G.R. No.
74431 November 6, 1989 responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil
PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN
VESTIL, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents.
Pablo P. Garcia for petitioners.
Roberto R. Palmares for private respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of
three. Her parents said she died because she
was bitten by a dog of the petitioners, but
the latter denied this, claiming they had
nothing to do with the dog. The Uys sued the
Vestils, who were sustained by the trial court.
On appeal, the decision of the court a
quo was reversed in favor of the Uys. The
Vestils are now before us. They ask us to set
aside the judgment of the respondent court
and to reinstate that of the trial court.
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a
dog while she was playing with a child of the
petitioners in the house of the late Vicente
Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F.
Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to
the Cebu General Hospital, where she was
treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on
the forehead" 1 and administered an anti-
rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was
discharged after nine days but was
readmitted one week later due to "vomiting
of saliva." 2 The following day, on August 15,
1975, the child died. The cause of death was
certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3
Seven months later, the Uys sued for
damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable
to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the
dog that bit and eventually killed their
daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge,
insisting that the dog belonged to the
deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a
tame animal, and that in any case no one
had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial,
Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants
and dismissed the complaint. 4
The respondent court arrived at a different
conclusion when the case was appealed. 5 It
found that the Vestils were in possession of
the house and the dog and so should be
Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It
also held that the child had died as a result
of the dog bites and not for causes
independent thereof as submitted by the
appellees. Accordingly, the Vestils were
ordered to pay the Uys damages in the
amount of P30,000.00 for the death of
Theness, P12,000.00 for medical and
hospitalization expenses, and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
In the proceedings now before us, Purita
Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the
house or of the dog left by her father as his
estate has not yet been partitioned and there
are other heirs to the property. Pursuing the
logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister
living in Canada would be held responsible
for the acts of the dog simply because she is
one of Miranda's heirs. However, that is
hardly the point. What must be determined is
the possession of the dog that admittedly
was staying in the house in question,
regardless of the ownership of the dog or of
the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or
whoever may make use of the
same is responsible for the
damage which it may cause,
although it may escape or be
lost. 'This responsibility shall
cease only in case the damages
should come from force
majeure from the fault of the
person who has suffered
damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as
caretaker of a carabao gored him to death
and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of
the animal for damages. The complaint was
dismissed on the ground that it was the
caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from
causing injury to any one, including himself.
Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in
possession of Miranda's house is hardly
credible. She said that the occupants of the
house left by her father were related to him
("one way or the other") and maintained
themselves out of a common fund or by
some kind of arrangement (on which,
however, she did not elaborate ). 7 She
mentioned as many as ten of such relatives
who had stayed in the house at one time or
another although they did not appear to be
close kin. 8 She at least implied that they did
not pay any rent, presumably because of
their relation with Vicente Miranda
notwithstanding that she herself did not
seem to know them very well.
There is contrary evidence that the
occupants of the house, were boarders (or
more of boarders than relatives) who paid
the petitioners for providing them with meals
and accommodations. It also appears that
Purita Vestil had hired a maid, Dolores
Jumao-as, who did the cooking and cleaning
in the said house for its occupants. 9 Her
mother, Pacita, who was a nursemaid of
Purita herself, categorically declared that the
petitioners were maintaining boarders in the
house where Theness was bitten by a
dog. 10 Another witness, Marcial Lao, testified
that he was indeed a boarder and that the
Vestils were maintaining the house for
business purposes. 11 And although Purita
denied paying the water bills for the house,
the private respondents submitted
documentary evidence of her application for
water connection with the Cebu Water
District, which strongly suggested that she
was administering the house in question. 12
While it is true that she is not really the
owner of the house, which was still part of
Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt
that she and her husband were its
possessors at the time of the incident in
question. She was the only heir residing in
Cebu City and the most logical person to
take care of the property, which was only six
kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover,
there is evidence showing that she and her
family regularly went to the house, once or
twice weekly, according to at least one
witness, 14 and used it virtually as a second
house. Interestingly, her own daughter was
playing in the house with Theness when the
little girl was bitten by the dog. 15 The dog
itself remained in the house even after the
death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until
1975, when the incident in question
occurred. It is also noteworthy that the
petitioners offered to assist the Uys with
their hospitalization expenses although
Purita said she knew them only casually. 16
The petitioners also argue that even
assuming that they were the possessors of
the dog that bit Theness there was no clear
showing that she died as a result thereof. On
the contrary, the death certificate 17 declared
that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which
had nothing to do with the dog bites for
which she had been previously hospitalized.
The Court need not involve itself in an
extended scientific discussion of the causal
connection between the dog bites and the
certified cause of death except to note that,
first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a
symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog
bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-
pneumonia, which ultimately caused her
death, was a complication of rabies. That
Theness became afraid of water after she
was bitten by the dog is established by the
following testimony of Dr. Tautjo:
COURT: I think there was
mention of rabies in the report
in the second admission?
A: Now, the child was
continuously vomiting just
before I referred to Dr. Co
earlier in the morning and then
the father, because the child
was asking for water, the father
tried to give the child water and
this child went under the bed,
she did not like to drink the
water and there was fright in
her eyeballs. For this reason,
because I was in danger there
was rabies, I called Dr. Co.
