On 26 May and 9 June 2011, just before and after the Shangri La Dialogue in

Singapore, in which China emphasized its commitment of "maintaining peace

and stability in South China Sea", Chinese fishery patrol ships cut seismometer
cables of Vietnam's Binh Minh 02 and Viking 02 oil exploration vessels within
Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), triggering a series of public
demonstrations in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city. Vietnamese accused China of
"systematic action" that "is aimed at turning the undisputed area belonging to
Vietnam into an area under dispute in order to materialize China's nine-dotted
line claim in the East Sea" [2] . China responded to the complaint and protests by
warning that "any exploration in the vicinity of the disputed Spratly islands without
its consent was a violation of its jurisdiction and sovereignty". [3]

II. OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH CHINA

SEA DISPUTE BETWEEN VIETNAM
AND CHINA
1. The significance of the South China
Sea
The South China Sea is a part of the Pacific Ocean which encompasses a large
area of about 3,500,000 square kilometers, spreading from Singapore and the
Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Taiwan. It comprises more than 200 small
islands, reefs, and cays, most of which are inhabited. The two largest
archipelagoes are the Paracel islands which covers an area of about 15,000
square kilometers with about 30 islets and reefs, and the Spratly islands which
stretches over an area of 180,000 square kilometers with more than 100
features. [4] It is widely acknowledged that the South China Sea, especially the
two largest archipelagoes, has a great importance in terms of geo-politics as well
as geo-economics because of its strategic location as a busy passageway for
about one third of world's ships and presumed rich natural resources, especially
oil and gas, underneath. [5]

2. The South China Sea Dispute

Apart from Vietnam and China, the South China Sea dispute involves four other
disputants, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. All disputants except
Brunei occupy certain area. "Vietnam occupies 21 islands, the Philippines, eight,
China, seven, Malaysia, five and Taiwan, one." [6] All claims are made based on
different historical rights, colonial inheritance, territorial and legal grounds,
including overlapping and competing claims over either maritime zone or
sovereignty over islands. The Philippines refers to the principle of "discovery of
unclaimed territories" and claims sovereignty over Kalayaan archipelago which
comprises eight islands in the Spratly archipelago [7] . Brunei and Malaysia make
advantage of legal bases given by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or Convention) to assert their sovereignty rights over
reefs for Brunei and islands in the southern Spratly for Malaysia. Taiwan, based
on historical ground, claims its right over the Pratas island which used to be
occupied by China.
China claims are based on the so-called "nine-dotted U-shape line" which first
appeared in a map published in 1948 in a private publication in China and
encompasses about 80 percent of the South China Sea, including the Paracel
and the Spartly islands. Despite China claims its sovereignty over this area,
giving that it has "historical rights" to do so because the Han dynasty in the
second century used it as the navigation route, [8] it has never officially declared
and ignored calls to clarify if it also claims to the rights over maritime space
enclosed which is far beyond 12 nautical miles from the disputed islands and
includes EEZ and continental shelves that overlaps the continental shelves of
other claimants as stipulated in the 1982 UNCLOS. [9] While the authenticity of
China's "historical rights" to sovereignty over the area as well as its claim over the
maritime water remains unclear, China opposes any activities by other claimants
within this U-shape line.
Vietnam makes reference to historical data, effective occupation, colonial
inheritance and legal ground to claim its sovereignty over the Paracel and the
Spratly islands as well as more than 200 nautical miles of continental rights as
stipulated in the 1982 UNCLOS. It has cited a number of credible documents and
maps to prove its occupation and sovereignty exercise over the islands since at
least the Le dynasty in the 15th century, throughout the French colonial time until
1974, when China used force to seize the Paracel, killing 53 Vietnamese
soldiers [10] and 1988, when the two sides clashed again in the Spartly islands,
Vietnam lost 7 islands to China and 64 Vietnamese soldiers were killed. [11] The
Paracel and 7 lost islands in the Spratly islands were placed under the jurisdiction
of Hainan Province.
Below are some recent developments that provide a snapshot of the increasing
tension between the two countries over the dispute:
In May 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia submitted a joint report on territorial claims in
the South China Sea to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf. In response, China submitted its U-shape line map. [12]
On 26 May and 9 June 2011, China ship cut the cables of two Vietnamese oil
explorations vessels, ramping up the public protests in Vietnam.
China detains and seizes hundreds of Vietnamese fishermen every year,
accusing them of violating its unilateral fishing ban. On 22 February 2012,
Vietnam accused China of shooting and damaging a Vietnamese fishing boat
near the Paracel. On 3 March 2012, China detained 21 Vietnamese fishermen
and their two boats in waters near the Paracel and demanded each boat
$11,000. Vietnam strongly protested against the requests [13] .
On 15 June 2012, Vietnam conducted a military air patrol over the Spratly islands
and then announced regular air patrol practice. In response, on 28 June 2012,
China also commenced regular air patrol to the Spratly islands. [14]
China warns and threatens foreign companies for joint oil exploration activities
with Vietnam in the overlapping area while offering oil blocks to its foreign
partners. On 23 June 2012, China offered nine blocks located within Vietnam's
200 nautical miles EEZ to foreign operators. Vietnam condemned China's "illegal
offer" and requested China to cease the bidding. [15]
On 21 June 2012, Vietnam passed the Law of the Sea of Vietnam restating its
claims over the Paracel and Spratlly islands. In a tit-for-tat response, China
immediately announced the establishment of prefecture-level Sansha City
(officially created on 24 July 2012) to administer the disputed islands and
surrounding waters as well as the establishment of a military base (officially
created on 19 July 2012) in the City. Vietnam condemned the establishment of
Sansha City, stating that it "violated international law, seriously violating Vietnam
sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes." [16]
The above developments indicate an "action-reaction cycle" with escalating
strains in the South China Sea which makes it difficult to reach a solution
acceptable by the both sides. The following section will discuss several policy
options for Vietnam to settle the South China Sea dispute with China.

