JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her G.R. No.

170220
capacity as Assignee of FEDERICO
C. SUNTAY, NENITA SUNTAY
TAEDO and EMILIO A.M.
SUNTAY III,
Petitioners, Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:

November 20, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
October 27, 2005 Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
77530, which vacated its May 26, 2004 Decision affirming (a) the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special
Agrarian Court, in Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, dated March 31, 2003
directing respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to deposit the provisional
compensation as determined by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD); (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying LBPs motion for reconsideration;
and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order requiring Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs Land
Compensation Department Manager, to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee[2] of Federico C. Suntay over certain
parcels of agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with
an area of 3,682.0285 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
31 (T-1326)[3] of the Registry of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro. In 1972, a portion of
the said property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the land
reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972)[4] and Executive
Order No. 228 (1987).[5] The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to
farmer beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed
the value of the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited in cash and
bonds in favor of Lubrica.

On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Taedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III
inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of agricultural land located at Balansay,
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro covered by TCT No. T-128[6] of the Register of
Deeds of Occidental Mindoro, consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of
45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of 165.1571 hectares or a total of
210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only
128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and valued the same at P1,512,575.05.
Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative
proceedings for determination of just compensation. On January 29, 2003, the
PARAD fixed the preliminary just compensation at P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682
hectares (TCT No. T-31) and P21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161 hectares (TCT No. T-
128).[7]

Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed on February 17, 2003, two separate
petitions[8] for judicial determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial
Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, docketed
as Agrarian Case No. R-1339 for TCT No. T-31 and Agrarian Case No. R-1340 for TCT
No. T-128, and raffled to Branch 46 thereof.

Petitioners filed separate Motions to Deposit the Preliminary Valuation Under Section
16(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 (1988)[9] and Ad Cautelam Answer praying
among others that LBP deposit the preliminary compensation determined by the
PARAD.

On March 31, 2003, the trial court issued an Order[10] granting petitioners motion,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, of the Land Compensation Department I (LCD
I), Land Bank of the Philippines, is hereby ordered pursuant to Section 16 (e) of RA
6657 in relation to Section 2, Administrative Order No. 8, Series of 1991, to deposit
the provisional compensation as determined by the PARAD in cash and bonds, as
follows:

1. In Agrarian Case No. R-1339, the amount of P 51,800,286.43, minus the amount
received by the Landowner;
2. In Agrarian Case No. R-1340, the amount of P 21,608,215.28, less the amount of
P 1,512,575.16, the amount already deposited.

Such deposit must be made with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Manila within five
(5) days from receipt of a copy of this order and to notify this court of her
compliance within such period.

Let this order be served by the Sheriff of this Court at the expense of the movants.

SO ORDERED.[11]

LBPs motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution[12] dated May 26, 2003.
The following day, May 27, 2003, the trial court issued an Order[13] directing Ms.
Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs Land Compensation Department Manager, to deposit the
amounts.

Thus, on June 17, 2003, LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for the issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 77530.[14]

On June 27, 2003, the appellate court issued a 60-day temporary restraining
order[15] and on October 6, 2003, a writ of preliminary injunction.[16]

On May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[17] in favor of the
petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, the
instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Order dated
March 31, 2003, Resolution dated May 26, 2003, and Order dated May 27, 2003 are
hereby AFFIRMED. The preliminary injunction We previously issued is hereby LIFTED
and DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED.[18]

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly ordered LBP to deposit the
amounts provisionally determined by the PARAD as there is no law which prohibits
LBP to make a deposit pending the fixing of the final amount of just compensation.
It also noted that there is no reason for LBP to further delay the deposit considering
that the DAR already took possession of the properties and distributed the same to
farmer-beneficiaries as early as 1972.

LBP moved for reconsideration which was granted. On October 27, 2005, the
appellate court rendered the assailed Amended Decision,[19] the dispositive portion
of which reads:

Wherefore, in view of the prescription of a different formula in the case of Gabatin

which We hold as cogent and compelling justification necessitating Us to effect the
reversal of Our judgment herein sought to be reconsidered, the instant Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED, and Our May 26, 2004 Decision is hereby VACATED
and ABANDONED with the end in view of giving way to and acting in harmony and in
congruence with the tenor of the ruling in the case of Gabatin. Accordingly, the
assailed rulings of the Special Agrarian Court is (sic) commanded to compute and fix
the just compensation for the expropriated agricultural lands strictly in accordance
with the mode of computation prescribed (sic) Our May 26, 2004 judgment in the
case of Gabatin.

SO ORDERED.[20]

In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the immediate deposit of
the preliminary value of the expropriated properties is improper because it was
erroneously computed. Citing Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[21] it held
that the formula to compute the just compensation should be: Land Value = 2.5 x
Average Gross Production x Government Support Price. Specifically, it held that the
value of the government support price for the corresponding agricultural produce
(rice and corn) should be computed at the time of the legal taking of the subject
agricultural land, that is, on October 21, 1972 when landowners were effectively
deprived of ownership over their properties by virtue of P.D. No. 27. According to the
Court of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly used the amounts of P500 and P300 which
are the prevailing government support price for palay and corn, respectively, at the
time of payment, instead of P35 and P31, the prevailing government support price
at the time of the taking in 1972.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

A. THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
LATEST DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, ET AL., G.R. NO. 127198, PROM. MAY 16,
2005; and[22]

B. THE COURT A QUO HAS, WITH GRAVE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, SO FAR
DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS,
DECIDING ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RAISED, AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF
THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.[23]

Petitioners insist that the determination of just compensation should be based on

the value of the expropriated properties at the time of payment. Respondent LBP,
on the other hand, claims that the value of the realties should be computed as of
October 21, 1972 when P.D. No. 27 took effect.
The petition is impressed with merit.

In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,[24] the Court ruled thus:

Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian
reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just
compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not
at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President,
Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding
did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the
payment of just compensation.

The Natividad case reiterated the Courts ruling in Office of the President v. Court of
Appeals[25] that the expropriation of the landholding did not take place on the
effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on October 21, 1972 but seizure would take effect on the
payment of just compensation judicially determined.
Likewise, in the recent case of Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,
[26] we held that expropriation of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place,
not on the effectivity of the Act on June 15, 1988, but on the payment of just
compensation.

In the instant case, petitioners were deprived of their properties in 1972 but have
yet to receive the just compensation therefor. The parcels of land were already
subdivided and distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries thereby immediately
depriving petitioners of their use. Under the circumstances, it would be highly
inequitable on the part of the petitioners to compute the just compensation using
the values at the time of the taking in 1972, and not at the time of the payment,
considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries have already
benefited from the land although ownership thereof have not yet been transferred
in their names. Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment of just
compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite before the property can be
taken away from its owners.[27] The transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an
accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner.[28]

Our ruling in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of

Agrarian Reform[29] is instructive, thus:

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as

October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of
land consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the land owned by him
was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged
member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative. It was understood, however, that
full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the
constitutional requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21,
1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27 (Emphasis
supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree,
after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives and full payment
of just compensation. x x x

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of
the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with
an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright
change of ownership is contemplated either.

We also note that the expropriation proceedings in the instant case was initiated
under P.D. No. 27 but the agrarian reform process is still incomplete considering that
the just compensation to be paid to petitioners has yet to be settled. Considering
the passage of R.A. No. 6657 before the completion of this process, the just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law.
Indeed, R.A. No. 6657 is the applicable law, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 having
only suppletory effect.[30]

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[31] we held that:

RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which the DAR shall acquire
and distribute to the landless. And to facilitate the acquisition and distribution
thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act should be adhered to.

Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall compensate the landowner
in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP
or as may be finally determined by the court as the just compensation for the land.
In determining just compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the land, the current
value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by
the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the property as well as the
nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on
the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
[32]

Corollarily, we held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada[33] that the above
provision was converted into a formula by the DAR through Administrative Order No.
05, S. 1998, to wit:
Land Value (LV) = (Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) + (Comparable Sales x 0.3) +
(Market Value per Tax Declaration x 0.1)

Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date, they
have not yet received just compensation. Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to
determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and
E.O. No. 228 considering the failure to determine just compensation for a
considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in
accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is important
considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real,
substantial, full and ample.[34]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended

Decision dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
affirming (a) the March 31, 2003 Order of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the
respondent Land Bank of the Philippines to deposit the just compensation
provisionally determined by the PARAD; (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying
respondents Motion for Reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order directing
Teresita V. Tengco, respondents Land Compensation Department Manager to comply
with the March 31, 2003 Order, is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian Court is ORDERED to
proceed with dispatch in the trial of Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, and to
compute the final valuation of the subject properties based on the aforementioned
formula.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118712 October 6, 1995

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents.

G.R. No. 118745 October 6, 1995

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL., respondents.