Q: In other words, the child had
hydrophobia?
18
A: Yes, sir.
As for the link between rabies and broncho-
pneumonia, the doctor had the following to
say under oath:
A: Now, as 1 said before,
broncho-pneumonia can result
from physical, chemical and
bacterial means. ... It can be the
result of infection, now, so if you
have any other disease which
can lower your resistance you
can also get pneumonia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Would you say that a person
who has rabies may die of
complication which is broncho-
pneumonia?
A: Yes.
 Q: For the record, I am
manifesting that this book
shown the witness is know as
CURRENT DIANOSIS &
TREATMENT, 1968 by Henry
Brainerd, Sheldon Margen and
Milton Chaton. Now, I invite
your attention, doctor, to page
751 of this book under the title
"Rabies." There is on this page,
"Prognosis" as a result of rabies
and it says: Once the
symptoms, have appeared
death inevitably occurs after 2-3
days as a result of cardiac or
respiratory failure or
generalized paralysis. After a
positive diagnosis of rabies or
after a bite by a suspected
animal if the animal cannot be
observed or if the bite is on the
head, give rabies vaccine (duck
embryo). Do you believe in this
statement?
A: Yes.
Q: Would you say therefore that
persons who have rabies may
die of respiratory failure which
leave in the form of bronco-
pneumonia?
A: Broncho-pneumonia can be a
complication of rabies. 19
On the strength of the foregoing testimony,
the Court finds that the link between the dog
bites and the certified cause of death has
beep satisfactorily established. We also
reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life
Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the
death certificate is not conclusive proof of
the cause of death but only of the fact of
death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's
hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that
she died because she was bitten by the dog
even if the death certificate stated a
different cause of death. The petitioner's
contention that they could not be expected
to exercise remote control of the dog is not
acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil
Code holds the possessor liable even if the
animal should "escape or be lost" and so be
removed from his control. And it does not
matter either that, as the petitioners also
contend, the dog was tame and was merely
provoked by the child into biting her. The law
does not speak only of vicious animals but
covers even tame ones as long as they cause
injury. As for the alleged provocation, the
petitioners forget that Theness was only
three years old at the time she was attacked
and can hardly be faulted for whatever she
might have done to the animal.
It is worth observing that the above defenses
of the petitioners are an implied rejection of
their original posture that there was no proof
that it was the dog in their father's house
that bit Theness.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed
by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based
on the negligence or on the presumed lack of
vigilance of the possessor or user of the
animal causing the damage. It is based on
natural equity and on the principle of social
interest that he who possesses animals for
his utility, pleasure or service must answer
for the damage which such animal may
cause. 21
We sustain the findings of the Court of
Appeals and approve the monetary awards
except only as to the medical and
hospitalization expenses, which are reduced
to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint.
While there is no recompense that can bring
back to the private respondents the child
they have lost, their pain should at least be
assuaged by the civil damages to which they
are entitled.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is
AFFIRMED as above modified. The petition is
DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It
is so ordered.
G.R. No. 103437 November 25, 1994
ILIGAN CEMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ZOSIMO
Z. ANGELES, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 58, Manila and BETA
Electric Corporation, respondents.
Roco, Buag, Kapunan, Migallos & Jardeleza
for petitioner.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas
for private respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 27189, which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Manila in
Civil Case No. 15634.
We deny the petition.
I however cancelled and
The facts of the case as found by the Court
of Appeals are as follows:
In 1981, the Iligan Cement
Corporation (ICC), started
undertaking its "Plant
Rehabilitation" program of
power requirements which had
to be implemented on a phase-
to-phase basis. Phase I of this
program consisted in the
installation of power factor
correction equipment. Based on
the study made by the ICC
safety engineer and electrical
engineering consultant,
Engineer Fernando Munasque,
the ICC decided to have
installed in the plant a
combination of the group and
the total power factor correction
substations. With the general
specifications furnished to
prospective suppliers, the ICC
requested the former to give
their respective price quotations
for the equipment. Of the four
would-be suppliers the ICC
considered the quotation of the
BETA Electric Corporation (Beta)
as the most reasonable. The
quotation was for either a six-
step power factor corrective
equipment or for a three-step
corrective power equipment.
Subsequently, or on August 19,
1983, Beta electric likewise
submitted a cost estimate with
regard to the installation,
commissioning and testing of
the equipment together with
the supply of wires, lugs and
foundation. After a thorough
evaluation of these proposals,
the ICC, through the
recommendation of Engr.
Munasque and Engr. Pachler, a
Swiss consultant, decided on
the purchase of a three-step
power factor correction
equipment. It likewise accepted
the Beta proposal for the
installation, commissioning and
testing of the power factor
equipments. Purchase orders
were sent to Beta by ICC to
cover these transactions on
October 14, 1983. These were
superseded by the purchase
orders filed on November 7,
1983, to take into account the
increase in prices of material
components of the power factor
equipment. It appeared from
these purchase orders that the
equipment cost P654,000.00
while the installation,
commissioning and testing
would amount to P39,947.00.
