx sn sgd Rntsg ?eqhb_m _ooqn_bg ne qd_rnm_akdmdrr vghbg cndr mns
sqd_s bnmrshstshnm_k ogq_rdr _r _arnktsdr _mc hmrsd_c hmsdqudmdr _f_hmrs
fnudqmldms _bsr nmkx vgdm sgdx _qd ghfgkx tmqd_rnm_akd hm sgdhq
bnmrshstshnm&rbnmsdws-Sgd k_mcl_qj cdbhrhnmTrreudK1"/rq}y. NlqlKwhuroi-ohdowk
)Lzd~xox-OdwdJ*13r ots sn sdrs sgd bnmrshstshnm_koqnuhrhnmr "Mn nmd l_x ad
qdetrdc dldqfdmbx ldchb_k sqd_sldms)" "Dudqxnmd g_r sgd qhfgs sn g_ud
_bbdrr sn gd_ksg b_qd rdquhbdr" _mc "Dudqxnmd g_r sgd qhfgs sn khed"vgdm _
l_m hm sgd ehm_krs_fdr ne rdudqd qdm_ke_hktqd bg_kkdmfdc _ fnudqmldms
gnrohs_k&rqdetr_k sn _kknb_sdch_kxrhrsqd_sldms qdrntqbdr sn ghl- Sgd Rntsg
?eqhb_m Bnmrshstshnm_kBntqs _ccqdrrdc sgd hrrtd chqdbskxhmrsd_c ne dmf_fhmf
hm hmsdqoqdshud sdwst_k _bqna_shbr nq bqd_shmf ehmd e_bst_k chrshmbshnmr-
09>
sp _s 4/1
01
F-Q Mn- 007184)161 RdQ? 07) L_x 1)0886
AB4*[
d/0&rq- _qs-00) 08-
AB0
L_mhk_OqhmbdGnsdk u- ':N["s Rdm&hbd
Hmr-Rxrsdl) B-Q- Mn- 01104'))1')6 RBQh[ 3/7) 320) Eda- 2)
0886-
78C
S_m_c_) 161 RBQe[ _s 47-
AB2
sp _s 871
AB3
A-&HQL&9).,-xsp mnsd) _s 04/-
@
M 0886 '01( ABKQ S*/_ ,*/'BB( 'R-Lqhb_(-
Vhsgnts chlhmhrghmf sgd oqnuhrhnmr&l_mc_snqx bg_q_bsdq) sgd Bntqs
qdbnfmhydcsg_s Rntsg ?eqhb_ g_c rb_qbd gd_ksgb_qd qdrntqbdr _mc sg_s sgd
gnrohs_k&ronkhbx enq _kknb_shmfsgdrd v_r mns tmqd_rnm_akd)dudm he sgdx
qdrtksdc hmsgd odshshnmdq
adhmfcdmhdc_bbdrr sn sgdl-
Hmnsgdq bnmsdwsr)sgd Bntqs&rodqbdhudc_bshuhrl hmsdwst_khrl g_r

g_c otqdkx rxlankhb qdrtksr- Sgd 5339 cdbhrhnmIhqduh.u 0(- MUGSC,131 bhshmf
Psr.ud, ed_stqdc _ bk_hl sg_s sgd bnmrshstshnm_k"qhfgs sn bkd_m _hq"021
bnlodkkdc sgd fnudqmldms sn qdpthqdsgd trd ne _ksdqm_shud etdk-Sgd Bntqs
cdkhudqdc _ rshqqhmf nohmhnm qdbnfmhyHmfsgd odshshnmdqr&rs_mchmf)
qddlog_rhyhmf Psr.z _mc qd_chmf sgd mtldqntr dmuhqnmldms_krs_shrshbr
oqdrdmsdchmsnsgd _msgnknfhdr)ats tkshl_sdkx chrlhrrhmf sgd odshshnmnm sgd
ldqhsr _mc _rjhmf sgd odshshnmdqrsn bhsd_ rodbhehbrs_stsnqx ctsx nvdc nq sn
chqdbssgdhqbk_hlr sn Bnmfqdrr- 022
Oghkhoohmd k_vxdqr dmf_fdc hmbnmrshstshnm_k hmsdqoqds_shnmltrs ad

_v_qd sg_s sgd bnmsdwsenq _ookxhmf)hmo_qshbtk_q)sgd cntakd rs_mc_qc ne
itchbh_kqduhdv hr q_chb_kkxcheedqdms-
Sghr rs_mc_qc cdl_mcr fqd_sdq rbqtshmx
vgdm cd_khmfvhsg onkhshb_k _mc gtl_m qhfgsr _r noonrdc sn rnbh_k_mc
dbnmnlhb hrrtdr _mc v_r lnrs qdbdmcxdlog_rhydc ax Itrshbd Ldmcny_-023
O_tk Eqdtmc dwok_hmdc hs_r "rdsZshmf\to _ ghdq_qbgxne u_ktdr vhsghmsgd ctd
oqnbdrr bk_trd-"024Hshr bk_rrhb_kkx
qdekdbsdchm"Ennsmnsd 7"D
Sgdqd l_x ad m_qqnvdq rbnod enq nodq_shnm

ne sgd oqdrtloshnm ne bnmrshstshnm_khsxvgdm
kdfhrk_shnm_ood_qr nm hsr e_bd sn ad vhsghm _
rodbhehboqnghahshnmne sgd Bnmrshstshnm)---
Hs hr tmmdbdrr_qx sn bnmrhcdq mnv vgdsgdq

kdfhrk_shnmvghbg qdrsqhbsrsgnrd onkhshb_koqnbdrrdr
vghbg b_m nqchm_qhkxad dwodbsdc sn aqhmf _ants
qdod_kne tmcdrhq_akd kdfhrk_shnm)
hr sn ad rtaidbsdc
7UAOtj A93 4
AUB
Rxlankhb qdrtksr _qd mns mdbdrr_qhkxld_mhmfkdrr ne bntqrd- LeTyOO0'- !5bmep bw'yvpSdM0vyz- bnmrhcdq)
00-&
v_r vhcdkx chrqdf_qcdc ax rbgnnkr hmsgd rntsgdqm Tmhsdc Rs_sdr hmsgb cbb_cb enkknvhmfhsr oqnltkf_shnm)
&k&H):RHHMDS)
OScz mnsd _s 025-
&03 UhbbmsdU) Ldmcny_) "Sgd M_stqd _mc Etmbshnmne Itchbh_k Qduhbv") Unk- -20Mn-0 S ne RJR) 5,12
'1//4()
tr O0[H):K
EQDBMC)NM TMCEQRS:[MCIMFShkDRTOQHB[HH&9
Bnbkm 00 '084n() txrwhg MMMLH9"kINH9-H)
Ohcz mnsd) _s 74)
sn lnqd dw_bshmfitcHBh_krbqtshmx tmcdq sgd fdmdq_k
oqnghahshnmr ne sgd Entqsddmsg -,[ldmcldms sg_m
_qd lnrs nsgdq sxodr ne kdfhrk_shnm----
Mnq cn vd hmpthqd--- vgdsgdq oqditchbd

_f_hmrs chrbqdsd _mc hmrtk_q lhmnqhshdr l_x ad _
rodbh_k bnmchshnm) vghbg sdmcr rdqhntrkx sn btqs_hk
sgd nodq_shnm ne sgnrd onkhshb_k oqnbdrrdr
nqchm_qhkxqdkhdc tonm sn oqnsdbs lhmnqhshdr) _mc
vghbg l_x b_kk enq _ bnqqdronmchmfkx lnqd
rd_qbghmf itchbh_k hmpthqx-00')
Sghr rs_mc_qc hr _ fthcdkhmd mns _ l_mc_snqx qtkd) _mc mnsd sg_s

_qft_akx sgd fqd_sdrs Tmhsdc Rs_sdr cdbhrhnm) Curzq y. Crdug rmFgxfdwlrq 259 nm
q_bh_krdfqdf_shnm) sq_mrenqldc sg_s bntmsqx&r rnbh_k k_mcrb_od- Mdudqsgdkdrr)
sgd dwo_mcdc rnbh_k _mc dbnmnlhb oqnuhrhnmr hm sgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnm aktq
sgd sq_chshnm_kkhmdr-Sghr hr lnrs duhcdms hm PsrKd _mc IhqduhK vhsg qdrodbs
sn sgd "qhfgs sn _ a_k_mbdc _mc gd_ksgetk dbnknfx" _mc Ndqlod Qulqfh Irwho _mc
Udqdgd y. Bqjdud vhsg qdrodbs sn sgd Ehkhohmn Ehqrs Onkhbx _mc bdqs_hm
dbnmnlhb oqnuhrhnmr- ?qd sgdrd onkhshb_k_mc dbnmnlhb hrrtdr vgdqd onkhbx
ltrs ad cdsdqlhmdc ax l_inqhs_qh_m oqnbdrr _mc vgdqd "ZrInld ok_x ltrs ad
_kknvdc enq sgd inhmsr ne sgd l_bghmd"02A> Nq _qd sgdrd hrrtdr ne etmc_ldms_k
bnmrshstshnm_k qhfgsr rtaidbs sn dw_bshmf rbqtshmx) s_jhmf Ndqlod Qulqfh Irwhi(K
rs_sdldms sg_s "sgdqd hr mnsghmf rn r_bqnr_mbs hm _mx dbnmnlhb onkhbx _r sn
cq_v hsrdke adxnmc itchbh_k qduhdv vgdm sgd Bnmrshstshnm hr hmunkudc"02>
O_q_cnwhb_kkx)l_mx hrrtdr l_x ad qdrnkudc dhsgdq v_x) _mc hs hr chr_rsqntr sn
kd_m snn bknrdkx sn dhsgdq dwsqdld) vghbg hr vg_s g_oodmdc hmo_rs cdbhrhnmr
vgdqd _m hrrtd v_r bg_q_bsdqhydc nmd,chldmrhnm_kkx-
Nmd mnsdr sg_s oqnuhrhnmr mns ogq_rdc _r bnmrshstshnm_k qhfgsr l_x

e_kkhmsn sghr aktqqhmf rs_mc_qc _r vdkk- Enq dw_lokd) vgdm _ odshshnm hmQvM92y.
F{hpwlyh Thfuhwdu}_rr_hkdc _kkdfdc bnla_s nodq_shnmr ax ?ldqhb_m rnkchdqr
vhsghm sgd Oghkhoohmdr tmcdq sgd _trohbdr ne sgd UE ?) sgd RnkhbhsnqFdmdq_k
hmunjdc sgd Oqdrhcdms&r aqn_c chrbqdshnm _r bnll_mcdq,hm,bghde _mc hm
enqdhfm _ee_hqr- Sgd Bntqs) gnvdudq) nm sgd oqdlhrd sg_s rtbg _kkdfdc
nodq_shnmr _f_hmrs "?at R_xx_e a_mchsr"03/ bnmrshstsdc _ v_q) rs_sdc sg_s sgd
AA02
TmhsdcRs_sdr u- B_qnkbmdOqnctbsr Bn-) 2/ T-R- 033)041m-3 '08-(W(-
A4 Q1
Gq'([[&k0 ne Snodj_) 236T-R- &HW2
[&-Gn_qc ne i&9ctb_shnm '0843(-
A4Q?
Lhrrntqh) H;_mr_r_mc Sdmmdrrdd Q_hkqn_co1 H[k_x)08T-R- 1')6)16/-'08/3( 'hknkldr) S,1
77,7
H[Ksmhk_OqhmbdHknsdk[&-':N["s Rdm&hbd Hmr-Rxrsdl) B-Q- Mn- 01104'))1')6
RdQ9[ 3/W)336)Eda- 2)
0886
AeQA
Bnmrshstshnm&rqdmtmbh_shnmne "v_q _r _m hmrsqtldms ne m_shnm_konkhbx"H,s0
qdrsqhbsdc sgd Oqdrhcdms&rchrbqdshnmhmsghr bnmsdws-
K_rskx) hs hr _ rtaskd onhms sg_s sgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnm hr hmehmhsdkx

knmfdq sg_m hs _bst_kkx hr) adb_trd sgd Oghkhoohmdr"_cnosr sgd fdmdq_kkx
_bbdosdc oqhmbhokdrne hmsdqm_shnm_k k_v _r o_qs ne sgd k_v ne sgd k_mc-"031
?ksgntfg sghr oqnuhrhnm cndr mns dkdu_sd btrsnl_qx hmsdqm_shnm_k k_v -sn sgd
r_ld shdq _r bnmrshstshnm_k oqnuhrhnmr)032 hs cndr fq_ms sgd Bntqs sgd
chrbqdshnm sn rdkdbs vghbg oqhmbhokdr sn cdbk_qd _r "fdmdq_kkx _bbdosdc
oqhmbhokdrne hmsdqm_shnm_k k_v" _mc sgdm _ookx sgdrd vhsg _ qdudqdmbd sg_s
aqhmfr sgdl sn md_q,bnmrshstshnm_krs_str _m(&[u_x- Hm_ mtladq ne b_rdr) sgd
Bntqs g_r bhsdc hmsdqm_shnm_k k_v oqhmbhokdrsn qdhmenqbd_ bnmrshstshnm_kqhfgs
hs g_r hcdmshehdc-Enq dw_lokd) sgd 1//5 cdbhrhnmJq uhTdeld qdrs_sdc sgd a_rhr
enq sgd Oghkhoohmdqhfgs sn oqhu_bx9
Sgd ldshbtkntr qdf_qc vd _bbnqc sn sgdrd ynmdr

Zne oqhu_bx\ _qhrdr mns nmkx eqnl ntq bnmuhbshnm
sg_s sgd qhfgs sn oqhu_bxhr _ "bnmrshstshnm_kqhfgs"
_mc "sgd qhfgs lnrs u_ktdc ax bhuhkhydcldm)" ats
_krn eqnl ntq _cgdqdmbd sn sgd Tmhudqr_k
Cdbk_q_shnmne Gtl_m Qhfgsr vghbg l_mc_sdr
sg_s) "mn nmd rg_kk ad rtaidbsdc sn _qahsq_qx
hmsdqedqdmbd vhsg ghr oqhu_bx" _mc "dudqxnmd g_r
sgd qhfgs sn sgd oqnsdbshnmne sgd k_v _f_hmrs rtbg
hmsdqedqdmbd nq _ss_bjr-" i,k,k
HmHryhuqphqw pZwoKh Vqlwhg TwdwhKriBphulp y. QoJujdqfp,";; sgdm Itrshbd

Otmn rs_sdc sg_s sgd qhfgs ne _m dwsq_chsddsn _ookx enq a_hk hr dw_lhmdc hm
khfgs ne nsgdq sqd_sx nakhf_shnmr) rtbg _r bnmbdosr ne khadqsxqdekdbsdc hmsgd
4u4 2 u B4
BNRS- Sdf4 @@
4uC! Sdf4 @C u B4
V OghkhoLnqqhr) Hmb-[&-Bntqs ne ?oob_kr) B-Q- Mn- 02-&1-113 RBQ0[ 46'" 42 '082(- "Tmcbq sgb
wevjh_dx3Fey _dvehf ehtj_ed 333 hkbxi ey _djxhdtj_edtb Tcl thv _dFd t i jtdw_d vbbktb1 dej i kf xh_eh1 je dtj_edtb
Hp-)rk_shnm-
"
0G Hmqb G_ad_r Bnqotr ne B_lhkn K- R_ahn- F-Q- Mn- 06323C) 4/3 RBQ? 6/3) 62'" Nbs- 06) 1'(5-
dxvxdj wxv_i _edi ^tov v_jxw _djxhdtj_edtb _di jhkcxdji _d tkw_j_ed je j^x vedi j_jkj_edtb uti xi _d btdwctha vti xi 3
Nrb_q Eq_mjkhmS_kk)Dey0shshy0,'-MurFbzc0ryo Uuvy0ccvravtuv10 U-vzd vyyFeOMMOM0vhM0sOMMM20 &p Fv-vM c1v4lC D 'cvvny0yr10
(uvr0lMyO0v&0.v>zyypbM2yyp
sReSebF&ecvyy-
" 71'3( OGHK- K-I- 60[)022,24 '1//0[(-
)-) "ihks hr _ fbmbq_kkx_bbbosdc oqhmnhokd hmhmsbqm_shnm_k k_v sg_s sgb oqbrtloshnm khbrhme_unq ne sgb
bWkRsdmbb ne sgb qhfgs) _mc sgd atqcdm khbrvhsg sgb _tsgnqhshbr sn itrshex sgb k_vetkmbrr ne sgb _qqdrs nq
cbsdmshnm-Sghr oqbrtloshnm bqb_sbr _kknakhf_shnmnm rs_sd _tsgnqhshdr sn l_jb deedbshudqblbchbr _u_hk_akbsn
B[t(& obqrnm tmcbq cbsdmshnmenq sgb dminxldms ne g-hretmc_ldms_k qhfgs sn khadqsx-"'h-Q- Mn- 030[460) 278
RBQ)[ ')12)588) Rbon13)1//1-
Tmhudqr_kCdbk_q_shnmne Gtl_m Qhfgsr 'TCGQ( _mc sgd Hmsdqm_shnm_k
Bnudm_msnm Bhuhk_mc Onkhshb_k Qhfgsr 'HBBOQ(-Ghfgkhfgshmfsghr sqdmc)sgd
pe
1//6 cdbhrhnmEhsduwphqw Ihdowk y. Qklolsslqh Qkdupdzhdowk, Jqf.M/R bhsdcsgd
cnbsqhmdne rs_sd hlltmhsx _r _ fdmdq_kkx _bbdosdc oqhmbhokdne hmsdqm_shnm_k
k_v mnsvhsgrs_mchmfhsr bnchehb_shnm hm sgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnm-036 'Mnsd)
gnvdudq) sg_s Udqdgd y. Bqjdud a_k_mbdcm_shnm_khrsbnmrshstshnm_k oqnuhrhnmr
_f_hmrssgd VSN ?fqddldms) bhshmfsgd fdmdq_kkx _bbdosdc oqhmbhokd ne sdl1d
vxqw vhuydqgd nq odqenql_mbd ne hmsdqm_shnm_k nakhf_shnmrhm fnnc e_hsg)
_ksgntfg sgd k_ssdq_qdhmedqhnqhmsgd ghdq_qbgxnek_vr(-
S_jdm etqsgdq)sgd cnbsqhmdne hmbnqonq_shnm b_m_mc g_r addm trdc

sn _qftd enq sgd dwhrsdmbdne mdv qhfgsr) adxnmc sgd _kqd_cx dwsdmrhud
bnmrshstshnm_k sdws-Lnrs oqnlhmdmskx)_ chrrdmshm Ffkhjdut} y. Thfuhwdu} pe
Kxvwlfh,(-J8qdf_qchmfsgd ehqrsdwdbtshnmtmcdq sgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnm) oqnonrdc
sg_s sgd qdhlonrdc cd_sg odm_ksxuhnk_sdc _ mdvkx,dldqfdc mnql ne
hmsdqm_shnm_k k_v) mnsvhsgrs_mchmfsg_s sgd Bnmrshstshnmdwokhbhskx f_ud
Bnmfqdrr sgd noshnm sn qdrsnqd sghr- Qdb_kkItcfd Anqj&r _clnmhshnm
038
_f_hmrs "sgd hmsdqm_shnm_k gnlnfdmhy_shnm ne bnmrshstshnm_kk_v---

_bbnlokhrgdc nmkxhesgd u_qhntr m_shnm_k bntqsr _qdvhkkhmfsn lhmhlhyd sgd
ghrsnqhb_ktmcdqrs_mchmfne sgdhqnvm bnmrshstshnmrhme_unq ne vg_s sgdx
odqbdhud_r _mhmsdqm_shnm_k lnq_khsx-"04/?ksgntfg qdedqdmbdsn hmsdqm_shnm_k
k_v mnqlr hr dwokhbhskx _tsgnqhydc ax sgd Bnmrshstshnm)sgd rtffdrshnm hm_
Rtoqdld Bntqs cdbhrhnmsg_s _m_kkdfdchmsdqm_shnm_k k_v mnql lhfgs sqtlo
_m dwokhbhs bnmrshstshnm_koqnuhrhnmrgnvr sgd _kktqd'nq _s kd_rshsr dwsqdld
onhms(ne trhmf hmsdqm_shnm_k k_v hmntq lncdqm itqhroqtcdmbd-
Hmsdqm_shnm_k
k_v mnqlr g_ud addmlnrs oqnfqdrrhudkxqdbnfmhydchm
gtl_m qhfgsr bnmsdwsr- Hryhuqphqw psIrqj Lrqj y. Podold(5( cdbk_qdc sgd
TCGQ _r bnms_hmhmf oqhmbhokdrne btrsnl_qx hmsdqm_shnm_k k_v) rs_shmfsg_s9
"Sgd lncdqm sqdmchmotakhb hmsdqm_shnm_k k_v hr sgd oqhl_bx ok_bdc nm sgd
vnqsg ne sgd hmchuhct_kodqrnm _mc sgd r_mbshsxne gtl_m qhfgsr-"041Sgd
7:B >4H4 Ea4 4*Runr37/nA2 IWH8 Be92 AQASd4AU2B9011 4

036 Jg _s 136) gomq. Rg_te "- Bntqs ne I[ood_a) B-Q- Mn- 8/203) 080 RBQ? 602) M")- 16) 088/:
Tmhsdc Rs_sdru- Qdxdr) F-Q- Mn- 68142) 108 RdQ? 081) L_q- 0) 0882- B9N9,:RS- _qs-WUH) 2-
&" F-Q- Mn- 0215/0)186 RdQ? 643) RT) Nbs- 01) 0887 (creFOvOvmz pv'.'&j yvgm,!-sOcvvsOyyw/
7:E : FEIJ 4 X1 u A3 0A14
thj3 @
&4;0 ANQJ) /s&Uebmnsd) _s 13-- [s sgd dwsqdld onhmsne Itcfd Anqj&rbqhshbhrl)gd onhmsrnts gnv Aqhshrg
Oqhld LhmhrsdqH[k_q!)&Tqds Sg_sbgdq _mc sgd Oqhmbdne V_kdr vdqd bg_qfdc hmsgd Tmhsdc Rs_sdr ne xhnk_shmf
gtl_m qhfgsr hmMnqsgdqmHqdk_mc _mc Khax__mc gnv sgd Hmsdqm_shnm_kBntqs ne Itrshbd nmbd) tmrtbbdrretkkx)
nqcdqdc sgd Tmhsdc Rs_sdr Rtoqdld Bntqs sn "sn s_jd _kkld_rtqdr _s hsr chron")&k"sn rs_x sgd dwdbtshnmne _
Fdql_m m_shnm_k rdmsdmbdcsn cd_sg ax _m?qhynm_itqx ctqhmf _ ltqcdq sqh_KJw! _s 16) 23-
))R B-Q- Mn- 042564)410 RBQ? 36/) ?oq- 08)1//6-
* 0+ 7J' tj e2A4
HBBOQ g_r addm bhsdc nm mtldqntr nbb_rhnmr- ?r _ etqsgdq dw_lokd) sgdm
Itrshbd Otmn&r rdo_q_sd nohmhnmhmUhfvrq y. DPNFMFP(3 _qftdc sg_s sgd
Bnmudmshnmnm sgd Qhfgsr ne sgd Bghkc oqnghahsdc chrbqhlhm_shnmnm _bbntms
ne ahqsg nq nsgdq rs_str) _mc sg_s sghr sqd_sx nakhf_shnm oqnghahsdc
chrbqhlhm_shnmne _m hkkdfhshl_sdbghkc enq otqonrdr ne bhshydmrgho-Sgd
Bntqs&r enbtr nm sgdrd gtl_m qhfgsr bnmsdwsr hm hmsdqm_shnm_k k_v
bnlokdldmsr hsr fqd_sdq rbnod enq itchbh_k qduhdv hmbnmrshstshnm_kgtl_m
qhfgsr bnmsdwsr-Sgd lnrs dwo_mrhudhmunb_shnmv_r sgd ehqrsvqhs ne _lo_qn
cdbhrhnm)vghbg bhsdc _ TCGQ enqltk_shnm "qhfgs sn khed)khadqsx_mc rdbtqhsx
ne odqrnm"043_knmfrhcdOghkhoohmdbnmrshstshnmoqnuhrhnmr-
Bghde Itrshbd Otmn&r UhfKrq nohmhnm)o_qdmsgdshb_kkx) hkktrsmssdrsgd

aktqqdc khmdr adsvddm onkhshb_k_mc gtl_m qhfgsr hrrtdr hm snc_x&r
bnmrshstshnm_kk_mcrb_od- Sgd Otmn nohmhnmeq_ldc sgd hrrtd _r nmd ne
chrbqhlhm_shnm_f_hmrs bghkcqdmax uhqstd ne sgd bhqbtlrs_mbdr ne sgdhqahqsg-
Gnvdudq) hs _bjmnvkdcfdc sg_s sgd sqtd hrrtd v_r vgdsgdq onotk_q
oqdrhcdmsh_kb_mchc_sd Edqm_mcn Ond) Iq- rgntkc ad chrpt_khehdc eqnl sgd
dkdbshnmrenq mns lddshmf sgd bhshydmrghoqdpthqdldms hm qdk_shnmsn sgd
bhqbtlrs_mbdr ne ghr ahqsg- Sgd nohmhnmbnmbktcdc9 "Vgdsgdq qdronmcdms
Edqm_mcn Ond) Iq- hr pt_khehdcsn qtm enq Oqdrhcdmshmunkudr_ bnmrshstshnm_k
hrrtd ats hsr onkhshb_ksnmd hr mn kdrr cnlhm_ms -- " Fhudm sgd hmcdbhrhudmdrr
ne sgd unsdr ne sgd ldladqr ne sghr Bntqs) sgd adssdq onkhbx_ooqn_bg hr sn
kdssgd odnokd cdbhcd----"
Sn rtll_qhyd sgd oqdbdchmf chrbtrrhnm) nmd adfhmr vhsg sgd

oqdlhrd sg_s sgd tmdkdbsdc itchbh_qx&rfqd_s onvdq hr etmc_ldms_kkx b_m_khydc
ax sgd b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrxqdpthqdldms _mc sgd onkhshb_k ptdrshnm cnbsqhmd-
?r vd g_ud rddm) gnvdudq) sgd enqldq&r dudqx e_bds g_r addm bghoodc _v_x
vghkd sgd k_ssdqg_r u_mhrgdc hmsn nakhuhnmenkknvhmfhsr onrs,L_qsh_k K_v
rshfl_-
Ehqrs) sgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnml_mc_sdr sgd Bntqs sn _ccqdrr fq_ud

_atrdr ne chrbqdshnmhm_cchshnmsn tmbnmrshstshnm_k_bsr) _mc sghr g_r addm
hmsdqoqdsdc_r _ ctsx _mc nakhf_shnmsn qdmcdq itcfldms- Sghr kd_udr mn
&I&dbrnm[&-Bnll&m nm H&9kbd-)F-Q) Mn- 0503903-313 RBQ)[ 5<</ 1"4),31gq- -[ 544bP

Rdd- negk&I Ckneb!0=d[- "gmn!n- KD1d1Mn- vRPRR3R4k/1
Bkdk-</ 54b44P'sk"H 9kbbnlo9klkkkf mnsd !3e-,/
ptdrshnm nq enq sgd sdwst_k
qnnl enq sgd oqtcdmsh_kb_sdfnqx ne onkhshb_k
ptdrshnmr _qhrhmf eqnl "sdwst_kkx cdlnmrsq_akd bnmrshstshnm_k
bnllhsldmsr-"
Rdbnmc) itqhroqtcdmbd hr qdokdsdvhsg oqdbdcdmsr sg_s dmbntq_fd

khadq_k
_ooqn_bgdr sn rs_mchmf)vhsg sgd sq_mrbdmcdms_k hlonqs_mbd cnbsqhmd
qd_chkxhmunjdc sn chrb_qc _mx rs_mchmf qtkd _r _ ldqd oqnbdctq_k
sdbgmhb_khsx-Lnrs oqnlhmdmskx)Qurylqfh ri Oruwk Drwdedwry. HSQ Qhdfh Qdqho
dwokhbhskxrs_sdc sgd Bntqs&radkhdesg_shsg_r _ ctsx sn enqltk_sd "bnmsqnkkhmf
oqhmbhokdr"sn fthcd sgd onkhshb_kaq_mbgdr _mc sgd bhshydmqx) dudm nm
_kkdfdckxlnns nq tmqhodhrrtdr-
Sghqc) sgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnm&r rgddq kdmfsg _mc sgd oqdu_hkhmf

sdwst_khrslhmcrds hmsgd Oghkhoohmdr g_r q_chb_kkxhmbqd_rdcsgd mtladq ne
sdwst_kgnnjr _ bnmrshstshnm_k b_rd l_x ad _mbgnqdc nm- Sghr qdctbdr sgd
mtladq ne etmbshnm_konkhshb_k ptdrshnmr ctd sn _m hmbqd_rdcmtladq ne
itchbh_kkxl_m_fd_akd rs_mc_qcr _mc) etqsgdq)hmbqd_rdcghmsr_s vg_s lhfgs
bnmrshstsdfq_ud _atrdr ne chrbqdshnm- Mdv oqnuhrhnmr_kknv lnqd hrrtdr sn
ad bg_q_bsdqhydc_r gtl_m qhfgsr hrrtdr) vghbg itrshehdr lnqd _ffqdrrhud
itchbh_kqduhdv tmcdq sq_chshnm_k cnbsqhmd-Ehm_kkx) sgd hmbnqonq_shnm bk_trd
oqnuhcdr _ sgdnqdshb_kkx hmehmhsd rntqbd ne _cchshnm_ksdws _mc itchbh_k
rs_mc_qcr enq sgd Bntqs ?r ots ax OqnedrrnqrSqhad _mc Lhbg_dkCnqe) "ne
bntqrd mn itcfd vntkc cdrbqhadgdq nvm dmsdqoqhrd _r sgd rtarshstshnm ne gdq
u_ktd itcfldmsr enq sgnrd ne sgd kdfhrk_stqd-
Hmrsd_c)k_vxdqr_mcitcfdr _khjd
vhkk_qftd --- sg_s sgd Bnmrshstshnmhsrdkel_qjr bdqs_hm u_ktdr _r rodbh_k-"044
Sgdx mnsd)etqsgdq)sg_s sgd kdudkne rodbhehbhsx sn vghbg nmd b_mdwsdmcsghr
rodbh_km_stqdsn _ u_ktd) sgd cdfqdd sn vghbg rodbhehbqhfgsr _qdcq_vm eqnl
_m_arsq_bsoqnuhrhnm)hr hsrdke_ u_ktd bgnhbdl_cd ax sgd Bntqs-
Sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq rg_ssdqr sgd k_rs tmaqnjdm khmjhmitchbh_k

qduhdv&r bg_hmr-045Sghr onvdq qdlnudr sgd b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrx
qdpthqdldms _ksnfdsgdq)kd_uhmfsgd Bntqs eqddsn _bs dudmvhsgnts _mxb_rd
adenqd hs) _r v_r ehqrs _mc lnrs oqnlhmdmskx rddm hm sgd M_shnm_k
Bnmrtks_shudRtllhs nm Dwsq_itchbh_k Jhkkhmf_mc DmenqbdcChr_ood_q_mbdr
hm1//6- 'Sghr _tsgnq qdhsdq_sdr
sg_s dudmhesgd Bntqs "rdhyZdc\sgd ahssdqbto
04/ SQHAD ( CNQ-E) -,xsp mnsd) _s 58-

04') O_qdmsgdshb_kkx) bntqsr ne bntqrd s_jd lnqd sg_m sgd b_rd _s g_mc hmsn_bbntms- ?r _qshbtk_sdcax
Oqnedrrnq Gdqadqs Vdbgrkdq) "kSIgd oqhmbhokd ne sgd cdbhrhnmltrs ad uh_akdhmqdedqdmbdsn sgd _ookhb_shnmr
sg_s _qd mnv enqdrdd_akd---- Mnsghmf kdrr vhkkr_shrexsgd dkdldmsr ne fdmdq_khsx_mc ne mdtsq_khsxhlokhbhshmsgd
bnmbdqs ne _ kdf_kitcfldms _r chrshmfthrgdc eqnl sgd eh_sne _ bntqs-" Gdqadqs Vdbgrkdq) Ukh Odwxuhd/Kxglfldo
-H:[hk(0&0III-NRNH&IIX9
Shd.zqlwo. lq 0--000& laRXh[kI&NRIK-9c
186,87 'RhcmdxGnnj dc-08'3(-
_kksnn fk_ckx)"046sghr hr mns mdbdrr_qhkx
_ mdf_shudntsbnld- Gnvdudq) gd
qdhsdq_sdrsg_s itqhrsr _mc _b_cdlhbr _khjd ltrs adenqd _mxsghmf dkrd
qdbnfmhydsgd ntsbnld enqvg_s hshr-(
Lnrs dwo_mrhudkx)hm sgd ehqrsvqhs ne _lo_qn qtkhmf) Thfuhwdu} ri

sgd Bntqs dmenqbdc"Zsgdqhfgs sn\ sn khed)khadqsx
Odwlrqdo Elihqvh y. Ndqdor/7:
_mc rdbtqhsx"048hmsgd aqn_c sdqlr ptnsdc- Hmok_hmats onvdqetk k_mft_fd
ax sgd Rg_jdrod_qd ne sgd Rtoqdld Bntqs ghlrdke) _r gd hr qdedqqdcsn ax
rnld ne ghr aqdsgqdm)Ndqror qdrs_sdcoqduhntr roddbgdr _mc chrbtrrhnmr nm
sgd vqhs ne _lo_qn _mc drs_akhrgdc sgd dwo_mrhud_ookhb_shnm ne hsr qtkdr-
Sghr cdbhrhnm)henmd ltrs ad bgnrdm) dmb_ortk_sdrsgd Otm_ Bntqer uhrhnm
ne gtl_m qhfgsr&oqhl_bx hmOghkhoohmd rnbhdsx-
Vhsgnts chlhmhrghmfsgd k_mcl_qj aknv rsqtbj ax Ndqdor enq gtl_m

qhfgsr)nmdltrs _m_kxydgnv sgd cdbhrhnmqdekdbsr_kkne onrs,0876 Oghkhoohmd
itchbh_k qduhdv&rdwo_mrhudbg_q_bsdqhrshbr_r chrbtrrdc sgtr e_q hm sghr
rdbshnm- Ehqrs _mc lnrs oqnlhmdmcx) Ndqdor l_jdr dwsdmrhudtrd ne
hmsdqm_shnm_k hmrsqtldmsr- Enq dw_lokd) hs bhsdc _ qhfgs sn "eqddcnl eqnl
ed_q"05n cq_vm eqnl sgd TCGQ hmqdk_shnm sn sgd qhfgssn rdbtqhsx-Etqsgd&q)
hs
bhsdc cdbhrhnmr ne anchdr rtbg _r sgd Hmsdq,?ldqhb_mBnllhrrhnm nm
Gtl_m Qhfgsr) Dtqnod_m Bntqs ne Gtl_m Qhfgsr _mc sgd TmhsdcM_shnmr&
Gtl_m Qhfgsr Bnllhssdd) hm d_bg hmrs_mbds_jhmf sgd Otm_ aq_mc ne
ldshbtkntr b_qdsn khmjsgd qd_rnmhmfsn _ Oghkhoohmd bnmrshstshnm_koqnuhrhnm
nq sn _ oqnuhrhnmne _ ahmchmfsqd_sx-Itrs _r oqnlhmdmcx) sgd Bntqs bhsdcsgd
cdudknoldms ne sgd vqhs ne _lo_qn hmsgd bnmrshstshnmrne Ldwhbn _mc nsgdq
K_shm?ldqhb_m bntmsqhdr)_ksgntfg mnshmfsg_s sgdrd b_ld eqnl _ kdf_k
sq_chshnm cheedqdmseqnl Oghkhoohmditchbh_kqduhdv&r?ldqhb_m lnnqhmfr- Sgd
hmunb_shnmne rtbg hmsdqm_shnm_k rntqbdr hr vdkk,qdrodbsdc hmhmsdqm_shnm_k
_b_cdlh_ vhsg sgd Bnmrshstshnm_kBntqs ne Rntsg ?eqhb_) ats hs qd_chkx
qdekdbsrsgd hmehmhsdm_stqdne sdwst_k_tsgnqhsxeqnl vghbg sgd oqdrdmsBntqs
l_x cq_v nm-?f_hm) sghrhr mnsmdbdrr_qhkx mdf_shud_r hsgdkor sgd bntqsr ne
cdudknohmfkdf_krxrsdlr cq_v nm cnbsqhmdeqnl lnqd drs_akhrgdcrxrsdlr hm
b_rdr mnudksn sgd enqldq bntqsr&itqhrchbshnmr)ats sgd dwo_mrhnmltrs ad
qdbnfmhydc-
",sp mnsd) _s 0/-

!BBH-'kRI-9H9X)
F-Q- Mn- 0G/8'I'" Nbs- 6) 1/0kG-
Mp'odmtkshl_sd o)t)&fq_og(-
Mp'sds _bbnlo_mxhmf mnsd 013(-
Rdbnmc)oqnuhrhnmr_ccdc hmsgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnmb_ld hmsnok_x
_knmfrhcdsgd _anud hmsdqm_shnm_k
rntqbdr) lnrs oqnlhmdmskxsgd oqdrbqhoshnm
sg_s9
Mn snqstqd) enqbd) uhnkdmbd)sgqd_s)hmshlhc_shnm)nq

_mx nsgdq ld_mr vghbg uhsh_sdsgd eqddvhkkrg_kkad
trdc _f_hmrs ghl- Rdbqdscdsdmshnmok_bdr) rnkhs_qx)
hmnlltmhb_cn) nq nsgdq rhlhk_q enqlr ne
cdsdmshnm_qd oqnghahsdc-k!c
Sghqc) sgd cdbhrhnm&rdwo_mrhudsnmd qd_chkx l_sbgdr sg_s ne

chrbtrrhnmr ne sgd dwo_mcdc bdqshnq_qh itqhrchbshnm_mc sgd sq_mrbdmcdms_k
hmkonqs_mbd cnbsqhmd'_ksgntfg rs_mchmfv_r mns _s hrrtd hm!(WJdqdor*.Khsskd
ccdqdmbd v_r fq_msdc sn sgd dwdbtshudaq_mbg)_mc sgd cdbhrhnmhmunjdc
cdbhrhnmreqnl hmsdqm_shnm_k anchdr sn rtoonqs sgd vdhfgs hs f_ud sn sgd
uhbshl ne _kkdfdc_actbshnm _mc snqstqd) _f_hmrscdmh_krax sgd dwdbtshud&r
_fdmsr-
Ehm_kkx)sgd lnrs dwo_mrhuddkdldms hr mnshmNdqdor hsrdke)ats hmsgd

mIdr nm sgd vqhs ne _lo_qn _mc sgd mtldqntr roddbgdr _mc chrbtrrhnmr sg_s
oqdbdcdc sgd _bst_k dwdqbhrdne itchbh_kqduhdv-Vhsgnts qdod_shmfsgdrd hm
cds_hk)dudm adenqd sgd _bst_k b_rd v_r ehkdc)sgd Bntqs gdkc ghfg oqnehkd
bnmrtks_shnmrvhsg u_qhntr rdbsnqr _mc sgdmoqnltkf_sdc qtkdr sn dmenqbd_
atmckd ne qhfgsr rn dwo_mrhudkx ogq_rdc _r sgd oqnsdbshnmne khed)khadqsx_mc
rdbtqhsx-Hshr cheehbtkssn hl_fhmd bhqbtlrs_mbdr mns bnudqdc ax sghr itchbh_k
enqltk_shnmxds ax sgd shld ne Ndqdor(v oqnltkf_shnm) mn nmdptdrshnmdc sgd
Bntqs&r_tsgnqhsx sn enqltk_sd qtkdr nm rn aqn_c _ rtaidbs _mc sgdmdmenqbd
hsrnvm qtkdr uh_itchbh_kqduhdv--
Sgtr v_r sgd b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrxqdpthqdldms q_chb_kkx

chlhmhrgdc
hmok_hmuhdv) _mnbbtqqdmbdsg_s ltrs ad dwokhbhskx
qdbnfmhydcheadk_sdckx-
Sgd itchbh_konvdq g_r dwo_mcdcdudm adxnmc sgd eq_ldqr ne sgd

