AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corp.

G.R. No. 166744. November 2, 2006.SCRA Citation: 506 SCRA 625DOCTRIN:

Private and public nuisance; definition The term nuisance is so comprehensive that it has been applied to
almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of
property, or his comfort; A private nuisance is one which violates only private rights and produces damage to but
one or a few persons while a nuisance is public when it interferes with the exercise of public right by directly
encroaching on public property or by causing a common injury, an unreasonable interference with the right common
to the general public.
In this case, the noise generated by an airconditioning system is considered a private nuisance.

Noise emanating from air-con units not nuisance per se Noise becomes actionable only when it passes the limits
of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener;
injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics will not render the noise
an actionable nuisance whether or not the noise is a nuisance is an issue to be resolved by the courts.

Test to determine noise as a nuisance- The test is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort are so
injuriously affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss (Ex Actual physical discomfort)
which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding property, in a
particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to
con*ne it within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another owner who, though creating a noise, is
acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it.

Action to abate private nuisance; incapable of pecuniary estimation an action to abate private nuisance, even
where the plaintiff asks for damages is one incapable of pecuniary estimation

FACTS:
AC enterprises (petitioner) is a corporation owns a 10 storey building in Makati City. Frabelle (respondent) is a
condominium corporation whose condominium development is located behind petitioner. Respondent complained
of the unbearable noise emanating from the blower of the air conditioning units of petitioner.
ISSUES:
1. Is it a nuisance as to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of proceedings or a nuisance per se

2. Is an action for abatement of a private nuisance, more specifically noise generated by the blower of an
air1conditioning system, even if the plaintiff prays for damages, one incapable of pecuniary estimation?

3. What is the determining factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint?

HELD:
1. It is a nuisance to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of proceedings; the noise is not a nuisance
per se. Noise becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the
locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener. Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position
or of especially sensitive characteristics will not render the house an actionable nuisance - in the conditions, of
present living, noise seems inseparable from the conduct of many necessary occupations
2. Yes, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation because the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money.
3. The determining factor is not its intensity or volume; it is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual
physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities rendering adjacent property less
comfortable and valuable.
Borlongan vs Pena

G.R. No. 143591 May 5, 2010 TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO E. MANUEL,
JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON, BENJAMIN DE LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALES, JR., and BEN YU LIM,
JR., Petitioners, vs. MAGDALENO M. PEA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago City, Respondents

FACTS
: Respondent Pena instituted a civil case for recovery of agents compensation and expenses, damages and
attorneys fees against Urban Bank and petitioners before the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss, including
several documents as evidence. Atty Pena claims that the documents were falsified. He subsequently filed his
Complaint-Affidavit with the City Prosecutor. The prosecutor found probable cause and the Informations were filed
before MTCC. Warrants of arrest were issued for the petitioners / accused.

Upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid
embarrassment, being then officers of Urban Ban. On the scheduled date for the arraignment, despite the
petitioners refusal to enter a plea, the court a quo entered a plea of Not Guilty for them.
The accused questioned the validity of the warrant of arrest. However, the trial court ruled that posting of bail
constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

ISSUE : Can the petitioners still question the validity of the warrant of arrest despite posting bail?

YES

HELD: The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of
Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after
arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his
objections thereto. Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it
cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of
arrest issued against her by the respondent judge.
There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to
question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act
should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the
particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x. Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus
Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail. Their
bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of
their arrest. On the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their plea
due to the fact that the issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when the court a quo
entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the same
with the Court of Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert their
incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest
Concio Vs DOJ

On challenge via petition for review on certiorari are the Court of Appeals May 24, 2006 Decision and October 10,
2006 Resolution1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 93763 dismissing herein petitioners petition for certiorari and prohibition that
sought to (i) annul respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Department Order Nos. 90 2 and 1653 dated February 8,
2006 and March 8, 2006, respectively, and all orders, proceedings and issuances emanating therefrom, and (ii)
prohibit the DOJ from further conducting a preliminary investigation in what has been dubbed as the "Ultra
Stampede" case.

In the days leading to February 4, 2006, people started to gather in throngs at the Philsports Arena (formerly Ultra)
in Pasig City, the publicized site of the first anniversary episode of "Wowowee," a noontime game show aired by
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN).

Came the early morning of February 4, 2006 with thousands more swarming to the venue. Hours before the show
and minutes after the people were allowed entry through two entry points at six oclock in the morning, the obstinate
crowd along Capt. Javier Street jostled even more just to get close to the lower rate pedestrian gate. The mad rush
of the unruly mob generated much force, triggering the horde to surge forward with such momentum that led others
to stumble and get trampled upon by the approaching waves of people right after the gate opened. This fatal
stampede claimed 71 lives, 69 of whom were women, and left hundreds wounded 4 which necessitated emergency
medical support and prompted the cancellation of the shows episode.

