In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No.163522
ASHTON WHITAKER, BYHISMOTHERANDNEXTFRIEND MELISSA
WHITAKER,

PlaintiffAppellee,

v.

KENOSHAUNIFIEDSCHOOLDISTRICT
NO.1BOARDOFEDUCATION,etal.,
DefendantsAppellants
____________________

AppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtforthe
EasternDistrictofWisconsin.
No.2:16cv00943PPPamelaPepper,Judge.
____________________

ARGUEDMARCH29,2017DECIDEDMAY30,2017
____________________

BeforeWOOD,ChiefJudge,andROVNERandWILLIAMS,Cir
cuitJudges.
WILLIAMS,CircuitJudge.Ashton(Ash)Whitakerisa17
yearoldhighschoolseniorwhohaswhatwouldseemlikea
simple request: to use the boys restroom while at school.
2 No.163522

However, the Defendants, the Kenosha Unified School Dis

trict and its superintendent, Sue Savaglio, (the School Dis
trict)believethattherequestisnotsosimplebecauseAsh1is
atransgenderboy.TheSchoolDistrictdidnotpermitAshto
enter the boys restroom because, it believed, that his mere
presence would invade the privacy rights of his male class
mates.Ashbroughtsuit,allegingthattheSchoolDistrictsun
written bathroom policy2 violates Title IX of the Education
AmendmentsActof1972andtheFourteenthAmendments
EqualProtectionClause.
Inadditiontofilingsuit,Ash,beginninghissenioryear,
moved for preliminary injunctive relief, seeking an order
grantinghimaccesstotheboysrestrooms.Heassertedthat
thedenial ofaccess totheboysbathroomwascausing him
harm, as his attempts to avoid using the bathroom exacer
bated his vasovagal syncope, a condition that renders Ash
susceptibletofaintingand/orseizuresifdehydrated.Healso
contendedthatthedenialcausedhimeducationalandemo
tionalharm,includingsuicidalideations.TheSchoolDistrict
vigorouslyobjectedandmovedtodismissAshsclaims,argu
ingthatAshcouldneitherstateaclaimunderTitleIXnorthe
EqualProtectionClause.Thedistrictcourtdeniedthemotion
todismissandgrantedAshspreliminaryinjunctionmotion.
Onappeal,theSchoolDistrictarguesthatweshouldexer
cise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the district

1WewillrefertothePlaintiffAppelleeasAsh,ratherthanbyhis

lastname,asthisishowhereferstohimselfthroughouthisbrief.
2WewillrefertotheSchoolDistrictsdecisiontodenyAshaccessto

theboysrestroomasapolicy,althoughanysuchpolicyisunwritten
anditsexactboundariesareunclear.
No.163522 3

courtsdecisiontodenythemotiontodismiss.However,we
declinethisinvitation,asthetwoorderswerenotinextricably
intertwinedandwecanreviewthegrantofthepreliminary
injunctionwithoutreviewingthedenialofthemotiontodis
miss.
TheSchoolDistrictalsoarguesthatweshouldreversethe
districtcourtsdecisiontograntthepreliminaryinjunctionfor
twomainreasons.First,itarguesthatthedistrictcourterred
infindingthatAshhaddemonstratedalikelihoodofsuccess
onthemeritsbecausetransgenderstatusisneitheraprotected
classunderTitleIXnorisitentitledtoheightenedscrutiny.
And,becausetheSchoolDistrictspolicyhasarationalbasis,
that is, the need to protect other students privacy, Ashs
claimsfailasamatteroflaw.Werejecttheseargumentsbe
causeAshhassufficientlydemonstratedalikelihoodofsuc
cessonhisTitleIXclaimunderasexstereotypingtheory.Fur
ther,becausethepolicysclassificationisbaseduponsex,he
hasalsodemonstratedthatheightenedscrutiny,andnotra
tionalbasis,shouldapplytohisEqualProtectionClaim.The
SchoolDistricthasnotprovidedagenuineandexceedingly
persuasivejustificationfortheclassification.
Second, the School District argues that the district court
erredinfindingthattheharmstoAshoutweighedtheharms
tothestudentpopulationandtheirprivacyinterests.Wedis
agree.TheSchoolDistricthasfailedtoprovideanyevidence
ofhowthepreliminaryinjunctionwillharmit,oranyofits
studentsorparents.TheharmsidentifiedbytheSchoolDis
trictareallspeculativeandbaseduponconjecture,whereas
theharmstoAsharewelldocumentedandsupportedbythe
record.Asaconsequence,weaffirmthegrantofpreliminary
injunctiverelief.
4 No.163522

I.BACKGROUND
AshWhitakerisa17yearoldwholivesinKenosha,Wis
consin with his mother, who brought this suit as his next
friend.3HeiscurrentlyasenioratGeorgeNelsonTremper
HighSchool,whichisintheKenoshaUnifiedSchoolDistrict.
Heenteredhissenioryearrankedwithinthetopfivepercent
ofhisclassandisinvolvedinanumberofextracurricularac
tivities including the orchestra, theater, tennis, the National
HonorSociety,andtheAstronomicalSociety.Whennotinos
choolorparticipatingintheseactivities,Ashworksparttime
asanaccountingassistantinamedicaloffice.
WhileAshsbirthcertificatedesignateshimasfemale,
hedoesnotidentifyasone.Rather,inthespringof2013,when
Ash was in eighth grade, he told his parents that he is
transgenderandaboy.Hebegantoopenlyidentifyasaboy
duringthe20132014schoolyear,whenheenteredTremper
asafreshman.Hecuthishair,begantowearmoremasculine
clothing, and began to use the name Ashton and male pro
nouns. In the fall of 2014, the beginning of his sophomore
year,hetoldhisteachersandhisclassmatesthatheisaboy
andaskedthemtorefertohimasAshtonorAshandtouse
malepronouns.
Inadditionto publicly transitioning,Ash begantoseea
therapist,whodiagnosedhimwithGenderDysphoria,which
the American Psychiatric Association defines as a marked
incongruence between ones experienced/expressed gender

3 Because Ash is a minor without a duly appointed representative,

pursuanttoRule17oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure,hemayassert
theseclaimsonlythroughanextfriendorguardianadlitem.
No.163522 5

andassignedgender.4Am.PsychiatricAssn,Diagnostic&
StatisticalManualofMentalDisorders452(5thed.2013).InJuly
2016, under the supervision of an endocrinologist at Chil
drens Hospital of Wisconsin, Ash began hormone replace
ment therapy. A month later, he filed a petition to legally
changehisnametoAshtonWhitaker,whichwasgrantedin
September2016.
Forthemostpart,Ashstransitionhasbeenmetwithout
hostilityandhasbeenacceptedbymuchoftheTrempercom
munity.AtanorchestraperformanceinJanuary2015,forex
ample,heworeatuxedoliketherestoftheboysinthegroup.
Hisorchestrateacher,classmates,andtheaudienceaccepted
thiswithoutincident.Unfortunately,theSchoolDistricthas
not been as accepting of Ashs requests to use the boys re
strooms.
Inthespringofhissophomoreyear,Ashandhismother
metwithhisguidancecounseloronseveraloccasionstore
questthatAshbepermittedtousetheboysrestroomswhile
atschoolandatschoolsponsoredevents.Ashwaslaternoti
fiedthat the administrationhad decided thathecouldonly
usethegirlsrestroomsoragenderneutralrestroomthatwas
intheschoolsmainoffice,whichwasquiteadistancefrom
hisclassrooms.BecauseAshhadpubliclytransitioned,hebe
lieved that using the girls restrooms would undermine his
transition.Additionally,sinceAshwastheonlystudentwho
was permitted to use the genderneutral bathroom in the
schoolsoffice,hefearedthatusingitwoulddrawfurtherat
tentiontohistransitionandstatusasatransgenderstudentat

