RA 6085 - AN ACT AMENDING COMMONWEALTH ACT 142 REGULATING

THE USE OF ALIASES

Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment
purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no
person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office
of the local civil registry, or with which he was baptized for the first time, or, in case of an alien,
with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as
may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons, whose births have not
been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the
approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The
name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like
those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name, and no person shall be
allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set
forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if
different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than
his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the use of the desired alias. The
judicial authority for the use of alias the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be
recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other, than
his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.

Sec. 3. No person having been baptized with a name different from that with which he was
registered at birth in the local civil registry, or in case of an alien, registered in the bureau of
immigration upon entry, or any person who obtained judicial authority to use an alias, or who uses
a pseudonym, shall represent himself in any public or private transaction or shall sign or execute
any public or private document without stating or affixing his real or original name and all names
or aliases or pseudonym he is or may have been authorized to use.

Sec. 4. Six months from the approval of this act and subject to the provisions of section 1 hereof,
all persons who have used any name and/or names and alias or aliases different from those
authorized in section one of this act and duly recorded in the local civil registry, shall be prohibited
to use such other name or names and/or alias or aliases.

RA 9255 - AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE

SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE OF EO
209, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

SECTION. 1. Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of
the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument
is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate
child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child."

FC 176
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate
child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all
other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a)

(1) CHANGE OF NAME, WANG

GR No. 159966_March 30, 2005

SUMMARY:
Petition for review on certiorari. Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother
Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/or
correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner
sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang to Julian Lin Wang.

PARTIES:
Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang aka Julian Lin Wang, duly represented by his mother
Anna Lisa Wang

Respondent Cebu City Civil Registrar, duly represented by the Registrar Oscar B. Molo

FACTS:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were
then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married they executed a
deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. However, Julians parents plan to stay let him study there together
with his sister Wang Mei Jasmine. Because Singapores practices are different whereby mothers
maiden surnames are not carried in a persons name, the parents anticipate that Julian will be
discriminated. It is for this reason that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be
changed to Julian Lin Wang.

RTC denied the petition. The reason given that he may be discriminated did not fall within the
grounds recognized by law. RTC ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the
child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the
convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the
right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should
now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor; that Julian can decide
whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name when he reach the age of majority.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. RTC ruled that the Singaporean
practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a
legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there. The dropping of the middle name would be
tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of
Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of name would not prejudice public interest
or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not suffice to grant the petition if the reason for
the change of name is itself not reasonable. Hence this petition.

Petitioners contentions are:

- that the trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Court,
that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Art. 174 of the FC
- that with globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on
the matter of dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for
consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the best interest of the
child
- that convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the name as long as it will not
prejudice the State and others
- that the middle name Carulasan will cause him undue embarrassment and the difficulty in
writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the
Singaporean community

Court required the OSG to comment on this petition and OSG stated that trial court correctly
denied the petition for change of name. It argued that:
- under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames
of their father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping
the same
- that there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name Carulasan is in the best
interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for change
of name and/or cancellation of entry
- that petitioner has not shown any compelling reason to justify the change of name or the
dropping of the middle name, for that matter
- that there is no confusion with sisters name since thy both use their fathers surname Wang
- even assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also not been
shown that the use of such middle name is actually proscribed by Singaporean law

ISSUE/S:
WON dropping the middle name of the a minor child is contrary to law (FC 174). NO IT IS
NOT CONTRARY TO LAW

RULING:
SC affirms the decision of the trial court. Petition denied.

RATIO:
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can
be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he
must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change.
Otherwise, the request should be denied.

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause
for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not
only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest

Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. The
Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes
their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only
a given name and his mothers surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate
child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a
public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his
middle name and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child
or an acknowledged illegitimate child.

Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the
middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and
recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.

Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name against the standards set
in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his justification is amorphous, to
say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on his petition. How such change of name
would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly
established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does
not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
 (2) GONZALUDO V. PEOPLE
GR No. 150910_February 6, 2006

PARTIES:
Petitioner Bienvenido Gonzaludo, relatives with Gregg and Melba Canlas who bought the
house from a certain Rosemarie Gelogo the mistress of Ulysses Villaflor (+) named; Gonzaludo
Respondent - People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Ulysses Villaflor married Anita Manlangit and they lived with his mother Anastacia Tobongbanua
in Bacolod City. Ulysses left for Pagadian City for work and later on Anita also left for Samar
also for work. When Ulysses returned to Bacolod, he bought a house and subsequently lived with
his mistress Rosemarie Gelogo. When Ulysses died, Rosemarie initially sold the house to the
petitioner Gonzaludo but since he did not have the money, he convinced his relatives spouses Greg
and Melba Canlas to buy the house, which they did. A Deed of Sale was executed whereby
Rosemarie signed as Rosemarie G. Villaflor and represented herself to be the lawful owner of the
subject house. The sale was witnessed by Gonzaludo.