FRANCISCO, R., J.:

It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the
underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as deny justice to the
landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side. 1 As eloquently
stated by Justice Isagani Cruz:

. . . social justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving, whether he
be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of
reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to
whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is
it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich
simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich
alike, according to the mandate of the law. 2

In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be
applied in its resolution.

Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian

Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712)
following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465.
However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the petitions were ordered
consolidated. 3

Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 20,
1994, which granted private respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and
ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is
hereby GRANTED:

a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declared null and void
insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or
bonds;

b) Respondent Landbank is ordered to immediately deposit not merely

"earmark", "reserve" or "deposit in trust" with an accessible bank designated by
respondent DAR in the names of the following petitioners the following amounts in
cash and in government financial instruments within the parameters of Sec. 18
(1) of RA 6657:

P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. Yap

P 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano Santiago

P 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR;

c) The DAR-designated bank is ordered to allow the petitioners to withdraw the

above-deposited amounts without prejudice to the final determination of just
compensation by the proper authorities; and

d) Respondent DAR is ordered to 1) immediately conduct summary

administrative proceedings to determine the just compensation for the lands of the
petitioners giving the petitioners 15 days from notice within which to submit
evidence and to 2) decide the cases within 30 days after they are submitted for
decision. 4

Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution dated January 18, 1995, 5
denying their motion for reconsideration.

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR
and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657).
Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the
valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of
RA 6657, private respondents filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents
questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 6 and DAR
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, 7 and sought to compel the DAR to
expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the
just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and
bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust
accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.

Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9, 1994, this Court
referred the petition to respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and
disposition.

As found by respondent court , the following are undisputed:

Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that "(o)n 4 September 1992 the transfer certificates of
title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of
Leyte and were transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively, based
on the request of the DAR together with a certification of the Landbank that the sum
of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap
for the parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283, respectively, and
issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562, respectively, in the names of listed
beneficiaries (ANNEXES "C" & "D") without notice to petitioner Yap and without
complying with the requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the
compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank. (Rollo, p. 6).

The above allegations are not disputed by any of the respondents.

Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago are
the owners of a parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615
hectares covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,
registered in the name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago; that in November and
December 1990, without notice to the petitioners, the Landbank required and the
beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX "B") to pay rentals
to the LandBank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least 25% of the net
harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an order
directing the Landbank to pay the landowner directly or through the establishment
of a trust fund in the amount of P135,482.12, that on 24 February 1992, the
Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago.
(ANNEX "E"; Rollo,
p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the landowners after they
signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals
to the LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).

The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent
Landbank claims 1) that it was respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the
execution of Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that
respondent Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did not collect any amount as
rental from the substituting beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99).

Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation (AMADCOR, for

brevity) alleges with respect to its properties located in San Francisco, Quezon
that the properties of AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares and another parcel
covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of 163.6189 hectares; that a summary
administrative proceeding to determine compensation of the property covered by
TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without notice to the
landowner; that a decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX "F") fixing
the compensation for the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of
209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish
a trust account for said amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the trust
account in the amount of P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision was established by
adding P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account established on 19 December 1991
(ANNEX "G"). With respect to petitioner AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it is
alleged that the property of AMADCOR in Tabaco, Albay is covered by TCT No. T-
2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with an area of 1,629.4578 hectares'; that
emancipation patents were issued covering an area of 701.8999 hectares which
were registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR
to fix the compensation for said land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust account in the
name of AMADCOR was established in the amount of P12,247,217.83', three notices
of acquisition having been previously rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)

The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent
Landbank claims that petitioner failed to participate in the DARAB proceedings (land
valuation case) despite due notice to it (Rollo, p. 100). 8

Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was
issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the
opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in
an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it
is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. 9
Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely
"earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as
landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the
property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. 10

Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid

exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. 11 Moreover,
the DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the
Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the
ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al.
vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA
343). 12

For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of
Deposits was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land
Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were also used. 13

On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision in favor
of private respondents. 14 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but
respondent court denied the same. 15

Hence, the instant petitions.

On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in
G.R. No. 118745 alleging that the appeal has no merit and is merely intended to
delay the finality of the appealed decision. 16 The Court, however, denied the
motion and instead required the respondents to file their comments. 17

Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null and void DAR
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of
trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that private
respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional
release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it
has filed for just compensation.

Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as
used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no
way excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for
the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through
Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in
implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.

The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:

Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied)

It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made
in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the
valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying
words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust
account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to
warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit".

The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an

administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if
there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative
enactment. 18 In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating
rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying
the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus
confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that
administrative regulations cannot extend
the law and amend a legislative enactment, 19 for settled is the rule that
administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in
case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails. 20
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact
rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis
in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as
compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA
6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds". In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and
54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of
the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down
Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.

Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private respondents are entitled to
withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution
of the cases involving the final valuation of their properties, petitioners assert the
negative.

The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of

compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation
as provided under Section 18 21 of the same law. According to petitioners, the right
of the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to
the final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that
adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount deposited in the trust account
pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection by the landowner because the latter
amount is only provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the property
pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite the
following pronouncements in the case of "Association of Small Landowners in the
Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform". 22

The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property
even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of
a well-accepted principle of eminent domain.

xxx xxx xxx

The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of
the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with
an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright
change of ownership is contemplated either.
xxx xxx xxx

Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily
transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.

Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in discarding
petitioners' assertion as it found that:

. . . despite the "revolutionary" character of the expropriation envisioned under RA

6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of Small Landowners
in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that
"payments of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in
money" even as the Supreme Court admits in the same case "that the traditional
medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other" the
Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the "recognized rule . . . that title to
the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon
full payment of the just compensation." 23 (Emphasis supplied)

We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in the "Association"
case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be
undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode
of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not,
however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just
compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.

The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under

Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18
is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts
already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply
because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have
already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an
oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private
respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it
in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in
exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association" case) that is,
however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which
the Court must rectify.

Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation

under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of
exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in
both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of
his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly,
we reiterate the cardinal rule that:

. . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just
compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to
the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time
from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just"
for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. 24 (Emphasis supplied)

The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to remove all legal

obstacles in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
and clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. 25 But despite this, cases
involving its implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts' dockets.
Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating the
farmers from their bondage will be attained in due time. It must be stressed,
however, that in the pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the rights of the
landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample
on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also
entitled to protection. 26

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 152154. July 15, 2003]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

(SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS
ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA
ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to (1) set
aside the Resolution dated January 31, 2002 issued by the Special First Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs.
Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al., and (2) reinstate its earlier decision dated September
19, 2000 which forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
the amount held in escrow in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the aggregate
amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on

Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No.
0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his
Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 1379[1] in relation to Executive
Order Nos. 1,[2] 2,[3] 14[4] and 14-A.[5]

In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356
million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest)
deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held
by the following five account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain
Swiss banks:

(1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts;

(2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus- Avertina Foundation accounts;

(3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts;

(4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts and

(5) Maler Foundation accounts.

In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in
treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couples salaries, other lawful income as
well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at
the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the
freeze order issued by the PCGG.

On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc,

Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.

Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental
Agreements[6] dated December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children
and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the
assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a
motion dated December 7, 1995 for the approval of said agreements and for the
enforcement thereof.

The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause

the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos
family under the conditions contained therein. The aforementioned General
Agreement specified in one of its premises or whereas clauses the fact that
petitioner obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21,
1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs
in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are
met x x x. The said decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Consandey, granting petitioners request
for legal assistance.[7] Consandey declared the various deposits in the name of the
enumerated foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen
to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution.

Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the

General/Supplemental Agreements. Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as
witness for the purpose of establishing the partial implementation of said
agreements.

On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or
judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto
which was later adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand,
Jr.
In its resolution dated November 20, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners
motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
the motion to approve the compromise agreement (took) precedence over the
motion for summary judgment.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998 claiming she was not
a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she
owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.

Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the District Attorney in Zurich,
Switzerland, an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an
escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. On appeal by the Marcoses,
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated December 10, 1997, upheld
the ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the request for the transfer of
the funds. In 1998, the funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow.
Subsequently, respondent Marcos children moved that the funds be placed in
custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was allegedly in danger of
dissipation by petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September 8,
1998, granted the motion.

After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial
order dated October 28, 1999 and January 21, 2000, respectively, the case was set
for trial. After several resettings, petitioner, on March 10, 2000, filed another motion
for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million, based on
the following grounds:

THE ESSENTIAL FACTS WHICH WARRANT THE FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS SUBJECT
OF THE PETITION UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR
PLEADINGS AND OTHER SUBMISSIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING.

II

RESPONDENTS ADMISSION MADE DURING THE PRE-TRIAL THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE
ANY INTEREST OR OWNERSHIP OVER THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE ACTION FOR
FORFEITURE TENDERS NO GENUINE ISSUE OR CONTROVERSY AS TO ANY MATERIAL
FACT IN THE PRESENT ACTION, THUS WARRANTING THE RENDITION OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.[8]

Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were
established, warranting a summary judgment on the funds sought to be forfeited.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the petitioners motion for summary
judgment, which opposition was later adopted by her co-respondents Mrs. Manotoc,
Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.