III. POLICY OPTIONS

1. Multilateralising the dispute through
ASEAN forum
This option implies that Vietnam should continue to highlight the issue in ASEAN;
emphasize the impacts of the dispute on the regional stability and peace in order
to forge a united front "to persuade China to solve the issue peacefully and
multilaterally." [17]
ASEAN comprises four out of six claimants, thus it is the most important platform
for claimants to meet, discuss and seek for available solutions. The body
achieved some success in building mutual trust and confidence between ASEAN
claimants and China. Some evidences are the 1992 Declaration on the South
China Sea, the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) and the 2011
Guidelines to Implement the DOC in which stated that the dispute should be
solved "by peaceful means, through friendly consultations and negotiations by
sovereign states directly concerned". These documents, however, have no legal
force. Therefore, ASEAN and China have also agreed in principle that a more
binding Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC) needs to be
quickly completed and adopted.
Yet the ASEAN's effectiveness in solving the dispute is being questioned. As
mentioned, the DOC was just a political statement with no legal binding
requirement. China agreed to discuss the COC at an "appropriate timing" but has
never stated when "an appropriate timing" is. [18] Most importantly, "divisions
between member states, stemming from different perspectives on the South
China Sea and differences in the value each member places on their relations
with China, have prevented ASEAN from coming to a consensus on the
issue." [19] On one side, claimants might share the same stand towards China
but none of them is willing to compromise with other claimants over the
sovereignty issue. On the other side, non-claimants ASEAN members value the
relations with China which are believed to be affected if they are pulled into any
undesirable conflict with China. The recent failure of ASEAN in bringing forward a
joint statement at the July 2012 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Phnom Penh due to
the divergence in attitudes towards the dispute is a clear evidence for this internal
ASEAN clash. This also indicates China's influence over other ASEAN members,
Cambodia as ASEAN Chair in this case, to maintain its interests. Even if
Vietnam, through its lobby efforts to pull ASEAN claimants and non-claimants
together, it is still difficult to reach a solution since China insists on its bilateral
negotiation strategy of "treat each case differently, and defeat each one
separately." [20]

