You are on page 1of 4

Mallilin vs.

Castillo

FACTS:

Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married and with
children but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective
marriages still subsist. They established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation
during their union of which petitioner was the President and Chairman and respondent as
Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise acquired real and personal properties which
were registered solely in respondents name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the couple
separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his share from respondent in the subject
properties but the latter refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in
her name. Furthermore, respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and
wife because they were still legally married at the time of cohabitation.

Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a
motion for summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and granted the latter.

ISSUE: WON petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties registered under
the name of the respondent considering they both have subsisting relationship when they
started living together.

HELD:

The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to marry each
other and were living together could not have owned properties in common. Under Article
148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them
through their joint contribution, property or industry, shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed
to be equal. Hence, there is co-ownership even though the couples in union are not
capacitated to marry each other.

Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioners complaint for partition on grounds of due


process and equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied.
Such dismissal is unjustified since both ends may be served by simply excluding from the
action for partition the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa
Castillo, not parties in the case.

The case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings.

Valdes vs. RTC

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their
mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their
mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered
as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family.

Agapay vs. Palang

FACTS:

Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in
Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950.
The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in
Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed
alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.

The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay,
herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land
located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise
purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of
compromise agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels
of land to their child Herminia.

Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were
convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and
her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages
against petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at
Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower
court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of
Erlinda Agapay.

HELD:

The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda.
However, their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the
properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by
them in proportion to their respective contributions. It is required that there be an actual
contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.

Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell
and had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually
contributed money to but the subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only
around 20 years old compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of
the US Government. Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have
contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-
ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA,
revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.

It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property
in favor of Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not
take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express
stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was
not specifically for separation of property and should not be so inferred.

With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of
conveyance for the property revealed the falshood of Erlindas claim that she bought such
property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided
the money for the purchase price and directed Erlindas name alone be placed as the
vendee.

The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly
void and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the
Family Code, expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better
than those in legal union.

Tumlos vs Fernandez

FACTS:

Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against
Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are
the absolute owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the
Tumlos to occupy the apartment for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was
agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay
1,000 a month which was not complied with. Demand was made several times for the
defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for the construction of
a new building.

Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that
they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they
lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and
that Gullerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she
discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage.

ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.

HELD:

SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property. The
claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence
presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having
cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two children were true, the claim of co-
ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma
and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. The property relation governing their
supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is
required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisitions
of common property by one who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not
included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven then there can be no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal shares.

You might also like