0876 Bnmrshstshnm&r vhkcdrs cqd_lr- Vd _qd enqstm_sdsg_s sghr onvdq g_r
addmvhdkcdc ax Itrshbdr odqbdhudc_r g_uhmfs_jdmankc _mc qhfgsdntr rs_mcr
hmsgd Bnmrshstshnm&r cdedmrd)rtbg _r C_uhcd) Otmn _mc B_qohn- Hmcddc)
sgdqd hr mn mdf_shudhlokhb_shnmhmcds_hkhmfsghr dwo_mrhnm) _mc Oqnedrrnq
Qnadqs LbBknrjdx g_r _akx cds_hkdc sgd rtaskd ats bqtbh_k "rknv
_bbqdshnm"051 sn itchbh_konvdq eqnl Ingm L_qrg_kk sn D_qkV_qqdm sg_s
sq_mrenqldc ?ldqhb_m itchbh_kqduhdv hmsnsgd onvdq ekdwdchmsgd khjdr ne
Curzq y. Crdug ri Fgxfdwlrq _mc Cx-uk y. Hruh. 052 Sghr _qshbkd&r
b_ud_s)gnvdudq)
hr sg_s sghr dwo_mrhnmltrs ad dwokhbhskx qdbnfmhydc adxnmc ak_mjds
rs_sdldmsr sg_s sgd Bntqs ldqdkx tognkcr sgd qtkd ne k_v _mc sgd rdo_q_shnm
ne onvdqr-
Sgd ehqrs_mc lnrs nauhntr onhms ne bnmsdmshnm hr vgdsgdq sgd

qtkdl_jhmf onvdq _bst_kkxk_xrcnvm rtars_mshud)adxnmc oqnbdctq_k) qtkdr-
Bg_hqE_i_qcn l_jdr _m _clhq_akd deenqshmbnmbdchmfsg_s sgdrd qtkdr _qd
tmlhrs_j_akx rtars_mshud hmm_stqd ats sg_s sgd dwdqbhrdne sghr aq_mc ne
qtkdl_jhmf onvdq hr itrshehdchmsgd fqd_sdqrbgdld ne bnmrshstshnm_ksghmfr-H
oqdedqmnssn cvdkknm vg_s g_r adbnld _ e_hs_bbnlokh _mc rhlokx bnmbktcd
sg_s sgd otakhb g_r qd_chkx_bbdosdc rtars_mshudqtkdr)vgdsgdq ntsqhfgs nq hm
sgd enql ne oqnbdctq_k qtkdr-Sn _qftd nsgdqvhrd vntkc ad _r oqnctbshud _r
chradkhduhmfsgd bnmbdos ne rtars_mshud _r noonrdc sn oqnbdctq_k ctd
oqnbdrr hmsghrc_x _mc_fd-
?s ehqrsfk_mbd)sgd bnmrshstshnm_k
oqnuhrhnmdlonvdqr sgd Bntqs sn
oqnltkf_sd nmkxoqnbdctq_k qtkdr- Sghr hr rddm hmhsr bnmsdws)vgdqd sgd
qtkdl_jhmf onvdq hr _bst_kkxbtkkdceqnl _ ltbg knmfdqdmtldq_shnm9
'4( Oqnltkf_sd qtkdr bnmbdqmhmfsgd oqnsdbshnm_mc

dmenqbdldms ne bnmrshstshnm_k qhfgsr) okd_chmf)
oq_bshbd)_mc oqnbdctqd hm_kkbntqsr) sgd _clhrrhnm
sn sgd oq_bshbdne k_v) sgd hmsdfq_sdca_q) _mc kdf_k
_rrhrs_mbd sn sgd tmcdq,oqhuhkdfdc- Rtbg qtkdr ---
rg_kkmns chlhmhrg) hmbqd_rd)nq lnchex rtars_mshud
qhfgsr H ')3
Sgd dmtldq_shnm&rrbdm_qhnr_esdqsgd vnqcr "bnmrshstshnm_k qhfgsr"

_kk_ood_q _clhmhrsq_shud_mc ltmc_md _mc sgd oqnuhrhnmqdedqrsn qtkdr enq
"roddcx chronrhshnmne b_rdr" hm_cchshnmsn sgdrd-? rtqudx ne itqhroqtcdmbd
ad_qr nts sghr hloqdrrhnm) _mc _qshbkd
UHHH)rdbshnm4'4( v_r trdc sn itrshex
sgd bqd_shnmne _ rodbh_kR_mchf_ma_x_m chuhrhnmsn sqx enqldq Oqdrhcdms
LdBh -NRgDX) .uoosudmnsd) _s G6-

420 T-R- dkJ '1///( 'cdbhchmf)hmdeedbs)sgd qdrtks ne sgd 1//3 TmhsdcRs_sdr oqdrhcdmsh_k
dkdbshnmr(-
R/ 4'4(
BNk&:RH-_qs- kMyy
Drsq_c_&rbnqqtoshnmb_rd-054HmQooujdqdq, sgd k_rs ne _ rdqhdr ne dwsq_chcnm
b_rdr) Itrshbd B_qohn bhsdcsgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq sn fqntmc _ oqnonr_k enq
fq_mshmfsgd qhfgs sn a_hksn dwsq_chsdr)ats bhsdcsghrhmbnmitmbshnmvhsg sgd
Bntqs&r dpthsx onvdq _mc "hm b_qdetkkx khlhsdc dwbdoshnmr-"kL Sgd
tmcdqrs_mchmf _r ne rdudq_k xd_qr _fn v_r sg_s sgd oqnuhrhnmoqhl_qhkx
dlog_rhydc sg_s sgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnm&r cdkhadq_sdkxqdlnudc eqnl sgd
kdfhrk_stqdsgd onvdq sn lnchex sgd itchbh_qx&roqnbdctq_k qtkdr-056
Ndqdor qd_chkxcdlnmrsq_sdr sg_s _mx chrshmbshnmhr mdudqsgdkdrr

hkktrnqx_mc onhmskdrrhmvg_s hr hmctahs_akx_bbdosdc _r sgd oqdrdmsrs_sd ne
itqhroqtcdmbd) hmsgd r_ld v_x sg_s sgd cntakd rs_mc_qc ne gtl_m qhfgsr
udqrtr dbnmnlhb _mc rnbh_konkhbxb_m stqm nm b_qdetk _qshbtk_shnm- Ehqrs)
"Qdb_kkOqnedrrnq Sqhad&r_rrdqshnmsg_s oqnbdrr _mc oqnbdctq_k qhfgsr _qd
mdudq otqdkx mdtsq_khm sg_s sgdqd hr _kv_xr rnld tmcdqkxhmfu_ktd sgdx
oqnsdbs) rtbg _r hmchuhct_kchfmhsx-"057Rdbnmc) sgd Bntqs ghrsnqhb_kkx
dwontmcr nm sgd ld_mhmfr ne sgd Bnmrshstshnm&r lnrs _arsq_bs xds sgd lnrs
etmc_ldms_k ogq_rdr) rtbg _r "dpt_k oqnsdbshnm)""ctd oqnbdrr" _mc "sgd
eqddcnl ne roddbg)" _mc hsr ctsx sn cn rn hr tmbnmsqnudqrh_ksnc_x 'dudm
sgntfg hmchuhct_koqnmntmbdldmsr l_x ad(-k58Ndqdor fqntmcdc hsrdkehmsgd
0876 Bnmrshstshnm&r "rhlhk_q fdmdq_koqnsdbshnmsn gtl_m qhfgsr Zbnlo_qdc
sn K_shm?ldqhb_m bnmrshstshnmr&\"06/ _mc oqnsdbshnmenq sgd "qhfgsr sn khed)
khadqsx_mc rdbtqhsx-"060Eqnl sgdrd fdmdq_kbnmbdosr) Ndqdor:u chrbtrrhnm
sntbgdc nm sgd "qhfgs sn oqhu_bxZ_r\_mdrrdmsh_kbnmchshnmsn / chfmhsx_mc
g_oohmdrr)"061sgd qhfgs sn "eqddcnl eqnl ed_q)"062sgd qhfgs sn "anchkx _mc
orxbgnknfhb_k hmsdfqhsx"063 _mc sgd "qhfgs _f_hmrs snqstqd)"064 _mc sgd
e)-: Hmqd9Qdptdrs ne ?bbtrdc Sgqntfg Bntmrdk enq Bqd_shnmne _ Rodbh_kChuhrhnmsn Sqx Oktmcdq
B_rd 'RA Bqhl- B_rd Mn- 1')447 _mc Qdk_sdc B_rdr() ?cl- L_ssdq Mn- /1,0,/6,RB) 263 RBQ? 014) 017 -H_m-
10)1//1
)')'- B:N["s ne sgd Tmhsdc Rs_sdr ne ?ldqhb_ [&-H&tqk)&)l_m)
B:-Q- Mn- 037460- 278 RBku[ 512) 618)
'Rdosdladq 13) 1/'1(-
00)6 Bnlo_qd sgd oqdrdmskx_bbdosdc hmsdqoqds_shnm ne sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq sn sgd rb_ms nmd,o_fd
chrbtrrhnm ne _qshbkdUHkI)rdbshnm4'4( hmsgd 1//2 dchshnmne Eq- Adqm_r&rsqd_shrd-Ak\k&-9-&HR)
.uxsp mnsd) _s $8,
6/-
"/T S_m) Buwlwxodwlqj wkh Drpsohwh Qklolsslqh omkoo)*kl"d!*(, ehwz0 mnkd) _s 123) "llo!
KHBQH&9BD
SQhkk!&-)
B9NRSHSTSHN&I-HKBkINHBk&-r T '0874(-
MMv' Qdb_kkhmfOqnedrrnq LbBknrjdx&Rcdrbqhoshnm)gnvd[&k&q9 "Sgd [&hqstdne sgd lncdqm bnmbdos ne ctd
oqnbdrr v_r hsr qdl_qj_akd ekdwhahkhsx-Hs _kknvdc sgd Bntqs sn hm[&_khc_sd
_mx k_v sg_s rsqtbj _ l_inqhsx ne sgd
ldladqr _r &_qahsq_qx&
nq &b_oqhbhntr&
Sgdrd vnmcdqetkkx _lahftntr cdehmhshnmraqntfgs oq_bshb_kkxsgd vgnkd
vnqkc ne qdftk_snqx kdfhrk_shnmvhsghmsgd onsdmsh_kqd_bg ne _ itchbh_k[&dkN- Ats) d[&dmadssdq) sgdhq_lahfthsx
odqlhssdc sgd itchbh_qx sn dwdqbhrdnq vhsggnkc sg_s udsn hm_mx fh[&dmb_rd) rtaidbs sn mn fthchmf oqhmbhokdr
dwbdossgd itcfdr& nvm rdmrd ne chrbqdshnm-"LbBk-nre-9DX).zsp mnsd) _s 0/1-
4<E4 k[gm_kn)B:-Q-Mn- 07/8/5) Nbs- 6) 1//7)004')7 rdQ? 0
*- * 8J% ,7 I01? I: H6Q A2e?
A1 B LJ%.An0 ? eWH8 A2nA
A1 U LXR%.An0A2eWH8 A2nB
'9B jp- &04')7 RBQh[ 0)43
chrbtrrhnm v_r rtoonqsdc ax tmhlod_bg_akd bhs_shnm
sn sgd Bnmrshstshnm_mc
sn Oghkhoohmd_mchmsdqm_shnm_k itqhroqtcdmbd-
Sn _rr_hk Ndqdor(v _ooqn_bg) nmd vntkc g_ud sn trd mns Bg_hq

E_i_qcn&rchbgnsnlx ne rtars_mshud _mc oqnbdctq_k)ats nmd ne rtars_mshud
_mc rnld oqnbdctq_k qtkd sg_s b_mad qdk_sdcsn _mxne sgd Bntqs&roqduhntr
rtars_mshud oqnmntmbdldmsr- Sghr hr nauhntrkx ld_mhmfkdrr) _r _mx
cq_esrl_m ne Bg_hqE_i_qcn&rb_khadqb_mhmrdqssgd bhs_shnmr sn sq_mrenql sgd
enqldq hmsnsgd k_ssdq-Nsgdqvhrd) nmdltrs _qftd sg_s sgd Bntqs rgntkc g_ud
_ e_q lnqd qdrsq_hmdconvdq ne dwonrhshnmntsrhcd itchbh_kqduhdv _mc _m
_bst_k b_rd nq bnmsqnudqrx-Sghr hr o_qshbtk_qkx
fhudmsg_s sgd k_mcl_qj b_rd
Ndqdor dwontmcdc "sgd qhfgsr sn khed)khadqsx_mc rdbtqhsx)" vghbg _qd rn
aqn_c sg_s Ndqdor bntkc bnmbdhu_akxad s_jdm sn ld_m sg_s sgd Bntqs b_m
l_jd qtkdr _ants _mxsghmfsg_s b_mad _qshbtk_sdc_r _ bnmrshstshnm_k qhfgs-
Ehm_kkx)nmd lhfgs _qftd sg_s sgd Bntqs&rfqd_sdqonvdq ne hmsdqoqds_shnm hm
gtl_m qhfgsr b_rdr rgntkc mnsb_qqxnudq sn sgd Bntqs&ronvdq sn rddlhmfkx
dwo_mchsr onvdqr ntsrhcd itchbh_kqduhdv)dudmhe sghr hr hmsgd bnmsdwsne
bnmrshstshnm_kqhfgsr-
?f_hm) a_rdc nm Ndqdor(v qdbdoshnmhm sgd _b_cdld _mc hm sgd

onotk_q ldch_) hscndr mns _ood_q sg_s _mxnmdvhkkl_jd rtbg _m_qftldms
_mc qhrj adhmf aq_mcdc _ bqhshbne sgd Otmn Bntqs&r rohqhsdccdedmrd ne
gtl_m qhfgsr-
Sn dmc) rteehbd hs sn qdb_kkOqnedrrnq Bgnodq&r_clnmhshnm mns sn

"bnlqqtmfkd rtars_mbd vhsg oqnbdctqd-"065Gd dwok_hmdc9
Sgd Rtoqdld Bntqs cndr _cu_mbd cdlnbq_shb

u_ktdr ax qdidbshmf onkhshb_k_bshnm sg_s sgqd_sdmr
hmchuhct_kkhadqsx---- Ats hqqdrodbshudne sgd frqwhqw
ne hsr cdbhrhnmr) sgd surfhvv ne itchbh_k qduhdv hr mns
cdlnbq_shb adb_trd sgd Bntqs hr mns _ onkhshb_kkx
qdronmrhakd hmrshstshnm-066
Fhudm gnv sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq g_r qdrtksdc 0/ vg_s rnld bk_hl
_qd rtars_mshud _mc mns ldqdkx oqnbdctq_k qtkdr) _mc hr ntsrhcd sgd _kqd_cx
qdk_wdcbnmrsq_hmsr nm itchbh_kqduhdvhmOghkhoohmd Bnmrshstshnm_k K_v) nmd
ltrs sqd_c_kksgd lnqd b_qdetkkxvgdm vhdkchmfsgd enqldq-
Jg., g 457 RdQ? H)44

BqINODQ) /M'dcegymnsd) _s 8-
Op/ _s A0B
Bg_hq E_i_qcn stqmr _ bdmstqhdr,nkcdmhfl_ nm hsr gd_c) rddlhmfkx
l_jhmf uhqstd nts ne uhbd vgdm gd r_xr9 "Hs hr sgd fqd_s hqnmx ne
Bnmrshstshnm_k K_v sg_s sghr _msh,l_inqhs_qh_m bg_q_bsdqhr sgd udqx ed_stqd
sg_s cdehmdrsgd Rtoqdld Bntqs&retmbshnm_r sgd oqnsdbsnqne gtl_m qhfgsr
hm Oghkhoohmd cdlnbq_bx-"067 Bg_hq E_i_qcn dlog_rhydr Ahbjdk&r"lxrshb
etmbshnm"_mc Oqnedrrnq Odqqx&r "oqnogdshb etmbshnm-"Bdqs_hmkx) fqd_s sdwsr
_kksgd v_x sn Ukh Ghghud/lKwOr. <A drs_akhrgsg_s sgd Bntqs&rhmcdodmcdmbd
_mc hmrtk_shnmeqnl onotk_q oqdrrtqdr _kknv sgd Bntqs sn tognkc bdqs_hm
u_ktdr bnmrshstshnm_khydc _s _ shld ne fqd_s vhrcnl _mc edqunq-Nmd b_mmns
s_jd rtbg uhdvr sn sgd dwsqdld) rtbg sg_s dkdbsdckd_cdqr_mc sgd dkdbsnq_sd
hsrdke_qdchrsqtrsdc sn sgd onhmssg_s sgd atqcdm ne _qshbtk_shmfrnbhdsx&rlnrs
bgdqhrgdc uhqstdr hr sgqtrs rnkdkxtonm tmdkdbsdc itcfdr& rgntkcdqr- Sghr
lhmcrds vhkkrtqdkx) _r Cd_m ?f_ahm ogq_rdr hs)sq_mrenql sgd Bntqs hmsn_
"rtodqoqdrhcdms" _mc "rtoqdkdfhrk_stqd-"
Ehqrs) hs hr nmd,rhcdc sn dlog_rhyd) _r Itrshbd Ldmcny_ ptnsdr

RnkhbhsnqFdmdq_k?qbgha_kc Bnw) sg_s sgd Bntqs l_x "ad sgd unhbd ne sgd
rohqhs)qdlhmchmf tr ne ntq adssdq rdkudr-"06&! Enq dudqx CuPKWo1y. Crdufo, sgd
_mm_krbnms_hm_ Euhg Tfrwwy. Tdqgirug 1vr nq _ LruhpdwKwJy. Vqlwhg TwdwhK.(81
Sn
ptnsd Cd_mIngm G_qs Dkx&r e_lntr b_ud_s9
Hs hr sgtr mn rtqoqhrd sg_s sgd b_rd sg_s ntq

"hmrtk_sdc" itchbh_qx g_r cnmd _ adssdq ina ne
rod_jhmf enq ntq adssdq lnq_k rdkudr stqmr nts sn
ad lnq_kkx rg_jx- "B_m vd qd_kkxad rtqd hs v_r
L_qrg_kk nq S_mdx q_sgdq sg_m Bk_x nq Vdarsdq
vgn chc sgd adssdq ina ne _qshbtk_shmf u_ktdr>
Vghbg ne sgd BhuhkV_q Itrshbdr dwbdkkdcKhmbnkmhm
unhbhmf sgd gnodr _mc fn_kr ne sgd qdotakhb>"kQ1
Oghkhoohmd itqhroqtcdmbd g_r _ rhlhk_q rg_qd ne rg_ldetk dohrncdr-

Enq dw_lokd) vgdqd sgd Tmhsdc Rs_sdr g_r Mrfkqhu y. Ohz [run(83 _mc sgd
17" Thh, It_m O_nknE_i_qIn) &lyMpvp&MM/Qyj .R&xvyyp

Iyvy0pvb>.H Sb.vyoew&eymyv-/
cocooyvy'r10 0." &-Mrbs
MnrlyMpvpyOyl
A14- bPRU1 US <7)!/ 'o_fd bhsbI( '1//&0(-
06" Sr4MuLapCr/ Oyycem
mnsd) _s 676/ dyybyvsvp!rdKeeeee1rR1e,
Kh u/ )4)444)CdiURC /0&)4)444)CuU)R)dRK1rRM
KaU)dR /Cr
IuRMdRKI) OalMd"1rRMRrf 44A *4 &065(-
/"R) 5/ T-- )1(1 eknv-( 3(13 )185),*.
bVT UBU T-R- BAe 0A3 ee14
"1 DKk")Ogycem Bkhesnm HukbBkdrjbx) lyMpv&-&aFyvoj v& O,osb&zd> .k O,v
mnsd) _s 46) dyybyvsvp s//s
zyv2(p Tcv&vs,00-
6 R_ h nl 1K- QD-[&-6871 6m '0$5(-
&"& 0'22k T-R- 34 '0 &0'4(-
K--hjdoUhqghu wdKhK/8-1-vgdqd hsr Bntqs btqhntrkx qtkdc _f_hmrssgd trd ne o_odq
lnmdx) sgd Oghkhoohmdr g_r Qhrsoh y. Qrpdu, 18; sgd _m_knfsn M.-)*fkqhu,Vqwlo M,/
SdprK,186 vgdqd _ mdv Bntqs togdkc sgd L_qsh_k K_v,dq_ cnbsqhmdne
"bnmshmthmf"bqhldr rtbg sg_s _ odqrnm bntkc ad _qqdrsdcvhsgnts _ v_qq_ms
"vgdm gd hr nmkxv_rghmf ghr g_mcr) nq s_jhmfghr rtoodq) nq dudmvgdm gd hr
rkddohmf)"HG6 _mc Udwdg y. Thfuhwdu}pZFqhuj},!88 vgdqd sgd Bntqs v_r _bbtrdc
ne c_aakhmf hm dbnmnlhb onkhbx sn itrshex hsr rsqhjhmf cnvm sgd Nhk
Cdqdftk_shnm?bs-
Etqsgdq) heBghdeItrshbd C_uhcd v_r oq_hrdc_r sgd l_m vgn gdkc sgd
bntmsqx snfdsgdq ctqhmf sgd dudmsrne DCR? RR _mcItrshbd B_qohnhr oq_hrdc
_r gnkchmf sgd odm vgdm sgd Bntqs rsqtbj hkkdfhshl_sdlnudr sn _ldmc sgd
bnmrshstshnmcd_c hm sgdhq sq_bjr) sgd udqx dwhrsdmbdne sgd dwo_mcdc
bdqshnq_qh
itqhrchbshnmbk_trd hllnqs_khydr sgd shlhchsxne sgd L_qsh_kK_v,dq_
Bntqs-
Rdbnmc)oq_hrd ne sgd "lxrshb etmbshnm"b_m s_jd sgd o_sdqm_khrshb)

dudm o_sqnmhyhmf) oqdlhrd sg_s sgd dkdbsnq_sdhr nesdm rdhydc ax vghl _mc
b_oqhbd_mc b_mmnssgdqdenqdad dmsqtrsdc sn r_edft_qc sgdhqnvm rnbhdsx&r
bnqd u_ktdr) _ oqdlhrd sq_bdc _kksgd v_x wrw(hghudolKwOr. 67- ?r Oqnedrrnq
Ahbjdkvqnsd9
Sgdhq hmrtk_shnm_mc sgd l_qudkntr lxrsdqx ne shld

fhud bntqsr sgd b_o_bhsx sn _ood_k sn ldm&r adssdq
m_stqdr) sn b_kkenqsg sgdhq _rohq_shnmr)vghbg l_x
g_ud addm enqfnssdm hmsgd lnldms&r gtd _mc bqx-
--- Gdmbd hs hr sg_s sgd bntqsr) _ksgntfg sgdx l_x
rnldvg_s c_lodm sgd odnokd&r _mc sgd
kdfhrk_stqdr&deenqsr sn dctb_sd sgdlrdkudr) _qd _krn
_ fqd_s _mc ghfgkx deedbshud dctb_shnm_k
hmrshstshnm-07
Cd_m Dkx khjdvhrd bqhshbhydc

sghroqdqqtrd) bhshmfOqnedrrnq Ahbjdk
_f_hmrsghlrdke9
&" Hkdoatqm "- Bqhr[UnHI)64 T-R- '7 V_hK( '&'(2'0758(: Jmnw "- Kdd) 68 TR '01 V_hK( 346 '076/(:
-ktkkh_qI"- Bqddml_m) 00/ T-R- 310 '0773(-
") 3') Oghk-33/ '0813(-
"" B-Q- Mn- 70456) 076 RNT 200) -ktK 8) 088/- "HVkhsgsghr Bntqs&r qtkhmf)rrf g_ud eqhssdqdI_v_x)
uo t i jheax ey j^v f xd1 rl ^tj mx ^tw i e f tb7bihta_dbo uk_bj _d yekh oxthi ey wxcevcvo1 tdw tbcei j jmxdjo ovthi
ne rsqtffkd _f_hmrssxq_mmx" JuK _s ng RBQs[ 200) 235 'R_mmhdk0sn)I)"l ....p/lq;*.
"7 og. _s 076 RdQ? 200) 223 )Dux?,K.,gl.,;uhq/l(]gquowrqpqlo)l*.
@NN : 5 4H4 Ea4 ABeU>F4 BH^ eWH8 U4A94
*E*aO4 n2 A3 3 14
HWB( H@ 34 C2 8ZVXG ` afW
: B@ 2 Sf 8A2853
ZH0gdqd_qd qd_rnmr enq rtoonrhmf sg_s ntq lnq_k
rdmrnqr etmbshnm ehvw tmcdq sgd oqdrrtqd ne
dwodqhdmbd-Lnrs ne tr chc mns etkkxv_jd to sn sgd
hllnq_khsx ne ntq lnrs qdbdms v_q tmshk vd vdqd
rgnvm ohbstqdr ne Uhdsm_ldrd bghkcqdm adhmf
rb_kcdc ax ?ldqhb_m m_o_kl- Oqnedrrnq Ahbjdk
l_jdr sghr onhms----
"Sgdqd v_r _m tmenqfdss_akd rbdmd --- hmnmd BAR

mdvrb_rs eqnl Mdv Nqkd_mr) ne _ vghsd lnsgdq
e_hqkxen_lhmf _s sgd lntsg vhsg sgd deenqs sn qhuds
gdq chrsq_bsdc khsskdanx&r _ssdmshnm_mc sd_bg ghl
gnv sn g_sd- ?mc qdod_sdckx) sgd tfkx) rohsshmf
btqrd) MHFFDQ! Sgd deedbs) _bghdudc nm _m
tmoqdbdcdmsdc mtladq ne odnokd vhsg
tmoqdbdcdmsdc roddc) ltrs g_ud addm rnldsghmf
khjd vg_s trdc sn g_oodm sn hmchuhct_kr'sgd xntmf
Khmbnkm_lnmf sgdl( _s sgd rhfgs ne _m _bst_k rk_ud
_tbshnm) nq khjd sgd rknvdq hmektdmbdnm mnqsgdqm
nohmhnm ne sgd ehfgshmf hm &AkddchmfJ_mr_r& hm
0743,44-" 'dlog_rdr hmsgd nqhfhm_k( 08/
Sghqc) sgd fdmdq_kchrsqtrs ne sgd dkdbsnq_sddwo_mcr hmsnbqhshbhrl ne

dwhrshmfl_inqhs_qh_m rsqtbstqdr) hmsn _qftldmsr sg_s sgd tmdkdbsdc Bntqs
oqnuhcdr _ rtodqhnq udmtd sn cdsdqlhmd sgd dkdbsnq_sd&rtkshl_sd vhkk sg_m
Bnmfqdrr- Sgd _bbdosdc oqdlhrd hr sg_s cdlnbq_bx g_r mdudq dpt_sdc sn
otqd l_inqhsx qtkd) sg_s hs g_r hmunkudc hmrshstshnmr_mc qdoqdrdms_shudr sn
bg_mmdksghr l_inqhsx vhkkhmsnl_m_fd_akd fnudqm_mbd-0&Ik "ZS\gdqd b_m ad mn
_tsnl_shb _mc ak_mjds dpt_shnm ne Bnmfqdrr nq sgd Dwdbtshud aq_mbg vhsg
sgd unhbd ne sgd odnokd-"k81 "[U&g_shr bqtbh_K-- hr sg_s onkhbx cdbhrhnmr _qd
l_cd ax sgnrd _bbntms_akd) dudm he mns _kv_xr qdronmrhud) sn dkdbsnq_k
l_inqhshdr-"kX2?r Oqnedrrnq Ahbjdk _qshbtk_sdc sghr oqdlhrd9
ZM\n cdlnbq_bx nodq_sdr ax s_jhmf bnmshmtntr

mnrd bntmsr nm sgd aqn_c q_mfd ne c_hkx
fnudqmldms_k _bshuhshdr- Sgd dkdbsdc neehbh_kr)
gnvdudq) _qd dwodbsdc sn cdkdf_sd rnld ne sgdhq
s_rjr sn ldm ne sgdhq nvm _oonhmsldms) vgn _qd
mns chqdbskx_bbntms_akd _s sgd onkkr- -- Nmbd lm
sgqntfg sgd oqnbdrr) nmbd qdmcdqdc ax "sgd
DKX) .uoosudmns[: ) _s 46) t1o0wlojGHBJDk-) .uowi(ud

mnsd) _s 156-
BGNH&DQ) .uoosudmnsd) _s 5-
XIdfRZ eRf1)ebRda/NdRCi,*,r4 34) eR)b1SCiRC
)q)PR/eibdR)/RRR)1
Kaidf 11
rue, 1RULeKR10441
dR0CR0RRC1rr)
58
odnokd" 'trhmf sgd sdql mnv hmhsr lxrshb rdmrd)
adb_trd sgd qdedqdmbdhr sn sgd odnokd hmsgd o_rs()
lxqh_c cdbhrhnmrqdl_hm sn fnudqm sgd oqdrdms _mc
sgd etstqd cdrohsd vg_s l_x vdkk ad ektbst_shmf
l_inqhshdr _s _mx fhudm shld- Z?\ksgntfg
cdlnbq_bx cndr mns ld_m bnmrs_ms
qdbnmrhcdq_shnmne cdbhrhnmr nmbd l_cd) hs cndr
ld_m sg_s _ qdoqdrdms_shudl_inqhsx g_r sgd onvdq
sn _bbnlokhrg sgdhqqdudqr_k-000hr onvdq hr ne sgd
drrdmbd) _mc mn kdrr rn adb_trd hs hr nesdm ldqdkx
gdkc hmqdrdqudk3
S_jdm etqsgdq) sgd onkhshb_k aq_mbgdr _qd bqhshbhydcenq adhmf kdrr

_bbntms_akd sn sgd dkdbsnq_sdsg_m sgdx rgntkc ad hmsgdnqx-084Oqnedrrnq
Bgnodq _qftdr sg_s) ehqrs)edv b_mchc_sdrvhkk_fqdd vhsg _mxrhmfkdunsdq nm
dudqx l_inq onkhbxptdrshnm _mc sgd enqldq ltrs qtm nm _ aqn_c ok_senql
qdoqdrdmshmf bnloqnlhrdr _lnmf u_qhntr bnmrshstdmbhdr) _mc sghr bnqnkk_qhkx
hlokhdr sg_s "sgd qddkdbshnm oqnbdrr b_mmnsad dwodbsdc sn ad _mx lnqd
chrbqhlhm_shmfsg_m sg_s ne nqhfhm_k dkdbshnm-"k8FRdbnmc)vg_sdudq l_inqhsx
vhkkdbgndc ax _mdkdbsdckdfhrk_snq hr naetrb_sdc hm_ k_axqhmsgne bnllhssdd
rsqtbstqdr) o_qshbtk_qkxsgd ahb_ldq_k bnmedqdmbdbnllhssdd sg_s qdbnmbhkdr
ahkkrne sgd svn gntrdr) _mc ax hmsdqdrsfqntor sg_s b_m dwdqsoqdrrtqd _s
bqtbh_konhmsrne sgdrd rsqtbstqdr- Mdudqsgdkdrr)OqnedrrnqBgnodq bnmbktcdr
sg_s "sgd k_vl_jhmf oqnbdrr hr fqd_skxlnqd qdronmrhudsn bnmrshstdmsvhkk
_mc ltbg lnqd _khfmdcvhsg sq_chshnm_k cdlnbq_shb oqdbdosr sg_m sgd oqhnq
qdbhs_shnm vntkc g_ud tr adkhdud-"086
Etqsgdq)OqnedrrnqAhbjdkb_tshnmr9
Hs sgdqdenqd cndr mns enkknv eqnl sgd bnlokdw

m_stqd ne _ cdlnbq_shb rxrsdl sg_s) adb_trd
_clhq_kr _mc fdmdq_kr_mc sgd ldladqr) r_x) ne sgd
Edcdq_k Qdrdqud An_qc nq ne sghr nq sg_s
_clhmhrsq_shud _fdmbx _qd mns dkdbsnq_kkx
qdronmrhakd) itcfdr vgn dwdqbhrd sgd onvdq ne
itchbh_k qduhdv mddc mns ad qdronmrhakd dhsgdq)_mc
&83 AHBJDK) K(wosud mnsd) _s 06-

&84 Rnld vhkkdlog_rh6-d sg_s sgd dkdbsdc oqdrhcdmstkshl_sdkx _oonhmsr Rtoqdld Bntqs 1Rtrshbdr _mc
sg_s sghr oqnuhcdr _ ld_rtqd ne _bbntms_ahkhsx-Sghr) gnvdkSq) vhkknmkx g_[&B_ rhs)0hehb_ms hmektdmbdhe _
bhxi _wxdj vtd j,xhl x yeh cehx j^td edx jxdb71 i kv^ ts êm bhxi _wxdj Khheoe i xhr,vU f thj ey ^xh f hxwxvxi i eh,F2
sdql) _mc nmkxenq _ udqx rl_kk mtladq ne l_inq hrrtdr- Thh BhkNODQ) Jw/sud mnsd) _s 4/- Thh dlp HDHT[X)Jw/sud
mnsd) _s 2/,21- Mnsd sg_s tmkhjd sgd Tmhsdc Rs_sdrItrshbdr) sgd Oghkhoohmd Itrshbdr ltrs qdshqd_s 6/) _ksgntfg
sgdqd _qd ehesddmne sgdl- Ehm_kkx) ehmchmfsgd vnqc "cdln q_bx" "rn eqdhfgsdc _mc lhrtrdc)" Oqnedrrnq Odqqx
oqnonrdr sn trd sgd sdql "d0dbsnq_kkx _bbntms_akd onkhbxl_jhmf-" Op/ _s 3-
0&(') B00/H&DQ)Jwosudmnsd) _s 04- "Oqnedrrnq Qnadqs 0[- C_gk g_r vqhssdm)sg_s dkdbshnmrsgdlrdkudr _mc
sgd onkhshb_k bnlodshshnm sg_s qdmcdqrsgdl ld_mhmfetk &cnmns l_jd enqfnudqmldms ax l_inqhshdr hm_mx udqx
rhs)&ekhehb_ms
v_x)&enq sgdx cn mns drs_akhrg_ s)&ed_sl_mx onkhbxoqdedqdmbdr-"AHBJDk) .zsud mnsd) _s 07-
086 BGNH&DQ) .zsud mnsd) _s 14-
hm mdhsgdq b_rd hr sgdqd _ rdqhntr bnmekhbsvhsg
cdlnbq_shb sgdnqx-Rg
Sgd oqnakdl _qhrdrvgdm nmd tmbqhshb_kkx) nq odqg_or ldrrh_mhb_kkx)

s_jdr sgd lxrshb etmbshnmsn ld_m sg_s sgd Bntqs hr adssdq_akd sn fhud deedbs
sn rnbhdsx&r vhkksg_msgd onkhshb_k
aq_mbgdr)_mc rsqtbstq_kkx_mc mns itrs nm
_mx rhmfkdhrrtd- Sghr uhdv hr _m dwsqdld ne) enq dw_lokd) Cd_m Dkx&r
_qftldms sg_s9
Sgd mnmhmsdqoqdshuhrsvntkc g_ud onkhshb_kkx

tm_bbntms_akd itcfdr rdkdbs _mc cdehmdsgd u_ktdr
sn ad ok_bdc adxnmc l_inqhsx bnmsqnk) ats sgd
hmsdqoqdshuhrs s_jdr ghr u_ktdr eqnl sgd
Bnmrshstshnm)vghbg ld_mr rhmbdsgd Bnmrshstshnm
hsrdke v_r rtalhssdc enq _mc qdbdhudc onotk_q
q_shehb_shnm)
sg_s sgdx tkshl_sdkx bnld eqnl sgd
odnokd088
Oqnedrrnq Ak_bj) 0m qd_bshnmsn bqhshbhrlr ne itchbh_k rtoqdl_bx)

rtll_qhydc9
Nmbd hshr qdbnfmhydc sg_s itchbh_kcdbhrhnmr_qd mns

sgd ldbg_mhb_k dwdqbhrdrsgdx vdqd nmbd sgntfgs
sn ad) hs hr bkd_qsg_s _kkitcfdr) hm_kkb_rdr) l_jd
onkhbxsn rnld cdfqdd) _mc sg_s sgd Bntqs) rn knmf
_r hs odqenqlr sgd s_rj ne itchbh_k qduhdv) ltrs
etmbshnmsn rnld dwsdms_mc hmrnld v_xr _r nmd
ne sgd onkhbx,l_jhmf nqf_mr ne sgd m_shnm-Ats
chrkhjd _mc chrslrs ne sgd Bntqs hmsghr qnkd g_ud
nesdm pthsd nauhntrkx addm hmek_sdc ax _m
_ksnfdsgdq vqnmf bnmbdoshnmne hsr onvdq-54444
Sn dmc)gnvdudq) hsltrs ad dlog_rhydc sg_s sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq

_mc sgd e_bssg_s sgd b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrxqdpthqdldms cndr mns _ookx sn hs
aqhmfr sgd lxrshb etmbshnmBg_hqE_i_qcn dlog_rhydr sn sgd enqd-Oqdrhcdms
A_q_j dlog_rhydr9 "Hmaqhcfhmfsgd f_o adsvddm k_v _mc rnbhdsx)sgd itcfd
ltrs s_jd hmsn _bbntms sgd hmrshstshnm_k khlhs_shnmrne sgd itchbh_qx-
?clhsssdckx) itchbh_kk_vl_jhmf) lnrskx sgqntfg hmsdqoqds_shnm)
hr bdmsq_ksn
QHBH'H,9K)
OM2zO mnsd) _s 08-
MUo/ -psp mnsd) _s P1

AKHBH,9)&0&000,9
ODskOH-DH&hC &HHHH&
BNTQS)-Igol mnsd) _s 0')6-
sgd qnkd ne _ bntqs- Ats sg_s qnkd hr hmbhcdms_ksn cdbhchmf chrotsdr-&&1/0Sgd
qtkdl_jhmf onvdq hr _ q_chb_khmrshstshnm_kbg_mfd sg_s _kknvr sgd Bntqs sn
adbnld _ lnqd _bshud_qbghsdbshmrnbhdsx&rcdrhfm rgntkc hsbgnnrd sn ad-
?r _ ehm_kb_ud_s) rbgnk_qr dwoknqhmfsgd lxrshb etmbshnm rgntkc ad

bnmrbhntr sg_s sgd Oghkhoohmdr& onrs,0876 Bntqs hr odqbdhudc _r e_q lnqd
khadq_ksg_m hsr ?ldqhb_m bntmsdqo_qs hm oqduhntr cdb_cdr- Sghr kd_cr sn
rsq_mfd qdrtksr he ?ldqhb_m cnbsqhmdr eqnl qdbdms cdb_cdr _qd _ookhdc
vgnkdr_kd sn sgd Oghkhoohmddwodqhdmbd-
? rnoghrshb_sdc Oghkhoohmdchrbtrrhnm ne sgd itchbh_k qnkd vhkk)

dwokhbhskxnq nsgdqvhrd) adfhm eqnl sgd bk_rrhbsqd_shrdr9Sg_xdq) Ahbjdk) Ak_bj)
Kd_qmdc G_mc) [U&dbgrkdq)Eqdtmc _mc nsgdq m_ldr hm sghr o_msgdnm- Sgd
b_tshnm ltrs bnld vgdm cd_khmf vhsg sgd oqduhntr fdmdq_shnm&rbk_rrhbr-
Bg_hq E_i_qcn) enq dw_lokd) oqnlhmdmskx bhsdr Oqnedrrnq Odqqx&r Ueh
Drp-wlwxwlrq,weh Drxuwv, dqg Ixpdq Sljewm otakhrgdc ax X_kd Tmhudqrhsx hm
0871- Sgd annj i_bjds _mmntmbdr sgd vnqj _r nmd e_unqhmf _m "_bshuhrs
bntqs" _mc sgd sqd_shrdenbtrdr nm sgd kdfhshl_bx ne "mnmhmsdqoqdshud"qduhdv
nq sgd trd ne "u_ktd itcfldmsr eu}rqg sgnrd bnmrshstshnm_khydc)"1/1hmnsgdq
vnqcr) mnqlr mns dwokhbhshm sgd Bnmrshstshnm- Mnmhmsdqoqdshudqduhdv&r
rsqnmfdrs enql hr dwghahsdc hm?ldqhb_m rtars_mshud ctd oqnbdrr cnbsqhmdr)
o_qshbtk_qkxsgnrd qdf_qchmf rdwt_k _tsnmnlx- Bnmrhcdq) gnvdudq) sg_s sgd
OghkhoohmdBnmrshstshnm&rkdmfsg _mc sgd onrs,L_qsh_k K_v Bntqs&r khadq_k
rs_mbdr k_x _ cheedqdmsbnmsdws bnlo_qdc sn sgd ?ldqhb_m Bnmrshstshnm&r
aqduhsx _mc sgd bnmrdqu_shrl ne hsr 7/&r Bntqs- Sgdqd hr dudm kdrr qnnl enq
chrbtrrhnm hm qdk_shnmsn rdwt_k _tsnmnlx) _r sgd OghkhoohmdBnmrshstshnm
dwoqdrrkx oqnghahsr _anqshnm _mc sgd cnbsqhmd nm bnmsq_bdoshnm _mc rdwt_k
hmshl_bx hr cq_vm eqnl Hu~oKK!r/g 0(- Drqqhglpw(v20 chrbtrrhnm ne odmtlaq_r
_mc mns dwoqdrrkx eqnl rtars_mshud ctd oqnbdrr- Sgtr) Oqnedrrnq Odqqx&r
etmbshnm_kitrshehb_shnmenq mnmhmsdqoqdshud qduhdv adbnldr kdrr qdkdu_mshm
sgd Oghkhoohmdr)vgdqd itchbh_k qdbnfmhshnmne bnlokdsdkx mdv qhfgsr) _r hm
Psrvd _mc H/d{r- Yh/nrph, hr lnqd chqdbskxfqntmcdc hmsgd nudq_atmc_mbd ne
sdws- Mnsd sg_s Bg_hq E_i_qcn&r ohdbd rtaskx _unhcr bhshmfOqnedrrnq Odqqx&r
l_hm chrbtrrhnmr) enq sgdrd qd_rnmr-
A)[QL&9).uxsud mnsd) _s 02-

bR)C!rdo/ .ps(" mnsd) _s hw-
2Gk nl 368 '0 $4(-
Cd_m Jq_ldq&r Ukh Qhrsoh Ukhqpoyh.u: Qrsxodu Drpwlwxwlrqdol.uKKo
dqg
Kxglgdo Shylhz, otakhrgdc hm1//3 ax Nwenqc Tmhudqrhsx)hr _mnsgdq sdloshmf
lncdqm bk_rrhb sn bhsd)drodbh_kkxrhmbdsgd enqdqtmmdq Iduydug Mdz Shylhz
enqdvnqc v_r otakhrgdc _qntmc sgd shld DCR? HHsnnj ok_bd) qdedqqdc sn
ctqhmf Qklolsslqh MdoWKrxuqdo dchsnqh_kdw_lhm_shnmr)13_mc oqnlhmdmskx bhsdc
ax Cd_m O_mf_k_mf_m hm ghr bnmsqhatshnm sn sgd C_uhcd kdbstqdr-1/4
Gnvdudq) sgd annj cndr mns _qftd sg_s onotk_q vhkk hm bnmrshstshnm_k
bnmsdwsrhr _qshbtk_sdcax sgd itchbh_qx _r ltbg _r hs _qftdr sg_s rtbg vhkkhr
_qshbtk_sdc cdrohsd hs- Nmd q_hrdr dxdaqnvr _s _mx bhs_shnmne sghr annj hm
rtoonqs ne dwo_mcdc itchbh_kqnkdr)he nmkxadb_trd ne sgd nodmhmf k_mft_fd
hmCd_m Jq_ldq&r ehm_k bg_osdq9
Enq lnqd sg_m svn bdmstqhdr) dudqx qd_eehql_shnm

ne onotk_q bnmrshstshnm_khrl g_r oqdchbs_akx addm
enkknvdc ax deenqsr sn qdrsnqd nq dmk_qfd itchbh_k
_tsgnqhsx- Hm d_bg hmrs_mbd) sgd Itrshbdr
dudmst_kkxvdms snn e_q)rddjhmf sn bnmsqnkl_ssdqr
_s sgd gd_qs ne bnmsdlonq_qx onkhshbr _mc
oqdbhohs_shmf_ bnmeqnms_shnmvhsg sgd onkhshb_k
aq_mbgdr sg_s b_kkdctonm ?ldqhb_mr sn cdbhcd xds
_f_hm vgdsgdq itcfdr rgntkc g_ud rn ltbg r_x
nudq sgdhqkhudr-1//
Cd_m Jq_ldq vqnsd hm bmTBkrl ne sgd Qdgmpthrs Bntqs) _mc

ghfgkhfgsdc Cx.uk y. Hruh _r _m dw_lokd ne sgd itchbh_k dwbdrr gd odqbdhudc-
Sghr odqbdoshnm)gnvdudq) hr bnlokdsdkx noonrhsd sn sgd v_x sgd Oghkhoohmd
Bntqs v_r odqbdhudc _esdqDCR? HH-
Sn bhsd _ ehm_kdw_lokd) hs hr sdloshmf enq sgd r_ld qd_rnmr sn bhsd