4WetakejudicialnoticeoftheDiagnosticandStatisticalManualpur

suanttoRule201oftheFederalRulesofEvidence.
6 No.163522

Tremper.Asahighschooler,Ashalsoworriedthathemight
bedisciplinedifhetriedtousetheboysrestroomsandthat
suchdisciplinemighthurthischancesofgettingintocollege.
For these reasons, Ash restricted his water intake and at
temptedtoavoidusinganyrestroomatschoolfortherestof
theschoolyear.
RestrictinghiswaterintakewasproblematicforAsh,who
hasbeendiagnosedwithvasovagalsyncope.Thiscondition
rendersAshmoresusceptibletofaintingand/orseizuresifde
hydrated.Toavoidtriggeringthecondition,Ashsphysicians
haveadvisedhimtodrinksixtosevenbottlesofwateranda
bottleofGatoradedaily.BecauseAshrestrictedhiswaterin
taketoensurethathedidnothavetoutilizetherestroomat
school,hesufferedfromsymptomsofhisvasovagalsyncope,
includingfaintinganddizziness.Healsosufferedfromstress
relatedmigraines,depression,andanxietybecauseofthepol
icysimpactonhistransitionandwhatheperceivedtobethe
impossible choice between living as a boy or using the re
stroom.Heevenbegantocontemplatesuicide.
Inthefallof2015,AshbeganhisjunioryearatTremper.
For six months, he exclusively used the boys restrooms at
schoolwithoutincident.But,inFebruary2016,ateachersaw
him washing his hands at a sink in the boys restroom and
reportedittotheschoolsadministration.Inresponse,Ashs
guidancecounselor,DebraTronvig,againtoldAshsmother
thathewaspermittedtoonlyusethegirlsrestroomsorthe
genderneutralbathroomintheschoolsmainoffice.Thenext
month, Ash and his mother met with Assistant Principal
HollyGraftodiscusstheschoolspolicy.Likebefore,Ms.Graf
statedthatAshwasnotpermittedtousetheboysrestrooms.
However,thereasonshegavethistimewasthathewaslisted
No.163522 7

asafemaleintheschoolsofficialrecordsandtochangethose
records,theschoolneededunspecifiedlegalormedicaldoc
umentation.
Two letters submitted by Ashs pediatrician, identifying
himasatransgenderboyandrecommendingthathebeal
lowed to use maledesignated facilities at school were
deemednotsufficienttochangehisdesignation.Rather,the
schoolmaintainedthatAshwouldhavetocompleteasurgi
caltransitionaprocedurethatisprohibitedforsomeone
under18yearsofagetobepermittedaccesstotheboys
restroom. Further, not all transgender persons opt to com
pleteasurgicaltransition,preferringtoforgothesignificant
risksandcoststhataccompanysuchprocedures.TheSchool
Districtdidnotgiveanyexplanationastowhyasurgicaltran
sitionwasnecessary.Indeed,theverbalstatementsmadeto
Ashsmomaboutthepolicyhaveneverbeenreducedtowrit
ing.Infact,theSchoolDistricthasneverprovidedanywritten
documentthatdetailswhenthepolicywentintoeffect,what
thepolicyis,orhowonecanchangehisstatusunderthepol
icy.
Fearingthatusingtheonegenderneutralrestroomwould
singlehimoutandsubjecthimtoscrutinyfromhisclassmates
andknowingthatusingthegirlsrestroomwouldbeincon
tradictiontohistransition,Ashcontinuedtousetheboysre
stroomfortheremainderofhisjunioryear.
This decision was not without a cost. Ash experienced
feelingsofanxiousnessanddepression.Heoncemorebegan
to contemplate suicide. Nonetheless, the schools security
guardswereinstructedtomonitorsAshsrestroomusetoen
surethatheusedtheproperfacilities.BecauseAshcontinued
8 No.163522

tousetheboysrestroom,hewasremovedfromclassonsev
eraloccasionstodiscusshisviolationoftheschoolsunwrit
tenpolicy.Hisclassmatesandteachersoftenaskedhimabout
thesemeetingsandwhyadministratorswereremovinghim
fromclass.
InApril2016,theSchoolDistrictprovidedAshwiththe
additionaloptionofusingtwosingleuser,genderneutralre
strooms.Theselockedrestroomswereontheoppositesideof
campusfromwherehisclasseswereheld.TheSchoolDistrict
provided only one student with the key: Ash. Since the re
stroomswerenotnearhisclassrooms,whichcausedAshto
missclasstime,andbecauseusingthemfurtherstigmatized
him,Ashagainavoidedusingthebathroomswhileatschool.
Thisonlyexacerbatedhissyncopeandmigraines.Inaddition,
Ashbegantofearforhissafetyasmoreattentionwasdrawn
tohisrestroomuseandtransgenderstatus.
Althoughnotpartofthisappeal,Ashcontendsthathehas
also been subjected to other negative actions by the School
District,includinginitiallyprohibitinghimfromrunningfor
promking,referringtohimwithfemalepronouns,usinghis
birthname,andrequiringhimtoroomwithfemalestudents
oraloneonschoolsponsoredtrips.Furthermore,Ashlearned
in May 2016 that school administrators had considered in
structing its guidance counselors to distribute bright green
wristbands to Ash and other transgender students so that
their bathroom usage could be monitored more easily.
Throughoutthislitigation,theSchoolDistricthasdeniedthat
itconsideredimplementingthewristbandplan.

No.163522 9

A. ProceedingsBelow
Inthespringof2016,Ashengagedcounselwho,inApril
2016,senttheSchoolDistrictaletterdemandingthatitpermit
him to use the boys restroom while at school and during
schoolsponsoredevents.Inresponse,theSchoolDistrictre
peateditspolicythatAshwasrequiredtouseeitherthegirls
restroom or the genderneutral facilities. On May 12, 2016,
AshfiledanadministrativecomplaintwiththeUnitedStates
Department of Educations Office for Civil Rights, alleging
thatthispolicyviolatedhisrightsunderTitleIX.Topursue
the instant litigation, Ash chose to withdraw the complaint
withoutprejudice.
OnJuly16,2016,AshcommencedthisactionandonAu
gust 15, he filed an Amended Complaint alleging that the
treatmenthereceivedatTremperHighSchoolviolatedTitle
IX,20U.S.C.1681,etseq.,andtheEqualProtectionClauseof
theFourteenthAmendment.Thatsameday,Ash,inamotion
forpreliminaryinjunction,soughttoenjointheenforcement
oftheSchoolDistrictspolicypendingtheoutcomeofthelit
igation.Thenextday,theSchoolDistrictfiledamotiontodis
miss and filed its opposition to the preliminary injunction
shortlythereafter.
Afterahearingonthemotiontodismiss,thedistrictcourt
deniedthemotion.Thenextday,itheardoralargumentson
Ashsmotionforpreliminaryinjunction.Afewdayslater,the
district court granted the motion in part and enjoined the
SchoolDistrictfrom:(1)denyingAshaccesstotheboysre
stroom;(2)enforcinganywrittenorunwrittenpolicyagainst
Ashthatwouldpreventhimfromusingtheboysrestroom
while on school property or attending schoolsponsored
events;(3)discipliningAshforusingtheboysrestroomwhile
10 No.163522