On November 21, 1983, Beta
submitted to ICC its proposed
construction and wiring diagram
for the latter's comment and
approval.
The equipment was delivered to
Iligan at plaintiff's cement plant
there. This equipment upon the
approval of the plaintiff, was
installed. On November 2, 1985,
in the presence and with the
approval, of ICC engineering
staff, the equipment was
switched on. Thereafter, a
chattering sound was heard,
and fire ensued.
An assessment of the extent of
the damage showed that
equipment loss amounted to
P8,577,581.84 (Exhs. I and I-2).
This however did not include
the power factor correction
equipment installed and
switched on that day since it
proved to be intact and
undamaged despite the fire.
No one claimed responsibility
for the fire. Thus, both parties
decided to form a technical
committee to study the
technical causes of the fire. The
committee, as agreed upon,
was composed of five members,
two from each party and the
fifth member, to be by plaintiff which
unanimously chosen by the had in its employ
parties, who would also act as an expert, a safety
the chairman. The parties engineer and
chose electrical
Engr. Alejandro Jimenez as engineering
chairman, a noted electrical consultant.
engineer.
ii.) The power
On April 30, 1986, the factor correction
committee submitted its report. equipment
Its findings showed that the fire delivered and
was "caused by arcing faults installed by Beta
and restrikes arising from was in accordance
overvoltage produced by with plaintiff's own
switching the 600 KVAR design and
capacitors into the 4160-volt specifications.
system which is susceptible to
arcing faults and whose iii.) Plaintiff
equipment are not well approved the
protected against overvoltage. construction and
The fire and the damages it wiring drawings for
caused was due to the fact that the equipment
oil circuit breakers were used delivered by Beta.
indoors" (Records, p. 128).
iv.) Plaintiff
Despite this report, the parties inspected and
were unable to pinpoint which accepted the
should shoulder what cost. power factor
Thus, on December 29, 1986, equipment
the ICC filed a complaint for delivered by Beta.
damages against Beta. It was
plaintiff's theory that part of the v.) The equipment
defendant's duty as the entity passed all the tests
commissioned by the ICC to required by the
manufacture, install, plaintiff.
commission and test the
equipment was the making of a vi.) The
prior technical audit. This energization and
stemmed from a comment switching on the
made by the committee stating equipment was
that the fire could have been previously cleared
avoided "had a technical audit with and approved
been made before the by plaintiff.
capacitors were considered."
vii.) The equipment
Defendant contended that suffers from no
plaintiff had no cause of action defect or
against it inasmuch as: deficiency
whatsoever
a.) Defendant performed all its (Records, pp. 31-
obligations to plaintiff under 32).
their contract.
Furthermore, defendant
i.) The design and asserted that "plaintiff itself
specifications for made a study of its electrical
the power factor system and on the basis of such
corrective study, decided on a power
equipment were factor corrective equipment
made exclusively which (it) itself designed." Thus,
it cannot be faulted if plaintiffs Munasque even
own study did not reveal the provided the
weakness and deficiency of its design,
electrical system. specifications and
diagram of the
After a series of hearings, the capacitor and
trial court decided for the discussed its
defendant. It held: details with BEC's
engineers.
To the mind of the Furthermore, ICC
court, BEC has not supervised the
at all breached its manufacture of the
capacitor contract capacitor as BEC
with ICC, let alone had to submit to
could such alleged ICC for approval all
breach of the construction,
contract be drawings, wirings
considered as the and other details
proximate cause of relative thereto
the November 2, (Rollo, pp. 34-37).
1985 fire that
damaged ICC's The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
major substation the trial court, dismissing the complaint and
and other power ordering the plaintiff (herein petitioner) to
utilization pay the defendant (herein private
equipment at its respondent) the sum of P1,012,269.61 as
Iligan cement actual damages (representing the unpaid
plant. It must be price of the power-factor correction
noted that BEC's equipment as of November 30, 1989) and
contract with ICC P150,000.00 as attorney's fees (Rollo, pp.
caused only the 83-84).
supply, installation,
commissioning and II
testing with the 63
step (sic) power In this petition, petitioner insists that the
factor capacitor at proximate cause of the fire was the
ICC's Iligan plant. negligence of private respondent in
The transaction switching on the capacitor into the electrical
itself came into system of petitioner without first determining
being as a whether said connection could be done
brainchild of ICC's safely. According to petitioner, if private
own safety and respondent took said precaution, it could
consultant have found that it was not safe to do so and
professional that there was no need for said equipment to
electrical engineer, be switched on because the cement plant's
Fernando power factor had reached the desired level
Munasque who (in even without the use of said equipment.
coordination with
ICC's projects III
group composed of
foreign and local The relations of the parties is governed by
engineers) studied, the provisions of the Civil Code of the
designed and Philippines on contracts for a piece of work.
recommended the
acquisition of the Article 1713 of said Code provides:
capacitor in 1981
admittedly for cost By the contract for a piece of
saving purposes. In work the contractor binds
fact, Engineer himself to execute a piece of
work for the employer, in
 consideration of a certain price
or compensation. The
contractor may either employ
only his labor or skill, or also
furnish the material.