Later, upon complaint of Ulyssess widow Anita Manlangit, an Information was filed with the
RTC charging Rosemarie Gelogo, alias Rosemarie Villaflor, the spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba
Canlas and petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document allegedly
committed. That Sps. Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas who despite of their knowledge that such
house was not owned by Rosemarie Gelogo bought the same from her in the amount of P80,000.00
and, herein accused Bienvenido Gonzaludo alias Ben, despite of his knowledge that such house
was not owned by Rosemarie Gelogo, participated in the commission of the herein offense by
causing his name and signature to be affixed in the said Deed of Sale as witness to the fraudulent
sale entered into by the parties. Rosemarie Gelogo remained at large, only the spouses Gregg
Canlas and Melba Canlas and herein petitioner were arraigned.

RTC acquitted the Canlas spouses but convicted petitioner of the complex crime of Estafa Thru
Falsification of Public Document. Petitioner went to CA via ordinary appeal but was dismissed
for lack of merit and affirmed RTCs judgment of conviction. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but same was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE/S:
That the CA erred when it x x x grossly misappreciated the facts and misapplied the law and
jurisprudence concerning the status of the house subject of this case as to whether the same is
totally a conjugal property of Ulysses and Anita or the house wholly or substantially belongs to
Rosemarie Gelogo a.k.a. Rosemarie G. Villaflor.

Petition is partly impressed with merit.

RULING:
CAs decision modified. Petitioner is acquitted of the complex crime of Estafa through
Falsification of Public Document, but found GUILTY of the crime of Falsification of Public
Document and is accordingly imposed an indeterminate sentence of 4 months and 1 day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as maximum, and to
pay a fine of P5,000.00.

RATIO:
It is worthy to note that petitioner was convicted by the trial court of the complex crime charged
in the Information for allegedly having conspired with Rosemarie Gelogo, who used the fictitious
surname Villaflor for the purpose of giving her a semblance of authority to sell the house
purportedly owned by her paramour, Ulysses Villaflor, who was legally married to private
complainant, Anita Villaflor.

It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish Rosemarie Gelogos criminal liability for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document, and thereafter, establish by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that herein petitioner conspired with Rosemarie in the commission of the
same complex crime. In other words, if Rosemarie cannot be held liable for the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document under the Information filed in this case, with all
the more reason should it be for petitioner, as alleged co-conspirator.
For an accused to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
document, all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document must
exist.

To secure conviction for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the
Court has time and again ruled that the following requisites must concur:

(1) that the accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;

(2) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneous with
the commission of the fraud;
(3) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations constitute the very cause which induced
the offended party to part with his money or property; and
(4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage

There is no question that the first, second and fourth elements are present: there was false or
fraudulent misrepresentation by Rosemarie Gelogo when she used the fictitious surname
Villaflor; the misrepresentation or false pretense was made prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of the fraud; and private complainant Anita Manlangits right to the subject 2-storey
house was lost or at the very least prejudiced when Rosemarie sold it to the Canlases.

We find no cogent reason to depart from the settled principle that the deceit, which must be prior
to or simultaneously committed with the act of defraudation, must be the efficient cause or primary
consideration which induced the offended party to part with his money or property and rule
differently in the present case.
While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in this case, when she
used the surname Villaflor to give her semblance of authority to sell the subject 2-storey house,
such fraud or deceit was employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones who money when
they bought the house. However, the Information charging Rosemarie of estafa in the present case,
alleged damage or injury not upon the Canlas spouses, but upon private complainant, Anita
Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not the efficient cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit
to part with her property in this case, Rosemarie cannot be held liable for estafa. With all the more
reason must this be for herein petitioner.

However, Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any private individual who shall commit
any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 in any public or official document or
letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document. In turn, Article 171 of the same
Code provides:

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner conspired with Rosemarie to falsify, that is, by
making untruthful statement in the narration of facts in the deed of sale, by declaring Rosemarie
to be the owner of the house subject of such sale and signing as Rosemarie Villaflor instead of
her real name, Rosemarie Gelogo, in order to sell the same to the Canlas spouses. It is established
by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that Rosemarie committed the crime of falsification of public
document. Likewise, proof beyond reasonable doubt has been duly adduced to establish conspiracy
between Rosemarie and petitioner who is the brother-in-law of Melba Canlas, one of the buyers of
the house in this case.

(3) DAPAR V. BIASCAN

439 SCRA 179

PARTIES:
Petitioner Zenaida F. Dapar alias Zenaida D. Biascan, the mistress of Mario Biscay
Respondents Gloria Lozano Biascan (legal wife) and Mario Biascan (husband)

FACTS:
Gloria and Mario were married in 1966 through civil rights and thereafter blesses with 4 children.
Mario worked as an electrician in Saudi Arabia wherein which he met the petitioner Zenaida
Dapar. They had an intimate relationship which resulted to Marios failure to give support to his
family.
Zenaida returned to the Philippines and was joined by Mario. They opened a joint account in PNB.
Mario went back to Saudi Arabia while Zenaida stayed in the Philippines. Mario remitted his
earning to Zenaida through their PNB account one in which other relatives of Zenaida remitted
money to her through the same account.

After sometime, a contract to sell was executed by and between State Land Investment
Corporation, on the one hand, and Sps. Mario M. Biascan & Zenaida D. Biascan", over a parcel
of land in Novaliches. A Deed of Sale was executed in favor of the Sps. Mario M. Biascan &
Zenaida D. Biascan.
After a few years Gloria L. Biascan filed a complaint against Zenaida for annulment of title,
reconveyance, and damages in the RTC of Caloocan City and alleged that:
- TCT issued to Sps. Mario M. Biascan & Zenaida D. Biascan was done through the fraudulent
misrepresentation of defendant that she is the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan;
- The defendants use of the surname Biascan is a usurpation of surname under Article 377 of
the New Civil Code of the Philippines, and as such, plaintiff, who is the legal wife of Mario M.
Biascan, is entitled to recover damages from defendant
- By reason of defendants illegal acts in causing the inclusion of her name in the aforesaid
transfer certificate of title and tax declaration, plaintiff, the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan, is
unduly deprived of her right over the property covered by said title and declaration, and to
vindicate such right, she is constrained to institute the instant action and retain the services of
counsel to which she has agreed to pay a certain sum of money

Zenaida filed a motion to dimiss and instituted an action for partition and alleged that she instituted
an action for the enforcement of the Amicable Settlement made before the barangay, before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City for the recovery of personal properties.

RTC ruled that Zenaida was a co-owner of the subject lot. Subsequently, Zenaida claimed that
Mario filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was dismissed on the ground
that the decision rendered by the RTC had long since become final and executory; thus, based on
the doctrine of res judicata, her ownership of the one- half portion of the lot could no longer be
questioned.

RTC denied the motion to dismiss. In her answer, Zenaida alleged that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case, as the cause of action therein was barred by prior judgment. After the
parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, Gloria filed an amended complaint, impleading
her husband Mario as party-defendant. There after RTC issued writ of preliminary injunction
restraining and enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution. After trial, court ruled in favor
of Zenaida and dismissed the complaint. The trial court ruled that the law on co-ownership
governed the property relations of Mario and Zenaida, who were living in an adulterous
relationship or in a state of concubinage at the time the house and lot in question was acquired.
The trial court further explained that under Article 148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money shall be owned in common in
proportion to their respective contributions, and in the event that the amount of such contributions
could not be determined, as in the present case, they shall be presumed to be equal. The trial court
concluded that the shares of Mario and Zenaida as described in TCT No. 207197 was in accordance
with the sharing prescribed in Article 148. As such, there was no legal basis to order the
reconveyance of the one-half share of the petitioner in favor of Gloria Biascan.

On appeal, however, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled in favor
of Gloria and Zenaidas motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE/S:
WON Gloria Biascan is entitled for claim for damages for the petitioners alleged usurpation of
her husbands name. NO. Gloria Biscay is not entitled to an award therefor.
RULING:
Petition is GRANTED. Decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of
respondent Glora Biscay is DISMISSED on the ground of res judicata. Counterclaims of the
petitioner against the respondent Gloria Biascan are DIMISSED.

