ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent
[Focusing on the Civil Code of the Philippines]
FACTS

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed

a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8.
Petitioner alleged that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962, with
his name registered as Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio in his
certificate of live birth, and his sex registered as male.
He alleged that he was a male transsexual, that is, anatomically male
but feels, thinks, and acts as a female and that he had always
identified with girls since childhood. Upon feeling trapped in a mans
body, he ultimately contracted sex reassignment surgery, going so far
as to obtain a medical certificate attesting that he had undergone the
procedure, from a Filipino doctor named Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to
be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to
female.
During the scheduled initial hearing in the Regional Trial Court,
petitioner testified for himself and presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz Jr. and his
American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner.
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines, thru the OSG, filed
a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is
no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason
of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in
favor of the Republic, ruling that the trial courts decision lacked legal
basis. The Court of Appeals granted the Republics petition and set
aside the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not sex reassignment surgery is a legal basis in order to have a
change of first name and change of sex in a persons birth records.
RULING
The petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals to disallow
Silverio the change of name and sex stands. The original ruling by the trial
court stays reversed and set aside. A change of name is considered a
privilege, not a right, and is governed by statutes. Article 376 of the Civil
Code provides: No person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority. It was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law), allowing that No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname and likewise provides the grounds for which the change of first
name be allowed. The petitioners basis for the change of his first name is his
sex reassignment surgery, not clerical or typographical error, and which is
also not amongst the given grounds. Furthermore, rather than avoiding
confusion, changing the petitioners name for his declared purpose may only
create grave complications in the civil registry and public interest. Petitioner
also failed to show or even allege any prejudice that he might suffer as
consequence of using his true first name. Furthermore, the acts, events, or
factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code do not include
sex reassignment surgery as a ground for correction of his first name and
cannot be interpreted to do so. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides, All
other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed
by special laws, but there is no special law pertaining to sex reassignment
and its effects. Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law)
states that a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth, thus including the sex of a person. The determination of
a persons sex upon birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. The
changes sought by petitioner would not cause no harm, injury, or prejudice
to anyone contrary to what the trial court had held. It was petitioners first
step to marrying his male fianc, going against the definition of marriage
(permanent union between a man and a woman), an essential requisite of
marriage (legal capacity of contracting parties who must be a male and a
female). Allowing for the petition will cause a great alteration of the laws of
marriage and also that of public policy, such as certain provisions in the
Labor Code, survivorship, certain felonies, among others. While Article 9 of
the Civil Code mandates that no judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the law, it is
not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation, only in the
interpretation of laws.