A contractor is responsible for the damages
caused by the defects in the work or by the
use of materials of inferior quality or due to
any violation of the terms of the contract (cf.
Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1723;
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines 291
[1992]).
Petitioner failed to present evidence that
there was a defect in the capacitor it ordered
from private respondent; that the latter used
materials of inferior quality; or that it had
violated the terms of the contract for the
supply of said equipment.
The Court of Appeals was categorical that
private respondent "did not at all break its
contractual obligation with plaintiff-appellant
(petitioner)" (Rollo,
p. 40).
Another point to consider is that after the
fire, the capacitor was still in good condition,
which could only mean that private
respondent had complied with the design
made by the engineers of petitioner.
Based on the findings of the Technical
Committee, the trial court concluded that the
overvoltage, caused by the weak and
inadequate electrical system of the cement
plant, generated the sparks which ICC's
circuit breakers failed to isolate or neutralize.
Hence, the sparks spread to other bigger-
sized circuit breakers of the cement plant's
electrical system, heated the poorly
insulated electrical wiring and ignited the oil
in the circuit breakers and transformer
equipment.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial
court that the overvoltage was caused by the
weak and deficient electrical system,
including the lack of protective relays, of the
cement plant itself (Rollo, p. 40).
The installation of the equipment prior to its
switching on into the electric system of the
cement plant was made under the
supervision of the engineers of petitioner.
The wiring lay-out plans were also approved
by petitioner (Rollo,
p. 41).
Petitioner has its own engineering staff and
foreign consultants, who were
knowledgeable about the capacity and
requirements of the electrical system of the
cement plant.
It was petitioner itself which made a study of
its electrical system and on the basis of such
study decided on the specifications of the
capacitor. Likewise, it was petitioner itself
that designed the equipment it ordered from
private respondent. The blame cannot be
laid at the door of private respondent, if
petitioner's study did not take into
consideration the deficiency of its electrical
system. Whatever defects or imperfections
were extant in the design were the
responsibility of petitioner's resident
engineers. It was petitioner which formally
communicated to private respondent in a
letter dated July 25, 1982, requesting for a
quotation for a power-capacitor bank and
attaching thereat a lay-out of said capacitor
bank.
According to the Technical Committee, "had
a technical audit been made before the
capacitors were considered, the system
would have revealed its weakness" (Rollo, p.
89).
It was petitioner's duty to conduct a periodic
technical audit of the cement plant. In this
particular case, petitioner was remiss in its
duty (TSN, March 4, 1988, pp. 52-54).
The "technical audit" is not included in the
contract for commissioning, installing and
testing of the power capacitor. It was
supposed to be the subject of another
contract between the parties but which did
not push through because of the fire.
Petitioner contends that there was no more
need to switch-on the capacitor prior to the
accident because its power factor had
already been raised to 93.3%, which was
more than the desired 85% level. It was
petitioner which ordered the capacitor. It was
in a better position to ascertain whether or
not it still needed the equipment. It was its
duty to inform private respondent that it had
already achieved the desired power factor
rating.
Finally, petitioner claims that the Court of
Appeals and the trial court substituted their
own judgment for the findings of fact of the
Technical Committee. The fact is that the
Technical Committee only made these
conclusions as to what, not who, caused the
fire. The two courts were the ones which
determined who was to be blamed for the
fire on the basis of the findings of fact of the
Technical Committee. In brief, the two courts
did not alter the findings of fact of the
Technical Committee, much less make their
own findings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968
MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG
CAEDO, and the Minors, EPHRAIM
CAEDO, EILEEN CAEDO, ROSE ELAINE
CAEDO, suing through their father,
MARCIAL T. CAEDO, as guardian ad
litem, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL
BERNARDO, defendants-appellants.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for plaintiffs-
appellants.
De Joya, Lopez, Dimaguila, Hermoso and
Divino for defendants-appellants
MAKALINTAL, J.:
As a result of a vehicular accident in which
plaintiff Marcial Caedo and several members
of his family were injured they filed this suit
for recovery of damages from the
defendants. The judgment, rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal on February
26, 1960 (Q-2952), contains the following
disposition:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court
renders a judgment, one in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael
Bernardo, jointly and severally, to pay
to plaintiffs Marcial Caedo, et al., the
sum of P1,929.70 for actual damages;
P48,000.00 for moral damages;
P10,000.00 for exemplary damages;
and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, with
costs against the defendants. The
counterclaim of the defendants
against the plaintiffs is hereby ordered
dismissed, for lack of merits.
On March 12, 1960 the judgment was
amended so as to include an additional
award of P3,705.11 in favor of the plaintiffs
for the damage sustained by their car in the
accident.
Both parties appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which certified the case to us in
view of the total amount of the plaintiffs'
claim.
There are two principal questions posed for
resolution: (1) who was responsible for the
accident? and (2) if it was defendant Rafael
Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu
Khe Thai, solidarily liable with him? On the
first question the trial court found Rafael
Bernardo negligent; and on the second, held
his employer solidarily liable with him.
The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the
morning of March 24, 1958 on Highway 54
(now E. de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity
of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving
his Mercury car on his way from his home in
Quezon City to the airport, where his son
Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for
Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs.
Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the
opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe
Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the
wheel, taking the owner from his Paraaque
home to Wack Wack for his regular round of
golf. The two cars were traveling at fairly
moderate speeds, considering the condition
of the road and the absence of traffic the
Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and
the Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles
(48 to 56 kilometers). Their headlights were
mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead
of the Cadillac, going in the same direction,
was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro
Bautista. The carretela was towing another
horse by means of a short rope coiled around
the rig's vertical post on the right side and
held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian
Bautista.
Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost
upon the rig when he saw it in front of him,
only eight meters away. This is the first clear
indication of his negligence.
The carretela was provided with two lights,
one on each side, and they should have
given him sufficient warning to take the
necessary precautions. And even if he did
not notice the lights, as he claimed later on
at the trial, the carretela should anyway
have been visible to him from afar if he had
been careful, as it must have been in the
beam of his headlights for a considerable
while.
In the meantime the Mercury was coming on
its own lane from the opposite direction.
Bernardo, instead of slowing down or
stopping altogether behind
the carretela until that lane was clear,
veered to the left in order to pass. As he did
so the curved end of his car's right rear
bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's
left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it
along as the car skidded obliquely to the
other lane, where it collided with the
oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had
seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he
slackened his speed, judged the distances in
relation to the carretela and concluded that
the Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo,
however, decided to take a gamble beat
the Mercury to the point where it would be in
line with the carretela, or else squeeze in
between them in any case. It was a risky
maneuver either way, and the risk should
have been quite obvious. Or, since the car
was moving at from 30 to 35 miles per hour
(or 25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was
already too late to apply the brakes when
Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters
in front of him, and so he had to swerve to
the left in spite of the presence of the
oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was,
the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's
right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper,
as already stated, caught the wheel of
the carretela and wrenched it loose. Caedo,
confronted with the unexpected situation,
tried to avoid the collision at the last
moment by going farther to the right, but
was unsuccessful. The photographs taken at
the scene show that the right wheels of his
car were on the unpaved shoulder of the
road at the moment of impact.
There is no doubt at all that the collision was
directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's
negligence and that he must be held liable
for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs.
The next question is whether or not Yu Khe
Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily
liable with the driver. The applicable law is
Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps,
the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have, by the use of due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It
is disputably presumed that a driver
was negligent, if he had been found
guilty of reckless driving or violating
traffic regulations at least twice within
the next preceding two months.
Under the foregoing provision, if the
causative factor was the driver's negligence,
the owner of the vehicle who was present is
likewise held liable if he could have
prevented the mishap by the exercise of due
diligence. The rule is not new, although
formulated as law for the first time in the
new Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman
vs. Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374, where
this Court held:
... The same rule applies where the
owner is present, unless the negligent
acts of the driver are continued for
such a length of time as to give the
owner a reasonable opportunity to
observe them and to direct his driver
to desist therefrom. An owner who sits
in his automobile, or other vehicle,
and permits his driver to continue in a
violation of the law by the
performance of negligent acts, after
he has had a reasonable opportunity
to observe them and to direct that the
driver cease therefrom, becomes
himself responsible for such acts. The
owner of an automobile who permits
his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta,
for example, at a speed of 60 miles an
hour, without any effort to stop him,
although he has had a reasonable
opportunity to do so, becomes himself
responsible, both criminally and civilly,
for the results produced by the acts of
the chauffeur. On the other hand, if
the driver, by a sudden act of
negligence, and without the owner
having a reasonable opportunity to
prevent the act or its continuance,
injures a person or violates the
criminal law, the owner of the
automobile, although present therein
at the time the act was committed, is
not responsible, either civilly or
criminally, therefor. The act
complained of must be continued in
the presence of the owner for such a
length of time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his driver act his
own.
The basis of the master's liability in civil law
is not respondent superior but rather the
relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is
that ultimately the negligence of the servant,
if known to the master and susceptible of
timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to
prevent injury or damage.
In the present case the defendants' evidence
is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe
Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had
been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co.
in the same capacity for over ten years.
During that time he had no record of
violation of traffic laws and regulations. No
negligence for having employed him at all
may be imputed to his master. Negligence on
the part of the latter, if any, must be sought
in the immediate setting and circumstances
of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain
the driver from pursuing a course which not
only gave him clear notice of the danger but
also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not
see that such negligence may be imputed.
The car, as has been stated, was not running
at an unreasonable speed. The road was
wide and open, and devoid of traffic that
early morning. There was no reason for the
car owner to be in any special state of alert.
He had reason to rely on the skill and
experience of his driver. He became aware of
the presence of the carretela when his car
was only twelve meters behind it, but then
his failure to see it earlier did not constitute
negligence, for he was not himself at the
wheel. And even when he did see it at that
distance, he could not have anticipated his
driver's sudden decision to pass
the carretela on its left side in spite of the
fact that another car was approaching from
the opposite direction. The time element was
such that there was no reasonable
opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the
risks involved and warn the driver
accordingly. The thought that entered his
mind, he said, was that if he sounded a
sudden warning it might only make the other
man nervous and make the situation worse.
It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes
no absence of that due diligence required by
law to prevent the misfortune.
