HegelsTheoryofSelfConsciousness:

DeducingtheNecessityofInterSubjectivity


MAPhilosophyThesis

ByJuliaBatty

Student5904498

ThesisAdvisor:Dr.DennisSchulting

UniversiteitvanAmsterdam

AcademicYear20082009
 TableofContents

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1

SectionOne:ContextualizationofHegelsAccountofSelfConsciousness............................................ 1

A.OverviewofHegelsThePhenomenologyofSpirit......................................................................... 1

B.HegelsIdealism .............................................................................................................................. 4

SectionTwo:HegelsThePhenomenologyofSpirit,Chapter4SelfConsciousness ........................12

A.SelfCertainty ................................................................................................................................13

B.SelfSufficiencyandNonSelfSufficiencyofSelfConsciousness:MasteryandServitude...........15

C.FreedomofSelfConsciousness:Stoicism,Skepticism,andtheUnhappyConsciousness ...........18

SectionThree:InterSubjectivity ..........................................................................................................21

Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................23

Bibliography ..........................................................................................................................................25
Introduction

InthisessayIwillprimarilyfocusontheclaimsmadewithinthefourthchapterofHegels
ThePhenomenologyofSpiritinordertoassessthenatureofselfconsciousnessandthelinks
betweentheselfandsociety.Thefourthchapterwillbeanalyzedinordertosupporttheclaimthat
selfconsciousnessisattainableonlyintherecognitionoftheselfbyanotherself.InthefirstsectionI
willofferanoverviewofthegeneralthrustofthePhenomenology 1 inordertocontextualizethe
themesofthefourthchapter.Sectiononewillalsoincludeanoutlineofthecontextualizationof
Hegelsphilosophicalclaims.ThiswillincludeadiscussionofhisindebtednesstoKant.Sectiontwo
willofferaninterpretationofandcommentaryonthefourthchapterofHegelsPhenomenology,
offeringanassessmentofhistheoryofselfconsciousness.Thethirdsectionwillelaborateonthe
selfsrelationshipwithsocietyandthevariousformsofsocietalinstitutionswhichserveasthebasis
forrecognition.Assuch,thissectionwillservetoexpandontheclaimthatitistheinteractionof
boththeindividualandsocietythatallowsfortheexistenceofeach.Throughananalysisofthe
fourthchapterandanelaborationoftheselfsrelationshipwithsociety,thisessayaimstoofferan
evaluationofthenecessityofintersubjectivityforHegelstheoryofselfconsciousnessaspresented
inThePhenomenologyofSpirit.Thatis,doesHegelclaimthattheselfonlybecomesfullyselfaware
byseeingoneselfthroughtheeyesofanotherinmutualrecognition?

SectionOne:ContextualizationofHegelsAccountofSelfConsciousness

A.OverviewofHegelsThePhenomenologyofSpirit

ThissectionprovidesabasicoverviewofmyinterpretationofthesectionsofThe
PhenomenologyofSpiritwhichleaduptoandfollowfromthefourthchapter.Thissegmentismeant
toserveasadescriptiveaccountofthegeneralthrustofHegelsPhenomenologyandtoprovidea
basicoverviewofthecontentofthesesectionsofthebook.
ThePhenomenologybeginswithaprefacewhichoffersthecoreofHegelsphilosophical
method.Hestates:
Thetrueshapeinwhichtruthexistscanonlybethescientificsystemofthattruth.To
participateinthecollaborativeeffortatbringingphilosophynearertotheformofscience
tobringitnearertothegoalwhereitcanlayasidethetitleofloveofknowledgeandbe
actualknowledgeisthetaskIhavesetformyself.(5) 2

1
PhenomenologyservesasanabbreviationforThePhenomenologyofSpiritinthispaper.
2
Hegel,ThePhenomenologyofSpirit,anewtranslationbyTerryPinkard,forthcomingwithCambridge
UniversityPress,2009.
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Hegel'sapproach,referredtoastheHegelianmethod,consistsofactuallyexaminingconsciousness'
experienceofbothitselfandofitsobjectsandextractingthecontradictionsandunitythatcometo
lightintheexaminationofthisexperience.ThisistheprocessofHegelsdialecticalmovement
whereinconsciousnessfocusesonwhatisactuallypresentinitselfanditsrelationtoitsobjectsand
discoversthatwhatinappearanceseemedtobestableformsinfactdissolveintoadevelopmental
progressionleadingtowardstruth.Hegelinsiststhatphilosophymustlookatconsciousnessasit
existsandnotmerelyrelyonargumentationbasedondeductivereasoning.Healsodisagreeswith
theepistemologicalemphasisofmodernphilosophyfromDescartesthroughKantinwhichthe
epistemologicalprocessofestablishingthenatureandcriteriaofknowledgecomespriortothe
actualizationofknowledge.Suchanapproachwouldimplyaninfiniteregress,whichHegelmaintains
isselfcontradictoryandfutile.Hegelisnotcontentwiththeideathatbeliefsarejustifiedbasedon
whatareconsideredtobebasicbeliefs.Heinsiststhatactualknowingmustbeexaminedasitoccurs
intheprocessofobtainingknowledge.ThisisthebasisfortheentirePhenomenology,whichisthe
studyofhowconsciousnesscomestobeselfconscious.
IntheprefaceofthePhenomenologyHegelstates:
Thecourseofstudiesoftheancientworldisdistinctfromthatofmoderntimesinthatthe
ancientcourseofstudiesconsistedinathoroughgoingcultivationofnaturalconsciousness.
Experimentingparticularlywitheachpartofitsexistenceandphilosophizingabout
everythingitcameacross,theancientcourseofstudiesfashioneditselfintoanaltogether
activeuniversality.Incontrast,inmoderntimes,theindividualfindstheabstractformready
made.Thestrenuousefforttograspitandmakeithisownismoreofanunmediateddrive
tobringtheinnertothelightofday;itisthetruncatedcreationoftheuniversalratherthan
theemergenceoftheuniversalfromoutoftheconcrete,fromoutofthediversityfound
withinexistence.Nowadaysthetaskbeforeusconsistsnotsomuchinpurifyingthe
individualofthesensuouslyimmediateandinmakinghimintoathinkingsubstancewhich
hasitselfbeensubjectedtothought;itconsiststoanevengreaterdegreeindoingthevery
opposite.Itconsistsinactualizingandspirituallyanimatingtheuniversalbymeansofthe
sublationoffixedanddeterminatethoughts.(33)

ThisisHegelstask,toreleasefixedformsofthoughtfromtheboundsofdualityandactualizethe
universal,orinHegelstermstheabsolute,inadevelopmentaleffortwhichunitestheinternalwith
theexternal.
Intheintroductionheprovidesadifferentperspectiveonwhatheestablishedinthe
preface.Hecallsattentiontowhatatfirstappearstobeaparadoxinvolvingtheissueofthe
absolute.Itinitiallyseemsthatthefacultyofknowledge,intermsofitsabilitytoknowtheabsolute,
cannotbeevaluatedproperlywithoutfirstestablishingthecriteriaforwhattheabsoluteactuallyis,
beyondamereideaofwhattheabsolutecouldbe.However,suchcriteriacouldonlybeestablished
ifthefacultyofknowledgealreadypossessedtheknowledgeitrequires.Hegelresolvesthis
contradictionbyimplementingamethodwhichstipulatesthatthelevelofknowledgethatis
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characteristicofeachsuccessivestageofconsciousnessisassessedbythecriteriapresupposedby
consciousnessitself.Eachprogressivestageofconsciousnesscontributestothedevelopmentof
knowledgeforconsciousness.Ateachstage,consciousnessdistinguishestheobjectofthat
knowledgeasdifferentfromwhatitknows.Consciousnesscomparesitsknowledgeoftheobject,or
whattheobjectisforconsciousness,withtheestablishedcriteriaforwhattheobjectmustbein
itself.Itwouldseemthatinthisprocesswhenconsciousnessisconfrontedwithdiscordbetweenits
ownknowledgeandtheencounteredobject,consciousnesswouldadjustitsknowledgetoconform
totheobject.However,Hegelinsiststhattheoppositeactuallyoccurs.Consciousnessitselfprovides
thecriteriaforwhattheobjectcouldbe.Thecriterionisnotestablishedexternally.Therefore,like
itsknowledge,theobjectthatconsciousnessdistinguishesfromitsknowledgeisreallyjustthe
objectforconsciousness.Thismeansthatitistheobjectasenvisionedbythatstageof
consciousness.Intheattempttoresolvethedisconnectionbetweenknowledgeanditsobject,
consciousnessalterstheobject.Thiscreatesanewobjectforconsciousnesswhichdevelopsfromits
owninadequateknowledgeoftheobjectasitoriginallyappeared.Consciousnessmodifiesitsobject
toconformtoitsknowledgeandthecriteriainplaceatthatstageofdevelopment.Thisisacontinual
process;consciousnessnowhasanewobjecttoexamineandanelevatedknowledgebywhichto
conductitsexamination.ForHegel,theseparationbetweenconsciousnessanditsobjectisnomore
realthanconsciousness'inadequateknowledgeofthatobject.Theknowledgeisinadequateonly
becauseofthatperceivedseparation.Eachsubsequentmovementallowsformoreknowledge.
ThefirstthreechaptersofthePhenomenologyprovidethefoundationfortheprogression
fromconsciousnesstoselfconsciousness.Thesechaptersdescribeinterrelatedmodesof
consciousnesswhichHegelcategorizesasSenseCertainty,Perception,andForceandthe
Understanding.Chapterfourcontainsapreliminarydiscussionoflifeanddesire,followedbytwo
subsections:IndependentandDependentSelfConsciousness:LordshipandBondageand
FreedomofSelfConsciousness:Stoicism,Skepticism,andtheUnhappyConsciousness.Reason,
chapter5,isdividedintothreechapters:ObservingReason,ActualizationofSelfConsciousness,
andIndividualityWhichTakesitselftobeRealInandForItself.Spirit,thebookssixthandfinal
chapter,isdividedintothreechapters:TheEthicalOrder,Culture,andMorality.Eachmodeof
consciousnessservestofurthertheprogressionofselfconsciousness.Attheendoftheprocessthe
objecthasbeenfullyspiritualizedbysuccessivecyclesofconsciousness'experience.Unityis
achieved:consciousnesswillfullyknowtheobjectandatthesametimefullyrecognizethatthe
objectisnoneotherthanitself.
Asindicated,thisessaywillfocusonchapterfour,Hegelstheoryofselfconsciousness.