On March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was conducted.

In a decision[9] dated September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioners

motion for summary judgment:

CONCLUSION

There is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence.

The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.

The Swiss deposits which were transmitted to and now held in escrow at the PNB
are deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten wealth.

DISPOSITION

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Republic of the Philippines

and against the respondents, declaring the Swiss deposits which were transferred to
and now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the total aggregate
value equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of August 31, 2000 together with the
increments thereof forfeited in favor of the State.[10]

Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration dated September 26,
2000. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed their own motion for
reconsideration dated October 5, 2000. Mrs. Araneta filed a manifestation dated
October 4, 2000 adopting the motion for reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos, Mrs.
Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.

Subsequently, petitioner filed its opposition thereto.

In a resolution[11] dated January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its
September 19, 2000 decision, thus denying petitioners motion for summary
judgment:

CONCLUSION

In sum, the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that
the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal
proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in
escrow from the Swiss Banks.

The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have
been established and our judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without
basis.

WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 19, 2000 is reconsidered
and set aside, and this case is now being set for further proceedings.[12]

Hence, the instant petition. In filing the same, petitioner argues that the
Sandiganbayan, in reversing its September 19, 2000 decision, committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that --

PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO PROVE ITS CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUISITES
OF SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF R.A. NO. 1379:

A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CATEGORICALLY ADMITTED NOT ONLY THE PERSONAL

CIRCUMSTANCES OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC
OFFICIALS BUT ALSO THE EXTENT OF THEIR SALARIES AS SUCH PUBLIC OFFICIALS,
WHO UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WERE PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF FOUNDATIONS.

B. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALSO ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF THE SWISS

DEPOSITS AND THEIR OWNERSHIP THEREOF:
1. ADMISSIONS IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ANSWER;

2. ADMISSION IN THE GENERAL / SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS THEY SIGNED AND

SOUGHT TO IMPLEMENT;

3. ADMISSION IN A MANIFESTATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IMELDA R. MARCOS

AND IN THE MOTION TO PLACE THE RES IN CUSTODIA LEGIS; AND

4. ADMISSION IN THE UNDERTAKING TO PAY THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.

C. PETITIONER HAS PROVED THE EXTENT OF THE LEGITIMATE INCOME OF

FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS.

D. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF UNLAWFULLY

ACQUIRED WEALTH.

II

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT RAISED

ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT CONSIDERING THAT:

A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DEFENSE THAT SWISS DEPOSITS WERE LAWFULLY

ACQUIRED DOES NOT ONLY FAIL TO TENDER AN ISSUE BUT IS CLEARLY A SHAM; AND

B. IN SUBSEQUENTLY DISCLAIMING OWNERSHIP OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS, PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS ABANDONED THEIR SHAM DEFENSE OF LEGITIMATE ACQUISITION,
AND THIS FURTHER JUSTIFIED THE RENDITION OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

III

THE FOREIGN FOUNDATIONS NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED.

IV
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
REVERSING HIMSELF ON THE GROUND THAT ORIGINAL COPIES OF THE
AUTHENTICATED SWISS DECISIONS AND THEIR AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS
HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT, WHEN EARLIER THE SANDIGANBAYAN
HAS QUOTED EXTENSIVELY A PORTION OF THE TRANSLATION OF ONE OF THESE
SWISS DECISIONS IN HIS PONENCIA DATED JULY 29, 1999 WHEN IT DENIED THE
MOTION TO RELEASE ONE HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION US DOLLARS ($150,000,000.00)
TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR OBJECTION TO THE

AUTHENTICITY OF THE SWISS FEDERAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.[13]

Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the respondents motions for
reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration were the authenticity,
accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged. Otherwise stated,
it was incorrect for the Sandiganbayan to use the issue of lack of authenticated
translations of the decisions of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court as the basis for
reversing itself because respondents themselves never raised this issue in their
motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration.
Furthermore, this particular issue relating to the translation of the Swiss court
decisions could not be resurrected anymore because said decisions had been
previously utilized by the Sandiganbayan itself in resolving a decisive issue before
it.

Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for questioning the non-production of the

authenticated translations of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions as this was
a marginal and technical matter that did not diminish by any measure the
conclusiveness and strength of what had been proven and admitted before the
Sandiganbayan, that is, that the funds deposited by the Marcoses constituted ill-
gotten wealth and thus belonged to the Filipino people.

In compliance with the order of this Court, Mrs. Marcos filed her comment to the
petition on May 22, 2002. After several motions for extension which were all
granted, the comment of Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. and the separate
comment of Mrs. Araneta were filed on May 27, 2002.
Mrs. Marcos asserts that the petition should be denied on the following grounds:

A.

PETITIONER HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AT THE

SANDIGANBAYAN.

B.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING THE CASE FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.[14]

Mrs. Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law in view of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
January 31, 2000 directing petitioner to submit the authenticated translations of the
Swiss decisions. Instead of availing of said remedy, petitioner now elevates the
matter to this Court. According to Mrs. Marcos, a petition for certiorari which does
not comply with the requirements of the rules may be dismissed. Since petitioner
has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, that is, to proceed to trial and submit
authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, its petition before this Court must
be dismissed. Corollarily, the Sandiganbayans ruling to set the case for further
proceedings cannot and should not be considered a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment.

Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., in their comment, prayed for the
dismissal of the petition on the grounds that:

(A)

BY THE TIME PETITIONER FILED ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 10

MARCH 2000, IT WAS ALREADY BARRED FROM DOING SO.

(1) The Motion for Summary Judgment was based on private respondents Answer
and other documents that had long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the
time the Motion was filed on 10 March 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in
against petitioner.
(2) By its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the Motion for
Summary Judgment on 10 March 1990, petitioner had legally bound itself to go to
trial on the basis of existing issues. Thus, it clearly waived whatever right it had to
move for summary judgment.

(B)

EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT LEGALLY BARRED FROM FILING THE
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS CORRECT IN RULING
THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT YET ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE
FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.

(1) Republic Act No. 1379, the applicable law, is a penal statute. As such, its
provisions, particularly the essential elements stated in section 3 thereof, are
mandatory in nature. These should be strictly construed against petitioner and
liberally in favor of private respondents.

(2) Petitioner has failed to establish the third and fourth essential elements in
Section 3 of R.A. 1379 with respect to the identification, ownership, and
approximate amount of the property which the Marcos couple allegedly acquired
during their incumbency.

(a) Petitioner has failed to prove that the Marcos couple acquired or own the Swiss
funds.

(b) Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the fact of acquisition has been
proven, petitioner has categorically admitted that it has no evidence showing how
much of the Swiss funds was acquired during the incumbency of the Marcos couple
from 31 December 1965 to 25 February 1986.

(3) In contravention of the essential element stated in Section 3 (e) of R.A. 1379,
petitioner has failed to establish the other proper earnings and income from
legitimately acquired property of the Marcos couple over and above their
government salaries.
(4) Since petitioner failed to prove the three essential elements provided in
paragraphs (c)[15] (d),[16] and (e)[17] of Section 3, R.A. 1379, the inescapable
conclusion is that the prima facie presumption of unlawful acquisition of the Swiss
funds has not yet attached. There can, therefore, be no premature forfeiture of the
funds.

(C)

IT WAS ONLY BY ARBITRARILY ISOLATING AND THEN TAKING CERTAIN STATEMENTS

MADE BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OUT OF CONTEXT THAT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO
TREAT THESE AS JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE
AND THEREAFTER A CONCLUSIVE CASE TO JUSTIFY THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS
FUNDS.

(1) Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the General and Supplemental
Agreements, as well as the other written and testimonial statements submitted in
relation thereto, are expressly barred from being admissible in evidence against
private respondents.

(2) Had petitioner bothered to weigh the alleged admissions together with the other
statements on record, there would be a demonstrable showing that no such judicial
admissions were made by private respondents.

(D)

SINCE PETITIONER HAS NOT (YET) PROVEN ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR FORFEITURE, AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
HAVE NOT MADE ANY JUDICIAL ADMISSION THAT WOULD HAVE FREED IT FROM ITS
BURDEN OF PROOF, THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. CERTIORARI,
THEREFORE, DOES NOT LIE, ESPECIALLY AS THIS COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF FACTS.
[18]

For her part, Mrs. Araneta, in her comment to the petition, claims that obviously
petitioner is unable to comply with a very plain requirement of respondent
Sandiganbayan. The instant petition is allegedly an attempt to elevate to this Court
matters, issues and incidents which should be properly threshed out at the
Sandiganbayan. To respondent Mrs. Araneta, all other matters, save that pertaining
to the authentication of the translated Swiss Court decisions, are irrelevant and
impertinent as far as this Court is concerned. Respondent Mrs. Araneta manifests
that she is as eager as respondent Sandiganbayan or any interested person to have
the Swiss Court decisions officially translated in our known language. She says the
authenticated official English version of the Swiss Court decisions should be
presented. This should stop all speculations on what indeed is contained therein.
Thus, respondent Mrs. Araneta prays that the petition be denied for lack of merit
and for raising matters which, in elaborated fashion, are impertinent and improper
before this Court.