The test of imputed negligence under Article
2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree,
necessarily subjective. Car owners are not
held to a uniform and inflexible standard of
diligence as are professional drivers. In many
cases they refrain from driving their own cars
and instead hire other persons to drive for
them precisely because they are not trained
or endowed with sufficient discernment to
know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the
relative dangers posed by the different
situations that are continually encountered
on the road. What would be a negligent
omission under aforesaid Article on the part
of a car owner who is in the prime of age and
knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not
necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and
infirm person who is not similarly equipped.
The law does not require that a person must
possess a certain measure of skill or
proficiency either in the mechanics of driving
or in the observance of traffic rules before he
may own a motor vehicle. The test of his
intelligence, within the meaning of Article
2184, is his omission to do that which the
evidence of his own senses tells him he
should do in order to avoid the accident. And
as far as perception is concerned, absent a
minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver
that appears to be fraught with danger to
one passenger may appear to be entirely
safe and commonplace to another. Were the
law to require a uniform standard of
perceptiveness, employment of professional
drivers by car owners who, by their very
inadequacies, have real need of drivers'
services, would be effectively proscribed.
We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu
Khe Thai, solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, is
an error. The next question refers to the
sums adjudged by the trial court as
damages. The award of P48,000 by way of
moral damages is itemized as follows:
1. Marcial Caedo
2. Juana S. Caedo
3. Ephraim Caedo
4. Eileen Caedo
5. Rose Elaine Caedo
6. Merilyn Caedo
Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming
that the Court should have granted them
also actual or compensatory damages,
aggregating P225,000, for the injuries they
sustained. Defendants, on the other hand
maintain that the amounts awarded as moral
damages are excessive and should be
reduced. We find no justification for either
side. The amount of actual damages suffered
by the individual plaintiffs by reason of their
injuries, other than expenses for medical
treatment, has not been shown by the
evidence. Actual damages, to be
compensable, must be proven. Pain and
suffering are not capable of pecuniary
estimation, and constitute a proper ground
for granting moral, not actual, damages, as
provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the
following:
MARCIAL T. CAEDO:
A. Contusion, with hematoma,
scalp, frontal left; abrasions,
chest wall, anterior;
B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right,
lst to 5th inclusive. Third rib has
a double fracture; Subparieto-
plaural hematoma; Basal disc
atelectasis, lung, right lower
lobe, secondary;
C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary
to probable basal fracture, skull.
JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1)frontal region, left; (2)
apex of nose; (3) upper eyelid,
left; (4) knees.
B. Wound, lacerated, irregular,
deep, frontal;
C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib
posterior, left with
displacement.
D. Fracture, simple, base,
proximal phalanx right, big toe.
E. Fracture, simple, base,
 metatarsals III and V right.
F. Concussion, cerebral.
EPHRAIM CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) left temporal area; (2) left
frontal; (3) left supraorbital
EILEEN CAEDO:
A. Lacerated wound (V-shaped),
base, 5th finger, right, lateral
aspect.
B. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) dorsum, proximal phalanx
middle finger; (2) Knee,
anterior, bilateral; (3) shin,
lower 1/3.
ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple: (1) upper
and lower lids; (2) left temporal;
(3) nasolabial region; (4) leg,
lower third, anterior.
MARILYN CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple: (1)shin,
lower 1/3 right; (2) arm, lower
third
C. Contusion with hematoma,
shin, lower 1/3, anterior aspect,
right. (See Exhibits D, D-1, D-2,
D-3, D-4, and D- 5)
It is our opinion that, considering the nature
and extent of the above-mentioned injuries,
the amounts of moral damages granted by
the trial court are not excessive.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
modified in the sense of declaring defendant-
appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability, and
is otherwise affirmed with respect to
defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs
against the latter.
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO
CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO
LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari
to set aside the Resolution[1] dated December
28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari
and the Resolution[2] dated August 24, 2000
denying the motion for reconsideration, both
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas,
Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No.
17-C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent
Mario Llavore Laroya (Laroya for brevity) and
the other owned by petitioner Roberto
Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and driven by
petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for
brevity), figured in an accident. As a result,
two cases were filed with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC for brevity) of
Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other
hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil
case against Laroya for quasi-delict,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the
criminal case was then at its preliminary
investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the
civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil
case on the ground of forum-shopping
considering the pendency of the criminal
case. The MCTC granted the motion in the
Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the
civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration,
Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the
civil case is a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal case.
The MCTC denied the motion for
reconsideration in the Order of May 7,
1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before
the Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for
brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66,
[3]
assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on
December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition
for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas
RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued
by the MCTC is a final order which disposes
of the case and therefore the proper remedy
should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC
further held that a special civil action for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that
even on the premise that the MCTC erred in
dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure
error of judgment and not an abuse of
discretion.
 Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion
for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC
denied the same in the Resolution of August
24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in
this wise:
In a certain vehicular accident involving two
parties, each one of them may think and
believe that the accident was caused by the
fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party,
believing himself to be the aggrieved party,
opted to file a criminal case for reckless
imprudence against the second party. On the
other hand, the second party, together with
his operator, believing themselves to be the
real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a
civil case for quasi-delict against the first
party who is the very private complainant in
the criminal case.[4]
Thus, the issue raised is whether an
accused in a pending criminal case for
reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a a declaration that the dismissal is with
separate civil action for quasi-delict against
the private complainant in the criminal case.
