Dec.

5 (M) 6-8 pm

. Proof of Filiation

1. Of legitimate children, FC 172-173

Diaz vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 621, June 22,

1984

Facts:

1) In 1911 Isidro Azarraga dies leaving 10 children the first 7 of who are
illegitimate born to his mistress Valentina Abarracoso.
th
2) The legitimacy of the 8 child is in question in this suit namely Leodegario,
th
(the 9 Filomena was the only one established as legitimate being born to the
valid marriage of Isidro andhis lawful wife Calixta Lozada)

3) Sept 10, 49 Leodegario dies intestate(no will)in an accident in Manila he

leaves behind no 9) spouse and no children to inherit his property amounting to
P28,000 worth of real estate in Capiz.

4) Oct 15, 49 original Maria Diaz, daughter of the decedents sister Filomena,
(she died during the pendency of the case and was replaced by her heirs) files
for letters of Administration w/ the CFI.
th
5) Oct 25, 49 Amador Azarraga (4 illegitimate child of Isidro, half brother of
decedent) files an opposition to the petition citing that the deceased is an
illegitimate son of Isidro via Valentina Abarracoso and thus is his brother rather
than the mothers.

6) Mar 1, 50 CFI rules in favor of

7) Aug 17, 70 20 years after granted admin, Eduardo Azarraga (heir of

Amador) files for the removal of admin from citing failure to render a final
accounting of the estate and a project of partition. He also requests to be granted
admin.

8) s cite that the decedent is not a legitimate child of Isidro and thus is not the
full blooded sibling of the mother who was a legitimate child.

9) asserts the opposite, that decedent Leodegario is legitimate

10) CFI again rules for

11) files with CA and is upheld and is granted admin to the prejudice of

Issues: WON Leodegario is a legitimate child of Isidro and his legal wife
Calixta Lozada

Held: YES, the proved the legitimacy of Leodegario through his school records
(UST Law) which cited the decedents name as Leodegario Azarraga y Lozada. It
was further strengthened by the preponderance of the will of Pastora Azarraga
which stated that the decedent and the mother Filiomena are full blooded
siblings. Moreover the court order of Mar 1, 50 (granting admin to the ) also
acknowledges this fact of legitimacy. CA set aside CFI affirmed.

Tison vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582, July 31,

1997
Facts:

1) Mar 5, 83Teodora Dezoller Guerero dies w/ no children leaving the prop in

question to her husband and the heirs of her brother(who diedin 73), the .

2) Jan 2, 88 After her death, her husband Martin Guerero adjudicates the house
to him and sells it to Teodora Domingo.

3) Martin dies on Oct 25, 88 and s Tison and Dezoller file for reconveyance
Nov. 2, 88 for 1/2share of the prop.

4) During the hearing the birth cert.s marriage cert.s w/c prove the filiation to
the decedent Teodora through their common link to their father Teodoras brother
Hermogenes Dezoller. More importantly they present the testimony of one of the
Corazon Dezoller Tison attesting that some time in 1946 the decedent had
actually acknowledged her as her niece (declaration of filiation).

5) files a demurrer to the evidence citing that they fall short of the
requirements set by Art 172 of the Family Code and that the testimony of
Corazon Dezoller Tison was self serving and uncorroborated.

6) Dec 3, 92 TC rules for granting the demurrer and dismissing the action for
reconveyance.

7) CA affirms citing the evidence presented was inadmisible.

Issues: WON the satisfy of the quantum of proof mandated by Art 172 of
the FC.

Held: YES, the court held that legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally in an
action for reconveyance, as such the court held that there being a presumption of
legitimacy in relation to the status of the petitioners the s failure to adduce
evidence disproving such a fact renders the presumption effective. Thus his
choice to file a demurrer rather than adduce evidence to controvert the
assertions comes as a implied admission of the fact of legitimacy. More
importantly the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison fell within the definition of a
declaration about pedigree that is exempt form the rule on hearsay based on the
following conditions: 1) that the declarant is either dead or unable to testify; 2)
that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is subject of inquiry,
3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration 4) that
the declaration was made ante litem motum (before the commencement of the
suit). Moreover the declaration may stand only if it pertains to the claimants right
over the declarants own estate (as in this case). If however the declaration is to
claim a right from another family member other than the declarants estate the
declaration may not be deemed credible.

Judgment reversed and set aside.

Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 188, April 20, 1998

Arturio Trinidad was born on July 21, 1943 from Felicidad Molato and Inocentes
Briones, who allegedly married on May 5, 1942. Upon the death of Inocentes,
Arturio lived with his aunt Lourdes in the property of Patricio Briones (father of
Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix) until he grew up and got married. When Arturio
returned to the property upon Lourdes invitation and sought to claim the share of
his father on the land, Lourdes refused to partition the property and claimed that
Inocentes never married, died single, and has no child. On the other hand,
Arturio claimed that his parents were legally married but failed to provide their
marriage certificate and his birth certificate to show his relationship with
Inocentes because these were lost during the war.

WON Arturio is the legitimate

The parents of Arturio, Inocentes and Felicidad, were validly married Office of the
Civil Registrar of Aklan certified that all its records of marriages and birth, among
others, were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation
Isabel Meren and Jovita Gerardo testified that his parents were married and
cohabited as husband and wife

Meren was one of the witnesses to the nuptials Jovita was the barangay captain
who had attended the birth and baptismal parties of Arturio

Arturio was born during their marriage and cohabitationThe baptismal certificate
of Arturio show his parents to be Inocentes and Felicidad and his birth to be on
July 21, 1943, after the legitimate and legal wedding of Inocentes and Felicidad
Family photos of Lourdes and Felix with Arturios wife and children substantiate
his claim that they had lived together in the property, contrary to Lourdes claim
that they had not

Heirs of Conti v CA, G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998

De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon, 366 SCRA 499

Facts:

- Aug 23, 1964 Danilo Jesus and Carolina Jesus were married. Their union
produced two children, Jacqueline (March 1, 1979) and Jinky Jesus (July 6,
1982).

- June 7 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as

his own illegitimate children with Carolina Aves de Jesus

- 12 March 1992 Juan Dizon died. Jacqueline and Jinky then filed an action to
be part of the heirs of his estate as his illegitimate children in a notarized
document.

- TC: ulitimately dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and for
being improper since its not the proper forum to question their paternity and
filiation. Thus the present case ISSUE: WON Jinky and Jacquelin are the
illegitimate children of Juan Dizon HELD: NO

- Presumption of law is that of legitimacy. Those who are born in wedlock

without conclusive proof that there was physical impossibility for the parents to
conceive the child are considered legitimate. Upon the expiration of periods
found in FC 170 and 171, this presumption of civil status becomes fixed and
unassailable. It is only when the legitimacy of the child has been disputed can
paternity of the husband be rejected.

While the recognition of illegitimacy by Dizon was made in accordance with the
rules on recognizing illegitimacy, this does not negate the legitimacy they hold
with Danilo Jesus. Petitoners were born during the marriage of their parents.
The certificates of live birth also identify Danilo de Jesus as their father.
Thus, before they can be recognized as illegitimate children, they must first
contest their status as legitimate children of Danilo Jesus.