PROPRIETY OF PETITIONERS
ACTION FOR CERTIORARI

But before this Court discusses the more relevant issues, the question regarding the
propriety of petitioner Republic's action for certiorari under Rule 65[19] of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated January 21,
2002 should be threshed out.

At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as an exception
to the general rule governing petitions for certiorari. Normally, decisions of the
Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court under Rule 45, not Rule 65.[20] But
where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy
and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the
existence and availability of the remedy of appeal.[21]

One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the
recovery of the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former
President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and business
associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then President
Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses was
EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting the President in
the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether
located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all
business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during his
administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship." The urgency of this undertaking was tersely described by this Court in
Republic vs. Lobregat[22]:
surely x x x an enterprise "of great pith and moment"; it was attended by "great
expectations"; it was initiated not only out of considerations of simple justice but
also out of sheer necessity - the national coffers were empty, or nearly so.

In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to
set aside technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede
judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at
the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties
concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and
firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its
search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such
cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition,
accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now.
Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and
resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying
procedural sidetracks.[23]

We thus take cognizance of this case and settle with finality all the issues therein.

ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT

The crucial issues which this Court must resolve are: (1) whether or not respondents
raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate summary
judgment; and (2) whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for
forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.

(1) THE PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

We hold that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their
pleadings. Thus, on motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take
place as a matter of right.

In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo[24], summary judgment was described as a
judgment which a court may render before trial but after both parties have pleaded.
It is ordered by the court upon application by one party, supported by affidavits,
depositions or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in
turn file an opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or other documents.
This is after the court summarily hears both parties with their respective proofs and
finds that there is no genuine issue between them. Summary judgment is
sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure:

SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a

claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time
after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
or any part thereof.[25]

Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any

material fact in the action.[26] The theory of summary judgment is that, although
an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is
demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not
genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and
rendering summary judgment for petitioner Republic.

The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case for forfeiture:

xxx

4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his

Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for several decades continuously and without
interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the
Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by direct action
of the people of EDSA on February 22-25, 1986.

5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former First Lady
who ruled with FM during the 14-year martial law regime, occupied the position of
Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 up to the peaceful revolution in
February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once as a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa during the early years of martial law from 1978 to 1984 and as
Metro Manila Governor in concurrent capacity as Minister of Human Settlements. x x
x

xxx xxx xxx

11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official Report
of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former President Marcos as President
form 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, P100,000 a year;
while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister of Human
Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was P75,000 a year xxx.

ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS
LEGITIMATE INCOME

xxx

12. Based on available documents, the ITRs of the Marcoses for the years 1965-
1975 were filed under Tax Identification No. 1365-055-1. For the years 1976 until
1984, the returns were filed under Tax Identification No. M 6221-J 1117-A-9.

13. The data contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheet filed by the Marcoses are
summarized and attached to the reports in the following schedules:

Schedule A:

Schedule of Income (Annex T hereof);

Schedule B:

Schedule of Income Tax Paid (Annex T-1 hereof);

Schedule C:

Schedule of Net Disposable Income (Annex T-2 hereof);

Schedule D:

Schedule of Networth Analysis (Annex T-3 hereof).

14. As summarized in Schedule A (Annex T hereof), the Marcoses reported
P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a period of 20 years from
1965 to 1984. The sources of income are as follows:

Official Salaries - P 2,627,581.00 - 16.01%

Legal Practice - 11,109,836.00 - 67.71%
Farm Income - 149,700.00 - .91%
Others - 2,521,325.00 - 15.37%
Total P16,408,442.00 - 100.00%

15. FMs official salary pertains to his compensation as Senate President in 1965 in
the amount of P15,935.00 and P1,420,000.00 as President of the Philippines during
the period 1966 until 1984. On the other hand, Imelda reported salaries and
allowances only for the years 1979 to 1984 in the amount of P1,191,646.00. The
records indicate that the reported income came from her salary from the Ministry of
Human Settlements and allowances from Food Terminal, Inc., National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation, National Food Authority Council, Light Rail Transit
Authority and Home Development Mutual Fund.

16. Of the P11,109,836.00 in reported income from legal practice, the amount of
P10,649,836.00 or 96% represents receivables from prior years during the period
1967 up to 1984.

17. In the guise of reporting income using the cash method under Section 38 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, FM made it appear that he had an extremely
profitable legal practice before he became a President (FM being barred by law from
practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and that, incredibly, he
was still receiving payments almost 20 years after. The only problem is that in his
Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately preceeding his ascendancy to
the presidency he did not show any Receivables from client at all, much less the
P10,65-M that he decided to later recognize as income. There are no documents
showing any withholding tax certificates. Likewise, there is nothing on record that
will show any known Marcos client as he has no known law office. As previously
stated, his networth was a mere P120,000.00 in December, 1965. The joint income
tax returns of FM and Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons of their
kleptocracy.
18. FM reported a total of P2,521,325.00 as Other Income for the years 1972 up to
1976 which he referred to in his return as Miscellaneous Items and Various
Corporations. There is no indication of any payor of the dividends or earnings.

19. Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda did not declare any income from any deposits
and placements which are subject to a 5% withholding tax. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue attested that after a diligent search of pertinent records on file with the
Records Division, they did not find any records involving the tax transactions of
spouses Ferdinand and Imelda in Revenue Region No. 1, Baguio City, Revenue
Region No.4A, Manila, Revenue Region No. 4B1, Quezon City and Revenue No. 8,
Tacloban, Leyte. Likewise, the Office of the Revenue Collector of Batac. Further, BIR
attested that no records were found on any filing of capital gains tax return
involving spouses FM and Imelda covering the years 1960 to 1965.

20. In Schedule B, the taxable reported income over the twenty-year period was
P14,463,595.00 which represents 88% of the gross income. The Marcoses paid
income taxes totaling P8,233,296.00 or US$1,220,667.59. The business expenses in
the amount of P861,748.00 represent expenses incurred for subscription, postage,
stationeries and contributions while the other deductions in the amount of
P567,097.00 represents interest charges, medicare fees, taxes and licenses. The
total deductions in the amount of P1,994,845.00 represents 12% of the total gross
income.

21. In Schedule C, the net cumulative disposable income amounts to P6,756,301.00

or US$980,709.77. This is the amount that represents that portion of the Marcoses
income that is free for consumption, savings and investments. The amount is
arrived at by adding back to the net income after tax the personal and additional
exemptions for the years 1965-1984, as well as the tax-exempt salary of the
President for the years 1966 until 1972.

22. Finally, the networth analysis in Schedule D, represents the total accumulated
networth of spouses, Ferdinand and Imelda. Respondents Balance Sheet attached to
their 1965 ITR, covering the year immediately preceding their ascendancy to the
presidency, indicates an ending networth of P120,000.00 which FM declared as
Library and Miscellaneous assets. In computing for the networth, the income
approach was utilized. Under this approach, the beginning capital is increased or
decreased, as the case may be, depending upon the income earned or loss incurred.
Computations establish the total networth of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda, for the
years 1965 until 1984 in the total amount of US$957,487.75, assuming the income
from legal practice is real and valid x x x.
G. THE SECRET MARCOS DEPOSITS
IN SWISS BANKS

23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how
both respondents clandestinely stashed away the countrys wealth to Switzerland
and hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate
entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or agents
who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained
numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility of
detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as the enormity of the
deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is confined to five identified
accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for
the filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.

H. THE AZIO-VERSO-VIBUR

FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS

24. On June 11, 1971, Ferdinand Marcos issued a written order to Dr. Theo Bertheau,
legal counsel of Schweizeresche Kreditanstalt or SKA, also known as Swiss Credit
Bank, for him to establish the AZIO Foundation. On the same date, Marcos executed
a power of attorney in favor of Roberto S. Benedicto empowering him to transact
business in behalf of the said foundation. Pursuant to the said Marcos mandate,
AZIO Foundation was formed on June 21, 1971 in Vaduz. Walter Fessler and Ernst
Scheller, also of SKA Legal Service, and Dr. Helmuth Merling from Schaan were
designated as members of the Board of Trustees of the said foundation. Ferdinand
Marcos was named first beneficiary and the Marcos Foundation, Inc. was second
beneficiary. On November 12, 1971, FM again issued another written order naming
Austrahil PTY Ltd. In Sydney, Australia, as the foundations first and sole beneficiary.
This was recorded on December 14, 1971.

25. In an undated instrument, Marcos changed the first and sole beneficiary to
CHARIS FOUNDATION. This change was recorded on December 4, 1972.