The Courts Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil
Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on
the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a
counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan
and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a
criminal case has a counterclaim against the
private complainant, he may file the
counterclaim in a separate civil action at the
proper time. They contend that an action on
quasi-delict is different from an action
resulting from the crime of reckless
imprudence, and an accused in a criminal
case can be an aggrieved party in a civil
case arising from the same incident. They
maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of
the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed
independently of the criminal action. Finally,
they point out that Casupanan was not the
only one who filed the independent civil
action based on quasi-delict but also
Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle,
who was not a party in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the
petition is fatally defective as it does not
state the real antecedents. Laroya further
alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo
forfeited their right to question the order of
dismissal when they failed to avail of the
proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that
there is no question of law to be resolved as
the order of dismissal is already final and a
petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a
lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo
contend that the petition raises the legal
question of whether there is forum-shopping
since they filed only one action - the
independent civil action for quasi-
delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action
for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-
shopping under Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC
did not state in its order of dismissal [5] that
the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the
Administrative Circular, the order of
dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the
complaint, unless the order of dismissal
expressly states it is with prejudice. [6] Absent
prejudice, the same is deemed without
prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being
silent on the matter, is a dismissal without
prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an
order dismissing an action without prejudice
is not appealable. The remedy of the
aggrieved party is to file a special civil action
under Rule 65.Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly
states that where the judgment or final order
is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action under
Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order
dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the
ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary
appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the
filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a
favorable judgment.[8] Forum-shopping is
present when in the two or more cases
pending, there is identity of parties, rights of
action and reliefs sought. [9] However, there is
no forum-shopping in the instant case
because the law and the rules expressly
allow the filing of a separate civil action
which can proceed independently of the
criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property
based on the Revised Penal Code while
Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action
for damages based on Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. Although these two actions arose
from the same act or omission, they have
different causes of action. The criminal case
is based on culpa criminal punishable under
the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is
based on culpa aquiliana actionable under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant.
Any aggrieved person can invoke these
articles provided he proves, by
preponderance of evidence, that he has
suffered damage because of the fault or
negligence of another. Either the private
complainant or the accused can file a
separate civil action under these
articles. There is nothing in the law or rules
that state only the private complainant in a
criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
(2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires
the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a
separate civil action, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which
could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis
supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused
in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in
a separate civil action, there can be no
forum-shopping if the accused files such
separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules for brevity),
as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a
separate civil action independently of the
criminal action provided the offended party
reserved the right to file such civil
action. Unless the offended party reserved
the civil action before the presentation of the
evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions
arising from the same act or omission were
deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
case. These civil actions referred to the
recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the
recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the
recovery of damages for violation of Articles
32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human
Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent
civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985
Rules, the offended party had to reserve in
the criminal action the right to bring such
action.Otherwise, such civil action was
deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
provided as follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of
indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions
extinguishes the others. The institution of, or
the reservation of the right to file, any of said
civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the
separate civil actions shall be made before
the prosecution starts to present its evidence
and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
of the accused.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
was amended on December 1, 2000 and now
provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
The reservation of the right to institute
separately the civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts presenting its
evidence and under circumstances affording
the offended party a reasonable opportunity
to make such reservation.
xxx
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed
separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application
is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this
rule governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal actions. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111,
what is deemed instituted with the criminal
action is only the action to recover civil
liability arising from the crime or ex-
delicto. All the other civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
are no longer deemed instituted, and may be
filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation
in the criminal action. The failure to make a
reservation in the criminal action is not a
waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these
articles of the Civil Code.The prescriptive
period on the civil actions based on these
articles of the Civil Code continues to run
even with the filing of the criminal
action. Verily, the civil actions based on
these articles of the Civil Code are separate,
distinct and independent of the civil action
deemed instituted in the criminal action. [10]
Under the present Rule 111, the offended
party is still given the option to file a
separate civil action to recover civil liability
ex-delicto by reserving such right in the
criminal action before the prosecution
presents its evidence. Also, the offended
party is deemed to make such reservation if
he files a separate civil action before filing
the criminal action. If the civil action to
recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed
separately but its trial has not yet
commenced, the civil action may be
consolidated with the criminal action. The
consolidation under this Rule does not apply
to separate civil actions arising from
the same act or omission filed under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.[11]
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the
amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action,
if reserved in the criminal action, could not
be filed until after final judgment was
rendered in the criminal action. If the
separate civil action was filed before the
commencement of the criminal action, the
civil action, if still pending, was suspended
upon the filing of the criminal action until
final judgment was rendered in the criminal
action. This rule applied only to the separate
civil action filed to recover liability ex-
delicto. The rule did not apply to
independent civil actions based on Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which
could proceed independently regardless of
the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules continues this
procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is
suspended. After the criminal action has
been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been entered in the
criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the
said civil action has already been
instituted, the latter shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be
found before judgment on the merits.