onschoolpropertyorattendingschoolsponsoredevents;and
(4)monitoringorsurveillingAshsrestroomuseinanyway.
Thisappealfollowed.
In a separate appeal, the School District petitioned this
courtforpermissiontofileaninterlocutoryappealofthedis
trictcourtsdenialofitsmotiontodismiss.Althoughinitially
thedistrictcourtcertifiedtheorderdenyingthemotiontodis
missforimmediateinterlocutoryappealpursuantto28U.S.C.
1292(b),itrevokedthatcertificationwhenitconcludedthat
ithaderredbyincludingthecertificationlanguageinitsini
tialorder.Therefore,wedeniedtheSchoolDistrictspetition
forinterlocutoryreviewofthemotiontodismissforlackof
jurisdiction.SeeKenoshaUnifiedSch.Dist.No.1Bd.ofEduc.v.
Whitaker,841F.3d730,73132(7thCir.2016).Inthealterna
tive,theSchoolDistricturgedthiscourttoexercisependent
jurisdictionovertheorderdenyingthemotiontodismissbe
causethedistrictcourthadpartiallygrantedthepreliminary
injunction.Butsincewelackedjurisdictiontoconsiderthepe
titionforinterlocutoryappeal,wealsolackedaproperjuris
dictionalbasisforextendingpendentjurisdiction.Id.at732.
Therefore,inthisappeal,theSchoolDistrictwasdirectedto
seekpendentappellatejurisdiction,whichithasnowdone.
II.ANALYSIS
TheSchoolDistrictraisestwoissuesonappeal.First,that
thiscourtshouldassertpendentjurisdictionoverthedistrict
courtsdecisiontodenyitsmotiontodismissandsecond,that
thedistrictcourterredingrantingAshsmotionforprelimi
naryinjunction.Wewilladdresseachissueinturn.

No.163522 11

A. PendentJurisdictionIsNotAppropriate
Ordinarily,anorderdenyingamotiontodismissisnota
final judgment and is not appealable. See 28 U.S.C. 1291
(providingfederalappellatecourtswithjurisdictionoverap
pealsfromallfinaldecisions).But,theSchoolDistrictagain
urgesustoassertpendentappellatejurisdictiontoconsider
thedenialofthemotiontodismiss.Wedeclinetheinvitation.
Pendentappellatejurisdictionisadiscretionarydoctrine.
Jonesv.InfoCureCorp.,310F.3d529,537(7thCir.2002).Itis
alsoanarrowone,Abeleszv.OTPBank,692F.3d638,647(7th
Cir. 2012), which the Supreme Court sharply restricted in
Swintv.ChambersCountyCommission,514U.S.35(1995).After
Swint,wenotedinUnitedStatesv.BoardofSchoolCommission
ersoftheCityofIndianapolis,128F.3d507(7thCir.1997),that
pendentappellatejurisdictionisacontroversialandembat
tleddoctrine.Id.at510.Nonetheless,theSupremeCourtrec
ognizedanarrowpathforitsuseinClintonv.Jones,520U.S.
681, 707 n.41 (1997), where it found that a collateral order
denyingpresidentialimmunitywasinextricablyintertwined
withanorderthatstayeddiscoveryandpostponedtrial,and
wastherefore,reviewableonappeal.
When applicable, the doctrine allows for review of an
otherwiseunappealableinterlocutoryorderifitisinextrica
bly intertwinedwith anappealableone. Montanov.Cityof
Chicago,375F.3d593,599(7thCir.2004)(quotingJones,310
F.3dat536)(internalquotationmarksomitted).Thisrequires
morethanacloselinkbetweenthetwoorders.Id.at600.
Judicialeconomyisalsoaninsufficientjustificationforinvok
ing the doctrine and disregarding the finaljudgment rule.
McCarterv.Ret.PlanforDist.ManagersofAm.FamilyIns.Grp.,
12 No.163522

540F.3d649,653(7thCir.2008).Rather,wemustsatisfyour
selvesthatbaseduponthespecificfactsofthiscase,itisprac
ticallyindispensablethatweaddressthemeritsoftheunap
pealableorderinordertoresolvetheproperlytakenappeal.
Montano,375F.3dat600(quotingUnitedStatesexrel.Valders
Stone&Marble,Inc.v.CWayConstr.Co.,909F.2d259,262(7th
Cir.1990))(internalquotationmarksomitted);seealsoAbelesz,
692F.3dat647([P]endentappellatejurisdictionshouldnot
be stretched to appeal normally unappealable interlocutory
ordersthathappentoberelatedevencloselyrelatedtothe
appealableorder.).Suchahighthresholdisrequiredbecause
amorerelaxedapproachwouldallowthedoctrinetoswallow
thefinaljudgmentrule.Montano,375F.3dat599(citingPat
tersonv.Portch,853F.2d1399,1403(7thCir.1988)).
As we discuss below, the district court determined that
Ashsufficientlydemonstratedalikelihoodofsuccessonthe
meritsofhisclaimsandthatpreliminaryinjunctivereliefwas
warranted.Indoingso,thedistrictcourtreferenceditsdeci
sion to deny the School Districts motion to dismiss. The
SchoolDistrictcontendsthatthisrenderedthetwodecisions
inextricably intertwined. Therefore, it reasons that pendent
jurisdictionisappropriatebecausetoengageinameaningful
review of the preliminary injunction order, the court must
alsoreviewthedenialofthemotiontodismiss.
Merelyreferencingtheearlierdecisiontodenythemotion
todismiss,however,didnotinextricablyintertwinethetwo
orders.Certainlythelegalissuesraisedinthemotionsover
lapped,asbothmotionschallenged,indifferentwaysandun
derdifferentstandards,the likelymerits ofAshsclaim.In
voking pendent jurisdiction simply because of this overlap
wouldessentiallyconvertamotionforpreliminaryinjunctive
No.163522 13

reliefintoamotiontodismiss,whichwouldraisethethresh
oldshowingaplaintiffmustmakebeforereceivinginjunctive
relief.Forallpracticalpurposes,thiswouldmeanthatevery
timeamotiontodismissisfiledsimultaneouslywithamotion
for preliminary injunction, this doctrine would apply. This
makes no sense and we do not see a compelling reason for
invokingthedoctrinehere.
B. PreliminaryInjunctiveReliefWasProper
Apreliminaryinjunctionisanextraordinaryremedy.See
GirlScoutsofManitouCouncil,Inc.v.GirlScoutsofUnitedStates
ofAm.,Inc.,549F.3d1079,1085(7thCir.2008)(notingthata
preliminary injunction is an exercise of a very farreaching
power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly de
mandingit.)(internalquotationmarksandcitationomitted).
Itisneverawardedasamatterofright.D.U.v.Rhoades,825
F.3d331,335(7thCir.2016).Wereviewthegrantofaprelim
inary injunction for the abuse of discretion, reviewing legal
issuesdenovo,Jonesv.MarkiewiczQualkinbush,842F.3d1053,
1057(7thCir.2016),whilefactualfindingsarereviewedfor
clearerror.Fed.TradeCommnv.AdvocateHealthCareNetwork,
841F.3d460,467(7thCir.2016).Substantialdeferenceisgiven
tothedistrictcourtsweighingofevidenceandbalancingof
thevariousequitablefactors.Turnellv.CentiMarkCorp.,796
F.3d656,662(7thCir.2015).
A twostep inquiry applies when determining whether
suchreliefisrequired.Id.at661.First,thepartyseekingthe
preliminaryinjunctionhastheburdenofmakingathreshold
showing:(1)thathewillsufferirreparableharmabsentpre
liminaryinjunctivereliefduringthependencyofhisaction;
(2)inadequateremediesatlawexist;and(3)hehasareason
ablelikelihoodofsuccessonthemerits.Id.at66162.Ifthe
14 No.163522