Makati Shangri-La v Harper, GR 189998, August 29, 2012

2. Of illegitimate children, FC 175

 Jison vs. CA, 286 SCRA 495

Facts:

1. Francisco Jison was married to Lilia Lopez Jison in 1945 and together, they
had Lourdes

2. Francisco impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar, Lourdes nanny, who gave birth

to Monina Joson on August 4, 1946

3. March 13, 1985: Monina filed a petition for recognition as Franciscos

illegitimate child

a. That Esperanza was still employed by Francisco at the time Monina was
conceived in 1945

b. That sexual contact between Francisco and Esperanza was not impossible

i. Castellanes, Sr., a worker in the Nelly Garden that Lilia managed

testified that Lilia spent her evenings in the Nelly Garden, working from
6PM to 3AM

c. That the affidavit she signed on September 21, 1971 where she denounced
her filiation with Francisco was acquired under duress

i. Bilbao, the procurement officer, hacienda overseer and administrator

testified that he was present during the event

d. That Francisco fathered Monina and recognized her as his daughter andThat
Monina has been enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as
Franciscos illegit child where Francisco

i. Sent her to schoolPaid for her school expenses Defrayed her

hospitalization expenses

1. Testified to by Monina herself and Ledesma, a banker and former mayor

ii. Gave her monthly allowances which he instructed his office personnel to
doPaid for her mothers funeral expenses Acknowledged her paternal
greetings and Called her his Hija or child

1. Testified to by Tingson, Nelly Gardens paymaster

a. who recorded its expenses and issued vouchers and

b. who knew the persons receiving money from Franciscos office and
 c. who kept Moninas accounts in a separate book to hide it from Lilia, as
instructed by Francisco

iii. Recommended her for employment in Merchant Financing Corporation

that is managed by the wife of his first cousin

iv. Allowed her to use his house in Bacolod Paid for her long distance
telephone calls

1. Testified to by the houseboy, Duatin, that

a. Monina was introduced to him as Franciscos child when she stayed there

b. Monina calls Francisco Daddy

c. Francisco instructed him to treat Monina just like the rest of his children

d. He hid Monina whenever Francisco and Lilia were there, as instructed

by Francisco

v. Had her vacation in his apartment in Manila

vi. Allowed her to use his surname

Issue: WON Monina is the illegitimate child of Francisco

Held: YES

1. The preponderance of evidence mentioned above sufficiently established her

filiation despite

a. the Affidavit dated Sept. 21, 1971, attesting that Francisco is not her father,
because it would not have been necessary if it were not true; Francisco had gone
to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation

b. Moninas birth and baptismal certificates were not signed by Francisco

because these are not conclusive evidence of filiation

c. Notes of Franciscos relatives attesting to Moninas filiation are without merit

since

i. they are not shown to be dead or unable to testify

ii. they are not family possessionsRule 130, Secs. 39, 40 require that family
possessions to be regarded as evidence of pedigree should be articles
representing, in effect, the familys joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree
of a person
 Heirs of Gabatan vs CA, GR 150206, March 13, 2009

Proof of filiation, FC 175

Doctrine: the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of
birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a
final judgment.

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article,
the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a
legitimate child.

ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final

judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Facts:

1. the subject property of this case is a land located in CDO originally owned by Juan
Gabatan.
2. The respondent here filed a complaint before the RTC against the petitioners for
reconveyance alleging that she is the sole owner of the piece of land located in CDO
claiming that her mother, Hermogena is the only child of Juan Gabatan and wife
Laureana.
a. On the other hand, the petitioners denied the allegations of the respondent
arguing that Juan Gabatan died single without any issue and were survived by
his brother and sister. The petitioners herein are the heirs of the said brother
and sister.
3. The RTC rendered a decision in favor fo the respondent. The CA upheld the said
decision ruling that
a. that respondents claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently
established during trial giving weight to the D eed of Absolute Sale executed
by Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa
Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan.

Issue: based on the law on proving filiation, was the respondent able to prove her mothers
filiation to the decedent?

Ruling: No.

Fact in issue: Here, two conflicting birth certificates of respondent were presented
at the RTC. Respondent, during her direct testimony, presented and identified a purported
certified true copy of her typewritten birth certificate which indicated that her mothers maiden
name was Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a certified
true copy of respondents handwritten birth certificate which differed from the copy presented
by respondent. Among the differences was respondents mothers full maiden name which was
indicated as Hermogena Calarito in the handwritten birth certificate.

Ruling: The petitioners evidence sufficiently proved that the entries in her birth certificate
were untrue.

The certified true copies of the handwritten birth certificate of respondent were duly
authenticated competent witnesses; namely, the Assistant Registration Officer of the Office of
the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and Archivist of the National Statistics Office
(NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila. Both witnesses testified that: (a) as part of their official duties they
have custody of birth records in their respective offices, and (b) the certified true copy of
respondents handwritten birth certificate is a faithful reproduction of the original birth
certificate registered in their respective offices.
On the other hand, the respondents birth certificate was only a photocopy and
inadmissible.

As to the Deed of Sale, the same should not be considered considering that there is
a public documentthe birth certificatewhich is the primary proof of filiation. It is
only in the absence of such types of documents that other evidence proving filiation
may be introduced.

To reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondents mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate
that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil
Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of these, respondent
should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent
allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mothers relationship
to Juan Gabatan.

However, respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth certificate, which would have been the
best evidence of Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at
the RTC. Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final judgment
categorically evidencing Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan.

Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac Pacana
and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that they personally knew Hermogena (respondents
mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to Laureana Clarito
and that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana. However, none of these witnesses
had personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of
Hermogena to Juan and Laureana.

Dela Cruz , et al vs. Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

DOCTRINE: 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the
same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

FACTS:

1 Petitioner Jenie, 21-year old, and Dominique, 19-year old, lived together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage.
2 They resided in the house of Dominiques parents.
3 Dominique died.
4 After almost two months, Jenie who continued to live with Dominiques parents, gave
birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz Aquino at the Antipolo
Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.
5 Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino,
with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she
submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the
Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgement
executed by Dominiques father Domingo Butch Aquino.
6 Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had
continuously acknowledge his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been
questioned.
7 Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled AUTOBIOGRAPHY, which Dominique,
during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting acknowledging his unborn child.
8 The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City denied Jenies application for registration of the
childs name.
 9 Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name
against respondent before the RTC of Antipolo City.
10 The Complaint alleged that the denial of registration of the childs name is a violation
of his right to use the surname of his deceased father.
11 They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an
admission of paternity in a private handwritten instrument within the contemplation of
the provision of law.
12 The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, as the
Autobiography was unsigned.
13 The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten
Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.

ISSUE: WON the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father of minor Christian
Dela Cruz can be considered as a recognition of paternity in a private handwritten instrument.
HELD: YES. It is to petitioner minor childs best interests to allow him to bear the surname of
the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.

RATIO: Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child
to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his
offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission
made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these
documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs paternity; hence,
no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private
handwritten instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative
father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the
Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.

xxxx

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques
Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.

First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second, the relevant matters
in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts
culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by
the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his
brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of
the questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity
of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that JENIE DELA CRUZ is MY WIFE
as WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE
TOGETHER.

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominiques
Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant
facts extant herein that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as
common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house in Pulang-lupa,
Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005;
and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish
that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules
respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is
made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed
by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

Lucas v Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011

DOCTRINE: During the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

It should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the
court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA
testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test
result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing

FACTS: Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of
Partiesto DNA Testing before the RTC. Jesse narrated his mothers account of her history with
Jesus S. Lucas and attached several copies of his personal documents. Though Jesus was not
summoned and was not served a copy of the petition, he nevertheless learned of it and
obtained for himself a copy. He then filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting
among others that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should
beserved on him as respondent.

Unbeknownst to Jesus on the day before he filed his Comment, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion
to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case
for hearing. After learning of the RTCs order, Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing
that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses
father.

Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse
failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action
enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba. This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for
Reconsideration of his own which the RTC granted.

A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by
Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet
taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then
filed a petitionfor certiorari with the CA. The CA ruled in favor of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed
to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and
held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima
facie case.

This case involves the issuance of a DNA testing order

ISSUE: Can the court order DNA testing to prove filiation

HELD: Yes, but there should be evidence submitted that DNA is warranted to prove filiation

RATIO: The statement in Herrera v. Alba, that there are four significant procedural aspects in a
traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and
misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during
trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence
that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to
establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima
facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity caseis therefore misplaced. A prima
facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.

Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis--
vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing
order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In
fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.

Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must
be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases.
We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of
paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the
action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which
the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.

Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012

DOCTRINE: Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to
secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or
inheritance. In paternity cases, the burden of proof is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child.