The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through then Secretary Angelo Reyes, immediately
created an inter-agency fact-finding team5 to investigate the circumstances surrounding the stampede. The team
submitted its report6 to the DOJ on February 7, 2006.

By Department Order No. 90 of February 8, 2006, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez (Gonzalez)
constituted a Panel (Evaluating Panel)7 to evaluate the DILG Report and "determine whether there is sufficient
basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the basis of the documents submitted."

The Evaluating Panel later submitted to Gonzalez a February 20, 2006 Report 8 concurring with the DILG Report but
concluding that there was no sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation

Respondent National Bureau of Investigation-National Capital Region (NBI-NCR), acting on the Evaluating Panels
referral of the case to it for further investigation, in turn submitted to the DOJ an investigation report, by a March 8,
2006 transmittal letter (NBI-NCR Report 10), with supporting documents recommending the conduct of preliminary
investigation for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries 11against
petitioners and seven others12 as respondents.
G.R. No. 160426 January 31, 2008

CAPITOLINA VIVERO NAPERE, petitioner,

vs.
AMANDO BARBARONA and GERVACIA MONJAS BARBARONA, respondents.

Respondent Amando Barbarona is the registered owner of Lot No. 3177, situated in Barangay San Sotero (formerly
Tambis), Javier, Leyte and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-7350. Lot No. 3176, covered by OCT
No. 1110 in the name of Anacleto Napere, adjoins said lot on the northeastern side. After Anacleto died, his son,
Juan Napere, and the latters wife, herein petitioner, planted coconut trees on certain portions of the property with
the consent of his co-heirs.

In their complaint, respondents alleged that in April 1980, the spouses Napere, their relatives and hired laborers, by
means of stealth and strategy, encroached upon and occupied the northeastern portion of Lot No. 3177; that the
Naperes harvested the coconut fruits thereon, appropriated the proceeds thereof, and, despite demands, refused to
turn over possession of the area; that in April 1992, a relocation survey was conducted which confirmed that the
respondents property was encroached upon by the Naperes; that on the basis of the relocation survey, the
respondents took possession of this encroached portion of the lot and harvested the fruits thereon from April 1993
to December 1993; but that in January 1994, the Naperes repeated their acts by encroaching again on the
respondents property, harvesting the coconuts and appropriating the proceeds thereof, and refusing to vacate the
property on demand.

On November 10, 1995, while the case was pending, Juan Napere died. Their counsel informed the court of Juan
Naperes death, and submitted the names and addresses of Naperes heirs.

On October 17, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision against the estate of Juan Napere. The Court finds in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant
GR. No. 182248 December 18, 2008

EQUITABLE PCI BANKING CORPORATION,

1
GEORGE L. GO, PATRICK D. GO, GENEVIEVE W.J. GO, FERDINAND MARTIN G. ROMUALDEZ, OSCAR P. LOPEZ-DEE,
RENE J. BUENAVENTURA, GLORIA L. TAN-CLIMACO, ROGELIO S. CHUA, FEDERICO C. PASCUAL, LEOPOLDO S. VEROY,
WILFRIDO V. VERGARA, EDILBERTO V. JAVIER, ANTHONY F. CONWAY, ROMULAD U. DY TANG, WALTER C. WESSMER,
and ANTONIO N. COTOCO vs. RCBC CAPITAL CORPORATION
The Facts

Petitioners Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB) and the individual shareholders of Bankard, Inc., as sellers, and
respondent RCBC Capital Corporation (RCBC), as buyer, executed a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) for the
purchase of petitioners interests in Bankard, representing 226,460,000 shares, for the price of PhP 1,786,769,400.

RCBC deposited the stipulated downpayment amount in an escrow account after which it was given full
management and operational control of Bankard. June 2, 2000 is also considered by the parties as the Closing
Date referred to in the SPA.

Sometime in September 2000, RCBC had Bankards accounts audited, creating for the purpose an audit team
and the conclusion was that the warranty, as contained in Section 5(h) of the SPA (simply Sec. 5[h] hereinafter),
was correct.

RCBC paid the balance of the contract price. The corresponding deeds of sale for the shares in question were
executed in January 2001. Thereafter RCBC informed petitioners of its having overpaid the purchase price of the
subject shares, claiming that there was an overstatement of valuation of accounts amounting to PhP 478 million,
resulting in the overpayment of over PhP 616 million. Thus, RCBC claimed that petitioners violated their warranty,
as sellers, embodied in Sec. 5(g) of the SPA (Sec. 5[g] hereinafter).

RCBC, in accordance with Sec. 10 of the SPA, filed a Request for Arbitration dated May 12, 2004 with the ICC-
ICA. In the request, RCBC charged Bankard with deviating from, contravening and not following generally accepted
accounting principles and practices in maintaining their books.