movantsuccessfullymakesthisshowing,thecourtmusten
gage in a balancing analysis, to determine whether the bal
anceofharmfavorsthemovingpartyorwhethertheharmto
other parties or the public sufficiently outweighs the mo
vantsinterests.Jones,842F.3dat1058.
1. AshLikelytoSufferIrreparableHarm
The moving party must demonstrate that he will likely
sufferirreparableharmabsentobtainingpreliminaryinjunc
tiverelief.SeeMichiganv.U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngrs,667F.3d
765,787(7thCir.2011).Thisrequiresmorethanamerepossi
bilityofharm.Id.at788.Itdoesnot,however,requirethatthe
harmactuallyoccurbeforeinjunctivereliefiswarranted.Id.
Nordoesitrequirethattheharmbecertaintooccurbeforea
courtmaygrantreliefonthemerits.Id.Rather,harmiscon
sideredirreparableifitcannotbepreventedorfullyrectified
bythefinaljudgmentaftertrial.GirlScoutsofManitouCoun
cil,Inc.,549F.3dat1089(quotingRolandMach.Co.v.Dresser
Indus.,Inc.,749F.2d380,386(7thCir.1984))(internalquota
tionmarksomitted).Becauseadistrictcourtsdetermination
regardingirreparableharmisafactualfinding,itisreviewed
forclearerror.Id.at1087.
Onappeal,theSchoolDistrictarguesthatthedistrictcourt
erredinfindingthatAshestablishedthathewouldsufferir
reparable harm absent a preliminary injunction. Although
Ash proffered reports from two different experts regarding
the harm caused to him by the School Districts policy, the
SchoolDistrictcontendsthatneitherexpertwasabletoactu
allyquantifythisharm.Further,theSchoolDistrictnotesthat
Ashsfailuretotakeadvantageofreadilyavailablealterna
tives,namelythegenderneutralbathrooms,undermineshis
claimofirreparableharm.Lastly,theSchoolDistrictpointsto
No.163522 15

Ashs delay in seeking injunctive relief as indicative of the

lackofirreparableharm.
The School Districtsarguments miss the point. The dis
trictcourtwaspresentedwithexpertopinionsthatsupported
Ashsassertionthathewouldsufferirreparableharmabsent
preliminaryrelief.Theseexpertsopinedthatuseoftheboys
restroomsisintegraltoAshstransitionandemotionalwell
being.Dr.StephanieBudge,apsychologistwhospecializesin
workingwithadolescentsandadultswhohaveGenderDys
phoria,metwithAshandhismother,andinherreportnoted
thatthetreatmentAshfacedatschoolsignificantlyandneg
ativelyimpactedhismentalhealthandoverallwellbeing.
Dr.BudgealsonotedthatAshreportedcurrentthoughts
ofsuicideandthathisdepressionworsenedeachtimehehad
to meet with school officials regarding his bathroom usage.
Ultimately, she opined that the School Districts actions, in
cluding its bathroom policy, which identified Ash as
transgenderandtherefore,different,weredirectlycausing
significantpsychologicaldistressandplace[Ash]atriskfor
experiencing lifelong diminished wellbeing and lifefunc
tioning.Thedistrictcourtdidnotclearlyerrinrelyingupon
thesefindingswhenitconcludedthatAshwouldsufferirrep
arableharmabsentpreliminaryinjunctiverelief.
Further, the School Districts argument that Ashs harm
wasselfinflictedbecausehechosenottousethegenderneu
tral restrooms, fails to comprehend the harm that Ash has
identified.TheSchoolDistrictactuallyexacerbatedtheharm,
whenitdismissedhimtoaseparatebathroomwherehewas
theonlystudentwhohadaccess.Thisactionfurtherstigma
tizedAsh,indicatingthathewasdifferentbecausehewas
atransgenderboy.
16 No.163522

Moreover,therecorddemonstratesthatthesebathrooms
werenotlocatedclosetoAshsclassrooms.Therefore,hewas
facedwiththeunenviablechoicebetweenusingabathroom
thatwouldfurtherstigmatizehimandcausehimtomissclass
time,oravoiduseofthebathroomaltogetherattheexpense
ofhishealth.
Additionally, Ash alleged that using the singleuser re
stroomsactuallyinvitedmorescrutinyandattentionfromhis
peers,whoinquiredwhyhehadaccesstotheserestroomsand
askedintrusivequestionsabouthistransition.Thisfurtherin
tensifiedhisdepressionandanxietysurroundingtheSchool
Districts policy. Therefore, it cannot be said that the harm
wasselfinflicted.
Finally,Ashdidnotdelayinseekinginjunctiverelief.He
had used the boys bathroom for months without incident,
and he filed an administrative complaint with the Depart
mentofEducationinApril2016,justweeksaftertheschool
begantoenforceitspolicyoncemore.Hemadethedecision
towithdrawthatcomplaintoverthesummerandcommence
theinstantlitigationinsteadsothathecouldpursueinjunc
tivereliefpriortobeginninghissenioryear.Itisimportantto
note that Ash was on summer break and not subject to the
SchoolDistrictsbathroompolicyatthetimehechosetopur
suethelitigation.Therefore,Ashsdecisiontoseekinjunctive
reliefoverthesummerratherthaninitiateanadministrative
complaintdoesnotunderminehisargumentthatthepolicy
was inflicting, and would continue to inflict, irreparable
harm.

No.163522 17

2. NoAdequateRemediesatLaw
Themovingpartymustalsodemonstratethathehasno
adequate remedy at law should the preliminary injunction
notissue.ProtamekIndus.,Ltd.v.EquitracCorp.,300F.3d808,
813(7thCir.2002).Thisdoesnotrequirethathedemonstrate
thattheremedybewhollyineffectual.FoodcommIntlv.Barry,
328F.3d300,304(7thCir.2003).Rather,hemustdemonstrate
thatanyawardwouldbeseriouslydeficientascomparedto
theharmsuffered.Id.
WhiletheSchoolDistrictfocusesthemajorityofitsargu
ments on why Ashs harm is not irreparable, it also argues
thatanyharmhehasallegedlysufferedcanberemediedby
monetary damages. We are not convinced. While monetary
damagesareusedtocompensateplaintiffsintortactions,in
thosesituationsthedamagesrelatetoapastevent,wherethe
harm was inflicted on the plaintiff through negligence or
somethingcomparable.Butthiscaseisnotthetypicaltortac
tion,asAshhasallegedprospectiveharm.Hehasassertedthat
thepolicycausedhimtocontemplatesuicide,aclaimthatwas
creditedbytheexpertreportofDr.Budge.Wecannotsaythat
this potential harmhis suicidecan be compensated by
monetarydamages.Noristhereanadequateremedyforpre
ventable lifelong diminished wellbeing and lifefunction
ing.Therefore,werejecttheSchoolDistrictsanalogytotort
damagesandfindthatAshadequatelyestablishedthatthere
wasnoadequateremedyoflawavailable.
3. LikelihoodofSuccessonMerits
Apartymovingforpreliminaryinjunctivereliefneednot
demonstratealikelihoodofabsolutesuccessonthemerits.In
stead,hemustonlyshowthathischancestosucceedonhis
18 No.163522

claimsarebetterthannegligible.Cooperv.Salazar,196F.3d
809, 813 (7th Cir. 1999). This is a low threshold. U.S. Army
Corps of Engrs, 667 F.3d at 782. Ashs Amended Complaint
containstwoclaimsonepursuanttoTitleIXandtheother
pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.Wewilldiscusseachclaiminturn.
i. TitleIXClaim
TitleIXprovidesthatnopersonshall,onthebasisofsex,
beexcludedfromparticipationin,bedeniedthebenefitsof,
orbesubjectedtodiscriminationunderanyeducationalpro
gramoractivityreceivingFederalfinancialassistance.20
U.S.C.1681(a);seealso34C.F.R.106.31(a).Coveredinstitu
tionsare,therefore,amongotherthings,prohibitedfrom:(1)
providingdifferentaid,benefits,orservices;(2)denyingaid,
benefits,orservices;and(3)subjectinganypersontoseparate
ordifferentrules,sanctions,ortreatmentonthebasisofsex.
See34C.F.R.106.31(b)(2)(4).Pursuanttothestatutesregu
lations,aninstitutionmayprovideseparate,butcomparable,
bathroom,shower,andlockerfacilities.Id.106.33.Thepar
tiesagreethattheSchoolDistrictreceivesfederalfundsand
isacoveredinstitution.
ThepartiesdisputefocusesonthecoverageofTitleIXand
whetherunderthestatute,atransgenderstudentwhoalleges
discrimination on the basis of his or her transgender status
canstateaclaimofsexdiscrimination.Neitherthestatutenor
the regulations define the term sex. Also absent from the
statute is the term biological, which the School District
maintainsisanecessarymodifier.Therefore,weturntothe
SupremeCourtandourcaselawforguidance.
No.163522 19