One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through:

1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
2. An admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned;
3. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child,
or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

This Court has held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds
of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

In Herrera v. Alba, the SC stressed that there are 4 significant procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action that parties have to face:
1. A prima facie case;
2. Affirmative defenses,
3. Presumption of legitimacy;
4. Physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.

A prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported by corroborative proof that she
had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the
putative father. The two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are:
1. incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or
impotency, or
2. That the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.

FACTS:
1. In September 1995, Divina Buling (Divina) filed a complaint before the RTC-Maasin
against Charles Gotardo (Charles) for compulsory recognition and support pendente
lite. She alleged that he was the father of her child, Gliffze. She made the following
 allegations:
a. Upon learning of her pregnancy, Charles made the preparations for a wedding.
b. However, the wedding did not happen. Hence, she filed a case for damages for
breach of promise to marry. This case was amicably settled.
c. When Gliffze was born, Divina wrote Charles for support. However, Charles
failed to provide it. Hence, Divinas demand for recognition and support for
their child. This demand proved to be futile. Hence, she filed the instant
complaint.
2. In his Answer, Charles denied the imputed parternity of Gliffze.
3. Divina alleged that
4. In June 2002, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving
Gliffzes filiation.
5. Divina filed an appeal to the Ca. In March 2004, the CA set aside the RTC decision and
ordered Charles to recognize his minor son, Gliffze.
6. Charles filed an MR but it was denied. Hence, this present petition for review on
certiorari where he argues that the CA committed reversible error in rejecting the RTCs
appreciation of his testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove
paternity.

ISSUE: WON Charles was able to prove with sufficient evidence his allegation that he is not the
father of Divinas minor child, Gliffze.

HELD: No.

RATIO: In this case, Divina established a prima facie case that Charles is the putative father of
Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, Charles, at
the time of her conception. Charles uncle, Rodulfo, who owned Charles bedspace (where the
parties had intimate relations), corroborated her testimony that Charles and Divina had an
intimate relationship.

For his part, Charles did not deny that he had sexual encounters with Divina, only that it
occurred on a much later date than Divina asserted, such that it was physically impossible for
the respondent to have been 3 months pregnant already in September 1994 when he was
informed of the pregnancy. However, Charles failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity
and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of
evidentiary support. Charles denial cannot overcome Divinas clear and categorical assertions.

Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation. A parent is obliged
to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support
is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the
amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or
increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to
support.
Wherefore, the petition is denied for lack of merit.

Perla v Baring, GR 172471, November 12, 2012

Doctrine: To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there
must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to
consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care,
which cannot be attributed to pure charity

Facts: Baring and her son Randy filed a complaint for support with the RTC against Perla,
alleging that the latter is the father of Randy. Baring alleges that Perla was her neighbor in
Taguig and that the latter courted her, and that they had sexual intercourse in 1983, Randy
being the product of that intercourse. She futher alleged that she was able to take Randy to
Perlas residence and was taken care of by Perlas mother. She further notes that Randy asked
Perla for support and the latter freely obliged and he has been known and referred to by the
former as his papa. She presented Randys birth certificate, containing Perlas name as the
father of Randy, although no signature of the latter was contained thereon. She admitted that
Perla had no hand in the preparation of the said birth certificate. Perla on his part asserted that
he only had sexual intercourse with Baring (one night stand) in 1980, and he has never seen
her since then. He further asserts that it was impossible for him to have had sex with her in
1983 as he was in IloIlo finishing his studies. The trial court ruled in favor of Baring and ordered
Perla to acknowledge Randy and give support. Upon appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence this present appeal.

Issue: W/N Baring was able to sufficiently establish Randys filiation to Perla, obliging the latter
to give support?

Held: No, she was not able to establish filiation through clear and competent evidence.

Ratio: A review of the Decision of the RTC would show that it is bereft of any discussion
regarding Randys filiation. Although the appellate court, for its part, cited the applicable
provision on illegitimate filiation, it merely declared the certified true copies of Randys birth
certificate and baptismal certificate both identifying Antonio as the father as good proofs of his
filiation with Randy and nothing more. This is despite the fact that the said documents do not
bear Antonios signature. Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy
identifying Antonio as the father. However, said certificate has no probative value to establish
Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same.60 It is settled that [a]
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of
said certificate. Besides, the several unexplained discrepancies in Antonios personal
circumstances as reflected in the subject birth certificate are manifestations of Antonios non-
participation in its preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol who signed as informant thereon
which she confirmed on the witness stand. Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his
illegitimate filiation. That during their first encounter in 1994 Randy called Antonio Papa and
kissed his hand while Antonio hugged him and promised to support him; or that his Aunt Lelita
treated him as a relative and was good to him during his one-week stay in her place, cannot be
considered as indications of Randys open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172(1).

To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider
the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which
cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not
only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as
such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.

3. Rights of illegitimate children, FC 176

4. Compulsory recognition, cf. RPC 345

People v Abella, G.R. No. 177295, January 6, 2010

DOCTRINE: The accused is the biological father of the two-year old daughter of AAA
as a result of the rape incident and in view of their "striking facial similarities and features."
The order to acknowledge and support accused-appellants offspring is in accordance with
Article 345 of the RPC.

FACTS: Marlon Barsaga Abella, while armed with "Balisong" and under the influence of liquor,
by means of force and intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there willfully and
feloniously enter the house of herein complainant and then and there have sexual intercourse
with AAA, a 38 year old woman of feeble mind, against her will to her damage and prejudice.
The complainant AAA later on gave birth to a baby girl.
The RTC convicted the accused-appellant Abella. The trial court found the 38-year old AAA as a
credible witness and her testimony candid and truthful despite her "moderate mental
retardation" or intellectual quotient of a 7 to 8-year old child. In contrast, the trial court found
that the defenses of denial and alibi of the accused-appellant were flimsy and farfetched. It
further ruled that the child conceived and delivered by AAA was fathered by the accused-
appellant.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower courts ruling. Hence, the case with the SC.

ISSUE: WON the accused is the father of the child conceived and delivered.

RULING: Yes, accused-appellant was the biological father.

RATIO: The court ruled that the accused Abella is the biological father of the two-year old
daughter of AAA as a result of the rape incident and in view of their "striking facial similarities
and features." The order to acknowledge and support accused-appellants offspring is in
accordance with Article 345 of the RPC.

AAA stated that several months after the incident, her stomach became big. Thinking that she
was just ill, she drank some bitter solution upon her mothers instruction. As her stomach
continued to grow, AAA was forced to tell her mother about the rape incident. Thereafter, AAA
consulted a doctor who confirmed that she was pregnant. Consequently she gave birth to a
baby girl.

BBB, AAAs mother, on the other hand, testified that the appellant is the cousin of her
husband. She claimed that she noticed her daughter becoming pale and thinner. She also
noticed that AAAs stomach was getting bigger and thus decided to bring her to a doctor, who
in turn informed her that her daughter might be pregnant. An ultrasound examination
confirmed that AAA was indeed pregnant. BBB then asked her daughter who was responsible
for her pregnancy, AAA replied that it was the appellant.

BBB further claimed that prior to the confirmation of the pregnancy, the appellant had given
her some mahogany seeds which he said AAA should take so that she will have her
menstruation. But since the mahogany seeds made AAA weaker, BBB discontinued it and
decided to consult a doctor instead. Upon learning that it was the appellant who had raped her
daughter, BBB immediately reported the matter to the Municipal Hall of Pamplona. Thereafter,
the appellant was arrested.

BBB also testified that appellants parents had tried to settle the case by offering the sum of
P20K. They however declined said offer, as it was not even commensurate to the expenses
they have already spent for their daughter and her child. AAA gave birth to a baby girl on 16
August [2000] but the appellant and his family had never given them any financial support.

F. Legitimated Children

1. who may be legitimated, FC 177, RA 9858

Abadilla vs Tabiliran, 249 SCRA 447

Facts:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the grounds of
gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. With respect to
the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and publicly
cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita Banzuela.
Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to the charge
on deceitful conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children with
Priscilla be registered as legitimate by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the
delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact,
he knew these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The judge averred that 25
years had already elapsed since the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married
Priscilla hence the cohabitation was neither bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as
1970, based on the record, Priscilla had begotten her 3 children (1970, 1971 and 1975).