2. Internationalize the dispute by

involving outside major powers
This option suggests that Vietnam should deepen its multifaceted relations,
including economic, diplomatic and military cooperation, with outside powers who
have interests in the South China Sea; emphasize the importance of the peace
and stability of South China Sea towards their interests in order to encourage a
common effort of navigating China's assertive claims and actions in the region.
Over the past years, Vietnam has had some success in expanding and
strengthening its relations with major powers through a wide range of
cooperation, including regular military visits, military technology and weapons
exchanges and joint energy exploration. For example, to deepen relations with
the U.S who has the largest economic interests in the South China Sea with $1.2
trillion out of $5.3 trillion of total trade passes, Vietnam has facilitated joint rescue
exercise with the U.S army, allowed U.S warship to access the military Carm
Ranh Bay for the first time since the end of the Vietnam War [21] , offered gas
and oil block in Vietnam's EEZ to the U.S ExxonMobil oil company, etc. This
results in a stronger stake of the U.S in the disputed area. At the 2010 Shangri La
Dialogue in Singapore, the then U.S Defense Secretary Robert Gates expressed
U.S interests in Vietnam's offshore oil exploration and declared that the U.S
opposes to "any effort to intimidate U.S corporations or those of any nation
engaged in legitimate economic activity" [22] . At the 2010 ASEAN Regional
Forum in Hanoi, U.S. Secretary Hillary Clinton declared that "the United States
has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime
commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea" and called for
"a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various
territorial disputes". Apart from the U.S, Vietnam has been trying to boost
relations with other major powers. For instance, in September 2011, Vietnam was
successful to reach an agreement on joint exploration with India. Vietnam has
also supported activities of Russian energy company Gazprom in joint oil
exploration projects in Vietnam's maritime waters. Besides, during 2009 alone,
Vietnam bought from Russia six Kilo-grass submarines and 12 Su-30MKK
fighters, becoming one of top weapon importers of Russia [23] . The growing
relationship with major powers as well as increasing involvement of these major
powers in the disputed area does help to increase Vietnam's leverage to China in
the South China Sea dispute. "Now China made efforts to further engage
Vietnam through party-to-party talks and keep their disagreements behind closed
door". [24]
However, Vietnam should stay aware that strong alignments with major powers to
balance too aggressively against China would irritate China and lead to
subsequent negative economic and political consequences. Meanwhile, Vietnam
cannot outright rely on any major powers because these countries have their own
priorities and their consistent longstanding position in the South China Sea is
neutrality. In other words, they might be willing to sacrifice the relation with
Vietnam if it conflicts with their priority interests. Vietnam should never get too
close to any powers but better to maintain limited alignments to just keep China
in check.

3. Resort to the international law of the

sea and international arbitration
This option recommends that Vietnam should resort to the international
frameworks to solve the dispute, that is, Vietnam should present evidences of its
sovereignty rights over the Paracel and Spratly islands, which abides by the 1982
UNCLOS, to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in order to gain
international support and acknowledgment of Vietnam's "facts on the ground"
while at the same time putting pressure on China to clarify its claims and
evidences.
The 1982 UNCLOS is aimed to manage potential conflicts/disputes among
countries over the rights to the world's ocean. "It holds valid legal title to
sovereignty over their islands has exclusive right to exploit living and nonliving
resources within 12 miles of their territorial sea and 200 miles beyond, known as
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)." [25]
Vietnam has ratified and abided by the 1982 UNCLOS since 1994. Its 2012 Law
of the Sea, in which clarifying its territorial seas, EEZ and continental shelf, was
also built on the provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS. Vietnam has also been
providing its historical data showing that it has been exercising effective
occupation of the islands for a long time. Recently, it introduced a 1904 Chinese
official map which showed that the Paracel and Spratly islands were not belong
to China [26] and received attention from international experts and community.
Therefore, it is very likely that Vietnam will win over China if the case is sent to
the international tribunal.
China is also a participant of the UNCLOS (since 1996) but its interpretation of
the Convention is "controversial". China has never clarified its vague claim of
"historical rights" of the area inside the U-shape line which is not suitable and so
unlikely to be supported by the provisions of the law. It "rejected the mechanism
for international arbitration and adjudication provided by UNCLOS" [27] and
prefers bilateral negotiations with other claimants in which China will have more
advantageous position.

4. Build up self-reliance
This option proposes Vietnam to build up its internal economic and military
capabilities to deter China's aggression by continuing reforming its economy and
modernizing its military forces.
Given that China used to use force to seize the Paracel and a part of the Spratly
in the past as well as it has been developing its military strengths and being more
assertive to claim its ownership over the islands, there could be a chance that
China would use force again and/or use its overwhelming economic power to put
pressure on Vietnam and other countries to give up on the issue.
Being aware of China's threat, Vietnamese government has been developing its
internal strengths, both economic and military inclusive, especially military
capability. Compared to 2003, Vietnam's military spending has been increased by
83% in 2012 [28] , in which mostly is invested in developing naval and air forces;
a large amount of budget has been spent on weapons purchase. Vietnam is
currently one of the top importers of Russia's weapons [29] . It is also persuading
the U.S to lift the ban on lethal weapons so that it could purchase more U.S
weapons and modernize military. [30] Pessimists believe that despite economic
and military strengthening efforts, Vietnam can never outweigh China in economy
and military power but still under China's influence. Economically, China is the
largest economic partner of Vietnam with expected two-way trade of $60 billion in
2015; Chinese products currently account 60% imports of Vietnam [31] . Militarily,
Vietnam's 2012 military budget is $3.3 billion while China's is $106.4 billion [32] .
However, these economic and military strengthening efforts still deserve a try
because if conflict is the case, it will impose certain costs on China and so deter
China's aggressive actions.