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B.HegelsIdealism

InRobertPippinsHegelsIdealism:theSatisfactionofSelfConsciousness,Pippinoutlinesthe
originsofHegelstheoryofselfconsciousnessasacontinuationoftheKantianproject. 3 Pippin
contendsthatHegel'stheoryofselfconsciousnessbuildsuponKant'snotionoftheapperceptiveI
whoseunityisfoundedupontheassertionIthink.IntheCritiqueofPureReasonKantoffershis
theoryoftranscendentalapperception,whichdescribestheunityandidentityofthemindandthe
mind'sconsciousnessofitselfasthesubjectofallitsrepresentations(A106108). 4 Kantclaimsthat
experienceisoneexperience;allpossibleappearancesstandalongsideoneanotherinone
experience(A108).Thereisoneandthesamegeneralexperienceofallthevarious
perceptions(A110),aconnectedwholeofhumanknowledge(A121).Thus,transcendental
apperceptionistheunitingofallappearancestogetherintooneexperience.TheapperceptiveI
isthesubjectofsuchexperience.ForKant,apperceptioniswhatallowsforexperiencetobeatall
possible;itisthatwhichconstitutestheunitybetweentheself(subject)andtheworld(object).Pure
apperceptionistheIthinkwhichKantinsistsmustbeabletoaccompanyallmyrepresentations
(B131).ThisdescribesthenecessaryconnectionbetweentheIanditsthoughts.Thistheoryof
apperceptionprovidesthebasisforHegelstheoryofselfconsciousnessforwhichheconsidered
himselfasindebtedtoKant,inawayhemakesexplicitwhenhewritesinTheScienceofLogic,
ItisoneoftheprofoundestandtruestinsightstobefoundintheCritiqueofPureReason
thattheunitywhichconstitutesthenatureoftheNotionisrecognizedastheoriginal
syntheticunityofapperception,astheunityoftheIthink,orofselfconsciousness. 5

ThispointreferstothesecondeditionofKantsTranscendentalDeduction,whichcomesclosetoa
formulationofHegelsabsoluteknowledge.Pippincitesthispassageascentraltohisreadingof
HegelsIdealism. 6 ForHegelthetermabsolutereferstowhatthereisunconditionally,thecapacity
forhumanbeingsforcompleteselfdeterminationorautonomy.ForKanttheabsoluteistobe
associatedwiththemetaphysicallyunconditionalandthusiscognitivelyinaccessibletohuman
reasoning.HegelseekstoovercomethisbarrierofinaccessibilityfoundinKant.ForHegel,the
absoluteisreinterpretedasthecompleteselfauthorizationofreasonauthorizingitselfasthe

3
Pippin,R.,Hegel'sIdealism:TheSatisfactionofSelfConsciousness.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,
1989.
PippinsreadingofHegelisbyandlargethebasisfortheHegelianKantiancomparisonstobeintroducedhere
unlessotherwiseindicated.
4
Kant,I.,Guyer,P.,&Wood,A.(1998).CritiqueofPureReason.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
5
Hegel,G.,ScienceofLogic.NewYork:Routledge,2004.,p.584.ReprintofHegel'sScienceofLogic,trans.A.V.
Miller,London:AllenandUnwin,1969.
6
Pippin,R.,HegelsIdealism:TheSatisfactionofSelfConsciousness,18.
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higheststandardofappeal.InKantthisisknownasautonomy,whichreferstoselflegislationandis
theabsolute(human)value.
KnowledgeoftheabsoluteforHegelmeanssomethingliketheknowledgeofthecapacityto
regulateourlivesrationallyinawaythatcountsasconstituentofleadinglivesfreely.Hegelclaims,
Consciousnessisforitselfitsconcept,andasaresultitimmediatelygoesbeyondtherestriction,
and,sincethisrestrictionbelongstoitself,itgoesbeyonditselftoo(80).Twoclaimsarebeing
madeinthispoint.First,Hegelcontendsthatconsciousnessisforitselfitsconcept.Because
consciousnessisforitselfitsownconcept,theremustbeastandardtowhichconsciousnessascribes
initsselfconception.Secondly,Hegelassertsthat,asaresult,consciousnessisimmediately
beyondanyrestrictionitsetsforitself.ForHegel,therestrictionamountstothestandardsand
proprietiesinherentinconsciousnesswhichareconsciousnessown.Thisishisversionofthe
Kantianautonomyprinciplethatselfconsciousnessissubjecttonolaworstandardotherthanthose
theselfsubjectsitselfto.Pippinpointsoutthat,thisiswhatispackedintotheforitselfhere. 7
Thismeansthattherearestandardswhichcanbesaidtogovernthoughtsandactionsbutonly
insofarassubjectsacceptsuchconstraintsandsustaincommitmenttothem.Thoughthese
standardsserveasaguideforconsciousness,thesubjectisselflegislatingandthereforenot
governedbythem.WhatthismeansforHegelisthatinanydeterminaterelationtotheworld,one
takesoneselftobeassessingwhatitisthatisbeingexperiencedbysomestandard,whichservesasa
criteriaforknowledge.
Consciousnessgoesoutsideofitselfandattemptstoknowtheobjectasitisinitself
accordingtosomecriteriathatmustbeinplaceinordertoknowtheobject.WhenHegelclaimsthat
consciousnessisforitselfitsownconcept,heismakingthepointthatconsciousnesstakesitselfto
beaselfregulatingknowerwhichservesasthebasisforestablishingthestandardsofthat
regulation.Suchstandardsarethebyproductofactivejudgmentsconductedbyconsciousnessasit
interactswiththeexternalworld.Kantclaims,inhisMetaphysicalDeduction:
Thesamefunctionwhichgivesunitytothevariousrepresentationsinajudgmentalsogives
unitytothemeresynthesisofvariousrepresentationsinanintuition;andthisunity,inits
mostgeneralexpression;weentitlethepureconceptoftheunderstanding(A79B1045).

IntheTranscendentalDeduction,Kantclaimsthatjudgingisbringinggivencognitionstothe
objectiveunityofapperception(B141).Giventhatformulationofjudging,theidentificationofthe
unityofjudgmentwiththeunityofintuitionexplainswhyKantclaims,Thetranscendentalunityof
apperceptionisthatunitythroughwhichallthemanifoldgiveninanintuitionisunitedintoa

7
Pippin,R.,OnHegelsClaimthatSelfConsciousnessisDesireItself(Begierdeberhaupt),
www.wcas.northwestern.edu/germanphil/docs/Pippin_draft.doc
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conceptoftheobject.Itisthereforeentitledobjective(B139).JohnMcDowellcontendsthatby
conceptoftheobjectKantmustmeansomethinglikeconceptuallyshapedawarenessofthe
object. 8 IntuitionsareofobjectsforKant,whichistobeunderstoodintermsoftheirpossessinga
kindofunitythatresultswhenoneisabletobringcognitionstotheunityofapperceptioninjudging.
ForKant,spontaneousapperceptiveactivityisatthecenterofhispictureofthesensory
consciousness.Kantdescribesunderstandingasthefacultyofapperceptionintermsofspontaneity.
ThesingularunityofaperceivedobjectisdependentontheunityoftheapperceptiveIinits
relationtotheobject.Thisisanactiveprocessofunification.Kantstates:
Thethoughtthattherepresentationsgiveninintuitiononeandallbelongtome,istherefore
equivalenttothethoughtthatIunitetheminoneselfconsciousness,orcanatleastsounite
them;andalthoughthisthoughtisnotitselftheconsciousnessofthesynthesisofthe
representations,itpresupposesthepossibilityofthatsynthesis(A79B1045).