First,underourowncaselaw,wedonotseeabarrierto
AshsTitleIXclaim.Althoughnotasoftenassomeofoursis
tercircuits,thiscourthaslookedtoTitleVIIwhenconstruing
TitleIX.Seee.g.,Smithv.Metro.Sch.Dist.PerryTwp.,128F.3d
1014,1023(7thCir.1997)(notingthatitishelpfultolookto
TitleVIItodeterminewhethertheallegedsexualharassment
issevereandpervasiveenoughtoconstituteillegaldiscrimi
nation on the basis of sex for purposes of Title IX.). The
SchoolDistrictcontendsthatweshoulddosohere,andrelies
on our reasoning in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d
1081(7thCir.1984),toconcludethatAshcannotstateaclaim
underTitleIXasamatteroflaw.Othercourtshaveagreed
withtheSchoolDistrictsposition.SeeEtsittyv.UtahTransit
Auth.,502F.3d1215,1221(10thCir.2007)(relyinguponUlane
tofindthattranssexualsarenotaprotectedclassunderTitle
VII); Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Commw. Sys. of Higher
Educ.,97F.Supp.3d657,67576(W.D.Pa.2015)(relyingupon
Ulanetofindthatatransgenderstudentcannotstateaclaim
underTitleIX).Wedisagree.
InUlane,wenotedindictathatTitleVIIsprohibitionon
sexdiscriminationimpliesthatitisunlawfultodiscriminate
againstwomenbecausetheyarewomenandagainstmenbe
causetheyaremen.742F.2dat1085.Wethenlookedtothe
lackoflegislativehistoryregardingthemeaningoftheterm
sexinTitleVIIandconcludedthatthisprohibitionshould
begivenanarrow,traditionalinterpretation,whichwould
also exclude transsexuals. Id. at 108586. This reasoning,
however, cannot and does not foreclose Ash and other
transgender students from bringing sexdiscrimination
claimsbaseduponatheoryofsexstereotypingasarticulated
fouryearslaterbytheSupremeCourtinPriceWaterhousev.
Hopkins,490U.S.228(1989).
20 No.163522

InPriceWaterhouse,apluralityoftheSupremeCourtand
twojusticesconcurringinthejudgment,foundthattheplain
tiffhadadequatelyallegedthatheremployer,inviolationof
TitleVII,haddiscriminatedagainstherforbeingtoomascu
line. The plurality further emphasized that we are beyond
thedaywhenanemployercouldevaluateemployeesbyas
sumingorinsistingthattheymatchedthestereotypeassoci
atedwiththeirgroup.Id.at251.Thus,theCourtembraceda
broadviewofTitleVII,asCongressintendedtostrikeatthe
entirespectrumofdisparatetreatmentofmenandwomenre
sultingfromsexstereotypes.Id.;seealsoSprogisv.UnitedAir
Lines,Inc.,444F.2d1194,1198(7thCir.1971)(Inforbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of
theirsex,Congressintendedtostrikeattheentirespectrum
ofdisparatetreatmentofmenandwomenresultingfromsex
stereotypes.).
TheSupremeCourtfurtherembracedanexpansiveview
ofTitleVIIinOncalev.SundownerOffshoreServices,Inc.,523
U.S.75(1998),whereJusticeScalia,writingforaunanimous
Court,declaredthatstatutoryprohibitionsoftengobeyond
theprincipaleviltocoverreasonablycomparableevils,andit
isultimatelytheprovisionsofourlawsratherthantheprin
cipalconcernsofourlegislatorsbywhichwearegoverned.
Id.at79.
FollowingPriceWaterhouse,thiscourtandothershaverec
ognizedacauseofactionunderTitleVIIwhenanadverseac
tionistakenbecauseofanemployeesfailuretoconformto
sexstereotypes.See,e.g.,Doev.CityofBelleville,119F.3d563,
58081(7thCir.1997),vacatedonothergrounds,523U.S.1001
(1998);Christiansenv.OmnicomGrp.,Inc.,852F.3d195,201(2d
Cir.2017);Bibbyv.Phila.CocaColaBottlingCo.,260F.3d257,
No.163522 21

26364(3dCir.2001);Nicholsv.AztecaRest.Enters.,Inc.,256
F.3d864,87475(9thCir.2001);Higginsv.NewBalanceAthletic
Shoe,Inc.,194F.3d252,261n.4(1stCir.1999).Ourmostrecent
applicationoccurredwhen,sittingenbanc,weheldthataho
mosexualplaintiffcanstateaTitleVIIclaimofsexdiscrimi
nationbaseduponatheoryofsexstereotyping.Hivelyv.Ivy
Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 35152 (7th Cir. 2017)
(holdingthatahomosexualplaintiffmaystateaclaimforsex
baseddiscriminationunderTitleVIIundereitherasexstere
otypingtheoryorundertheassociationaltheory).
The School District argues that even under a sexstereo
typingtheory,Ashcannotdemonstratealikelihoodofsuccess
onhisTitleIXclaimbecauseitspolicyisnotbasedonwhether
thestudentbehaves,walks,talks,ordressesinamannerthat
is inconsistent with any preconceived notions of sex stereo
types.Instead,itcontendsthatasamatteroflaw,requiringa
biologicalfemaletousethewomensbathroomisnotsexste
reotyping.However,thisviewistoonarrow.
Bydefinition,atransgenderindividualdoesnotconform
tothesexbasedstereotypesofthesexthatheorshewasas
signed at birth. We are not alone in this belief. See Glenn v.
Brumby,663F.3d1312(11thCir.2011).InGlenn,theEleventh
Circuitnotedthat[a]personisdefinedastransgenderpre
ciselybecauseoftheperceptionthathisorherbehaviortrans
gressesgenderstereotypes.Id.at1316.TheEleventhCircuit
reiteratedthisconclusioninapercuriamunpublishedopinion,
noting that sex discrimination includes discrimination
against a transgender person for gender nonconformity.
Chavezv.CreditNationAutoSales,LLC,641F.Appx883,884
(11thCir.2016)(unpub.).
22 No.163522

TheSixthCircuithasalsorecognizedatransgenderplain
tiffsabilitytobringasexstereotypingclaim.InSmithv.City
of Salem 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004), the plaintiff was diag
nosed with Gender Identity Disorder, a condition later re
namedGenderDysphoria.Bornamale,theplaintiffbeganto
presentatworkwithamorefeminineappearanceandman
nerisms.He5allegedinhiscomplaintthatasaresult,hisem
ployerschemedtotakeactionagainsthimandultimatelysub
jectedhimtoapretextualsuspensioninviolationofTitleVII.
While thedistrict courtconcludedthatbecausetheplaintiff
wastranssexualhewasnotentitledtoTitleVIIsprotections,
theSixthCircuitdisagreed.
Instead,theSixthCircuitnotedthatPriceWaterhouseestab
lished that the prohibition on sex discrimination encom
passes both the biological differences between men and
women, and gender discrimination, that is, discrimination
basedonafailuretoconformtostereotypicalgendernorms.
Id.at573(citingPriceWaterhouse,490U.S.at251).IfTitleVII
prohibitsanemployerfromdiscriminatingagainstawoman
fordressingtoomasculine,then,thecourtreasoned,TitleVII
likewiseprohibitsanemployerfromdiscriminatingagainsta
manwhodressesinawaythatitperceivesastoofeminine.In
bothexamplesthediscriminationwouldnotoccurbutforthe
victimssex,inviolationofTitleVII.Id.at574.Therefore,the
plaintiffsstatusastranssexualwasnotabartohisclaim.
Severaldistrictcourtshaveadoptedthisreasoning,find
ingthatatransgenderplaintiffcanstateaclaimunderTitle

