PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., petitioners, considered a separate will of each testator.

Thus regarded,
vs.
MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of
probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of First Instance of Cebu
(when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive
effect as to his last will and testament despite the fact that even
then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills,
whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of
a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). The error thus committed
by the probate court was an error of law, that should have been
corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of
the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision,
however erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for
the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world (Manalo vs.
Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estates of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156); and
public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of
occasional errors judgment of courts should become final at
some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis set
litium (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil, 521, and other cases cited
in 2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1963 Ed., p. 322).
the holding of the court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint will
is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the
deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the properties in question, for the
reasons extensively discussed in our decision in Bilbao vs. Bilbao,
87 Phil. 144, that explained the previous holding in Macrohon vs.
Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267.
Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass
upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the
testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is
shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said
Gervasia.
It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should
be in common usage could not make them valid when our Civil
Codes consistently invalidated them, because laws are only
repealed by other subsequent laws, and no usage to the contrary
may prevail against their observance (Art. 5, Civ. Code of 1889;
Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950).

Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la

Cerna, are concluded by the 1939 decree admitting his will to
probate. The contention that being void the will cannot be
validated, overlooks that the ultimate decision on Whether an act
is valid or void rests with the courts, and here they have spoken
with finality when the will was probated in 1939. On this court,
the dismissal of their action for partition was correct.

But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account

also, to avoid future misunderstanding, that the probate
decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the
deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not
include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia
Rebaca, who was then still alive, and over whose interest
in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no
jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then
be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil
Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's
lifetime.

It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the

estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death,
reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is

SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan, respondent.
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American
citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance
with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
.
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of
the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this
Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities
prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of
wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines
are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in
accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his
domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines;
(3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country;
(4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court,
and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of
Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500
[1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first
and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed
evidence.
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either
for the testators reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third
person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at
bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the
two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to
property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical
considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a
number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to
bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187
SCRA 743 [1990]).
RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA
SANTIAGO, respondents.
whether or not the will in question was executed and attested as
required by law.
Petitioner, in her first assignment, contends that the respondent
Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F",
was executed and attested as required by law when there was
absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were
credible witnesses. She argues that the require. ment in Article
806, Civil Code, that the witnesses must be credible is an
absolute requirement which must be complied with before an
alleged last will and testament may be admitted to probate and
that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on record
that the witness has a good standing in his community, or that
he is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable.
We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article
820 of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a witness to
the execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth the
disqualification from being a witness to a win. These Articles
state:
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen
years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and
write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in
article 806 of this Code. "Art. 821. The following are disqualified
from being witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a
document, perjury or false testimony.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that
the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial
as to his good standing in the community, his reputation
for trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and
uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed
and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the
qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code
are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind
can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the
questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or
more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or
competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he
is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and
write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has
none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil
Code
Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y
LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO, petitioner-appellee,
(lalabs sa exam Louie)
vs.
LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO, oppositors-
appellants.
The next contention of appellants refers to the revocatory clause
contained in 1939 will of the deceased which was denied
probate. They contend that, notwithstanding the disallowance of
said will, the revocatory clause is valid and still has the effect of
nullifying the prior of 1918.
A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will,
having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed
in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the
effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory
clause is void.
. A long line of authorities is cited in support of this contention.
And these authorities hold the view, that "an express revocation
is immediately effective upon the execution of the subsequent
will, and does not require that it first undergo the formality of a
probate proceeding". (p. 63, appellants' brief .
It is true that our law on the matter (sec. 623, Code Civil
Procedure) provides that a will may be some will, codicil, or other
writing executed as proved in case of wills" but it cannot be said
that the 1939 will should be regarded, not as a will within the
meaning of said word, but as "other writing executed as provided
in the case of wills", simply because it was denied probate. And
even if it be regarded as any other writing within the meaning of
said clause, there is authority for holding that unless said writing
is admitted to probate, it cannot have the effect of revocation.
(See 57 Am. Jur. pp. 329-330).
There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator
deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will because of his
knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will he
executed in 1939. The only evidence we have is that when the
first will was executed in 1918, Juan Salcedo, who prepared it,
gave the original and copies to the testator himself and
apparently they remained in his possession until he executed his
second will in 1939. And when the 1939 will was denied probate
on November 29, 1943, and petitioner was asked by her attorney
to look for another will, she found the duplicate copy (Exhibit A)
among the papers or files of the testator. She did not find the
original.
If it can be inferred that the testator deliberately destroyed the
1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause of
the 1939 will, and it is true that he gave a duplicate copy thereof
to his wife, the herein petitioner, the most logical step for the
testator to take is to recall said duplicate copy in order that it
may likewise be destroyed. But this was not done as shown by
the fact that said duplicate copy remained in the possession of
petitioner. It is possible that because of the long lapse of twenty-
one (21) years since the first will was executed, the original of
the will had been misplaced or lost, and forgetting that there was
a copy, the testator deemed it wise to execute another will
containing exactly the same testamentary dispositions. Whatever
may be the conclusion we may draw from this chain of
circumstances, the stubborn fact is that there is no direct
evidence of voluntary or deliberate destruction of the first will by
the testator. This matter cannot be inference or conjectur.
Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was
voluntarily destroyed by the testator after the execution of the
second will, which revoked the first, could there be any doubt,
under this theory, that said earlier will was destroyed by the
testator in the honest belief that it was no longer necessary
because he had expressly revoked it in his will of 1939? In other
words, can we not say that the destruction of the earlier will was
but the necessary consequence of the testator's belief that the
revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was valid and
the latter would be given effect? If such is the case, then it is our
opinion that the earlier will can still be admitted to probate under
the principle of "dependent relative revocation".
This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative
revocation, and is usually applied where the testator
cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument
intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make
a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the
old, and the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails
of effect for same reason. The doctrine is n limited to the
existence of some other document, however, and has
been applied where a will was destroyed as a
consequence of a mistake of law. . . . (68 C.J.P. 799).
The rule is established that where the act of destruction
is connected with the making of another will so as fairly
to raise the inference that the testator meant the
revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of a new
disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will
be conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the
new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will
intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the
revocation fails and the original will remains in full force.
(Gardner, pp. 232, 233.)
In the mater of the estate of Jesus de Leon. IGNACIA
DIAZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DE LEON, opponent-appellee. (lalabas sa exam louie)
The only question raised in this case is whether or to the will
executed by Jesus de Leon, now, was revoked by him.
The petitioner denies such revocation, while the contestant
affirms the same by alleging that the testator revoked his will by
destroying it, and by executing another will expressly revoking
the former.
We find that the second will Exhibit 1 executed by the deceased
is not cloth with all the necessary requisites to constitute a
sufficient revocation.
But according to the statute governing the subject in this
jurisdiction, the destruction of a will animo revocandi constitutes,
in itself, a sufficient revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of Civil
Procedure.)lvvph1n+
From the evidence submitted in this case, it appears that the
testator, shortly after the execution of the first will in question,
asked that the same be returned to him. The instrument was
returned to the testator who ordered his servant to tear the
document. This was done in his presence and before a nurse who
testified to this effect. After some time, the testator, being asked
by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the will, said that it had been
destroyed.
The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the
established fact that the testator was anxious to
withdraw or change the provisions he had made in his
first will. This fact is disclosed by the testator's own
statements to the witnesses Canto and the Mother
Superior of the Hospital where he was confined.
The original will herein presented for probate having
been destroyed with animo revocandi, cannot now be
probated as the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA
MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION
MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, AND
ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO
MALOTO, respondents.
There is no doubt as to the testamentary capacity of the testatrix
and the due execution of the will. The heart of the case lies on
the issue as to whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana.
The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be
found in Article 830.
 Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the
following cases:
(1) By implication of law; or
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as
provided in case of wills: or
(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will
with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself,
or by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction. If burned, torn cancelled, or
obliterated by some other person, without the express
direction of the testator, the will may still be established,
and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its
contents, and due execution, and the fact of its
unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are
established according to the Rules of Court. (Emphasis
Supplied.)
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like
burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective
revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus
revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that
the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may
be performed by another person but under the express direction
and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without
saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke,
may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite
alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the
necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last
will and testament. The intention to revoke must be
accompanied by the overt physical act of burning,
tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by
the testator or by another person in his presence and
under his express direction.
Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased.
FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CORNELIO MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA,
FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-
appellees.
With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that
there is positive proof, not denied, which was accepted by the
lower court, that will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The
law does not require any evidence of the revocation or
cancellation of a will to be preserved. It therefore becomes
difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills.
The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place
must either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence
showing that after due search the original will cannot be found.
Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the
possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in
the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was
cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is
shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot
be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will
has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge
or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of
cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly,
being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never
conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not
destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
In view of the fat that the original will of 1919 could not be found
after the death of the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of
the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are
forced to the conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court
are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a
proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the
proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its
existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the
burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. In
a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for the
purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of
cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation
perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by
the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by
proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each
copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of
the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it
is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not
cancelled or destroyed by the testator. (Borromeo vs. Casquijo,
G.R. No. L-26063.)1
ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ROSARIO GUEVARA and her husband PEDRO BUISON,
respondent-appellees
1. EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION; NOT PROPER IN TESTATE
SUCCESSION. Section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
authorizing the heirs of a person who dies intestate to make
extrajudicial partition of the property of the deceased, without
going into any court of justice, makes express reference to
intestate succession, and therefore excludes testate succession.
2. ID.; EFFECTS OF; TESTATE SUCCESSION. In the instant case,
which is a testate succession, the heirs made an extrajudicial
partition of the estate and at the same time instituted proceeding
for the probate of the will and the administration of the estate.
When the time came for making the partition, they submitted to
the court the extrajudicial partition previously made by them,
which the court approved. Held: That for the purposes of the
reservation and the rights and obligations created thereby, in
connection with the relatives benefited, the property must not be
deemed transmitted to the heirs from the time the extrajudicial
partition was made, but from the time said partition was
approved by the court. (Syllabus.)
HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM, G.R. No. 168156
- versus - CALLEJO, SR., and
However, contrary to the ruling of the MTCC and RTC, the
purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay could not
properly be relied upon to establish petitioners right to possess
the subject lot because, without having been probated, the said
last will and testament could not be the source of any right.
Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:
Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless
it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court
having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of
wills after the testators death shall govern.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either
during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.
In Caiza v. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court ruled that: [a]
will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the
testators death, it may be changed or revoked; and until
admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no
right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite
explicit: No will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court.[12]
Further, it is not quite correct for petitioners to contend that the
children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first marriage could not have
conveyed portions of the subject lot to respondent, as she had
claimed, because until the present, it is still covered by OCT Nos.
196 and 1032 under the names of Pedro and Leona Cuntapay. To
recall, it was already agreed by the heirs of the said spouses in a
Partition Agreement dated December 28, 1979 that the subject
lot would belong to Isabel Cuntapay. The latter died leaving her
six children by both marriages as heirs. Considering that her
purported last will and testament has, as yet, no force and effect
for not having been probated, her six children are deemed to be
co-owners of the subject lot having their respective pro indiviso
shares. The conveyances made by the children of Isabel
Cuntapay by her first marriage of their respective pro indiviso
shares in the subject lot to respondent are valid because the law
recognizes the substantive right of heirs to dispose of their ideal
share in the co-heirship
and/co-ownership among the heirs. The Court had expounded
the principle in this wise:
This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an
heir can sell whatever right, interest, or participation he may
have in the property under administration. This is a matter which
comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court.
The right of an heir to dispose of the decedents property, even if
the same is under administration, is based on the Civil Code
provision stating that the possession of hereditary property is
deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the
moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is
accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs, the whole
estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common
by such heirs.
The Civil Code, under the provisions of co-ownership, further
qualifies this right. Although it is mandated that each co-owner
shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership. In other words, the law does not prohibit a co-
owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in
the property held in common.
Contrary to the assertion of petitioners, therefore, the
conveyances made by the children of Isabel Cuntapay by
her first marriage to respondent are valid insofar as their
pro indiviso shares are concerned. Moreover, the CA
justifiably held that these conveyances, as evidenced by
the deed of donation and deed of sale presented by
respondent, coupled with the fact that she has been in
possession of the subject lot since 1955, establish that
respondent has a better right to possess the same as
against petitioners whose claim is largely based on Isabel
Cuntapays last will and testament which, to date, has not
been probated; hence, has no force and effect and under
which no right can be claimed by petitioners.
Significantly, the probative value of the other evidence
relied upon by petitioners to support their claim, which
was the affidavit of Heliodoro Turingan, was not passed
upon by the MTCC and the RTC. Their respective decisions
did not even mention the same.
In conclusion, it is well to stress the CAs admonition that
x x x our ruling on the issue of physical possession does not
affect title to the property nor constitute a binding and
conclusive adjudication on the merits on the issue of ownership.
The parties are not precluded from filing the appropriate action
directly contesting the ownership of or the title to the property.
[19]

As early as 1942, this Court has recognized said right of an heir

to dispose of property under administration. In the case of Teves
de Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al., it was said that the sale made by
an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the
pending administration, in no wise, stands in the way of such
administration. The Court then relied on the provision of the old
Civil Code, Article 440 and Article 399 which are still in force as
Article 533 and Article 493, respectively, in the new Civil Code.
The Court also cited the words of a noted civilist, Manresa: Upon
the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the
undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to
the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a
community of ownership being thus formed among the
co-owners of the estate which remains undivided.[18]

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ,
OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA JUGO,respondents.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the
respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after
declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo
validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the
nullified provision to the proper court in a separate action for that
purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does
not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same
criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and
ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of
nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and
the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by
preponderance of evidence in the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning
donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary
provisions.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith.
As argued by the private respondents:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits
indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the
testator and petitioner, the devisee.
Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence
on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator,
which led private respondents to present contrary evidence.
In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of
the legacy given in the will to petitioner by the deceased testator
at the start of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the
man he had lived with as man and wife, as already married, was
an important and specific issue brought by the parties before the
trial court, and passed upon by the Court of Appeals.
Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the
will, it was petitioner who opted to present evidence on her
alleged good faith in marrying the testator. (Testimony of
Petitioner, TSN of August 1, 1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64).
Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence that would
refute the testimony of petitioner on the point.
Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator,
testified at length on the meretricious relationship of his brother
and petitioner. (TSN of August 18,1975).
Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties
made a decisive issue right at the inception of the case.
Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling
on the question.
When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and
petitioner 'were deemed guilty of adultery or concubinage', it
was a finding that petitioner was not the innocent woman she
pretended to be.
xxx xxx xxx
3. If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless, then
private respondents respectfully offer the following analysis:

FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the
deceased testator in a town in Tarlac where neither she nor the
testator ever resided. If there was nothing to hide from, why the
concealment' ? Of course, it maybe argued that the marriage of
the deceased with private respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise
done in secrecy. But it should be remembered that Rufina Gomez
was already in the family way at that time and it would seem that
the parents of Martin Jugo were not in favor of the marriage so
much so that an action in court was brought concerning the
marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of August 18, 1975,
pp. 29-30)
SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator
when they were still both single. That would be in 1922 as Martin
Jugo married respondent Rufina Gomez on November 29, 1923
(Exh. 3). Petitioner married the testator only on December 5,
1952. There was a space of about 30 years in between. During
those 30 years, could it be believed that she did not even wonder
why Martin Jugo did not marry her nor contact her anymore after
November, 1923 - facts that should impel her to ask her groom
before she married him in secrecy, especially so when she was
already about 50 years old at the time of marriage.
THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923
is by itself conclusive demonstration that she new that the man
she had openly lived for 22 years as man and wife was a married
man with already two children.
FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of
respondent Rufina Gomez, is it possible that she would not have
asked Martin Jugo whether or not they were his illegitimate or
legitimate children and by whom? That is un-Filipino.
FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents
of the deceased testator, is it possible that she would not have
known that the mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and
Carmelita Jugo was respondent Rufina Gomez, considering that
the houses of the parents of Martin Jugo (where he had lived for
many years) and that of respondent Rufina Gomez were just a
few meters away?
Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are
unbelievable. They are, to say the least, inherently improbable,
for they are against the experience in common life and the
ordinary instincts and promptings of human nature that a woman
would not bother at all to ask the man she was going to marry
whether or not he was already married to another, knowing that
her groom had children. It would be a story that would strain
human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not know that Martin
Jugo was already a married man in view of the irrefutable fact
that it was precisely his marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez
that led petitioner to break off with the deceased during their
younger years.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is
against the making of a donation between persons who are living
in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes
void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may
receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy
because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to
a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
PEDRO D. H. GALLANOSA, CORAZON GRECIA-
GALLONOSA and ADOLFO FORTAJADA, vs HON.
UBALDO Y. ARCANGEL,
Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the
"annulment" of a will. In order that a will may take effect, it has
to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary
proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil
Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, formerly sec. 1, Rule 76, Rules of Court;
Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil.
249).
The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due
execution or formal validity of the will (Sec. 625, Act 190,
sec. 1, Rule 76, now sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Last par.
of art. 838, Civil Code).
That means that the testator was of sound trial
disposing mind at the time when he executed the will
and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or
undue influence; that the will was signed by him in
the presence of the required number of witnesses,
and that the will is genuine trial is not a forgery.
Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned
in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal
action for the forgery of the will. (3 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p.
395; Manahan vs. Manahan, 58 Phil. 448).
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to
the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore
(Santos vs. De Buenaventura, L-22797, September 22,
1966, 18 SCRA 47).
In Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil. 180, a "petition for
annulment of a will" was not entertained after the
decree of probate had become final. That case is
summarized as follows:
Wills; Probate; Alledged Fraudulent Will;
Appeal. V. died. His will was admitted
to probate without objection. No appeal
was taken from said order. It was
admitted that due trial legal notice had
been given to all parties. Fifteen months
after the date of said order, a motion
was presented in the lower court to
have said will declared null and void, for
the reason that fraud had been
practised upon the deceased in the
making of his will.
Held: That under section 625 of Act No.
190, the only time given parties who are
displeased with the order admitting to
probate a will, for an appeal is the time
given for appeals in ordinary actions;
but without deciding whether or not an
order admitting a will to probate will be
opened for fraud, after the time allowed
for an appeal has expired, when no
appeal is taken from an order probating
a will, the heirs can not, in subsequent
litigation in the same proceedings, raise
questions relating to its due execution.
The probate of a will is conclusive as to
its due execution trial as to the
testamentary capacity of The testator.
(See Austria vs. Heirs of Ventenilla. 99
Phil. 1069).
On the other hand, the 1943 decree of adjudication
rendered by the trial court in the testate proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Florentino Hitosis, having been
rendered in a proceeding in rem, is under the abovequoted
section 49(a), binding upon the whole world (Manalo vs.
Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156;
De la Cerna vs. Potot, 120 Phil. 1361, 1364; McMaster vs.
Hentry Reissmann & Co., 68 Phil. 142).
It is not only the 1939 probate proceeding that can be
interposed as res judicata with respect to private
respondents' complaint, The 1952 order of dismissal
rendered by Judge Maalac in Civil Case No. 696, a
judgment in personam was an adjudication on the merits
(Sec. 4, Rule 30, old Rules of Court). It constitutes a bar by
former judgment under the aforequoted section 49(b)
(Anticamara vs. Ong, L-29689. April 14, 1978).
The plaintiffs or private respondents did not even bother to
ask for the annulment of the testamentary proceeding trial
the proceeding in Civil Case No. 696. Obviously, they
realized that the final adjudications in those cases have the
binding force of res judicata and that there is no ground, nor
is it timely, to ask for the nullification of the final orders trial
judgments in those two cases.
In the matter of the will of Donata Manahan.
TIBURCIA MANAHAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENGRACIA MANAHAN,
we believe that, essentially, her claim narrows down to the
following: (1) That she was an interested party in the
testamentary proceedings and, as such, was entitled to and
should have been notified of the probate of the will; (2) that
the court, in its order of September 22, 1930, did not really
probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its
authentication; and (3) that the will is null and void ab
initio on the ground that the external formalities prescribed
by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with
in the execution thereof.
The appellant's first contention is obviously unfounded and
untenable. She was not entitled to notification of the
probate of the will and neither had she the right to expect
it, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having
filed an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof.
Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the
deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be
notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will
in which the appellant has not been instituted heir.
Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire
any successional right.
The second contention is puerile. The court really decreed
the authentication and probate of the will in question, which
is the only pronouncement required of the trial court by the
law in order that the will may be considered valid and duly
executed in accordance with the law. In the phraseology of
the procedural law, there is no essential difference between
the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The
words authentication and probate are synonymous in this
case. All the law requires is that the competent court
declared that in the execution of the will the essential
external formalities have been complied with and that, in
view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid and effective
in the eyes of the law.
The last contention of the appellant may be refuted merely
by stating that, once a will has been authenticated and
admitted to probate, questions relative to the validity
thereof can no more be raised on appeal. The decree of
probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution
thereof and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds
authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or
independent action or proceedings (sec. 625, Code of Civil
Procedure; Castaeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426;
Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil., 436; Sahagun vs. De
Gorostiza, 7 Phil., 347; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil., 393;
Montaano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., 676; In re Estate of Johnson,
39 Phil., 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil., 105; Austria vs.
Ventenilla, 21 Phil., 180; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855;
and Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vao, 8 Phil., 119).
But there is another reason which prevents the appellant
herein from successfully maintaining the present action and
it is that inasmuch as the proceedings followed in a
testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's decree
admitting the will to probate was effective and conclusive
against her, in accordance with the provisions of section
306 of the said Code of Civil Procedure which reads as
follows:
SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. . . . .
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific
thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or
in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition
or relation of a particular person the judgment or
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the
will or administration, or the condition or relation of
the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or
granting of letters of administration shall only
be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator
or intestate; . . . .
On the other hand, we are at a loss to understand how it
was possible for the herein appellant to appeal from the
order of the trial court denying her motion for
reconsideration and a new trial, which is interlocutory in