26. On August 29, 1978, the AZIO FOUNDATION was renamed to VERSO
FOUNDATION. The Board of Trustees remained the same. On March 11, 1981,
Marcos issued a written directive to liquidated VERSO FOUNDATION and to transfer
all its assets to account of FIDES TRUST COMPANY at Bank Hofman in Zurich under
the account Reference OSER. The Board of Trustees decided to dissolve the
foundation on June 25, 1981.

27. In an apparent maneuver to bury further the secret deposits beneath the thick
layers of corporate entities, FM effected the establishment of VIBUR FOUNDATION
on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz. Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Fides Trust, were designated as members of the Board of Trustees. The
account was officially opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial
owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Company acted as
fiduciary. However, comparison of the listing of the securities in the safe deposit
register of the VERSO FOUNDATION as of February 27, 1981 with that of VIBUR
FOUNDATION as of December 31, 1981 readily reveals that exactly the same
securities were listed.

28. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is certain that the VIBUR FOUNDATION is
the beneficial successor of VERSO FOUNDATION.

29. On March 18, 1986, the Marcos-designated Board of Trustees decided to

liquidate VIBUR FOUNDATION. A notice of such liquidation was sent to the Office of
the Public Register on March 21, 1986. However, the bank accounts and respective
balances of the said VIBUR FOUNDATION remained with SKA. Apparently, the
liquidation was an attempt by the Marcoses to transfer the foundations funds to
another account or bank but this was prevented by the timely freeze order issued
by the Swiss authorities. One of the latest documents obtained by the PCGG from
the Swiss authorities is a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck (the trustee) stating
that the beneficial owner of VIBUR FOUNDATION is Ferdinand E. Marcos. Another
document signed by G. Raber of SKA shows that VIBUR FOUNDATION is owned by
the Marcos Familie

30. As of December 31, 1989, the balance of the bank accounts of VIBUR
FOUNDATION with SKA, Zurich, under the General Account No. 469857 totaled
$3,597,544.00

I. XANDY-WINTROP: CHARIS-SCOLARI-
VALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS

31. This is the most intricate and complicated account group. As the Flow Chart
hereof shows, two (2) groups under the foundation organized by Marcos
dummies/nominees for FMs benefit, eventually joined together and became one (1)
account group under the AVERTINA FOUNDATION for the benefit of both FM and
Imelda. This is the biggest group from where the $50-M investment fund of the
Marcoses was drawn when they bought the Central Banks dollar-denominated
treasury notes with high-yielding interests.

32. On March 20, 1968, after his second year in the presidency, Marcos opened
bank accounts with SKA using an alias or pseudonym WILLIAM SAUNDERS,
apparently to hide his true identity. The next day, March 21, 1968, his First Lady,
Mrs. Imelda Marcos also opened her own bank accounts with the same bank using
an American-sounding alias, JANE RYAN. Found among the voluminous documents in
Malacaang shortly after they fled to Hawaii in haste that fateful night of February
25, 1986, were accomplished forms for Declaration/Specimen Signatures submitted
by the Marcos couple. Under the caption signature(s) Ferdinand and Imelda signed
their real names as well as their respective aliases underneath. These accounts
were actively operated and maintained by the Marcoses for about two (2) years
until their closure sometime in February, 1970 and the balances transferred to
XANDY FOUNDATION.

33. The XANDY FOUNDATION was established on March 3, 1970 in Vaduz. C.W.
Fessler, C. Souviron and E. Scheller were named as members of the Board of
Trustees.

34. FM and Imelda issued the written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus
Geel of SKA on March 3, 1970. In the handwritten Regulations signed by the Marcos
couple as well as in the type-written Regulations signed by Markus Geel both dated
February 13, 1970, the Marcos spouses were named the first beneficiaries, the
surviving spouse as the second beneficiary and the Marcos children Imee,
Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and Irene as equal third beneficiaries.

35. The XANDY FOUNDATION was renamed WINTROP FOUNDATION on August 29,
1978. The Board of Trustees remained the same at the outset. However, on March
27, 1980, Souviron was replaced by Dr. Peter Ritter. On March 10. 1981, Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos issued a written order to the Board of Wintrop to liquidate the
foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in Zurich in favor of FIDES
TRUST COMPANY. Later, WINTROP FOUNDATION was dissolved.

36. The AVERTINA FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty.
Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of FIDES TRUST CO.,
as members of the Board of Trustees. Two (2) account categories, namely: CAR and
NES, were opened on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner of AVERTINA was
not made known to the bank since the FIDES TRUST CO. acted as fiduciary.
However, the securities listed in the safe deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION
Category R as of December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register
of AVERTINA FOUNDATION Category CAR as of December 31, 1981. Likewise, the
securities listed in the safe deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category S as
of December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register of Avertina
Category NES as of December 31, 1981.Under the circumstances, it is certain that
the beneficial successor of WINTROP FOUNDATION is AVERTINA FOUNDATION. The
balance of Category CAR as of December 31, 1989 amounted to US$231,366,894.00
while that of Category NES as of 12-31-83 was US$8,647,190.00. Latest documents
received from Swiss authorities included a declaration signed by IVO Beck stating
that the beneficial owners of AVERTINA FOUNDATION are FM and Imelda. Another
document signed by G. Raber of SKA indicates that Avertina Foundation is owned by
the Marcos Families.

37. The other groups of foundations that eventually joined AVERTINA were also
established by FM through his dummies, which started with the CHARIS
FOUNDATION.

38. The CHARIS FOUNDATION was established in VADUZ on December 27, 1971.
Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller of SKA and Dr. Peter Ritter were named as
directors. Dr. Theo Bertheau, SKA legal counsel, acted as founding director in behalf
of FM by virtue of the mandate and agreement dated November 12, 1971. FM
himself was named the first beneficiary and Xandy Foundation as second
beneficiary in accordance with the handwritten instructions of FM on November 12,
1971 and the Regulations. FM gave a power of attorney to Roberto S. Benedicto on
February 15, 1972 to act in his behalf with regard to Charis Foundation.

39. On December 13, 1974, Charis Foundation was renamed Scolari Foundation but
the directors remained the same. On March 11, 1981 FM ordered in writing that the
Valamo Foundation be liquidated and all its assets be transferred to Bank Hofmann,
AG in favor of Fides Trust Company under the account Reference OMAL. The Board
of Directors decided on the immediate dissolution of Valamo Foundation on June 25,
1981.

40 The SPINUS FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty.
Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co., as
members of the Foundations Board of Directors. The account was officially opened
with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner of the foundation was not
made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, the list of
securities in the safe deposit register of Valamo Foundation as of December 31,
1980 are practically the same with those listed in the safe deposit register of Spinus
Foundation as of December 31, 1981. Under the circumstances, it is certain that the
Spinus Foundation is the beneficial successor of the Valamo Foundation.

41. On September 6, 1982, there was a written instruction from Spinus Foundation
to SKA to close its Swiss Franc account and transfer the balance to Avertina
Foundation. In July/August, 1982, several transfers from the foundations German
marks and US dollar accounts were made to Avertina Category CAR totaling DM
29.5-M and $58-M, respectively. Moreover, a comparison of the list of securities of
the Spinus Foundation as of February 3, 1982 with the safe deposit slips of the
Avertina Foundation Category CAR as of August 19, 1982 shows that all the
securities of Spinus were transferred to Avertina.

J. TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS

42. The Trinidad Foundation was organized on August 26, 1970 in Vaduz with C.W.
Fessler and E. Scheller of SKA and Dr. Otto Tondury as the foundations directors.
Imelda issued a written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus Geel on
August 26, 1970. The regulations as well as the agreement, both dated August 28,
1970 were likewise signed by Imelda. Imelda was named the first beneficiary and
her children Imelda (Imee), Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and, Irene were named as
equal second beneficiaries.

43. Rayby Foundation was established on June 22, 1973 in Vaduz with Fessler,
Scheller and Ritter as members of the board of directors. Imelda issued a written
mandate to Dr. Theo Bertheau to establish the foundation with a note that the
foundations capitalization as well as the cost of establishing it be debited against
the account of Trinidad Foundation. Imelda was named the first and only beneficiary
of Rayby foundation. According to written information from SKA dated November 28,
1988, Imelda apparently had the intention in 1973 to transfer part of the assets of
Trinidad Foundation to another foundation, thus the establishment of Rayby
Foundation. However, transfer of assets never took place. On March 10, 1981,
Imelda issued a written order to transfer all the assets of Rayby Foundation to
Trinidad Foundation and to subsequently liquidate Rayby. On the same date, she
issued a written order to the board of Trinidad to dissolve the foundation and
transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in favor of Fides Trust Co. Under the account
Reference Dido, Rayby was dissolved on April 6, 1981 and Trinidad was liquidated
on August 3, 1981.