5WewillusethemasculinepronountorefertotheSmithplaintifffor

thepurposeofclarity,asthisishowtheSixthCircuitreferredtotheSmith
plaintiffthroughoutitsopinion.
No.163522 23

VIIforsexdiscriminationonthebasisofasexstereotyping
theory.SeeValentineGev.Dun&Bradstreet,Inc.,No.6:15CV
1029ORL41GJK, 2017 WL 347582, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 24,
2017);Robertsv.ClarkCty.Sch.Dist.,215F.Supp.3d1001,1014
(D.Nev.2016),reconsiderationdenied,No.2:15CV00388JAD
PAL,2016WL6986346(D.Nev.Nov.28,2016);Fabianv.Hosp.
of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 527 (D. Conn. 2016);
E.E.O.C.v.R.G.&G.R.HarrisFuneralHomes,Inc.,100F.Supp.
3d594,603(E.D.Mich.2015);Lopezv.RiverOaksImaging&
DiagnosticGrp.,Inc.,542F.Supp.2d653,660(S.D.Tex.2008);
Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.D.C. 2008).
Further,courtshaveappliedPriceWaterhouseandfoundthat
transgenderplaintiffscanstateclaimsbaseduponasexste
reotypingtheoryundertheGenderMotivatedViolenceAct,
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000), and
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Rosa v. Park W. Bank &
TrustCo.214F.3d213,21516(1stCir.2000).
Here,however,theSchoolDistrictarguesthatthisreason
ingfliesinthefaceofTitleIX,asCongresshasnotexplicitly
added transgenderstatus asaprotectedcharacteristictoei
therTitleVIIorTitleIX,despitehavingopportunitiestodo
so. See e.g., Student NonDiscrimination Act of 2015 S. 439
114thCong.(2015).TheSupremeCourthasrejectedthisar
gument,statingthatcongressionalinactionlackspersuasive
significance because several equally tenable inferences may
bedrawnfromsuchinaction,includingtheinferencethatthe
existinglegislationalreadyincorporatedtheofferedchange.
Pension Benefit. Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650
(1990)(quotingUnitedStatesv.Wise,370U.S.405,411(1962))
(internalquotationmarksomitted);seealsoHively,853F.3dat
344 ([I]t is simply too difficult to draw a reliable inference
fromthesetruncatedlegislativeinitiativestorestouropinion
24 No.163522

onthem.).Therefore,Congressionalinactionisnotdetermi
native.
Rather,Ashcandemonstratealikelihoodofsuccessonthe
meritsofhisclaimbecausehehasallegedthattheSchoolDis
tricthasdeniedhimaccesstotheboysrestroombecausehe
istransgender.Apolicythatrequiresanindividualtousea
bathroomthatdoesnotconformwithhisorhergenderiden
tity punishesthat individualforhisorhergendernoncon
formance,whichinturnviolatesTitleIX.TheSchoolDistricts
policyalsosubjectsAsh,asatransgenderstudent,todifferent
rules, sanctions, and treatment than nontransgender stu
dents,inviolationofTitleIX.Providingagenderneutralal
ternative is not sufficient to relieve the School District from
liability,asitisthepolicyitselfwhichviolatestheAct.Fur
ther,basedontherecordhere,thesegenderneutralalterna
tiveswerenottruealternativesbecauseoftheirdistantloca
tion to Ashs classrooms and the increased stigmatization
theycausedAsh.Rather,theSchoolDistrictonlycontinuedto
treat Ash differently when it provided him with access to
thesegenderneutralbathroomsbecausehewastheonlystu
dentgivenaccess.
And,whiletheSchoolDistrictrepeatedlyassertsthatAsh
maynotunilaterallydeclarehisgender,thisargumentmis
representsAshsclaimsanddismisseshistransgenderstatus.
Thisisnotacasewhereastudenthasmerelyannouncedthat
he is a different gender. Rather, Ash has a medically diag
nosedanddocumentedcondition.Sincehisdiagnosis,hehas
consistentlylivedinaccordancewithhisgenderidentity.This
lawsuitdemonstratesthatthedecisiontodosowasnotwith
outcostorpain.Therefore,wefindthatAshhassufficiently
No.163522 25

establishedaprobabilityofsuccessonthemeritsofhisTitle
IXclaim.
ii. EqualProtectionClaim
Althoughwearemindfulofourdutytoavoidrendering
unnecessary constitutional decisions, ISI Intl, Inc. v. Borden
Ladner Gervais LLP, 256 F.3d 548, 552 (7th Cir. 2001), as
amended(July2,2001),wewilladdressAshsEqualProtection
claimasthedistrictcourtdeterminedthatAshalsodemon
stratedanadequateprobabilityofsuccessontheclaimtojus
tifythepreliminaryinjunction.TheEqualProtectionClause
oftheFourteenthAmendmentisessentiallyadirectionthat
allpersonssimilarlysituatedshouldbetreatedalike.Cityof
Cleburnev.CleburneLivingCtr.,473U.S.432,439(1985)(citing
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). It therefore, protects
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination. See Vill. of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam).
Generally,stateactionispresumedtobelawfulandwillbe
upheldiftheclassificationdrawnbythestatuteisrationally
relatedtoalegitimatestateinterest.CityofCleburne,473U.S.
at440.
The rational basis test, however, does not apply when a
classificationisbaseduponsex.Rather,asexbasedclassifica
tionissubjecttoheightenedscrutiny,assexfrequentlybears
norelationtotheabilitytoperformorcontributetosociety.
Id.at44041(quotingFrontierov.Richardson,411U.S.677,686
(1973))(internalquotationmarksomitted);seealsoJ.E.B.v.Al
abamaexrel.T.B.,511U.S.127,135(1994).Whenasexbased
classification is used, the burden rests with the state to
demonstrate that its proffered justification is exceedingly
persuasive.UnitedStatesv.Virginia,518U.S.515,533(1996);
seealsoHaydenexrel.A.H.v.GreensburgCmty.Sch.Corp.,743
26 No.163522

F.3d569,577(7thCir.2014).Thisrequiresthestatetoshow
thattheclassificationservesimportantgovernmentalobjec
tives and that the discriminatory means employed are sub
stantiallyrelatedtotheachievementofthoseobjectives.Vir
ginia,518U.S.at524(internalquotationmarksomitted).Itis
notsufficienttoprovideahypothesizedorposthocjustifica
tioncreatedinresponsetolitigation.Id.at533.Normaythe
justificationbebaseduponoverbroadgeneralizationsabout
sex.Id.Instead,thejustificationmustbegenuine.Id.
Ifastateactorcannotdefendasexbasedclassificationby
relying upon overbroad generalizations, it follows that sex
basedstereotypesarealsoinsufficienttosustainaclassifica
tion.SeeJ.E.B.,511U.S.at138(rejectingthestatesrelianceon
sexbasedstereotypesasadefensetothediscriminatoryuse
ofperemptorychallengesduringjuryselection);seeGlennv.
Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2011) (All persons,
whether transgender or not, are protected from discrimina
tiononthebasisofgenderstereotype.).
Asathresholdmatter,wemustdeterminewhatstandard
ofreviewappliestoAshsclaim.TheSchoolDistricturgesus
toapplytherationalbasistest,arguingthattransgendersta
tusisnotasuspectclass.Applyingthattest,theSchoolDis
trictcontendsthatitspolicy ispresumptively constitutional
andthatrequiringstudentstousefacilitiescorrespondingto
theirbirthsextoprotecttheprivacyofallstudentsisarational
basisforitspolicy.So,theSchoolDistrictmaintainsthatAsh
cannotdemonstratealikelihoodofsuccessonhisEqualPro
tectionClaim.
Ashdisagrees.Hearguesthattransgenderstatusshould
be entitled to heightened scrutiny in its own right, as
transgenderpeopleareaminoritywhohavehistoricallybeen
No.163522 27