Issue: Whether or not the 3 children can be considered legitimate.

Ruling:

The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the time
they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only
natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other, are natural.

Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy
the sanctity of marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the
child.

2. How legitimation takes place, FC 178, FC 180

3. Retroactivity and effects, FC 180-181

4. Action to impugn legitimation, FC 182

5. Rights of legitimated children, FC 179

XI. ADOPTION

Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250

DOCTRINE: Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an
adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99
of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but
must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence.

FACTS:

1. Margarita de Asis died, leaving a holographic will providing for a legacy of cash,
jewelry, and stocks to respondent; a legacy of support; and a legacy of education to
Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner.
2. During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the bank which
either she or respondent, adopted daughter could open. 5 days after her death,
respondent opened the safety deposit box and removed its contents
3. Respondent claims that she opened the safety deposit box in good faith, believing that
 it was held jointly by her and her deceased mother.
4. Respondents filed a petition to probate the will. After having learned that the safety
box was opened, petitioner's son filed a motion in the probate court, claiming that the
deceased had executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate and
demanding its production.
5. Petitioner filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted
child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by the brother of the deceased the
petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of a certain Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by
him. This affidavit was later modified to state that petitioner was adopted by both of
margarita de Asis and her husband.
6. During the hearing, petitioner presented no decree of adoption in his favor. Instead, he
attempted to prove, over private respondents' objections, that he had recognized the
deceased spouses as his parents; he had been supported by them until their death.
7. Photographs were also intended to be presented by petitioner, e.g., photograph of Irma
Veloso where she addressed herself as sister of petitioner; photograph of deceased
Margarita de Asis and petitioner when he was a boy; document showing that
petitioners real name is "Renato Lazatin."

ISSUE: Whether or not renato has established his status as an adopted child.

HELD: NO. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an
adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99
of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but
must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence.

On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of
its non-existence. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by
the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not
his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption.

Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were
actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the
proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument.

The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this
order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.

As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to establish the former existence of the adoption paper
and its subsequent loss or destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first
been established that such adoption paper really existed and was lost.

Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575

DOCTRINE: A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority
vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the
spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, both spouses shall exercise
parental authority over the adopted jointly. The adopting parents have the right to the care and
custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.

FACTS:
1. Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with this court over the person of the minor
Angelie Anne Cervantes.
2. Mino was born on Feb. 14, 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon,
who are common-law husband and wife.
3. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreons sister and brother in
law, the petitioners.
 4. Petitioner spouses took care and custody of the child when she was barely 2 weeks
old.
5. An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners was also
executed by respondent Gina
6. The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioenrs over the child
7. RTC rendered a decision granting the petition
8. Angelie Anne Fajardo Cervantes
9. Sometime in March or April 1987, petitioners received a letter from respondents
demanding to be paid P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child.
10. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand
11. Sept. 11, 1987: respondent Gina took the child from her yaya at the
petitioners residence on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her
mother. Gino brought the child to her house
12. Petitioners demanded the return of the child but Gina refused

ISSUE/S: WON the writ should be granted.

HELD: YES. the writ should be granted.

RATIO: Respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina
his open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor that desireable atmosphere

Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with full knowledge and consent of respondents
A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural
parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural
parent of the adopted

R.A. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Law)

A.M. No. 02-6-02-S.C. (Aug. 22, 2002)

A. Requisites to be an adopter

1. Age and capacity required Sec. 7

2. Husband and wife jointly Sec. 7

Michelle Lim, GR 168992, May 21, 2009

Doctrine: The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision
means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the
ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures
harmony between the spouses.

Facts:
1. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim
(Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were
entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child
of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they
were the childrens parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and
Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the
clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977. Michael was 11 days old when
Ayuban brought him to petitioners clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.
2. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the
children to exclusive schools. They used the surname Lim in all their school records
 and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December
2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
3. Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given
under Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of
a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court. At the time of the filing of the petitions for
adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years
and seven months old.
4. Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their
Affidavits of Consent. Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent. Petitioners husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of
Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
5. Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the
duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the
child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim dura lex sed lex is not
applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary
in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not
anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of
majority.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt?

Held: No. The use of the word shall in the Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed
only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First,
the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband
Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner
and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does
not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen.
He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove
that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have
been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is
entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed
to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were
shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees
the legitimate children of petitioner.

3. Need for consent Sec. 9

Landingin vs. RP, G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006

CASE 334: Landingin v. RP, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006

DOCTRINE: Adoption is denied because there was no consent from the mother, although the
social worker wrote in her report that the mother appeared and was interviewed and she said
she consented to the adoption.

FACTS:
1. Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of
3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia Ramos.
2. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their
paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2
children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the
institution of the adoption.
3. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the
petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.
4. A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and
narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after
weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.
5. However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence
the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.

ISSUE: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptees
biological mother.

HELD: No.
RATIO: Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of
the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will
suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed
adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be
obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of
love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of
others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

4. Aliens as adopters Sec. 7 (b)

Republic v. Toledano, 233 SCRA 9

Facts:
1. On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba,
Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse sought to jointly adopt the minor,
Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse.
a. Circumstances of the respondents: Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen
of the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981
at Olongapo City.
 b. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States
of America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially
capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
2. The RTC then granted the adoption of the respondents.
3. Hence, the present action by the petitioner arguing that the respondents are not
qualified to adopt Solomon.

Issue: are the respondents qualified to adopt Solomon?

Ruling: No.

With Regard to the qualifications of Alvin:

Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family
Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon Joseph Alcala.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who
are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with
the rules on intercountry adoption as may be provided by law.

Hence, There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to
adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision.
In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the
United States of America.
In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor
the legitimate child of his spouse.
In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to
adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A.
Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.

With regard to Evelyn:

Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to
paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209.

She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the
petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which
mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must
be read along together with Article 184. Article 185 is all too clear and categorical
and there is no room for its interpretation. There is only room for application.

R.A. 8043, The Law on Inter-Country Adoption

A.M. No. 02-6-02-S.C. (Aug. 22, 2002)
 B. Who may not adopt, Sec. 7

C. Who may be adopted, Sec. 8

D. Who may not be adopted

E. Effect of death, Sec. 13

F. Procedure in adoption

Republic Act No. 9253, March 12, 2009 - AN ACT

REQUIRING CERTIFICATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE
AND DEVELOPMENT (DSWD) TO DECLARE A "CHILD LEGALLY
AVAILABLE FOR ADOPTION" AS A PREREQUISITE FOR ADOPTION
PROCEEDINGS

G. Effects of a decree of adoption

1. On status
2. On parental authority,

Tamargo v. CA, 209 SCRA 518

DOCTRINE: Under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is
the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over
whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.

FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the
RTC by petitioners, parents of Jennifer, against respondent spouses, Adelbertos natural
parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.

In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence was filed against Adelberto, who was acquitted and exempted from criminal
liability on the ground that he acted without discernment. Prior to the incident the spouses
Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto before the then CFI of Ilocos Sur.

This petition for adoption was granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. In their
Answer, respondent spouses, Adelbertos natural parents, claimed that they should not be the
indespensible parties, but rather the adopting parents to the action since parental authority
had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was
filed.

The trial court ruled against the adopting parents, who filed an MR which was later denied for
being filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioners went to the CA on a petition for
mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial courts decision. The CA dismissed the petition,
ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal. Hence this petition for review

ISSUE: Who should be responsible for the tortuous act of the minor Adelberto, his natural
parents or adopting parents?

HELD: The natural parents

RATIO: Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of
parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the
child. In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was
still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the
suit for damages. Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child
under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code.

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to
impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.

To hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to
burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they
could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical
custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on
the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was
not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested
in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody
period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident.
Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.

Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575

DOCTRINE: A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority
vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the
spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted
shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and
custody of the adopted child 8 and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.

FACTS:
1. In February 1987, common law spouses Conrado Fajardo (Conrado) and Gina Carreon
(Gina) had a child, Angelie.
2. Conrado and Gina offered Angelie for adoption to Ginas sister and brother-in-law,
Zenaida and Nelson. The latter couple took care and custody of Angelie when she was
barely 2 weeks old.
3. In April 1987, an Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child was executed
between the parties.
4. Nelson and Zenaida received a letter from Conrado and Gina demanding to be paid,
otherwise, they would get Angelie back. The former couple refused to accede to the
demand.
5. In August 1987, the appropriate petition for adoption was filed before the RTC-Rizal.
The petition was granted. Angelie was freed from parental authority of her natural
parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them.
6. In September 1987, while Nelson and Zenaida were out at work, Gina took Angelie on
the pretext that she was instructed to do so by Zenaida. Gina brought Angelie to her
(Ginas) house.
7. Nelson and Zenaida demanded the return of Angelie, but Gina refused. Gina alleged
that the Affidavit of Consent to the adoption was not fully explained to her. She sent
word to Nelson and Zenaida that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if
she were paid the amount of P150,000.00.

ISSUE: WON the adoptive parents have the legal right to custody and care for the adopted
minor child.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: Refer to Doctrine.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.

3. On hereditary rights, Sec. 18; FC 189-190; Art. 39, PD 603, Rule

99, Section 5
See: Balane, Ruben, Jottings in Succession, [2006 ed.]

4. On name

In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia, 454 SCRA 541

Doctrine: An adopted child may use her mothers name as her middle name.

Facts: Petitioner Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his illegitimate child, minor
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein that she has been using her mothers
middle name and surname, and further alleged that he is now a widower, making him qualified
to be her adoptive parent. He prays that her middle name be changed from Astorga to Garcia,
and her last name changed from Garcia to Catindig. The trial court granted his petition and
ordered that her name then be Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Petitioner then filed a motion for
clarification, praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her mother as her
middle name. The trial court denied the said motion, ruling that there is no law or
jurisprudence which allows an adopted child to use her biological mothers surname as her
middle name. Hence this present petition.

Issue: Can an adopted child use the surname of her biological mother as her middle name?

Held: Yes, the law is silent with regard to the issue, but taking into consideration the
paramount interest of the child, it should be allowed.

Ratio: As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle
name. Even Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise
known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as
to what middle name a child may use.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of
the Civil Code merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the
surname of the childs mother as his middle name.

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent
with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier
discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father. Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties,
Stephanie continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain
her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18,
Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of
his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from
her natural mother in the future.

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.
 H. Rescission of adoption, Sec. 19
Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003
DOCTRINE: R.A. No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 prohibits
rescission of the decree of adoption by the adopting parents.

FACTS: Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose
Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. Eventually, the couple decided to file a petition
for adoption. An order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than
before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the
Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."

A sad turn of events came many years later. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption before the RTC.

Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, R.A. No. 8552, also known as
the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of
adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.

Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending that the petitioner had no
cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated,
by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e.,
to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then
Article 348 of the Civil Code and Article 192 of the Family Code.

The trial court dismissed the petition stating that Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted
the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family Code.
Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there is lack of cause of action hence, the
petition with the SC.

ISSUE: WON the adopting parents have the right to rescind a decree of adoption.

RULING: No, the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 prohibits rescission by the adopting parents.

RATIO: The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed. It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552
that petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the
new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and
the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements,
the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been
initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued. .

1. by the adopted
2. by the adopter/s
3. effects of rescission, Sec. 20

XII. SUPPORT

A. What comprises support, FC 194

B. Who are obliged to provide support, FC 195, 196

Pelayo v. Lauron, 12 Phil 453

FACTS:
October 13, 1906, evening: Dr. Arturo Pelayo was called to the house of Marcelo Lauron and
Juana Abella. He was asked to give birth to their daughter-in- law. He assisted in the delivery of
the child. He was kept occupied until the next day. He valued his fee at P500 BUT Marcelo and
Juana refused to pay without reason. A complaint was filed by Pelayo against Lauron and Abella
for collection. The contentions of Lauron and Abella are as follows: (a) that their son and his
wife lived independently from them and in a separate house (b) that if she did stay in their
house that night, it was due to fortuitous circumstances (c) that their daughter-in-law had died
due to the childbirth. The RTC Held that Lauron and Abella absolved from the complaint due to
lack of sufficient evidence to establish a right of action against them.

ISSUE:
WON the husband is bound to pay the bill for the delivery.

RULING: Yes.
Article 142 and 143, Civil Code: Mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of
mutual support

Includes medical services in case of illness thats when either of them by reason of illness
should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to
furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored. The father
and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves upon the husband
to provide support. Hence, her husband, and not her father and mother- in-law, is liable. That it
is of no matter who called the doctor and requested his services. That there was imminent
danger to her life and medical assistance was urgently needed.

Sanchez v. Zulueta, 68 Phil 110

Facts: In civil case No. 3199 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, wherein Josefa Diego and
Mario Sanchez are plaintiffs and Feliciano Sanchez is defendant, the plaintiffs ask that the
defendant be sentenced to pay them a monthly allowance for support.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs are the wife and child, respectively, of the defendant;
that the latter, since 1932, refused and still refuses to support the plaintiffs; that the latter
have no means of subsistence, while the defendant receives from the United States Army a
monthly pension of P174.20; that the defendant abandoned the plaintiffs without any
justifiable cause and now refuses to allow them to live with him.

The defendant alleges, as special defense, that the plaintiff Josefa Diego abandoned the
conjugal home on October 27, 1930, without his knowledge or consent, because she
committed adultery with Macario Sanchez, with whom she had, as a result of the illicit
relations, a child which is the other plaintiff Mario Sanchez.

The month following the filing of the complaint, the plaintiffs asked the court to compel the
defendant to give them, by way of allowance pendente lite, the sum of P50 a month. In
opposition to his petition, the defendant alleged that Mario Sanchez is not his legitimate child
but is the adulterous child of the plaintiff with Macario Sanchez, and he asked for an
oppurtunity to adduce evidence in support of this defense. The court, without acceding to this
petition of the defendant to adduce evidence, favorably acted upon the application of the
plaintiffs and ordered the defendant to pay a monthly allowance pendente lite of P50 to the
plaintiffs, from July 1, 1936. In view of these facts, the defendant filed a petition for prohibition
before the Court of Appeals against the judge of the Court of First Instance and the plaintiffs.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition, and from this resolution, the defendant comes to this
court on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in granting support pende lite to Apellees.

Ruling:

We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to present
his evidence for the purpose of determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the
application. Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support
(Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil., 285). Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is
the fruit of such adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of the defendant
and, hence, would not be entitled to support as such. But as this defense should be
established, and not merely alleged, it would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It
is not of course necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient the court
ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly
resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the
resolution to be entered.

Although mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application, nevertheless, the
failure to accompany the opposition therewith did not justify the court in ignoring said
opposition, just because of this omission, inasmuch as an opportunity to present evidence has
been asked. It may be that the defendant could not get hold of affidavits in support of his
opposition, but he may have on hand other evidence of greater weight.

If the defendant has a valid defense which calls for proof, and he asks for an opportunity to
present evidence, it is error to deny him this opportunity.

De Asis vs. CA, G.R. No. 127578, Feb. 15, 1999

DOCTRIE: The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third
person. Article 301 of the Civil Code, the law in point. Furthermore, future support cannot be
the subject of a compromise under Art. 2035. While it is true that in order to claim support,
filiation or paternity must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof
must be judicially established and declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to the
will or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another
action asking for the same relief (no force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata
claimed by Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any
compromise or waiver.