After drawn out proceedings with each party alleging deviation and non-compliance by the other with arbitration
rules, the tribunal, with Justice Kapunan dissenting, rendered a Partial Award . On the matter of prescription, the
tribunal held that RCBCs claim is not time -barred, the claim properly falling under the contemplation of Sec. 5(g)
and not Sec. 5(h). As such, the tribunal concluded, RCBCs claim was filed within the three (3) year period under
Sec. 5(g) and that the six (6)-month period under Sec. 5(h) did not apply.The tribunal also exonerated RCBC from
laches, the latter having sought relief within the three (3)-year period prescribed in the SPA.

Notably, the tribunal considered the rescission of the SPA and ASPA as impracticable and "totally out of the
question." RCBC filed with the RTC a Motion to Confirm Partial Award. The RTC issued the first assailed order
confirming the Partial Award and denying the adverted separate motions to vacate and to suspend and inhibit.
From this order, petitioners sought reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the RTC.
SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. & MARLOWE NAVIGATION CO., INC.
G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a
POEA-approved Contract of Employment. On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained
to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of
US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the
end of April. However ,respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence,
petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May.

Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but
at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his
contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for
payment of his money claims. LA rendered the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question the finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to the
NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the
unexpired portion of their contracts.
Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in
Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject
clause. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:
Sec. 10.Money Claims
. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract
or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate
of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his
employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the
US$4,200.00awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23,
equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the
monthly rate of US$2,590.00
NASECO GUARDS ASSOCIATION-PEMA (NAGA-PEMA), Petitioner vs NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION
(NASECO), Respondent. G.R. No. 165442; August 25, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent National Service Corporation (NASECO) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the PNB organized under the
Corporation Code in 1975. It supplies security and manpower services to different clients such as the SEC, PDIC,
Food Terminal Incorporated, Forex Corporation and PNB. Petitioner NASECO Guards Association-PEMA (NAGA-
PEMA) is the collective bargaining representative of the regular rank and file security guards of
respondent. NASECO Employees Union-PEMA (NEMU-PEMA) is the collective bargaining representative of the
regular rank and file (non-security) employees of respondent such as messengers, janitors, typists, clerks and
radio-telephone operators.

On June 8, 1995, petitioner and respondent agreed to sign a CBA on non-economic terms. On September 24,
1996, petitioner filed a notice of strike because of respondents refusal to bargain for economic benefits in the
CBA. Following conciliation hearings, the parties again commenced CBA negotiations and started to resolve the
issues on wage increase, productivity bonus, incentive bonus, allowances, and other benefits but failed to reach an
agreement.

Meanwhile, respondent and NEMU-PEMA entered into a CBA on non-economic terms. Unfortunately, a dispute
among the leaders of NEMU-PEMA arose and at a certain point, leadership of the organization was
unclear. Hence, the negotiations concerning the economic terms of the CBA were put on hold until the internal
dispute could be resolved.

On April 29, 1997, petitioner filed a notice of strike before the NCMB against respondent and PNB due to a
bargaining deadlock. The following day, NEMU-PEMA likewise filed a notice of strike against respondent and PNB
on the ground of ULP. Efforts by the NCMB to conciliate failed. DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the
strike notices. DOLE Secretary issued a Resolution directing petitioner and respondent to execute a new CBA
incorporating therein his dispositions regarding benefits of the employees. The charge of ULP against respondent
and PNB was dismissed.

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA questioning the DOLE Secretarys order. CA partly granted
the petition and ruled that a recomputation and reevaluation of the benefits awarded was in order. Petitioner was
not in favor with the result of the recomputation. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