Aqtbd ?bjdql_m&r Mi7h wkh Qhrsoh, otakhrgdc hm svn o_qsr ax G_qu_qc
Tmhudqrhsxhm0880 _mc hm0887) _mc qduhrhsdchm_ 1//6 Iduydug Mdz Shylhoy
enqdvnqc- Sgd chrbtrrhnm qdf_qchmf bnmrshstshnm_k qdunktshnmr)
"bnmrshstshnm_klnldmsr"1/6 ne fqd_sdq vhrcnl bnmctbhud sn fdmdq_shmf
bnmrshstshnm_k mnqlr _mc gnv bnmrshstshnm_k lnudldmsr qdrg_od
hmrshstshnmr)_r "sgd Odnokd _eehql sgd mddc sn athkc _ mdv kdf_knqcdq nts ne
l_sdqh_kr hmgdqhsdceqnl sgd o_rs- Oqdrhcdmbx)Bnmfqdrr) Bntqs,,sgd m_ldr
&/& Dw-) K_qqx Jq_ldq) (okh .J(xspqh Hpuo 1'~'~'~ Uhup Gruhzrug( JQh Ukh Hpuo, 004 H,H-HQU- K- QH9H-
3
(3112,- glhg lq &e_m)_Jhq Fpskdoo(((!!} Jkh QuoKol",hdoogi*ooo}riDlp{wu .z..z.
10 Kd} Ji/kdo HpZwu .z..z.
/.u,zsud mnsd-
&/& Q_tk O_mf_k_mf_m) DklhiJ/uo"h ool!dulr );. Pduogh, Jh .k Koxg} looJxgllld! o(kl/r.z.wKmKk}:
"!l-dq..,mlK17qdolwu
Qr!lolhupg/xg,lld! .k glo l,p, 7/ OHkh!--US437 '100/'(-
)Nh) I;-QikZDQ)SGD OknN!&H-I-9 SkkHk[kRq9KUDR)-|xsud
- mnsd) _s 116-
1;" c AQBBH) k[F9&DQKH") [UH9&0&00H9ODNOKD9ENTMC HS0/!&hR166 '0880(: Aqtbd ?bjdql_m) Ukh 0 wyvypp
Dlpioloxolrq, 01/00-0\'0& K- QH9["-
0626) 06L '1//6(-
qdl_hm sgd r_ld ats etmc_ldms_k qdk_shnmrghor_qd qdrg_odc sgqntfg
tmbnmudmshnm_k_bshuhsx)"1/Ghr e_rbhm_shmf-Gnvdudq) sgd bnmsdws hr
kdfhshlhyhmfmdv bnmrshstshnm_kmnqlr vhsgnts sgd enql_k _ldmcldms
oqnbdrr hm_qshbkdU ne sgd Tmhsdc Rs_sdr Bnmrshstshnm-Sghr chrbtrrhnm hr
rhlhk_qkxkdrr qdkdu_msfhudm sgd ltbg k_qfdq mtladq ne mnqlr _kqd_cx
dwokhbhshm sgd Oghkhoohmd Bnmrshstshnm-Hm rtll_qx) sgd _bshuhrl _mc
dctb_shnm ne sgd dkdbsnq_sdcdrbqhadc hmsgdrd sgqdd jdx dw_lokdr _qd mns
pthsd ne sgd fdmqdrntfgs hmsgd Oghkhoohmdr
snc_x-
Oghkhoohmd rstcdmsr ltrs sgtr ad bnmrbhntr sg_s sgdx _qd cd_khmf

vhsg _ knmfdq)qhbgdqBnmrshstshnm_mc dpt_kkxbnmrbhntr ne sgd hmbqd_rhmfkx
dwo_mrhud_ooqn_bg adhmf s_jdm ax sgd Bntqs sn hsr _tsgnqhsx-Sghr lhkhdt
ltrs ad _m_kxydc cheedqdmskx- ?lnmf nsgdqr) OqdrhcdmsA_q_j&r annj)
otakhrgdc hm1//5 _mc nesdmqdedqqdcsn ax BghdeItrshbd Otmn) hr _ fnnc
bntmsdqdw_lokd- Sghr sqd_shrd qdedqr sn _ q_mfd ne itqhrchbshnmr _mc
bnmrbhntrkx mnsdr sgd rgnqsbnlhmfr ne ?ldqhb_m cnbsqhmdvgdm _ookhdcsn
_mnsgdqitqhrchbshnm-
Sghr _tsgnq gnodr _s sghronhmssg_s gd g_r mnsbnmuhmbdcghr qd_cdq

sg_s sgd qtkdl_jhmf hr hmu_khc
nq dudmtmvhrd- Q_sgdq)sghr_tsgnq gnodr sg_s
gd g_r hloqdrrdc tonm ghr qd_cdq sgd mddc sn bqhshb_kkx _m_kxydsgd
qtkdl_jhmf onvdq&r _ookhb_shnm- Sghr _tsgnq g_r hcdmshehdc
entq hmhsh_k
_qd_r
enqqdekdbshnm hmsghruhqfhmsdqqhsnqx
ne OghkhoohmdBnmrshstshnm_kK_v-
Hs hr cheehbtkssn odqbdhud_ qd_kchrshmbshnm adsvddm sgd Bntqs&r

onvdq ne itchbh_kqduhdv _mchsr qtkdl_jhmf onvdq -hmsgd r_ld v_x sg_s hshr
cheehbtkssn odqbdhud_ chrshmbshnm adsvddm sgd Oqdrhcdms&r Bnll_mcdq,hm,
Bghde onvdqr _mc sgd fdmdq_kdwdbtshudonvdq- Dudmsr eqnl sgd M_shnm_k
Bnmrtks_shudRtllhs nm Dwsq_itchbh_k H;9hkkhmf
_mc DmenqbdcChr_ood_q_mbdr
sn Ndqdor rgnv sg_s sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq hr itrs _r onsdms_r sgd onvdq ne
itchbh_kqduhdv)_mc _qft_akx lnqd rn rhmbdhshr mnsqdrsqhbsdcax sgd b_rd _mc
bnmsqnudqrxqdpthqdldms- Sgd jdx) sgdm)hr sn dmrtqd sg_s itchbh_kcnbsqhmd
qdl_hmr _mhmsdfq_k vgnkd _mc sgd itqhroqtcdmsh_ksq_idbsnqxqdl_hmr bkd_q_mc
qd_chkxbg_qsdc-
Nm nmd g_mc) nmd rddr sgd dwodqhdmbd vhsg !WJdqdor, vgdqd _ enql_k
cdbhrhnmotqrt_ms sn sgd onvdq ne itchbh_kqduhdvqdhsdq_sdc_mc rtll_qhydc
sgd u_ktdr _mc fn_kr ntskhmdchmu_qhntr roddbgdr) rxlonrh_ _mc _qshbkdr
qdf_qchmfsgd vqhs ne _lo_qn- Ndqdor _mbgnqr_kksgdrd vhsgnts kd_uhmfnmd
sn vdhfg sgd vqhssdml_sdqh_kkd_chmfto sn _ mdv qtkd sgd v_x nmd vntkc
_m_kxydkdfhrk_shud
qdbnqcr _mcronmrnqrgho roddbgdr-
Nm sgd nsgdq g_mc) sgd khmjr ne sgd Bntqs&r fthcdkhmdrs_shmf _

oqdedqdmbdenq sgd hlonrhshnm ne ehmdrnudq hloqhrnmldms hmkhadkb_rdr
'sqd_sdc _r _m dwdqbhrdne sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq hm sghr _qshbkd(sn
itqhroqtcdmbd hr kdrr dwokhbhs-Jq uh NdwdKdhw,209 odmmdcrhwlnmsgr _esdqsgdrd
fthcdkhmdrvdqd qdkd_rdc)cd_ksvhsg _ mdvro_odq bnktlmhrs vgn vqnsd sg_s _
edl_kd Itrshbd g_c qdbdhudc_ anw bnms_hmhmf OGO0/ lhkkhnmhmgdq neehbd
_mc cdunsdc entq rdo_q_sd bnktlmr sn sgd _kkdfdc aqhadqx-Sgd cdbhrhnm
bnloqdgdmrhudkx qduhdvdc oqdbdcdmsr _mc cnbsqhmdrnm khadk_mc oqdrr
eqddcnl- Hmsgd dmc) gnvdudq) MWodfdvdhwcdunsdc nmkx nmd rdmsdmbdsn
dwok_hmhmf sgd odm_ksxhs hlonrdc9 "Fhudm sgd fq_uhsx ne qdronmcdms
L_b_r_ds&rhloqnodq bnmctbs) bntokdc vhsg sgd qdb_kbhsq_ms l_mmdq hmvghbg
gd qdronmcdc vgdm bnmeqnmsdcvhsg sgd qd_khsx ne ghr vqnmfcnhmf) _ odm_ksx
ne ehmdhmsgd _lntms ne O1/)NNN-NN vntkc ad qhfgs _mc qd_rnm_akd-"Sgd
Bghdeitrshbd&rd_qkhdq fthcdkhmdrvdqd mnsldmshnmdc _s _kk)dudmsgntfg nmd
ne sgd bhqbtlrs_mbdr sgdrd dwokhbhskx rs_sdc _r _ fqntmc enq _ookxhmfsgd
oqdedqdmbdenq _ ehmdv_r "sgd vhcd k_shstcdsq_chshnm_kkx fhudmsn cde_l_snqx
tssdq_mbdr _f_hmrsotakhb neehbh_kr hmbnmmdbshnm vhsg nq qdkdu_mssn sgdhq
odqenql_mbd ne neehbh_k ctshdr nq _f_hmrsotakhb ehftqdr hmqdk_shnm sn l_ssdqr
ne otakhb hmsdqdrshmunkuhmfsgdl)"10/ _ k_shstcd ghfgkhfgsdc hm Itrshbd
B_qohn&r uhfnqntr chrrdms-
Sgdqd hr sgtr _ bkd_qmddc sn _cgdqd sn sgd Ndqdor _ooqn_bg) vghbg

rgntkc rsdl eqnl _ qdbnfmhshnm ne sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq _r hmsdfq_ksn sgd
r_ld itchbh_konvdq eqnl vghbg itchbh_kqduhdv hr cq_vm _mc sg_s _ gnkhrshb
bnmsdwsenqansg onvdqr ltrs ad l_hms_hmdc-Rgntkc _ qtkd s_jd nm _mhbnmhb
rs_stqd hm ntq itchbh_ko_msgdnm)hsr hmektdmbdnm cnbsqhmdrgntkc ad _r
qd_chkxsq_bd_akd_r fqd_s oqdbdcdmsrrtbg _r /111.!!,dud yO/FohfwrudoFTMO0z'MM/
1/&0 Hmsgd L_ssdq ne sgd ?kkdf_shnm&Bnms_hmdchmsgd Bnktlm& ne 0[0q-.Hl_cn 0&-k_d_r_ds Otakhrgdc

hmNdog*(d c_sdc Rdosdladq Rn/ 08) 54e _mc 54/ 54e4e<10[-0-Mn-006,/8,K&=,RB)-[tf- n/ 54e4en1
8bjb H: O^^Sfa bhbba1 -Gk_Uvb_dvi [` fZC. 01TI^J Q.mKA: ^.aX Fb dkbx aX bdFyvhvdvb, _d j^x @
` ^bae[f[a` ey
Odm_kshdr hmKhadkB_rdr) ?cl- Bhqd-Ren053*,n/ )48/ -H_m- 58/ 5*,4eP1
Sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq qdunkudr _qntmc sgd jdx ogq_rd "oqnbdctq_k
qtkdr)" vghbg hlokhdr sg_s hsnmkxe_bhkhs_sdr
sgd oqnsdbshnmne dwhrshmfqhfgsr-
Hcd_kkx)sgtr) sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq rgntkc mns cdehmd mdv bnmrshstshnm_k
qhfgsr-
Sghr hr tmkhjdkxsn ad rn rsq_hfgsenqv_qc) hmsgd r_ld v_x sg_s hshr _

mns pthsd ehwdc khmd sg_s cdl_qb_sdr vgdm sgd Bntqs dmenqbdr sgd
Bnmrshstshnm&rsdws _mc vgdm sgd Bntqs dmenqbdr vg_s _qd _qft_akx
hmsdqoqds_shnmrmns pthsd ehqlkx qnnsdc hm sgd sdws9-Ndo/dor a_r _kqd_cx
cdlnmrsq_sdc sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq&r aqd_csg hmbq_eshmfqtkdr sn oqnsdbs
"Zsgd qhfgs sn\ sn khed)khadqsx_mc rdbtqhsx-" Rhlhk_qkx)sgd qtkd ne oqdedqdmbdhm
khadkb_rdr hr _qft_akx _ rxmsgdrhr a_rdc nm dwhrshmfitqhroqtcdmbd odqbdhudc
sn ad lnqd sg_m sgd rtl ne hsro_qsr-
Sgd bnmbdqmqdstqmr sn sgd b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrx qdpthqdldms- Tysghr

qdpthqdldms rg_qodmr sgd itchbh_krdmrd _mc e_bhkhs_sdrlnqd deedbshud_bshnm
ax _ aq_mbg cdrhfmdc sn ad hmrtk_sdc eqnl rnbhdsx) sgdm nmd rgntkc ad v_qx
nq _s kd_rs qdrsq_hmdchm_ookxhmfsgd itchbh_konvdq vgdqd mn bnmbqdsdb_rd
dwhrsr_mc vgdqd nmd sqd_cr nm kdfhrk_shudsdqqhsnqxne oqnrodbshud dudmsr _mc
onsdmsh_khshdr-
Sgd onrrhahkhsxne mdv _mc _qft_akx rtars_mshud hmsdqoqds_shnm) _mc

chrinhmsdc eqnl sgd l_hm eknv ne itqhroqtcdmbd) sgqntfg sgd qtkdl_jhmf
onvdq hr mns qdlnsd- Rgnqskx_esdqSgd Qtkd nm sgd Vqhs ne G_ad_r C_s_ v_r
oqnltkf_sdc)100 Bghde Itrshbd Otm_ chrbtrrdc sgd mdv vqhs _mc nodmdc ax
ntskhmhmf sgd qhfgs sn oqhu_bx&r cheedqdms cdudknoldms hm ?ldqhb_m
itqhroqtcdmbd)101 chrbtrrhmf knb_shnm_k'nq rhst_shnm_k(oqhu_bx)hmenql_shnm_k
oqhu_bx _mc cdbhrhnm_koqhu_bx-102Sghr hr rhfmhehb_msadb_trd Oghkhoohmd
oqhu_bx itqhroqtcdmbd hr _mbgnqdc nm Itrshbd Aq_mcdhr&rPopvwhg chrrdms _mc
sgd qhfgs _f_hmrs tmqd_rnm_akd rd_qbg _mc nm Hqvzrog _mc hsr chrbtrrhnm ne
odmtlaq_r-103 Bnmrdptdmskx) Oghkhoohmdcnbsqhmd g_r enbtrdc nm sgd
BAA 84 D4 Ea4 923A3A>3I: 2AS` 4 BB2B9924

101 Qdxm_sn Otm_) Sgd Bnllnm Qhfgs sn Oqh[&_bx)
Roddbg cdkhudqdcadenqd sgd Enqtl nm Sgd Vqhs
ne Hk_ab_) C_s_ _mc Gtl_m Qhfgsr) kmmnsdbg Rdlhm_q ek_hk)Bnllnmvd_ksg ?udmtd) Ptdynm Bhsx)
Oghkhoohmdr)
_s 2,3 'L_q- 01) 1'/7(-
100 Sgh) _tsgnq) hm _m _qshbkbvqhssbm hm 1//4 _mc _r cbudknodc hm nkcdq _qshbkd" oqnonrsc sn
vedi eb_wtjx j^x h_^j _d y_l x i xdi xi F f h_l tvo ti tkjededb.,1 ti i xvbki _ed1 ti hxf kjtj_ed1 ti ?AUÂf[f1. tdU ti
buhcbmsh_qxoqhuhkdfdr-Sgd _qshbkbqdsq_bdr_mc bnlo_qbr sgb Oghkhoohmd _mc )[lbqhb_m bunktshnm ne sgb qhfgs-
S_m) "ooKhHKpsohoh Q'fHIkknQulpM[z .psud mnsb) _s 0h6-
1" Nkl)sd_c u- Tmhsdc Rs_sdr)166 T-R- 327 '0 k, 'Aq_mcbh))I-- glz.z. y'yypv,/Sgb ch")bmsIhrbtnrbc "sgd
h_^j je ux bxj tbedx1' j^tj 'cei j vecf d3F^xdi _d 33
v ey h_^ji tdw j^x h_^j jbb5ej 'tbkvU uo xd _b_41xwb77vd3' NG tj
tmqd_rnm_akd rd_qbg bnmsdws_mc nm bnmsqnk ne nudq nmd&rodqrnm_k
hmenql_shnm)_r ghfgkhfgsdcax l_qptdd cdbhrhnmrrtbg _r Qhrsoh y. mrkqKrq21?
_mc Psoh y. UruuhK.216Cdbhrhnm_koqhu_bx)nq oqhu_bx_r odqrnm_k_tsnmnlx _mc
qds_hmhmf bnmsqnknudq etmc_ldms_k cdbhrhnmrsg_s _eedbs nmdrdke)g_r mns
addm dwoknqdchmsgd Oghkhoohmdr) drodbh_kkxbnmrhcdqhmfgnv sgd ?ldqhb_m
cnbsqhmdhr btqqdmskx_mbgnqdcnm Srh y. Ydgh2(7 _mc Mdzuhqfh y. Uh{dK218_mc
gnv sgd Oghkhoohmd Bnmrshstshnmoqnghahsr_anqshnm_mc sgd oqdrdmsBntqs
_ood_qr dwokhbhskx tmrxlo_sgdshb sn qhfgsr ne rdwt_k _tsnmnlx _rrdqsdc ax
gnlnrdwt_kr- 108
Sghr _tsgnq g_r oqduhntrkx_qftdc sg_s sgd knfhbne cdbhrhnm_koqhu_bx

hr entmc hm Oghkhoohmditqhroqtcdmbd- "HqKzrog chc mns cd_k vhsg
hmenql_shnm&r chrbknrtqd) _mc hshr _ ldqd rgheshmqgdsnqhbats mns knfhb sn
ghfgkhfgssgd bgnhbdptnsd9 &Vntkc vd _kknvsgd onkhbdsn rd_qbg sgd r_bqdc
oqdbhmbsr ne l_qhs_k adcqnnlr enq sdkks_kdrhfmr ne sgd trd ne
bnmsq_bdoshudr>&11/Stqmhmfsghrhmbnmrhrsdmbx nm hsrgd_c) gnvdudq) sgd qhfgs
sn oqhu_bx_ood_qdc hmsgd 1//2 cdbhrhnmFKwudgd y. FKfulwru,221vghbg cd_ks
vhsg bgnnrhmf sn bng_ahs vhsg rnldnmd nsgdq sg_m nmd&rrontrd tmcdq _
qdkhfhntr rdbs&rr_mbshnm)_mc sgd 1/// cdbhrhnmJ/VKrqr y. Cl/gqhu,222 vghbg
cd_ksvhsg _mnkc l_m&r qhfgssn bgnnrd mnssn ad uhrhsdcax bdqs_hm qdk_shudr-
Mdhsgdqb_rd hmunkudcchrbknrtqd ne hmenql_shnm-"112 Etqsgdq) sgd knfhb hr
367- Fqhrvnkc u- Bnmmdbshbts) 270 T-R- 368 '0854(- "ZRIodbhehba&kl_msddr hm sgd Ahkkne Qhfgsr g_ud
odmtlaq_r) enqldc ax dl_m_shnmr eqnl sgnrd ft_q_msddr sg_s gdko eyh sgdl khed_mc rtars_mbd- U_qhntr
ft_q_msddr bqd_sdynmdr ne oqh[_bx-"Op _s 373-
104 F-Q- Mn- 02Q70) 237 RBQ? 415) Cdd- 07)1/// -.!r!p.urq cd_ks vhsg _m _hqonqsrd_qbg sg_s qd[&d_kbc
cqtfr _mc qtkdc sg_s9"Odqrnmr l_x knrd sgd oqnsdbshnmne sgd rd_qbg _mc rdhytqd bk_trd ax dwonrtqd ne sgdhq
odqrnmr nq oqnodqsx sn sgd otakhb hm_ l_mmdq qdekdbshmf_ k_bj ne rtaidbshud dwodbs_shnmne oqh[&_bx) vghbg
dwodbs_shnmrnbhdsx hr oqdo_qdc sn qdbnfmhyd_r qd_rnm_akd-Rtbg qdbnfmhshnmhr hlokhbhs hm_hqonqs rdbtqhsx
oqnbdctqdr ----" Op _s 423-
10') F-Q- Mn- 016574)182 RdQ? 030) Itk- 12) 0887- Ps!h rslbj cnvm _m dwdbtshud nqcdq sg_s k_xsgd
a_rhr enq enqlhmf _ m_shnm_khcdmshehb_shnm b_qc rxrsdl _mc _bbnlo_mxhmf hmenql_shnmc_s_a_rd) rs_shmf sg_s
sghr "oqdrrtqdr sgd odnokd sn rtqqdmcdq sgdhqoqhu_bxax a[&hmf hmenql_shnm_ants sgdlrdkudr nm sgd oqdsdws
sg_s hsvhkke_bhkhs_sdcdkhudqxne a_rhb rdquhbdr-"og _s 06/-
106 30/ T-R- 002 '0862( 'qdbnfmhyhmf_ qhfgs sn _anqshnm(-
54P 428 T-R- 447 '1//2(- Cd_khmf vhsg gnlnrdwt_k rdwt_k _bsh[&hsx) M.dzuh",yh lkdc9 "Sgd b_rd cndr
hmunkudsvn _ctksr --- Sgd Rs_sdb_mmnscdld_m sgdhqdwhrsdmbdnq bnmsqnksgdhqcdrshmxax l_jhmf sgdhqoqhu_sd
rdwt_k bnmctbs _ bqhld- Sgdhq qhfgs sn khadqsxtmcdq sgd Ctd Oqnbdrr Bk_trd fhudr sgdl sgd etkkqhfgs sn dmf_fd
hmsgdhqbnmctbs vhsgnts hmsdqudmshnm ne sgd fnudqmldms-" Op _s 467-
10/ "ZSgd Rs_sd\ rg_kk dpt_kkx oqnsdbs sgd khedne sgd lnsgdq _mc sgd khedne sgd tmanqm eqnl
bnmbdoshnm-"BNMRS- _qs-HH) 01- BghdeItrshbd Otm_ g_r otakhbkxcdrbqhadc M,zuh",. _r _ cdbhrhnmnm sgd qhfgs
Sey tbb _dw_l _wktbi je xdtx _d tvji ^_i jeh_vtbbo v^thtvjxh_C3vw ti ,Uvo_tjx i xnktb _djxhvekhi x3,' bkde3 ?JH
Drpprq Sljkl 10 Qul,Kd,},.iK/sudmnsd) _s 3- Oqnedrrnq Sqhad s_jdr dwbdoshnmsn sghr bg_q_bsdqhy_shnm) qdatsshmf
sg_s9"Hs&rmns sgd rncnlx- Hs&rsgd qdk_shnmrgho!&" K_tqdmbd Sqhad) Mdzwp" " Uh{" z.: Ukh (UK/qgdphqod! Sl*!,ko"
Ukdl Edq: Oro Tshdn Mg s/Odph, 006 G?Q[&-0--QDH&- 0782) 08/3 '1//3(-
5ur Fqhrvnkc) 270 TR _s 374-
110 IX1 Mn- O,/1,0540) 3/7 RBQ? 0) ?tf- 3) 1//2-
,.,.,. R3d3Ye3 79ECDE1998>3 = YE 0'() Xto 78185553
&" S_m) Ukh D"rps!"h Sljkl 10 Qul",([( .,yK/Q",mnsd) _s 7/,70-
_qft_akx qdekdbsdchm sgd k_mft_fd ne sgd kd_chmfcdbhrhnmhsrdke)Nruih y.
Nxwxf.33.2 Sghr hr _kk_qftldms _mchmedqdmbd)gnvdudq) _mc rgnqs ne sgd Bntqs
dwokhbhskx qdbnfmhyhmfnq qdedqqhmfsn cdbhrhnm_koqhu_bx)vghbg vntkc ad
pthsd _m dwo_mrhnmne Oghkhoohmd cnbsqhmdhmhrrtdr sn vghbg hshr btqqdmskx
gnrshkdrtbg _r _anqshnm)gnlnrdwt_k qdk_shnmrghor _mc r_ld rdw l_qqh_fd-
Nm sgd nsgdq g_mc) mnsdgnv oqhu_bx&r entmc_shnmrghesdc rtaskx sn hmbktcd
hmsdqm_shnm_k k_v hmTdelr, _mcgnv d_rhkxsghrlhfgs ad qdod_sdc-
Sn ad bkd_q)BghdeItrshbd Otmn rodbhehb_kkx bhsdccdbhrhnm_k oqhu_bx

hm_ a_bjfqntmc chrbtrrhnm ne ?ldqhb_m cnbsqhmd_mc mns _r Oghkhoohmd
_tsgnqhsx-Mdudqsgdkdrr)sghrhkktrsq_sdrgnv sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq b_mrtaskx
_ksdqnq ad odqbdhudcsn _ksdqdwhrshmf cnbsqhmd)henmkxsgqntfg sgd hloqdbhrd
bhs_shnmne _ kdrrdqrbgnk_q-Cdbrhnm_koqhu_bxg_r _bst_kkxaddm bhsdcax sgd
Oghkhoohmd Bntqs) ats hmbnmsdwsrsg_s _ood_q sn ad bkd_qlhrs_jdr- Enq
dw_lokd) _ uhfnqntr chrrdmshmFvwudgd y. Tdqgljdqet}dq,225 cd_khmfvhsg sgd
hmudrshf_shnm ne bdqs_hmehm_mbh_k hmenql_shnmne enqldq oqdrhcdmsInrdog
Drsq_c_ hmqdk_shnm sn _kkdfdcbnqqtoshnm)qd_c9
Z[UIg_srsqhjdr tr lnrs hr sgd o_sdms tme_hqmdrr ne

sk0d oqnbdrr- Ehqrs hm sgd Ahkkne Qhfgsr hr sgd
l_mc_sd sg_s mn odqrnm rg_kk ad cdoqhudc ne ghr
Hhed9khadqsxnq oqnodqsx vhsgnts ctd oqnbdrr ne k_v-
Bntqsr g_ud gdkc sg_s sgd qhfgs ne odqrnm_k
oqhu_bx hr nmd _rodbs ne sgd "khadqsx" oqnsdbsdc
ax sgd Ctd Oqnbdrr Bk_trd- A_rhb ctd oqnbdrr
cdl_mcr sg_s sgd Neehbd ne sgd Nlatcrl_m
etqmhrg odshshnmdq_ bnox ne c0d rtaondm_d ctbdr
sdbtl hshrrtdc ---- 11')
Sghr o_rr_fd bhsdc Srh _mc nsgdq k_mcl_qj ?ldqhb_m cdbhrhnm_k

oqhu_bxcdbhrhnmr)vghbg l_cd mn rdmrd hmsgd bnmsdws-116Rtbg onsdmsh_k
lhrs_jdr hmsgd dwdqbhrdne qtkdl_jhmf l_x ad naetrb_sdc ax sgd k_bj ne
dwok_m_shnm nq bhs_shnmhmqtkdr)tmkdrr vdkkcnbtldmsdc _mc _mmns_sdc_r sgd
oqdrdmsBntqs hr cnhmf- Sgd enql_s ne qtkdr) ne bntqrd) l_x kdmchsrdkesn
hmsdmshnm_knaetrb_shnm sg_s l_x oqnud lnqd cheehbtkssn ptdrshnm sg_m _
cdbhrhnmsg_s e_hkrsn bhsdsgd oqdbdcdmsrhshmunjdr-
Ug _s 86,88) golqj h[knqebu- Ltstb) F-Q- Mt- 1/-&R6)11 RBHU[313) 332) I_m- 20) 0$7-
F-Q- Mn- 046183) 4kI8RBQ? 08/) Mn["- 2C) 1//F
Uho _s 1')'(-
S_m) Ukh DrpsohohSlkoo)*Q,lqx} .z."sp mnsd) _s 0/3-
Sghr _qshbkd g_r dlog_rhydc sg_s sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq&raqd_csg khdr
hmhsr adhmf cq_vm eqnl sgd r_ld onvdq _r itchbh_kqduhdv)xds tmedssdqdcax
sgd b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrxqdrsqhbshnm- Hmsgdnqx) sgd itchbh_konvdq bntkc ad
_ookhdcoqnrodbshudkx)_jhm sn kdfhrk_shnm- Hmoq_bshbd)_ qtkd sg_s _ood_qr sn
dmenqbd_ q_chb_kmdv bnmrshstshnm_k qhfgs vhsg sdmtntr a_rhr hmoqduhntr
cdbhrhnmrvntkc mnsad rn d_rx sn oqnltkf_sd _mc vntkc e_bdbg_kkdmfd_mc
bqhshbhrl-Gnvdudq) bnmrhcdqsg_s hsl_x mns ad _r cheehbtkssn oqnltkf_sd _
qtkd cdrhfmdc sn oqddlos bdqs_hmb_rdr _mc hlodcd etstqd) lnqd dwo_mrhud
cnbsqhmdrhmsgd dwdqbhrdne itchbh_kqduhdv- Sgd Bntqs&r oqnmntmbdldmsr
g_ud _ enqbd sg_s b_m chrok_bd "_mshkhadqs_qh_m onkhbhdr---vghbg b_mmns
ltrsdq rteehbhdms onkhshb_ka_bjhmf enq qdhmrs_sdldms _esdq itchbh_k
hmu_khc_shnm ---- ZD\udmvgdm sgd Bntqs _clhssdckx qdsqdmbgdrhmsgd e_bd ne
otakhb chrr_shre_bshnm)hsnesdmkd_udr_ chrshmbskx vhcdq _qd_ ne bnmrshstshnm_k
khadqsxsg_m vntkc g_ud dwhrsdcvdqd hs mns enq sgd itchbh_qx&rnqhfhm_k
hmsdqudmshnm-"11G Bnmbdhu_akx)sgd qdudqrd nq _ jhmc ne oqnrodbshud)itchbh_k
oqddloshnm l_x rstms _ cnbsqhm_k cdudknoldms- ?s sgd udqx kd_rs)gd Bntqs&r
onsdmsh_kkx oqnmntmbhmfcnbsqhmd)hmvg_sdudq l_mmdq) hm_ o_qshbtk_qro_bd
ltrs ad b_qdetkkxdw_lhmdc)_r hsr_bshnmrhmduhs_akx sq_mrenql sg_s ro_bd-118
Hshr cheehbtkssn uhrt_khydsghr onrrhahkhsxrn d_qkxhmsgd qtkdl_jhmf

onvdq&r cdudknoldms) ats bnmrhcdqsgd 1//6 cdbhrhnmTloyhulr y. Qhrsoh.3OMO
Qnlldk Rhkudqhntmcdqvdms rtqfdqx hm Sg_hk_mc _mc) qdstqmhmfsn sgd
Oghkhoohmdr vhsg edl_kd fdmhs_kh_)odshshnmdcenq _ bg_mfd ne m_ld sn "Ldkx"
_mc ne rdw sn edl_kd- Sgd sqh_kbntqs _kknvdc sghr) rs_shmf sg_s sgd
"lhrenqstmd sn ad sq_oodc hm_ l_m&r ancx hr mnsghr nvm cnhmf _mc rgntkc
mns ad hm_mxv_x s_jdm _f_hmrsghl-" "Sgd Neehbdne sgd Rnkhbhsnq Fdmdq_k
adk_sdckxbg_kkdmfdcsgd qtkhmf_mc sgd Rtoqdld Bntqs gdkc sg_s adb_trd
oqdrdmsk_v _kknvr _ bg_mfd ne nmd&rrdw sn ad dmsdqdchmsnsgd bhuhkqdfhrsqx
nmkxhm b_rdr ne bkdqhb_k dqqnq)_ odqrnm&rrdw _s ahqsg ltrs ad cddldc
hllts_akd tmshkBnmfqdrr kdfhrk_sdrnsgdqvhrd-"120
Gnvdudq) "Ldkx" g_c _ l_kd eh_mbd)_mc sgd hlokhbhs hrrtd v_r

vgdsgdq sn _kknv _ sq_mrrdwt_kvgn tmcdqvdms rdw qd_rrhfmldms rtqfdqx sn
55X KRR*fM /d/ Odc&- mnsd) _s 01'"

88,. fe v_jx edx vF2rtcf bv1 Fb r1'ectd,i vê_vx m^xj^xh eh dej je ^tr,v t v^_bU [mtdFbbl *vw _d j^x hd_jxw
ejtjxi kdwxh j^x h_^j je wxv_i _edtb f h_n_bvo3 f^_i vtd kd_djxdj_edtbbo vhxtjx 17 kehdvi j_v, i f ^xhx ey f h_l tjx
hvbtj_edi j^tj kxjxhi M.r,MycfTMdj yhebbb_bbjvdfd_d _d1 yeh vntcf bx1 wabbbvi j_v r,_ebvdvv3 f^_i bfj_^j dej hxi kbj [X
_m dlog_rhr v_r hmrsd_c o"s nm bKH"_k oqnsdbshnm- )c)e)eRRu Z9-S)Se4)k e4mnsd )Hs031
gbe F-Q- Mn- 063L[&()Nbs- 11)1//6-
10& S_m) Ukh DKKqsohwh
Qzgkhkk
o'-v-(0-,'/ KVJ((((mnsd) _s 1/&(-
l_qqx- Sgd Bntqs bkd_qkx qdbnfmhydcsg_s sghrv_r sgd hrrtd) _r Tloyhulr:uehqrs
o_q_fq_og lhqqnqdc _mdwbdqoseqnl Mlwwohwrq y. Qudqjh/52 _ Sdw_r qtkhmfsg_s
chr_kknvdc rtbg _ sq_mrrdwt_k eqnl l_qqxhmf- Sgtr) vhsg _cqnhs
bg_q_bsdqhy_shnm) Tloyhuldbnmudqsdc_ rtars_mshudhrrtd , _ sq_mrrdwt_k&r qhfgs
sn dwoqdrrrdwt_khcdmshsx _mc)ax dwsdmrhnm) sn qdbnfmhydsghrbgnrdm hcdmshsx
hmsgd bnmsdwsne sgd etmc_ldms_k qhfgs sn l_qqx , hmsn_ oqnbdctq_k hrrtd
qdunkuhmf_qntmc sgd btqqdms kdf_k qdpthqdldmsr sn bg_mfd nmd&rm_ld-
Rtaskd trd ne sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq bntkc bq_es sgd r_ld onkhbx ats
oqnrodbshudkx)dudm adenqd _ sdrs b_rd b_m bqxrs_kkhyd hm_ sqh_kbntqs- Sgd
onkhbx bntkc ad l_cd lnqd cheehbtkssn bg_kkdmfdadb_trd qtkdr b_m ad
oqnltkf_sdc vhsgnts dwsdmcdcdwok_m_shnm nq bhs_shnmr) nq sgd qtkd bntkc ad
cdrhfmdc sn _mbgnq_ k_sdq_mshbho_sdc dwdqbhrdne itchbh_kqduhdv)s_jhmf sgd
oqdlhrd sg_s sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq hr ne sgd r_ld rtars_mbd _r itchbh_k
qduhdv _mc rgntkc _qft_akx ad ne md_qvdhfgs hmrhfm_khmf itchbh_konkhbx-Hm
sghr b_rd) sgd qtkd bntkc ad cdoknxdc ax bq_eshmf_ bnmrshstshnm_k qhfgs sn
l_qqh_fd _r _m"hmuhnk_akd rnbh_khmrshstshnm"122
_mc rhlhk_qsdwst_kgnnjr sg_s
_qd qd_chkxqdehmdchmsnrstqchdql_sdqh_ksg_msgd TmhsdcRs_sdr& Cdedmrd ne
L_qqh_fd?bs- 123
?m dudm rtaskdq _mc _qft_akx rhlokdq ldsgnc ne trhmf sgd

qtkdl_jhmf onvdq sn rsddq cnbsqhmdvhsgnts qdrhrs_mbdeqnl sgd b_rd nq
bnmsqnudqrxqdpthqdldms hr sn rsqdmfsgdm_m_ms_fnmhrshb bnmrshstshnm_k
qhfgs-
Rgntkc _ sq_mrrdwt_k&r qhfgs sn rdwt_kdwoqdrrhnmoqnud snn bnmsqnudqrh_k_m
dw_lokd enq _ qd_cdq)_mc sghr_tsgnq cndr mns_hl hmsghr ro_bd sn dwoqdrr_
rtoonqshud nq chrlhrrhud nohmhnm)124 s_jd sgd mns tmqdk_sdc1//3 cdbhrhnm
Uzdq y. Hod{d Yhondph-Qklolsslqhv, 1p: 125 Gdqd) sgd Bntqs togdkc _
bnqonq_shnm&r qhfgs sn sdqlhm_sd_m dloknxdd vgn l_qqhdc _ bnlodshsnq&r
dloknxdd hm uhnk_shnmne gdq dloknxldms bnmsq_bs)_mc dudm cdunsdc
565 8 R-V-2c 112 'Sdw- Bhu-?oo- 0888(- "Kloo(hqrnodmdc9&Vgdmhr _ l_m _ l_m _mc vgdm hr _ vnl_m
_ vnl_m> Hmo_qshbtk_q)cndr sgd k_v qdbnfmhydsgd bg_mfdr l_cd ax _ ogxrhbh_mtrhmf rb_kodk)cqtfr _mc
bntmrdkhmf vhsg qdf_qc sn _ odqrnm&rrdw>&Jmwwohorqnodmdc9 &Vgdmhr _ l_m _ l_m) _mc vgdm hr _ vnl_m _
vnl_m> --- ZBh_m_ ogxrhbh_mbg_mfd sgd fdmcdq ne _ odqvm vhsg _ rb_kodk)clfr _mc bntmrdkhmf) nq hr _
odqrnmr fdmcdq kNtSHts_akxehwdcax btq Bqd_qnq_s ahqsg>&"S_m) (VKhDrpsohowo)kooiKQ,lKoK>[,
.uxsu" mnsd) _s 10'(
gSbBP1
"RA : ad334IJ 4 Sdf4 mi3 u B4
&" 0 nl ^ 6 'Rtoo- HH08$(: 17 T-R-B-? 062GB 'Vdrs Rtoo- 2;;a, / -edqRgdeehdkc[&-Tmhsdc
Jhmfcnl) Z0888016 DGQQ 052-
&" Sghr _tsgnq g_r oqduhntrkx oqnonrdc sn _ookx _qftldmsr _g")hmrsr_ld,rdw l_qqh_fd sn l_qqh_fdr
hm[&Ng&hmf ahrdwt_kr _mc sq_mrrdwt_kr) s_jhmf _ onhms qdod_sdckx dlog_rhydc hm Oqnedrrnq Dkhy_adsg
O_mf_k_mf_m&r eqbrgl_m Odqrnmr bk_rr sg_s he oqhu_bx _mc sgb qhfgs sn l_qqx _mc sn bmsbq hmsn qnl_mshb
qdk_shnmrghorhmgbqdhmhmchuhct_kr)sgdm sgd _m_kxrhrne sgdrd qhfgsr ltrs ad l_cd vhsg qdrobbs sn hmchuhct_kr
_mc mns sn sgdhqo_hqhmfr-Nrb_q Eq_mjkhmS_m) N"uuldjh UepxK!.kBqrokhu Mhq.u:Yhljklqj JehW"olglw} r/.id",,yKh{
Ndpw(!!,hKO5l Bsso}lqj BujxphqoK 10 Clvh{xdM,doogUi()KKw.iK{xdMu,
70 OGHK-
K--I- m8 '1//5(-
125 Ctmb_m ?rr&m ne Cds_hkl_m,OSFVN _mc Sdbrnm [&-Fk_wn Vdkkbnld,Oghkr-) Hmb-)F-Q- Mn-
051883) 327 RBQ-9[232) Rdo- 06) 1//3-
rxlo_sgdshb k_mft_fd sn sgd bnqonq_shnm&r deenqsrsn s_jd kdrrdqld_rtqdr sn
lhshf_sd sgd bnmekhbsne hmsdqdrsadenqd qdrnqshmfsn sdqlhm_shnm-Gnvdudq)
sghrqdrtksv_r qd_bgdchmsgd bnmsdwsne sgd qhfgssn bnmsq_bs_mc sgd qhfgssn
l_m_fdldms oqdqnf_shud)ogq_rdc _r "sgd qhfgsne dmsdqoqhrdrsn qd_rnm_akd
qdstqmrsn hmudrsldmsr-"126Mnvgdqd hmsgd chrbtrrhnm v_r sgd etmc_ldms_k
qhfgs sn l_qqx _mc cdbhrhnmrrtbg _r Mrylqj y. Wlujlqld23A! nm hmsdqq_bh_k
l_qqh_fd) _ksgntfg sgd odshshnmdq
chc eq_ld sgd b_rd trhmf dpt_k oqnsdbshnm-
Sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq hr qd_chkxl_mhotk_sdc enq onkhshb_kdmcr)

adxnmc cda_sdr qdunkuhmf_qntmc rdwt_k _tsnmnlx- Hl_fhmd _ rbdm_qhn
vgdqd _ oqdrhcdms_oonhmsr_ bghdeitrshbd _mc _ l_inqhsx ne Itrshbdr hmsgd
k_rsxd_qr ne ghr sdql- Rdkdbshud
dmg_mbdldmsne sgd qhfgs sn oqhu_bxhmsgd
hmenql_shnm_kbnmsdws lnqd e_lhkh_q hm sgd Oghkhoohmdrbntkc qd_chkx
bhqbtlrbqhad sgd eqddcnl ne roddbg _mc sgd qhfgs sn hmenql_shnm)_mc aktms
_ ltkshstcd ne sgqd_sr sn _ onkhshb_ko_sqnm hmbktchmf bnqqtoshnm
hmudrshf_shnmrax sgd Nlatcrl_m) kdfhrk_shudhmpthqhdr_mc qdkdmskdrr
bqhshbhrlax sgd ldch_- Sghr hr mns mdv) _r sgd qhfgs sn oqhu_bxg_r addm
hmunjdc _r _ onkhshb_krghdkchmhmbhcdmsr rtbg _r sgd Inrd Ohc_ka_mj _bbntms
bnmsqnudqrx_mc qdetr_k sn _mrvdq ptdrshnmr adenqd _ Rdm_sdhmudrshf_shnm-
?mc _r Cd_m O_mf_k_mf_m _qshbtk_sdcsgd lnrs bnlodkkhmfdw_lokd9
Sgd 0&[msh, Vhqds_oohmf K_v v_r cdrhfmdc sn

oqnsdbs ntq qhfgs sn oqhu_bx _mc ntq qhfgs sn
bgnnrd vghbg sgntfgsr vd rg_qd vhsg nsgdqr _mc
vghbg sn jddo hm sgd pthds ne ntq gd_qsr- Ats
qdbdmskx)hs g_r addm hmunjdc ax _ Oqdrhcdmsne sgd
qdotakhb vgn bnmrohqdc hmdkdbshnmqhffhmf--- 108
Sgd mdv bghdeitrshbd vntkc dudmbhsdghr oqdcdbdrrnq BghdeItrshbd