character. In view of this erroneous interpretation, she
succeeded in appealing indirectly from the order admitting
the will to probate which was entered one year and seven
months ago.
Before closing, we wish to state that it is not timely to
discuss herein the validity and sufficiency of the execution
of the will in question. As we have already said, this
question can no more be raised in this case on appeal. After
due hearing, the court found that the will in question was
valid and effective and the order admitting it to probate,
thus promulgated, should be accepted and respected by all.
The probate of the will in question now constitutes res
judicata.
RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and
LAURO AUSTRIA MOZO, petitioners, vs. HON. ANDRES
REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI
CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA
respondents.
The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are
locked in dispute over the bulk of the estate of the
deceased. Arrayed on one side are the petitioners Ruben
Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo,
three of a number of nephews and nieces who are
concededly the nearest surviving blood relatives of the
decedent. On the other side are the respondents brothers
and sisters, Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz,
Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the
will of the deceased Basilia, and all of whom claim kinship
with the decedent by virtue of legal adoption. At the heart
of the controversy is Basilia's last will immaculate in its
extrinsic validity since it bears the imprimatur of duly
conducted probate proceedings.
the issue of whether or not such institution of heirs would
retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the
adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under
article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites
must concur: First, the cause for the institution of
heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause
must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear
from the face of the will that the testator would not
have made such institution if he had known the
falsity of the cause.
Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive
injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator may
have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such
institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after
an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would
not have made the institution if he had known the cause for
it to be false. Now, would the late Basilia have caused the
revocation of the institution of heirs if she had known that
she was mistaken in treating these heirs as her legally
adopted children? Or would she have instituted them
nonetheless?
The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer,
is mute on this point or at best is vague and uncertain. The
phrases, "mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang
mana," were borrowed from the language of the law on
succession and were used, respectively, to describe the
class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the
inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the
decedent would have willed her estate other than the way
she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to
make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free
portion of her estate (libre disposicion) which largely
favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children,
and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a
perceptible inclination on her part to give to the
respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined
her to give to them. Compare this with the relatively small
devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood
relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta
and Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben
Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz,
et al. from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the
other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the
testate by intestacy a result which would subvert the
clear wishes of the decedent.
Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be
swept away by these explicit injunctions in the Civil Code:
"The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which
will give to every expression some effect, rather than one
which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of
two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred
which will prevent intestacy." 1
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side,
especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of
the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, 2 as
was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the
principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of
the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the
language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect. 3 A
probate court has found, by final judgment, that the late
Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of testamentary
capacity and her last will executed free from falsification,
fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it
becomes our duty to give full expression to her will.4
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner, vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special
Cases Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA
DIONGSON, respondents.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not
private respondents have been pretirited.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or
all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
testator, the institution shall he effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's
will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17
SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned,
Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she
does not ascend or descend from the testator,
although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise,
even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir,
there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the
inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art.
854, Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be
said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez,
whose legal adoption by the testator has not been
questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the
Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603,
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption
gives to the adopted person the same rights and
duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter
and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the
adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally
omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and
that both adopted child and the widow were
deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be
denied that they were not expressly disinherited.
Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the
legally adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment
throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance
including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en
virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in
Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do not result in
intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for
they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the
legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his
brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator
results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification
of such institution of universal heirs-without any other
testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded
and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no
leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid),
supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the
will the whole property of the deceased has been left by
universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The
effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be,
necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin,
74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises
must, as already stated above, be respected.
Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y
Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI, ET AL., petitioners, vs.
IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN, respondents.
The decisive question here raised is whether, upon the
foregoing facts, the omission of the children of the first
marriage annuls the institution of the children of the first
marriage as sole heirs of the testator, or whether the will
may be held valid, at least with respect to one-third of the
estate which the testator may dispose of as legacy and to
the other one-third which he may bequeath as betterment,
to said children of the second marriage.
Appellants, on the other hand, maintain that the case is one
of voluntary preterition of four of the children by the first
marriage, and of involuntary preterition of the children by
the deceased Getulia, also of the first marriage, and is thus
governed by the provisions of article 814 of the Civil Code,
which read in part as follows:
The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the
legacies and betterments shall be valid, in so far as
they are not inofficious.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's
will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited.(Cf. 6 Manresa, 346.) In
the instant case, while the children of the first
marriage were mentioned in the will, they were not
accorded any share in the heriditary property,
without expressly being disinherited. It is, therefore,
a clear case of preterition as contended by
appellants. The omission of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is
a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not
expressly made or is not at least manifest.
Except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be
valid in so far as they are not inofficious" (art. 814 of the
Civil Code), preterition avoids the institution of heirs and
gives rise to intestate succession. (Art. 814, Civil Code;
Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 17, 1908
and February 27, 1909.) In the instant case, no such
legacies or betterments have been made by the testator.
"Mejoras" or betterments must be expressly provided,
according to articles 825 and 828 of the Civil Code, and
where no express provision therefor is made in the will, the
law would presume that the testator had no intention to
that effect. (Cf. 6 Manresa,
ZONIA ANA T. SOLANO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, BIENVENIDO S. GARCIA, and EMETERIA S.
GARCIA, respondents.
Thus, the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had
jurisdiction to conclude that, upon the facts, the GARCIAS
and ZONIA were in the same category as illegitimate
children; that ZONIA's acknowledgment as a "natural child"
in a notarial document executed by SOLANO and Trinidad
Tuagnon on December 22, 1943 was erroneous because at
the time of her birth in 1941, SOLANO was still married to
Lilly Gorand, his divorce having been obtained only in 1943,
and, therefore, did not have the legal capacity to contract
marriage at the time of ZONIA's conception, 7 that being
compulsory heirs, the GARCIAS were, in fact, pretended
from SOLANO's Last' Will and Testament; and that as a
result of said preterition, the institution of ZONIA as sole
heir by SOLANO is null and void pursuant to Article 854 of