The suspension shall last until final
judgment is rendered in the criminal
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on
the merits is rendered in the civil action, the
same may, upon motion of the offended
party, be consolidated with the criminal
action in the court trying the criminal action.
In case of consolidation, the evidence
already adduced in the civil action shall be
deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right
of the prosecution to cross-examine the
witnesses presented by the offended party in
the criminal case and of the parties to
present additional evidence. The
consolidated criminal and civil actions shall
be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action,
the running of the period of prescription of
the civil action which cannot be instituted
separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present
Rules did not change the rule that the
separate civil action, filed to recover
damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the
filing of the criminal action.Section 2 of the
present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing,
after commencement of the criminal action,
of a separate civil action to recover
damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed
independently
The crucial question now is whether
Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the
offended parties in the criminal case, can file
a separate civil action against the offended
party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:
SEC 3. When civil action may proceed
independently. - In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the independent civil
action may be brought by
the offendedparty. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its
counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules,
expressly allows the offended party to bring
an independent civil action under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated
in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil
action shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.In no case,
however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
There is no question that the offended
party in the criminal action can file an
independent civil action for quasi-delict
against the accused. Section 3 of the present
Rule 111 expressly states that the offended
party may bring such an action but the
offended party may not recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged
in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of
Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the
criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however,
invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs.
Cantos[12] where the Court held that the
accused therein could validly institute a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against
the private complainant in the criminal
case. In Cabaero, the accused in the
criminal case filed his Answer with
Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At
that time the Court noted the absence of
clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on
impliedly instituted civil actions and
the necessary consequences and
implications thereof. Thus, the Court ruled
that the trial court should confine itself to the
criminal aspect of the case and disregard
any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court
further ruled that the accused may file a
separate civil case against the offended
party after the criminal case is terminated
and/or in accordance with the new Rules
which may be promulgated. The Court
explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or
third-party complaint on the civil aspect will
only unnecessarily complicate the
proceedings and delay the resolution of the
criminal case.
 Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present
Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules
precisely to address the lacuna mentioned
in Cabaero. Under this provision, the
accused is barred from filing a counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint in the
criminal case. However, the same provision
states that any cause of action which could
have been the subject (of the counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be
litigated in a separate civil action. The
present Rule 111 mandates the accused to
file his counterclaim in a separate civil action
which shall proceed independently of the
criminal action, even as the civil action of the
offended party is litigated in the criminal
action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111,
the independent civil action in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not
deemed instituted with the criminal action
but may be filed separately by the offended
party even without reservation. The
commencement of the criminal action does
not suspend the prosecution of the
independent civil action under these articles
of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2
of the present Rule 111 refers only to the
civil action arising from the crime, if such
civil action is reserved or filed before the
commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two
separate suits for the same act or
omission. The first a criminal case where the
civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a
civil case for quasi-delict - without violating
the rule on non-forum shopping. The two
cases can proceed simultaneously and
independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the
criminal action will not suspend the civil
action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is
that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant. In most cases, the
offended party will have no reason to file a
second civil action since he cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
of the accused. In some instances, the
accused may be insolvent, necessitating the
filing of another case against his employer or
guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil
action for quasi-delict for the same act or
omission he is accused of in the criminal
case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph
6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which
states that the counterclaim of the
accused may be litigated in a separate
civil action. This is only fair for two
reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from
setting up any counterclaim in the civil
aspect that is deemed instituted in the
criminal case. The accused is therefore
forced to litigate separately his counterclaim
against the offended party. If the accused
does not file a separate civil action for quasi-
delict, the prescriptive period may set in
since the period continues to run until the
civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed
innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177
of the Civil Code, in the same way that the
offended party can avail of this remedy
which is independent of the criminal
action. To disallow the accused from filing a
separate civil action for quasi-delict, while
refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the
criminal case, is to deny him due process of
law, access to the courts, and equal
protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-
delict filed separately by Casupanan and
Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by
the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the
ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the
possibility that the decision of the trial court
in the criminal case may vary with the
decision of the trial court in the independent
civil action. This possibility has always been
recognized ever since the Civil Code
introduced in 1950 the concept of an
independent civil action under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law
itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly
provides that the independent civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter. In Azucena vs. Potenciano,
[13]
the Court declared:
x x x. There can indeed be no other logical
conclusion than this, for to subordinate the
civil action contemplated in the said articles
to the result of the criminal prosecution
whether it be conviction or acquittal would
render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may
proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.
More than half a century has passed
since the Civil Code introduced the concept
of a civil action separate and independent
from the criminal action although arising
from the same act or omission. The Court,
however, has yet to encounter a case of
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of
trial courts, one hearing the criminal case
and the other the civil action for quasi-
delict. The fear of conflicting and
irreconcilable decisions may be more
apparent than real. In any event, there are
sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court
to deal with such remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure took effect on December
1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of
dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before
the amendment of the rules. The Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given
retroactive effect considering the well-settled
rule that -
x x x statutes regulating the procedure of
the court will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
[14]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on
certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and
August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No.
17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No.
2089 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.