ThesecondformulationofKantsTranscendentalDeductionprovidesafulldiscussionwhichexplains
thatitistheIofapperceptionwhichallowsfortheunifyingofmultiplerepresentations.
HegelsupportstherootpointofKantssupremeprinciplewhichinsiststhatthephraseI
thinkmustbeabletoaccompanyalloftheselfsexperiencedrepresentations.KantandHegelare
inagreementthatthisisbecauseeveryaspectofwhatonedoesisanaspectofonesapperceptive
awareness,whichisjudgmental.Indoinganyactivitythereisselfknowledgeofbeingactive,notin
thesenseofanobservationalawareness,butinthesenseofanactiveselfengagement.An
observationalselfawarenessisintuitivelyimplausiblebecauseexperienceisindicativeofthereality
thattherearenottwoseparatethingsoccurringinselfawareness.Hegelstates,TheIisthecontent
oftherelationandtherelatingitself,i.e.selfconsciousnessisitsownobject(166).Thereisone
thinggoingoninselfawareness,whichisanapperceptiveattendingtotheself.Inactivitytheselfis
categorizingandclaimingitselftobedoingvariousactivitiessimplythroughtheactionof
engagement.Thisisaformofimplicitclaimmakingwhichentailstheactualcontentofthe
experiencebeingshapedbytheapperceptiveattentionbestowedbytheself.Thistranspireswithout
theselfbeinganobjectforitselfandwithouttheselfexperiencingitselfobservationally.
Selfconsciousnessisnotmerelyfilledwiththepresenceoftheworld.Rather,self
consciousnesstakestheworldtobeacertainway,itisjudgmental.ForKant,consciousnessis
judgmentalinformandtheformofthoughtisalsotheformofthings.Therefore,consciousness
requirestheactivityofjudgingforittobedeterminate.ThisisthebasisforHegelsdescriptionofa
selfrelationalrelationtoanobject.However,Hegelconsidereditnecessarytophilosophically
developatheoryofselfconsciousnessbeyondareferencetoaformalI.Itisamatterofformal

8
McDowell,J.,HavingtheWorldinView,Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,2009,70.
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necessitythattherebeanIthinkingitsthoughts,makingclaimsandjudging,butwhateveror
whoeverthisImightbeisnotadequatelydevelopedinKantstheoryaccordingtoPippin. 9 For
HegelthisuncoveringofselfconsciousnessisparamountbecauseifnothingisknownofthisIwho
thinks,nothingcanbeactuallyknownconcerningwhattheImustthinkinorderfortheretobe
determinateobjectsofexperience.Kantinsistsoncategorieswhichheconsideredtobepure
conceptsoftheunderstanding.Kantsclaiminthedeductionofthecategoriesshowsthattheseare
nothingbutthefunctionsofthought,oftheI,insofarastheyaretheformsofobjectivethought;so
perhapssomethingcanbeknownabouttheIofformalthinking.Thesecategoriesareclaimedto
constitutewhatanobjectcanbeforasubject.ForHegel,Kantiscorrectinhistheorythattheself
relationcandeterminewhattherelationtoobjectscouldbefromthesideofthesubject,asin
Kantstranscendentalidealism.However,Hegelsawtheneedtofurtherdevelopselfconsciousness
inordertoofferananalysisoftheselfsrelationtoitselfinrelationtoobjects.
Hegelsmodelofselfconsciousnessisinternalistbutalsoaprojectionoutward.
Consciousnessisnotjustaregisterofthedatathataccompaniessensoryexperience;consciousness
takesitselftobeinarelationofknowledgewithobjectsaccordingtosomecriteria.Thus,
consciousnessisinawayalwaysbeyonditselfbecauseitisalwayscapableofdisregardingthe
conceptithasorhadbasedonnewinformationandjudgments.Hegelwasinterestedinhow
consciousnesscomestobothhaveaconceptforitselfandhowinbeingbeyonditselfitisalways
capableinsomewayoflosingfaithinitsconcepts,commitments,andbeliefs.Thiswholeprocess
HegelreferstoasexperienceanditishisowncomplexwayofexplainingtheKantiantheoryof
apperception.AccordingtoHegelsinterpretation,consciousnessisneverindirectrelationtoan
object,butinrelationtoanobjectonlyinaselfrelation.WhenHegelsays,consciousnessisfor
itselfitsconcept(80),thisnotionofforitselfistheHegelianformulationofKantstheoryof
apperceptionandisindicativeofaprovisionalrelationshipwithwhatoneclaimstobetrue,which
allowsforsubjectivity.ForHegelthisistheprocessofhumanlife,tobeconstantlyconfrontedbythe
reflectivecharacterofonesengagementwiththeworldandwithothersubjects.Thisreflective
characterbringsintoplaythestandardsthatonetakestobeauthoritative.
KantandHegelarereferredtoasGermanIdealists.Thereisacommonmisinterpretationof
thetenetsofthisformofphilosophythatcanbeoutlinedastheexistenceofobjectsintheworld
beingdependentuponmentalactivity.ForinstanceFichtesclaim,theIpositsthenotI 10 could
bemisinterpretedasmeaningthattheIthinkssomethingandtherebysimplypopsintoexistence.

9
Pippin,R.,Hegel'sIdealism:TheSatisfactionofSelfConsciousness,36.
10
Fichte,J.,&Breazeale,D.(1993).Fichte:EarlyPhilosophicalWritings,Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1993,
374.
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However,whatFichtemeantisthatwhatcountsasthenotI,orwhatcountsasaconstrainton
thinkingfromtheoutside,issomethingthattheIhastothinkofasaconstraintfromtheoutside.
Itdoesnotjustdoitonitsown.ThekindofIdealismatissueforHegelisanabsoluteconsciousness
whichservesasthekeysourceofunityamongstallotherthings.Thisinvolvesstandardstowhich
consciousnesssubmitsitselftoindeterminingwhatthecaseisforwhatoughttobedone,asself
legislated.Thesestandardsarenotmattersoffactforconsciousnessbutratherprinciplestowhich
themindholdsitselftoornot.Thereisnoauthorityinknowledgeclaimstowhichtheselfis
subjectedtowhichthatselfhasnotsubmitteditselfto.Theselfiscenteredonrecognitionandwhat
oughttobebelievedandwhatoughttobedonebasedonselflegislatedvalues.ThisistheKantian,
Fichtean,andHegelianpositionwhichismostconcernedwiththecharacterofthestandards
determiningwhatoughttobedone.Thesestandardsareconsideredsubjectiveinsofarasthese
philosophersdenytherealistviewofthesourceorauthorityofthesevalues.Theyoperatewithin
theframeworkofIdealismwhichmaintainsthattheauthorityoftheselawsdonotcomefromGod
ornature.KantclaimedinhisGroundworkoftheMetaphysicsofMoralsthathumanvaluesareself
legislatedandthisclaimistakenveryseriouslybyhisfellowIdealists.Forinstance,theclaim
concerningtheselfandrecognitionwasalsodevelopedinFichteinregardtosocietalstandards.
AccordingtoPaulRedding,
FichtehadintroducedtherecognitionthemeinhisFoundationsofNaturalRight,to
deducethesocialexistenceofhumanswithinrelationsofmutualrecognitionasa
necessaryconditionoftheirveryselfconsciousness,butitalsofunctionedaspartofa
solutiontoaprobleminternaltotheworkonwhichthetheoryofrightswasmeanttobe
based,theFoundationoftheCompleteWissenschaftslehreof17945. 11

AbsoluteIdealismdeniestherealistaccountconcerningthesourceofthesestandardsandconceives
ofsuchcriteriaasbeingselflegislatedresultsofcollectivehumanenterprisestoregulateknowledge
claims.Hegelfeelsthereisanaccounttobegivenofthisdevelopmentalstoryofthevarious
attemptstoselflegislate,regulatebehaviorandmakeknowledgeclaims.Thisissueofconnecting
HegelwiththeapperceptionthemeinKantreliesonanoverallunderstandingofwhattheyeachare
doingasIdealists.Thisessaycanonlyofferabriefoverviewofthisconnection.
Toreiterate,Hegelcontendsthatinordertoproperlyunderstandthesubjectsrelationtoan
objecttheremustbeanaccountofthesubjectsrelationtoitself.ToaccomplishthistaskHegel
focuseshisattentiononthesubjectsubjectrelationship.PippindefendsaninterpretationofHegels
selfconsciousnesstheorywhichassertsthatthethemeofthesubjectobjectrelationinthefirst
threechaptersofHegelsPhenomenologyispreservedinthefourthchapter.ForPippinthiseffortis

11
Redding,P.,FichtesRoleinHegelsPhenomenologyofSpirit,Chapter4,papertoAPA,PacificDivision,
AnnualConference,SanFrancisco,March25,2005,2.
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Hegelsattempttocorrectlyunderstandthemodeofselfrelationinrelationtoobjectsthatmakes
intentionalawarenessofexperiencepossible. 12 HegelisattemptingtoreevaluateKantsquestfor
determiningwhattheconditionsareforthepossibilityofexperience.AtthispointKantandHegel
haveestablishedroughlythesameformulation.Apurelyintuitiveorreceptivepictureisnota
possibleorcoherentanalysisofexperience.Apurelyspontaneous,selfdeterminingpictureisnotan
accuratemodelfortheexperienceofhumanbeings.Whatisrequiredisacooperativesynthesisin
ordertoaccountforthepossibilityofexperienceandknowledge.Pippinsperspectiveonthefirst
threechaptersisthatHegelisreiteratingKantsargument:thattheremustbecooperationbetween
passivelyreceivedandspontaneouslyactiveelementsincognitioninorderfortheretobethe
possibilityofexperienceandthusthepossibilityforanintentionalobjectofawareness.Inother
words,fortheretobeadeterminateobjectofawareness,therehastobeaprincipleofunification.
WithoutthisKantianprincipleofapperceptionthereisnowaytoaccuratelyaccountfortheminds
attendancetoadeterminateobject.ThisissueofselfconsciousnessarisesoutoftheKantian
formulationjustasinHegelsPhenomenology,fromthedeficienciesofthemodelofselfrelationin
relationtoobjects.
HegelandKantareinagreementasfarasthisformulationmakessense.Theselfisnotan
object.Whatthenisthenatureoftheselfrelationinrelationtoobjectsnecessaryfortheretobean
experience,ifitisalsothecasethattheselfcannotbeforitselfanobject?Inotherwords,thisisthe
problemofthinkingofapperceptionasakindofparallelobjectconsciousnesswhichdesignatesthe
selfasawareoftheworldandawareoftheselfasanobjectawareoftheworld.Thisisnotthecase
fortwomainreasons.First,thisinterpretationleadstoaformofinfiniteregress.Ifitisaconditionof
selfawarenessthatthereisanapperceptivedimension,thentheawarenessoftheselfaswellasan
awarenessoftheworldwouldalsorequireanawarenessofaselfasanobjectawareoftheworld.
Secondly,anawarenessoftheselfinthethirdpersonasanobjectasonewouldbeawareof
someoneelseasaself,eliminatestheabilityfortheselftobeconsciousofitselfasasubject.This
wouldabolishthepossibilityforselfconsciousness.Ultimately,tobeconsciousofonesselfasa
subjectistohaveajudgmentalpointofview.Therefore,apperceptioncannotbeanobjectlike
modeloftheselfsrelationtoitselfinitsrelationtoobjects.
ForKant,apossibleintentionalrelationtoanobjectofawarenessisthepossibilityof
experienceitself.InStrawsons 13 formulation,experiencerequiressomeseparationbetweentheI
andtheobject.TheremustbeanawarenessofanobjectasdifferentfromtheIthatisawareofit.