the Civil Code. t.hqw
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at
the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious. ... 8
As heretofore stated, the usufruct in favor of Trinidad
Tuagnon over the properties indicated in the Will is valid
and should be respected.
The case of Nuguid vs. Nuguid, et al., 14 reiterating the
ruling in Neri, et al. vs. Akutin, et al., 15 which held that
where the institution of a universal heir is null and void due
to pretention, the Will is a complete nullity and intestate
succession ensues, is not applicable herein because in the
Nuguid case, only a one-sentence Will was involved with no
other provision except the institution of the sole and
universal heir; there was no specification of individual
property; there were no specific legacies or bequests. It was
upon that factual setting that this Court declared: t.
hqw
In contrast, in the case at bar, there is a specific bequest or
legacy so that Article 854 of the Civil Code, supra, applies
merely annulling the "institution of heir".
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, deceased. ADOLFO C.
AZNAR, executor and appellee, vs. MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, oppositor and appellant.
The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains, that there
has been preterition of Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in
the direct line, resulting in the annulment of the institution
of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one,
some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir;
but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious.
On the other hand, appellant contends that this is not a
case of preterition, but is governed by Article 906 of the
Civil Code, which says: "Any compulsory heir to whom the
testator has left by any title less than the legitime
belonging to him may demand that the same be fully
satisfied." Appellant also suggests that considering the
provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly denied
his relationship with Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy
nevertheless although less than the amount of her legitime,
she was in effect defectively disinherited within the
meaning of Article 918, which reads:
ART. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of
the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if
contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of
those set forth in this Code, shall annul the
 institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the
person disinherited; but the devices and legacies
and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to
such extent as will not impair the legitimate.
Thus, according to appellant, under both Article 906 and
918, Helen Garcia is entitled only to her legitime, and not to
a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the
succession were intestate.
January 16, 1895, May 25, 1917, and April 23, 1932,
respectively. In each one of those cases the testator left to
one who was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the
legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or
even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other
persons. It was held that Article 815 applied, and the heir
could not ask that the institution of heirs be annulled
entirely, but only that the legitime be completed. (6
Manresa, pp. 438, 441.)
The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with
the expressed wishes of the testator in the present case as
may be gathered very clearly from the provisions of his will.
He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural
daughter, and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00.
The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to
possess such status is no reason to assume that had the
judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective
attitude towards her would have undergone any change and
that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to
Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by him.
The decision of this Court in Neri, et al. v. Akutin, 74 Phil.
185, is cited by appellees in support of their theory of
preterition. That decision is not here applicable, because it
referred to a will where "the testator left all his property by
universal title to the children by his second marriage, and
(that) without expressly disinheriting the children by his first
marriage, he left nothing to them or, at least, some of
them." In the case at bar the testator did not entirely omit
oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a legacy of
P3,600.00.
The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death
consisted of 399 shares of stocks in the Christensen
Plantation Company and a certain amount in cash. One-
fourth (1/4) of said estate descended to Helen Garcia as her
legitime. Since she became the owner of her share as of the
moment of the death of the decedent (Arts. 774, 777, Civil
Code), she is entitled to a corresponding portion of all the
fruits or increments thereof subsequently accruing. These
include the stock dividends on the corporate holdings. The
contention of Lucy Duncan that all such dividends pertain to
her according to the terms of the will cannot be sustained,
for it would in effect impair the right of ownership of Helen
Garcia with respect to her legitime.
One point deserves to be here mentioned, although no
reference to it has been made in the brief for oppositor-
appellant. It is the institution of substitute heirs to the
estate bequeathed to Lucy Duncan in the event she should
die without living issue. This substitution results in effect
from the fact that under paragraph 12 of the will she is
entitled only to the income from said estate, unless prior to
her decease she should have living issue, in which event
she would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the property
will go to the other relatives of the testator named in the
will. Without deciding this, point, since it is not one of the
issues raised before us, we might call attention to the
limitations imposed by law upon this kind of substitution,
particularly that which says that it can never burden the
legitime (Art. 864 Civil Code), which means that the
legitime must descend to the heir concerned in fee simple.
TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena
Flordelis and Tirso, Jr., all surnamed Reyes y
Barretto, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. LUCIA MILAGROS
BARRETTO-DATU, defendant-appellee.
The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from
which Salud acquired the fishpond in question is void ab
initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid title
thereto, and that the court did not acquire any jurisdiction
of the person of the defendant, who was then a minor.'
Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto,
the lower court declared the project of partition submitted
in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Bibiano Barretto (Civil Case No. 49629 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila) to be null and void ab initio (not merely
voidable) because the distributee, Salud Barretto,
predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a
daughter of the spouses Bibiano Barretto and Maria
Gerardo. The nullity of the project of partition was decreed
on the basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then
in force) providing as follows: .
A partition in which a person was believed to be an
heir, without being so, has been included, shall be
null and void.
Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of
the old Civil Code has been misapplied to the present
case by the court below. The reason is obvious: Salud
Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the
late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament
together with defendant Milagros; hence, the
partition had between them could not be one such
had with a party who was believed to be an heir
without really being one, and was not null and void
under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081)
does not speak of children, or descendants, but
ofheirs (without distinction between forced,
voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud
happened not to be a daughter of the testator does
not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly
named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at
liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to
whomsoever he chose. While the share () assigned
to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud
did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary
heir of Bibiano Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her
father's will a share smaller than her legitime
invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there
was here no preterition, or total ommission of a
forced heir. For this reason,Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil.
322, invoked by appellee, is not at all applicable,
that case involving an instance of preterition or
omission of children of the testator's former
marriage.
Appellee contends that the partition in question was
void as a compromise on the civil status of Salud in
violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code. This
view is erroneous, since a compromise presupposes
the settlement of a controversy through mutual
concessions of the parties (Civil Code of 1889, Article
1809; Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 2028); and
the condition of Salud as daughter of the testator
Bibiano Barretto, while untrue, was at no time
disputed during the settlement of the estate of the
testator. There can be no compromise over issues
not in dispute. And while a compromise over civil
status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a
settlement by the parties over the share that should
correspond to a claimant to the estate.
At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as
its own name implies, is merely a proposal for distribution of
the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is the
court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and
determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to
which each is entitled (Camia vs. Reyes, 63 Phil. 629, 643;
Act 190, Section 750; Rule 90, Rules of 1940; Rule 91,
Revised Rules of Court), and it is that judicial decree of
distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. If
the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or
the testament, the same should have been corrected by
opportune appeal; but once it had become final, its binding
effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless
properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
 (4) When a child or descendant by
fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
influence causes the testator to make
a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause
DY YIENG SEANGIO, G.R. Nos. 140371-72 to support the parents or ascendant
BARBARA D. SEANGIO who disinherit such child or
and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, descendant;
Petitioners, Present: versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, (6) Maltreatment of the testator by
AZCUNA, word or deed, by the child or
descendant;[8]
(7) When a child or descendant
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, leads a dishonorable or disgraceful
unmistakably showed Segundos intention of excluding his life;
eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons (8) Conviction of a crime which
that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by carries with it the penalty of civil
Segundo. interdiction.