RATIO:
The The usurpation of name under Article 377 of the Civil Code implies some injury to the
interests of the owner of the name. It consists in the possibility of confusion of identity between
the owner and the usurper, and exists when a person designates himself by another name. The
elements are as follows: (1) there is an actual use of anothers name by the defendant; (2) the use
is unauthorized; and (3) the use of anothers name is to designate personality or identify a person.
None of the foregoing exist in the case at bar. Respondent Gloria Biascan did not claim that the
petitioner ever attempted to impersonate her. In fact, the trial court found that respondent Mario
Biascan allowed the petitioner to use his surname.

The mere use of a surname cannot be enjoined; it is the use thereof coupled with the representation
that one is the lawful wife, or the usurpation of the wifes status, which gives rise to an action for
damages.

NCC
Art. 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and
without leaving an agent to administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party,
a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary.
This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by the
absentee has expired. (181a)
Art. 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article having been made, the judge shall
take the necessary measures to safeguard the rights and interests of the absentee and shall specify
the powers, obligations and remuneration of his representative, regulating them, according to the
circumstances, by the rules concerning guardians. (182)
Art. 383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse present shall be preferred when there
is no legal separation.
Art. 384. Two years having elapsed without any news about the absentee or since the receipt of
the last news, and five years in case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration
of his property, his absence may be declared. (184)
Art. 385. The following may ask for the declaration of absence:
(1) The spouse present;
(2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy of the same;
(3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy;
(4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the condition
of his death. (185)
Art. 386. The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until six months after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Art. 387. An administrator of the absentee's property shall be appointed in accordance with Article
383. (187a)
Art. 388. The wife who is appointed as an administratrix of the husband's property cannot alienate
or encumber the husband's property, or that of the conjugal partnership, without judicial authority.
(188a)
Art. 389. The administration shall cease in any of the following cases:
(1) When the absentee appears personally or by means of an agent;
(2) When the death of the absentee is proved and his testate or intestate heirs appear;
(3) When a third person appears, showing by a proper document that he has acquired the absentee's
property by purchase or other title.
In these cases the administrator shall cease in the performance of his office, and the property shall
be at the disposal of those who may have a right thereto.
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives,
he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years
shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. (n)
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who
has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not
been known for four years. (n)
Art. 392. If the absentee appears, or without appearing his existence is proved, he shall recover his
property in the condition in which it may be found, and the price of any property that may have
been alienated or the property acquired therewith; but he cannot claim either fruits or rents. (194)
 Art. 393. Whoever claims a right pertaining to a person whose existence is not recognized must
prove that he was living at the time his existence was necessary in order to acquire said right. (195)
Art. 394. Without prejudice to the provision of the preceding article, upon the opening of a
succession to which an absentee is called, his share shall accrue to his co-heirs, unless he has heirs,
assigns, or a representative. They shall all, as the case may be, make an inventory of the property.
(196a)
Art. 395. The provisions of the preceding article are understood to be without prejudice to the
action of petition for inheritance or other rights which are vested in the absentee, his representatives
or successors in interest. These rights shall not be extinguished save by lapse of time fixed for
prescription. In the record that is made in the Registry of the real estate which accrues to the
coheirs, the circumstance of its being subject to the provisions of this article shall be stated. (197)
Art. 396. Those who may have entered upon the inheritance shall appropriate the fruits received
in good faith so long as the absentee does not appear, or while his representatives or successors in
interest do not bring the proper actions. (198)
FC
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors.
Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her
obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial
separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community,
subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or
property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling
without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three
months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling.
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
(4)Easter Shipping V Lucero
PARTIES:
Petitioner: Eastern Shipping Lines Company where the deceased husband of the respondet
worked for.
Respondent: Josephine Lucero Claiming for death benefits from the Petitioner.

MATERIAL FACTS: Capt Julio Lucero is an employee of the petitioner Eastern Shipping and
was assigned as the caption of one of its ship, along with allowance and benefits.

In their contract, Capt. Julios employment is only valid for one trip and would end the moment
the ship arrives to its destination (Manila.)

However, on the way to the destinations, the ship encountered problems, which resulted into the
deaths of the crew including Capt. Julio.
The company then paid the death benefits of the crews heirs, except Capt. Julios wife, Josephine,
the respondent in this case, who refused the offered payment.