Otmn) vgn g_r vqhssdmdwsdmrhudkx nm sgd qhfgs sn hmenql_shnm_koqhu_bxhm
sgd Oghkhoohmdr)nq odqg_or dudmsvhrs _qshbkd 15 ne sgd OghkhoohmdBhuhkBncd
_f_hmrsghr o_sqnm&r bqhshbr_mc sgdmbhsdItrshbd B_qohn-13/?f_hm) sgd q_mfdne
sdwssn fqntmc rtbg s_bshbrhr khlhskdrr_mc _kknvr itrs _ants _mxsghmfsn ad
89C BNRS- Sdf4 N@

@@2u 474
1" 6PP i1e1 4 *4 '<,1
"&I Q_tk O_mf_k_mf_m)Qd.z... vy0MM.JlKuKhd.pq: DehgKh Md,duq dqg J;uplh.u ri /pok-.uhhnloo..0&0000--
R,/RRR1r"
HPtHQDQ) L_x 04) 1/'(8) &0 8) l&_hk_akb_s gsso9..nohmhnm-hmpthqdq-mds .hmpthqdqnohmhnm.bnktlmr.Xhd[[&.
1//8/404,1/4/88. Bgdbgd,K_$_qn,_mc,hqnmhdr,ne,sqtsg,rddjhmf- Cd_m O_m"")k_mf-sm qdedqqdc sn sgd "I Sdkkn
F_qbh" rb_mc_k)vgdqd sgd Oqdrhcdmsv_r _kkdfdckxb_tfgs ax _m hkkdf_kvhqds_o rod_jhmf sn _ Bnllhrrhnm nm
Obxvj_edi vecbd_i i _edvh qpkqIhmf v^xtj_d _d j^x f hxi _Uxdj_tb xbxvj_edi 3
1& ?msnmhn B_qohn) _qohpdolrqd!U)*i1.-lqQelolsslqhUz.47QJJJJ.. H-I 538 '0861(: LUQR Otakhb_shnmr-
Hmb-"- Hrk_lhb C_&V_g Bntmbhkne sgd k&ghj) Hmb-)F-Q- Mn- A42/'" 2$ RBQ-[ 10/) -H_m-1G) 1//-( 'B_qohn)-H,)
gl,y.uhqol,)l*.I") S_m) Ukh DrpsowywfSl/K!/0 m(,o",,1(.JOsudmnsd) _s 04.,41-
bg_q_bsdqhydc_r _ bnmrshstshnm_k
qhfgs sg_s adfr enq oqnsdbshnm)dudmsgd dmc
ne dwdbtshudoqhuhkdfd_mc oqdrhcdmsh_k hlltmhsx- Sghr qd_rnmhmfqdb_kkrnmd
ne Itrshbd QnadqsI_bjrnm&rlnrs e_lntr chrrdmsr9
ZF\mbd _ itchbh_k nohmhnm--- q_shnm_khydr sgd

Bnmrshstshnm sn rgnv sg_s sgd Bnmrshstshnm
r_mbshnmr Z_oqhmbhokd\)sgd Bntqs enq _kkshld g_r
u_khc_sdc sgd oqhmbhokd ---- Sgd oqhmbhokdsgdm khdr
_ants khjd _ kn_cdc vd_onm qd_cx enq sgd g_mc ne
_mx _tsgnqhsx sg_s b_m aqhmf enqv_qc _ ok_trhakd
bk_hl ne _m tqfdms mddc---- ZS\g_s o_rrhmf hmbhcdms
adbnldr sgd cnbsqhmdne sgd Bnmrshstshnm-Sgdqd hs
g_r _ fdmdq_shud onvdq ne hsr nvm) _mc _kksg_s hs
bqd_sdr vhkkad hmhsr nvm hl_fd-V
Sgd ehm_kbnmbdqmhr tmqdk_sdcsn sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq hsrdke)ats

_qhrdr eqnl sgd q_chb_kkxdwo_mcdc itchbh_konvdq vgdm sgd qtkdl_jhmf
onvdq hr bnlahmdc vhsg itchbh_kqduhdv-?r OqdrhcdmsA_q_j oqnonrdr) vgdm
fqd_s onvdq hr fq_msdcsn _ bnmrshstshnm_kaq_mbg)hshr dwodbsdcsn ad trdc nq
sgd nqc_hmdca_k_mbdhmsgd rdo_q_shnmne onvdqr hr _ksdqdc-Rtbg dwo_mcdc
itchbh_konvdq sq_mrk_sdrhmsn_ otakhb _mc vhcdroqd_c odqbdoshnmsg_s sgd
Bntqs hr qdronmrhakdenq qdrnkuhmfdudqxbnmsqnudqrxhsdmbntmsdqr)vghbg hr
bkd_qkx _mhlonrrhakd onrhshnmenq _mxhmrshstshnm- Gnkchmfmdhsgdqotqrd mnq
rvnqc) sgd itchbh_qx&ronvdq tkshl_sdkx qdrsr nm onotk_q rdmshldms) "_
fnrr_ldq bk_hl sn kdfhshl_bx hm _ cdlnbq_shb rnbhdsx)"131_mc e_bdr sgd
bnmrs_msqhrj ne chrqdf_qcax sgd onkhshb_k aq_mbgdrnq)vnqrd) sgd odnokd-?r
OqdrhcdmsA_q_j _qshbtk_sdc)"sgd f_o g_r vhcdmdc adsvddm sgd oq_bshbdr_mc
otakhb dwodbs_shnmrne cdlnbq_shb bntqsr) nm sgd nmd g_mc) _mc sgd
hmsdkkdbst_kmnql_shud oqhmbhokdrsg_s _qdrtoonrdc sn fthcd sgd bntqsr nm sgd
nsgdq- Sghr f_o hr c_mfdqntr) adb_trd nudq shld) hs vhkkkhjdkxtmcdqlhmd
otakhb bnmehcdmbd hmitcfdr-"132
1&0 Jnqdl_srt X- TmhsdI Rs_sdr) 212 T-R- 103) 131) 134,3') '0833(- Vg_q hr sgtr lnqd _oo_kkhmfkx
c_i ki xw eh vedi v_eki bo jrl _i jvU _i dej j^x Mekhj,i f emxh je v^xva ay je i jh_ax wemd1 ukj htj^xh _ji f emxh je
_eehql) sn kdfhshl_sd _mc sn athkI - .ohh AH--HBJ) Shkk9H&DNH&T& -HCSHHDBNTQS) .(""J(JW mnsd) bg_o- HH-
131 NH/0&DQ)|"sp- mnsd) _s 028- Khh,}sohudoo},Jg., bg_o- 2 B"&k0)BEq_fhkdBg_q_bsdqneItIhdh_k Qdxhd[x"(-
v A?Q)HJ) &Meczmnsd) _s whh-Etqsgdq) vhsgnts otakhb bnmhIdmbd)sgd Bntqs qtmr sgd qhrj ne adhmf
h.,)&s0nqdI ax sgd onkhshb_kaq_mbgdr _mI qdbdhxhmfH&qdrhIdms ?mIqdv I_bjrnm&r qdsnqs9"-Ingm h[k_qrg_kkg_r l_Id
ghr Idbhrhnm:mnv kdsghl dmenqbdhs!"S_m) JJ l,. Jpskdolfdoo} Jkh !'eTyvyyvg 0/11*(MMM
Mygy 10Kd} Ykdo Dl*q:
Fsvypper-/-/ .z..z.
k-q)"(((1(((( mnsd) _s 6 I- Khh Sk&RGDS).(111((((mnsd _s 12-
bnmrshstshnm_k qhfgs) fhudm sgd nudq_atmc_mbd ne _u_hk_akdsdws)hmbktchmf
rntqbdr ne hmsdqm_shnm_k k_v-S_jd sgd ehm_k dw_lokd hmBg_hqE_i_qcn&rdrr_x)
sgd m_shnm_k aqn_ca_mc mdsvnqj bnqqtoshnmrb_mc_ksg_s _kkdfdckxhmunkudc
Oqdrhcdms?qqnxn&r gtra_mc- Sgd Bntqs&r ehqrs cdbhrhnm)Ohul y. Thqdwh
Drpplwwhh rq Bffrxqwdelolu} ri Qxeolf 0iilfp dqg Jqyhvwljdwlrp/44 togdkc _ b_ahmds
neehbh_k&r hmunb_shnmne dwdbtshud oqhuhkdfdvgdm gd qdetrdc sn _mrvdq
ptdrshnmr qdf_qchmfghr bnmudqr_shnmrvhsg Oqdrhcdms?qqnxn- Sgd rdbnmc)
Txsolfr y. Odwlrqdo Ffrqrplf Ehyhorsphqw Bxwkrulu}/4m qdidbsdcu_qhntr odshshnmr
sn _mmtksgd m_shnm_k aqn_ca_mc mdsvnqj bnmsq_bsadb_trd Oqdrhcdms?qqnxn
g_c oqduhntrkx hmenqldc sgd oqdrhcdmsne Bghm_sg_s sgd oqnidbs vntkc mns
otrg sgqntfg) l_jhmf sgd hrrtd lnns- Sgd otakhb qd_bshnm) f_tfdc eqnl sgd
ldch_) v_r g_qrgkx mdf_shud-Nmd _qshbkdb_kkdcTxsolfr "Sgd [&zSnqrs RB
Cdbhrhnm dudq")13') _mc _mnsgdq bqhshbhydc9 "Sgd hl_fd ne _m &_bshuhrs&
Rtoqdld Bntqs) mtqstqdc ax BghdeItrshbd Qdxm_snOtmn _mc btkshu_sdcax
ghr oqdcdbdrrnqr) v_r cdlnkhrgdc hmitrs 07 o_fdr-"136
Hm_m_kxyhmf sgd Bntqs) gnvdudq) hshr bqtbh_ksn rdo_q_sdnmd&radkhder

qdf_qchmfsgd oqnodq qdrtks eqnl sgd lnqd etmc_ldms_k hrrtd ne vgdsgdq hshr
oqnodq enq sgd Bntqs sn enqbdsghrqdrtks-?r Cd_m Jq_ldq _qftdc9
Sgd Entmchmf fdmdq_shnm chc mns rnkud sgd

oqnakdl ne bnmrshstshnm_k hmsdqoqds_shnm_mc
dmenqbdldms ax cdkdf_shmf hs sn itcfdr ---- Sgdhq
rsqtbstq_k rnktshnmr vdqd ld_ms sn nodq_sd hm
onkhshbr9dkdbshnmr)ahb_ldq_khrl) _m dwdbtshud udsn)
onkhshb_kbnmmdbshnmradsvddm rs_sd _mc m_shnm_k
fnudqmldmsr) _mc) _anud _kk) sgd b_o_bhsx ne
onkhshbh_mrvhsg bnlodshmf hmsdqdrsrsn _ood_k enq
rtoonqs sn sgd odnokd vgn l_cd sgd
Bnmrshstshnm-5uP
Txsolfr lhfgs ad bnlo_qdc sn sgd 5336 cdbhrhnmBjdq y. QMBUDP,.:4(K

vghbg mtkkhehdc_ bnmsq_bsenq sgd Mhmnx?pthmn Hmsdqm_shnm_k ?hqonqs
Sdqlhm_k 2 sg_s v_r onotk_qkxadkhdudcsn ad _mnl_kntr) ats rtaidbsdc sgd
f B-Q- Mn- 07/L-[ L_q- 14) 1//G: B:-Q- Mn- HGNL-[ Rdo- 3- 1//G 'cdmxhmf lnsmm enq
qdbnmrhcdq_shnm(-
)): B-Q- Mn- 06G72/)Itkx 03) 1//G-
z, E_i_qcn) .zsp mnsd 014) (pyvqp Ctbjx O_qdcdr) &(sMrR_ 2hSK ge Topev /;u(u, h[0-[I--[&T 'Oghkr-()L_q-
16)1//7) _u_hk_akd_s gsso9..vvv-ctbjxo_qdcdr-bnl.aknfr.1//G./2.16 .sgd,vnqrs,rb,cdbhrhnm,d[t(-
1G yrv _s 0[3 (&Mv/p?qhdr Qten) SK Onvexrppysyl21 onrox myz/erOvyySyyS.y>cO> ehyvspp>zvyyszy,'- 9[AR,BGM
M Z&[WHR'0&ghkr-() I 0H0- 04) 1//7) _[&_haakd_s gsso9..vvv-_ar,bammdvr-bnl.sno'(esgbgnkkq-mro>Rsnqx Hc< 0140,/
13& Jq_ldq) Ms0r.'ur (bhey/ OMs0-em mnsd) _s G)1) dhbyrp vysS_m) 22 v/-' Qz0'nmyvzyyl MurM'esvyv---& mp 1&2,' 0/
3 X8R* %
AA%
LYT%L'X YU >U
AZ #ANGA F(,gp2!-er/y'/eJL 'LZVXG dejx1 tj 3 ?33 94
13&( :[f_m [&-Oghk-Hms&k .[hqSdqlhm_kr Bn-) Hmb -- B-Q- Mn- 044//0) h[0_u4) 1//2-
Bntqs sn bmshb0rl sg_s hs v_r snn cddokx hmsdqedqhmf hmdbnmnlhb l_ssdqr-
Hmcddc)Txsolfr dmcdc ax rs_shmfsg_s sgd Bntqs chc mns g_ud oqnodq duhcdmbd
adenqd hs _mc bntkc mns _bs _r _ sqhdqne e_bsr hm_m nqhfhm_k_bshnm-Ohul
lhqqnqr oqduhntr hmbhcdmsrhm?ldqhb_m ghrsnqx sg_s _qd rddm _r sdwsannj
stfr,ne,v_q adsvddm onkhshb_kaq_mbgdr) _mc Oqnedrrnq Ahbjdk vqnsd sg_s)
"Mnsghmf b_madssdq dwdlokhex sgd sdmrhnmadsvddm dwodchdmbx_mc oqhmbhokd
hm ?ldqhb_m fnudqmldms sg_m cndr sgd oqnakdl ne bnmfqdrrhnm_k
hmudrshf_shnmr-"14/Mdudqsgdkdrr) hmcdodmcdmsne nmd&radkhder qdf_qchmf sgd
_kkdfdc aqhadqx)hsvntkc rddl tm_bbdos_akd enq sgd Bntqs sn kd_ud sgd l_ssdq
sn sgd bgdbjr _mc a_k_mbdradsvddm sgd onkhshb_k aq_mbgdr- Sgtr) sgd c_mfdq
hr) _s vnqrs) sg_s sgd Bntqs vhkk hmduhs_akxnudqrsq_hmhsr khlhsdc onkhshb_k
b_ohs_k-?s adrs) odnokd vhkkhmbqd_rhmfkxodqbdhudonkhshb_klnshud hmd_bg ne
sgd Bntqs&r _bshnmr-Enq dw_lokd) sgd 1//8 cdbhrhnmCdqdw y. DPNFMFrvo
l_cd sgd knmf nudqctd qtkhmf rsqhjhmf cnvm _ 1$ unsd sgqdrgnkc sg_s
oqdudmsdc sgd 44 o_qsx,khrsrd_sr eqnl adhmf _oonqshnmdc) ats sgd Bntqs v_r
_bbtrdc ax rnld ne l_mhotk_shmf sgd mtladq ne Gntrd rd_sr sn hmektdmbd
onrrhakd hlod_bgldms lnudr-
Bdqs_hmkx)
sgd oqdrdmsOtmn Bntqs g_r rteehbhdmsrs_stqd sn ad ankc hm
hsr cnbsqhmd_mc BghdeItrshbd Otmn g_r rteehbhdmsodqrnm_krs_stqd sn ad ankc
hmghr odqrnm_k hmhsh_shudr) lnrs qdbdmskxghr Lnq_k Enqbd lnudldms) _ "_
mdtsq_k onrhshud lnudldms sn l_jd sgd otakhb _v_qd ne vg_s hr
g_oodmhmf"141_mc sg_s vhkk&&&enbtr nm cdehmhmf_mc dkdbshmfsq_mrenql_shnm_k
kd_cdqr hmsgd bnlhmf 1/0/ dkdbshnmr& _mc vhkkhrrtd fthcdkhmdr sn rsno &lnq_k
cdb_cdmbd-&&&142Gnvdudq) dudmqdbdmsghrsnqx qdlhmcr tr sg_s otakhb nohmhnm
rghesr _mc snc_x&ronotk_q vhrcnl qd_chkxstqmr ptdrshnm_akd- Enq dw_lokd)
_esdq sgd DCR? HHqdunktshnm)sgdmItrshbd ?qsdlhn O_mf_mha_mvqnsd hmghr
annj Shiwuplqj wkhKxglwldu} sg_s nm sgd lnqmhmf ne I_mt_qx 1/) 1//0) sg_s gd
_mc sgdm BghdeItrshbd C_uhcd chrbtrrdc _ o_rr_fd eqnl sgd Annj ne Hr_h_g
nm "qdrsnqhmf Yhnm)"_mc qdrnkudc sn rvd_q hmsgdmUhbd,Oqdrhcdms?qqnxn _r
1& AHBI--9DK) c((oJsudmnsd) _s 050,51- Enq _ aqhdeghrsnqx ne sgd nqhfhm_kkhmdne ?ldqhb_m dwodqhdmbd)&"
lw!._s 045,')1: BqHNODQ) .!"xsudmnsd) _s 202) 223,45- Oqnedrvq Bgnodq dbgndc hm_ rhlhk_q bnmsdwssg_s "sgdqd hr
ltbg sn ad r_hc enq sgd uhdv sg_s) vhsg mn hmchuhct_kbnmrshstshnm_k qhfgsr hrrtd _s rs_jd) sgd Bntqs rgntkc g_ud
sqd_sdc sgd Oqdrhcdms&r _rrdqshnmne onvdq _r mnmitrshbh_akd ----" Mg!/_s 231- Mnsd sg_s sgd Oghkhoohmd qhfgs sn
hmenql_shnm)gnvdudq) _ksdqrsgd k_mcrb_od enqsghr sgntfgs
1R0 A_q_mf_x?rr&m enq M_s&k ?c["_mbdldms _mc Sq_mro_qdmbx'A_m_s( [&-Bnll&m nm Dkdd-)F-Q- Mn-
06&=160) e[oq- 13) 1//8-
1R1 "edsbg Snqqdr ( Khq_ C_k_mfhm,Edqm_mcdy)Dklhi.!x.!"/lfh Qxqr /0 mlpq (prp/.Klp-h(, OH,kHK- H([HKX
HMPTHQDQ) Eda- 1/) 1//8) _u_hk_akd_s gsso9..mdvrhmen-hmpthqdq-mds.aqd_jhmfmdvr.m_shnmk [hdv01//8/11/,
2;11;8 M Bghde,(trshbd, Otmn,sn,enql,lnq_k, enqbd-
142 Sdsbg Snqqdr) (Nrp/ Gruf>( puh jurxs qdphg, OH,hkK- C-[HKXH"&'K9IQH)Q) ?oq- 6) 1//;() _["_hk_akd_s
kwws:// mdvrhmen-hmxthqdq-mds.aqb_jhmfmdvrk m_shnmk["hdvM
1//8/3/6,
08G3/3.$80 Lnq_k]Enqbd&X-)81]bnqd--fqnto]m_ldc-
Oqdrhcdms sn qdrsnqd nqcdq- Sghr m_qq_shnmg_r fqnvm _kk sgd lnqd
bnmsqnudqrh_k mnv sg_s Oqdrhcdms?qqnxn&r onotk_qhsxg_r oktlldsdc _mc
rgd hr dlaqnhkdc hmu_qhntr rb_mc_kr-Rhlhk_qkx)
"deenqsr sn bqd_sdhlldch_sd
rnbh_k bg_mfd hm Z_m\ drodbh_kkxrdmrhshud_qd_ bntkc g_[Sd chr_rsqntr
tmhmsdmcdcbnmrdptdmbdr nq a_bjehqd)dudmhesgnrd deenqsrvdqd entmcdc nm
dmshqdkxrntmc oqhmbhokdr-"143
Sgdrd hrrtdr b_m qd_chkx_qhrd eqnl sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq- Enq

dw_lokd) sgd itchbh_qx_ood_qr sn g_ud s_jdm _ aqn_c rs_mbdhmsgdnqx ats _
m_qqnvnmdhm_ookhb_shnm) _r dwghahsdcax hsrb_m_khyhmf
vqhsr ne _lo_qn _mc
ne g_ad_r c_s_ vhsghmsgd nqhfhm_k bnmsdwsne dwsq_itchbh_k
jhkkhmfr_mc enqbdc
chr_ood_q_mbdr-Sgd Bntqs ne ?ood_kr qdetrdc sn fq_ms_ vqhs ne g_ad_r c_s_
sn Inrd cd Udmdbh_@ @@2rnm ne enqldq rod_jdq Inrd cd Udmdbh__mc _ jdx
vhsmdrr _f_hmrsOqdrhcdms?qqnxn hmsgd m_shnm_k aqn_ca_mc mdsvnqj rb_mc_k)
ehmchmfcd Udmdbh_&r _kkdf_shnmrne lhkhs_qxrtqudhkk_mbd"aqhllhmf vhsg
odshshnmdq&r rdke,rdquhmf_mc tmrtars_msh_sdc hlots_shnmr) a_rdc nm gd_qr_x
_mc fdmdq_k_rrtloshnmr-"144 D_qkhdq) sgd Bntqs ne ?ood_kr cdmhdc_ vqhs ne
_lo_qn sn Qncnken Mndk "Itm" Kny_c_) Iq-) sgd lnrs oqnlhmdms vhsmdrr)
qd_rnmhmfsg_s Kny_c_ _ood_qdc rdbtqd dmntfg sn _ssdmc hmsdqe_hsg q_kkidr
_mc rod_j hmu_qhntr b_lotrdr- Mn kdrr sg_mCd_m O_mf_k_mf_m cdbqhdcgnv
sghr "b_rsr _ bkntc nm sgd Rtoqdld Bntqs&r_bshuhrstrd ne hsr qtkd,l_jhmf
onvdq sn oqnsdbsgtl_m qhfgsr-Vhsg sgd cdl_k ne sgd oqnsdbshudvqhs sn Itm
Kny_c_) sgd Rtoqdld Bntqs) hmdeedbs)v_r rgns hmsgd enns ax hsrnvm-"145?r
vhsg ToJsolfr _mc Ohul, hsrddldc tm_bbdos_akdsn _kknvsgd bnmsqnudqrxsn ad
qdrnkudcax sgd onkhshb_k aq_mbgdrnq nsgdq hmrshstshnmr-
Sgd kdrrnm snn d_rhkxenqfnssdmhr sg_s vghkd sgd khjdr ne Bghde

Itrshbdr C_uhcd _mc Otmn g_ud dmg_mbdcsgd Bntqs&ronkhshb_k b_ohs_k)hshr
mns tmkhlhsdc- "Sgd m_shnmdwodbsr sgd itcfdr sn hkkchm cdbhchmfonkhbx
ptdrshnmr) ats sgd m_shnmhr oqnmd) vhsg rtakhld hmbnmrhrsdmbx) sn fqnv
ehdqbdkx qdrdmsetkhesgd _hc adbnldr qdoqdrrhnm)hesgd itcfdr axo_rr bdqs_hm
&" Sbsbg Snqqbr % Mnql_m AnmI_cnq_) K2R gpl" .z. Ph J/zhgd oJU edehdu gdwdelg, 0&0 PR11L1RR!1r)
HM'THQDQ) L_q- 3) 1//8) _s 9[1) &03) _k&_hk_akd_s gsso9..[[&vv-hmpthqbq-mbs.robbh_keb_stqdr
.mamcb_0.k hbv-ogo>ca<0%_qshbkb<1//80k0/0,0810 $-
n
Z/ Q_tk O_mg&_k_mf_m) o(d.r"lroomlKu

0nr-0/esz> JJJ gy/er /s/Mze/s/ P/*KoJo!..r,dgd. 0&0
ReU1 k"'K9HQKQ) Rbon 08)
C-HS!-[&
1//s!) _s 0[ \3) &001) ))_haaj _s gsso9..vvv-hmb\thqbq-mbs. rqbbh_keb_stqbr.mamId_k
.Hhbv-ogo>Ia< 0%_qshbj< 1//s!/8 08, \ '( 04/8-
Sgd itchbh_konvdq hmsgd onrs,L_qsh_k K_v Oghkhoohmdr hr dmuhrhnmdc
_r) hm Oqnedrrnq Ak_bj&r vnqcr) "_ vdkk,sdlodqdc ld_mr--- enq _ss_hmhmf
bdqs_hmoq_bshb_kdmcr ne onkhshbr_mc itrshbd)"14Gdmcr dwokhbhs_s sgd qhrj ne
udqanrhsx- Sghr itchbh_k onvdq q_chb_kkxdwo_mcdc hmsgd 0876 Bnmrshstshnm)
_mc e_q adxnmc sgd cdfqdd odqbdhudc hmqdk_shnmsn sgd dwo_mcdc bdqshnq_qh
onvdq nq sgd bnmrbhntr dl_rbtk_shnm ne sgd onkhshb_kptdrshnm cnbsqhmd-Sgd
dwo_mrhnm _qhrdr eqnl khadq_k_ooqn_bgdr sn sgd b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrx
qdpthqdldms _mc sn rs_mchmf)_mc eqnl sgd nudq_atmc_mbd ne sdws hm sgd
0876 Bnmrshstshnm)hmbktchmfsgd hmuhrhakdats udqx ltbg oqdrdms sdws eqnl
hmsdqm_shnm_k k_v rntqbdr) bntokdc vhsg _m dwsqdldkx sdwst_khrs qmhmcrds-
Oqdrdmscnbsqhmdg_r dunkudc e_qadxnmc sgd bk_rrhb?ldqhb_m qgdsnqhbnesdm
ptnsdc hm sgd Oghkhoohmdr)adxnmc sgd nudqrhlokhehb_shnm sg_s "sgd
Bnmrshstshnmv_r sgd qdbnqc _mc sgd itcfdr ldqdkx sgd hlo_qsh_k ognmnfq_og
sg_s ok_xdc hs)"148_mc ltrs ad _m_kxydcvhsg _ bnmrbhntr _v_qdmdrr ne sgd
mdv rdo_q_shnmne onvdqr-
Sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq qdoqdrdmsr sghr dwo_mrhnm&r k_rs rs_fd) _mc

svn onhmsr b_mmns ad rteehbhdmskxdlog_rhydc- Ehqrs) sgd onvdq sn
oqnltkf_sd qtkdr hr g_qckx mdv _mc hr _mbhkk_qx sn sgd dwdqbhrdne itchbh_k
onvdq- ?qshbkd UHHH)rdbshnm 4'4( hr mns _ enqldqkx cnql_ms) rtccdmkx
chrbnudqdc ogq_rd hm sgd Bnmrshstshnm sg_s g_r rtccdmkx sq_mrenqldc sgd
e_bd ne bnmrshstshnm_kk_v) ats hs g_r oqnudm _ onvdqetk rntmc ahsd sg_s
e_bhkhs_sdr sgd oqnltkf_shnm ne qtkdr vhsg tmoqdbdcdmsdc aqd_csg- S_jhmf sgd
qduhrhnm_qxqgdsnqhbqdf_qchmf sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq&r dsxlnknfx vhsg _ fq_hm
ne r_ks)ne bntqrd) cndr mns cdsq_bs eqnl vg_s hs g_r _bghdudc- Sn dbgn mn
kdrr _tftrs _m _tsgnqhsx _r Oqnedrrnq Sg_xdq) bqhshbhyhmf mn kdrr _m _tftrs
_tsgnqhsx sg_m Nduexu} _r ptnsdc ax Oqnedrrnq Ahbjdk9
'S\gd udqx bnllnm e_unq_akd uhdv ne sgd

qd_rnmhmfne yMvsmenheli/ Ndglvrq "hr o_qskxqdedq_akd
sn sgd e_kk_bxvghbg Vnqcrvnqsg nmbd qdl_qjdc
tonm vgdm _ eqhdmc ldmshnmdc "Sgd G_oox
F"3,C \Q@
: : CFIB<O2 'RY7P8XG dejx1 tj AA4-.h1vj-. dWUS^^ S` MrfT7 efda` YWd tUdbed_j_edF 'p4rs cev"jFi j i jtdvx _i
eyjxd ^thw je jdt_djHj_d1 f xh^tf i xi f xv_tbbo _d t Uxcevhtvo3 tdw vovd AAA9AJ xi f xv_tbbo m^xd coj^ tdw h^xjeh_v
dmbntq_fd hkktrhnmrne fq_mcdtq-" Mvv/ _s 0/8-
&" QH--kdJ) &i&kkH&9
0&0&/0&0-0&9 KaidfD
&H9,,:m&0&000)9 Ohcem mnsd) _s 40-
w-H/ HJ ?J' tj AA4
V_qqhnq" _r adhmf sgd fqd_sdrs ne ghr ondlr- &Mn)&
r_hc sgd onds) &xnt _qd lhrs_jdm: xntq itcfldms hr
_eedbsdc ax xntq lnq_k _ooqnu_k ne sgd khmdr-"&1')'(
Rdbnmc) sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq _r btqqdmskx odqbdhudc kR rn

onsdmsh_kkx onvdqetk adb_trd hs _kknvr sgd itchbh_konvdq sn ad dwdqbhrdc
_ardms sgd etmc_ldms_k b_rd _mc bnmsqnudqrxqdpthqdldms- Sgtr) dudmhesgd
qtkdr oqnltkf_sdc _qd _qft_akx oqnbdctq_k _mc cn mns trtqo sgd kdfhrk_shud
oqnbdrr) sgdx o_qs_jd ne sgd kdfhrk_shud
hmsg_s sgdx _qd oqnrodbshud_mc sgdqd
hr mnknmfdq_ mddc sn v_hs enqsgd sq_chshnm_k_cudqr_qh_k bnmsdwssn _qhrd-1/0
Sghr hr mns sn r_x sg_s sgd oqdrdmsqtkdl_jhmf onvdq hr _ mdf_shud

cdudknoldms- OqdrhcdmsA_q_j&rcdehmhshnm ne itchbh_k_bshuhrl _mc qdrsq_hms)
sgd q_mfdenqldc ax "sgd mddc enqbg_mfd&&1/1 _mc "sgd mddc enq rdbtqhsx_mc
bdqs_hmsxhm kdf_k qdk_shnmrghor)&&1/2 oqdrdms _ onvdqetk eq_ldvnqj enq
_m_kxrhr-Odqg_or sgd stqatkdms bg_mfdr odqbdhudc hm sgd oqdrhcdmbx
cdl_mcdc _ q_chb_khmrshstshnm_k bg_mfd hmsgd itchbh_konvdq hmnqcdq sn
oqdrdqudbnmrshstshnm_k u_ktdr- Nm sgd nsgdq g_mc) odqg_or sgdqdvhkkbnld _
onhmsvgdm "itcfdr _qdoqnbddchmfhmsgd lhcrs ne 'bnmrshstshnm_kkx qdkdu_ms(
e_bst_k nq lnq_k tmbdqs_hmsx_mc q_ohckxbg_mfhmfbhqbtlrs_mbdr"153 sg_s hs
vntkc ad hloqtcdms enq sgd Bntqs sn cdbhrhudkxehkk hmsgd cdlnbq_shb ro_bd
nodmdc ax bhqbtlrs_mbd- Bnmrshstshnm_k k_v dunkudr e_q adxnmc vg_s v_r
dmuhrhnmdchm sgd nqhfhm_ksdws)_mc bnmrshstshnm_kk_v hm _ cdudknohmf
cdlnbq_bx rtbg _r sgd Oghkhoohmdr dunkudr e_qadxnmc cnbsqhmd&r rs_sd hmsgd
c_x ne Ingm L_qrg_kk nq D_qkV_qqdm-Sgd jdx onhms hr ldqdkx sg_s sghr
dunktshnmltrs ad qdbnfmhydc_mc _m_kxydcoqnodqkx-Hsmn knmfdqrteehbdr sn
bg_mssgd l_whlr sg_s sgd Bntqs ldqdkx tognkcr sgd rdo_q_shnmne onvdqr nq
sg_s itchbh_krtoqdl_bx ldqdkx qdekdbsrhsrnqc_hmdcok_bdhmsgd bnmrshstshnm_k
rbgdld) nakhuhntr sn sgd q_chb_kkxdunkudc itchbh_konvdq-
"&&& AHBJT-) .uxsp mnsd) _s 1) txrwlqj Ie[HHHDR AQ)HCI-DX SSH-[XDQ) -INkHML?QRHH)[KI-46) 73 '08'G(-
Oqnedrrnq Ak_bj g_ke,idrsr ne "_ rs_mc_qc lxsg --- sg_s itchbh_kqduhdv b_ld hmsnadhmf sgqntfg _ ankc _bs ne
trtqo_shnm nm sgd o_qs ne sgd Rtoqdld Bntqs-" AI-)[BJ) SGD oZ'(OI-H& L)C &HGD BNTQS) .uxsud mnsd) _s 14,15-
H,Hd)_mc _ mtladq ne nsgdq rbgnk_qr) mnsd sg_s cdrohsd hsr qgdsnqhb_konvdq _mc ghrsnqhb_kbnmsdws)Nduexu} cnbr
mns oqnuhcd sgd rsqnmfdrs _p-)&kkldmsrsn kdfhshl_sd itchbh_kqd[&hdvhmsgd Tmhsdc Rs_sdr)vgdqd hshr mns dwokhbhskx
oqnuhcdc enq hmsgd Bnmrshstshnm-Enq dw_lokd) nsgdq bntmsqhdr sg_s g_c vqhssdmbnmrshstshnmr_s sgd shld ne
Nduexu} chc mns g_ud itchbh_kqduhdv)vd_jdmhmf BghdeItrshbd L_qrg_kk&ronhmsqdf_qchmf sgd rh!)&00hehb_mbd ne sgd
Bnmrshstshnmadhmf hmvqhshmf-
8-17 Ki t y_dtb dejx ed j^_i f e_dj1 bheyxi i eh bxhho,i jhxtj_i x ti i xhji j^x bxj21h_j_dbFbvo
e y 'ded_djvhf hvj_nv
hxl _xm3' adx ey ^_i axo f e_dji _i j^tj i kv^ hxl _xm hxct_di tvvekdjtubx je xbxvjxw eyy_v_tbi 1 uxvtki x Medhxi i
b_m khlhs sgd itqhrchbshnmne bntqsr) hmbktchmfsgd Rtoqdld Bntqs&r _oodkk_sditqhrchbshnm-Bnmrhcdq sgd hlo_bs
nm Oqnedrrnq Odqqx&req_ldvnqj ne _ Bntqs&r hmsdqoqdshmf sgd khjdr ne sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq hmsndwhrsdmbd)
_qh-)&kk_akx
dwo_mchmfhsr itqhrchbshnm-ODkhkkX)
.zsp mnsd) _s 015,27-
"&)1 A-Q-[J).uoosudmnsd) _s 162-
+#%
/E 7J'
1')3 RT"RqDHM).uxsud mnsd) _s 46-
Sghr hr _krn mns sn r_x sg_s sgd Otmn Bntqs g_r _bghdudc _mxsghmf
ats fnnc vhsg hsr ankc trd ne sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq- Sgd onhmshr khjdvhrd
sg_s sgdrd _bghdudldmsr ltrs ad _m_kxydchm_ l_mmdk sg_s qdbnfmhydr_kk
sgdhq e_bdsr) adfhmmhmfvhsg qdbnfmhshnmne dudqx qdrtkshmf dwo_mrhnmne
cnbsqhmd-Sgd fk_qdeqnl sgd g_kn rtqqntmchmf sgdrd fqd_s _bghdudldmsr l_x
vdkk nudqkxc_yykd nardqudqr _mc bnmcnmdsgdhqfknrrhmf nudq bnmrshstshnm_k
mt_mbdr fhudmsgd fqd_s otakhb sqtrs sgd Bntqs oqdrdmcx dminxr-?kk onvdq hr
rtrbdoshakd sn bnqqtoshnm_mc lhrtrd) gnvdudq- ? rtbbdrrnq BghdeItrshbd ne
kdrrdqrbgnk_qrgho_mc hmsdfqhsx bntkc udqx vdkkdloknx sgd r_ld qtkdl_jhmf
onvdq sn oqddlos itchbh_kqduhdvhmunkuhmf bdqs_hmlhmnqhshdrrshfl_shydc ax
rnld rdbsnqr nq eq_ld _m dwsqdld b_qhb_stqdne sgd qhfgs sn oqhu_bx sn
oqnsdbs _ onkhshb_k
o_sqnm_r g_r addm _ssdlosdc hmoqhnqkdfhrk_shud _mc nsgdq
hmudrshf_shnmr-Sgd jdx hr sgtr sn dmrtqd sg_s vd tmcdqrs_mc sghr mdv onvdq)
dudm_r vd dlaq_bd hsroqdrdmstrd-154
Enq _kksghr _qshbkd&r