subjectedtodiscriminationbasedupontheimmutablechar
acteristicsoftheirgenderidentities.Alternatively,heargues
that even if transgender status is not afforded heightened
scrutinyinitsownright,theSchoolDistrictsbathroompolicy
creates a sexbased classification such that heightened scru
tinyshouldapply.
Thereisnodenyingthattransgenderindividualsfacedis
crimination,harassment,andviolencebecauseoftheirgender
identity.AccordingtoareportissuedbytheNationalCenter
for Transgender Equality, 78% of students who identify as
transgenderorasgendernonconformant,reportbeinghar
assedwhileingradesK12.SeeJaimeM.Grantetal.,Injustice
atEveryTurn:AReportoftheNationalTransgenderDiscrimina
tion Survey, Natl Center for Transgender Equality, at 33
(2011), available at http://www.transequality.org/sites/de
fault/files/docs/resources/NTDS_Report.pdf. These same in
dividuals in K12 also reported an alarming rate of assault,
with35%reportingphysicalassaultand12%reportingsexual
assault.Id.Asaresult,15%oftransgenderandgendernon
conformantstudentssurveyedmadethedecisiontodropout.
Id.Thesestatisticsarealarming.Butthiscasedoesnotrequire
ustoreachthequestionofwhethertransgenderstatusisper
se entitled to heightened scrutiny. It is enough to stay that,
justasinPriceWaterhouse,therecordforthepreliminaryin
junctionshowssexstereotyping.Wenoteaswellthatthereis
norequirementthateverygirl,oreveryboy,besubjectedto
thesamestereotyping.ItisenoughthatAshhasexperienced
thisformofsexdiscrimination.
Here,theSchoolDistrictspolicycannotbestatedwithout
referencing sex, as the School District decides which bath
28 No.163522

roomastudentmayusebaseduponthesexlistedonthestu
dentsbirthcertificate.Thispolicyisinherentlybasedupona
sexclassificationandheightenedreviewapplies.Further,the
SchoolDistrictarguesthatsinceittreatsallboysandgirlsthe
same,itdoesnotviolatetheEqualProtectionClause.Thisis
untrue.Rather,theSchoolDistricttreatstransgenderstudents
likeAsh,whofailtoconformtothesexbasedstereotypesas
sociated with their assigned sex at birth, differently. These
studentsaredisciplinedundertheSchoolDistrictsbathroom
policyiftheychoosetouseabathroomthatconformstotheir
genderidentity.ThisplacestheburdenontheSchoolDistrict
todemonstratethatitsjustificationforitsbathroompolicyis
notonlygenuine,butalsoexceedinglypersuasive.SeeVir
ginia,518U.S.at533.Thisburdenhasnotbeenmethere.
TheSchoolDistrictdefendsitsbathroompolicybyclaim
ing it needs to protect the privacy rights of all 22,160 stu
dents.6 The mere presence of a transgender student in the
bathroom,theSchoolDistrictargues,infringesuponthepri
vacyrightsofotherstudentswithwhomheorshedoesnot
share biological anatomy. While this court certainly recog
nizesthattheSchoolDistricthasalegitimateinterestinen
suring bathroom privacy rights are protected, this interest
mustbeweighedagainstthefactsofthecaseandnotjustex
aminedintheabstract,todeterminewhetherthisjustification
isgenuine.

6WenotethattheSchoolDistrictsrelianceupontheprivacyinterests

ofallofits22,160studentsisoddgiventhatthepreliminaryinjunction
orderonlypertainstoAsh,astudentatoneofitshighschools.Manyof
theSchoolDistrictsstudentsattendschoolsotherthanTremperandare
therefore,totallyunaffectedbythedistrictcourtsorder.
No.163522 29

WhattherecorddemonstrateshereisthattheSchoolDis
trictsprivacyargumentisbaseduponsheerconjectureand
abstraction.Fornearlysixmonths,Ashusedtheboysbath
room while at school and schoolsponsored events without
incident or complaint from another student. In fact, it was
onlywhenateacherwitnessedAshwashinghishandsinthe
restroomthathisbathroomusageoncemorebecameanissue
intheSchoolDistrictseyes.Andwhileatoralargument,the
SchoolDistrictassertedthatithadreceivedjustonecomplaint
fromaparent,thisisinsufficienttosupportitspositionthat
itspolicyisrequiredtoprotecttheprivacyrightsofeachand
everystudent.CounselfortheSchoolDistrictcitedtoAshs
AmendedComplaintforthisassertion.TheAmendedCom
plaint,however,statesthatsomeparentsandotherKenosha
residentsbegantospeakoutinoppositiontoAshsrightto
use the boys restrooms. Am.Comp. 77. It further states
that several community members spoke at a School Board
meeting and voiced their opposition to a policy that would
allow transgender students to use genderappropriate re
strooms.Seeid.(OneparenttoldtheBoardthathewasop
posedtopermittingtransgenderstudentstousegenderap
propriaterestrooms.).Nonetheless,neitherpartyhasof
feredanyevidenceorevenallegedthattheSchoolDistricthas
receivedanycomplaintsfromotherstudents.Thispolicydoes
nothingtoprotecttheprivacyrightsofeachindividualstu
dentvisvisstudentswhosharesimilaranatomyanditig
noresthepracticalrealityofhowAsh,asatransgenderboy,
usesthebathroom:byenteringastallandclosingthedoor.
A transgender students presence in the restroom pro
videsnomoreofarisktootherstudentsprivacyrightsthan
thepresenceofanoverlycuriousstudentofthesamebiolog
icalsexwhodecidestosneakglancesathisorherclassmates
30 No.163522

performing their bodily functions. Or for that matter, any

otherstudentwhousesthebathroomatthesametime.Com
mon sense tells us that the communal restroom is a place
whereindividualsactinadiscreetmannertoprotecttheirpri
vacy and those who have true privacy concerns are able to
utilize a stall. Nothing in the record suggests that the bath
roomsatTremperHighSchoolareparticularlysusceptibleto
an intrusion upon an individuals privacy. Further, if the
SchoolDistrictsconcernisthatachildwillbeinthebathroom
withanotherchildwhodoesnotlookanatomicallythesame,
then it would seem that separate bathrooms also would be
appropriate for prepubescent and postpubescent children
who do not look alike anatomically. But the School District
hasnotdrawnthisline.Therefore,thiscourtagreeswiththe
districtcourtthattheSchoolDistrictsprivacyargumentsare
insufficient to establish an exceedingly persuasive justifica
tionfortheclassification.
Additionally,atoralargument,counselfortheSchoolDis
trictclarifiedthattheonlywaythatAshwouldbepermitted
tousetheboysrestroomwouldbeifheweretopresentthe
schoolwithabirthcertificatethatdesignatedhissexasmale.
ButitisimportanttokeepinmindthattheSchoolDistricthas
notprovidedawrittencopyofthepolicy.Norisitclearthat
oneevenexists.And,beforethislitigation,Ashsmotherwas
nevertoldthatsheneededtoproduceabirthcertificate.In
stead,whensheaskedtheSchoolDistricttopermithimtouse
the boys restroom, the schools assistant principal told her
that Ash could use the boys restroom only if his sex was
changedintheschoolsofficialrecords.Todoso,Ashwould
need to submit unspecified legal or medical documenta
tion. Despite explaining to the assistant principal that Ash
No.163522 31