5. Go for joint management of

overlapped resources
This option implies Vietnam's possible consideration of joint management of
resources at areas where claims are overlapped with China. This means both
sides have to reach a consensus over the measure of maritime space
surrounding each island, regardless of ownership, and then agree to jointly
administer the overlapped claimed area outside the maritime space. This differs
from the early 1990s proposal of "shelving disputes and going for joint
development" by the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in which China ignored
the possibility of joint development in the Paracel while proposing a joint
management with Vietnam in the West Vanguard Bank Basin locating in
Vietnam's maritime waters. [33]
Obstacles to this attempt of joint management is that China claims much of the
South China Sea, including most of the Vietnam's islands and asserts its rights to
unilaterally benefit from the resources while Vietnam is also strong in its position
of sovereignty rights over these islands. Both sides have condemned each other
of exploring and exploiting natural resources, mainly fish and gas-oil, within their
maritime waters. China consistently challenged foreign oil companies having joint
exploration activities with Vietnam and warned them of "unspecified
consequences in their business dealings with China". This uncompromising
attitude by the both sides, especially by China, makes it impossible for a
consensus to be reached on measuring the overlapped area which is not really
belongs to any party.

6. Policy Recommendation: Cooperate

and struggle bilaterally and multilaterally
Vietnam should consider a comprehensive approach that provides it with
flexibility and effectiveness in dealing with China. This option is, therefore,
recommended because it develops a comprehensive approach by taking into
account of both bilateral and multilateral cooperation and struggle, considering
the special characteristics of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship:
Deepen the multifaceted bilateral relationship with China through different
networks of Party-to-Party, Government-to-Government, and People-to-People,
especially Party-to-Party channel. History shows that the special relation between
the two communist parties enables the two sides to repair their bilateral relations
fast after serious incidents. For example, strains in the Vietnam-China relations
after the May and June 2011 events was significantly reduced after the visit to
China by Vietnam Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in
October 2011 when the two sides agreed on the six basic principles in settlement
of the dispute, emphasizing the importance of negotiations and friendly
consultations. [34]
Encourage ASEAN unity as a primary multilateral platform to counter China's
assertiveness. ASEAN has certain setbacks but it cannot be denied that through
DOC and other cooperation mechanisms such as ARF, FTA, ASEAN has some
significant success in building mutual confidence and developing mutual interests
with China. Of course, as analyzed, it is tough to forge a united and effective
stance among ASEAN members; however, common interests of peace, free
navigation and other legal interests under the 1982 UNCLO could be driving
forces to make this more likely to happen.
Deepen ties with major powers. Direct interests of maintaining free navigation in
the South China Sea are motivations for these powers to align with ASEAN and
Vietnam to balance against China's aggression. The depth and durability of
commitment by these major powers, however, might be doubted because they
also have their own priorities. Therefore, Vietnam should not outright rely on the
outside powers to outright balance against China, but maintain a safety distance
from either side and at the same time build up its capacity for self-reliance.
Well prepare and announce sufficient historical and legal data to prove Vietnam's
sovereignty rights over the Paracel and Spartly islands; mobilize media, including
social media, to effectively involve in the issue by providing transparent and
correct information in order to make Chinese people and international community
to understand correctly about the situation, urge the world to support Vietnam
and impose pressure on China to clarify its claims.

III. CONCLUSION
The South China Sea dispute between Vietnam and China has become more
and more sensitive and complicated because both countries are so strong in their
own positions in the dispute that no one is willing to compromise their rights over
the Paracel and Spratly islands - a convergence of geo-politics and geo-
economics. Vietnam has more credible historical and legal data to prove its
sovereignty rights over the islands but the strategic significance of China to
Vietnam and China's assertiveness put Vietnam in a policy dilemma between
developing the strategic bilateral relationship and struggling to win over China in
the dispute. To reduce tensions, Vietnam should have a comprehensive
approach, that is, boosting bilateral ties while seeking ways to balance against
China at the same time, internally or externally. In this connection, this paper
recommends Vietnam to simultaneously (i) deepen its multifaceted relationship
with China through Party-to-Party, Government-to-Government and People-to-
People channels; (ii) continue to take advantage of ASEAN as a primary platform
to counter China's claims; (iii) develop ties with major powers while not forget to
build up self-reliance; and (iv) make public all evidence to prove Vietnam's
sovereignty rights to the Paracel and Spratly island in order to gain support from
international community and put pressure on China to clarify its claims and deter
its aggressive actions. However, it should be acknowledged that since the core of
the South China Sea dispute is the territorial sovereignty that involved claimants
will never want to compromise, it might too sensitive and complex for a feasible
solution to thoroughly settle the dispute in a foreseeable future.