For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code

requires that the same must be effected through a will Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the
wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With document executed by Segundo can be considered as a
regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were holographic will.
stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that
the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the
maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and
matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject
a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code: to no other form, and may be made in or out of
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as Segundos document, although it may initially come across
illegitimate: as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
(1) When a child or descendant has written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself.
been found guilty of an attempt An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced
against the life of the testator, his or from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not
her spouse, descendants, or make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the
ascendants; disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
(2) When a child or descendant has disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
accused the testator of a crime for results in the disposition of the property of the testator
which the law prescribes Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the
imprisonment for six years or more, if absence of Alfredo.[10]
the accusation has been found
groundless; Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the
(3) When a child or descendant has will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the
been convicted of adultery or limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the
concubinage with the spouse of the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are
testator; designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is
only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law,
morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. [11]

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one

who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present
case, should be construed more liberally than the ones
drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument and the
intention of the testator.[12] In this regard, the Court is
convinced that the document, even if captioned
as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by
Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed
by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic
will. Unless the will is probated,[13] the disinheritance cannot
be given effect.
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning
[14]
With regard to the issue on preterition, [15] the Court the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the
believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron
not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge
Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also,
Segundo did not institute an heir[16] to the exclusion of his 1. The widow's legitime.
other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of
one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not The appellant's do not question the legality of giving
operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was Marcelle one-half of the estate in full ownership. They admit
included plainly as a witness to the altercation between that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's
Segundo and his son, Alfredo. legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the
Considering that the questioned document is Segundos only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be
holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since
intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with.
Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to
Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass
one-half of his estate over which he could impose no
either real or personal property unless it is proved and
burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless
whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his
property may be rendered nugatory.[17]
PCIB VS ESCOLIN not digested It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the
appellants question and justifiably so. It appears that the
court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle
because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor
of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle
who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio"
as her legitime and which is more than what she is given
under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in
the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run
counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his
dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor
Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint-
judgment of another heir so that he may enter into the
inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted." (Art.
857, Civil Code. And that there are several kinds of
substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or
compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858,
Civil Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although the Code
enumerates four classes, there are really only two principal
classes of substitutions: the simple and
the fideicommissary. The others are merely variations of
these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil
Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or
more persons to substitute the heir or heirs
instituted in case such heir or heirs should die
before him, or should not wish, or should be
incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of
the cases to which it refers, shall comprise
the three mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise
provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil
Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by
virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir
instituted is entrusted with the obligation to
preserve and to transmit to a second heir the
whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid
and shall take effect, provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree
from the heir originally instituted, and
provided further that the fiduciary or first heir
and the second heir are living at time of the
death of the testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar
substitution in respect of the legacies of Roberto and Jorge
Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor
de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con
substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the legality of the
substitution so provided. The appellants question the
sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de
Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third usufruct over
the estate given to the widow Marcelle However, this
question has become moot because as We have ruled
above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y
fideicomisaria in connection with Wanda's usufruct over two
thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace v. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void
because Wanda survived the testator or stated differently
because she did not predecease the testator. But dying
before the testator is not the only case for vulgar
substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to
accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil
Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect,
the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the
following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V.
Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally
instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a
fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution
does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is
explained by Tolentino as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe
"degree" as designation, substitution, or
transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain
 has decidedly adopted this construction. From
this point of view, there can be only one
tranmission or substitution, and the
substitute need not be related to the first
heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman,
however, construe the word "degree" as
generation, and the present Code has
obviously followed this interpretation. by
providing that the substitution shall not go
beyond one degree "from the heir originally
instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates
that the second heir must be related to and
be one generation from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary
can only be either a child or a parent of the
first heir. These are the only relatives who are
one generation or degree from the fiduciary
(Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit
the usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and
867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the
testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary
substitution when he permits the properties subject of the
usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the
usufructuaries and the naked owners." (Brief, p. 26.)
be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to
Wanda on the ground that the Constitution covers not only
succession by operation of law but also testamentary
succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional
provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does
not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the
prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien
would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying
money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of
a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in
favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does
not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the
vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed
by the Constitution.

3. The usufruct of Wanda.

The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties

of the estate in favor of Wanda is void because it violates
the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of
lands by aliens.