FACTS:

1. Respondent brought an action for maintenance and support against petitioner alleging
that petitioner is the father of respondent and the same refused and/or failed to
provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands.
2. later on, respondent withdrew the complaint for the reason that petitioner denied
paternity of the said minor and due to such denial, it seems useless to pursue the said
action. They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint with the
condition that petitioner will not pursue his counter claim.
3. However, Respondent filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as
the minors legal guardian/mother. Petitioner interposed maxim of res judicata for the
dismissal of the case. He maintained that since the obligation to give support is based
on existence of paternity between the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates
the right to claim support.

ISSUE: Whether or not the minor is barred to claim support

HELD: No. The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third
person. Article 301 of the Civil Code, the law in point. Furthermore, future support cannot be
the subject of a compromise.
Art. 2035,

The reason behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of
the right to support is stated, thus, The right to support being founded upon the need of the
recipient to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this
would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be
renounce; hence, support which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced. To
allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is
virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden. This is
contrary to public policy

In the case at bar, respondent minor's mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case,
manifested that she was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support from
petitioner who denied his paternity over the child. Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's
theory that the dismissal has the effect of res judicata on the subsequent case for support

Rondina v People, GR 179059, June 13, 2012

DOCTRINE: Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three different kinds of civil liability that
may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the
law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring.

FACTS:
1. Rondina was charged for the crime of rape. AAA (16 y.o victim).
2. On July 15, 1998, AAA, upon arriving home from school at around 4:00 p.m., immediately
proceeded to the toilet to defecate. The said toilet, constructed of hollow blocks with G.I.-
sheet roofing, had only a tie-wire as lock. It was located outside AAAs house and was being
used as a communal toilet by the occupants of nearby houses.
3. Once inside, AAA immediately took off her panty and relieved herself, forgetting to lock the
door. After washing her anus, AAA was surprised when Victor, a neighbor, suddenly
entered the toilet with only a towel covering himself from the waist down. Victor
immediately removed the towel from his waist as well as his brief. He then poked a knife
on AAAs neck, covered her mouth and threatened her by saying [d]ont ever tell anybody
otherwise I will kill your parents, your siblings including yourself.
4. Victor ordered AAA to stand against the wall with her hands on both sides and forcefully
inserted his penis into AAAs vagina. AAA felt pain. After a while, she felt a liquid-like
substance discharged from Victors penis. When Victor had already satisfied his bestial
desire, he again wrapped the towel around his waist and before getting out of the toilet
uttered do not tell your mother or else I will kill you.
5. RULING OF THE RTC: In resolving the case, the court held that the prosecution was
able to duly establish all the elements of rape.
6. RULING OF THE CA: it found no reason to overturn the decision of the RTC.
7. It is worth noting that the said rape resulted to AAAs conception of a child, CCC

ISSUE/S: WON Victor could be ordered to acknowledge AAAs offspring and give her support.

HELD: YES. He could be ordered to acknowledge AAAs offspring and give her support.

RATIO: Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three different kinds of civil liability that may
be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law
should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the
Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction was
eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested
by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced
to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise parental authority over his children, no
further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the childs status. Hence,
[Victor] should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victims child. The amount [and terms] of
support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article
201of the Family Code.

Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012

Facts
1. Divina Buling met Charles Gotardo on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a
casual employee, while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.
2. The petitioner started courting the respondent in the third week of December 1992 and
they became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993. Sometime in September
1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the respondent in the
formers rented room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the respondents
uncle.
3. The petitioner rented the room from March 1, 1993 to August 30, 1994. The sexual
encounters occurred twice a month and became more frequent in June 1994;
eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she was pregnant.
4. When told of the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the
respondent. They in fact applied for a marriage license. The respondent responded by
filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages
against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry. Later, however, the petitioner
and the respondent amicably settled the case.
5. The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner
did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a
letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for their child. When the
petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite.

Issue
Whether or not Gliffze is entitled to support?

Ruling
Yes!

Ratio
Evidently, the totality of the respondents testimony positively and convincingly shows that no
real inconsistency exists. The respondent has consistently asserted that she started intimate
sexual relations with the petitioner sometime in September 1993. Since filiation is beyond
question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no
final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or
increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the
recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.

Perla v Baring, GR 172471, November 12, 2012

Doctrine: To be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with sufficient
certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation.

Facts: Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and petitioner Antonio Perla (Antonio) were
allegedly neighbors. Eventually, they became sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant,
Antonio allegedly assured her that he would support her. However, Antonio started to evade
her.

Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a Complaint for
support against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support
Randy. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal
Certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and
Antonio supplied the information in the said certificates. The RTC rendered a decision ordering
Antonio to support Randy, which was affirmed by CA.

Issue: WON Randy is entitled to support?

Ruling: No, Respondent failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio.

Ratio: Mirasol and Randys Complaint for support is based on Randys alleged illegitimate
filiation to Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established
with sufficient certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation. An order for x xx support may create an unwholesome
situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued
only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.

In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio.
The Certificate of Live Birth and baptismal certificate of Randy have no probative value to
establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. A certificate of
live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate. Also, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only
serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the
veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, x xx baptismal certificates are
per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

Calderon vs Roxas, G.R. No. 185595, Jan. 09, 2013

Doctrine: An order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the
Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights
and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things
remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory.

Facts:
1. Petitioner Ma. Carminia Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio Roxas, were
married on Dec. 4, 1985 and their union produced four children.
2. On Jan. 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family
Code.
3. The trial court issued an Order granting petitioners application for support pendent
lite. Respondent filed a Motion to Reduce Support.
4. The trial court rendered its Decision declaring null and void the marriage, awarding the
custody of the parties minor children to their mother, ordering the respondent Jose
Antonio Roxas to provide support to the children, and dissolving the community
property or conjugal partnership property of the parties. Petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal from the Orders.

Issue: Whether or not the Orders on the matter of support pendent lite are final?

Held: No. The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendent lite and support in
arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main
action for declaration of nullity of marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally
dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioners
claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody,
support and conjugal assets.

The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendent lite which may be
availed of at the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the
judgment or final order. On March 4, 2003, this Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional
Orders which shall govern the issuance of provisional orders during the pendency of cases for
the declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of voidable marriage and legal separation.
These include order for spousal support, child support, child custody, visitation rights, hold
departure, protection and administration of common property.

C. Source of support, FC 197-198, cf. FC 49, 70, 94, 121, 122

Lerma v. CA, 61 SCRA 440

DOCTRINE: Adultery is a good defense against a petition for support.

FACTS:
1. Teodoro E. Lerma and Concepcion Diaz were married on May 19, 1951.
2. On August 22,1969 the petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent and
a certain Teodoro Ramirez and on September 26, 1972 the court of First Instance of Rizal
decided the adultery case of the respondent and found her and her co-accused, Teodoro
Ramirez, guilty of the charge, sentencing them to a term of imprisonment.
3. During the pendency of the adultery case against the respondent, wife On November 18,
1969 the respondent filed with the lower court, a complaint against the petitioner for legal
separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their children and support, with an
urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their youngest son, Gregory, who was
then and until now is in her custody.
4. The respondents complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and
attempt against her life.
5. The application for support pendente lite was granted in an order dated December 24,1969,
which was amended in an order dated February 15, 1970.
6. The petitioner filed his opposition to the respondent's application for support pendente lite,
setting up as defense the adultery charge he had filed against the respondent.
7. On March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the aforementioned orders on the
ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion. The next day the respondent
court gave due course to the petition and issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge
Luciano from enforcing said orders.
8. The respondent court, in its decision of October 8, 1970, set aside the assailed orders and
granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the lower court in support of
his defense against the application for support pendente lite.

ISSUE(S): WON adultery is a good defense against the respondent's claim for support
pendente lite
HELD: Yes

RATIO: The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership
property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to
live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that after the filing
of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act
which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be
considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support.

Reyes vs Ines-Luciano, 88 SCRA 803

DOCTRINE: It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support
however, the alleged adultery of wife must be established by competent evidence. The
allegation that the wife has committed adultery will not bar her from the right receive
support pendente lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained wig
defeat the action.