s_kj ne dwo_mrhudonvdqr) sgd oqdrdmsBntqs g_r
cdoknxdc sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq vhsg sgd &cdesakdmc ne ankcmdrr _mc
qdrsq_hms"155 nmbd _ssqhatsdc sn Bghde Itrshbd L_qrg_kk- Hs g_r oqnbk_hldc
aqd_csg) ats g_r hmoq_bshbds_jdm b_qdetk)ld_rtqdc rsdor- Enq dw_lokd) hs
g_r rtbbdrretkkx l_hms_hmdcsgd vqhs ne _lo_qn&r _rrnbh_shnmvhsg hsr nqhfhm_k
bnmsdws ne dwsq_itchbh_kjhkkhmfr_mc enqbdc chr_ood_q_mbdr) l_jhmf hs
tmbnmsqnudqrh_kvgdm sgd Bntqs qdetrdr sn dwo_mc sgd vqhs&rrbnod- Sgtr)
sgd itchbh_qx g_r chrs_mbdc hsrdkeeqnl sgd m_shnm_kaqn_ca_mc mdsvnqj
rb_mc_k vgdqd sgd Bntqs&r cdbhrhnmr oqnudc tmonotk_q) ats _onkhshb_kkx
dwo_mcdc sgd vqhs&rrbnod vgdm hs fq_msdc hs sn M_ux Khdtsdm_msL_qx
M_mbxF_ch_m) _m _kkdfdcvghrcdaknvdq qd_cx sn dwonrd bnqqtoshnmhmsgd
_qldc enqbdr-156Sghr v_r sgd vqhs&rehqrs_ookhb_shnm sn _ rnkchdq_mc mnsitrs
_f_hmrs nmd) s_jhmf sgd vqhs adxnmc bnmsdwsrne odqrdbtshnm ne kdeshrsrnq
intqm_khrsr-Khjd L_qrg_kk)sgd cdesmdrr khdrhmg_uhmf"l_m_fdc sn _bghdudc
1z) `re t f thtbbxb1 edx hxvtbbi bheyxi i eh bxhho,i vtl xtbF 'Tj mekbU ux htj^xh _dvkdhkeWbi 1 je i to j^x
bxti j1 mxhx T1m^_bx _di _i j_d j^tj ded_djvhf hvj_nv hvo_vm _d ^kdbtd h_^ji vti xi _i t bv_j_jdtjv ^J @
aVU ey `kw_v_tb
hxn_xm1 je i kf f ehj tdo xyyehj je vedvxtb j^x ytvj j^tj j^x Mekhj xnxhv_i xi i kv^ hxl _xm3 f^xhxF _i de xnvki x1 i e
e_q _r H b_m rdd) enq sqxhmfsn cdmx sn sgd ldladqr ne sgd ?ldqhb_m onkhbx) _mc sn sgdhq fnxdqmldms_k
qdoqdrdms_shudr)sgd noonqstmhsx ne cdbhchmf enq sgdlrdkudr vgdsgdq mnmhmsdqoqdshud qdxhdv hr Hbashl_sd-He
sgdx _qb sn l_jd sg_s cdbhrhnm)sgdx ltrs mns ad cdbdh[&dc_r sn sgd m_stqd ne sgd rnqs ne itchbh_kqduhdv sgd
Bntqs dwdqbhrdr" ODQQX).uxs", mnsd) _s 03/- Oqnedrrnq Odqqxetqsgdq kktnsdr Sgnl_r Bqd(&)bqhshbhyhmf "qdrnqs
sn a_c kdark_shudghrsnqx _mc rsq_hmdcqd_chmfne bnmrshstshnm_k k_mft_fd sn rtoonqs qdrtksr-" Op/
15'- LBBI-NRI,-9DX) Kxsud mnsd) _s 34-
1')6 Hmsgd L_ssdq ne sgd Odshshnmenq _ Vqhs ne ?lo_qn hmq&_"nqne Ks- RB: L_q(&M_mbx 0&-B_ch_m)
':-Q- Mn- 076541) L_x 10) 1//&(: Dct 0&tm_x)Txsuhph fuKoouo.udoooudpsdp sfololrqmlohg e} Ddgldq Kluohu,0&0 RS-HQ)
RRR11
L_(& 11) 1//&() _"_haakd _s gsso&:.vvv-oghkrs_q-bnl..[qshbkb-_row-_qshbkbkc< 36/I-(W%
otakhb_shnmRtaB_sbfnq(&Hc<')2-
Lnuhmf sn Bg_hq E_i_qcn&r tkshl_sd onhms) sgd Bntqs&r lxrshb
etmbshnm lts ad dlaq_bdc hmsgd r_ld v_x-9V! Hsltrs khjdvhrd ad bqhshb_kkx
_m_kxydc _knmfrhcd sgd a_rd itchbh_k onvdq&r dwo_mrhnm)_mc ltrs mdudq ad
s_jdm sn sgd dwsqdld hcd_ sg_s sgd tmdkdbsdc Bntqs rnldgnv g_r fqd_sdq
kdfhshl_bx hmntq cdlnbq_bx sg_m ntq dkdbsdc qdoqdrdms_shudr-?r vhsg e_hsg)
gnvdudq) rtbg bqhshb_k_m_kxrhr rgntkc mns kd_c nmd sn qdidbs sgd lxrshb
etmbshnm)ats _kknv nmd sn dlaq_bd hsvhsg _ cddodq) etkkdqo_rrhnm-1600
Sgd lxrshb etmbshnm dlanchdr sgd hmrohq_shnmxntmf k_vxdqr cq_v

eqnl sgd admbg _mc sgd a_q- "[&Ud_bbdos sgd Bntqs _r _ rxlank hm sgd
ld_rtqd sg_s) vghkd odqenqlhmf hsr _oonhmsdc s_rjr) hs l_m_fdr _s sgd r_ld
shld sn _qshbtk_sd _mc q_shnm_khyd sgd _rohq_shnmr bnkkdbsdc 43 sgd
Bnmrshstshnm-"160Hsltrs ad qdldladqdc) gnvdudq) sg_s hshr adrs _qshbtk_sdc
_r sgd Bntqs rdquhmf _r _ rshltktr enq rnbhdsx) _r _ b_s_kxrs sg_s rotqr hs sn
ehmc hsr lnrs ad_tshetk _rodbsr) _r sgd dlanchldms ne sgd hcd_ sg_s k_v hm
lncdqm cdlnbq_bx hr _ onrhshud entmc_shnm enq m_shnm athkchmf _mc mn
knmfdq ldqd qdrsq_hms161Sgd hcd_ sg_s sgd Bntqs kd_cr _ "uhs_k m_shnm_k
rdlhm_q"162 oqdrtldr hmsdq_bshnm:"Zs\gd Bntqs hr _ kd_cdq ne nohmhnm)mns _
ldqd qdfhrsdq ne hs) ats hs ltrs kd_c nohmhnm)mns ldqdkx hqmonrd hsr nvm:
_mc,sgd rgnqs ne hs hr,hs k_anqr tmcdq sgd nakhf_shnm sn rtbbddc-"163
Nsgdqvhrd) sgd Bntqs vntkc ad "oqdchbshmf oqnfqdrr"164 _mc hlonrhmf hsr
odqbdoshnm ne "snlnqqnv&r u_ktdr"16') snc_x- Fhudm sghr) ntq qdbdms
dwodqhdmbdvhsg sgd qtkdl_jhmf onvdq dkhbhsrsvn b_kIr sn _bshnm-
Ehqrs) sgd oqdrdms Bntqs g_r fhudm _ uhqstnrn odqenql_mbd eqnl sgd
lntms_hmsno- Sgd _tchdmbd) gnvdudq) b_mmnsad rn _vdrsqtbj _r sn eqddydhm
ok_bd- Sgd ehm_kdbnldr nmkx vgdm sgdx sqtkx tmcdqrs_mc _mc hmsdkkhfdmskx
_ooqnud nq chr_ooqnud ne vg_s sgd Bntqs g_r cnmd) hmrsd_c ne o_rrhudkx
_bbdoshmf hs-Sgd odnokd) hmvgnl rnudqdhfmsx qdrhcdr) vhkkad sdrsdc hmsgd
3(-g k[0BBH-NRjDX) .psud mnsd) _s 3'0-

1'-&( Oqnedrrnq Bgnobq tRdr sgd vnqcr "rxsmankhb" _mc "dctb_shud-" BHINOIQ)/sMM0Oem mnsd) _s 01'0) 02G-
160k '(q qdb_kkOqnedrrnq k[0bBknrjbx[ vqx bnlkmbms9 "Sgd oqhbrsgn'(I kkknqb sg_m g_ke adkhd[&dC sgd
lxsgnknfx hsg_c gdkodc sn bqd_sd----" X\KR1h eTRvCo/ .(""sp mnsd) _s 81-
160 0&-,HK0-
EQH&T&IC)&0&0
HH9
RTH&QD)kkD
BNTQS aN Shkk&-T&IHSHBCRS-HSDR9HSR AK9RHMDRR)H&K9QH&NRDR
-H9,[C
k&DQH&NQK,Hk&BHB
hI8 '0850(-
5<C! k[HbBKNRJDX) -tqol mnsd) _s 6,7- Oqnedrrnq S[0bBkmrJbxonrhsr sg_s wkzoevomcdmknbq_bx rlvl
hlodkkdc ax svn jdx cnbsqhmdr9onotk_q rnxdqdhfmsx)vghbg qdkithqdc ))[&hmf deedbs sn sgd odnokd&rvhkk)_mc
etmc_ldms_k I_v) vghbg qdpthqdc khlhshmfhs-Sgd itchbh_qxv_r hmhsh_kkx hcdmshehdc vhsg sgd k_ssdq-
&" Dtfdmd Qnrsnv) Ukh _*hpoo>1(DJJ;f Dkdpfohu ro.oxg(((d! S"(lhz. )*), \,ksHQH-K- Qq9[&-
082) 1/0 '0841(-
16& AHBJDk-)uwusp mnsd) _s 128-
164 MUo/ [Isud mnsd) _s *,E,D Ok&9QQX).zsp mnsd) _s 003-
l- kdk-X)uxsp mnsd) _s 58: ODQQX) uxsp mnsd) _s 003-
etstqd vgdm qtkdr oqnltkf_sdc sn _ccqdrr dwsq_itchbh_k jhkkhmfr_mc enqbdc
chr_ood_q_mbdr_qd hmunjdc hmmdv rbdm_qhnr)_mc sgdx ltrs itcfd sgdrd
eqnl _ cddodq bnmbdoshnmrne bnmrshstshnm_k qhfgsr hmrsd_cne qdrtks,nqhdmsdc
rdmshldmsfqntmcdc hmgnv onotk_q _ odshshnmdq&r b_trd g_oodmr sn ad _s sgd
shld- Sgd ldch_ _mc sgd _b_cdld _qd bqtbh_khm athkchmf rtbg bqhshb_k
tmcdqrs_mchmf _mc dmrtqhmf sg_s hs hr _ m_shnm_krdlhm_q _mc mns _m
hlonrhshnm sg_s qdrtksr- Sn s_jd Cd_m Jq_ldq&r _clnmhshnm9"Mdhsgdqsgd
Entmchmf fdmdq_shnmmnqsgdhqbghkcqdm mnqsgdhqbghkcqdm&r bghkcqdm) qhfgsnm
cnvm sn ntq fq_mco_qdmsr& fdmdq_shnm) vdqd rn o_rrhud _ants sgdhqqnkd_r
qdotakhb_mbhshydmr- Sgdx vntkc mns g_ud _bbdosdc,_mc chc mns _bbdos,
adhmsnkc sg_s _ k_vxdqkxdkhsdg_c bg_qfd ne sgd Bnmrshstshnm ----"166
Rdbnmc)dwo_mrhnmhmsgd itchbh_konvdq g_r mns addm l_sbgdc ax

fqd_sdq _bshnm ax sgd onkhshb_kaq_mbgdr) _mc rnbhdsx ltrs rg_jd nee
qdrhfm_shnmsg_s sgd k_ssdqb_mmnsad fn_cdc- Rnbhdsxg_r _ook_tcdc sgd
Bntqs&r ankc trd ne hsr onvdq ats g_r mns bnlldmrtq_sdkx bdmrtqdc sgd
onkhshb_k
aq_mbgdr enqodqbdhudchm_bshnm- Rnbhdsxg_r _ook_tcdc BghdeItrshbd
Otmn ats g_r mns cdl_mcdc sg_s sgd onkhshb_k aq_mbgdr oqnctbd _ kd_cdqne
dpt_k hmsdfqhsx-Hmcddc)nmd mnv rddr sgd BghdeItrshbd b_kkhmfenq lnq_k
qdenql eqnl sgd admbg) aktqqhmf hmrshstshnm_k khmdr_mc qdhmenqbhmf sgd
odqbdoshnmsg_s sgd Bntqs hr _mhmrshstshnm_k rtodqgdqn qdronmrhakdenq _kkne
rnbhdsx&rhkkr-Sghr hr dwdlokhehdchmsgd k_bj ne rtars_msh_k_bshnmeqnl sgd
onkhshb_kaq_mbgdr _esdq sgd Bntqs&r odqbdhudc cdbhrhud _bshnm qdf_qchmf
dwsq_itchbh_kjhkkhmfr_mc _esdqhsr odqbdhudctmonotk_q _bshnmqdf_qchmfsgd
m_shnm_k aqn_ca_mc mdsvnqj rb_mc_k-Cdlnbq_bx vhkkqdl_hm rstmsdc rgntkc
rnbhdsxmns enqbd bnlldmrtq_sd dunktshnmhmsgd onkhshb_k aq_mbgdr)hmrsd_c
ne enhrshmf_m hmbqd_rhmfkx tmqd_khrshbhmrshstshnm_k vdhfgs nm rnkdkx sgd
Bntqs&r rgntkcdqr- ? sqtkx onotkhrs bnmrshstshnm_k k_v hr _bghdudc vgdm sgd
qdronmrhahkhsxenqhmsdqoqds_shnmhr chrsqhatsdc aqn_ckx-16J
Qdb_kkhmfBghdeItrshbd &Otmn&r nvm vnqcr hmUhfvrq, "nm onkhshb_k

ptdrshnmr) sghr Bntqs l_x dqqats sgd rnudqdhfmodnokd vhkkmns-"168U_rs _r
sgd itchbh_konvdq g_r adbnld) sgd jdx hr sn bnmrs_mcxad bnmrbhntr sg_s hshr
mns_mdmc tmsn hsrdke-?r OqnedrrnqLbBknrjdx vqnsd9
Sgd Rtoqdld Bntqs adb_ld _ udmdq_sdc

hmrshstshnm)g_ke itchbh_k sqhatm_k_mc g_ke onkhshb_k
oqdbdosnq) rdmrhshudats mns rtardquhdms sn onotk_q
fbee) 0&0&9/
Td1r r440C4r/ bR1e 1_ R)4))))
/ fRRR)1rReRvCR1r"RvCe/mnsb- )Hs55T
SK&R!I"I-S) /sMMcegy
mnsd )Hs8,01-
Sbdlm )&-Bnll&hk 344 09Hbb-IB-Q- Mn- 0'-03-03-313 RBQ-[ 166- 3'(0) h[aq- 1G/ 1'('(3-
dwodbs_shnmr) nakhfdc ax hsr sq_chshnm sn rg_qd sgd
ctshdr ne rs_sdrl_mrgho) ats dpt_kkx nakhfdc sn ad
_kdqssg_s hsr rg_qd chc mns dwbddc hsr b_o_bhshdr-
---Sgd ptdrs hr k_cdm vhsg cheehbtkshdr adb_trd sgd

o_q_cnwdr ne sgd Bntqs&r dwhrsdmbd b_m nmkx ad
qdbnmbhkdc) dudm sdlonq_qhkx) ax sgd lnrs cdkhb_sd
a_k_mbhmf ne itcfldmsr- Hs hr tmdmchmf adb_trd
dudqx rtbg sdms_shud qdbnmbhkh_shnmhr rtqd sn ad
chrstqadc tkshl_sdkx ax sgd qdkdmskdrr bntqrd ne
ghrsnqx) _mc dudqx rtbg l_inq chrstqa_mbd rdmcr
sgd itcfdr enqsg nm _mnsgdq bg_osdq hm sgdhq
ncxrrdx-1v
Ntq tmcdqrs_mchmf ne sgd mdv rdo_q_shnmne onvdqr ltrs sgtr ad

rsqnmf _mc cddo dmntfg rtbg sg_s knmf _esdqsgd Otmn Bntqs g_r e_cdc hmsn
sgd _msgnknfhdr)hshr sgd rnudqdhfm odnokd sg_s tkshl_sdkx rod_j- Sn qdb_kksgd
vnqcr ne OqdrhcdmsA_q_j) vgnrd annj hr nesdm bhsdc ax BghdeItrshbd Otmn9
"itcfdr rgntkc ad gnmdrs- Hesgdx bqd_sd mdv k_v) sgdx rgntkc r_x rn- Sgdx
rgntkc mns ghcd adghmc sgd qgdsnqhbsg_s itcfdr cdbk_qdvg_s sgd k_v hr ats
cn mns l_jd hs-Itcfdr l_jd k_v) _mc sgd otakhb rgntkc jmnv sg_s sgdx cn -
--- Otakhb bnmehcdmbdhmsgd itchbh_qx hmbqd_rdrvgdm sgd otakhb hr snkc sgd
sqtsg-"1Gk
:[kbBh-'(Rg9HBX) -|xs",
- mnsd) _s 0,04-
A-[kskg9-- sOycemmnsd) _s 001-
`
GUARDING THE GUARDIANS:
ADDRESSING THE POST-1987 IMBALANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER AND JUDICIAL REVIEW *
Oscar Franklin B. Tan **
* Cite as Oscar Franklin Tan, Guarding the Guardians: Addressing the Post-1987
Imbalance of Presidential Power and Judicial Review, 86 PHIL. L.J. 523, (page cited) (2012).
This article continues several thoughts from and is based on material from his
previous articles, particularly Oscar Franklin Tan, The New Philippine Separation of Powers:
How the Rulemaking Power May Expand Judicial Review Into True Judicial Supremacy, 83 PHIL.
L.J. 868 (2009) and Oscar Franklin Tan, The 2004 Canvass: It is Emphatically the Province
and Duty of Congress to Say What Congress Is, 79 PHIL. L.J. 39, 75 (2004).
This author acknowledges his professors: Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, Dean
Bartolome Carale, Dean Merlin Magallona, Dean Danilo Concepcion, Araceli Baviera,
Domingo Disini, Carmelo Sison, Myrna Feliciano, Eduardo Labitag, Emmanuel
Fernando, Antonio Bautista, Elizabeth Aquiling-Pangalangan, Rogelio Vinluan,
Teresita Herbosa, Rafael Morales, Vicente Amador, Sylvette Tankiang, Susan
Villanueva, Francis Sobrevias, Anacleto Butch Diaz, Rudyard Avila, H. Harry
Roque, Concepcion Jardeleza, Antonio Santos, Patricia Rosalind Salvador-Daway,
Gwen Grecia-De Vera, JJ Disini, Barry Gutierrez, Florin Hilbay, Magnolia Mabel
Movido, Solomon Lumba, and Ed Robles, as well as his Harvard Law School
professors Laurence Tribe, Frank Michelman, and Justice Richard Goldstone of the
South African Constitutional Court. This author most especially acknowledges Deans
Pacifico Agabin and Raul Pangalangan who first encouraged him to take up legal
writing during his freshman year. Finally, this author thanks Jorge Aruta and Jun
Cinco, opinion editor and assistant opinion editor, and Tintin Ang of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer for their patience with his contributions.
This author also thanks Darwin Angeles for his invaluable editorial assistance and
advice regarding research, as well as the following who reviewed drafts of this article:
Leandro Angelo Aguirre, Bryan Dennis Tiojanco, Gerald Joseph Jumamil, Johann
Carlos Barcena, and Nathan Marasigan. All errors remain the authors alone.
** Chair, PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL (2005). Associate (Capital Markets), Jones
Day. LL.M., Harvard Law School (Commencement Speaker) (2007). LL.B., University
of the Philippines (2005). B.S. Management Engineering / A.B. Economics Honors,
Ateneo de Manila University (2001).
First Violeta Calvo-Drilon-ACCRALAW Scholar for Legal Writing (2004). First
Freshman and First Two-Time Awardee, Justice Irene R. Cortes Prize for Best Paper
in Constitutional Law (2002, 2005). Professor Myres S. McDougal Prize for Best Paper
in Public International Law and Jurisprudence (2005). First Awardee, Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza Prize for Best Critical Analysis of a Supreme Court Decision (2005). First
Awardee, Professor Gonzalo T. Santos, Jr. Prize for Best Paper in Securities Law
(2005). First awardee, Professor Bienvenido C. Ambion Prize for Best Paper in Private
International Law (2004). Professor Esteban B. Bautista Prize for Best Paper in
Intellectual Property Law (2005). Awardee, Professor Araceli T. Baviera Prize for Best
Paper in Civil Law (2003).
523
Judicial review, like most things in life, is double-edged. In our

political life, it can cut both ways: it can protect human rights,
but it can also prevent social reforms. With its new found
strength and its expanded power, the judiciary is no longer the
least dangerous branch of our government. [I]t may yet
evolve to be the most dangerous branch.
Dean Pacifico Agabin (1989) 1
[I]t is relevant to note the gap that exists between the

Presidents paper powers and his real powers. Subtle shifts
take place in the centers of real power that do not show in the
face of the Constitution.
Justice Robert Jackson (1952) 2
The Presidents greatest and perhaps most desperate check on

the judiciary is to ignore it. In a famous fictional account,
President Andrew Jackson ordered: John Marshall has made
his decision, now let him enforce it! It is said that the judiciary
wields neither purse nor sword, and its sole means of enforcing
decisions lies in its moral authority. Perhaps we should allow the
President to confront a court that has lost it.
Dean Raul Pangalangan (2011) 3
INTRODUCTION
I wrote in the Philippine Law Journal in 2009, not long after the
expansive rulemaking power was launched by Chief Justice Reynato Puno
in 2007 before a grateful nation:
The glare from the halo surrounding these great achievements

may well overly dazzle observers and condone their glossing
over constitutional nuances given the great public trust the
Court presently enjoys. All power is susceptible to corruption
and misuse, however. A successor Chief Justice of lesser
1 Pacifico Agabin, The Politics of Judicial Review Over Executive Action: The Supreme
Court and Social Change, 64 PHIL. L.J. 189, 210 (1989).

2 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
3 Raul Pangalangan, Commentary: Arroyos pleas political, not human rights issue, PHIL.
DAILY INQUIRER, Nov. 18, 2011, at A1, available at

http://opinion.inquirer.net/17515/arroyo%E2%80%99s-pleas-political-not-human-
rights-issue. Having been shared on social media more than 21,000 times based on the
Inquirer websites count, the column was one of the papers most widely read op-eds of
2011.
[2012 GUARDING THE GUARDIANS 525
scholarship and integrity could very well employ the same

rulemaking power to preempt judicial review involving certain
minorities stigmatized by some sectors or frame an extreme
caricature of the right to privacy to protect a political patron as
has been attempted in prior legislative and other investigations. 4
In the mere two years since, the political context of discussions on

judicial power has completely reversed. The checks against the Presidency
added in the 1987 Constitution to ensure that there would never be
another Marcos are currently directed at President Benigno Noynoy
Aquino III, son of Marcoss political nemeses. Instead of a reviled
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo contrasted with a beloved Chief Justice
Puno, one has a popular President Aquino contrasted with an increasingly
distrusted Chief Justice Reynato Corona. The Court has been labeled by
some as the Arroyo Court, with all 15 Justices appointed by President
Arroyo at one point.
A young lawyer who grew up in the aftermath of the Edsa

Revolution and entered law school shortly after the Edsa II protests that
led to President Joseph Estradas resignation may well lose his moorings
given such a cataclysmic change. I wrote my initial reaction to Chief Justice
Coronas impeachment, the first of a Philippine jurist:
Hilario Davide Jr., singlehandedly holding the nation

together through sheer integrity, remains my image of a chief
justice. I walked to Edsa with the Class of 2001, listened to him
speak at my graduation then and, with the greatest of pride,
entered his alma mater, the UP College of Law. This image
broadened to include Justice Antonio Carpios stand against a
sham peoples initiative for Charter change and Chief Justice
Reynato Punos rallying the nation against extrajudicial killings.
Thus, the so-called assault on the Supreme Court comes as a
visceral blow. Natalie Portman almost whispers, So this is how
liberty dies with thunderous applause. 5
This article is a twofold record of my thoughts on judicial review

since entering the UP College of Law, thoughts that have evolved since my
initial articles. First, this article surveys the scope of judicial power. Filipino
lawyers take for granted that this power was intentionally strengthened in
our post-martial law constitution, but few acknowledge its actual
expansiveness in practice, far beyond even judicial reviews traditional case
4Tan, The New Philippine Separation of Powers, supra note *, at 931.

5Oscar Franklin Tan, Commentary: The only boss at battleground of principle, PHIL.
DAILY INQUIRER, Dec. 19, 2011, available at http://opinion.inquirer.net/19379/the-
%E2%80%98only-boss%E2%80%99-at-battleground-of-principle.
and controversy restraint. 6 Second, this article surveys the scope of

presidential power relative to judicial review. Although there are narrow
areas where the President enjoys deference to his actions, constitutional
design generally exposes his every action to a judicial labeling of grave
abuse of discretion. 7 In surveying presidential power, one must recognize
the many key doctrinal developments in the last decade, many spurred by
former President Arroyos controversial acts. These developments have
not, as a whole, received the same attention in the academe given to
doctrinal developments in the judiciary and I recall Professor Laurence
Tribes admonition that Constitutional Law courses sometimes focus
overly on the Supreme Court to the detriment of understanding the
Presidency and Congress. One must recall with respect to the political
branches, lacking an organized system of jurisprudence to document their
thoughts:
The Constitution was an extraordinary document. But a
document is only a document, and what the Constitution really
meant i.e., meant in practice only practice could disclose.8
This article concludes that there is an imbalance to the point that a

popular president may find himself stymied by a Supreme Court allegedly
using judicial power for partisan ends. The citizenry, particularly the media
and the academe who are crucial in communicating constitutional
interpretation to them, must keep aware of this imbalance and ensure that
the expanded judicial power is deployed in accordance with their wishes
instead of hamstringing their popularly elected leaders.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARROYO COURTS RECENT ACTIONS
The interplay between President Aquino and Chief Justice Corona

provides a vivid backdrop for this discussion. The story begins with
President Aquinos landslide victory after the May 10, 2010 elections, a
wave of hope and nostalgia that began with an emotional tsunami during
the long 8-hour funeral procession of his mother [in 2009]. 9 President
Aquinos term began on June 30. 10
6 This thought began in Tan, The New Philippine Separation of Powers, supra note *.
Updated discussions from previous articles have been incorporated in this article to
present an integrated discussion to the reader.
7 This thought began in Tan, The 2004 Canvass, supra note *.
8 ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 13 (1973).
9 Shay Cullen, Aquino election brings hope, nostalgia to Philippines, NATL CATHOLIC
REPORTER, Jun. 4, 2010, at http://ncronline.org/news/global/aquino-election-brings-

hope-nostalgia-philippines. For an in-depth account, see CHAY HOFILEA & MIRIAM
GRACE A. GO, AMBITION DESTINY VICTORY: STORIES FROM A PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION (2011).
On May 17, however, then Chief Justice Puno compulsorily

retired. 11 Two days after the elections, on May 12, then President Arroyo
appointed then Justice Corona as Punos successor. Corona previously
served as Arroyos chief of staff, spokesman and acting executive secretary.
Arroyo, by then, had already appointed a majority of the Court.
The appointment was sharply criticized as an unconstitutional

midnight appointment and the highly respected Senior Associate Justice
Antonio Carpio and Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales both publicly opined
that President Arroyo had no power to appoint Punos successor. 12 The
opinion of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, was prominently cited:
[A]ny person who accepted the post of Chief Justice from Ms

Arroyo would open himself or herself to impeachment by the
next Congress. 13
Ahead of the May 10 elections, however, the Supreme Court ruled

that President Arroyo was entitled to appoint the next chief justice, arguing
in a stunning reversal of the tradition against midnight appointments that
the provision requiring a Supreme Court vacancy to be filled within 90
days trumped the ban on appointments by the president two months
before the elections. 14 (Fr. Bernas has since revised his opinion in line with
the Courts decision.) President Aquino publicly refused to recognize
Coronas appointment and refused to be sworn in by him, eventually
taking his oath before Justice Carpio-Morales, who prominently dissented
in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council. 15
The Court soon set several stumbling blocks in the path of

President Aquino and his campaign crusade against corruption primarily
directed against former President Arroyo. The Court struck down
11 CONST. art. VIII, 11.

12 Tetch Torres & TJ Burgonio, Arroyo appoints Corona as new chief justice, PHIL.
DAILY INQUIRER, May 12, 2010, available at
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20100512-269580/Arroyo-
appoints-Corona-as-new-chief-justice.
13 Norman Bordadora, Bernas: Arroyo appointment may destroy SC credibility, PHIL.
DAILY INQUIRER, Jan. 23, 2010, available at

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100123-
248930/Bernas-Arroyo-appointment-may-destroy-SC-credibility.
14 De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, 615 SCRA 666, Mar.
17, 2010.
15 Maila Ager & Tetch Torres, Conchita Morales is new Ombudsman, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, Jul. 25, 2011, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/29653/conchita-

morales-is-new-ombudsman.
Aquinos first executive order creating a Philippine Truth Commission to

investigate corruption during the Arroyo administration. Of all possible
reasons, the decision was anchored on one of the most incredible, most
ridiculous possible ground, the human rights doctrine of equal protection:
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution

allows classification. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so
that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard
is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No.

1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is
to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. 16
The disconnect in Biraogo must be apparent to a freshman

Constitutional Law student. The decision read like a textbook discussion of
the rational basis test but, in a subterfuge in plain sight, applied an exacting
strict scrutiny analysis appropriate for a classification based on race or
religion. I criticized Biraogo as establishing allegedly corrupt government
officials as a new suspect class in Philippine jurisprudence and necessarily
labeling former President Arroyo a human rights victim:
Will you teach your children that Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo is a human rights victim?
The brazen intellectual dishonesty in the Truth

Commission decision must shock you. Equal protection, being
a human rights doctrine, is strictly applied only when suspect
16 Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commn of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, 637 SCRA 78, Dec.
7, 2010.
classifications are involved: race, religion and gender. Classic

victims of discrimination in law and common sense include the
Cordillera tribesman, the Muslim and the working woman. The
Court added the overseas Filipino worker to modernize this list.
Outside suspect classifications, equal protection is

applied with far less strictness than in the Truth Commission
decision.
The Truth Commission decision misrepresented the equal

protection doctrine so suavely it even appeared helpful, advising
to add a simple s so the order covers all past administrations.
The entire nation unfairly ridiculed President Aquinos legal
team as lightweights who drafted an order so obviously flawed.
The entire nation unwittingly agreed that Arroyo is a human
rights victim. 17
Biraogo, however, was largely, albeit, begrudgingly accepted. The

loud outcry was not against the tragic blow dealt to human rights
jurisprudence, but President Aquinos allegedly lightweight legal team.
Senator Francis Chiz Escudero publicly suggested that an s be added
to change past administration to past administrations to cure the
alleged defect. 18 The unkindest cut of all came from Senator Joker Arroyo,
who had served Aquinos own mother:
Arroyo then noted that President Corazon Aquino had a

more high-powered team notably former Senate President
Jovito Salonga, former Sen. Rene Saguisag, former Rep.
Teodoro Locsin, Jun Factoran and Dodo Sarmiento.
All of them were trained in Harvard and we had zero

problems with the Supreme Court because we do our
homework, Arroyo said.
He said that Cory Aquinos EO 1, which created the

Presidential Commission on Good Government, was approved
without corrections from the draft of Salonga. 19
17 Oscar Franklin Tan, Commentary: Gloria M. Arroyo as human rights victim, PHIL.
DAILY INQUIRER, Jan. 16, 2012, available at http://opinion.inquirer.net/21191/gloria-
m-arroyo-as-human-rights-victim.
18 Maila Ager, Aquino told: Add s to administration in Truth EO, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, Dec. 9, 2010, available at

http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view/20101209-
307966/Aquino-told-Add-s-to-administration-in-Truth-EO.
19 Gil C. Cabacungan Jr, Joker tells Aquinos legal team: Dont act rashly, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, Aug. 16, 2010, available at

Judicial supremacy thus appeared unshakeable in the public view,

unless challenged by an all-Harvard Law team led by a legend such as
former Senate President Jovito Salonga, also a holder of a Yale Doctor of
Laws degree.
Senator Arroyo criticized President Aquinos legal team for

racking up four cases before the Supreme Court in just 46 days in
power, 20 with each of Aquinos first three executive orders challenged.
Aquinos supporters, however, pointed to a lengthening string of
controversial decisions involving former President Arroyo allegedly tainted
by partisan interests, whose subjects included midnight appointments, the
creation of a new congressional district allegedly for Arroyos sons
candidacy, constitutional amendments, virtual martial law, abuse of
executive privilege, bypass of the Commission on Appointments and
anomalous government contracts. 21
Perhaps the most outlandish case involved the exoneration of an

Arroyo-appointed Justice from plagiarism charges even after several
recognized public international law scholars not only wrote the Court
about the plagiarism but claimed their articles were cited to support the
opposite propositions. 22 The plagiarized decision, sadly, ruled against
comfort women forced by the Japanese army to provide sexual services
during World War II. 23 The Court also disciplined a majority of the
University of the Philippines College of Law faculty for its vocal
opposition in the matter. 24 Law students across the country ridiculed the
Courts definition of plagiarism as necessitating intent and the Microsoft
Word defense:
[P]lagiarism is essentially a form of fraud where intent to

deceive is inherent.
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100816-287029/Joker-
tells-Aquinos-legal-team-Dont-act-rashly.
20 Id.
21 In re Impeachment of Corona, Case No. 002-2011, Verified Complaint for
Impeachment, at 18-21 (Dec. 12, 2011).

22 In re Charges of Plagiarism Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo,
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, 632 SCRA 607, Oct. 15, 2010; Dona Pazzibugan, Plagiarism:
Author files complaint with SC, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jul. 31, 2010, available at
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100731-
284134/Author-files-complaint-with-SC.
23 Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, 619 SCRA 533, Apr. 28, 2010.
24 In re Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, Oct.
19, 2010. The author enjoyed dark humor from some of the Facebook pages of the
professors concerned and Romel Bagares during the entire episode.
[P]lagiarism presupposes intent and a deliberate, conscious

effort to steal anothers work and pass it off as ones own. 25
[T]he Microsoft word program does not have a function that

raises an alarm when original materials are cut up or pruned.
The portions that remain simply blend in with the rest of the
manuscript, adjusting the footnote number and removing any
clue that what should stick together had just been severed. 26
Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors

materials that he lifted from their works and used in writing the
decision for the Court in the Vinuya case. But, as the Court
said, the evidence as found by its Ethics Committee shows that
the attribution to these authors appeared in the beginning drafts
of the decision. Unfortunately, as testified to by a highly
qualified and experienced court-employed researcher, she
accidentally deleted the same at the time she was cleaning up
the final draft. The Court believed her since, among other
reasons, she had no motive for omitting the attribution. The
foreign authors concerned, like the dozens of other sources she
cited in her research, had high reputations in international law. 27
The resolutions dispositive portion even provided:
[T]he Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to acquire the

necessary software for use by the Court that can prevent future
lapses in citations and attributions. 28
Attending a family reunion after Vinuya, I found myself at a table

of 12-year olds asking him why the Supreme Court had ruled that they
could now copy for their school term papers.
The Courts lowest point came when it issued a temporary

restraining order grounded on the right to travel allowing former President
Arroyo and her husband to leave the country, allegedly before charges
would be brought against them. The order was odd in that it did the
opposite of preserving the status quo and was issued ex parte without
allowing the government to respond. Chief Justice Corona was later
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, 632 SCRA 607, 630 Oct. 12, 2011.
26 Id at 628.
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, 642 SCRA 11, 45, Feb. 8, 2011.

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, 632 SCRA 607, 636-37, Oct. 15, 2011.
accused of abusing his administrative powers to railroad the order. 29

Although many voiced the need to respect the order to maintain the rule
of law, Dean Raul Pangalangan opined in the Inquirers front page that the
false human rights issue should be pierced and the actual political issue
should be recognized:
It would be the supreme irony to allow GMA (Gloria

Macapagal-Aroyo) to invoke our most sacred human rights
protections to escape justice. That would be her supreme, final
perversion of our democratic institutions. While countless
voices have correctly quoted human rights law, our democracy
must recognize GMAs pleas as a political, not human rights,
issue.
Our Bill of Rights is our democracys greatest triumph. It is

counter-majoritarian; it empowers the weakest member of
our society to stand against the most powerful members. Wind
and sunshine may enter the humblest hovel, but the king must
first knock at the door.
The Bill of Rights is applied by the courts with very strict

scrutiny in favor of the disadvantaged for whom those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities
historically do not work: From the Maguindanao massacre
victims to millions of starving children who might be fed and
clothed with the money from the fertilizer and ZTE scams.
That is why we must pierce legal rhetoric to see what is

really at stake. 30
President Aquinos Secretary of Justice Leila de Lima refused to

honor the order and had the Arroyos blocked from boarding planes at the
airport. Charges and an arrest warrant were soon brought against Arroyo 31
and impeachment was initiated against Corona in less than a day. One
headline story opened:
Allies in the House of Representatives, seeking to appease

an angry President Benigno Aquino III, on Monday swiftly
impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona for interfering in the
Impeachment, art. VII (Dec. 12, 2011).

30 Pangalangan, supra note 3.
31 Cynthia Balana et al, Judge OKs continued hospital arrest for Arroyo, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, Dec. 13, 2011, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/97883/judge-oks-

continued-hospital-arrest-for-arroyo.
prosecution of former President and now Pampanga

Representative Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. 32
In attempting to resist the Supreme Court, thus, President Aquino

deployed the heavy artillery of impeachment after every other weapon in
the arsenal apparently failed. It would later appear that even this firepower
brought to bear was insufficient to erase the blot of De Castro v. Judicial and
Bar Council and Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission from legal reasoning.
II. THE GREATLY EXPANDED PHILIPPINE POWER OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW
A. THE EXPANDED CERTIORARI POWER
The Philippine Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently

asserted:
The major difference between the judicial power of the
Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court
is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted
to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as
expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also
a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power
to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality. (emphasis in the
original) 33
This excerpt from the landmark cases Francisco v. House of

Representatives and Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice may
well be the Philippine Courts Marbury v. Madison 34 (or perhaps its Aaron v.
32 Cynthia D. Balana & Gil C. Cabacungan Jr., 188 solons impeach CJ Corona, PHIL.
DAILY INQUIRER, Dec. 13, 2011, at A1, available at
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/109793/188-solons-impeach-cj-corona.
33 Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459,
643 SCRA 198, Feb. 15, 2011, quoting Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No.
160261, 415 SCRA 44, 130-31, Nov. 10, 2003.
For other recent discussions of judicial powers expanded scope, see Bryan Dennis
Tiojanco & Leandro Angelo Aguirre, The Scope, Justifications and Limitations of
Extradecisional Judicial Activism and Governance in the Philippines, 84 PHIL. L.J. 73 (2009)
(Awardee, Justice Irene R. Cortes Prize for Best Paper in Constitutional Law (2009));
Johann Carlos Barcena, Easing the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty: The Judiciary in a
Developing Democracy, 84 PHIL. L.J. 883 (2010) (Awardee, Justice Irene R. Cortes Prize
for Best Paper in Constitutional Law (2010)).
34 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (generally referred to as the decision that
established judicial review in the United States).

Cooper), 35 an ex cathedra pronouncement on judicial review made when

intervening in an impeachment, that most political of the political
branches powers. Francisco outlines the 1987 Constitutions design. First,
judicial review has been made explicit and is not a mere product of
jurisprudence. Second, it is not limited to determining whether the
Constitution has been breached; the Court is further empowered to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government even where a branch of government
has acted within its power. Third, judicial review is denominated as a duty,
a word that the Court cites emphatically when it is determined to rule on
an issue.
It is well established that this outline is intentional constitutional
design and the Constitutional Commission intentionally intended to
strengthen the Court as a foil against another potential Marcos. What is
less clear to our generation of lawyers who inherited this post-EDSA
legacy is the extent to which the expanded certiorari power has gone
beyond the already broad scope it was envisioned to have.
B. HYPERTEXTUALISM AND THE POLITICAL QUESTIONS DEATH
The expanded certiorari power allows the Supreme Court to

invalidate the act of a co-equal branch that is either invalid under the
Constitution or is technically valid but deemed a grave abuse of discretion.
It would follow that what is squarely within a branchs discretion must be
valid and beyond the Courts scrutiny. This follows from Marbury itself;
before Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is, 36 he
wrote in a preceding section that:
[W]here the heads of departments merely execute the will

of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive
professes a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be
more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically
examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and
individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it
seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself
injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a
remedy. 37
35358 U.S. 1 (1958).

36Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)
37 Id. at 166-67. This thinking is classically articulated in Philippine jurisprudence
in Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1067 (1957).