12
Pippin,R.,Hegel'sIdealism:TheSatisfactionofSelfConsciousness.
13
Strawson,G.,WhatistheRelationBetweenanExperience,theSubjectoftheExperience,andtheContent
oftheExperience?,PhilosophicalIssues13(1):279315,2003.
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KantbeganthistrajectoryinGermanIdealismbyidentifyingwhatheclaimedtobethepossibilityof
experience.Thisentailstheclaimthatanyintentionalrelationshiptoobjectsinconsciousnessmust
beactivelyestablishedandcannotbeunderstoodastheproductofthesensoryinterchangewiththe
world.Otherwiseitwouldbeasifthemeresensiblepresenceofobjectsandtheiractual
modificationofthefacultiesofsensibilityonitsowncouldsomehowtriggerorsetthecontentof
thoughts,asifprovidingsufficientcriteriaforthoughttohavedirectionatobjects.Thisistheheart
ofKantsDeduction,thatallcontentfilledconsciousnessisapperceptive,aselfrelationinrelationto
objects.Thisphenomenonissomewhatdifficulttodescribe.ItamountstoKantsideaof
spontaneity,thatallrelationshipsbetweensubject(self)andobjectareactivelyestablishedas
apperceptive.Theactoftakinganobjecttobeanobjecthasanapperceptive,subjectiveformthatis
activelyestablishedbetweentheselfandallobjectsthattheselftakestobesuchobjects.The
complexitiesoftheseclaimswillhavetobesetaside.
Forthisproject,thepointthatiscrucialforHegelisthedescriptionofthejudgmentalform
ofconsciousnesswhichisapperceptive,activelyestablishedbytheselfandconstantlyatworkin
consciousexperience.Thisisaselflegislatingactivityofvariousdegreesthatisincorporatedinto
consciousexperience.Thereisalwaysanunderlyingattentivenesstotestingourjudgmentsinthe
normativeinterchangebetweentheselfandtheworld.ForKantandforHegelthereisnomindless
copingwiththeworld,thereisonlyaselfrelationinrelationtotheworldwhichisapperceptiveand
activelyfocusedonstandardsofcredibility.Selfconsciousnessisactive,notaselfobservation.Kant
states,Butthoughallourknowledgebeginswithexperience,itdoesnotfollowthatitallarisesout
ofexperience(B1).Thisdirectlyrespondstotheempiricistclaimthatonecanonlygaintrue
knowledgethroughsenseexperience.Kantinsistedthatwhilecognitionstartswithexperience,this
doesnotmeanthatknowledgeisonlygainedthroughexperience.Heclaimed,Thoughtswithout
contentareempty,intuitionswithoutconceptsareblind(A51/B76).Itisthereforejustasnecessary
tomakeconceptssensible,thatis,toaddtheobjecttotheminintuition,asitistomakeour
intuitionsintelligiblebybringingthemunderconcepts.Withoutthisunderstandingnoobjectwould
bepresentinthoughtandintuitionswouldremainblind.InKant,sensibilityisthemind'sabilityto
receivepresentationsandwithoutthissensibilitynoobjectswouldbegiven,resultinginthoughts
whichareempty.
InTheCritiqueofPureReasonKantmakesaclaimthatisillustrativeoftheformofIdealism
presupposedinHegelsPhenomenologyofSpirit.AccordingtoKant,
Thesetwopowersorcapacitiescannotexchangetheirfunctions.Theunderstandingcan
intuitnothing,thesensescanthinknothing.Onlyintheirunioncanknowledgearise.But
thatisnoreasonforconfoundingthecontributionofeitherwiththatortheother;ratherit

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 isastrongreasonforcarefullyseparatinganddistinguishingtheonefromtheother.
(A51/B75)

Kantsawtheunderstandingasthefacultyofthinkingofobjects,asdistinctfromboththefacultyof
sensibilityandthecognitionofsensibleobjects,whicharisesfromthefunctioningofboththese
faculties.InFaithandKnowledge,Hegelcontrastshisownorganicideaofproductiveimagination
withwhatheattributestoKantas,themechanicalrelationofaunityofselfconsciousnesswhich
standsinantithesistotheempiricalmanifold,eitherdeterminingitorreflectingonit. 14 Hegel
claims,TheIisnowthissubjectivity,thisinfiniterelationtoitself,buttherein,namelyinthis
subjectivity,liesitsnegativerelationtoitself,diremption,differentiation,judgment 15 Infinite
relationtoitselfmeansthatanydistinctionsaresublated,ormadefluid,andsoalwaysbeyondfixed
forms.Hegeloftenusestheterminfiniteindiscussingtherelationtotheself;thisistobecontrasted
withthefiniterelationtotheself.Thefiniteselfisselfdeterminedinwhatitthinksordoesby
somethingotherthanitsownselfdetermination.So,theIinitsinfiniteselfrelationdecideswhat
tobelieveonthebasisofwhatitthinksoughttobebelieved.
Hegelstates,TheIjudges,andthisconstitutesitasconsciousness;itrepelsitselffromitself;
thisislogicaldetermination. 16 HereHegelismakinguseofanotherKantianclaim.ThisisHegels
wayofsayingconsciousnessisforitselfitsownconceptandatthesametimealreadybeyonditself.
Itisnotcausedtobeinabeliefstatebyanexogenouscause.Itdeterminesitselftoclaimwhatit
claimsandisalsoabletochangewhatitclaims.Itrepelsitselffromitself(156);itholdsitselffrom
itselfatadistancefromwhatitbelieves.Thesubjectmustbeabletodistinguishitselffromitsobject
inordertobesaidtohaveanobjectofexperienceandtobeabletomaketheclaim,Iamtaking
thisobjecttobesuchandsuch.Makingsuchaclaimalsoallowsforthesubjecttobemistakeninits
takinganobjecttobesuchathing.Itmustbeclearthatselfrelationisnotinrelationtoanobject.
Relationtoanobjectinconsciousness,thecapacityforadeterminateexperience,presupposesnot
justrelatednesstotheobjectasamachinecouldbesaidtoregisterimpressions,butanactivityofa
subject.Theremustbeanactualselfrelation,anactiveselfinitiatedclaimthatanobjectissuchand
suchathing.Thisselfrelationisquitedifficulttomapoutandexplainbecauseitisnotanobjectin
experience,itisofthesubjectofexperienceandthesubjectofexperienceisnotanobjectinit.This
distinctionalsomeansthatthemodalityofthisselfrelatingisnotobservationalandthatthereisno
introspection.Whatthenisthisselfrelationinrelationtoanobject?ThatistheaimofHegels
fourthchapter.

14
Hegel,G.,FaithandKnowledge.Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1977,92.
15
QuotedinPippin,R.,HegelsIdealism:TheSatisfactionofSelfConsciousness,37.
16
Ibid.,37.
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SectionTwo:HegelsThePhenomenologyofSpirit,Chapter4Self
Consciousness

Toreiterate,Hegelmovesfromconsciousnesstoselfconsciousnessinchapterfourofhis
PhenomenologyofSpirit.Inturningtoselfconsciousness,Hegelaimstounfoldamethodologyfor
uncoveringthedevelopmentofthisselfrelation.Hegelmakesselfconsciousnesscentraltohis
readingofDescartesandusesthedualityinhisargumentationasastartingpointforhisowncase.In
hisbook,Hegel,CharlesTaylorsummarizesthecritiqueHegelbringsagainstDescartes. 17 This
amountstoTaylorsassertionthatforHegel,Descartesfailedinhismissiontounitethoughtand
externalreality.DescartesinternalizesthequestwithinhisCogito,whereasHegelinsiststhataunity
betweentheinternalandtheexternalisrequiredtoachieveacertaintyofself.IntheLecturesonthe
HistoryofPhilosophy,HegelcriticizesDescartesinabilitytomakethetransitionfromcertaintyto
truth. 18 ForHegel,knowledgepresupposesadistinctionbetweenthesubjectthatknowsandthe
objectthatisknowninconsciousness.Inthisprocessitisdiscoveredthatwhatinitiallyseemedtobe
anindependentexternalobject,ortheobjectinitself,isinactualityonlythewayinwhichtheobject
appearswithinconsciousness.Hegelstates:
Thewaytheobjectimmediatelywasinitself,assensecertaintysentity,perceptions
concretething,ortheunderstandingsforce,evenmoresoprovesitselfnottoexistintruth.
Rather,thisinitselfturnsouttobeawayinwhichtheobjectexistsmerelyforanother
(166).

ThisallowsfortheproblemofDescartestheorytoberesolvedintheovercomingofthedistinction
betweenappearanceandreality.Hegelnotesthatwithinconsciousnesswehaveacertaintythatis
thesameasitstruth(166).Consciousnessdistinguishesbetweenitselfanditsobjectwithin
consciousness,withinwhichtheknowerandtheknown,ortheconceptandtheobject,coincide.
Hegelcontends:
certaintyisitselfitsobject,andconsciousnessisinitsowneyesthetruth.Tobesure,there
isalsothereinanotherness,butconsciousnessmakesadistinctionwhichforitisatthe
sametimenodistinctionatall.Ifwecallthemovementofknowledgeconceptbutcallthe
objectknowledgeasunityatrest,ortheI,thenweseethattheobjectcorrespondsto
theconcept,notonlyforusbutforknowledgeitself(166).