FACTS: Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City a
complaint for legal separation on the ground that her husband Manuel J.C. Reyes had
attempted to kill her. She alleged that he punched her, held her head, and bumped it several
times against the cement floor. He also pushed her at the stairway of 13 flights, and swung at
her abdomen which got her half-unconscious. It was her father who saved her. Her husband
(for the second time) doused her with grape juice, kicked her several times, and was saved this
time by her driver.

The respondent Judge Ines-Luciano of the lower court granted the wife pendente lite. The
husband filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to receive
such support during the pendency of the case, and that even if she is entitled to it, the amount
awarded was excessive. The judge reduced the amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly.
Husband filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to annul the order granting alimony. CA
dismissed the petition which made the husband appeal to the SC.

ISSUE: WON adultery can be used as a defense in an action for support

HELD: YES, Provided that adultery is established by competent evidence.

RATIO: Mere allegations will not bar her right to receive support pendente lite. Support can be
administered during the pendency of such cases. In determining the amount, it is not
necessary to go into the merits of the case. It is enough that the facts be established by
affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.

The private respondent has submitted documents showing that the corporations controlled by
the petitioner have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of the Ministry of Public
Highways.

Considering the high cost of living due to inflation and the financial ability of the petitioner as
shown by the documents of record, We find that the amount of P4,000.00 a month granted by
the respondent Judge as alimonypendente lite to the private respondent is not excessive.
There is no showing that the respondent Judge has committed a grave abuse of discretion in
granting said support.

The SC on July, 1978 ordered the alimony to be P1000/month from the period of June to
February 1979, after the trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on the accepted findings
of the trial court that the husband could afford it because of his affluence and be cause it
wasnt excessive.

D. Order of support, FC 199, 200, 204

Mangonon vs. CA, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006

DOCTRINE: Rule 61 of the Rules of Court provides: SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

SECTION 1. Application.- At the commencement of the proper action or proceeding,

or at any time prior to the judgment or final order, a verified application
for support pendente lite may be filed by any party stating the grounds
for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties, and
accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in
support thereof.
xxxx

SEC. 4. Order.- The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall
render such orders as justice and equity may require, having due regard
to the probable outcome of the case and such other circumstances as
may aid in the proper resolution of the question involved. If the
application is granted, the court shall fix the amount of money to be
provisionally paid or such other forms of support as should be provided,
taking into account the necessities of the applicant and the resources or
means of the adverse party, and the terms of payment or mode for
providing the support. If the application is denied, the principal case shall
be tried and decided as early as possible.

Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition
of judgment or final order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve
fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court
is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to
justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other
documentary evidence appearing in the record.

Art. 199 of the Family Code provides: Whenever two or more persons are obliged to
give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order
herein provided:
1. The spouse;
2. The descendants in the nearest degree;
3. The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
4. The brothers and sisters.

The obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient.
However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the
claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do
so.

Art. 204 of the Family Code provides: The person obliged to give support shall have the option
to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in
the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot
be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.

Under the abovecited provision, the obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his
obligation to give support. Thus, he may give the determined amount of support to the
claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. The second option cannot be
availed of in case there are circumstances, legal or moral, which should be considered.

FACTS:
1. In March 1994, Belen Mangonon (Belen) filed, in behalf of her then minor children, Rica
and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for
support pendente lite with the RTC-Makati. She made the following allegations:
a. She and Federico Delgado (Federico) were civilly married by a court judge in
Legaspi, Albay.
b. Belen was only 21 years of age and Federico was only 19 years of age when
they got married.
c. In August 1975, their marriage was annulled on the ground that the marriage
was solemnized without the required consent as per Art. 85 of the NCC.
d. In March 1976, or within 7 months after the annulment, Belen gave birth to
their twin daughters, Rica and Rina.
e. Belen, with the assistance of her 2 nd husband, Danny, raised the twins because
Federico totally abandoned them.
f. At the time the petition was instituted, Rica and Rina got accepted to
universities abroad. However, they were financially incapable of pursuing
collegiate education.
 g. Demands were made upon Federico and his father, Francisco, for general
support and for the payment of the required college education of the twins.
However, these demands remained unheeded. Considering the impending
deadline for admission to college and the opening of classes, Belen and her
then minor children had no choice but to file the petition before the trial court.
h. They invoked Arts. 194 (1) and (2) and 199 (c) of the Family Code.
2. In his Answer, Federico:
a. Stated that as the birth certificates of the twins do not bear his signature, it is
essential that their legitimacy be first established as there is no basis to claim
support until a final and executory judicial declration has been made as to the
twins civil status.
b. Averred that the order of liability for support under Art. 199 of the Family Code
is not concurrent such that the obligation must be borne by those more closely
related to the recipient. In this case, he maintained that responsibility should
rest on Belen and Danny, the latter having voluntarily assumed the duties and
responsibilities of a natural father.
c. Contends that even assuming that he is responsible for support, he could not
be made to answer beyond what Belen and Danny can afford.
3. In the meantime, in April 1994, Belen filed an Urgent Motion to Set Applicationfor
Support Pendente Lite for Hearing because Rica and Rina both badly needed
immediate financial resources for their education. Federico opposed this.
4. In May 1994, Belen filed a Motion to Declare Federico in default. This was favorably
acted upon by the trial court.
5. In August 1994, Federico filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, alleging that the
summons and a copy of the petition were not served in his correct address.In June
1994, his Motion was granted.
6. The trial court eventually held that Federico be liable to provide financial support to the
twins, though the amount was lower than what was prayed for.
7. Unsatisfied, Belen brought the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari. The CA
affirmed the trial court ruling. Belen filed an MR but it was denied.
8. At the time of the filing of the present Petition, it is alleged that:
a. Rica had already entered Rutgers University with a budget of US$12,500.00 for
academic year 1994-1995. She was able to obtain a tuition fee grant of
US$1,190.00 and a Federal Stafford loan from the US government in the
amount of US$2,615.00. In order to defray the remaining balance of Ricas
education for said school year, Belen claims that she had to secure a loan
under the Federal Direct Student Loan Program.
b. Rina entered CW Post, Long Island University, where she was expected to
spend US$20,000.00 for the school year 1994-1995. She was given a financial
grant of US$6,000.00, federal work study assistance of US$2,000.00, and a
Federal Stafford loan of US$2,625.00. Again, Belen obtained a loan to cover the
remainder of Rinas school budget for the year.
9. For her part, Belen argues the following points:
a. Under the law, the obligation to furnish support to Rica and Rina should be first
imposed upon their parents. She contends, however, that the records of this
case demonstrate her as well as Federicos inability to give the support needed
for Rica and Rinas college education. Consequently, the obligation to provide
support devolves upon Francisco, being the grandfather of Rica and Rina.
b. As Francisco has the financial resources to help defray the cost of Rica and
Rinas schooling, the CA then erred in sustaining the trial courts Order
directing Federico to pay Rica and Rina the amount of award P5,000.00 each as
monthly support pendente lite, an amount lower than what was prayed for.
10. For his part, Francisco argues that:
a. The trial court was correct in declaring the parents, Belen and Federico, to be
the persons liable for support pursuant to Art. 199 of the Family Code.
b. Assuming he could be held liable for support, he has the option to fulfill the
obligation either by paying the support or receiving and maintaining in the
dwelling here in the Philippines the person claiming support.
c. Because Belen and her twin daughters are now US citizens, they cannot invoke
the Family Code provisions on support as laws relating to family rights and
 duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
11. For his part, Federico argues that:
a. Assuming he is indeed the father of the twins, he has the option under the law
as to how he would provide support.
b. The trial court and the CA are correct in ruling that the parents of a child
should primarily bear the burden of providing support to their offspring.

ISSUES:
1. WON Francisco can be compelled to give his grandchildren financial support in case his
son (and their father) is incapable of doing so.
2. WON Francisco and Federico have an option under the law as to how they could
perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina.

HELD:
1. Yes.
2. None.