In practice, however, this framework has no relevance to

Philippine judicial review.
The political question doctrine determines whether a matter is

only politically examinable or properly subject to judicial review and this
doctrine has been pronounced dead under the 1987 Constitution,
particularly with the expanded certiorari power thought to drastically
restrict if not practically bar this doctrines application.
Baker v. Carr 38 contains the political question frameworks classic

formulation:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political

question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question. 39
Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. divides Bakers formulation into three

categories:
textual: where there is found a textually demonstrable

constitutional commitment of the issue to a political
department
functional: where there is a lack of judicially discoverable and

manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for non-judicial discretion
prudential: where there is the impossibility of a courts

undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
38 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

39 Id. at 217, quoted in Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261,
415 SCRA 44, 151, Nov. 10, 2003; Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710, 353 SCRA
452, 490, Mar. 2, 2001.
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious

pronouncements by various departments on one question 40
First, Fr. Bernas has pronounced the prudential question extinct

because judicial review is denominated a duty by the 1987 Constitution 41
and this has caused the Court to state: Justices cannot abandon their
constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a
crisis. 42 This attitude is a conscious shift from Marcos-era invocations of
the political doctrine that matches the textual shift embodied in the
expanded certiorari power.
Second, the textual and the functional questions are ultimately

choked off by the 1987 Constitutions sheer length and the present
extreme textualist mindset in Philippine constitutional law. The textual
question arises when the Constitutions text assigns an issues resolution to
a political branch. The functional question arises when the Constitution
provides no rules in its text to govern an issue and leaves its resolution to a
political branch with greater institutional competence to resolve it using its
discretion. 43 In the face of either question, one readily finds a textual
anchor in the torrents of text contained in the 1987 Constitution and
argues that the text must be interpreted in an exercise of judicial review. 44
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora 45 exemplifies the extreme

textualist approach. President Joseph Estradas deployment of Marines in
shopping malls to augment policemen and enhance their visibility was
challenged as unconstitutional. Instead of simply holding that these
deployments fell squarely within the Presidents discretion as Commander-
in-Chief, the Court asserted jurisdiction over the matter and found that
there was no evidence that the President used his powers over the military
arbitrarily, the expanded certiorari powers framework. Dean Pacifico
40 JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A
COMMENTARY 953-54 (2003 ed.).

41 Id. at 959.
42 Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 415 SCRA 44, 162,
Nov. 10, 2003.

43 Christopher Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen,
83 GEO. L.J. 347, 352 (1994).

44 The Court has on rare occasions still explicitly recognized political questions.
[A]lthough the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is
implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which
is automatic rather than initiated. The constitutional validity of the Presidents
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political
question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of
the Court. Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293, Mar. 20, 2012.
45 G.R. No. 141284, 338 SCRA 81, Aug. 15, 2000.
Agabin jokingly refers to the power to call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence in the central business district, 46
summing up the textual trap the Court laid for itself when it went further
and ruled on whether the lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
qualifiers to the Presidents power to declare martial law apply to his
deployment of the armed forces. More recently, Province of North Cotabato v.
GRP Peace Panel 47 ruled that the President had the power to negotiate peace
agreements with rebels and did so by textually tying this implied power to
the explicit power to the Commander-in-Chief power to prevent and
suppress rebellion and lawless violence. 48 This technical approach is
distinguished from a broader approach in Marcos v. Manglapus. 49
IBP v. Zamoras doctrine, birthed by textualist acrobatics, carried far

beyond its benign factual milieu to Lacson v. Perez 50 and Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary, 51 which dealt with the state of rebellion declared during the
EDSA III demonstrations in May 2001 and the takeover by soldiers in
July 2003 of the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati for use as a base
to air grievances against President Arroyo, and eventually to David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 52 which dealt with the state of national emergency and
alleged virtual declaration of martial law in February 2006, after the
discovery of a suspected plot by soldiers who participated in the
Oakwood mutiny and other elements who sought to unseat President
Arroyo. This tortuous but increasingly ominous line of cases eventually
discussed the difference between a state of rebellion and a state of
national emergency and how the latter might involve an awesome
power but the latter did not, and detailed a sequence of graduated
powers. David in effect deemed the two terms instances of calling out the
armed forces to suppress lawless violence, with different collars, but with a
better appreciation of a discussion that began with the power to call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in the central
business district.
The David line of cases revolved around the phrase lawless
violence despite the weighty concepts of Commander-in-Chief and
martial law being defined and illustrates how Philippine jurisprudence is
developed by anchoring onto snippets of constitutional text. Philippine
jurisprudence has produced more curious textual anchors; for example,
46 Tan, The 2004 Canvass, supra note *, at 84.

47 Province of North Cotabato v. Govt of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, 568 SCRA 402, Oct. 14, 2008.
48 Id. at 503.
49 G.R. No. 88211, 177 SCRA 668, Sep. 15, 1989.
50 G.R. No. 147780, 357 SCRA 756, May 10, 2001.
51 G.R. 159085, 421 SCRA 656, Feb. 3, 2004.
52 G.R. 171396, 489 SCRA 161, May 3, 2006.
Duncan Assn of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo-Wellcome Philippines, Inc. 53

emphasized a right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments,
and to expansion and growth 54 while deciding whether an employer could
contractually restrict an employees right to marry and prohibit marriage to
a competitors employee. It takes only a modicum of creativity to coax a
textual anchor out of the 1987 Constitution and when this is achieved, one
may readily assert the need to interpret the textual standard and find a not
truly political question as opposed to a truly political question, using
Franciscos framework.
To cite another freshman syllabus example of hypertextualism at

work, Cayetano v. Monsod 55 ruled that lawyer Christian Monsods experience
in various banks and non-governmental organizations met the requirement
that a Commission on Elections commissioner should have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. 56 Instead of simply ruling that
the appointment lay within the Presidents discretion as appointing
authority, the Court delivered an elaborate dissection of the phrase
practice of law, complete with quotes from magazine articles and
strained explanations of how a World Bank lawyer encounters the laws of
other countries and a National Movement for Free Elections chair
encounters election law issues. 57
[O]ld textualism is based on the incorrect view of linguistics and

jurisprudence by which the text can be clear without examining its context.
Judge Learned Hand was right in saying, There is no surer way to misread
any document than to read it literally. 58 The extreme form of textualism
is contrary to the South African approach of reasonableness which does
not treat constitutional phrases as absolutes and instead intervenes against
government acts only when they are highly unreasonable in their
constitutions context. The landmark decision Soobramoney v. Minister of
Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 59 put to test the constitutional provisions No one
may be refused emergency medical treatment, Everyone has the right to
have access to health care services and Everyone has the right to life
when a man in the final stages of severe renal failure challenged a
government hospitals refusal to allocate dialysis treatment resources to
him. The South African Constitutional Court addressed the issue directly
instead of engaging in interpretive textual acrobatics or creating fine factual
53 G.R. No. 162994, 438 SCRA 343, Sep. 17, 2004.

54 CONST. art. XIII, 3.
55 Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 201 SCRA 210, Sep. 3, 1991.
56 CONST. art. IX-C, 1(1).
58 AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 150 (2006).
59 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) (S.Africa).
distinctions. Without diminishing the provisions mandatory character, the

Court recognized that South Africa had scarce health care resources and
that the hospitals policy for allocating these was not unreasonable, even if
they resulted in the petitioner being denied access to them.
C. EXPANDED STANDING RULES
Under the expanded certiorari power, thus, the Court can

review practically any question presented to it. In addition, the question
may potentially be brought by any party, the final relaxation of the classic
case and controversy constraint on judicial review. The now familiar
language of Kilosbayan v. Guingona 60 cast this traditional constitutional
constraint as a mere technicality:
A partys standing before this Court is a procedural technicality

which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view
of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark
Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality
because the transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. 61
Guingona was decided by a slim majority and practically reversed

the following year in Kilosbayan v. Morato. 62 Parenthetically, Court has shied
away from this exaggerated formulation. For example, the 2011 decision
Bayan Muna v. Romulo 63 restated:
The Court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit
to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right of judicial review. 64
Chief Justice Puno, in the 2009 decision Lozano v. Nograles, 65

presented a more technically accurate articulation:
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but

a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to
settle only actual controversies involving rights which are
60 G.R. No. 113375, 232 SCRA 110, May 5, 1994.

61 Id. at 134.
62 G.R. No. 118910, 246 SCRA 540, Jul. 17, 1995.
63 G.R. No. 159618, 641 SCRA 244, Feb. 1, 2011.
64 Id. at 256.
65 G.R. 187883, 589 SCRA 354, Jun. 16, 2009.
legally demandable and enforceable. As stated in Kilosbayan,

Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr., viz.:
x x x [C]ourts are neither free to decide all kinds of

cases dumped into their laps nor are they free to
open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a
grievance. The rationale for this constitutional
requirement of locus standi is by no means trifle. It
is intended to assure a vigorous adversary
presentation of the case, and, perhaps more
importantly to warrant the judiciary's overruling the
determination of a coordinate, democratically elected
organ of government. It thus goes to the very
essence of representative democracies.
A lesser but not insignificant reason for

screening the standing of persons who desire to
litigate constitutional issues is economic in character.
Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity
of courts to render efficient judicial service to our
people is severely limited. For courts to
indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits
and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their
dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective
dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that
clearly confronts our judiciary today. 66
Guingonas doctrine featured prominently in several Davide Court

decisions such as IBP v. Zamora regarding the deployment of marines to
augment police, Bayan v. Zamora 67 regarding the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) with the United States, Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources 68 regarding the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 and Lim v.
Executive Secretary 69 regarding the Balikatan military exercises.
Parenthetically, it may be better phrasing to admit in such decisions that
standing is being analyzed with liberality rather than dismissing standing as
a mere technicality and having to deal with questions such as advisory
opinions.
The Court has recognized liberality in standing in specific areas. It

has reiterated that when the question is one of public right ... the people
are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation
the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or
66 Id. at 361-62.
67 G.R. No. 138570, 342 SCRA 449, Oct. 10, 2000.
68 G.R. No. 135385, 347 SCRA 128, Dec. 6, 2000.
69 G.R. No. 151445, 380 SCRA 739, Apr. 11, 2002.
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a

citizen. 70 Further, the Court has explicitly stated that it treats standing
liberally in taxpayers suits, 71 although some recent decisions do deny
taxpayer standing on the ground that there is no direct expenditure
questioned. In addition, there are narrow circumstances in which the
Constitution explicitly grants standing to any citizen, most prominently
when one questions the factual bases for a declaration of martial law or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 72
Legislators are another recognized category:

To the extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so
is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of

Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury,
which can be questioned by a member of Congress. 73
The Court noted in David, however, that being a former legislator

confers no special standing. 74 Moreover, where the act subject of the
petition impairs no prerogative of Congress, legislators may claim no
standing to sue. 75
Oposa v. Factoran, 76 penned by then Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.,
granted the most extreme liberality in standing by recognizing unborn
petitioners:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as

well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and
for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality
70 Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, 136 SCRA 27, 36, Apr. 24, 1985, quoted in
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commn, G.R. No. 72119, 150 SCRA 530, 536-37, May 29,
1987. The doctrine was prominently reiterated in decisions such as Francisco, 415
SCRA at 136; Chavez v. Pres. Commn on Good Govt, G.R. No. 130716, 299SCRA
744, 759-60, Dec. 9, 1998.
71 Abaya v. Ebdane, G.R. No. 167919, 515 SCRA 720, 757, Feb. 14, 2007;
Constantino v. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106164, 472SCRA 505, 518, Oct. 13, 2005, citing Tatad
v. Garcia, G.R. No. 114222, 243 SCRA 436, 455, Apr. 6, 1995.
72 CONST. art. VII, 18(3).
73 Sanlakas v. Reyes, G.R. No. 159085, 421 SCRA 656, 665, Feb. 3, 2004, citing
Phil. Const. Assn v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, 235 SCRA 506, Aug. 19, 1994.
74 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 489 SCRA 160, 223, May 3,
2006.
75 Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 164978, 472 SCRA 587, 595, Oct. 13,
2005.
76 G.R. No. 101083, 224 SCRA 792, Jul. 30, 1993.
to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based

on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the rhythm and
harmony of nature. 77
The Court codified Oposas extremely liberal approach to standing

in environmental claims in its Rules of Procedure in Environmental Cases:
SEC. 4. Who may file.Any real party in interest, including the

government and juridical entities authorized by law, may file a
civil action involving the enforcement or violation of any
environmental law.
SEC. 5. Citizen suit.Any Filipino citizen in representation of

others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an
action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental
laws. 78
Oposas emphasis on intergenerational responsibility was also

reiterated in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Citizens of
Manila Bay, 79 which Justice Presbitero Velasco ended with this exhortation:
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that

the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be
written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and
political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the
inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. Even assuming
the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding
petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women
representing them cannot escape their obligation to future
generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay
clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be
a betrayal of the trust reposed in them. 80
MMDA v. Concerned Citizens represents the modern, refined form

of an Oposa constitutional claim regarding the environment. The claim was
anchored on [r]espondents constitutional right to life, health, and a
77Id. at 802-03.
78A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 2, Apr. 29, 2010. For a recent overview of Philippine
environmental law, see Elizabeth Barrett Ristroph, The Role of Philippine Courts in
Establishing the Environmental Rule of Law, at
http://works.bepress.com/elizabeth_ristroph/3 (last visited Apr. 23, 2012).
79 G.R. No. 171947, 574 SCRA 661, Dec. 18, 2008.
80 Id. at 692.
balanced ecology 81 but specific statutory as well as international law

obligations were also cited as bases to compel the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources and other specified agencies to clean
up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to
make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact
recreation. 82 This follows from the note in Justice Florentino Felicianos
Oposa concurring opinion that the petitioners should have asserted a more
specific legal right. Contrast MMDA v. Concerned Citizens with the earlier
decision Henares v. LTFRB, 83 which cited Oposa and featured a claim that
the constitutional right to clean air 84 compelled the government to
require the use of alternative fuel. The Court delivered a stirring opinion
recognizing the petitioners standing, reemphasizing Oposa and reading the
numerous environmental statistics presented into the anthologies, but
ultimately dismissing the petition on the merits and asking the petitioners
to cite a specific statutory duty owed or to direct their claims to
Congress. 85
Finally, extending the transcendental importance doctrine and

these related rules, Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel 86 ended its
discussion of standing, mootness and other rules by stating that the Court
would render a decision on a controversial Memorandum of Agreement on
the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001
to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public
and, most especially, the government. 87 Such a rationale arguably borders
on judicial legislation, particularly if these principles are dicta enunciated
outside the scope of judicial review. Sarcastically, one may accuse the
Court of taking the transcendental importance doctrine even further to a
doctrine of liberality when it is of a mood to lecture.
Note, finally that the Court on several occasions has asserted a

liberal stance on standing but declined a resolution on the merits by
invoking an aspect of the case and controversy requirement, such as
81 Id. at 666.
82 Id. at 667-68.
83 Henares v. Land Trans. Franchising & Reg. Board, G.R. No. 158290, 505
SCRA 104, Oct. 23, 2006.

84 Id. at 113, 116-18.
85 Symbolic results are not necessarily meaningless of course. Brown v. Board of
Education, consider, was widely disregarded by schools in the southern United States in
the decade following its promulgation. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS 136 (1999).
86 Province of North Cotabato v. Govt of the Republic of the Phlippines Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, 568 SCRA 402, Oct. 14, 2008.
87 Id. at 462.
mootness, ripeness, or lis mota. 88 This was most prominent in the recent
ruling of mootness in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 89 regarding a challenge to
a declaration of martial law in Maguindanao following the alleged murder
of 57 women and journalists by that provinces Ampatuan political clan
and alleged subsequent mobilization of thousands of the clans armed
followers. The Court, two years after the petition was brought, declined to
rule on the martial law declarations constitutionality because former
President Arroyo lifted it after only eight days. Fortun argued:
The problem in this case is that the President aborted the

proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao in just eight days.
In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took
off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter,
it having become moot and academic.
Of course, the Court has in exceptional cases passed upon

issues that ordinarily would have been regarded as moot. But
the present cases do not present sufficient basis for the exercise
of the power of judicial review. The proclamation of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in this case, unlike similar Presidential acts in the late 60s
and early 70s, appear more like saber-rattling than an actual
deployment and arbitrary use of political power. 90
Justice Carpio heavily criticized the Bickelian dodge, arguing:

Failing to determine the constitutionality of Proclamation No.
1959 by dismissing the cases on the ground of mootness sets a
very dangerous precedent to the leaders of this country that
they could easily impose martial law or suspend the writ without
any factual or legal basis at all, and before this Court could
review such declaration, they would simply lift the same and
escape possible judicial rebuke. 91
88For a discussion of Philippine standing and case and controversy frameworks,

see, generally, VICENTE V. MENDOZA, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS, chap. 3 (2004). See also Francisco v. House of
Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 415 SCRA 44, 160-62, Nov. 10, 2003, quoting
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
89 G.R. No. 190293, Mar. 20, 2012.
90 Id. Fortun also ruled that the Court should first allow Congress to review a
declaration of martial laws factual bases. The constitutional validity of the Presidents
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political
question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of
the Court. Id.
91 Id. (Carpio, J., dissenting).
This was also prominent in Lacson v. Perez, 92 which declared

petitions regarding President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion
moot and academic (although this application of mootness was reversed in
Sanlakas and David v. Macapagal-Arroyo; 93 the latter ruled on President
Arroyos Proclamation 1017, which was assailed as a virtual declaration of
martial law), and North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel which almost declared
petitions assailing a Memorandum of Agreement regarding the Mindanao
peace process moot by one vote. In addition to the traditional Bickelian
escape devices relating to standing or case and controversy, Lacson also
cited the Courts lack of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory
relief, Lim and Francisco v. Fernando 94 invoked the doctrine that the Court is
not a trier of facts (to alleged foreign military operations and jaywalking,
respectively), 95 while Tanada v. Angara 96 most prominently held that certain
constitutional provisions are not meant to be self-executing (and thus
enforceable in themselves). This authors previous article detailed a number
of these subtle dodges and how these simulate the political question
doctrine when it is convenient to present a similar dog with a different
collar. 97
Note, incidentally, that there remain cases where the Court

exercises its prerogative to a Bickelian dodge by finding a lack of standing.
In 2010, for example, when militant organizations challenged the Human
Security Act of 2007, the Court found that they faced neither an actual
charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under the law and refused to
accept alleged tagging and surveillance of these organizations as
sufficient to grant standing. 98 More amusingly, Senior Associate Justice
Carpio delivered a most powerful deadpan refusal in Paguia v. Office of the
President, 99 where Alan Paguia was not only denied standing to assail former
Chief Justice Davides appointment as an ambassador for being allegedly
beyond the mandatory retirement age for Department of Foreign Affairs
employees but reminded his suspension from the practice of law
prohibited him from even bringing the suit. 100 Soriano v. Lista 101 similarly
92 G.R. No. 147810, 357 SCRA 756, May 10, 2001.

2006.
94 G.R. No. 166501, 507 SCRA 173, Nov. 16, 2006.
96 G.R. No. 118295, 272 SCRA 18, 54, May 2, 1997. See Manila Prince Hotel v.
Govt Service Ins. System, G.R. No. 122156, 267 SCRA 408, 431, Feb. 3, 1997; Oposa
v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224 SCRA 792, 805, Jul. 30, 1993.
97 Tan, The 2004 Canvass, supra note *, at 80-97.
98 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R.

No. 178552, 632 SCRA 146, 168-72, Oct. 5, 2010.
99 G.R. No. 176278, 621 SCRA 600, Jun. 25, 2010.
100 Id. at 605-06.
rejected citizen and taxpayer standing for a petitioner questioning the lack
of Commission on Appointments confirmation of senior Coast Guard
officers. The decision noted the Coast Guard is no longer technically part
of the armed forces. 102
Chief Justice Puno ended Lozano v. Nograles with a stinging rebuke

that summarizes the transcendental importance doctrines outer bound:
[W] hile the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to

the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements
of personal injury to the broader transcendental
importance doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is
not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file
petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.
In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely

because it is not available simply at the behest of a partisan
faction, but is exercised only to remedy a particular, concrete
injury. When warranted by the presence of indispensible
minimums for judicial review, this Court shall not shun the duty
to resolve the constitutional challenge that may confront it. 103
D. THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONS SHEER LENGTH
In addition to the political questions practical nonexistence and

extremely liberal standing rules, the Philippine hypertextualist mindset
effectively expands the scop of judicial review when coupled with the sheer
length of the 1987 Constitution. 104 This overabundance of text makes it
easy to find a textual hook for just about any claim, and has allowed the
Court to break new constitutional ground without, unlike the United States
Supreme Court, having to first justify the very existence of the right it is
enforcing 105 or pinpoint judicially manageable standards under Baker.
101G.R. No. 153881, 399 SCRA 437, Mar. 24, 2003.

102Id. at 439-41.
103 Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. 187883, 589 SCRA 356, 362, Jun. 16, 2009.
104 Professor Mark Tushnet uses the illustrations of a thick constitution of
detailed but uncontroversial provisions and a thin constitution of fundamental

principles. Consider that such an illustration may be less useful in the Philippines in
that the lengthier Constitution contains many pregnant phrases and constitutionalized
aspirations and ideals, rendering the thin constitution quite bloated. MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 9-12 (1999).
105 Dean Ely lamented the transparent failure of the dominant mode of
noninterpretivist review in his milieu. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
41 (1980).
The most prominent examples are all too familiar from a freshmans
Constitutional Law syllabus. Oposa upheld a constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology as well as the standing of unborn
generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility. 106
Tecson v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. 107 recognized a constitutional right
to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth. 108
Other constitutional provisions have been interpreted to authorize the
prohibition of monopolies that are against the public interest 109 and a
Filipino First Policy 110 that allowed a Filipino bidder to match the offer
of a foreign company. Indeed, in one early decision regarding the 1987
Constitutions economic provisions, then Justice Artemio Panganiban
found basis to emphatically state:
Kayat sa mga kababayan nating kapitalista at may kapangyarihan,

nararapat lamang na makiisa tayo sa mga walang palad at mahihirap sa
mga araw ng pangangailangan. Huwag na nating ipagdiinan ang kawalan
ng tubo, o maging ang panandaliang pagkalugi. At sa mga
mangangalakal na ganid at walang puso: hirap na hirap na po ang ating
mga kababayan. Makonsiyensya naman kayo! (emphasis in
original) 111
The shift from what was once highly discretionary into judicially
manageable was most prominent in Francisco v. House, where the Court
ruled on the validity of an impeachment complaint against its own Chief
Justice, despite the argument that [i]f the political question doctrine has
no force where the Constitution has explicitly committed a power to a
coordinate branch and where the need for finality is extreme, then it is
surely dead. 112 The Court held:
106 Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224 SCRA 792, 802-03, Jul. 30, 1993.
107 Duncan Assn of Detailman-PTGWO & Tecson v. Glaxo Wellcome
Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 162994, 438 SCRA 343, Sep. 17, 2004.
108 Id. at 352-53, quoting CONST. art. XIII, 3. The same right was cited in
ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, 469 SCRA 14, 304, Oct. 18,
2005 (Tinga, J., dissenting).
109 Agan v. Phil. Intl Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), G.R. No. 155001, 402
SCRA 612, May 5, 2003.

110 Manila Prince Hotel v. Govt Service Ins. System, G.R. No. 122156, 267 SCRA
408, Feb. 3, 1997.

111 Tatad v. Sec. of Energy, G.R. No. 124360, 281 SCRA 330, 379, Nov. 5, 1997.
(Panganiban, J., concurring), quoted in Tan, The 2004 Canvass, supra note *, at 93. To our
capitalist and influential countrymen, it is but right that you express solidarity with the
poor in times of need. Let us not emphasize a lack of profit or temporary losses. To
unscrupulous and heartless businessmen: our countrymen are in dire straits. Listen to
your consciences!
112 Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
[T]he U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that the

House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the
US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment. This reasoning
does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the
Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as
earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how
that exclusive power is to be exercised. 113
Clearly, this assertion of judicial review does not arise purely from
the expanded certiorari jurisdiction; it is also grounded on additional text.
The 1987 Constitutions length also makes the context for

applying the double standard of judicial review is radically different. This
standard demands greater scrutiny when dealing with political and human
rights as opposed to social and economic issues and was most recently
emphasized by Justice Mendoza. 114 Paul Freund explained it as set[ting]
up a hierarchy of values within the due process clause. 115 It is classically
reflected in Footnote 4:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the

presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which

restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to
be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other
types of legislation.
Nor do we inquire whether prejudice against discrete

and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 116
This standard is a guideline not a mandatory rule, and note that

arguably the greatest United States decision, Brown v. Board of Education 117
113Francisco, 415 SCRA at 175-76

114See Vicente V. Mendoza, The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 31 J. OF THE
INT. BAR OF THE PHIL. 6, 22-23 (2005).
115 PAUL FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 11 (1950), quoted
in MENDOZA, supra note 88, at 85.

116 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938).
117 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
on racial segregation, transformed that countrys social landscape.

Nevertheless, the expanded social and economic provisions in the 1987
Constitution blur the traditional lines. This is most evident in Oposa and
Henares with respect to the right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
Manila Prince Hotel and Tanada v. Angara with respect to the Filipino First
Policy and certain economic provisions. Are these political and economic
issues where policy must be determined by majoritarian process and where
[s]ome play must be allowed for the joints of the machine 118 ? Or are
these issues of fundamental constitutional rights subject to exacting
scrutiny, taking Manila Prince Hotels statement that there is nothing so
sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review
when the Constitution is involved 119 ? Paradoxically, many issues may be
resolved either way, and it is disastrous to lean too closely to either
extreme, which is what happened in past decisions where an issue was
characterized one-dimensionally.
One notes that provisions not phrased as constitutional rights may

fall into this blurring standard as well. For example, when a petition in Lim
v. Executive Secretary assailed alleged combat operations by American
soldiers within the Philippines under the auspices of the VFA, the Solicitor
General invoked the Presidents broad discretion as Commander-in-Chief
and in foreign affairs. The Court, however, on the premise that such
alleged operations against Abu Sayyaf bandits 120 constituted a war, stated
that the Constitutions renunciation of war as an instrument of national
policy 121 restricted the Presidents discretion in this context. Hacienda
Luisita Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council 122 recognized a right of
farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof, given that the Constitutions
provisions on agrarian reform used the word right, and recognized this
right as sufficient basis to test the constitutionality of a law that allowed
stock distribution instead of actual land to farmers. 123
Finally, it is a subtle point that the 1987 Constitution is infinitely

longer than it actually is, because the Philippines adopts the generally
118 Missouri, Kansas and Tennessee Railroad v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)
(Holmes, J.).
119 Manila Prince Hotel v. Govt Service Ins. System, G.R. No. 122156, 267 SCRA
408, 447, Feb. 3, 1997

121 CONST., art. II, 2.
122 G.R. No. 171101, Jul. 5, 2011.
123 G.R. No. 171101, Jul. 5, 2011 (Corona, C.J., dissenting). See also the dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice Corona on the Supreme Courts Resolution on the Motion for
Reconsideration in G.R. No. 171101, Nov. 22, 2011.
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. 124
Although this provision does not elevate customary international law to
the same tier as constitutional provisions, 125 it does grant the Court the
discretion to select which principles to declare as generally accepted
principles of international law and then apply these with a reverence that
brings them to near-constitutional status anyway. In a number of cases, the
Court has cited international law principles to reinforce a constitutional
right it has identified. For example, In re Sabio 126 restated the basis for the
Philippine right to privacy from the familiar formulation in the landmark
cases Ople v. Torres 127 and Morfe v. Mutuc: 128
The meticulous regard we accord to these zones [of privacy]

arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a
constitutional right and the right most valued by civilized
men, but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights which mandates that, no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy and
everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks. 129
Taken further, the doctrine of incorporation can and has been

used to argue for the existence of new rights, beyond the already extensive
constitutional text. Most prominently, a dissent in Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, 130 regarding the first execution under the 1987 Constitution,
proposed that the reimposed death penalty violated a newly-emerged norm
of international law, notwithstanding that the Constitution explicitly gave
Congress the option to restore this. 131 Recall Judge Borks admonition
against the international homogenization of constitutional law
124 CONST., art. II, 2.

125 Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91332, 224 SCRA 576, 593
(1993). Under the doctrine of incorporation rules of international law are given a
standing equal, not superior, to national legislation. For a recent and interesting
commentary on the incorporation clause, see Merlin Magallona, An Essay on the
Incorporation Clause of the Constitution as a Juridical Enigma, 35 J. INT. BAR PHIL. 18 (2010).
126 In re Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio, G.R. No. 174340, 504 SCRA 704,
736, Oct. 17, 2006.

127 G.R. No. 127685, 293 SCRA 141, Jul. 23, 1998.
128 G.R. No. 20387, 22 SCRA 424, Jan. 31, 1968.
129 In re Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio, G.R. No. 174340, 504 SCRA 704,
736, Oct. 17, 2006. Recent decisions have cited international instruments in addition to
the constitutional bases in landmark cases. Oscar Franklin Tan, Articulating the Complete
Philippine Right to Privacy in Constitutional and Civil Law: A Tribute to Chief Justice Fernando
and Justice Carpio, 82(4) PHIL. L.J. 78, 133-35 (2008).
130 G.R. No. 132601, 297 SCRA 754, 793-817, Oct. 12, 1998 (per curiam dissenting
opinion).
131 CONST. art. II, 19(1).
accomplished only if the various national courts are willing to minimize the
historical understanding of their own constitutions in favor of what they
perceive as an international morality. 132 Although reference to
international law norms is explicitly authorized by the Constitution, the
suggestion in a Supreme Court decision that an alleged international law
norm might trump an explicit constitutional provision shows the allure (or
at least its extreme point) of using international law in our modern
jurisprudence.
International law norms have been most progressively recognized

in human rights contexts. Government of Hong Kong v. Olalia 133 declared the
UDHR as containing principles of customary international law, stating
that: The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed
on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. 134
The ICCPR has been cited on numerous occasions. As a further example,
then Justice Punos separate opinion in Tecson v. COMELEC 135 argued that
the Convention on the Rights of the Child prohibited discrimination on
account of birth or other status, and that this treaty obligation prohibited
discrimination of an illegitimate child for purposes of citizenship. The
Courts focus on these human rights contexts in international law
complements its greater scope for judicial review in constitutional human
rights contexts. The most expansive invocation was the first writ of
amparo decision, which cited a UDHR formulation right to life, liberty
and security of person 136 alongside Philippine constitution provisions.
Chief Justice Punos Tecson opinion, parenthetically, illustrates the
blurred lines between political and human rights issues in todays
constitutional landscape. The Puno opinion framed the issue as one of
discrimination against children by virtue of the circumstances of their
birth. However, it acknowledged that the true issue was whether popular
presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr. should be disqualified from the
elections for not meeting the citizenship requirement in relation to the
circumstances of his birth. The opinion concluded: Whether respondent
132 ROBET BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 24
(2003). At the extreme point of Judge Borks criticism, he points out how British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher and the Prince of Wales were charged in the United States
of violating human rights in Northern Ireland and Libya and how the International
Court of Justice once, unsuccessfully, ordered the United States Supreme Court to to
take all measures at its disposal to stay the execution of a German national sentenced
to death by an Arizona jury during a murder trial. Id. at 27, 34.
133 G.R. No. 153675, 521 SCRA 470, Apr. 19, 2007.
134 Id. at 481.
135 Tecson v. Commn on Elec., G.R. No. 161434, 424 SCRA 277, 399-401, Mar.
3, 2004.
136 Sec. of Natl Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, 568 SCRA 1, Oct. 7, 2008
(text accompanying note 126).

Fernando Poe, Jr. is qualified to run for President involves a constitutional

issue but its political tone is no less dominant. Given the indecisiveness
of the votes of the members of this Court, the better policy approach is to
let the people decide.
E. THE NOW DORMANT RULEMAKING POWER
The rulemaking power shatters the last unbroken link in judicial

reviews chains. 137 This claimed power to promulgate rules to protect
rights, even arguably substantive rules, removes the case and controversy
requirement altogether, leaving the Court free to act even without any case
before it, as was first and most prominently seen in the National
Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killing and Enforced
Disappearances in 2007. At this summit, then Chief Justice Puno
announced:
[T]he paucity of power of the Judiciary in checking human

rights violations was remedied by stretching its rule making
prerogative. Article VIII, section 5 (5) empowers the Supreme
Court to `promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights x x x.
In expanding the judicial rule making authority to enhance

the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, our
Constitutional Commissioners were endowed with prophetic
eyes. For two decades later, we would be bedeviled by
extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances that would
expose the frailties of our freedom, the inadequacy of our laws
if not the inutility of our system of justice. Given these
vulnerabilities, the Judiciary, on its part, has decided to unsheath
its unused power to enact rules. 138
With due respect to Chief Justice Puno, it is juvenile to believe

that stray surplusage in the 1987 Constitution lay dormant for two decades
then suddenly transformed the face of Philippine Constitutional Law at
137 Parenthetically, courts of course take more than the case at hand into account.
As articulated by Professor Herbert Wechsler, [T]he principle of the decision must be

viable in reference to the applications that are now foreseeable. Nothing less will
satisfy the elements of generality and of neutrality implicit in the concept of a legal
judgment as distinguished from the fiat of a court. Herbert Wechsler, The Nature of
Judicial Reasoning, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM 297-98 (Sidney Hook
ed.1964).
138 Reynato Puno, The View from the Mountaintop, Keynote Address at the
National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killing and Enforced Disappearances,

Centennial Hall, Manila Hotel, 2-3, at 4-5 (Jul. 16, 2007).
that landmark summit. Curiously, the burly protector does not visibly
spring forth from the text of article VIII, section 5(5), or at least not until
phrases from it are selectively quoted as they are to students today:
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
Nor was article VIII, section 5(5) cited as containing the

rulemaking power in the first 20 years of its life. Its most prominent
articulation during this period came in Echegaray where then Justice Puno
highlighted not quite that section 5(5) created a new power but emphasized
that the 1987 Constitution vested the power to promulgate court rules
solely in the Supreme Court and it is no longer shared with Congress:
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This

Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power
to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution
took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with
the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is
to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to
urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no
jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions,
a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time
immemorial.
Later, in Purganan, the last of a series of extradition cases, Justice

Carpio cited the rulemaking power to ground a proposal for granting the
right to bail to extradites, but cited this in conjunction with the Courts
equity power and in carefully limited exceptions. 139 As recently as 2010,

section 5(5) was asserted by Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative
v. Cabato-Cortes 140 to uphold a judicial rule requiring the payment of court
fees against a legislative exemption from such fees. Finally, compare the
presently accepted interpretation of the rulemaking power to the scant
one-page discussion of article VIII, section 5(5) in the 2003 edition of Fr.
Bernass treatise. 141 Setting the text of section 5(5) aside, as Justice Carpio
alluded to, courts have had power to promulgate procedural rules for
centuries and many rules of evidence and writs have ancient roots. The
Miranda 142 rule well entrenched in popular media and cheesy police movies
reflects the extent and acceptance of this power.
Arguably, the present rulemaking power was a sound bite and

shrewd textual anchor that readily satisfied a hypertextualist Philippine bar
when Chief Justice Puno needed to justify the unprecedented action he
nobly undertook to address extrajudicial killings in the country at a time
when government allegedly turned a blind eye or was even accused of
perpetrating it. Consider the spectacle of a Chief Justice addressing a
crucial national issue long before a case was brought before his court, but
the textual hook and unmistakable public adulation for Puno won the day.
Chief Justice Puno primarily deployed the rulemaking power to

create the writ of amparo, principally to address extrajudicial killings as
documented in the landmark decision Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo, 143 which came a year after Punos summit and enforced [the right
to] to life, liberty and security 144 The Puno Court also issued rules
regarding the writs of habeas data and kalikasan, 145 to protect the rights to
informational privacy and to a healthful environment. Finally, the Puno
Court also issued a guideline stating a preference for the imposition of
fines over imprisonment in libel cases, arguably an exercise of the
rulemaking power in the context at the time.
Without diminishing the landmark blow struck by Manalo for
139Govt of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, 389
SCRA 623, 729, Sep. 24, 2002 (Carpio, J., concurring).
140 G.R. No. 165922, 613 SCRA 733, Feb. 26, 2010.
142 See, generally, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); CONST. art. III, 12(1).
143 G.R. No. 180906, 568 SCRA 1, Oct. 7, 2008.
144 Id. at 64.
145 The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, Jan. 22, 2008;
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Apr. 13, 2010;
Abigail Sze, Court News Flash: SC Unveils Landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, Apr. 14, 2010, at
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/news/courtnews%20flash/2010/04/04141001.php.
human rights, that first decision recasting article VIII, section 5(5) reflects
all of post-1987 Philippine judicial reviews expansive characteristics as
discussed thus far. First and most prominently, Manalo makes extensive use
of international instruments. For example, it cited a right to freedom from
fear 146 drawn from the UDHR in relation to the right to security. Further,
it cited decisions of bodies such as the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations
Human Rights Committee, in each instance taking the Puno brand of
meticulous care to link the reasoning to a Philippine constitutional
provision or to a provision of a binding treaty. Just as prominently, the
Court cited the development of the writ of amparo in the constitutions of
Mexico and other Latin American countries, although noting that these
came from a legal tradition different from Philippine judicial reviews
American moorings. The invocation of such international sources is well-
respected in international academia with the Constitutional Court of South
Africa, but it readily reflects the infinite nature of textual authority from
which the present Court may draw on. Again, this is not necessarily
negative as it helps the courts of developing legal systems draw on doctrine
from more established systems in cases novel to the former courts
jurisdictions, but the expansion must be recognized.
Second, provisions added in the 1987 Constitution came into play

alongside the above international sources, most prominently the
prescription that:
No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other

means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited. 147
Third, the decisions expansive tone readily matches that of

discussions of the expanded certiorari jurisdiction and the transcendental
importance doctrine (although standing was not at issue in Manalo). Little
deference was granted to the executive branch, and the decision invoked
decisions from international bodies to support the weight it gave to the
victim of alleged abduction and torture, against denials by the executives
agents.
Finally, the most expansive element is not in Manalo itself, but in

the rules on the writ of amparo and the numerous speeches and
discussions that preceded the actual exercise of judicial review. Without
repeating these in detail, even before the actual case was filed, the Court
146 Id. (text accompanying note 124).

147 CONST. art. III, 12(2).
held high profile consultations with various sectors and then promulgated
rules to enforce a bundle of rights so expansively phrased as the protection
of life, liberty and security. It is difficult to imagine circumstances not
covered by this judicial formulation yet by the time of Manalos
promulgation, no one questioned the Courts authority to formulate rules
on so broad a subject and then enforce its own rules via judicial review.
After Manalo, several other decisions regarding the writ of amparo

followed and were not unexpected given they dealt with persons whose
disappearances were widely reported in national media such as Jonas
Burgos, son of the late anti-Marcos activist Jose Burgos who was allegedly
abducted in broad daylight in 2007, 148 University of the Philippines
students Sherlyn Cadapan and Karen Empeo who were allegedly
abducted in 2006, 149 Cordillera activist James Balao who was allegedly
abducted in 2008, 150 urban poor leader Lourdes Rubrico who was allegedly
abducted but released in 2007, 151 Filipino-American activist Melissa Roxas
who was abducted but released in 2009 152 and Engr. Mored Tagitis who
disappeared in 2007 and was allegedly under surveillance. 153 Further,
amparo decisions explicitly declined to rule on substantive issues
148 Burgos v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183711, 621 SCRA 481 Jun. 22, 2010
and 653 SCRA 512, Jul. 5, 2011; Mother pleas for life of missing son, others, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, Oct. 28, 2009, available at
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/cebudailynews/metro/view/20091028-
232720/Mother-pleas-for-life-of-missing-son-others.
149 Boac v. Cadapan, G.R. No. 184461, 649 SCRA 618, May 31, 2011; Editorial: Its
AFPs move, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 23, 2011, , available at

http://opinion.inquirer.net/6795/its-afps-move.
150 Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, Dec. 13, 2011; Desiree Caluza,
Kin of missing Cordillera activist seek Aquino help, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jun. 18, 2011,
available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/15857/kin-of-missing-cordillera-activist-seek-
aquino-help.
151 Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, 613 SCRA 233, Feb. 18, 2010;
Leila Salaverria, Abducted militant seeks SC protection, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Oct. 31,
2007, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20071031-
97817/Abducted_militant_seeks_SC_protection.
152 Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, 630 SCRA 211, Sep. 7, 2010;
Lira Dalangin-Fernandez, Missing Fil-Am activist surfaces after 7 days, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, May 25, 2009, available at
http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/education/view.php?db=1&article=20071105
-98909.
153 Razon v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, 606 SCRA 598 Dec. 3, 2009 and 612 SCRA
685, Feb. 16, 2010; Julie Alipala, Engineer reported missing in Sulupolice, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, Nov. 7, 2007, , available at
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view/20090525-
207010/Missing-Fil-Am-activist-surfaces-after-7-days.
Another amparo decision is Yano v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640, 612 SCRA 347,
Feb. 11, 2010.
establishing liability such as command responsibility 154 and the issue of

orders such as those ordering the return of a persons belongings. 155
Finally, the Court repeatedly emphasized the writ of amparos
extraordinary nature and declined to apply it to contexts other than
extrajudicial killings and related disappearances. Specifically, the Court
declined to apply the writ of amparo to a hold departure order against the
travel of activist priest Robert Reyes, 156 property disputes, 157 the court
sanctioned demolition of a dwelling 158 and confinement in a mental
hospital. 159 It is also important to note that the writ of amparo has received
legislation sanction and the Anti-Torture Act of 2009 requires writs of
amparo or habeas data in relation to torture cases to be resolved
expeditiously. 160
What has been controversial recently is not a new rule but the
Courts active approach in MMDA v. Concerned Citizens. The decision gave
specific instructions to several government agencies in relation to Manila
Bays water quality and reiterated these in a resolution three years later. The
Court also formed an advisory committee, headed by Justice Velasco, the
decisions author, that reviewed detailed reports from various government
agencies. Justice Carpio wrote a vigorous dissent to the 2011 resolution,
criticizing these as encroachments on executive power in the guise of the
Court controlling the execution of a decision. 161
The approach of MMDA v. Concerned Citizens, however, has

arguably been codified in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
These rules provide for the appointment of a commissioner to monitor
compliance with a judgment in an environmental claim and the submission
of periodic reports to the court, 162 and provision for broad possible reliefs
(except awards of damages) pursuant to a writ of kalikasan. 163 The writ of
kalikasan, thus, beyond the writ of amparo demonstrates how broad the
present judicial power can be, where the Court can articulate a substantive
154 Generally, Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 151.