17
Taylor,C.,Hegel.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1975.
18
Rockmore,T.,Cognition:AnIntroductiontoHegel'sPhenomenologyofSpirit.Berkeley:Universityof
CaliforniaPress,1997,concerning:Hegel,LecturesontheHistoryofPhilosophy:TheLecturesof18251826,III:
139145.
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FichteprovidedanaccountwhichappealedtoHegel.ForFichte,allconsciousexperiencecanbe
deducedfromorexplainedbytheverypossibilityofselfconsciousness. 19 LikeFichte,Hegel
contendsthatconsciousnesscannotaccountforitself.Infact,inhisanalysisofselfconsciousness,
hefollowsfromFichtesviewofselfconsciousnessasalimitingandconditioningconsciousness. 20
UltimatelyHegelstheoryofselfconsciousnessdevelopedoutofhisdesiretoaccountfortheunity
oftheselfandtheexternalworldandhisprojectservesasacontinuationandsupplementationof
theaccountspresentedbyKantandFichte.

A.SelfCertainty

ForHegel,thedistinctionbetweensubjectandobjectfallswithinthesubject.Theobjectis
thesubjectsownobjectandHegelconsidersthisinternalrelatednessoftheIasparadigmforany
subjectobjectrelation.Heclaims,TheIisthecontentoftherelationandtherelatingitself.TheIis
itselfinitsbothconfrontinganotherandatthesametimereachingoutoverandbeyondthisother,
which,fortheI,islikewisemerelyitself(166).Inselfconsciousnesscertaintyandtruthcoincide,
allowingfortherealmoftruth(167).Asselfconsciousnessconcernsselfknowing,thedifficulty
posedbyknowledgeofanindependentobject,theknowingofanother(167),hasbeen
transcended.Yeteverything,includingtheexistenceofanindependentobject,isretained.Forwe
onlybecomeselfconsciousthroughthereturnfromoutofotherness(167).Anyrelationtoan
objectisatwostagemovementwhichbeginswiththeappearanceofanobject,whateveristobe
knownthroughsensationandperception,andtheunityofitselfwithitself.However,thisunityisnot
tobeunderstoodasactual,butasapotentialrelationmediatedthroughdesire.ForHegel,desireis
theforcewhichmovesconscioushumanbeingsoutsideofthemselvesandintotheworld.Hestates,
Selfconsciousnessisdesireitself(167).Thesubjectisconfrontedwiththeexternalthingit
desirestoknowanditself.Theprogressionofselfconsciousnessconsistsinsatisfyingdesireby
overcomingthedifferencebetweenitselfandwhatisdesiredinaharmonizationbetweenthe
subjectandtheobject.
Hegelexaminestheobjectasbothappearance(forus)andinitself.Fromtheinitself
perspective,itisalive,becausetheobjecthasbecomelife(168).Hegelfurtherdefinestheobject's
essenceasbeinginfinityasthesublationofalldistinctions(169).Heretheterminfinityindicates
theovercomingofalldistinctionsinordertograsptheobjectasitisinitsowndistinctiveness.As

19
Fichte,Johannet.al.ScienceofKnowledge.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982.Second
IntroductiontotheScienceofKnowledge,inFichte:ScienceofKnowledge,37.
20
Fichte,Johannet.al.ScienceofKnowledge.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982,Foundationsof
theEntireScienceofKnowledge(1794),inFichte,230231.
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indicatedbyHegel,thedifferencesperceivedareintheobjectofknowledge,sincetheself
sufficientmembersexistforthemselves(170).Hegoesontoconsiderobjectsfromtwo
perspectives,asselfsufficient;andasexhibitingdifference,asalive,sincelifeisaprocessanda
livingthing(171).Allobjectschangeastheselfsviewofthemchanges,becausethewholecycle
constituteslife(170).Heclaimsthatitisdesirethatforcesthesubjectoutofitselfintotheworld,
whereitbecomesconsciousofitself.Initially,selfconsciousnessisonlythissimpleessence(173)
thatdevelopsintheinteractionwithanotherself,whichtheselveseachrespectivelyunderstandas
bothanobjectandanotherself.Asubjectbecomesselfconscious,orcertainofitself,inrendering
theothersubmissive,bywayoftheactofsublatingthisother,whichinitseyesexhibitsitselfas
selfsufficientlife(174).Thus,toachieveselfcertaintyistoengageinastrugglewithanother.
Hegelstates:
Selfconsciousnessisthusdesire.Certainofthenullityofthisother,itpositsforitselfthis
nullityasitstruth,itdestroystheselfsufficientobject,andittherebygivesitselfthe
certaintyofitselfastruecertainty,asthesortofcertaintywhichinitseyeshascometobein
anobjectivemanner(174).

Sinceselfconsciousnessrequiresconsciousnessofoneselfasother,aselfonlysatisfiesdesire
throughrecognition.Atthisstagetherecognitionisaselfrecognitionofonesownotherasan
objectforitself,whichishowonesselfcertaintyisestablished.Thisselfrecognitiondevelopsfirst
andlateremergesintotheformofintersubjectiverecognition.Insuggestingthatselfawareness
onlyarisesinarelationtoanother,HegeldrawsfromFichtestheorywhichclaimsthatfullself
consciousnessrequiresarelationtoanotherperson. 21 Hegelexpandsuponthispointinhisaccount
ofthemaster/slaverelation.Ifselfconsciousnessdependsonarelationtoanother,andiftheother
cannotbesublatedordestroyed,thentherelationtotheothermustbeaninterpersonal
interaction.ThispromptsHegelsclaimthatSelfconsciousnessattainsitssatisfactiononlyin
anotherselfconsciousness(175).Selfconsciousnessincludespure,undifferentiatedsubjectivity,
thendesireanditssatisfactioninthecertaintythatitisselfaware,andfinallythetruthofself
certaintythatliesintherelationofselfconsciousnesstoanother,describedasthedoublingofself
consciousness(176).Hegelexpandshisclaimbypointingtowardaconceptionofspirit.ForHegel
itisevidentthatAselfconsciousnessexistsforaselfconsciousness(177).Thedoublingofself
consciousnessoccursfirstwithintheself,andonlythencanbeseentorefertoarelationtoanother
self;infact,therelationtoanotherselfisimpliedbytheselfrelationtooneselfasonesownother.
Hegelstheoryofknowledgeisbaseduponhisviewofselfconsciousness.Itisinselfconsciousness

21
SeeFoundationsoftheEntireScienceofKnowledge,inFichte:ScienceofKnowledge,172173.
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thatconsciousnessfirstfindsitspathandstepsoutintothespiritualdaylightofthepresent
(177).

B.SelfSufficiencyandNonSelfSufficiencyofSelfConsciousness:MasteryandServitude

Selfconsciousnessexistsinandforitselfbecauseandbywayofitsexistinginandforitself
foranother;i.e.,itexistsonlyasarecognizedbeing.Theconceptofitsunityinitsdoubling,
ofinfinityrealizingitselfinselfconsciousness,isthatofamultisidedandmultimeaning
intertwining,suchthat,ononehand,themomentswithinthisintertwiningmustbestrictly
keptapartfromeachother,andontheotherhand,theymustalsobetakenandcognizedat
thesametimeasnotdistinguished,thatis,theymustbealwaystakenandcognizedintheir
opposedmeanings.Thistwofoldsenseofwhatisdistinguishedliesintheessenceofself
consciousness,whichistobeinfinitelyorimmediatelytheoppositeofthedeterminateness
inwhichitisposited.Theelaborationoftheconceptofthisspiritualunityinitsdoubling
presentsuswiththemovementofrecognition(178).

InchapterfourofthePhenomenologythediscussionofselfconsciousnessisdividedinto
twosections,SelfsufficiencyandNonSelfSufficiencyofSelfConsciousnessandFreedomofSelf
Consciousness.Thefirstsectionincludeswhatiscommonlyreferredtoasthemaster/slave
dialectic.ThissectionholdsparticularimportanceforHegelsentirephilosophicalprojectinnoting
thatselfconsciousnessisasocialproductderivedfrominterpersonalrelations.Hegelshiftsthe
accountofknowledgefromthelogicalreconstructionoftheconditionsofknowingastheproper
modeofanalysisofthesocialworld,toanintegratedinterpersonalprocessofbecoming.Hegel
declaredthatselfawarenessisnotanallornothingmodeofmindbutratheramatterofdegree.
ForHegelthesociallifeisbothanecessaryaswellasongoingstruggleforrecognitionwhichcan
resultinvastlydifferentoutcomes.Bothhisexpositionofthemaster/slaverelationinthefirst
sectionandhisfurtherexpositionoffreeselfconsciousnessinthesecondsectionofthischapter
concernthesocialconstitutionofthesubject.
ThemainthemeinHegelsmaster/slavedialecticissocialinequality.Thissectionaimsto
establishwhetherthisinequalityismerelyacontingent,orratheranecessary,featureofthesocial
world.Here,Hegelisconcernedwithanindividualmemberofsociety,whoseselfawarenessexhibits
eitherindependenceasselfsufficientordependenceasnonselfsufficient.Selfsufficiency,whichis
relatedtosocialindependence,orpermanence,baresaslightresemblancetoAristotle'sviewof
humanhappiness(eudaimonia)asselfsufficientandlackinginnothing. 22 Hegel'smainpointisthat
ininherentlyunstablerelationsofsocialinequality,themasterisnotselfsufficientbutdependent
ontheslave.Hestates:

22
Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics,I,7,1097a151097b20,Ross,W.D.,revisedbyJ.O.Urmson.inTheComplete
WorksofAristotle,TheRevisedOxfordTranslation,vol.2,JonathanBarnes,ed.,Princeton:Princeton
UniversityPress,1984.
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 Intheseterms,thetruthoftheselfsufficientconsciousnessistheservileconsciousness.At
first,thisconsciousnessadmittedlyappearsexternaltoitselfandnotasthetruthofself
consciousness.However,inthewaythatmasteryshowedthatitsessenceisthetopsyturvy
inversionofwhatmasterywantstobe,sotooinitsconsummationwillservitudebecometo
anevengreaterdegreetheoppositeofwhatitimmediatelyis.Asaconsciousnessforced
backintoitself,itwilltaketheinwardturnandconvertitselfintotrueselfsufficiency(193).