wastooyoungtohavesexreassignmentsurgeryandpresent
ingtheSchoolDistrictwithtwolettersfromAshspediatri
cian,Ashwasstillnotallowedtousetheboysrestroom.
Further,itisunclearthatthesexmarkeronabirthcertifi
catecanevenbeusedasatrueproxyforanindividualsbio
logicalsex.Themarkerdoesnottakeintoaccountanindivid
ualschromosomalmakeup,whichisalsoakeycomponent
ofonesbiologicalsex.Therefore,onesbirthcertificatecould
reflect a male sex, while the individuals chromosomal
makeupreflectsanother.Itisalsounclearwhatwouldhap
penifanindividualisbornwiththeexternalgenitaliaoftwo
sexes,orgenitaliathatisambiguousinnature.Inthosecases,
it is clear that the marker on the birth certificate would not
adequatelyaccountfororreflectonesbiologicalsex,which
wouldhavetobedeterminedbyconsideringmorethanwhat
waslistedonthepaper.
Moreover,whileitistruethatinWisconsinanindividual
mayonlychangehisorherdesignatedsexonabirthcertifi
cate after completing a surgical reassignment, see Wis. Stat.
Ann.69.15(4),thisisnotuniversallythecase.Forexample,
asAshscounselpointedoutduringoralargument,inMin
nesota,anindividualmayamendhisorherbirthcertificateto
reflect his or her gender identity without surgical reassign
ment. See Requirements for documents submitted to support the
amendment of a birth record, MINNESOTA DEPT OF HEALTH,
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/chs/osr/reqdocs.html#gender
(lastvisitedMay30,2017).Therefore,astudentwhoisborn
inMinnesotaandbeginshistransitionthere,obtainingamod
ifiedbirthcertificateaspartoftheprocess,couldmovetoKe
noshaandbepermittedtousetheboysrestroominoneof
32 No.163522

the School Districts schools even though he retains female

anatomy.
Additionally,thepolicyfailstoaccountforthefactthata
new student registering with the School District need not
evenprovideabirthcertificate.Rather,theSchoolDistrictre
quiresthateachnewstudentprovideeitherabirthcertificate
or a passport. See Registration, KENOSHA UNIFIED SCH. DIST.,
http://www.kusd.edu/registration (last visited May 30, 2017).
PursuanttotheUnitedStatesDepartmentofStatespolicies,
anindividualmayapplyforandreceiveapassportthatre
flectshisorhergenderidentitybypresentingasignedmedi
cal certification from a physician. See Gender Designation
Change, U.S. DEPT OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/con
tent/passports/en/passports/information/gen
der.html#change(lastvisitedMay30,2017).Thisprocessdoes
notrequirethatanindividualhaveundergonesexreassign
mentsurgery.Therefore,theSchoolDistrictsrelianceupona
birth certificates sexmarker demonstrates the arbitrary na
ture of the policy; so, Ash has met the low threshold of
demonstrating a probability of success on his Equal Protec
tionClaim.
4. BalanceofHarmsFavorsAsh
Havingalreadydeterminedthatthedistrictcourtdidnot
errinfindingthatAshwillsufferirreparableharmabsentpre
liminary injunctive relief, we now must look at whether
granting preliminary injunctive relief will harm the School
Districtandthepublicasawhole.Onceamovingpartyhas
metitsburdenofestablishingthethresholdrequirementsfor
a preliminary injunction, the court must balance the harms
facedbybothpartiesandthepublicasawhole.SeeGirlScouts
ofManitouCouncil,Inc.v.GirlScoutsofU.S.ofAm.,Inc.,549
No.163522 33

F.3d 1079, 1100 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Turnell v. CentiMark
Corp.,796F.3d656,662(7thCir.2015).Thisisdoneonaslid
ingscalemeasuringthebalanceofharmsagainstthemoving
partys likelihood of success. Turnell, 796 F.3d at 662. The
morelikelyheistosucceedonthemerits,thelessthescale
musttipinhisfavor.Id.Theconverse,however,alsoistrue:
thelesslikelyheistowin,themorethebalanceofharmsmust
weigh in his favor for an injunction to issue. Id. Substantial
deferenceisgiventothedistrictcourtsanalysisofthebalanc
ingofharms.Id.
TheSchoolDistrictarguesthatthedistrictcourterredin
determiningthatthebalanceoftheharmsweighedinfavor
ofgrantingtheinjunctionbecauseitignoredthefactthatthe
harmextendsto22,160studentsintheSchoolDistrictwhose
privacyrightsareatriskbyallowingatransgenderstudentto
utilizeabathroomthatdoesnotcorrespondwithhisbiologi
calsex.Grantingtheinjunction,theSchoolDistrictcontinues,
alsoirreparablyharmedthesestudentsparents,whoarenow
denied the right to direct the education and upbringing of
their children. Additionally, the School District asserts that
the injunction harms the public as a whole, since it forces
otherschooldistrictsnationwidetocontemplatewhetherthey
mustchangetheirpoliciesandaltertheirfacilitiesorriskbe
ing found out of compliance with Title IX. Noncompliance
placestheirfederalfundingatrisk.Baseduponthisrecord,
however,wefindtheSchoolDistrictsargumentsunpersua
sive.
TheSchoolDistricthasnotdemonstratedthatitwillsuffer
anyharmfromhavingtocomplywiththedistrictcourtspre
liminaryinjunctionorder.Norhasitestablishedthatthepub
licasawholewillsufferharm.Asnotedabove,beforeseeking
34 No.163522

injunctiverelief,Ashusedthebathroomfornearlysixmonths
withoutincident.TheSchoolDistricthasnotproducedanyev
idencethatanystudentshaveevercomplainedaboutAshs
presenceintheboysrestroom.Norhavetheydemonstrated
that Ashs presence has actually caused an invasion of any
otherstudentsprivacy.AndwhiletheSchoolDistrictclaims
thatpreliminaryinjunctivereliefinfringesuponparentsabil
ity todirectthe educationoftheir children, it offers no evi
dencethataparenthaseverassertedthisright.Theseclaims
areallspeculative.
Wearefurtherconvincedthatthedistrictcourtdidnoterr
infindingthatthisbalanceweighedinfavorofgrantingthe
injunction when considering the statements made by amici,
whoareschooladministratorsfromtwentyonestatesandthe
District of Columbia. Together, these administrators are re
sponsible for educating approximately 1.4 million students.
Each administrator has experience implementing inclusive
bathroom policies in their respective schools, and each has
grappledwiththesameprivacyconcernsthattheSchoolDis
trict raises here. These administrators uniformly agree that
thefrequentlyraisedandhypotheticalconcernsaboutapol
icy that permits a student to utilize a bathroom consistent
withhisorhergenderidentityhavesimplynotmaterialized.
Rather,intheircombinedexperience,allstudentsneedsare
bestservedwhenstudentsaretreatedequally.
AlthoughtheSchoolDistrictarguesthatimplementingan
inclusivepolicywillresultinthedemiseofgendersegregated
facilitiesinschools,theamicinotethatthishasnotbeenthe
case. In fact, these administrators have found that allowing
transgenderstudentstousefacilitiesthatalignwiththeirgen
No.163522 35

deridentityhasactuallyreinforcedtheconceptofseparatefa
cilitiesforboysandgirls.Whenconsideringtheexperienceof
thisgroupinlightoftherecordhere,whichisvirtuallydevoid
ofany complaintsorharmcaused to the School District, its
students,orthepublicasawhole,itisclearthatthedistrict
courtdidnoterrinbalancingtheharms.
III.CONCLUSION
Appellantsmotiontohavethiscourtassertpendentap
pellantjurisdictionoverthedistrictcourtsdenialofAppel
lantsMotiontoDismissisDENIED. Thedistrictcourtsorder
grantingtheAppelleesmotionforapreliminaryinjunctionis
AFFIRMED.