WON PNB, being the undisputed owner of and exercising control over respondent, should be made liable to pay
the CBA benefits awarded to the petitioner.
G.R. No. 159059 VICTORIA BUETA VDA. DE COMENDADOR, INREPRESENTATION OF DEMETRIO
T.COMENDADOR, Petitioner,vs. VISITACION C. BOMBASI AND CESAR C.BOMBASI, Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS OF THE CASE
Private Respondent Visitacions late mother Marciana V d a . D e C o r o n a d o ( V d a . D e C o r o n a d o )
a n d t h e Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna entered into a lease contract whereby the Municipality allowed the
use and enjoyment of property comprising of a lot and a store in favor of the respondents mother for twenty years,
extendible for another 20 years. The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build a
fire wall on her rented property which must be at least as high as the store; and in case of modification of the
p u b l i c m a r k e t , s h e o r h e r h e i r / s w o u l d b e g i v e n preferential rights. Visitacion took over the
store when her mother died Visitacion secured the yearly Mayors permits. A f i r e r a z e d t h e p u b l i c m a r k e t o f
N a g c a r l a n . U p o n Visitacions request for inspection, District Engineer G o r o s p e o f t h e t h e n
M i n i s t r y o f P u b l i c W o r k s a n d Highways, found that the store of Visitacion remained i n t a c t a n d s t o o d
strong. This finding of Engineer G o r o s p e w a s c o n t e s t e d b y t h e M u n i c i p a l i t y
o f Nagcarlan. The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan,
Laguna issuedResolution No. 183 authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish the store being occupied by
Visitacion usingl e g a l m e a n s . M a y o r C o m e n d a d o r r e l y i n g o n t h e strength of Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution Nos. 183and 156 authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and Angeles
supervising the work. Visitacion, filed with a case for damages before the R T C . S p o u s e s B o m b a s i ,
t h e r e a f t e r, f i l e d a c r i m i n a l complaint a g a i n s t M a y o r C o m e n d a d o r , A s i l o a n d Angeles for
violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman. S a n d i g a n b a y a n r e n d e r e d a d e c i s i o n , f i n d i n g
t h e accused Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Sec.3(e) of Republic Act. No. 3019. The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion for R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n
a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e d e a t h o f t h e l a t e Mayor had totally extinguished both his criminal and civil liability.
The Sandiganbayan granted the extinction of the criminal liability is concerned and denied the e x t i n c t i o n o f
t h e c i v i l l i a b i l i t y h o l d i n g t h a t t h e c i v i l action is an independent civil action. Hence, these Petitions for Review
on Certiorari.

ISSUE1.WON the accused is guilty of violating RA 3019 2 . W O N t h e a c t u a l d a m a g e s

p r a y e d f o r i s unconscionable
G.R. No. 177807/G.R. No. 177933 Case Digest

G.R. No. 177807/G.R. No. 177933, October 11, 2011

Emilio Gancayco
vs City Government of Quezon City and MMDA
Ponente: Sereno

Facts:

FACTS: The consolidated petitions of Retired Justice Emilio Gancayco, City Government of Quezon City and the
Metro Manila Development Authority stemmed from a local ordinance pertaining to Construction of Arcades, and
the clearing of Public Obstructions. Gaycanco owns a property, of which he was able to obtain a building permit for
a two-storey commercial building, which was situated along EDSA, in an area which was designated as part of a
Business/Commercial Zone by the Quezon City Council. The Quezon City Council also issued Ordinance No. 2904,
which orders the construction of Arcades for Commercial Buildings. The ordinance was amended to not require the
properties located at the Quezon City - San Juan boundary, and commercial buildings from Balete - Seattle Street
to construct the arcades, moreover, Gancayco had been successful in his petition to have his property, already
covered by the amended ordinance, exempted from the ordinance. MMDA on April 28, 2003, sent a notice to
Gancayco, under Ordinance no. 2904, part of his property had to be demolished, if he did not clear that part within
15 days, which Gancayco did not comply with, and so the MMDA had to demolish the party wall, or wing walls.
Gancayco then filed a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Quezon
City, seeking to prohibit the demolition of his property, without due process and just compensation, claiming that
Ordinance no. 2904 was discriminatory and selective. He sought the declaration of nullity of the ordinance and
payment for damages. MMDA contended that Gancayco cannot seek nullification of an ordinance that he already
violated, and that the ordinance had the presumption of constitutionality, and it was approved by the Quezon City
Council, taking to note that the Mayor signed the ordinance. The RTC, however, declared that the Ordinance was
unconstitutional, invalid and void ab initio. MMDA appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the CA partly granted the
appeal, with the contention that the ordinance was to be modified; it was constitutional because the intention of the
ordinance was to uplift the standard of living, and business in the commercial area, as well as to protect the welfare
of the general public passing by the area, however the injunction against the enforcement and implementation of
the ordinance is lifted. With that decision, the MMDA and Gancayco filed Motions for Reconsideration, which the CA
denied, as both parties have no new issues raised. Therefore they petitioned to the Court.
 ISSUES: Whether or not the wing wall of Gancaycos property can be constituted as a public nuisance. Whether or
not MMDA was in their authority to demolish Gancaycos property.

HELD: The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court decided that the wing wall of Gancaycos
building was not a nuisance per se, as under Art. 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, nuisance is defined as
any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures of endangers the
health or safety of the others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality; (4) obstruct or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5)
hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens. A
nuisance per se are those which affect the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated
under the undefined law of necessity. As Gaycanco was able to procure a building permit to construct the building, it
was implied that the city engineer did not consider the building as such of a public nuisance, or a threat to the
safety of persons and property. The MMDA was only to enforce Authoritative power on development of Metro
Manila, and was not supposed to act with Police Power as they were not given the authority to do such by the
constitution, nor was it expressed by the DPWH when the ordinance was enacted. Therefore, MMDA acted on its
own when it illegally demolished Gancaycos property, and was solely liable for the damage