ForHegel,theinterpersonalsocialrelationshipcanonlyassumethreemainshapes:themaster'srule
overtheslave;ortheslave'sruleoverthemaster;orfinallyarelationofmutualequality,inwhich
thereareneithermastersnorslaves.Fullselfconsciousnessdependsonarelationofequality,of
mutualrecognitionwhichhasaninterestingcognitiveimplication.
Hegelextendstheclaimthatselfconsciousnessisdesireandthatdesireisonlysatisfied
throughanequalrelationtoanotherself.Whatwasdiscussedearlier,arelationbetweenahuman
subjectandanobject,hasnowbeenreplacedbyarelationshipbetweentwosubjectswithina
processofrecognition.Thesatisfactionofdesirerequirestherecognitionofaselfasaselfby
anotherself.Selfconsciousnessexistsinandforitselfbecauseandbywayofitsexistinginandfor
itselfforanotheritexistsonlyasrecognized(178).ForHegel,socialrecognitionisadynamic
processunfoldinginaninterpersonalrelation.Someonewhoseeksrecognitioninsocialinteraction
losesandthenfindshimselfinanother,therebysublatingtheother.Fortheselftheotherisnotan
essence,orendinitself,butmerelyameanstoitsownend,sinceitseesitselfintheother
(179).Fromthisperspective,theindividualseekingrecognitionneedstosublateordominatethe
othertobecomeselfaware,orcertainofitselfastheessentialbeing(180).Inthisprocessof
dominatingtheothertheindividualinasensefreesitselffromtheconstraintsoftherelation;it
receivesbackitsownselfand,asadirectresult,freestheother(181).
Theprocessofrecognitionconcernstheinterrelationoftwopeoplethroughthedouble
movementofthetwoselfconsciousnesses(182).Eachonlybecomesselfawarethroughits
relationtotheother,throughwhichitrelatestoitselfanddiscoversthateachisalsoawarethatthe
otherisselfaware.Theyrecognizethemselvesasmutuallyrecognizingeachother(184).The
mererecognitionthatanotherisparticipatingintheprocessofrecognitionisnotrecognitionofthat
person.Thisprocessofrecognitionthroughaninterpersonalrelationisamatterofdegree.The
master/slaverelationservesasaparadigmofhowrecognitionisanintegralpartofselfconscious
life;however,itisnotthatanyinterpersonalrelationmusthavethismaster/slaveform.Hegel
discussestypesofrecognitionoccurringinarelationbetweenunequalsopposedtoeachother,
includingonebeingonlyrecognizedandtheotheronlyrecognizing(185).Tobeginwith,an
individualbecomesawareofitself,andonlythen,inafurtherstage,inrelationtoanotherindividual.
Inthisinitialphase,eachpersonisselfawareononlythemostminimallevelwhichdoesnotimply

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anawarenessofanyoneelse.Togobeyondthisminimalselfawarenesstofullselfconsciousness,a
personmustrelatetoanotherreciprocally,whereeachisfortheotherastheotherisforit(186).
Thisfollowsdirectlyfromtheconceptofrecognition,sinceapersonisonlyfullyselfawarewhen
recognitionthroughtheotherattainstheunrestrictedformpossibleonlybetweenequals.
Thefirstabstractformofrecognitionconsistsinexcludinganythingelseinordertobeoneself.
Hegeldepictsthisasatrialbydeathinwhicheachaffirmstheirselfbyriskingtheirlifeinseekingthe
other'sdeathwiththeaimofgainingrecognition.Intrialbydeath,eachseekstheother'sdeathat
thecostofhisownlife,thoughoneoftheconsciousnessesinevitablysubmits.Inthisscenario,the
levelofpersonalriskisessential.Theindividualwhohasnotriskedhislifemayberecognizedasa
person,buthehasnotachievedthetruthofbeingrecognizedasaselfsufficientselfconsciousness
(187).Inthecaseoflegalrecognition,whichmerelyaccordsstatusasalegalindividuallike
everyoneelse,isnotyettherecognitionofanindividualasaparticularselfconsciousness.Theinitial
approachtorecognitionisselfdebilitating(188).Innotingthatlifeisasessentialtoitaspure
selfconsciousness(189),thepointismadethattreatinganotherasanobjectorasathingisto
denyoneselfthepleasureofarelationamongequals.
Thefirststageofthisinequality,ortrialbydeath,resultsinitsdissolutionthroughthedeathof
oneofthemembers.Thesecondformofthisinequalityisinitiallymorestable.Hereonememberis
selfsufficient,livingonlyforhimself,andtheotherisdependent,livingsimplyforanother.Hegel
states,Oneistheselfsufficient;itsessenceisbeingforitself.Theotherisnonselfsufficient;being
foranother,isitsessence.Theformeristhemaster,thelatteristheservant(189).Invertingthe
usualviewthattheslavedependsonthemaster,Hegelextendstherelationofdominanceasan
inherentlyinstablerelianceofthemasterontheslave.Hedepictsthisdependencyasatriadic
relationbetweenthemaster,theslave,andathing,ordesiredobject.Themasterconsciousnessis
mediatedwithitselfthroughanotherwhoseessenceincludesitsbeingsyntheticallycombinedwith
selfsufficientbeing,thatis,withthinghooditself(190).Theconsciousnessofthemasterisdoubly
relatedtothething,astheobjectofdesire,andtotheslave,forwhomitisanobjectofdesire.
Hegelstheorymakestheassumptionthattheworkofslavesconcernsthings,orphysicalobjects.
ForHegel,themasterrelatestotheslavethroughthething,andconverselytothethingthroughthe
slave.Theslavedependsonthesubstantialthingthatisunderthepowerofthemaster.Hegel
remarksthatSinceheisthepoweroverthisbeing,whereasthisbeingisthepowerovertheother,
themasterthushaswithinthissyllogismtheotherassubordinatetohim(190).Therelationofthe
masterandtheslavetothethingisunequalsincetheslaveinsomewaybecomesitselfthrough
whatistothemasteronlyasourceofwork.NowHegelarguesthatinthisunequalrelationship,the
recognitionthemasterobtainsfromtheslaveisinadequateandunsatisfying.Anindividualasslave
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toanotherisforcedtosubmittothewillofthemaster,sothatwhattheservantdoesisreallythe
mastersdoing(191).Sincethereisnoreciprocity,thisisaformofrecognitionthatisonesided
andunequal(191).ForAristotle,theslaveisnomorethanatoolforthemaster.ForHegel,ina
relationofinequalitytheweakermemberfunctionsasamereobjecttobemanipulatedbythe
mastertosatisfyhisowndesires.Yetthefactthattheslavefunctionsmerelyasathingmakesit
impossibleforthemastertobecertainofbeingforselfasthetruth(192).Hegelnowunveilsthe
deeperstructureofanyrelationofinequality.Thepointbeingthatanyformofinequalitybetween
selvesisinherentlyunstableandtherebyunsatisfying.
Apotentialforsocialchangeiscreatedwhenanindividualinamerelysubordinatesocialrole
becomesselfawareand,forthatreason,istransformedintoatrulyindependentconsciousness
(193).Hegelbringsoutthispointbyconsideringtheinequalityfromtheslave'sposition.Hedepicts
itfromtheslave'ssideasrelevantlysimilartotrialbydeathinsayingthattheslavefeltthefearof
death,oftheabsolutemaster(194).Inprinciple,inthemaster'sdependenceontheslave,the
slaveisindependent.Hisindependenceisrealizedthroughhisservice,orwork.Selfawarenessis
discoveredinandthroughtheselfsinteractionswithitswork.Bymeansofworkthisservile
consciousnesscomesroundtoitself(196).Forthroughtheactoflabor,thecapacitiesoftheself
areexternalizedintheactionofthedeed.ForHegel,workleadstoselfconsciousnessthat
destabilizesratherthanstabilizesunequalsocialrelationships.Inanelaborationontheslave
consciousnessHegelwrites,
theform,bybeingpositedasexternal,becomesinhiseyesnotsomethingotherthan
himself,forhispurebeingforitselfisjustthatform,whichinhiseyesthereinbecomesthe
truth.Therefore,bywayofthisretrieval,hecomestoacquirethroughhisownmeansa
mindofhisown,andhedoesthispreciselyintheworkinwhichtherehadseemedtobe
merelysomeoutsidersmind(196).

Hegelendsthispassagewithfurthercommentsonwork,whichemphasizesthatasaresultofhis
formativeactivitytheslavebecomessomeonewhoexistsnotonlyforanotherbutonhisown
account,andtherebyforhimself.