Respondent then filed a complaint at the National Seamen Board for the monthly accrued payment,
which the petitioner had stopped paying, but petitioner contends that respondent is no longer
entitled to such as it already paid the said benefits to the heirs.

However, the board sided with the respondent saying that the presumptive death of Capt. Lucero
could not be applied as Art. 391 of the Civil Code provide that it has a 4-year period.

It was appealed at the NLRC, but NLRC affirmed the boards decision.

ISSUE: WON presumption of death can be invoked.

HELD: No, SC declared that it was sufficiently established that Capt. Lucero perished with the
ship. NLRC ruling reversed and set aside.

LAWS INVOLVED: NCC 391, FC 41

RATIO: It is undisputed that on February 16, 1980, the Company received three (3) radio
messages from Capt. Lucero on board the M/V Eastern Minicon the last of which, received at 9:50
p.m. of that day, was a call for immediate assistance in view of the existing "danger": "sea water
was entering the hatch"; the vessel "was listing 50 to 60 degrees port," and they were "preparing
to abandon the ship any time.' After this message, nothing more has been heard from the vessel or
its crew until the present time.

There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and disappearance of
the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically. are sufficient to lead
Us to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it.
upon this premise, the rule on presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code
must yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence.

(5)Republic V Granada
PARTIES:
Petitioner: Republic of The Philippines contending the respondents request of presumptive
death of her missing husband.
Respondent: Yolanda Granada petitioned for his missing husband to be declared DEAD.

MATERIAL FACTS: Respondent Yolanda Granada met Cyrus Granada while both of them
worked for the Sumida Electric in Paranaque.

The two later got married in a civil ceremony in Manila, which resulted into a son named Cyborg.
Sumida Electric closed thereafter, which led to Cyrus to leave for Taiwan to work, but never to
return again. According to the respondent, after 9 years of waiting, she then filed a petition for the
presumptive death of Cyrus at the Muntinlupa RTC, which it granted.

However, the OSG contends that respondent Yolanda did not made efforts in locating her missing
husband, but the RTC denied the petition. The OSG then raised it to the CA, but the respondent
filed a motion to dismiss, which the CA granted, hence this petition at the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred when it affirmed the ruling of RTC of declaring the presumptive
death of Yolandas husband

HELD: No, because the petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summery judicial
proceeding, hence FINAL AND EXECUTORY and not subject to an appeal.

LAWS INVOLVED: FC 41

RATIO: The Republics arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the
Petition.

The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her well-founded belief that
her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively
dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, [n]othing is more settled
in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.

(6)Barretto vs Local Civil Registrar

PARTIES:
Petitioner Domingo Barretto: claiming that he is Rosario Baretto
Respondent Local Civil Registrar
FACTS: According to Register in the record of births of the civil register of Manila, a female
child named Rosario Barreto was born on June 29, 1944 to the spouses Faustino Barreto and King
Lian, both natives of Amoy, China On the other hand, according to the record of baptisms of the
Parroquia de Chinos in Manila, a child born on June 29, 1944 to the spouses Faustino Sy Barretto
and Diana King Luan Ty was baptized on May 21, 1950. The name of the baptized child is
Domingo Sy Barretto. Domingo Barretto requested the local civil registrar of Manila to issue a
certified copy of his birth record which he needed in connection with his application for a marriage
license. He discovered that his name in the record of birth is Rosario, a female. Because of that
discrepancy, he was not able to secure a license. He filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila
a petition for the correction of the alleged erroneous entries in his birth record regarding his name
and sex but the petition was dismissed. Domingo Barretto filed a second petition for correction in
the same court. On December 21, 1967 he amended his petition by limiting it to the correction of
the entry in his birth record as to his sex. The Solicitor General filed motions to dismiss the original
and amended petitions. Domingo Barretto testified that he is the same person known as Rosario
Barretto in the birth certificate, he presented the marriage contract of his parents, he said that he
has always been known at home and in the neighborhood as Domingo and presented his mother
and neighbor to testify that he is indeed known as Domingo Barretto. The trial court granted the
amended petition. It reasoned out that the error sought to be corrected was "merely typographical
or clerical, and not controversial". It observed that there was an erroneous entry as to petitioner's
sex because "the name Rosario is commonly used for both male and female persons. In this appeal,
the Solicitor General contends that the trial court erred in characterizing the writing of the word
"female" in the record of birth of Rosario Barreto as a clerical error. The OSG argues that the
change of the sex in that birth record is a substantial alteration. He surmises that petitioner
Domingo Barretto's motive in filing the petition for correction is to strengthen his claim that he is
a native-born Chinese as stated in his certificate of residence. According to the Solicitor General,
there is no record in the civil registry of Manila that Domingo Barretto was born in this country.
The record of birth refers to Rosario Barreto. The Solicitor General observes that official records
should not be altered if in doing so there is danger that the Government would become a party to
a scheme to circumvent the laws regarding the residence of aliens in this country
ISSUE: Whether the supposed erroneous entry as to the sex of Rosario Barreto, as indicated in the
birth record, is a clerical error that may be changed by means of a petition for correction filed by
one Domingo Barretto?
HELD: No. Lower Courts order is reversed and set aside.