RATIO: 1. After the hearings conducted and evidence presented, the SC finds that Belen was
able to establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin daughters to Francisco and
Federico and the twins entitlement to support pendente lite.

In the words of the trial court: By and large, the status of the twins as children of Federico
cannot be denied. They had maintained constant communication with their grandfather
Francisco. As a matter of fact, respondent Francisco admitted having wrote several letters to
Rica and Rina. In the said letters, particularly at the bottom thereof, Francisco wrote the names
of Rica and Rina Delgado. He, therefore, was very well aware that they bear the surname
Delgado. Likewise, he referred to himself in his letters as either Lolo Paco or Daddy Paco. In his
letter of October 13, 1989, he said as the grandfather, am extending a financial help of
US$1,000.00. On top of this, Federico even gave the twins a treat to Hongkong during their
visit to the Philippines. Indeed, Federico and Francisco, by their actuations, have shown beyond
doubt that the twins are Federicos children.

Having addressed the issue of the propriety of the trial courts grant of support pendente lite in
favor of Rica and Rina, the next question is who should be made liable for said award.

The pertinent provision of the Family Code on this subject is Art. 199. In the instant case, both
the trial court and the CA held Federico liable to provide monthly support pendente lite in the
total amount of P10,000.00 by taking into consideration his supposed income of P30,000.00 to
P40,000.00 per month. This Court is, however, unconvinced as to the veracity of this ground
relied upon by the trial court and the CA.

The trial court gave full credence to Federicos allegation in his Answer and his testimony as to
the amount of his income. However, upon review of the evidence, there is no evidence to
support his assertions regarding his employment and his earning. Notably, he was even
required by Belens counsel to present to the court his income tax return and yet the records of
this case do not bear a copy of said document. This severely undermines the truthfulness of
Federicos assertion with respect to his financial status and capacity to provide support to Rica
and Rina.

In addition, Francisco himself stated in the witness stand that as far as he knew, his son,
Federico, did not own anything. From the testimonies, this answer emerged:

Q: It is stated in this letter that I am making this request to you and not to your son, Rico, for
reasons we both are aware of. Do you know what reason that is?
A: Yes. The reason is that my son do not have fix employment and do not have fix salary and
income and they want to depend on the lolo.
xxxx
Q: Would you have any knowledge if Federico owns a house and lot?
A: Not that I know. I do not think he has anything.
Q: How about a car?
A: Well, his car is owned by my company.

Federico himself admitted in court that he had no property of his own, thus:

There being prima facie evidence showing that Belen and Federico are the parents of Rica and
Rina, they are primarily charged to support their childrens college education. In view however
of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by Francisco. Under
Art. 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and
Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents.

2. Anent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the option under the law as to how they
could perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina, Francisco insists that Rica and Rina
should move here to the Philippines to study in any of the local universities. After all, the
quality of education here, according to him, is at par with that offered in the USA. The
applicable provision of the Family Code is Art. 204.

In this case, this Court believes that Francisco could not avail himself of the second option.
From the records, it is found that prior to the commencement of this action, the relationship
between Francisco, on one hand, and Belen and her twin daughters, on the other, was indeed
quite pleasant. However, things changed. With the filing of this case, and the allegations
hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been
affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had
considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all
these, there is no possibility of seeing Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the
company of those who have disowned them.

Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, the law mandates that the amount of
support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of
the recipient. Guided by this principle, this Court holds Francisco liable for half of the amount of
school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by Belen,
Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors.

Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their education
by the time of the promulgation of this decision, it is proper to award support pendente lite in
arrears to be computed from the time they entered college until they had finished their
respective studies.

NOTE: The issue of the applicability of Art. 15 of the Civil Code on Belen and her twin
daughters raised by Francisco is best left for the resolution of the trial court. After all, in case it
would be resolved that Rica and Rina are not entitled to support pendente lite, the court shall
then order the return of the amounts already paid with legal interest from the dates of actual
payment.

Wherefore, the petition is partially granted.

Spouses Lim v Lim, G.R. No. 163209, October 30, 2009

Doctrine: Inability of the parents to give support will shift some of the obligations to the
relatives in the nearest degree.

Facts: Cheryl Lim was married to Edward Lim in 1979. They had 3 children and they were all
living in Edward Lims family home in Forbes Park, with the latter mother and father. Cheryl Lim
caught Edward sleeping with his fathers mid-wife, forcing Cheryl to leave the house with her
three children. Cheryl, for her and her children, sued Edward and his family for support. The
trial court ruled in favor of Cheryl and granted her support, ordering Edward and his parents to
provide the same. Edwards parents, petitioners herein, appealed the decision to the CA
arguing that they should not be held liable for support as their liability to support ends with
Edward and that the latter can readily give the same with his P6K monthly salary. The CA
affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence this present appeal.

Issue: Can Edwards parents be held liable to give support to the grand children?

Held: Yes, the persons obliged to give support are unable to do so, hence the liability of the
grandparents sets in.

Ratio: By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal
support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit
their petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable.
Although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the
emancipation of the child, the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties
ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the
correlative parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination
or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon
default of the parents but also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support. Here, there
is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal
support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support
Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet
respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their
children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the
paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold
otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of
tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give
adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.

However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this
word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As
petitioners grandchildren by blood, only the respondent children belong to this category.
Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband
Edward, arising from their marital bond.

E. Manner and time of payment, FC 200-204

Calderon vs Roxas, G.R. No. 185595, Jan. 09, 2013

Doctrine: An order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the
Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights
and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things
remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory.

Facts:
1. Petitioner Ma. Carminia Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio Roxas, were
married on Dec. 4, 1985 and their union produced four children.
2. On Jan. 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family
Code.
3. The trial court issued an Order granting petitioners application for support pendent
lite. Respondent filed a Motion to Reduce Support.
4. The trial court rendered its Decision declaring null and void the marriage, awarding the
custody of the parties minor children to their mother, ordering the respondent Jose
Antonio Roxas to provide support to the children, and dissolving the community
property or conjugal partnership property of the parties. Petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal from the Orders.

Issue: Whether or not the Orders on the matter of support pendent lite are final?
 Held: No. The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendent lite and support in
arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main
action for declaration of nullity of marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally
dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioners
claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody,
support and conjugal assets.

The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendent lite which may be
availed of at the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the
judgment or final order. On March 4, 2003, this Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional
Orders which shall govern the issuance of provisional orders during the pendency of cases for
the declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of voidable marriage and legal separation.
These include order for spousal support, child support, child custody, visitation rights, hold
departure, protection and administration of common property.

F. Amount of support, FC 200-208

Lacson vs. Lacson, G.R.No. 150644, August 28, 2006

Facts:
. Feb 14, 1953 (CHEESY!) when they got married
. Jan 9, 1963 when Carmen (respondent) left home in Bacolod to go to
Manila
. March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as
well as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila
o Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where
the two eldest kids would go to petitioner Alfonso and the youngest
would stay with Carmen
o This was affirmed by the CFI
c. May 7, 1963 respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children
be given to her in JDRC since she said she only entered into agreement
to gain custody of her younger children and thus should be given
custody of the older ones as well who are all below 7 years old.
d. CA: ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of
children should be declared null and void and as such the execution of
said judgment is void too. ISSUE: WON support should be awarded to
the wife HELD: Yes, should have but was filed out of time
Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have
been declared null and void since no compelling reasons were stated
otherwise
o However the children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old
may choose which parent they want to live with (sec. 6, Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court, as long as above ten) already 1968
o Court may also award custody to who they deem more fit through
evidence.

Art 356 of the NCC - Every child:

(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical,
moral and intellectual development.
However even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of
the agreement is valid with respect to the separation of property of the
spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership since it had
judicial sanction. (art 190/191 of NCC)
Corroborated by already 5-year separation

G. Renunciation and Termination, NCC 2035; FC 194; NCC 152 (read

Tolentino)

H. Support pendente lite, FC 198; Rules of Court, Rule 61

I. Procedure in applications for support, Rule 61