C.FreedomofSelfConsciousness:Stoicism,Skepticism,andtheUnhappyConsciousness

Hegelinsiststhattheintellectualfreedomnecessaryforattainingknowledgethroughthe
developmentofselfconsciousnessmustbeacquiredandisneithersimplygiven,norreached
throughmereintrospection.Descartestheoryofconsciousnessinsiststhatitisalwayspossiblefora
cognitivesubject,consciousofotherthings,orthingsotherthanitself,totakeitselfasitsobject,
hencetobecomeselfconscious.However,forHegel,fullselfconsciousness,orselfcertainty,only
emergesthroughsocialrecognition.Hegelsmaster/slaverelationisdepictedasastrugglebetween
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twopersonslockedinanunequalrelationshipwhichprovokesvarioussuccessiveoutcomes.Hegel
offershisinterpretationofthreerelatedattitudes,eachofwhichrepresentanapproachtothe
subjectasselfconscious.Hegelusesthesethreemodelsasillustrativeofthewaysforaselfaware
individual,tounderstandtherelationbetweentheselfandreality.Hebeginsthisprocessby
discussingtheresultsofhismaster/slaveanalysis.Throughsocialinteraction,theinitiallyabstract
selfhasreachedanawarenessofitselfasaconsciousnesswhichthinks,thatis,isafreeself
consciousness.Theseaspects,whichsignifytheselfaspassiveandtheoreticaloractiveandpractical,
aresuccessivephasesofthefreedomofselfconsciousness.Thisnewstage,whereselfrelation
begins,featuresaselfwhothinksorisafreeselfconsciousness,aselfwho,forthefirsttime,is
selfawareandthereforecapableofacquiringknowledge.Hegelprovidesafurtherdistinction
betweendeficientandfullformsofselfconsciousness,ormererepresentationstypicalofreligion,
anddeficientformsofphilosophy.Thought,whichisconceptual,unifiestheconceptofthethingand
thethingoftheconcept,thetheoryanditsobject.AsHegelnotes,
Whatisrepresented,alreadyshaped,existenthasasmuchtheformofbeingsomething
otherthanconsciousness.However,aconceptisatthesametimeanexistentandthis
distinction,insofarasitexistsitself,isconsciousnessdeterminatecontent.However,in
thatthiscontentisatthesametimeaconceptuallygraspedcontent,consciousnessremains
immediatelyselfawareofitsunitywiththisdeterminateanddistinguishedexistent,notasit
wouldbeinthecaseofrepresentationinwhichconsciousnessespeciallyhastoreminditself
thatthisisitsrepresentation;rather,theconceptistomeimmediatelymyconcept(197).

Thediscussionislimitedheretoemphasizingthebasicdistinctionbetweenrepresentationaland
conceptualthought.Unlikerepresentationwhichmerelyaimstograspanexternalobject,thought
cognizeswhatiswithinandimmanenttoconsciousness.
Regardingstoicism,Hegelnotes,
Eversinceitmadeitsconsciousappearanceinthehistoryofspirit,thisfreedomofself
consciousnesshas,asiswellknown,beencalledstoicism.Itsprincipleisthis:Consciousness
isthethinkingessenceandthatsomethingonlyhasessentialityforconsciousness,oristrue
andgoodforit,onlyinsofarasconsciousnessconductsitselfthereinasathinkingcreature
(198).

Hefurtherstates,whetheronthethroneorinfettersultimatelyitsaimistobefree,andto
maintainindifferencewhichwithdrawsfromexistence(199).Hegelinsiststhatformsofthought
arerelatedtothehistoricalmomentinwhichtheyappearandnotesthatstoicismcouldonlyappear
inatimeofuniversalfearandservitudeinwhichculturehadrisentothought(193),muchlike
theunequalrelationoftheslavetothemaster.Thestoic,whoisindifferentwithrespecttonatural
existence(200),isonlyfreeinthought.Therefore,stoicismisunabletoprovideactualcriteriafor
theattainmentoftruthandinsteadrestsinthoughtdevoidofallcontent(200).Thereissimply
nocontentbeyondthelevelofthought,whichrendersstoicfreedomasincomplete.Stoicismwhich
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merelyabstractsfromtheworldoffersonlyanabstractconceptionoffreedomrealizedinskepticism
astheactualexperienceofwhatthefreedomofthoughtis(202).Stoicismdeliversanotionof
independentconsciousnesswithintherelationofsocialinequalitywhichskepticismrealizesand
experiences.Skepticismistherealizationofthatofwhichstoicismismerelytheconceptanditis
theactualexperienceofwhatfreedomofthoughtis.Skepticismisinitselfthenegative,andthatis
thewayitmustexhibititself(202).
Asinthemaster/slaverelation,stoicismcorrespondstotheabstractideaoffreedomasan
independentconsciousness,whereasskepticismcorrespondstoitsrealizationthroughtheslave.
Skepticismexertsitsfreedominnegatingotherness,orwhatconcretelyexists,sothatwhat
vanishesisthedeterminate(204).Itisthenegationofallindividualityandalldistinction(205).
Yetitisplaguedbyinternalcontradictioninitsattentiontotheinessential.Hegelcomparesits
oppositionofchangetopermanenceandofpermanencetochangetothesquabblingofchildren
(205).ForHegel,stoicismandskepticismareillustrativeofthelesserformsofselfconsciousnessin
hisaccountofthehistoricalriseofselfconsciousnessinhumanculture.InHegel'scontextualized
treatmentofstoicismandskepticismhedrawscomparisonsbetweenformsofthoughtandspecific
historicalcircumstances.Hegelregardsallformsofthoughtasintrinsicallyhistorical.Inlinking
stoicismtoaparticularhistoricalmoment,Hegelissuggestingthatparticularformsofthoughtand
theoryaremadepossiblebyspecifichistoricalcircumstances.
ForHegel,skepticismfailsonaccountofitsselfcontradictorynature,sinceitaffirmswhatit
alsodenies.Hegelsunhappyconsciousnessprogressesbeyondskepticism,whichseparatesthetwo
attitudeswhichareinternalizedinaformofdualityinwhichtheindividualisdividedagainstitself.
Thisdivision,whichexhibitsthedominanceoftheunchangeableoverthechangeable,isafurther
formofthemaster/slaverelation.Theunhappyconsciousnessismarredbydiscordastheselfis
simultaneouslycommittedtoconflictingaccountsofitself.Unhappyconsciousnessisthestatein
whichtheindividualdefineshimselfthroughhissubordinationtoanother,andrepeatsthestruggle
asdefinedbytheslave'srelationtothemaster.
Stoicismandskepticismareconsideredtobelesserformsoftherealizationofhumanfreedom.
Sinceitisinternallycontradictory,skepticismcannotbemaintained.Itleadstoanewattitude
combiningwithintheindividual'sawarenessthetwomomentsthatskepticismisolates.Stoicismis
representativeoftheabstractattitudeofthemasterandskepticismaffirmsthemasteragainstthe
slave,whiletheunhappyconsciousnessillustratesbothperspectiveswithinasingleconsciousness.
HegelclaimsthattheUnhappyConsciousnessistheconsciousnessofselfasadualnatured,merely
contradictorybeing(206).Theskepticaldualismbetweenthesubjectandtheworldistakenup
withinconsciousnessintheunhappyconsciousnessasestrangedwithinitself(207).Hegeldepicts
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theunhappyconsciousnessasinitsunhappiness(211).Unhappyconsciousnessexistsinthree
ways.Inthefirstphaseitexistsasanindividual.Second,itexistsasconsciousnesswhichfindsitself
merelydesiringandlaboringbutwhofeelsratherthanthinks,andthus,failstoachievecertainty
foritself(218).Apersonwithanunhappy,dividedconsciousnessconfrontsanactualitybrokenin
twothatisbothamerenothingnessandsanctified(219).Suchanindividual,whocouldaffirm
himselfifactualitywereamerenothingness,cannotdosointhefaceofanactualitythathasthe
formoftheunchangeable(220).Hefindshimselfinarelationshipbetweentwoextremeterms
(221),lackinginanyeffectivemediation.Atmost,theselfwhosurrendershimselftoanother,
becomesawareofhimselfinwhathedoesasindividualityexistingforitselfassuch(222).Third,
thereisthepersonwhohasprovenhisselfsufficiencybywayofitswillingandbywayofits
accomplishment(223).Thisisthelessonoftheslave'sconfrontationwiththeactualworld.
Despiteanattitudeofselfdenial,theindividualbecomesawareofhimselfinworkand
consumption(223).Ifactualityisamerenothingness,thenHegelsassessmentiscorrectwhenhe
statesthattheactualactivityofconsciousnessbecomesanactivityofdoingnothing,anditsactof
consumptionbecomesafeelingofitsunhappiness(225).Inasurrenderofoneself,the
consciousnessdeprivesitselfintruthandcompletelyoftheconsciousnessofinnerandouter
freedom,ofactualityasitsbeingforitself(229).Yettheindividualalsofindshimselfinthisway,in
thecompletedsacrifice,freedfromthetrapofunhappiness.Becauseintentions,likethelanguagein
whichtheyareexpressed,areintrinsicallyuniversal,inwhatitdoes,theindividualconsciousness
realizesitselfasconsciousnessthatexistsabsolutelyinitselfwithinitsindividuality,thatis,itisits
certaintyofbeingallreality(230).