RATIO: We hold that the petition for correction is not warranted because under the facts of this
case the alleged error is not clerical in nature. If the name in the record of birth were Domingo
Barretto and his sex was indicated therein as female, it might be argued that the error would be
clerical. But that is not the fact in this case. The situation is more complicated. A person named
Domingo Barretto claims that he is Rosario Barreto and that the word "female" in the latter's birth
record is a mistake It is settled that the summary procedure for correction of entries in the civil
registry under article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined to
"innocuous or clerical errors, such as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes
or obvious to the understanding" or corrections that are not controversial and are supported by
indubitable evidence. A clerical error "is one made by a clerk in transcribing or otherwise, and, of
course, must be apparent on the face of the record, and capable of being corrected by reference to
the record only" The alleged error in this case cannot be corrected by reference to the record. There
is a need to determine whether Rosario Barreto and Domingo Barretto are one and the same person
and to ascertain why Domingo was registered in the record of birth as Rosario. The petition
involves a controversial matter. Petitioner's evidence is not indubitable.
 (7)Labayo-Rowe v. Republic

PARTIES:

Petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe: petition for the correction of entries in the civil registry for
change of name and civil status

Respondent Republic of the Philippines

FACTS: On November 18, 1970, Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe, filed through counsel a petition for
the correction of entries in the civil registry with the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga. She
asked the court to order the Local Civil Registrar of San Fernando, Pampanga to correct the entries
in the birth certificates of her children Vicente L. Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat especially with
regard to petitioner's name which appears in both certificates as "Beatriz Labayo/Labayu" and as
regards her civil status and date of marriage which appears in the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat
as "married" with the year appearing "1953 Bulan. Judge Malcolm Sarmiento, finding the petition
to be sufficient in form and substance, granted the petition and set the case for hearing on January
20, 1971. The Republic was represented by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose R. Paras who appeared
for the Solicitor General. At the hearing, petitioner testified that her nickname is Beatriz and
Emperatriz J. Labayo is her real name; that the entry in Victoria Miclat's birth certificate stating
her civil status as "married" is not correct because she was never married to Vicente Miclat, the
father of her child; that the date and place of marriage appearing in the said birth certificate as
1953-Bulan is not true as they were never married; that the questioned entries were reported by
Vicente Miclat; and that she is at present married to an American by the name of William Rowe.
Finding merit in the petition, the presiding judge issued an order dated January 25, 1971 directing
the local civil registrar of San Fernando, Pampanga to correct the entries and to change the name
of the mother appearing as Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo. The court also directed the civil
registrar to correct the name of the mother appearing as Beatriz V. Labayu/Beatriz to Emperatriz
Labayo, her civil status from "married" to "single" and the date and place of marriage from "1953-
Bulan" to "No marriage." On February 19, 1971, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed
a notice of appeal together with the record on appeal, praying that the same be approved and
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. There being no objection interposed and since the record on
appeal was filed within the reglementary period, the same was approved and directed to be
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. In its appeal, the Republic questions the propriety of the lower
court's order to correct the civil status and the date and place of marriage of the petitioner below
as appearing in the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat. Republic prays for the reversal of the order
of the lower court. It likewise prayed that the appeal be elevated to the SC as it involves a pure
question of law.
ISSUE: Whether the correction of entries in the civil registry involving the correct spelling of the
surname as well as the civil status of the mother at the time of the birth of her child are considered
as clerical errors which might be corrected through judicial sanction?
HELD: No. Order appealed from is MODIFIED by nullifying the portion which directs the change
of petitioner's civil status as well as the filiation of the child Victoria Miclat.
RATIO: If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to
the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order
for the correction of the mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the
civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial
alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the
nature of the issues involved. This opinion is predicated upon the theory that the procedure
contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature which does not cover cases involving
controversial issues. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial
in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues
in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the
contrary admitted. The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the books making
up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein contained. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere
summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected
by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open,
the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. The right of the child Victoria to
inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment
resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that the
notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108,
like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant
to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution which directs
that such rules "shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights." If Rule 108 were to be
extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the
eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations
concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without
observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an
unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify substantive rights. This situation
is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code.
(8)REP. VS. CAGANDAHAN, G.R. NO. 166676, SEPT. 12,