The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as
follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural land shall
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,[1] petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA[2]
COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS,
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the
Court of Appeals, petitioner found his way to this
Court via the present petition, contending that the
Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of
Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza
on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in
ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of
Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that
successional rights are transmitted from the moment
of death of the decedent[10] and compulsory heirs are
called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate
children and descendants, in relation to their
legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are
compulsory heirs.[11] Thus, the petitioner, his mother
and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by
operation of law, without need of further
proceedings, and the successional rights were
transmitted to them from the moment of death of
the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance
includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably,
whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of
subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs,
at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of
the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by
the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were
likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his
death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot
No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the
condition that the usufruct thereof would be
delivered to the herein private respondent every
year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his
compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title
over the said property, and they also assumed his
(decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot
involved to herein private respondent. Such
obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally
corresponds to the right of private respondent over
the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which
is now being demanded by the latter through the
institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private
respondent has a cause of action against petitioner
and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint
below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New
Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable
because what the testatrix intended was a
substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be
substituted by the testatrix's near descendants
should there be noncompliance with the obligation
to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a
person or persons to take the place of the heir or
heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general,
the testator may either (1) provide for the
designation of another heir to whom the property
shall pass in case the original heir should die before
him/her, renounce the inheritance or be
incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution,
[12]
or (2) leave his/her property to one person with
the express charge that it be transmitted
subsequently to another or others, as in a
fideicommissary substitution.[13] The Codicil sued
upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the
inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation. [14] In the
case under consideration, the provisions of subject
Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
default due to predecease, incapacity or
renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would
substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that,
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the
conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property
referred to shall be seized and turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here
and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a
fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly
mandated to preserve the property and to
transmit the same later to the second heir. [15] In the
case under consideration, the instituted heir is in
fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the
property provided the negotiation is with the near
descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a
very important element of a fideicommissary
substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly
imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the
property and its transmission to the second heir.
"Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed
by the testator in his will, there is no
fideicommissary substitution."[16] Also, the near
descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not
definite. The property will only pass to them should
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the
obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private
respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary
substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863,
the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the
property is transmitted must not be beyond one
degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A
fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the
first heir is not related by first degree to the second
heir.[17] In the case under scrutiny, the near
descendants are not at all related to the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil
is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore,
Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of
law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil
Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the
institution or the application of the property
left by the testator, or the charge imposed on
him, shall not be considered as a condition
unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may
be claimed at once provided that the
instituted heir or his heirs give security for
compliance with the wishes of the testator
and for the return of anything he or they may
receive, together with its fruits and interests,
if he or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir,
an institution referred to in the preceding
article cannot take effect in the exact manner
stated by the testator, it shall be complied
with in a manner most analogous to and in
conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in
Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession
as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In
a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object
of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of
the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge
imposed by the testator upon the heir.[18] A "mode"
imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it
does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the
succession.[19]On the other hand, in a conditional
testamentary disposition, the condition must happen
or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to
succeed the testator. The condition suspends but
does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does
not suspend.[20] To some extent, it is similar to a
resolutory condition.[21]
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it
can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended
that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the
testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted
heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one
hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private
respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the
lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not
make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the
effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent
on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear,
though, that should the obligation be not complied
with, the property shall be turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants. The manner of
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil
is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a
charge upon the instituted heir without, however,
affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are
generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed
upon the heir should not be considered a condition
unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such
was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt,
the institution should be considered as modal and
not conditional.[22]
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of
petitioner that the private respondent has only a
right of usufruct but not the right to seize the
property itself from the instituted heir because the
right to seize was expressly limited to violations by
the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty
arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of
any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be
ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into
consideration the circumstances under which it was
made.[23] Such construction as will sustain and
uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted. [24]
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is
under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs
of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such
obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or
mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or
otherwise negotiate the property involved. The
Codicil further provides that in the event that the
obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected,
Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property
and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants.
The non-performance of the said obligation is thus
with the sanction of seizure of the property and
reversion thereof to the testatrix's near
descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly
imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted
heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the
sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-
fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to
the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission
that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the said
obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed
by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner
had become the obligation of the lessee; that
petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and
constructive compliance of his obligation through the
consummated settlement between the lessee and
the private respondent, and having consummated a
settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the
private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation
under the amicable settlement and not the seizure
of subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn,
revocable and free act by which a person disposes of
his property, to take effect after his death. [25] Since
the Will expresses the manner in which a person
intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes
and desires of the testator must be strictly followed.
Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise
agreement which would thereby defeat the very
purpose of making a Will.
TESTATE ESTATE OF VICENTE SINGSON PABLO,
deceased. ROSALIA ROSARIO VDA. DE
SINGSON,petitioner-appellee, vs. JOSEFINA F. VDA.
DE LIM
The widow, as administratrix, presented a project of
partition in which the properties not disposed of in the will
were adjudicated to the four brothers and the four nieces of
the deceased "in the proportion provided in paragraph 8 of
the will." The brothers, appellants herein, objected to the
project of partition insofar as it includes the nieces of the
deceased, on the ground that under clause 8 of the will, in
relation to article 751 of the Civil Code, they were not
entitled to any share. The nieces also objected to the
project of partition, alleging that certain other specified
properties had been omitted therefrom, which formed part
of the properties not disposed of and which under clause 8
of the will "should be distributed in equal parts to all who
are entitled thereto." The trial court sustained the
contention of the nieces (appellees herein) and ordered the
administratrix "to amend the project of partition so as to
include therein the said properties and that all of those not
disposed of in the will be adjudicated in equal parts to the
brothers and nieces of the deceased."
The only question raised in this appeal is the interpretation
of clause 8 of the will above quoted. Said clause provides
that "all of my properties not disposed of otherwise in this
testament shall be distributed in equal parts to all who are
entitled thereto." In this connection appellants invoke article
751 of the Civil Code, which provides that "a disposition
made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives
shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in
degree."
The trial court noted that the testator, who was a lawyer,
did not use the word "relatives" in the clause in question.
We do not need to decide here whether, had the testator
used the word "relatives," the nieces would be excluded.
The authorities differ on the interpretation of article 751.
Some hold that under said article the nephews and nieces
inherit by representation together with the brothers and
sisters of the testator, as in legal succession; while others.
Manresa among them, hold that said article excludes
nephews and nieces when brothers and sisters survive. We
think the testator, by referring to "all who are entitled
thereto," instead of referring to his "relatives," precisely
meant to avoid the uncertainty of the interpretation of
article 751 and to indicate his wish that the residue of his
estate be distributed in equal parts to all who would have
been entitled to inherit from him had he dies intestate.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C.
ROSALES, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO ROSALES,
MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES
and ANTONIO ROSALES,respondents.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our
resolution petition. First is a widow (surviving spouse) an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are the
Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from
getting a share of the estate in question final as against the
said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups,
namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who
inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an
intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in
the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil
Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in
Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the
Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit
from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal
shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants
of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall
inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag
inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them
should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion
pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal
portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with
legitimate children or their descendants and illegitimate
children or their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the
same share as that of a legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a
widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-
in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which
entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her
own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of
the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession
(Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous
exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State
as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a
provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of
the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the
legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an
intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so
provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in
accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil
Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to
their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by
legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not
excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude
one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be
duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three
classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner
and to the extent established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the
deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow
or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the
estate of a parent-in-law.
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil
Code aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A
careful examination of the said Article confirms that the
estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased
spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the
intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the
deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the
petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by
the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the
Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is
explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by
fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would
have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the
succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one
whom the person represented would have
succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is
called to succession by law because of his blood
relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio
Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his
grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father
would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same
right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with
her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of
her husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or
contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as
compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her
husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is
their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra
Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from
his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute
MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. EUFEMIO
S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-
appellee.
When an action for legal separation is
converted by the counterclaim into one for a
declaration of nullity of a marriage, does the
death of a party abate the proceedings?
The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed
conversion of a legal separation suit to one for declaration
of nullity of a marriage, which is without basis, for even
petitioner asserted that "the respondent has acquiesced to
the dismissal of his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page
22). Not only this. The petition for legal separation and the
counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same
marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication.
They are not inseparable nor was the action for legal
separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by
the counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a valid
marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable
marriage as a pre-condition.
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the
plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal
separation, abate the action? If it does, will abatement also
apply if the action involves property rights? .
An action for legal separation which involves nothing
more than the bed-and-board separation of the
spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this
jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the
Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by
allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else)
to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by
providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and
even rescind a decree of legal separation already
rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that
the death of one party to the action causes the death
of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum
persona.
... When one of the spouses is dead, there is
no need for divorce, because the marriage is
dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the
suit, if the death of the spouse takes place
during the course of the suit (Article 244,
Section 3). The action is absolutely dead
(Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req.,
May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.") 4 .
Marriage is a personal relation or status,
created under the sanction of law, and an
action for divorce is a proceeding brought for
the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that
relation. The action is one of a personal
nature. In the absence of a statute to the
contrary, the death of one of the parties to
such action abates the action, for the reason
that death has settled the question of
separation beyond all controversy and
deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over
the persons of the parties to the action and of
the subject-matter of the action itself. For this
reason the courts are almost unanimous in
holding that the death of either party to a
divorce proceeding, before final decree,
 abates the action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208; Wren
v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth v. Danforth,
111 Ill. 236; Matter of Grandall, 196 N.Y. 127,
89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17 Ann.
Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41
N.W. 817; Strickland v. Strickland, 80 Ark.
452, 97 S. W. 659; McCurley v. McCurley, 60
Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbie v. Begbie,
128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for
separation and maintenance (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101
SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris 208).
A review of the resulting changes in property relations
between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of
the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive
the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. On
the point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provides: .
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall
have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live
separately from each other, but the marriage
bonds shall not be severed; .
(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the
absolute conjugal community of property
shall be dissolved and liquidated, but the
offending spouse shall have no right to any
share of the profits earned by the partnership
or community, without prejudice to the
provisions of article 176;
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be
awarded to the innocent spouse, unless
otherwise directed by the court in the interest
of said minors, for whom said court may
appoint a guardian;
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified
from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in
favor of the offending spouse made in the will
of the innocent one shall be revoked by
operation of law.
From this article it is apparent that the right to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the
absolute community of property), the loss of right by the
offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit
by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the
revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights
and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code
article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses;
and by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities
are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible.
Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not
thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17,
Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the
action through a substitute of the deceased party.
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and
the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court shall order, upon proper notice, the
legal representative of the deceased to
appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days,
or within such time as may be granted...
The same result flows from a consideration of the
enumeration of the actions that survive for or against
administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of
Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which
may not be brought against executor or
administrator. No action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon
shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or
personal property, or an interest therein, from
the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of
marriage can be deemed fairly included in the
enumeration..