SectionThree:InterSubjectivity

Hegelapproachesthematterofselfconsciousnessinanunusualway.Hebreaksfromthe
traditionaldualisticaccountoftheselfanddeclarestheselftobedesire,selfconsciousnessis
desireitself,(167)andsatisfiedonlyinanotherselfconsciousness.Selfconsciousnessattainsits
satisfactiononlyinanotherselfconsciousness(175).However,themerecycleofdesireand
satisfactionwillnotsupplywhatisconsiderednecessaryforknowledge.Infact,thissequence
changeswhenthecycleofsatisfactionanddesireisinterruptedbyanothersubject(notobject),
whosepresenceinawayforcesthequestionofstatusoftheselfsclaimtobeindependentandself
relatedbyengineeringakindofstruggle.ThemainpointisHegelsinsistencethatthefirst
manifestationofhumandesireisevidencedbythecapacitytoriskoneslifeforthesakeof
dominanceoveranotherinthestruggleforrecognition.Hegelsnotionofselfrelationisprovisional

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andconfirmableonlyasitsendstheselfbackintotheworldtotestwhatintentionstheselfactually
has;thisistheactivityofselflegislation.Thisisaprocessthatevolvesfrombasicselfconsciousness
intoautonomy.
ForHegel,fullautonomyisonlypossibleforthephilosopher.HoweverHegelclaimsthat
thereisanotherlevelofautonomyforthenonphilosopherwhichinvolvesbeingaparticipantin
objective,rationalinstitutions.Itdoesnotmeanmerelybeingabletosaythinkforyourself,which
isnotnecessarilyhelpfulifoneisthinkingerroneously.Hegelstheoryofobjectivespiritaccountsfor
thewayinwhichparticipationinthemoderninstitutionsoftheworldcountsasbeingautonomous
andselfrulinginanobjectiveway.Inthismodel,subjectivityistheprocessoftheselfunderstanding
confirmingthatwhatoneisdoingisright.Forthephilosopherthiscanbeachievedonthehighest
scale,butfornonphilosophersthishasalimitedrange.Autonomyinthestrictestsenseisthe
absoluteknowledgethephilosopheralonehas.
Frommyunderstanding,thislimitationisselfimposed.Typically,onceonemeetsan
adequatelevelofknowledgethatallowsforonesownpurposestobeachieved,theselfworksto
merelymaintainitsstatus.Afewindividualsareunabletoachievethislevelofadequacyandtheir
developmentisspentinstruggleagainstthestatusquo.Ararefewriseabovethestandardandare
abletoachieveanabsoluteknowledge.Thesefewhaveaninsatiabledesirefortruthandultimate
justiceandserveastheguidinglightsfortheprogressionofhumanityasthecollective.Relianceon
andsubmissiontothestandardsofsocietyisevidenceofthishierarchy.
Hegelsaccountringstruewitheverydayexperience.Often,peoplecometoknow
themselvesthroughtheimagetheybelieveothersholdofthem.Thisimageispositiveornegative
dependingontheindividualandtheirstandinginsociety.Thissystemgivesrisetobothacclaimand
stressesasindividualsstrivetoasserttheirfreeindividualityagainsttheobjectifyingimagesthat
othershaveofthem.Asindicatedthereisonlyaminoritygroupofindividualsthatdonotself
regulatetheirselvestoreflectthebasicvaluesofsociety.Evenwithinthisgroup,minorityfactions
willestablishtheirownstandardswhichwillbeheldasprecedentbythemembersofthatgroup.
Thatis,itisextremelyrareforindividualstocompletelyliveinisolation.Evenanindividualexisting
inisolationwillstillsubscribeonsomeleveltostandardsintuitedfromtheirsurroundingsorvalues
maintainedfromthepreisolatedstate.Inarealwaytheselfcravesregulations:theselfregulation
ofwhatwillbestprovidesatisfactionforthedesire.Humanemotionalsoprovidesalevelof
substantiationforHegelsclaims.Angerisanemotionalresponsetounbalancedformsof
recognition.Fearistheresultofnotknowingwhatonecanexpect;itisalackofrecognition.Loveis
theharmonizationofmutualrecognition.Obviouslythesearegeneralstatements,buttherestill
seemstobeaclearlinkbetweentheemotionalstatesoftheselfandthevariouslevelsof
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satisfactionorlackthereofwithininteractiveintersubjectiverecognitionthatsupportsHegels
claims.Selfconsciousnessexistsforselfconsciousness.Onlytherebydoesselfconsciousnessin
factexist,foritisonlythereinthattheunityofitselfinitsothernesscomestobeforit(177).
Asocietyallowsitsindividualmemberstoachieveindividualneedsorwishesthattheycould
notfulfillseparatelybythemselves,withouttheexistenceofthesocialgroup.Societyonlyexistsin
virtueofitsmembersandyetthememberscouldnotadequatelyfunctiononalevelofsatisfactionif
notforthesocietalvaluesfortheselftolegislateitsownbehavior.Thereisalsoevidencefoundin
thevariousformsofinstitutionswhichserveasthebasisfortheimplementationofsocietys
standardsandrecognition.Forexample,prisonsandmentalinstitutionsoperatethrough
confinementandprovidelevelsofrehabilitationandpunishment.Otherthanthedeathpenalty,as
faraspunishmentgoes,theworstpossibleformofpunishmentissolitaryconfinement.Thisisan
interestingindicationofthevalueplacedoninteractionandintersubjectivity.
Theselfrequiresinteraction,thesatisfactionofdesirewhichissynonymouswiththeself.
Languageservesasourmostbasicacknowledgmentoftheother.Languageallowsforthepossibility
ofcommunicatingandworkingtogetherforthecommongoalsofthecollective.Everythingis
constructedonandverifiedbythefoundationsofourlinguisticinteractionswhichallowsforthe
evolvingsharedperceptionandacceptanceoftherulesofengagementbetweenmembersof
society.Theselfvalidatessocietyinthiswayandinreturnisprovidedwithitsownvalidation.The
institutionofmarriageisagoodexampleofrequiringanddesiringexternalvalidationoftheself.For
manypeopleitisnotenoughtobeinacommittedrelationshipwhichbothpeoplemutually
recognize.Theyrequirealegalcontractwhichbindsbothindividualstothesocialinstitutionknown
asmarriage.Education,theprocessofearningadegreefromanaccreditedinstitutiontooffer
validationofskillsandmentalprowessisanotherillustrationofthispoint.Onceagainshowingthat
forboththeselfandsociety,onesownabilitiesmustbevalidatedinordertoserveasproofof
recognition.Thesearejustamerefewofthemanypossibleexampleswhichcanbeofferedin
supportofHegelstheoryofselfconsciousnessasdesireandrecognitionwhichinvolvesself
legislatingstandardsofinteraction.

Conclusion

InpartAofsectiononeofthisessayanoverviewofthePhenomenologywasofferedto
provideasummaryofthegeneralthrustofthework.PartBofthefirstsectionprovidedanaccount
ofthecontextwhichsuppliedtheseedforHegelstheoryofselfconsciousness,elucidatinghis
indebtednesstoKant.Hegelsworkwasinspiredbyandindebtedtothephilosopherswhowere

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workingduringthecourseofhislifetimeaswellasthosewhocamebeforehim.ForHegel,
consciousnesscanonlybeaccountedforthroughselfconsciousness.Consciousnessisunableto
establishaunifiedconceptionofanobject;allsuchPreHegelianeffortstocomprehendtheunityof
objectsfromtheperspectiveofconsciousnessresultedindualism.Thisprovidedthemotivation
behindhismovefromconsciousnesstoselfconsciousnessinchapterfourofThePhenomenologyof
Spirit.
Inthesecondsection,thefourthchapterofthePhenomenologywasexamined.PartAoffers
anaccountofHegelsconceptofselfcertaintyandpartBdetailedthetheoryofselfsufficiency
versusnonselfsufficiencyandincludedanexaminationofthemaster/slavedialectic.Thestronger
thedesireofpureselfconsciousness,thestrongertheselfbecomesintermsofdevelopingwithin
society.Themoretheselfrecognizescorrectly,themoretheselfiscorrectlyrecognized;thisallows
theselftothrive.Selfconsciousnessdependsonthisinteractionwhichinthebestcasescenario,as
shownbythemaster/slavedialectic,isanequalexchange.PartCofthesecondsectionprovidedan
analysisofthefreedomofselfconsciousnessandincludedadiscussionofstoicism,skepticismand
theunhappyconsciousness.Thethirdsectionofferedadeductionofthenecessityofinter
subjectivityinHegelsaccountofselfconsciousness.
Theselfisaneverevolvingactiveprocesswhichiscontinuouslybecomingitselfinthe
overlappingseguesbetweenwhathasbeenandwhatwillbe.Theselfisnotafixedstagnantpoolof
reductivefacts,suchasname,age,professionormaritalstatus.Perhapsitiscommonplaceto
identifyoneselforothersassuch,buttheselfissomethingmuchmore.Theselfisanactive,
intentionalamalgamationofonesdeedsandisverifiedinthecollectiverecognitionofthosedeeds.
TheIreferredtoinselfrelationisthemergerbetweenonesownparticulardesiresandthe
universalacceptanceandshareabilityoftheactiveexpressionofthosedesires.Theselfexistsasa
particularonlyinvirtueoftheexperienceofdifferentiation.Anexperienceoftheselfasawareofits
selfispossibleonlyintheprocessofdistinguishingbetweenonesselffromanother.Theselfmust
recognizeitselfasanindividualizedselfinordertohaveaconceptionoftheselfasdistinct.Yetat
thesametime,thisacceptanceofonesselfasanindividualrequirestheconfirmationofanotherto
offervaliditytoitsexperience.Thisisalifelongprocessofinteractionandaffirmation.Thisisthe
circularprocessoftheuniversalflowingintotheparticularbackintotheuniversal.Theselfis
attainableonlythroughparticularization,buttheachievementofthatselfisonlypossiblethrough
recognitionofandreconnectionwiththecollective.Theselfrecognizesitselfasseparatefromthe
wholebutonlythroughtheemersionoftheselfbackintothewholecantheselfrecognizeitselfasa
legitimateselfconsciousness.

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