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the RTCranch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff
Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering
from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons
possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male
characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate
evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by
Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that Cagandahan is genetically female but because
her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of
both male and female. The lower court decided in her favor but the OSG appealed before the SC
invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said
petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE: Is the change of sex or gender and name of respondent valid?

HELD: YES. The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally
defective because it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim
any interest therein is not without merit.

The Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a persons sex
appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care
in view of the delicate facts present in this case.

The Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term intersexuality which is the condition
or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. Intersexuality applies to human beings who
cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic
species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined
to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have
biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal
of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright denial.

The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male
or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally
negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law and
the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence points that respondent
is male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate
entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex
the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in
cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity
that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court will not consider respondent as
having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither
will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold
of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is
the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit
of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of
action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of
evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under
the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal
judgment of being a male.
 (9) BRAZA V THE REGISTRAR, G.R. NO. 181174, DECEMBER 4, 2009

PETITIONER: Cristina Braza, first wife of Pablo Braza, assailing the filiation and marriage of the
Titulars
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS: Patrick Titular (son of Pablo) and Lucille Titular (alleged second
wife of Pablo)

FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres Braza is the wife of Pablo Sicad Braza Jr., the latter died in
a vehicular accident in Indonesia. During the wake following the repatriation of his (Pablos) remains
in the Philippines, Respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and
introduced themselves as the wife and son respectively, of the deceased. Petitioner Cristina made
inquiries and in the course of which she obtained Patrick Alvins birth certificate from the Local
Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which had states that Pablo S. Braza is the father of Patrick
Alvin and the latter was acknowledged by the father. It also stated that Patrick Alvin was legitimated
by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents. Therefore, his name is changed to Patrick Alvin
Titular Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing Pablo and Lucille
were married.

Cristina and her co-petitioner filed before the RTC of Negros a petition to correct the entries in the
birth certificate record of Patrick in the Local Civil Registry. They contended that Patrick could not
have been legitimated by the supposed subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said
marriage is bigamous on account of a valid and subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo.
Petitioner prayed for the: 1) correction of the entries in Patricks birth record with respect to his
legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment and the use of the last name BRAZA,
2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick,
to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation, 3) the declaration of nullity
of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of
the marriage between Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

RTC dismissed the petition without prejudice, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of
entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected
to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action. MR was
also denied.

ISSUE: Can the court pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on filiation even in an action
to correct entries in the civil registrar?

RATIO: NO. Petition is dismissed. Petition to correct the entries (Rule 108) is a wrong remedy in
this case because the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and
filiation.

The allegations of the petition filed before the RTC clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the
marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patricks filiation
in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which
an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated may
generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors
in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding;
an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such
as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all
interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.

In the case at bar, the petitioners cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and
Lucilles marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which causes of
action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March
15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as
expressly provided in said Code.

It is well settled doctrine that validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral
attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

DALE

Republic v Sagun
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Nora Sagun

Facts:
Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a
Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married
to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said
document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was
denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate
that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her
election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be
ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate.
In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a Filipino, speaks Ilocano and Tagalog
fluently and attended local schools in Baguio City, including Holy Family Academy and the Saint
Louis University. Respondent claimed that despite her part-Chinese ancestry, she always thought
of herself as a Filipino. She is a registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A.
Roxas in Baguio City and had voted in local and national elections as shown in the Voter
Certification issued by Atty. Maribelle Uminga of the Commission on Elections of Baguio City.
She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship
and such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a
Philippine passport.
On August 7, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as counsel
for the Republic of the Philippines and authorized the City Prosecutor of Baguio City to appear in
the case. However, no comment was filed by the City Prosecutor.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April 3, 2009 granting
the petition and declaring respondent a Filipino citizen.
Contending that the lower court erred in so ruling, petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the
instant recourse via a petition for review on certiorari.