44. The PALMY FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Dr. Ivo
Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co, as
members of the Foundations Board of Directors. The account was officially opened
with the SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner was not made known to
the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, when one compares the
listing of securities in the safe deposit register of Trinidad Foundation as of
December 31,1980 with that of the Palmy Foundation as of December 31, 1980, one
can clearly see that practically the same securities were listed. Under the
circumstances, it is certain that the Palmy Foundation is the beneficial successor of
the Trinidad Foundation.

45. As of December 31, 1989, the ending balance of the bank accounts of Palmy
Foundation under General Account No. 391528 is $17,214,432.00.

46. Latest documents received from Swiss Authorities included a declaration signed
by Dr. Ivo Beck stating that the beneficial owner of Palmy Foundation is Imelda.
Another document signed by Raber shows that the said Palmy Foundation is owned
by Marcos Familie.

K. ROSALYS-AGUAMINA
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS

47. Rosalys Foundation was established in 1971 with FM as the beneficiary. Its
Articles of Incorporation was executed on September 24, 1971 and its By-Laws on
October 3, 1971. This foundation maintained several accounts with Swiss Bank
Corporation (SBC) under the general account 51960 where most of the bribe monies
from Japanese suppliers were hidden.

48. On December 19, 1985, Rosalys Foundation was liquidated and all its assets
were transferred to Aguamina Corporations (Panama) Account No. 53300 with SBC.
The ownership by Aguamina Corporation of Account No. 53300 is evidenced by an
opening account documents from the bank. J. Christinaz and R.L. Rossier, First Vice-
President and Senior Vice President, respectively, of SBC, Geneva issued a
declaration dated September 3, 1991 stating that the by-laws dated October 3,
1971 governing Rosalys Foundation was the same by-law applied to Aguamina
Corporation Account No. 53300. They further confirmed that no change of beneficial
owner was involved while transferring the assets of Rosalys to Aguamina. Hence, FM
remains the beneficiary of Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300.

As of August 30, 1991, the ending balance of Account No. 53300 amounted to
$80,566,483.00.
L. MALER FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS

49. Maler was first created as an establishment. A statement of its rules and
regulations was found among Malacaang documents. It stated, among others, that
50% of the Companys assets will be for sole and full right disposal of FM and Imelda
during their lifetime, which the remaining 50% will be divided in equal parts among
their children. Another Malacaang document dated October 19,1968 and signed by
Ferdinand and Imelda pertains to the appointment of Dr. Andre Barbey and Jean
Louis Sunier as attorneys of the company and as administrator and manager of all
assets held by the company. The Marcos couple, also mentioned in the said
document that they bought the Maler Establishment from SBC, Geneva. On the
same date, FM and Imelda issued a letter addressed to Maler Establishment, stating
that all instructions to be transmitted with regard to Maler will be signed with the
word JOHN LEWIS. This word will have the same value as the couples own personal
signature. The letter was signed by FM and Imelda in their signatures and as John
Lewis.

50. Maler Establishment opened and maintained bank accounts with SBC, Geneva.
The opening bank documents were signed by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunnier as
authorized signatories.

51. On November 17, 1981, it became necessary to transform Maler Establishment

into a foundation. Likewise, the attorneys were changed to Michael Amaudruz, et.
al. However, administration of the assets was left to SBC. The articles of
incorporation of Maler Foundation registered on November 17, 1981 appear to be
the same articles applied to Maler Establishment. On February 28, 1984, Maler
Foundation cancelled the power of attorney for the management of its assets in
favor of SBC and transferred such power to Sustrust Investment Co., S.A.

52. As of June 6, 1991, the ending balance of Maler Foundations Account Nos.
254,508 BT and 98,929 NY amount SF 9,083,567 and SG 16,195,258, respectively,
for a total of SF 25,278,825.00. GM only until December 31, 1980. This account was
opened by Maler when it was still an establishment which was subsequently
transformed into a foundation.

53. All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart have a total balance of
about Three Hundred Fifty Six Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by Annex
R-5 hereto attached as integral part hereof.
x x x x x x.[27]

Respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and

Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., in their answer, stated the following:

xxx xxx xxx

4. Respondents ADMIT paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition.

5. Respondents specifically deny paragraph 5 of the Petition in so far as it states

that summons and other court processes may be served on Respondent Imelda R.
Marcos at the stated address the truth of the matter being that Respondent Imelda
R. Marcos may be served with summons and other processes at No. 10-B Bel Air
Condominium 5022 P. Burgos Street, Makati, Metro Manila, and ADMIT the rest.

xxx xxx xxx

10. Respondents ADMIT paragraph 11 of the Petition.

11. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 12 of the Petition for lack of

knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents were not privy to the transactions and that they cannot remember
exactly the truth as to the matters alleged.

12. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 13 of the Petition for lack of

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation
since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs and Balance Sheet.

13. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 14 of the Petition for lack of

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation
since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs.
14. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 15 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation
since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs.

15. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 16 of the Petition for lack of

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation
since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs.

16. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 17 of the Petition insofar as it

attributes willful duplicity on the part of the late President Marcos, for being false,
the same being pure conclusions based on pure assumption and not allegations of
fact; and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember
with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs or the attachments thereto.

17. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 18 of the Petition for lack of

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation
since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs.

18. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 19 of the Petition for lack of

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation
since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs and that they are not privy to the activities of the BIR.

19. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 20 of the Petition for lack of

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation
since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs.

20. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 21 of the Petition for lack of

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation
since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs.

21. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 22 of the Petition for lack of

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation
since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs.

22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that

Respondents clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the
same under layers and layers of foundation and corporate entities for being false,
the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.

23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the transactions
regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that as to
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved
were lawfully acquired.

24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,37, 38, 39, 40,
and 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents are not privy to the transactions
and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with
exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent
Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.

25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46, of the Petition
for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same
having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos
she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.

26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, of the Petition for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same
having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos
she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.

Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos
and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer
to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and
contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute
a genuine issue for trial. Respondents defenses of lack of knowledge for lack of
privity or (inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago or, on the part of
Mrs. Marcos, that the funds were lawfully acquired are fully insufficient to tender
genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses defenses were a sham and evidently
calibrated to compound and confuse the issues.

The following pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses are replete with indications of
a spurious defense:

(a) Respondents' Answer dated October 18, 1993;

(b) Pre-trial Brief dated October 4, 1999 of Mrs. Marcos, Supplemental Pre-trial Brief
dated October 19, 1999 of Ferdinand, Jr. and Mrs. Imee Marcos-Manotoc adopting
the pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, and Manifestation dated October 19, 1999 of Irene
Marcos-Araneta adopting the pre-trial briefs of her co- respondents;

(c) Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 21, 2000, filed by Mrs.
Marcos which the other respondents (Marcos children) adopted;

(d) Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos and adopted by
the Marcos children;

(e) Motion for Reconsideration dated September 26, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos;
Motion for Reconsideration dated October 5, 2000 jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and
Ferdinand, Jr., and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated October 9, 2000
likewise jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.;

(f) Memorandum dated December 12, 2000 of Mrs. Marcos and Memorandum dated
December 17, 2000 of the Marcos children;

(g) Manifestation dated May 26, 1998; and

(h) General/Supplemental Agreement dated December 23, 1993.

An examination of the foregoing pleadings is in order.

Respondents Answer dated October 18, 1993.

In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation
contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they
gave were stock answers like they have no sufficient knowledge or they could not
recall because it happened a long time ago, and, as to Mrs. Marcos, the funds were
lawfully acquired, without stating the basis of such assertions.

Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does
not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters
upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only
a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and
shall deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the
complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.[28]

The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to make them

disclose facts which will disprove the allegations of petitioner at the trial, together
with the matters they rely upon in support of such denial. Our jurisdiction adheres
to this rule to avoid and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste of time by
compelling both parties to lay their cards on the table, thus reducing the
controversy to its true terms. As explained in Alonso vs. Villamor,[29]

A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and
skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It
is rather a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the
court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done
upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapiers thrust.

On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully acquired.
However, she failed to particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the lawful
manner or mode of acquisition of the subject funds. Simply put, she merely stated
in her answer with the other respondents that the funds were lawfully acquired
without detailing how exactly these funds were supposedly acquired legally by
them. Even in this case before us, her assertion that the funds were lawfully
acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any factual support which can prove,
by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that indeed the funds were acquired
legitimately by the Marcos family.

Respondents denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan were based on their

alleged lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations of the petition.

It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the rules is a denial through
a statement that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the material averment in the complaint. The
question, however, is whether the kind of denial in respondents answer qualifies as
the specific denial called for by the rules. We do not think so. In Morales vs. Court of
Appeals,[30] this Court ruled that if an allegation directly and specifically charges a
party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the latter
did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be
made.

Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses
responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim of
ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise
an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that they
were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged.[31]

To elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 of the petition for

forfeiture stated:

23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how
both respondents clandestinely stashed away the countrys wealth to Switzerland
and hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate
entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or agents
who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained
numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility of
detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as the enormity of the
deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is confined to five identified
accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for
the filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.
[32]
Respondents lame denial of the aforesaid allegation was:

22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that

Respondents clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the
same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false,
the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.[33]

Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on
pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of
the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It
was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at.[34] Stated
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it
an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party.
It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the
words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held
that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.
[35]

In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition
were not specifically denied by respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer. The
denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the averment in
paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that Respondents clandestinely stashed
the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of
foundations and corporate entities. Paragraph 22 of the respondents answer was
thus a denial pregnant with admissions of the following substantial facts:

(1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and

(2) that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990.

Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss
bank deposits in the sum of about US$356 million, not having been specifically
denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to
Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure:

Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not
specifically denied. xxx.[36]
By the same token, the following unsupported denials of respondents in their
answer were pregnant with admissions of the substantial facts alleged in the
Republics petition for forfeiture:

23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegation since respondents were not privy to the transactions
regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that, as to
respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved
were lawfully acquired.

24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,
41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions
and as to such transactions they were privy to, they cannot remember with
exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except as to respondent
Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.

25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 45, and 46 of the petition for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to from a belief as to the truth of the
allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to, they cannot remember with exactitude, the same
having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos,
she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.

26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52 of the petition for
lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same
having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos,
she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.

The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the respondents answer pertained

to the creation of five groups of accounts as well as their respective ending
balances and attached documents alleged in paragraphs 24 to 52 of the Republics
petition for forfeiture. Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never specifically denied the
existence of the Swiss funds. Her claim that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired was an acknowledgment on her part of the existence of said deposits. This
only reinforced her earlier admission of the allegation in paragraph 23 of the
petition for forfeiture regarding the existence of the US$356 million Swiss bank
deposits.

The allegations in paragraphs 47[37] and 48[38] of the petition for forfeiture
referring to the creation and amount of the deposits of the Rosalys-Aguamina
Foundation as well as the averment in paragraph 52-a[39] of the said petition with
respect to the sum of the Swiss bank deposits estimated to be US$356 million were
again not specifically denied by respondents in their answer. The respondents did
not at all respond to the issues raised in these paragraphs and the existence, nature
and amount of the Swiss funds were therefore deemed admitted by them. As held in
Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sing,[40] if a defendants denial is a negative pregnant, it is
equivalent to an admission.

Moreover, respondents denial of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture for lack
of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions was just a
pretense. Mrs. Marcos privity to the transactions was in fact evident from her
signatures on some of the vital documents[41] attached to the petition for forfeiture
which Mrs. Marcos failed to specifically deny as required by the rules.[42]

It is worthy to note that the pertinent documents attached to the petition for
forfeiture were even signed personally by respondent Mrs. Marcos and her late
husband, Ferdinand E. Marcos, indicating that said documents were within their
knowledge. As correctly pointed out by Sandiganbayan Justice Francisco Villaruz, Jr.
in his dissenting opinion:

The pattern of: 1) creating foundations, 2) use of pseudonyms and dummies, 3)

approving regulations of the Foundations for the distribution of capital and income
of the Foundations to the First and Second beneficiary (who are no other than FM
and his family), 4) opening of bank accounts for the Foundations, 5) changing the
names of the Foundations, 6) transferring funds and assets of the Foundations to
other Foundations or Fides Trust, 7) liquidation of the Foundations as substantiated
by the Annexes U to U-168, Petition [for forfeiture] strongly indicate that FM and/or
Imelda were the real owners of the assets deposited in the Swiss banks, using the
Foundations as dummies.[43]

How could respondents therefore claim lack of sufficient knowledge or information

regarding the existence of the Swiss bank deposits and the creation of five groups
of accounts when Mrs. Marcos and her late husband personally masterminded and
participated in the formation and control of said foundations? This is a fact
respondent Marcoses were never able to explain.
Not only that. Respondents' answer also technically admitted the genuineness and
due execution of the Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of the late
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the petition for forfeiture, as
well as the veracity of the contents thereof.

The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and balance sheets on the
ground of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly points out that respondents' denial was
not really grounded on lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
but was based on lack of recollection. By reviewing their own records, respondent
Marcoses could have easily determined the genuineness and due execution of the
ITRs and the balance sheets. They also had the means and opportunity of verifying
the same from the records of the BIR and the Office of the President. They did not.

When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and necessarily within their
knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a
specific denial.[44] An unexplained denial of information within the control of the
pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an
effective denial.[45]

The form of denial adopted by respondents must be availed of with sincerity and in
good faith, and certainly not for the purpose of confusing the adverse party as to
what allegations of the petition are really being challenged; nor should it be made
for the purpose of delay.[46] In the instant case, the Marcoses did not only present
unsubstantiated assertions but in truth attempted to mislead and deceive this Court
by presenting an obviously contrived defense.

Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily
within the pleaders knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial at
all.[47] Respondents ineffective denial thus failed to properly tender an issue and
the averments contained in the petition for forfeiture were deemed judicially
admitted by them.

As held in J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc.:

Its specific denial of the material allegation of the petition without setting forth the
substance of the matters relied upon to support its general denial, when such
matters were plainly within its knowledge and it could not logically pretend
ignorance as to the same, therefore, failed to properly tender on issue.[48]

Thus, the general denial of the Marcos children of the allegations in the petition for
forfeiture for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations since they were not privy to the transactions cannot
rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are the legal heirs and successors-
in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore bound by the acts of their father
vis-a-vis the Swiss funds.

PRE-TRIAL BRIEF DATED OCTOBER 18, 1993

The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In said
brief, Mrs. Marcos stressed that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. But, as in
their answer, they failed to state and substantiate how these funds were acquired
lawfully. They failed to present and attach even a single document that would show
and prove the truth of their allegations. Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:

The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, x x x their
respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:

xxx

(d) the documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof;

xxx

(f) the number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective
testimonies.[49]

It is unquestionably within the courts power to require the parties to submit their
pre-trial briefs and to state the number of witnesses intended to be called to the
stand, and a brief summary of the evidence each of them is expected to give as well
as to disclose the number of documents to be submitted with a description of the
nature of each. The tenor and character of the testimony of the witnesses and of
the documents to be deduced at the trial thus made known, in addition to the
particular issues of fact and law, it becomes apparent if genuine issues are being
put forward necessitating the holding of a trial. Likewise, the parties are obliged not
only to make a formal identification and specification of the issues and their proofs,
and to put these matters in writing and submit them to the court within the
specified period for the prompt disposition of the action.[50]

The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently adopted by respondent Marcos

children, merely stated:

xxx

WITNESSES

4.1 Respondent Imelda will present herself as a witness and reserves the right to
present additional witnesses as may be necessary in the course of the trial.

xxx

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

5.1 Respondent Imelda reserves the right to present and introduce in evidence
documents as may be necessary in the course of the trial.

Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents constituting her
evidence. Neither the names of witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was
stated. What alone appeared certain was the testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in
fact had previously claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge. And even then, the
substance of her testimony, as required by the rules, was not made known either.
Such cunning tactics of respondents are totally unacceptable to this Court. We hold
that, since no genuine issue was raised, the case became ripe for summary
judgment.

OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DATED MARCH 21, 2000
The opposition filed by Mrs. Marcos to the motion for summary judgment dated
March 21, 2000 of petitioner Republic was merely adopted by the Marcos children as
their own opposition to the said motion. However, it was again not accompanied by
affidavits, depositions or admissions as required by Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure:

x x x The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at

least three (3) days before hearing. After hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and
admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.[51]

The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions and admissions to contradict the

sworn declarations in the Republics motion only demonstrated that the averments
of such opposition were not genuine and therefore unworthy of belief.

Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000;[52]

Motions for Reconsideration;[53] and Memoranda
of Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children[54]

All these pleadings again contained no allegations of facts showing their lawful
acquisition of the funds. Once more, respondents merely made general denials
without alleging facts which would have been admissible in evidence at the hearing,
thereby failing to raise genuine issues of fact.

Mrs. Marcos insists in her memorandum dated October 21, 2002 that, during the
pre-trial, her counsel stated that his client was just a beneficiary of the funds,
contrary to petitioner Republics allegation that Mrs. Marcos disclaimed ownership of
or interest in the funds.

This is yet another indication that respondents presented a fictitious defense

because, during the pre-trial, Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children denied ownership
of or interest in the Swiss funds:

PJ Garchitorena:
Make of record that as far as Imelda Marcos is concerned through the statement of
Atty. Armando M. Marcelo that the US$360 million more or less subject matter of the
instant lawsuit as allegedly obtained from the various Swiss Foundations do not
belong to the estate of Marcos or to Imelda Marcos herself. Thats your statement of
facts?

Atty. MARCELO:

Yes, Your Honor.

PJ Garchitorena:

Thats it. Okay. Counsel for Manotoc and Manotoc, Jr. What is your point here? Does
the estate of Marcos own anything of the $360 million subject of this case.