155 Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 152.
156 Reyes v. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 182161, 606 SCRA 580, Dec. 3, 2009.
157 Castillo v. Cruz, G.R. No. 182165, 605 SCRA 628, Nov. 25, 2009; Salcedo v.
Bollozos, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2236, 623 SCRA 27, Jul. 5, 2010; Tapuz v. del Rosario,
G.R. No. 182484, 554 SCRA 768, Jun. 17, 2008.
158 Canlas v. Napico Homeowners Assn, G.R. No. 182795, 554 SCRA 208, Jun.
5, 2008.
159 So v. Tacla, G.R. No. 190108, 633 SCRA 563, Oct. 19, 2010.
160 Rep. Act. No. 9745, 10 (2009).
161 Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Citizens of Manila
Bay, G.R. No. 171947, Feb. 15, 2011 (Carpio, J., dissenting).
162 A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 5, 4, Apr. 29, 2010.
163 Rule 7, 15.
right using rulemaking, further articulate the right using judicial review in
cases brought pursuant to the rule the Court formulated, then closely
direct government agencies to implement the Courts doctrine. This
breadth is not in itself unprecedented as judiciaries in other countries have
taken similar expansive approaches if only because no other government
body might do so. Such expansive power must be recognized and the
potential for abuse must likewise be recognized. For example, a year after
MMDA v. Concerned Citizens was promulgated, a group claiming to
represent small fishermen alleged that government demolition of fishing
facilities pursuant to the decision was actually being done to facilitate the
construction of an expressway and casino complex and would result in
destruction of mangroves and corals and the livelihood of 26,000
persons. 164
Presented with such expansive power, one notes Harvard

Professor Cass Sunsteins proposal to exercise judicial power in narrow,
focused incremental steps instead of broad decisions. He wrote:
Minimalists insist that some constitutional rights are

systematically underenforced by the judiciary and for
excellent reasons. These reasons have to do with the courts
limited fact finding capacities, their weak democratic pedigree,
their limited legitimacy, and their frequent ineffectiveness as
instigators of social reform. 165
One concludes that the rulemaking power became dormant after

the immensely popular Chief Justice Puno retired. No major new rule has
been observed and the interpretation of existing rules promulgated under
this power have strictly followed the initial announced intent. Each time
the writ of amparo is affirmed, the Court takes care to also affirm its
extraordinary nature. One infers that the Court recognizes that the
rulemaking power lies close to the edge of its powers (or perhaps slightly
beyond) and cannot be exercised absent overwhelming public support. The
rulemaking power thus lies dormant but remains available to a Court that
feels worthy of wielding it once again.
F. AN ENTRENCHED ACCEPTANCE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
Perhaps the final expansion of judicial power in the Philippines is
164 Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Citizens of Manila
Bay, G.R. No. 171947, Oct. 6, 2009.

165 CASS SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS
ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 127 (2005).

an unshakeable, entrenched acceptance of judicial supremacy as seen in the

Corona impeachment trial, ongoing as of this writing. Picking up from the
introduction, the trials progress implies that impeachment is currently not
an accepted mode of correcting or otherwise responding to what appears
to be an out-of-bounds Supreme Court decision and, further, that nothing
short of a constitutional amendment or a revolution might change a
Supreme Court constitutional interpretation.
Judicial reviews classic articulation in the Philippines was in the
same breath judicial supremacys classic articulation, and Justice Jose
Laurels words were used to headline the controversial Biraogo v. Philippine
Truth Commission decision:
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional

boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. 166
Without revisiting judicial supremacys progress since Angara v.

Electoral Commission, it is sufficient to note that Chief Justice Coronas
impeachment was originally sought on doctrinal grounds, most
prominently his midnight appointment that was widely believed to be
unconstitutional and against tradition. However, as the Supreme Court
ruled that the appointment was valid, even this powerful ground was
nuanced by alleging that it was betrayal of public trust to accept such a
dubious appointment, instead of the House of Representatives directly
challenging the Courts decision with the various weighty reasons available
to it. The impeachment complaint alleged:
Despite the obviously negative and confidence-shattering

impact that a midnight appointment by an outgoing President
would have on the people's faith in the Supreme Court and the
judicial system, Respondent eagerly, shamelessly, and without
even a hint of self-restraint and delicadeza, accepted his midnight
appointment as Chief Justice by then-President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. 167
The complaint assailed several other decisions, from Biraogo which

used the human rights doctrine of equal protection to strike down a
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).

166
167In re Impeachment of Corona, Case No. 002-2011, Verified Complaint for
Impeachment, at 14 (Dec. 12, 2011).
Presidential Truth Commission tasked with investigating anomalies in the

preceding Arroyo regime to the Courts exoneration of Justice Mariano
Castillo who was accused by several noted public international law authors
and members of the UP College of Law faculty of plagiarizing the formers
articles in a decision. Despite the doctrinal grounds to question such
decisions, the complaint instead argued that Coronas votes were biased
and cited an investigative report that claimed Corona voted in favor of
Arroyo, who appointed him, in 78% of cases involving her. 168 The defense
asserted in response to several allegations that (1) a Supreme Court
decision had already settled the issue raised and (2) the assailed action was
a collegial Supreme Court action of which Corona is only one member. 169
These appeared to have been accepted by the public who were conditioned
to thinking of the impeachment trial as a judicial trial where evidence of
individual guilt would weigh heaviest.
The House prosecution team soon changed tack even before the
trial began, dropping all allegations regarding decisions and focusing on
accusing Corona of amassing ill-gotten wealth and waving pictures of
luxury condo units allegedly owned by Corona in front of TV cameras.
The prosecution later rested having barely discussed any of the allegations
regarding Supreme Court decisions. 170
It appeared that House prosecutors felt it was too difficult to
argue judicial doctrine to ordinary voters and the prosecutors and their
political allies were unable to effectively do so. One must note that,
whatever the reason, the prosecution was unable to question Supreme
Court constitutional interpretation even in an impeachment context,
despite the popularity of President Aquino at the time.
168Id. at 15-21.
169 In re Impeachment of Corona, Case No. 002-2011, Answer to Verified
Complaint for Impeachment (Dec. 21, 2011). For a summary of the prosecution and
defense positions, see Oscar Franklin Tan, Talk of the Town: Impeachment trial scorecard,
PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, at A16, Jan. 15, 2012
170 Cathy Yamsuan & Cynthia Balana, Prosecution rests case vs Corona, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, Feb. 29, 2012, available at

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/153265/prosecution-rests-case-vs-corona.
The prosecution discussed only articles 2, 3 and 7 of its complaint. Article 3
involved the recall of the Supreme Court decision favoring labor unions in Flight
Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) v. Philippine Airlines allegedly
after Philippine Airlines counsel Estelito Mendoza wrote a letter to the Court and
involved no doctrinal issue. G.R. No. 178083, Jul. 23, 2008; In re Letters of Atty.
Mendoza, A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC, Oct. 04, 2011. Article 7 accused Corona of highly
partisan action in the issuance of a temporary restraining order that would have
allowed former President Arroyo and her husband to leave the country and likewise
involved no doctrinal issue. Minute Resolution dated Nov. 18, 2011 in Macapagal-
Arroyo v. De Lima, G.R. No. 199034 and subsequent Court resolutions.
II. A SURVEY OF THE PRESIDENTS POWERS
The 1987 Constitution radically expanded judicial power with the

explicit expanded certiorari power and this has been implicitly further
expanded following Philippine attitude and practice. The presidency, on
the other hand, is subject to further additional post-martial law restraints.
Through a constitutional design that presumes a noble Court and an
ignoble president, this section aims to establish that there is little in terms
of explicit power a supposedly noble president can muster against a
supposedly ignoble Court. Note that classic discussions on the separation
of powers discuss drawing boundaries between the executive and
legislative branches and discussions of judicial restraint have been more
muted in the Philippines compared to the practical abolition of the political
question doctrine and the expansion of judicial power in interpreting
constitutional provisions with the exacting scrutiny of a fundamental
human rights context.
A. CONTROL, TAKE CARE AND GENERAL EXECUTIVE POWERS
The president is vested with the executive power of government

and generally exercises this through his control of executive
instrumentalities:
The executive power shall be vested in the President of the

Philippines.
The President shall have control of all the executive

departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed. 171
The last sentence above is referred to as the take care power and
articulates the Presidents primary function. 172 Biraogo summarized:
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the

Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and
sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
171 CONST. art. VII, 1, 17. Note, however, that the President only exercises
supervision over local government units. See Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211,
177 SCRA 668, 689, Sep. 15, 1989 for an enumeration of executive powers explicit in
article VII.
2006.
employees of his department. He has control over the executive

department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the
authority to assume directly the functions of the executive
department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion
of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President
also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under
his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. 173
Bermudez v. Executive Secretary 174 describes the Presidents power of

control:
[T]he President is the head of government whose authority

includes the power of control over all executive departments,
bureaus and offices. Control means the authority of an
empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set
aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance
of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter,
as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. Expressed
in another way, the President has the power to assume directly
the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It
can accordingly be inferred therefrom that the President can
interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or
altogether ignore their recommendations. (internal citations
omitted) 175
Rufino v. Endriga 176 stated the power of control is vast and

encompasses any government instrumentality not part of the legislative or
judicial branches or an independent constitutional body. 177 It ruled that a
law prescribing that an instrumentality shall enjoy autonomy of policy and
operation 178 would be unconstitutional if interpreted to exclude that
instrumentality from the Presidents power of control.
The legitimacy of the Presidents actions was famously articulated
173 G.R. No. 192935, Dec. 7, 2010, citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, 293
SCRA 141, Jul. 23, 1998.

174 G.R. No. 131429, 311 SCRA 733, Aug. 4, 1999.
175 Id. at 741, citing Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143 (1955); Echeche v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 89865, 198 SCRA 577, Jun. 27, 1991; Pelaez v. Auditor-General,
G.R. No. 23825, 15 SCRA 569, Dec. 24, 1965; Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pano,
G.R. No. 27811, 21 SCRA 895, Nov. 17, 1967.
176 G.R. No. 139554, 496 SCRA 13, Jul. 21, 2006.
177 Id. at 62-65.
178 Pres. Dec. No. 15, 3 (1972).
by Justice Robert Jackson in the Steel Seizure Case: 179
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied

authorization of Congress, his authority is at a maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate.
When the President acts in absence of either a

congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon
his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority or in
which its distribution is uncertain.
When the President takes measures incompatible with the

expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional
power minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter. 180
Constitutional text aside, the presidencys broad implicit powers

are classically articulated in Marcos v. Manglapus:
[A]lthough the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the

exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive
power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the

government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. 181
Marcos v. Manglapus articulates the general framework and

boundaries for judicial review of presidential action:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political

question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry
into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would
have normally left to the political departments to decide. But
nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Courts jurisdiction
the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for
179 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
180 Id. at 637-38.
181 Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 177 SCRA 668, 691-92, Sep. 15, 1989.
Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or

referendum. We cannot, for example, question the Presidents
recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature
or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a
presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the
beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we
amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute
brought before us because the power is reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our

determination thereof on the political question doctrine. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by
petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the scope
of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to
settle all actual controversies before them. When political
questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave
abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter
which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.182
Unfortunately, the preceding section on judicial power has shown

that this classic framework is cast aside with ease in later decisions. The
Francisco line too readily finds not truly political questions in
impeachment contexts, supposed to be the most political of political
exercises. Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel and certain other
decisions may provide basis for judicial review when the Court is of a
mood to lecture or even lay down guidelines that are arguably judicial
legislation.
The President enjoys no special preference in the exercise of his

general executive power and power of control over executive agencies.
Executive privilege became controversial after alleged abuses by former
President Arroyo but is less relevant in this discussion because it is a shield
against legislative, not judicial, questioning of cabinet officials. Arthur
Schlesinger documents how this evolved to the point that early American
presidents ordered documents requested by legislators moved to the White
House and dared the investigating legislators to initiate impeachment
should they wish to demand the documents. National security might be an
area where the President receives deference, given his greater competence
to determine the actual condition of the country 183 due to the multitude
Id. at 695-96.
182
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. 171396, 489 SCRA 161, 242, May 3, 2006
183
(President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Offices vast
of military and police intelligence assets at his command and following

decisions such as David, Marcos v. Manglapus, and Lim v. Executive Secretary on
the conduct of military exercises with the US military. These decisions,
however, emphasize the Courts wide latitude in exercising the expanded
certiorari power in this sphere and any Court restraint is purely self-
restraint. Further, Manalo and succeeding writ of amparo decisions
emphasize how executive agents up to generals and the Secretary of
Defense are readily subject to the Courts jurisdiction.
The general use of the general executive power to oppose the

judiciary lies in refusing to enforce certain decisions or interpretations. A
President is always entitled to retort, as Andrew Jackson allegedly did to
Worcester v. Georgia: 184 John Marshall has made his decision; now let him
enforce it! 185 Sufficient subtlety, as seen with former President Arroyo,
may make it difficult to bring a judicial challenge, cast doubt on a
decisions application to a slightly altered set of facts or change tack when a
case has with some delay made its way through the court system akin to
the state of rebellion cases. The President may also influence agencies
decisions and rulemaking. 186
A President is also entitled to be completely unsubtle, as
exemplified by how Secretary De Lima refused to enforce the temporary
restraining order that would have allowed former President Arroyo and her
husband to leave the country, with the bare pretext of first not officially
receiving the order and then claiming that they would not implement the
order while the Department of Justice filed for reconsideration. 187 In this
case, the President relied purely on testing his popularity against the
Supreme Courts. To cite another example, the Supreme Court issued an
order to place PHP4.8 billion representing the withholding tax on interest
from the zero coupon Poverty Eradication and Alleviation Certificates (or
the PEACE bonds) issued by the government in 2001 to be placed in
escrow, pending the resolution of a petition by the countrys largest banks
to uphold that these bonds were not supposed to be subject to this tax
under their terms. The Department of Finance did not place the amount in
escrow, with Internal Revenue Commissioner Kim Henares arguing that
the relevant agencies did not receive the TRO before they were required
intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the
country.).
184 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
185 I HORACE GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CONFLICT, A HISTORY OF THE GREAT
REBELLION 106 (1864).

186 Lawrence Lessig, Readings by our Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 175,
186-89 (1993).
187 Christine O. Avendao et al, Government stops Arroyo flight, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, Nov. 16, 2011, available at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/94427/govt-stops-

arroyo-flight.
by law to withhold the tax. 188 These examples possibly prove that the
President may well outright defy the Supreme Court on a matter he deems
critical and the Court may well lose if public opinion is not on its side and
be told, John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it!
However, it would be difficult and imprudent given residual fears of
another Marcos for a President to confront a Supreme Court in this way
with any frequency. Employing technicalities or outright defiance is
unlikely to enjoy public support in the long term and a popular President
would not want to tax his political capital by being accused of doing what
former President Arroyo allegedly did with impunity, albeit with more
subtlety and semblance of a legal pretext. The judiciary is also, of course,
entitled to be equally determined and equally emphatic in rendering a
decision against the President.
Supreme Court Administrator Midas Marquez explicitly criticized

these awkward moves in the Courts 2012 annual media forum:
Supreme Court Spokesman and Court Administrator Jose

Midas Marquez on Wednesday accused the Aquino government
of emboldening the public to defy the courts.

Marquez took note of the Executive Branchs habit of
invoking technicalities to evade compliance of court orders
even if compliance was still possible. 189
In addition to the above Supreme Court orders, Marquez cited

the DoJs defiance of a Manila trial court judges order for the inspection
of the vehicle National Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director Reynaldo
Esmeralda was riding in when he was supposedly ambushed on Feb. 21
this year. 190 The alleged defiance of court orders took a strange turn in
the much publicized bikini girls case, where a Catholic high school
brazenly refused to comply with a trial court order to allow several high
school girls to attend their graduation after the school disallowed them
from attending their schools graduation ceremony after the school
administration discovered photos in Facebook allegedly showing the girls
188 Ronnel Domingo, High courts tax order came too late, says DOF, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, Nov. 4, 2011, available at http://business.inquirer.net/28521/high-courts-

tax-order-came-too-late-says-dof. See Jerome Aning & Christine Avendano, SC issues
TRO on BIR move to tax PEACe bonds, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Oct. 18, 2011, available at
http://business.inquirer.net/25585/sc-issues-tro-on-bir-move-to-tax-peace-bonds.
189 Tetch Torres, Marquez blames Aquino govt for encouraging people to defy court orders,
PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Apr. 18, 2012, available at

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/178847/marquez-blames-aquino-govt-for-encouraging-
people-to-defy-court-orders.
190 Id.
in bikinis and in salacious poses. Some pundits put these bikini photos on
the same plane as Secretary de Limas defiance of the Supreme Court order
that would have allowed former President Arroyo to leave the country and
asked why the two should be treated differently. Arguably, the latter was
spurred by the belief that the Supreme Court acted with extreme partiality
and political motivations and I wrote that individuals religious beliefs
however strong should not lead to an intellectual impunity that believes
itself above the law:
With what impunity, thus, do teachers claim to know morality

better than these parents to the point of defying a court order?
The privacy violation here is not the superficial kind

involving a nun hacking into a students account in search of
compromising photos. (Facebook friends allegedly sent the
photos to STC.) The right to privacy in its deepest sense
protects an intimate zone in which a human is free to make
fundamental decisions about oneself. Perhaps the most
fundamental decision in the Facebook age is how one shapes
the identity one presents to the world, including ones sexuality.
As Dean and Justice Irene Cortes put it: The stand for privacy
need not be taken as hostility against other individuals, against
government, or against society. It is but an assertion by the
individual of his inviolate personality.
The bikini girls are not being punished for a lighthearted

teenage moment immortalized on the Internet. They are really
being punished for transgressing the unspoken stereotype of the
Filipino woman straitjacketed as a Maria Clara who should not
bare even her ankles. This stereotype is as outmoded as the idea
of educating girls just enough to allow them to pray. Teenage
girls worldwide now admire the new stereotype of strong, smart
and independent women, from modern characters such as
Hermione Granger and Katniss Everdeen to Jane Austens
Elizabeth Bennet. They embrace Sex and the Citys message
of equal footing in relationships. And they believe one is free to
revel in ones own beauty for its own sake. As The Vagina
Monologues put it: My short skirt, believe it or not, has
nothing to do with you.
We must protect the deeper right to privacy from

intellectual impunity where schools defy courts and diverge
from human rights standards protected by our Constitution.
We must protect the idea that our national values cannot be
imposed but are shaped by an evolving consensus emerging
from the exercise of these rights, including by teenage girls.
Beyond STC, we must curb intellectual impunity in the

name of morality or values in our national decisions. With
the same intellectual impunity, some bishops floated the idea of
excommunicating President Aquino if he pursues reproductive
health legislation and called for People Power against him in a
colorful sideshow to the ongoing impeachment trial. With the
same intellectual impunity, some vandalized and eventually
forced the closure of Mideo Cruzs allegedly blasphemous art
exhibit instead of staging their own and allowing the public to
judge. With the same intellectual impunity, Comelec blocked a
homosexual party from participating in the party-list elections
until the Supreme Court noted that its members alleged
immorality was not punished by Philippine law. Justice Mariano
del Castillo wrote: [O]ur democracy precludes using the
religious or moral views of one part of the community to
exclude from consideration the values of other members of the
community. 191
The President would be well advised to choose a mode of

resistance better grounded in Justice Jacksons categories of presidential
power and with less potential for massive collateral damage than clumsy
outright defiance of the Supreme Court.To cite an American example,
parenthetically, the American Social Security Administration blatantly
disregarded late 1970s appellate court rulings that would have made it
more difficult for the agency to reduce the number of its beneficiaries, to
the point that the US Ninth Circuit promulgated a statewide injunction and
Congress considered legislation to put an end to the conflict. 192 A
Philippine parallel might be Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission, 193 whose
barbaric yawp against an independent constitutional body read:
We note with stern disapproval that the Civil Service

Commission has once again directed the appointment of its
own choice in the case at bar. We must therefore make the
following injunctions which the Commission must note well
and follow strictly.
Up to this point, the Court has leniently regarded the attitude

of the public respondent on this matter as imputable to a lack
of comprehension and not to intentional intransigence. But we
are no longer disposed to indulge that fiction. Henceforth,
191 Oscar Franklin Tan, Commentary: Intellectual impunity vs the right to bikini photo,
PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Apr. 2, 2012, available at

http://opinion.inquirer.net/26129/intellectual-impunity-vs-the-right-to-bikini-photos.
The essay was one of the most widely read Inquirer op-eds in 2012 as of its publication.
192 Samuel Estreicher & Richard Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 681-82 (1989).

193 G.R. No. 96298, 197 SCRA 106, May 14, 1991.
departure from the mandate of Luego by the Civil Service

Commission after the date of the promulgation of this decision
shall be considered contempt of this Court

The Commission on Civil Service has been duly warned.
Henceforth, it disobeys at its peril.
B. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF POWER
It is appropriate to begin a discussion of the Presidents specific,

explicit powers with the Commander-in-Chief power, one described by
Schlesinger as of prime importance. The Founders were determined to
deny the American President what Blackstone had assigned to the British
King the sole prerogative of making war and peace. 194 The 1987
Constitution provides:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all

armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may,
for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. 195
This presidential role emphasizes why executive power is

concentrated in one person when decisive, immediate action is called for
and the classic example of a political question where Bakers unusual need
for questioning adherence to a political decision already made is required
is in the middle of a shooting war. In summary, however, the President
enjoys little additional preference against judicial review in wielding the
Commander-in-Chief power outside an actual war. The power was granted
great deference in decisions during former President Arroyos term, but
only in the narrow confines of the most benign calling out power.
This is not difficult to understand given that much of the 1987

Constitutions restraints on the president were motivated by fear of martial
law and a Commander-in-Chief turned dictator. The rest of the
Constitutions article VII, Section 18 imposes multiple safeguards against a
declaration of martial law or a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
194 SCHLESINGER, supra note 8, at 3, quoting WOODROW WILSON,

CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56-57 (1908).
including both judicial and congressional review, and these powers are
unlikely to be exercised except in a genuinely dire emergency. Or rather,
based as past allegations against former President Arroyo, a president
might attempt to evade these restrictions by giving actions akin to martial
law other names. 196
Note, however, that when former President Arroyo declared

martial law in Maguindanao following the so-called Ampatuan massacre of
57 women and journalists by the Ampatuan political clan and subsequent
alleged mobilization of thousands of their armed followers, the Court
despite the multiple safeguards against martial law declined to rule on the
matter for two years, after which it dismissed the case for mootness. The
Court reasoned that she lifted martial law after only eight days and
Congress likewise did not act further on the matter. 197 In this decision,
Justice Carpio vigorously dissented to emphasize, first, that standing is
granted to any citizen to question a declaration of martial law and this
grant of standing should not be restricted in interpretation. Second, Justice
Carpio argued that the power to declare martial law is restricted by the
Revised Penal Code definition of rebellion, which requires that the armed
uprising or violence contemplated have a political complexion such as the
intent to remove a potion of Philippine territory from the governments
jurisdiction. He argued that a declaration of martial law was
unconstitutional where the alleged armed mobilization was by known
political allies of then President Arroyo. He reiterated a low bar, however,
for reviewing the propriety of martial law and proposed the low bar of
probable cause. Third, Justice Carpio vigorously argued that the Courts
power of review was independent of Congress and the Court could act
without waiting for Congressional inaction. 198
The present framework for the Commander-in-Chief powers was

articulated in Sanlakas v. Reyes 199 and reiterated in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo:
[Section 18] grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief,

a sequence of graduated power[s]. From the most to the
least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two
powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two
conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that
public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as
196 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 489 SCRA 160, May 3, 2006
and preceding cases.

197 Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293, Mar. 20, 2012.
198 Id. (Carpio, J., dissenting).
199 G.R. No. 159085, 421 SCRA 656, Feb. 3, 2004.
we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, [t]hese

conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out
power. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes
necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. 200
The framework of graduated powers gives great deference to the

President with respect to the most benign power, the calling out
power or the deployment of the military, from the deployment of Marines
in shopping malls in IBP v. Zamora to military responses to a state of
rebellion in Sanlakas. This has been borne out in the American
experience, which moved from wars declared with Congressional
authorization to the Presidents unilateral deployment of troops in various
exercises, police actions and peacekeeping missions with the term war
rarely mentioned. This change also conforms to modern military reality
from formal battlefields to abstract battle lines crossed by terrorists,
insurgents, guerillas and commandos. Of course, the power to position
troops itself is broader than it seems. In 1846, for example, US President
James Polk deployed American troops in disputed territory and were
predictably attacked by Mexican troops. Whatever Congress power over
war on paper, Polk then stampeded Congress into a recognition of a state
of war. 201
The Supreme Court recently and explicitly upheld the breadth of

presidential power outside a martial law or suspension of writ context in
Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel:
[T]he President's power to conduct peace negotiations is

implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the
general responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent
and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. 202
Further, Sanlakas held that the Commander-in-Chief power may

be exercised broadly when coupled with the executive power:
Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President
from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution
vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but,
first and foremost, with Executive powers.
200 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA at 242.

201 SCHLESINGER, supra note 8, at 41.
202 Province of North Cotabato v. Govt of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, 568 SCRA 402, 502, Oct. 14, 2008.

Lincoln believed the Presidents power broad and that of
Congress explicit and restricted, and sought some source of
executive power not failed by misuse or wrecked by sabotage.
He seized upon the President's designation by the Constitution
as Commander-in-Chief, coupled it to the executive power
provision and joined them as the war power which
authorized him to do many things beyond the competence of
Congress.

The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is
that the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is
and become more so when taken together with the provision
on executive power and the presidential oath of office.

Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion
springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at
the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief
powers. 203
David added that the primary function of the President is to

enforce the law. In the exercise of such function, the President, if
needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-
in-Chief. 204 One notes that previous decisions have recognized great
deference in reviewing the factual bases for the exercise Commander-in-
Chief powers and even Justice Carpios dissent in Fortun regarding an
actual declaration of martial law proposed the low bar of probable cause
for a review of such a declaration. In the United States, the Commander-
in-Chief power has been stretched to argue for an inherent discretion to
interrogate enemy combatants, practically arguing to justify torture in
certain circumstances. 205
The deference to the calling out power is deceptive, however, in

that it exists only within a very narrow sphere bounded by a large number
of restrictions. The President may deploy the armed forces to suppress a
rebellion but past the point when persons can legitimately be treated as
combatants, he will be bound by restrictions against unreasonable search
and the rights of the accused. Sanlakas precisely emphasized that the
declaration of a state of rebellion was tolerable only in that the Court
found that it had no legal significance and the mere declaration of a state
203 Sanlakas v. Reyes, G.R. No. 159085, 421 SCRA 656, 669-77, Feb. 3, 2004.
2006.
205 SUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 155.
of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. 206

Sanlakas added that a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for
the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of
rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are
present. 207 David stated that although the President has broad power to
declare a state of national emergency and act to address such an
emergency, he may not exercise emergency powers such as the takeover of
private property absent congressional authorization. 208
Finally, the deference results in part from unelected Justices

natural hesitation to countermand military matters but such deference has
always been accompanied by a reiteration that the Court may invalidate a
calling out if it is established to be a grave abuse of discretion. The bar
has been set explicitly high, however:
As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents

exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that "judicial inquiry
can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the
Presidents decision is correct," but that "the President did not
act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness,
but arbitrariness. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court
further ruled that it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show
that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis
and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion,
then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings.
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise

of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of
factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated
Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the
events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting
reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape
of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo
D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army
showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
206 Sanlakas v. Reyes, G.R. No. 159085, 421 SCRA 656, 677, Feb. 3, 2004, citing
Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, 357 SCRA 757, 776, May 10, 2001 (Kapunan, J.,
dissenting).
207 Id. at 678.
208 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 489 SCRA 160, 250-57, May 3,
2006.
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events.

Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced
that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for
military aid.
Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President

Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do
nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such
power or duty must not stifle liberty. 209
The problem for a popular president, however, is that the

Commander-in-Chief power offers little outside the purely military sphere
for his execution of programs. He may not, for example, have an allegedly
corrupt former official court-martialed instead of prosecuted.
C. EMERGENCY POWERS
When David discussed how the Commander-in-Chief power may

be wielded broadly in conjunction with the general executive power, the
power of control and the take care power, it also mentioned emergency
powers in relation to the following constitutional provisions:
In times of national emergency, when the public interest so

requires, the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. 210
In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may,

by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject
to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such
powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. 211
David affirmed that the President may declare a state of national

emergency and bring all of his powers to bear on such an emergency,
including the Commander-in-Chief powers. It described emergencies as
209 Id. at 228-29.

211 CONST. art. VI, 23(2).
encompassing a wide range of situations 212 in three broad categories:

economic, natural disaster and national security. Thus, for example, the
President could declare an economic emergency with some reasonable
factual basis and deploy troops to help build buildings, bridges and roads
in remote areas.
David, however, clarified that these powers are not the emergency
powers contemplated in the Constitution but are part of the Presidents
implied executive powers or another explicit power. Additional emergency
powers may only be authorized by Congress, under the following
framework:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the

Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a

national policy declared by Congress. 213
One recalls Justice Jacksons three graduations of presidential

power, as well as his admonition that:
[The forefathers] knew what emergencies were, knew the

pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too,
how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also
suspect that they suspected that emergency powers would tend
to kindle emergencies. 214
Absent Congressional authorization, the President falls back on

his general executive power and Justice Jacksons twilight zone, 215 and
enjoys no particular preference against judicial review.
D. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
More than the calling out gradation of the Commander-in-Chief
212 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 489 SCRA 160, 253-254, May 3,
2006.
213 Id. at 251, citing ISAGANI CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 94 (1998).
214 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650(1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
power, the President traditionally enjoys some of the greatest judicial

deference in foreign affairs, classically described as the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ in the
field of international relations, 216 a field where the separation of powers
finds far less application. 217 Schlesinger noted that:
Congress could not easily stay abreast of the details of relations

with foreign states. It rarely acted as a unified body. It could not
conduct negotiations. It could not be relied on to preserve
secrecy about matters where secrecy was indispensable.
Moreover, international law itself, by requiring in every nation a
single point of responsible authority, confirmed presidential
primacy in foreign relations. 218
Perhaps this deference is best reflected in this powers lack of an

explicit grant and left implied in the Constitutions structure, with only
restrictions on the power made explicit:
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective

unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate. 219
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on

behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. 220
The lack of judicially manageable standards in foreign affairs

was highlighted in Arroyo v. De Venecia: 221
[W]hile Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope of judicial

inquiry it has not altogether done away with political
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign
relations. 222
In the political questions jargon, foreign affairs is a key example

of a functional question, 223 or at least an example where hypertextualism is
challenged by a rare dearth of text. Functionally, the Presidents primacy in
216 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
217 Id. at 316.
218 SCHLESINGER, supra note 8, at 13-14.
221 G.R. No. 127255, 277 SCRA 268, Aug. 14, 1997.
222 Id. at 289-90.
foreign affairs is readily understood as a state needs to speak with one

clear, definitive voice to others. Marcos v. Manglapus classic discussion cites
an example:
[T]here remain issues beyond the Courts jurisdiction We

cannot, for example, question the Presidents recognition of a
foreign government. 224
An established line of cases has also affirmed the judiciarys

acceptance of determinations by the executive that an international
organization enjoys certain immunities, 225 although this is subject to
exceptions discussed below.
The traditional deference to the President in foreign affairs has

doctrinally spilled over into the modern diplomatic development of
executive agreements over treaties. Executive agreements, entered into
with other states solely by the executive pursuant to its foreign affairs
power, cover a broad array of subjects and are distinguished from treaties
in practice almost solely by these agreements not being submitted to the
Senate for ratification. In the United States, these became an instrument
of major foreign policy when an exchange of notes with Great Britain
limited naval forces in the Great Lakes, shortly after war with Great Britain
ended. The US Senate did not ratify the executive agreement although it
endorsed it with a two-thirds vote. 226 The 2011 decision Bayan Muna v.
Romulo summarized the present doctrine:
The categorization of subject matters that may be covered

by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is
not cast in stone. [F]orm takes a back seat when it comes to
effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty
or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international
agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle.
As may be noted, almost half a century has elapsed since the

Court rendered its decision in Eastern Sea Trading. Since then,
225 Intl Catholic Migration Commn v. Calleja, G.R. No. 85750, 190 SCRA, 130,
Sep. 28, 1990; Holy See v. Rosario, G.R. No. 101949, 238 SCRA 524, Dec. 1, 1994;
Lasco v. U.N. Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration, G.R. No. 109095,
241 SCRA 681, Feb. 23, 1995; Callado v. Intl Rice Research Institute, G.R. No.
106483, 241 SCRA 681, May 22, 1995; Dept of Foreign Affairs v. Natl Labor
Relations Commn, G.R. No. 113191, 262 SCRA 38, Sep. 18, 1996. See Lacierda v.
Platon, G.R. No. 157141, 468 SCRA 650, Aug. 31, 2005 (resolution of claim allegedly
against persons in their individual capacities and not against an international
organization employing them).
226 SCHLESINGER, supra note 8, at 86-87.
the conduct of foreign affairs has become more complex and

the domain of international law wider, as to include such
subjects as human rights, the environment, and the sea. In fact,
in the US alone, the executive agreements executed by its
President from 1980 to 2000 covered subjects such as defense,
trade, scientific cooperation, aviation, atomic energy,
environmental cooperation, peace corps, arms limitation, and
nuclear safety, among others. Surely, the enumeration in Eastern
Sea Trading cannot circumscribe the option of each state on the
matter of which the international agreement format would be
convenient to serve its best interest. 227
Bayan Muna v. Romulo practically deemed antiquated the statement

in Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading: 228
International agreements involving political issues or

changes of national policy and those involving international
arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of
treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of
detail carrying out well-established national policies and
traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature usually take the form of executive
agreements. 229
Bayan Muna v. Romulo is a strong precedent in the executives favor

in that the Court upheld the executive agreement despite the available
reasons to do otherwise. The agreement in question was a bilateral non-
surrender agreement, executed with the United States in 2003 through an
exchange of diplomatic notes, where each country agreed not to surrender
a national of the other to an international tribunal. The Philippines signed
the Rome Statue establishing the International Criminal Court in 2000,
although it only acceded to the treaty in 2011 after the decision, 230 and the
United States entered into these bilateral agreements with various countries
in an attempt to protect its nationals from harassment in such international
tribunals. The Bayan Muna petitioners argued that the non-surrender
agreement contravened the Rome Statute, although the Court ruled that it
complemented the latter, the International Criminal Courts jurisdiction
227 Bayan Muna v. Romula, G.R. No. 159618, 641 SCRA 244, 260-62, Feb. 1,
2011.
2283 SCRA 351 (1961). Parenthetically, Eastern Sea Trading made its point by noting
that the Parity Rights with the United States was previously an executive agreement
not concurred in by the US Senate, before these were appended to the Philippine
Constitution in an ordinance.
229 Id. at 356.
230 Philippines ratifies the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN NEWS
CENTRE, Aug. 30, 2011, at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39416.

intended to complement domestic courts. The petitioners also argued that

the agreement contravened the Philippine Act on Crimes Against
International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against
Humanity, which permits the Philippines to surrender persons to an
international tribunal already investigating or prosecuting the crime they
are accused of in lieu of a domestic investigation. 231 In a vigorous dissent,
Justice Carpio emphasized that the Act on Crimes against International
Humanitarian Law stated a policy that a state is has a duty to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over international crimes and the agreement should
thus be ratified before effectively amending a law.
One thus concludes that if the present jurisprudential trajectory is

followed, an executive agreement would conceivably only be struck down
if it too blatantly conflicted with a law or treaty. This was in fact the case in
Adolfo v. Court of First Instance of Zambales, 232 where the 1947 Military Bases
Agreement provided that the Philippines would exercise jurisdiction over
members of the United States armed forces but custody would be
entrusted to the commanding officer of the nearest American base.
However, an exchange of notes in 1965 extended this to a civilian
component. Justice Fernando wrote that the Bases Agreement, being a
ratified treaty, would have to be respected but declared the case moot
following the American civilian in questions voluntary waiver of an
American commanders custody. Adolfo was in fact cited in Bayan Muna v.
Romulo.
Bayan v. Zamora 233 upheld the Visiting Forces Agreement, although

it was ratified by the Senate by then. Lim v. Executive Secretary declined to
examine whether American troops were engaged in offensive exercises in
the Philippines without further proof, raising that the Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts.
Finally, despite the deference granted in a foreign affairs context,

one must remain aware that the expanded certiorari power may strike
down what is deemed grave abuse of discretion. Bayan Muna reiterated:
[B]earing in mind what the Court said in Taada v. Angara, that

it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and
authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve
grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or
department of the government, we cannot but resolve head on
231 Rep. Act No. 9851, 17 (2009).

232 G.R. 30650, 34 SCRA 166, Jul. 31, 1970.
233 G.R. 138587, 342 SCRA 449, Oct. 10, 2000.
the issues raised before us. Indeed, where an action of any

branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution or is done with grave abuse of discretion, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle it. As in this petition, issues are precisely raised putting
to the fore the propriety of the Agreement pending the
ratification of the Rome Statute. 234
Tanada v. Angara prominently addressed whether the Senate could

validly concur in the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization
and refused to consider this a political question despite the clear textual
commitment of treaties to the Senate. This was because of nationalist
constitutional provisions that may have stated policies contrary to the
WTOs. In a foreign affairs context, a hypertextualist may draw on far
more verbiage by considering treaties or declaring international custom.
For example, dictum in Liang v. People, 235 which rejected an extension of
diplomatic immunity of a Chinese Asian Development Bank economist to
a slander charge, stated:
The DFAs determination that a certain person is covered by

immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in
courts. 236
The holding was anchored on the Vienna Convention on

Diplomatic Relations, under which immunity does not extend beyond
official functions. 237 Liang is contrasted with Minucher v. Court of Appeals, 238
which recognized that a US Drug Enforcement Agency agent conducting
surveillance on alleged international drug traffickers in the Philippines and
testifying in a criminal case against one was acting within his official
functions and enjoyed diplomatic immunity. Liang is not the only exception
to the general deference to an executive recognition of diplomatic
immunity. German Agency for Technical Cooperation v. Court of Appeals 239
rejected a finding of diplomatic immunity made by the Solicitor General
and not the Department of Foreign Affairs, although the Court noted the
website of the agency concerned described it as a company under
private law and the matter was a labor case involving allegedly illegally
dismissed Filipinos. The reasoning behind these precedents may readily be
234 Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, 641 SCRA 244, 256, Feb. 1, 2011,
quoting Taada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, 272 SCRA 18, 48-49, May 2, 1997.
235 G.R. No. 125865, 355 SCRA 125, Mar. 26, 2001 (Resolution on Motion for
Reconsideration).
236 Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865, 323 SCRA 692, 695, Jan. 28, 2000.
237 Liang, 355 SCRA at 133.
238 G.R. No. 142396, 397 SCRA 244, Feb. 11, 2003.
239 G.R. No. 152318, 585 SCRA 160, Apr. 16, 2009.
used against the President in weightier matters beyond individual

foreigners.
E. APPOINTMENTS
The Constitution provides:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the

Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. 240
This provision is understood to refer to four categories:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors;

other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval
captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in
the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments

are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to

appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress

may by law vest in the President alone. 241
Bermudez v. Executive Secretary describes the Presidents general

power to appoint the executive branchs officers in broad terms:
When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the
power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must
be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion
of whom to appoint.
240CONST. art. VII, 16.

241Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, Oct. 18, 2011, citing Sarmiento v.
Mison, G.R. No. 79974, 156 SCRA 549, Dec. 17, 1987.
[T]he phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary

should be interpreted, as it is normally so understood, to be a
mere advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially
persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the
party to whom it is made. The President, being the head of
the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away
with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in
the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he
cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his
authority. 242
Beyond the executive branch, Pimentel v. Executive Secretary

described:
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and
the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this
executive power except in those instances when the
Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the
executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the
legislature. The scope of the legislatures interference in the
executives power to appoint is limited to the power to
prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. 243
Rufino v. Endriga added:

Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the
Legislative and Judicial branches violates the system of
separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican
government. 244
Rufino found that the Cultural Center of the Philippines was part
of the executive branch, not being legislative or judicial, and struck down
provisions of a law that allowed the centers board of trustees to appoint a
new trustee in case of a vacancy as unconstitutional and against the
Presidents power to appoint. 245 Contrast Rufino with Liban v. Gordons 246
different outcome because it found that the entity in question, the
Philippine National Red Cross, was not a government entity.
242G.R. No. 131429, 311 SCRA 733, 740-41, Aug. 4, 1999.

243Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 164978, 472 SCRA 587, 593, Oct.
13, 2005, citing Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974, 156 SCRA 549, Dec. 17, 1987;
Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903 (1954); Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, 223
SCRA 568, Jun. 22, 1993. The decision noted that the Commission on Appointments
is distinct from Congress and its powers are executive in nature even though it is
composed of legislators.
244 G.R. No. 139554, 496 SCRA 13, 50, Jul. 21, 2006, citing Santos v. Macaraig,
G.R. No. 94070, 208 SCRA 74, Apr. 10, 1992.