Issues:
1. W/N respondents petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is sanctioned
by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence
2. W/N respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law.
Held: Petition in favor of Republic. Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly
failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine
citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically
lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of
suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing
exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence,
respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her
Philippine citizenship when clearly, she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we
held in Ching, the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious
and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to
comply with the foregoing requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be denied.
UNITED ABANGAN CLAN V SABELLANO
Petitioner: United Abangan Clan
Respondent: Yolanda Sabellano

Facts:
Anastacia and Raymundo allegedly got married on February 18 1873 at the Santo Tomas de
Villanueva Parish in El Pardo, Cebu City. A delayed registration of the marriage was entered in
the records of the Civil Registrar, and a Certificate of Marriage issued sometime in September
2007 or 134 years after their purported matrimonial bond. The petition for late registration was
filed by Rolando Cabellon, Edith T. Casas, and Imelda T. Casugay, who were allegedly the true
legal heirs and descendants of Anastacia and Raymundo. On 19 May 2008, the United Abangan
Clan filed a Petition seeking the cancellation of the entry in the Register of Marriages. It averred
that Anastacia died single and without issue. It then posited that the claimed marriage could not be
registered under Act No. 3753, because it had ostensibly taken place before 27 February 1931,
which was the date of effectivity of the law. Furthermore, petitioner contended that it was not
Anastacia and Raymundo who had filed the application for the late registration of their marriage,
and that there was failure to show cause for the delay in registration.
On the other hand, respondents argued that petitioner was engaged in forum shopping, since the
fact of marriage between Anastacia and Raymundo was an important issue to be resolved in
another case. Docketed as SP. PROC. No. 16171-CEB, the case involved a petition for the judicial
declaration of the heirs of decedent Anastacia (first petition). They next asserted that the United
Abangan Clan was estopped from questioning the late registration of the marriage, which
petitioner had failed to contest after the publication of the Notice of Delayed Registration. They
then averred that it failed to exhaust administrative remedies, as it did not appeal the decision of
the Civil Registrar to a higher office. Finally, they claimed that the marriage of Anastacia and
Raymundo had been established by means of an ancient document found in the church records of
the Santo Tomas de Villanueva Parish.
On 6 February 2009, the RTC issued a Resolution dismissing the Petition for cancellation of the
entry in the Register of Marriages (second petition) on the ground of litis pendentia. According to
the trial court, the first and second petition, which were both initiated by petitioner, involved the
same parties and concerned the same issues and reliefs prayed for. The trial court explained that
any decision on the first petition would necessarily constitute res judicata in the present case, since
the ultimate purpose of the second petition was to assert heirship and the right of succession over
the inheritance left by Anastacia. Finally, the RTC declared that the present petition was still
premature, because petitioner should have first brought the issue to the attention of the Civil
Registrar pursuant to the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction.
Issue: W/N the instant petition was properly dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia.
Held: Petition is granted.
There is no identity and similarity between the first and the second petitions with respect to the
issues under litigation. The action in the prior Petition (SP. PROC. No. 16171-CEB) involves a
judicial declaration of heirship, while the main issue in the present one (SP. PROC. No. 16180-
CEB) pertains to a cancellation of entry in the civil register. An action for declaration of heirship
(declaracion de herederos) refers to a special proceeding in which a person claiming the status of
heir seeks prior judicial declaration of his or her right to inherit from a decedent. On the other
hand, an action for cancellation of entry in the civil register refers to a special proceeding whereby
a substantial change affecting the civil status of a party is sought through the amendment of the
entry in the civil register. In the former, what is established is a partys right of succession to the
decedent; in the latter, among those settled are the issues of nationality, paternity, filiation,
legitimacy of the marital status, and registrability of an event affecting the status or nationality of
an individual. Because the respective subject matters in the two actions differ, any decision that
may be rendered in one of them cannot constitute res judicata in the other. A judicial declaration
of heirship is inconclusive on the fact of occurrence of an event registered or to be registered in
the civil register, while changes in the entries in the civil register do not in themselves settle the
issue of succession.