A further reason why an action for legal separation is JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners, vs.
abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO
are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree and VICTORIA RONDA NACARIO, respondents.
of separation, their source being the decree itself; without
the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate
before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely court erred in holding that the petitioners are still liable to
rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pay the private respondents the aggregate amount of
pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, P20,505.00 despite the agreement of extrajudicial
death producing a more radical and definitive separation; settlement between the petitioners and the victim's
and the expected consequential rights and claims would compulsory heirs.
necessarily remain unborn.
The petition is meritorious.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a
declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen
Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them
Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and
being by payment. Article 1231 of the Civil Code of the
academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be
Philippines provides:
no further interest in continuing the same after her demise,
that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any
property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved
and determined in a proper action for partition by either the (1) By payment or performance;
appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
(2) By the loss of the thing due;
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab
initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the (3) By the condonation or remission of the
Civil Code, because the second marriage had been debt;
contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for
seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally (4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of
believed dead, still the action for annulment became creditor and debtor;
extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved
had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the (5) By compensation;
Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be
brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties
(6) By novation.
involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal
partnership that might have resulted from such voidable
marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate (Emphasis ours.)
proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided
in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their
annulment proceeding. obligation petition arising from the accident that occurred
on November 7, 1979. The only question now is whether or
not Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the
petitioners' payment, is entitled to it.
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates
the persons to whom payment to extinguish an obligation
should be made.
Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the
person in whose favor the obligation has
been constituted, or his successor in interest,
or any person authorized to receive it.
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son
with the deceased are the successors in interest referred to
in law as the persons authorized to receive payment. The
Civil Code states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory
heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with
respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate
parents and ascendants with respect to their
legitimate children and decendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children and natural
children by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in
Article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and
5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2.
Neither do they exclude one another.
(Emphasis ours.)
Article 985. In default of legitimate
children and descendants of the deceased,
his parents and ascendants shall inherit from
him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed
only when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant.
On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all
classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido
was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the
private respondents are not successors-in-interest of
Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners
therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with
Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural
guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had
been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not
a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse
as an heir of the deceased spouse.
Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors
of Bienvenido, seek relief and compensation from the
petitioners. While it may be true that the private
respondents loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the
damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his
funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but
money claims against the estate of their deceased
son. 16 These money claims are not the liabilities of the
petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the
agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded
with Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow
and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her
co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of
Claim" in favor of the petitioners.
LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, vs., COURT OF
APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120,
Caloocan City, and RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents.

The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate courts

Order, which respondent Court of Appeals sustained,
nullifying the transfer of the Valenzuela property from
Rafael to Estrellita and declaring the Paraaque property as
subject to collation.

The appeal is well taken.

Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the

outset. Article 1061 of the Civil Code speaks of collation. It
states:

Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other

compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate
any property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may
be computed in the determination of the legitime of each
heir, and in the account of the partition.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other
forced heirs who intervene in the division of the inheritance
of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property
which they received from him, so that the division may be
made according to law and the will of the testator.[24]
Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding
with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights
received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime
of the decedent.[25] The purpose for it is presumed that the
intention of the testator or predecessor in interest in
making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is
to give him something in advance on account of his share in
the estate, and that the predecessors will is to treat all his
heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the
contrary.[26] Collation does not impose any lien on the
property or the subject matter of collationable donation.
What is brought to collation is not the property donated
itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it
was donated,[27] the rationale being that the donation is a
real alienation which conveys ownership upon its
acceptance, hence any increase in value or any
deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or
donee.[28]
The attendant facts herein do no make a case of collation.
We find that the probate court, as well as respondent Court
of Appeals, committed reversible errors.
First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of
petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a
son-in-law of Rafael, is one of Rafaels compulsory heirs.
Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to
their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by
legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not
excluded by those in Nos 1 and 2; neither do they exclude
one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be
duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three
classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner
and to the extent established by this Code.
With respect to Rafaels estate, therefore, petitioner who
was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered
a third person or a stranger.[29] As such, petitioner may not
be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither
may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no
personality or interest in the said proceeding,[30] which
petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation.[31]
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and
determine the title or ownership of a property which may or
may not be included in the estate proceedings.[32] Such
determination is provisional in character and is subject to
final decision in a separate action to resolve title.[33] In the
case at bench, however, we note that the probate court
went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded
to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela
property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the
transfer of the subject property between the concerned
parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and
the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the
presence or absence of consideration, are matter outside
the probate courts jurisdiction. These issues should be
ventilated in an appropriate action. We reiterate:
x x x we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which
takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has
power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the
properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong
prima facie to the deceased, although such a determination
is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to
the right of the interested parties, in a proper action, to
raise the question bearing on the ownership or existence of
the right or credit.[34]
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the
Paraaque property to collation is premature. Records
indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its
initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the
legitimate of any of Rafaels heirs has been impaired to
warrant collation. We thus advert to our ruling in Udarbe v.
Jurado, 59 Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:
We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In
accordance with the provisions of article 1035[35] of the
Civil Code, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to allege and
prove that the donations received by the defendants were
inofficious in whole or in part and prejudiced the legitimate
or hereditary portion to which they are entitled. In the
absence of evidence to that effect, the collation sought is
untenable for lack of ground or basis therefor.
collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the
decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which
fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Paraaque
property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument,
voluntarily and willfully waived any claims, rights,
ownership and participation as heir[38] in the Paraaque
property.
Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain
whether or not the Valenzuela property may be brought to
collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of
Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an
amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property.[39]
Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be
collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the
Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of
Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court
on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.

Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate

in this case the probate court, nonetheless, made a
reversible error in ordering collation of the Paraaque
property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by
way of a deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The
Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the
proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not
become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed
collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory basis.
[36] The order of the probate court presupposes that the
Paraaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to
Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Paraaque
property was conveyed for and in consideration
ofP900,000.00,[37] by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita.
Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and
petitioner who inherited and is now the present owner of
the Paraaque property is not one of Rafaels heirs. Thus, the
probate courts order of collation against petitioner is
unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with
Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does
not have any interest in Rafaels estate. As it stands,
collation of the Paraaque property is improper for, to repeat,

BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as
Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma,respondents.
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in
the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of
the donated properties. As the said court correctly
observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di
na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as
"irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express
prohibition against collation.6 The fact that a donation is
irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof
from the collation required under Article 1061.
Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,7 the said
provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time
would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or
render their decisions invalid.
It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has
now been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987
Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of
justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the
speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging
their dockets these many years. Serious studies and efforts
are now being taken by the Court to meet that need.

We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and

"free portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared
by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the
legal consequences of the donation being made. It is
reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the
document, that he would have included therein an express
prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention.

Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice

under the clear language of Article 1062.1awphil The
suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because
the properties donated were imputable to the free portion
of the decedent's estate merits little consideration.
Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that
the disputed donation is officious The sole issue is whether
or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we
see none.

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed

plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general
rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear
indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but
the rule, which is categorical enough.

There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned

by the petitioner regarding the decision of the appealed
case by the respondent court beyond the 12-month period
prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973