245 Rufino v. Endriga, 496 SCRA at 60-62.
246 G.R. No. 175352, 593 SCRA 68, Jul. 15, 2009.
Following Cayetano v. Monsod, the President has enjoyed deference

in choice of appointments, with requirements for positions interpreted in
his favor in cases of doubt. There, the Court ruled that lawyer Christian
Monsods experience in various banks and non-governmental
organizations met the requirement that a Commission on Elections
commissioner should have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years 247 and delivered an elaborate dissection of this phrase complete
with quotes from magazine articles and strained explanations of how a
World Bank lawyer encounters the laws of other countries and a National
Movement for Free Elections chair encounters election law issues. 248
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, with similar deference, upheld how

former President Arroyo appointed several cabinet secretaries in an acting
capacity while Congress was in session then immediately reappointed them
in an ad interim capacity immediately upon Congress recess. 249 This
substantially delayed the need for the appointees confirmation because
acting secretaries need not be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The decision also rejected the proposition that only an
undersecretary may be appointed an acting secretary. 250 Another recent
decision upheld a law that allowed the President to appoint officers-in-
charge for certain Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao offices until
an upcoming election, in the context of election synchronization. 251
More recently, in Paguia v. Office of the President, Alan Paguia was not
only denied standing to assail former Chief Justice Davides appointment
as an ambassador for being allegedly beyond the mandatory retirement age
for Department of Foreign Affairs employees but reminded his suspension
from the practice of law prohibited him from even bringing the suit. 252
Soriano v. Lista similarly rejected citizen and taxpayer standing for a
petitioner questioning the lack of Commission on Appointments
confirmation of senior Coast Guard officers. The decision noted the Coast
Guard is no longer technically part of the armed forces, 253 and a previous
decision ruled similarly regarding the Philippine National Police and its
senior officers. 254
The power to appoint is obviously important in relation to the
247 CONST. art. IX-C, 1(1).

249 Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 164978, 472 SCRA 587, 600, Oct.
13, 2005.
250 Id. at 598-99.
251 Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, Oct. 18, 2011.
252 Paguia v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 176278, 621 SCRA 600, 605-06,
Jun. 25, 2010.

253 G.R. No. 153881, 399 SCRA 437, 439-40, Mar. 24, 2003.
254 See Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, 371 SCRA 165, Aug. 11, 1999.
judiciary in that the President appoints Supreme Court Justices and other
judges, although the impact of such appointments are not immediately felt.
In President Aquinos case, he may feel stymied by ten years worth of
judicial appointments made by his predecessor.
Otherwise, the deference accorded to the Presidents power to
appoint, however, is not particularly helpful to a popular president facing
an adverse Court in that the deference does not extend to judicial review of
the appointees acts. The Court may also opt to find grave abuse of
discretion when interpreting an appointees qualifications if there is an
available textual hook in the relevant constitutional or statutory provision.
F. PARDON
The Constitution provides:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in

this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction by final judgment. 255
The nature of a pardon has been described as follows:

In Monsanto v. Factoran, we have firmly established the general
rule that while a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting
out the existence of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the
offender is as innocent as though he never committed the
offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence
of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not
forgetfulness. It does not erase the fact of the commission of
the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon frees the
individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores to him all his civil rights. Unless expressly grounded on
the persons innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 256
The Presidents power to pardon is understood to be one of

utmost discretion and Marcos v. Manglapus classic discussion noted:
[T]here remain issues beyond the Courts jurisdiction We
cannot set aside a presidential pardon. 257
255CONST. art. VII, 19.

256Garcia v. Chairman of Commn on Audit, G.R. No. 75025, 226 SCRA 356,
Sep. 14, 1993, citing Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, 170 SCRA 190, Feb. 9,
1989.
The power is also understood to be broad and Llamas v. Orbos 258

upheld a pardon in an administrative case as the Constitutions
qualification only excluded impeachment cases. 259 A pardon may be
accompanied by conditions or reinstatement to an administrative
position. 260 The main restriction is the requirement that a pardon be
granted only after a conviction by final judgment. People v. Salle 261
categorically declared:
We now declare that the conviction by final judgment

limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present
Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or
conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal
from his conviction by the trial court. [A]gencies or
instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require
proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his
conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. The
acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment
or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue
of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the
withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor
administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the
accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the
release of the accused from confinement. 262
The dearth of jurisprudence on the power to pardon appears to

affirm its breadth and highly discretionary nature. When former President
Arroyo pardoned former President Joseph Estrada following his
conviction for plunder, 263 debates revolved purely around its wisdom, not
its validity. As always, however, the Court may find grave abuse of
discretion. For example, it may decide that a pardon or stated reasons for a
pardon contradicts a stated constitutional policy, akin to how certain
provisions were invoked in Tanada v. Angara in an attempt to block a
ratified treaty.
The problem, again, for a popular president is that the power to

pardon is extremely narrow. A pardons main use in opposing the judiciary
is to signal severe disagreement with the interpretation of a law or even the
258 G.R. No. 99031, 202 SCRA 844, Oct. 15, 1991.
259 Id. at 857.
260 Garcia v. Chairman of Commn on Audit, supra note 256
261 G.R. No. 103567, 250 SCRA 581, Dec. 4, 1995.
262 Id. at 592.
263 Lira Dalangin-Fernandez, Arroyo grants pardon to Estrada, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, Oct. 25, 2007 available at:

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20071025-
96730/%28UPDATE_3%29_Arroyo_grants_pardon_to_Estrada..
Constitution by pardoning those convicted pursuant to this interpretation.

This was most famously done by Thomas Jefferson, in opposition to the
Alien and Sedition Act of 1801, and he wrote:
[N]othing in the Constitution has given [the judiciary] a right to

decide for the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide
for them. Both magistrates are equally independent in the
sphere of action assigned to them. The judges, believing the law
constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence But the
executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, were bound
to remit the execution of it; because that power had been
confined to them by the Constitution [T]he opinion which
gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are
constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in their
own sphere of action, but for the legislature and executive also,
in their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch. 264
G. VETO
The Presidents power to veto is treated with similar deference:
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a

law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he
shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with
his objections to the House where it originated, which shall
enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the
Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be
sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which
it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds
of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all
such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas
or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against
shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate
his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within
thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the
264 Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REV.
1463, 1490 (2003).

veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object. 265
The dearth of jurisprudence and textual hooks governing vetos

may similarly reflect the belief that it is purely discretionary. Gonzales v.
Macaraig 266 upheld the broad use of the item veto to veto provisions in
the General Appropriations Bill for 1989, despite a Senate resolution that
opined this was unconstitutional, and noted that some provisions were
inappropriate for an appropriations bill. 267
However, as with the power to pardon, the power to veto is

narrow and is principally directed at Congress. A veto may indirectly
oppose the judiciary by targeting legislation pursuant to a decision the
President wishes to oppose. For example, Andrew Jackson vetoed the
charter of the Bank of the United States renewal out of disagreement with
McCulloch v. Maryland. 268 Noting a more recent American practice, a
President may make a signing statement or articulate how he intends to
enforce (or not enforce) a bill he signs into law instead of using his veto.
Harvard Professor Laurence Tribe believes such decisions to sign and
make a statement are manifestly unreviewable. 269 More broadly, vetos
may be part of the executives constitutional interpretation. 270 As with
other powers, finally, it is not impossible that a veto be declared grave
abuse of discretion.
H. FISCAL POWERS
The Presidents fiscal powers merit two quick notes:

266 G.R. No. 87836, 191 SCRA 450, Nov. 19, 1990.
267 Id. at 464.
268 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
269 Laurence Tribe, Tribe says signing statements are the wrong target, BOSTON GLOBE,
4, Aug. 9, 2006, available at

http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2006/08/09_tribe.html. See Laurence Tribe, Larry
Tribe on the ABA Signing Statements Report, BALKINIZATION, Aug. 6, 2006, at
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/08/larry-tribe-on-aba-signing-statements.html.
270 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What
the Law is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 251 (1994); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in
Theory and Practice: Two Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEO.
L.J. 373, 378-80 (1994); Michael Rappaport, The Presidents Veto and the Constitution, 87
NW. U. L. REV. 735, 766-71 (1993); Geoffrey Miller, The Presidents Power of Interpretation:
Implications of a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law, 56-AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35,
50-51 (1993); Gary Lawson & Christopher Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1286-88 (1996); Christopher May, Presidential
Defiance of Unconstitutional Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
865, 992-93 (1994).
(1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations

recommended by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of

appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations. 271
First, the Presidents power to realign funds is mundane,

uncontroversial and highly discretionary, particularly coupled with his
power to control the executive and focus all his powers in an emergency.
However, judicial review will likely be directed at the funds use and not
the realignment.
Second, the President could conceivably refuse to increase the

judiciarys budget during his entire term as Congress is only bound not to
reduce it. 272 This is, of course, an extremely indirect and abstract method
of making his case, with unsure effectiveness.
I. IMPEACHMENT
Impeachment is a congressional prerogative but is included in this

discussion as it is the gravest check against the Supreme Court.
Conceivably, as President Aquinos critics allege, a president may influence
his allies in Congress to initiate impeachment. Entire books have been
written about impeachment given its gravity, but this discussion is solely
concerned with impeachments use by the political branches to challenge
constitutional interpretation.
The prosecution in the ongoing Corona impeachment trial failed

to make these challenges. As discussed in the end of the last section, the
prosecution team soon dropped all allegations regarding decisions and
focused on accusing Corona of amassing ill-gotten wealth. The prosecution
later rested having barely discussed any of the allegations regarding

272 CONST. art. VIII, 3.
Supreme Court decisions. 273 House prosecutors apparently felt it too

difficult to argue judicial doctrine to ordinary voters.
Again, the Philippine perception of judicial supremacy diluted the

charges against Corona in relation to constitutional interpretation at the
outset. The powerful charge of a midnight appointment, being contrary to
a decided case, was nuanced by alleging that it was betrayal of public trust
to accept such a dubious appointment, following Fr. Bernass initial
opinion that any person who accepted the post of Chief Justice from Ms
Arroyo would open himself or herself to impeachment by the next
Congress. 274 The questionable reasoning behind De Castro v. Judicial and
Bar Council itself went unchallenged. The impeachment complaint alleged:
Despite the obviously negative and confidence-shattering

impact that a midnight appointment by an outgoing President
would have on the people's faith in the Supreme Court and the
judicial system, Respondent eagerly, shamelessly, and without
even a hint of self-restraint and delicadeza, accepted his midnight
appointment as Chief Justice by then-President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. 275
The complaint assailed several other decisions, from Biraogo which

used the human rights doctrine of equal protection to strike down a
Presidential Truth Commission tasked with investigating anomalies in the
preceding Arroyo regime to the Courts exoneration of Justice Mariano
Castillo who was accused by several noted public international law authors
and members of the UP College of Law faculty of plagiarizing the formers
articles in a decision. Despite the doctrinal grounds to question such
decisions, the complaint instead argued that Coronas votes were biased
and cited an investigative report that claimed Corona voted in favor of
273 Cathy Yamsuan & Cynthia Balana, Prosecution rests case vs Corona, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, Feb. 29, 2012, , available at

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/153265/prosecution-rests-case-vs-corona.
The prosecution discussed only articles 2, 3 and 7 of its complaint. Article 3
involved the recall of the Supreme Court decision favoring labor unions in Flight
Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) v. Philippine Airlines allegedly
after Philippine Airlines counsel Estelito Mendoza wrote a letter to the Court and
involved no doctrinal issue. G.R. No. 178083, Jul. 23, 2008; In re Letters of Atty.
Mendoza, A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC, Oct. 04, 2011. Article 7 accused Corona of highly
partisan action in the issuance of a temporary restraining order that would have
allowed former President Arroyo and her husband to leave the country and likewise
involved no doctrinal issue. Minute Resolution dated Nov. 18, 2011 in Macapagal-
Arroyo v. De Lima, G.R. No. 199034 and subsequent Court resolutions.
274 Bordadora, supra note 13.
Impeachment, at 14 (Dec. 12, 2011).

Arroyo, who appointed him, in 78% of cases involving her. 276 The defense
asserted in response to several allegations that (1) a Supreme Court
decision had already settled the issue raised and (2) the assailed action was
a collegial Supreme Court action of which Corona is only one member. 277
[S]imple questions deserve straight answers, not a defense by

abstract legalism that claims that the questions may not even be asked. 278
Nevertheless, these defense positions appeared to have been accepted by
the public who were conditioned to thinking of the impeachment trial as a
judicial trial where evidence of individual guilt would weigh heaviest.
Senator Antonio Trillanes IV was the only senator-judge to articulate a
philosophy other than a proposed impartial adherence to evidence:
If an impeachment trial were meant to be solely evidence-based,

then why didnt our constitutional framers just give that power
to the Supreme Court whose members are supposed to be
experienced judges?
The overarching policy issue in this episode is whether the

conviction or acquittal of Corona would be good for our
country. To resolve this, I intend to use political acceptability as
the sole criterion to evaluate the projected outcomes of either
(decision).
My verdict should not be based solely on evidence as it now

becomes a matter of public policy 279
Trillaness position appears to have been taken less seriously than

armchair lawyering. Picking up the point that senators are elected officials
and not necessarily lawyers by profession, I wrote on the need to ensure
the electorates thoughts on constitutional interpretation needed to be
heard in the impeachment of a Justice:
276 Id. at 15-21.

277 In re Impeachment of Corona, Case No. 002-2011, Answer to Verified
Complaint for Impeachment (Dec. 21, 2011). For a summary of the prosecution and
defense positions, see Tan, Impeachment trial scorecard, supra note 169, at A16.
278 Oscar Franklin Tan, Commentary: Shoot the ball, not the ref, PHIL. DAILY
INQUIRER, Feb. 15, 2012, available at http://opinion.inquirer.net/23121/shoot-the-

ball-not-the-ref.
279 Speech delivered at University of the Philippines National College of Public
Administration and Governance, Jan. 9, 2012, quoted in Cathy Yamsuan, Corona verdict
not solely evidence-based, says Trillanes, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, available at
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/124755/corona-verdict-not-solely-evidence-based-says-
trillanes.
This impeachment is about once again placing our

democratic institutions under intense scrutiny as a new
generation of voters with no firsthand memory of Edsa
emerges. An accounting of the judiciary must be an
accounting of its very doctrines to ensure that these adhere to
the principles the President, Congress and the only boss
believe our nation stands for. As Stanford Dean Larry Kramer
cautioned: To nudge popular institutions out of the life of the
Constitution is to impoverish both the Constitution and the
republican system it is meant to establish. 280
While popular constitutionalism in the abstract appeared to

resonate during the Corona impeachments early weeks, people appeared
to have difficulty taking the next mental step to declaring a constitutional
value judgment by popularly elected officials superior to a Court decision
in an impeachment context.
Dean Pangalangan wrote:
We need to respond to the fear of lynch-mob populism,

the fear that impeaching Chief Justice Renato Corona today will
weaken the constitutional protection for our rights in the future.

That fear is anchored on the principle of judicial

supremacy, the theory that the courts are the surest
expositors of the Constitution, in contrast to common people
who are caricatured as creatures without reason, ever in thrall
to irrational emotions. 281
Further:
We have, therefore, reached the point as a nation where

we must take action to save the Constitution from the Court
and the Court from itself. . We want a Supreme Court which
will do justice under the Constitution and not over it.
These words were uttered not by President Benigno

Aquino III in 2011, but by US President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt (FDR) in a fireside radio broadcast in 1937. The
alarmists amongst us dont remember much, and that is why
their logic is bizarre. The Supreme Court hurriedly issues a
TRO that would let Arroyo evade Philippine justice, and they
280Tan, The only boss at battleground of principle, supra note 5.

281Raul Pangalangan, Anti-democratic constitutionalism, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jan.
12, 2012, available at http://opinion.inquirer.net/21017/anti-democratic-
constitutionalism.
chant Hallelujah, the rule of law has triumphed! Congress

hurriedly uses its constitutional power to impeach, and they cry
bully and dictatorship. We forget our history. 282
Schlesinger implies that impeachment is hardly a purely judicial

proceeding; The Senate, in trying impeachment cases, was better equipped
to be the judge of the law than of the facts. 283 Yale Professor Charles
Black adds:
[T]echnical rules of evidence were elaborated primarily to hold

juries within narrow limits. They have no place in the
impeachment process. Senators are in any case continually
exposed to hearsay evidence. If they cannot be trusted to
weigh evidence, appropriately discounting for all the factors of
unreliability that have led to our keeping some evidence away
from juries, then they are not in any way up to the job, and
rules of evidence will not help. 284
In the Corona trials opening days, it appeared that the Senate

might assert primacy over the Supreme Court in impeachments. I argued
that the Senate may present its own constitutional interpretation as part of
its necessary task to define betrayal of public trust and culpable
violation of the Constitution in order to judge the impeached against
these standards:
The Coronavela has dispelled the great myth that only the
Supreme Court may interpret the Constitution. After Senate
President Juan Ponce Enrile quoted the Constitution to assert
that the Senate is the sole authority in impeachment cases and
only the military can stop the trial, no temporary restraining
order (TRO) issued from the Supreme Court. After Sen.
Franklin Drilon instructed the Supreme Courts clerk of court
to turn over Chief Justice Renato Coronas statements of assets,
liabilities and net worth (SALN), required by the Constitution
to be disclosed as provided by law, Court Administrator Midas
Marquez immediately announced the SALN could be disclosed.

With the flexing of the Senates muscles [t]he key
defense argument that the Senate cannot scrutinize
constitutional questions is now untenable. The Senate threw
a jab when it demanded the SALN; it may throw a knockout
282 Raul Pangalangan, Save the Constitution from the Court, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER,
Dec. 15, 2011, available at http://opinion.inquirer.net/19229/%E2%80%98save-the-

constitution-from-the-court%E2%80%A6%E2%80%99.
284 CHARLES BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 18 (1974).
punch when it asserts the power to define betrayal of public

trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. 285
One notes the introduction of a former House Judiciary

Committee Chair:
We do not assume the responsibility of proving that the

respondent is guilty of a crime. We do assume the
responsibility of bringing before you a case, proven facts, the
reasonable and probable consequences of which are to cause
people to doubt the integrity of the respondent presiding as a
judge. 286
This potential trajectory was soon derailed by two developments.

First, as mentioned, the trial increasingly focused on assets Chief Justice
Corona was allegedly hiding. Second, the Senate declined to press Senate
President Juan Ponce Enriles earlier strong assertions of jurisdiction when
a bank in which Corona had US dollar accounts obtained a temporary
restraining order against the Senate subpoena regarding these dollar
accounts, based on bank secrecy laws governing dollar deposits. 287 Fr.
Bernas asked questions he answered no to:
[O]nly the Constitution is superior Does the fact that

the Constitution [identifies] the Senate as the sole judge of all
impeachment cases make it superior to the Supreme Court in
everything relating to impeachment? 288
285 Oscar Franklin Tan, Drilons jab may result in a knockout, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER,
Jan. 25, 2012, available at http://opinion.inquirer.net/21781/drilon%E2%80%99s-jab-

may-result-in-a-knockout. See Christine O. Avendao, Enrile: Only military can stop
Corona impeachment trial, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Jan. 2, 2012, available at
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/121009/enrile-only-military-can-stop-corona-
impeachment-trial; Cathy Yamsuan et al, SC clerk of court turns over Corona SALNs, PHIL.
DAILY INQUIRER, Jan. 19, 2012, available at
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/130453/round-3-of-corona-trial-to-prosecution. A
similar argument was made in Joel Butuyan, Should we let it be?, Malaya, Jan. 12, 2012,
available at http://www.malaya.com.ph/01122012/edtorde.html.
286 RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 57 (1973).
287 Phil. Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court, G.R. No. 200238, Feb. 9,
2012; Michael Lim Ubac, Senate votes 13-10 to obey TRO on Corona dollar accounts, PHIL.
DAILY INQUIRER, Feb. 14, 2012, available at
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/145105/senate-votes-13-10-to-obey-tro-on-corona-
dollar-accounts.
288 Jerome Aning & Norman Bordadora, SC, Senate impeachment court equals, says Fr.
Bernas, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Feb. 10, 2012, available at

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/142963/sc-senate-impeachment-court-equals-says-fr-
bernas.
President Aquino himself called to uphold the Senates

jurisdiction:
[T]he English words sole and exclusively are clear in

referring to the power of the House to impeach and referring to
the Senates right to try. So I dont get the legal theory that all of
a sudden the Supreme Court can involve itself in the
impeachment process when the Constitution that we all swore
to defend says that one part of the impeachment belongs
exclusively to the House and the other to the Senate. 289
Harvard Professor Raoul Berger noted:
From Story onward it has been thought that in the domain of

impeachment the Senate has the last word; that even the issue
whether the charged misconduct constitutes an impeachable
offense is unreviewable, because the trial of impeachments is
confided to the Senate alone. This view has the weighty
approval of Professor Herbert Wechsler: Who would
content that the civil courts may properly review a judgment of
impeachment when article I, section 3 declares that the sole
power to try is in the Senate? That any proper trial of an
impeachment may present issues of the most important
constitutional dimension is simply immaterial in this
connection. 290
Black adds:
[J]udicial review has no part to play in impeachment

proceedings. For now, it should be briefly pointed out that, if I
am right, then Congress rests under the very heavy
responsibility of determining finally some of the weightiest of
constitutional questions. [W]e have to divest ourselves of the
common misconception that constitutionality is discussable or
determinable only in the courts. We ought to understand, as
most senators and congressmen understand, that Congresss
responsibility to preserve the forms and precepts of the
Constitution is greater, rather than less, when the judicial forum
is unavailable, as it sometimes must be. 291
289Id.
290BERGER, supra note 286, at 104. Berger further notes that impeachment under
the United States Constitution was originally under the Supreme Court but later
transferred to the Senate as no other tribunal than the Senate could be trusted. Id. at
113.
291 BLACK, supra note 284, at 23-24.
The crucial senatorial vote should be taken, and should be

known to be taken, with full knowledge that there is no appeal.
No senator should be encouraged to think he can shift to any
court responsibility for an unpalatable or unpopular decision. 292
Note, however, that Berger believes impeachment is subject to

judicial review:
The sole power to try affords no more exemption from that

doctrine than does the sole power to legislate. 293
It was never intended that Congress should be the final

judge of the boundaries of its own powers. Astonishment
would have greeted a claim of illimitable power made with
respect to any function of Congress. Astonishment would have
greeted a claim that the structure so carefully reared upon the
separation of powers could be shaken to bits whenever
Congress chose to resort to an unlimited power of
impeachment. (internal citations omitted) 294
I wrote that conceding authority to a Court order and opening a

crack in the Senates supposed sole authority over impeachment would
present future problems:
Having proclaimed that only the military can stop the

impeachment trial, Enrile cannot afford to cede any authority.
The high court now gauges the Senates resolve against its trial
balloon TRO on the disclosure of Coronas dollar accounts.
When the Supreme Court blocked Chief Justice Hilario

Davide Jr.s impeachment in 2003, it claimed it could interpret
the rules governing impeachment even though it had no power
to decide the verdict. Impeachment is a political process in part
because there are few restrictions and even the very definitions
of betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the
Constitution are left to senators judgment. Imagine if the
ongoing debate on the standard to convict crystallizes, whether
into betrayal beyond reasonable doubt, betrayal with
overwhelming preponderance of evidence, or betrayal with
substantial evidence. Might the Supreme Court rule that the
Senates verdict failed to meet its own standard and nullify it as
grave abuse of discretion? Idle legal minds can craft infinite
outlandish pretexts.
292 Id. at 62.

293 BERGER, supra note 286, at 120.
294 Id. at 116-17. Impeachment was a carefully limited exception to the separation
of powers, tolerable only if exercised strictly within bounds. Id. at 118.

The defense insidiously claims that it has properly raised

questions of law before the Supreme Court. This is like
justifying a rule book change that forces a referee to count shots
in only one sides basket. Questions of law are woven into the
impeachment trials fabric, and even if the Supreme Court does
not outright halt the trial, a deceptively narrow order may leave
the impeachment court with nothing to decide. Enrile need not
suffer the travesty of having another court headed by the
defendant himself shape his trial; every textbook tells the
defense to raise its issues before the impeachment court when it
has convened. 295
With the Senate unwilling to resist a restraining order against its

own subpoena, it appears highly unlikely as of this writing that it would
explicitly present a constitutional interpretation at odds with a Supreme
Court decision. The opposite of this result might have been the Senate
discarding strict notions of evidence and individual culpability and making
a policy-driven decision to remove Chief Justice Corona on the purely legal
ground that he was a midnight appointee. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar
Council would stand, albeit severely discredited, because the Senate verdict
would be pursuant to the power to impeach and remove, not the power of
judicial review. A policy-driven or symbolic removal as opposed to one
pursuant to a finding of individual guilt is supported by history; Berger
notes that impeachment was essentially a political weapon 296 used to
make a kings advisers accountable.
One might argue that some eminent American scholars have

written against the resort to impeachment over differences in
constitutional interpretation or political ideology. Schlesinger, for example,
wrote:
There was broad agreement, among scholars at least, on

doctrine. Impeachment was a proceeding of political nature, by
no means restricted to indictable crimes. On the other hand, it
was plainly not to be applied to cases of honest disagreement
over national policy or over constitutional interpretation,
especially when a President refused to obey a law that he
believed struck directly at the presidential prerogative.
Impeachment was to be reserved, in Masons phrase at the
Constitutional Convention, for great and dangerous
offenses. 297
Schlesinger wrote in the Presidents context, however, and Berger
295 Tan, Shoot the ball, not the ref, supra note 278.
wrote that the American Founding Fathers were exclusively concerned

with the President 298 when the provisions of the United States
Constitution on impeachment were drafted. One doubts the honest
disagreement contemplated extends to a contravention of tradition and
established jurisprudence as seen in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council and
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission. The argument that Congress cannot be
left to exercise unlimited power fails when one instead hands unlimited
power over the Constitution to the Supreme Court. Choosing between
these two branches, I wrote analyzing the legitimacy of the canvass of
presidential election results that there can only be one choice:
Given human frailties, Congress thus plays a legitimizing role in

the most essential of democratic exercises, and by its very
nature, it is the only body capable of doing so. 299
Parenthetically, the Court also rebuffed a prosecution request for

certain of its records due to the separation of powers and
interdepartmental comity. 300 The Senate did not pursue this matter.
J. THE PRESIDENCY AS A BULLY PULPIT
If even the weighty artillery of impeachment does not suffice to

contest what the President fears are improvident exercises of the judicial
power, the last of his residual powers is resort to the presidency as a bully
pulpit, or what Professor Laurence Tribe describes as the ability to
command national attention. This has been described:
Justice Robert Jacksons astute observation in Youngstown

Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer on the unique nature of the
presidency, has been widely quoted:
Executive power has the advantage of concentration in a

single head in whose choice the whole Nation has a part,
making him the focus of public hopes and expectations. In
drama, magnitude, and finality, his decisions so far overshadow
any others that almost alone he fills the public eye and ear. No
other personality in public life can begin to compete with him
in access to the public mind through modern methods of
communications. By his prestige as head of state and his
influence upon public opinion he exerts a leverage upon those

300 In re Production of Court Records, Resolution dated Feb. 14, 2012, available at
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/notice.pdf.
who are supposed to check and balance his power which often
cancels their effectiveness.
Correspondingly, the unique nature of the office affords

the President the opportunity to profoundly influence the
public discourse, not necessarily through the enactment or
enforcement of laws, but specially by the mere expediency of
taking a stand on the issues of the day. Indeed, the President is
expected to exercise leadership not merely through the proposal
and enactment of laws, but by making such vital stands. U.S.
President Theodore Roosevelt popularized the notion of the
presidency as a bully pulpit, in line with his belief that the
President was the steward of the people limited only by the
specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the
Constitution, or impleaded by Congress under its constitutional
powers. 301
The Presidency, in short, can become more than the sum of its
powers if only because of the gravitas and influence of being the countrys
focal point. The only long term way for a President to resist a Court is to
engage it on its own battlefield of reason and pit one institutions moral
capital against anothers. If the Justices are inevitably teachers in a vital
national seminar, 302 the Presidency is a powerful platform from which to
join and possibly dominate the debate.
President Aquino, based on media reports, has attempted to do so

in relation to the Corona impeachment trial, at times arguing the very text
of the Constitution. Although this language may not yet be mainstream in
the Philippines, he would not be alone in broader experience. Abraham
Lincoln, for example, voiced opposition to Dred Scott v. Sandford, 303 which
ruled that slaves were not citizens of the United States, and argued that
beyond the immediate parties to the case:
We nevertheless do oppose [Dred Scott] as a political rule

which shall be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who
thinks it wrong, which shall be binding on the members of
Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not
actually concur with the principles of that decision. 304
2006 (Tinga, J., dissenting), quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
302 Eugene Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193,
208 (1952).
303 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
304 Edwin Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 985 (1987).
Franklin Delano Roosevelt pushed the New Deal and a modern

government economic role against an extreme version of laissez-faire then
prevailing in judicial thinking. FDR directly debated decisions reasoning in
public, catching media fancy with witty criticism such as, We have been
relegated to the horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce. 305
More recently, at his 2010 State of the Union Address and in the presence
of US Supreme Court Justices, President Barack Obama vocally criticized a
decision on corporate spending in political campaigns that reversed a
century of law to open the floodgates for special interests including
foreign companies to spend without limit in our elections. 306
The President may readily deploy his entire array of powers from
the bully pulpit. As mentioned, Thomas Jefferson used opposed the Alien
and Sedition Act of 1801 by pardoning those found guilty under it and
Andrew Jackson vetoed the charter of the Bank of the United States out of
disagreement with an underlying Supreme Court doctrine.
The powerful pulpit aside, other stakeholders need to work to

elevate the level of debate. In particular, the media and the academe are
crucial to translating high level constitutional theory into everyday values.
CONCLUSION
Given its constitutional history, one imagines that the Philippines

is a prime potential victim for what Judge Robert Bork calls the
American disease the seizure by judges of authority properly belonging
to the people and their elected representatives. 307
In 2006, at an informal session with Professor Mark Tushnet

organized by my classmate Kasia Klaczynska, he asked each of us to share
the most extreme exercise of judicial review in our home countries. I
ventured that in 2001, there were large and prolonged demonstrations after
then President Joseph Estradas impeachment trial was aborted, which
ended after the Justices of the Supreme Court walked into the center of the
crowds at EDSA and swore in Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President. 308 The exercise ended as none of my dumbstruck classmates
could offer a comparably outlandish anecdote.
305 Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Laws
Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 1019 (2000).

306 Brian Montopoli, Obama Hammers Supreme Court in Speech, CBS NEWS, Jan. 27,
2010, at http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-504643_162-6148414.html.
307 COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 1 (2003).
308 Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710, 356 SCRA 108, Mar. 2, 2001.
Immediately before this article was finalized I sat in Professor

Frank Michelmans last lecture in comparative constitutional law on April
20, 2012. He mentioned that the insertion of language regarding economic
policy into constitutions gave some courts in developing countries the
textual basis to implement broad liberal economic policies by judicial fiat.
He was quite surprised to hear that the Philippine Court acted in a similar
manner with nationalist economic provisions but fortunately backed down
when asked to rule on the Philippines entry into the World Trade
Organization.
Filipino lawyers have taken for granted the Supreme Courts

relative power in our separation of powers. In addition to the expanded
certiorari power explicitly given to it under the 1987 Constitution, the
Court historically enjoyed the greatest public support and was perceived as
democracys last bastion. Our Presidency and Congress were severely
damaged after the perceived partisan maneuvering during the Estrada
impeachment trial and the alleged massive corruption that characterized
President Arroyos extended tenure; in contrast, Chief Justice Davides
calming influence during and in the aftermath of the Estrada trial, Justice
Carpios barricade of charter change 309 and Chief Justice Punos
extrajudicial crusade against extrajudicial killings 310 made judicial restraint
an unthinkably unpopular philosophy both in legal academia and the
mainstream media. The constitutional design has always presumed a
good Supreme Court checking a bad President and less thought was
given to a partisan Court straining the limits of its power.
This article has reviewed the recent experience in the ongoing

Corona impeachment trial and how difficult it is for a popular President
Aquino to challenge allegedly partisan decisions with dubious bases such as
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, which upheld the midnight appointment
of a Chief Justice after the presidential elections but before the new
presidents term, and Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, which used the
human rights doctrine of equal protection to shield former President
Arroyo from prosecution for corruption. Surveying judicial power in
practice under the 1987 Constitution, one summarizes:
1) The power of judicial review was textually reinforced into the

expanded certiorari power, and may strike down acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion even if technically not
309 Lambino v. Commn on Elections, G.R. No. 174153, 505 SCRA 160, Oct. 26,
2006.
310 Secretary of Natl Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, 568 SCRA 1, Oct. 7,
2008.
unconstitutional;
2) The political question doctrine, which marks the outer bound

of a political branchs power relative to judicial review, is all but
nonexistent;
3) An extremely textualist Philippine approach effectively expands

the scope of judicial power;
4) Highly liberal standing rules effectively expand the scope of

judicial power;
5) The 1987 Constitutions sheer length presents near infinite

textual hooks to anchor an exercise of judicial power, and
international law sources provide even more hooks;
6) The rulemaking power, introduced in 2007, expands judicial

power even further, beyond the traditional case and
controversy restraint of judicial review; and
7) An entrenched deference to judicial supremacy in the

Philippines makes judicial power even broader in practice.
Against the judicial power, one surveys presidential power:
1) The President enjoys no special preference relative to judicial

review in the exercise of his general executive power;
2) The President has numerous implied powers;
3) The President exercises broad power to control executive

instrumentalities and a government body not legislative or
judicial or part of an independent constitutional body is
deemed executive;
4) As Commander-in-Chief, the President faces substantial post-

martial law restrictions should he declare martial law or a
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, but enjoys substantial
deference using his most benign power of calling out the
armed forces;
5) The President enjoys substantial deference in foreign affairs,

including entry into executive agreements that do not require
Senate ratification;
6) The President enjoys latitude in focusing his powers in an

emergency and declaring a state of national emergency but
true emergency powers require congressional authorization;
7) The President enjoys substantial deference in making

appointments;
8) The President enjoys substantial deference in granting

pardons;
9) The President enjoys substantial deference in exercising a

veto;
10) The President may attempt to influence Congress to initiate

and try a Justice in impeachment but this has not been an
effective venue for challenging judicial doctrine in Philippine
experience; and
11) The President enjoys a powerful, implied bully pulpit by being

the nations focal point from which he may attempt to
influence the country.
The ready conclusion is that the constitutional design favors

aggressive judicial review as a general rule and recognizes narrow areas of
deference to presidential power as an exception. The only long term way
for a popular president to resist a possibly partisan Court in this framework
is to use his bully pulpit to challenge the Courts very reasoning following
the likes of Lincoln and Roosevelt. Disinterested stakeholders such as the
media and academe are crucial to elevating the level of debate necessary to
make such a challenge possible, beyond the present default to judicial
supremacy in the Philippines. People must realize that they cannot fear
another martial law regime only to ignore the more subtle impunity
embodied in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council and Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Commission.
One consolation for an embattled President is that the judiciarys

true strength lies in its moral strength, holding neither purse nor sword,
and its more extreme powers such as the rulemaking power appear to be
difficult to exercise absent the kind of clear popular support Chief Justice
Puno did. For all the scholarly literature on the Courts greater mystic
function, a President cannot forget that he is equally capable of mustering
moral strength and firing the national imagination. As Schlesinger wrote:
The effective means of controlling the Presidency lay less in law

than in politics. For the American President ruled by influence;
and the withdrawal of consent, by Congress, by the press, by
public opinion, could bring any President down. The great
Presidents understood this. 311
One must always recall judicial reviews place in democracy as a

countermajoritarian enigma and its presumption that citizens remain active
participants. An abdication of this collective role to the judiciary means
the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral education and
stimulus that comes from fighting the question out in the ordinary way,
and correcting their own errors. The tendency of a common and easy
resort to this great function, now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the
political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral
responsibility. 312 As Judge Learned Hand put it, it would be most
irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how
to choose them, which I assuredly do not. 313
As recent experience has shown, the level of discourse sorely

needs to be elevated in impeachment contexts, and the process must
transcend armchair lawyering into an opportunity for elected officials to
represent their constituents in affirming or rejecting constitutional
interpretation. As I proposed:
The cruelest fiction is that impeachment cannot ask a

justice to account for how human rights have been rewritten.
This is a fiction maintained by a legal elite trained to discount
the electorate as a whimsical mob and aggrandize law as a
secular religion where equal protection is reduced to an
incantation. To apply the designated check and balance of
impeachment on the Supreme Court to challenge its doctrine
has never meant to appeal a case by referendum. It simply
means that, beyond who won and who lost, the sovereign
people have the ultimate duty to rebuke the human rights
doctrine they disbelieve. It simply means the Constitutions
ultimate interpretation lies not with the lawyer who wrote it but
with the ordinary citizen who lives it, not with legal
technicalities blown out of proportion but with resonance in
daily life.
It simply means that the sovereign people, through their

elected representatives, have every right in our democracy to
remind unelected justices that the Constitution is too important

312 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (1901).
313 LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
to be left to them alone and that they have the ultimate right to
take it back if they are unable to teach their children that Arroyo
is a human rights victim. 314
Schlesinger ended his classic discourse:
A constitutional Presidency, as the great Presidents had

shown, could be a very strong Presidency indeed. But what kept
a strong President constitutional, in addition to checks and
balances incorporated within his own breast, was the vigilance
of the nation. Neither impeachment nor repentance would
make much difference if the people themselves had come to an
unconscious acceptance of the imperial Presidency. As
Madison said long ago, the country could not trust to
parchment barriers to halt the encroaching spirit of power. In
the end, the Constitution would live only if it embodied the
spirit of the American people. (internal citations omitted) 315
One argues that in the post-1987 context of an already

institutionalized wariness of an imperial Presidency, the same reasoning
should equally apply to an imperial Judiciary and the most dangerous
branch. 316
- o0o -
314 Tan, Gloria M. Arroyo as human rights victim, supra note 17.
316 E.g., Agabin, supra note 1, at 210.

Franklin Drilon, Oscar Franklin Tan - Essays On Congress' and The President's Duty To Interpret The Constitution (2014)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Franklin Drilon, Oscar Franklin Tan - Essays On Congress' and The President's Duty To Interpret The Constitution (2014)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL

Congress Duty to Interpret the Constitution

How the President and Congress Resist Judicial Review

Oscar Franklin B. Tan

The power of internal regulation and discipline is inherent in any legislative

We observe, however, that the Supreme Court steps in when parties

The phrase loyalty to the Constitution is heard every time a supposed

163556, June 8, 2004.

Congress, however, is duty bound to take a much broader view in both

Given this, it is empowering to realize that answers to difficult consti-

Oscar Franklin Tans thesis in his editorial examination submission is all

globalization, and our macroeconomic, investment, energy, and taxation policies.

Oscar Franklin B. Tan

THE TRIPARTITE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, PHILIPPINE STYLE 41

I. THE STAGE CONGRESS SET FOR THE 2004 CANVASS... 45

II. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS AND THE ROOTS OF REPUBLICANISM.. 56

III. THAYER AND THE POLITICAL BRANCHES CONCURRENT DUTY 61

IV. APPLYING COORDINACY THEORY TO THE 2004 CANVASS... 73

Oscar Franklin B. Tan **

[Coordinacy theory] recognizes that the President and Congress also

Dred Scott v. Sandford is a grim illustration of how catastrophic

(Puno, J., concurring and dissenting).

As Caesar loved me, I weep for him;

Citing his experience with Francisco v. House of Representatives and the

2004, 8 at http://www.inq7.net/opi/2004/jun/04/text/opi_rpangalangan-1-p.htm. For a history of the

PHIL. L.J. 189, 209-10 (1989).

THE TRIPARTITE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, PHILIPPINE STYLE

The separation of powers that underlies Philippine society today differs

L.J. 8, 17-19 (1974).

of Power Among Its Different Parts), in 43 GREAT BOOKS 153.

it ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction 21 in lieu of

However judicial supremacy has evolved in the United States, 25 it was

[J]urisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be

Francisco and the Canvass Resolutions, however, set themselves apart

Moving to the Canvass Resolutions and beyond the textbook discussions

reckless partisanship, a la Bush v. Gore. 39 As Yale Professor Jack Balkin pointedly

[O]ne member of the majority, Associate Justice Clarence Thomas, addressed

Reacting to Bush, Professor Larry Kramer cautioned, To nudge popular

I. THE STAGE CONGRESS SET FOR THE 2004 CANVASS

The 2004 canvassing of votes was arguably a drawn-out albeit televised

Lifes but a walking shadow, a poor player

Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166 supplements this provision, which

In practice, Congress assigns a joint committee to perform the actual

Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefore, and for Other Purposes).

INQUIRER, Jun. 4, 2004, at A1.

Jun. 14, 2004, at A1.

The canvass finished at 8:21 PM of June 20, and 180 Certificates of

QUESTION 1: WHAT KIND OF BODY IS THE NATIONAL BOARD?

Rather, the Board, with a membership and leadership identical to

Jun. 21, 2004, at A1.

541, 567 (2004).

Thus, if the Board is clearly Congress itself, then it remains a co-equal

QUESTION 2: WAS THE 22-MAN CANVASS COMMITTEE VALID?

Otherwise, the President would be precluded from retaining advisers who

Oct. 30, 1995.

BETRAYALS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST 226-27 (Shiela Coronel ed. 2000).

QUESTION 3: COULD THE CANVASS COMMITTEE FUNCTION

Pimentels petition was unanimously dismissed. Pimentel even implied that

78 MATTHEW MOEN & GARY COPELAND, THE CONTEMPORARY CONGRESS 95 (1999).

opinion); Id. at 37 (Azcuna, J., separate opinion).

QUESTION 4A: IS THE PRESIDENTIAL CANVASS A MINISTERIAL TASK?

Congress merely acts as a national board of canvassers, charged with the

Although Lopez was decided under the 1935 Constitution, several