Atty. TECSON:

We joined the Manifestation of Counsel.

PJ Garchitorena:

You do not own anything?

Atty. TECSON:

Yes, Your Honor.

PJ Garchitorena:

Counsel for Irene Araneta?

Atty. SISON:

I join the position taken by my other compaeros here, Your Honor.

xxx

Atty. SISON:

Irene Araneta as heir do (sic) not own any of the amount, Your Honor.[55]

We are convinced that the strategy of respondent Marcoses was to confuse

petitioner Republic as to what facts they would prove or what issues they intended
to pose for the court's resolution. There is no doubt in our mind that they were
leading petitioner Republic, and now this Court, to perplexity, if not trying to drag
this forfeiture case to eternity.

Manifestation dated May 26, 1998 filed by MRS.

Marcos; General/Supplemental Compromise
Agreement dated December 28, 1993

These pleadings of respondent Marcoses presented nothing but feigned defenses. In

their earlier pleadings, respondents alleged either that they had no knowledge of
the existence of the Swiss deposits or that they could no longer remember anything
as it happened a long time ago. As to Mrs. Marcos, she remembered that it was
lawfully acquired.

In her Manifestation dated May 26, 1998, Mrs. Marcos stated that:

COMES NOW undersigned counsel for respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before this
Honorable Court, most respectfully manifests:

That respondent Imelda R, Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-
entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the
various foundations alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the
estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

In the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements, respondent Marcoses sought to

implement the agreed distribution of the Marcos assets, including the Swiss
deposits. This was, to us, an unequivocal admission of ownership by the Marcoses of
the said deposits.

But, as already pointed out, during the pre-trial conference, respondent Marcoses
denied knowledge as well as ownership of the Swiss funds.

Anyway we look at it, respondent Marcoses have put forth no real defense. The facts
pleaded by respondents, while ostensibly raising important questions or issues of
fact, in reality comprised mere verbiage that was evidently wanting in substance
and constituted no genuine issues for trial.

We therefore rule that, under the circumstances, summary judgment is proper.

In fact, it is the law itself which determines when summary judgment is called for.
Under the rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine
issues of fact requiring the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on
their face the pleadings appear to raise issue, if the affidavits, depositions and
admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as
prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law.[56]

In sum, mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in

evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not
defeat a motion for summary judgment.[57] A summary judgment is one granted
upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important
questions or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on the
assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are
patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent
fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a
civil action where there exists no serious controversy.[58] Summary judgment is a
procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise
only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact. The theory of
summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender
issues requiring trial, if it is established by affidavits, depositions or admissions that
those issues are not genuine but fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with
the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner.[59]

In the various annexes to the petition for forfeiture, petitioner Republic attached
sworn statements of witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses'
participation in the illegal acquisition of funds deposited in the Swiss accounts under
the names of five groups or foundations. These sworn statements substantiated the
ill-gotten nature of the Swiss bank deposits. In their answer and other subsequent
pleadings, however, the Marcoses merely made general denials of the allegations
against them without stating facts admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby
failing to raise any genuine issues of fact.

Under these circumstances, a trial would have served no purpose at all and would
have been totally unnecessary, thus justifying a summary judgment on the petition
for forfeiture. There were no opposing affidavits to contradict the sworn declarations
of the witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to the inescapable conclusion that
the matters raised in the Marcoses answer were false.

Time and again, this Court has encountered cases like this which are either only
half-heartedly defended or, if the semblance of a defense is interposed at all, it is
only to delay disposition and gain time. It is certainly not in the interest of justice to
allow respondent Marcoses to avail of the appellate remedies accorded by the Rules
of Court to litigants in good faith, to the prejudice of the Republic and ultimately of
the Filipino people. From the beginning, a candid demonstration of respondents
good faith should have been made to the court below. Without the deceptive
reasoning and argumentation, this protracted litigation could have ended a long
time ago.

Since 1991, when the petition for forfeiture was first filed, up to the present, all
respondents have offered are foxy responses like lack of sufficient knowledge or
lack of privity or they cannot recall because it happened a long time ago or, as to
Mrs. Marcos, the funds were lawfully acquired. But, whenever it suits them, they
also claim ownership of 90% of the funds and allege that only 10% belongs to the
Marcos estate. It has been an incredible charade from beginning to end.

In the hope of convincing this Court to rule otherwise, respondents Maria Imelda
Marcos-Manotoc and Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. contend that "by its positive acts and
express admissions prior to filing the motion for summary judgment on March 10,
2000, petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial on the basis of existing
issues. Thus, it had legally waived whatever right it had to move for summary
judgment."[60]

We do not think so. The alleged positive acts and express admissions of the
petitioner did not preclude it from filing a motion for summary judgment.

Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Rule 35

Summary Judgment

Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a

claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time
after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
or any part thereof.

Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any
time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. (Emphasis ours)[61]

Under the rule, the plaintiff can move for summary judgment at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto (i.e., in answer to the claim, counterclaim or cross-claim)
has been served." No fixed reglementary period is provided by the Rules. How else
does one construe the phrase "any time after the answer has been served?

This issue is actually one of first impression. No local jurisprudence or authoritative

work has touched upon this matter. This being so, an examination of foreign laws
and jurisprudence, particularly those of the United States where many of our laws
and rules were copied, is in order.

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party seeking to
recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim may move for summary judgment
at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or
after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, and that a
party against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted may move for
summary judgment at any time.

However, some rules, particularly Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York,
specifically provide that a motion for summary judgment may not be made until
issues have been joined, that is, only after an answer has been served.[62] Under
said rule, after issues have been joined, the motion for summary judgment may be
made at any stage of the litigation.[63] No fixed prescriptive period is provided.

Like Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, our rules also provide that a
motion for summary judgment may not be made until issues have been joined,
meaning, the plaintiff has to wait for the answer before he can move for summary
judgment.[64] And like the New York rules, ours do not provide for a fixed
reglementary period within which to move for summary judgment.

This being so, the New York Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 113 of the Rules
of Civil Practice can be applied by analogy to the interpretation of Section 1, Rule
35, of our 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Under the New York rule, after the issues have been joined, the motion for summary
judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation. And what exactly does the
phrase "at any stage of the litigation" mean? In Ecker vs. Muzysh,[65] the New York
Supreme Court ruled:

"PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff introduced her evidence and the defendants rested on the case made by
the plaintiff. The case was submitted. Owing to the serious illness of the trial justice,
a decision was not rendered within sixty days after the final adjournment of the
term at which the case was tried. With the approval of the trial justice, the plaintiff
moved for a new trial under Section 442 of the Civil Practice Act. The plaintiff also
moved for summary judgment under Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice. The
motion was opposed mainly on the ground that, by proceeding to trial, the plaintiff
had waived her right to summary judgment and that the answer and the opposing
affidavits raised triable issues. The amount due and unpaid under the contract is not
in dispute. The Special Term granted both motions and the defendants have
appealed.
The Special Term properly held that the answer and the opposing affidavits raised
no triable issue. Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice and the Civil Practice Act
prescribe no limitation as to the time when a motion for summary judgment must
be made. The object of Rule 113 is to empower the court to summarily determine
whether or not a bona fide issue exists between the parties, and there is no
limitation on the power of the court to make such a determination at any stage of
the litigation." (emphasis ours)

On the basis of the aforequoted disquisition, "any stage of the litigation" means that
"even if the plaintiff has proceeded to trial, this does not preclude him from
thereafter moving for summary judgment."[66]

In the case at bar, petitioner moved for summary judgment after pre-trial and
before its scheduled date for presentation of evidence. Respondent Marcoses argue
that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during the pre-trial conference, petitioner
"waived" its right to summary judgment.

This argument must fail in the light of the New York Supreme Court ruling which we
apply by analogy to this case. In Ecker,[67] the defendant opposed the motion for
summary judgment on a ground similar to that raised by the Marcoses, that is, "that
plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment" by her act of proceeding to
trial. If, as correctly ruled by the New York court, plaintiff was allowed to move for
summary judgment even after trial and submission of the case for resolution, more
so should we permit it in the present case where petitioner moved for summary
judgment before trial.

Therefore, the phrase "anytime after the pleading in answer thereto has been
served" in Section 1, Rule 35 of our Rules of Civil Procedure means "at any stage of
the litigation." Whenever it becomes evident at any stage of the litigation that no
triable issue exists, or that the defenses raised by the defendant(s) are sham or
frivolous, plaintiff may move for summary judgment. A contrary interpretation would
go against the very objective of the Rule on Summary Judgment which is to "weed
out sham claims or defenses thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved
in a trial."[68]

In cases with political undertones like the one at bar, adverse parties will often do
almost anything to delay the proceedings in the hope that a future administration
sympathetic to them might be able to influence the outcome of the case in their
favor. This is rank injustice we cannot tolerate.
The law looks with disfavor on long, protracted and expensive litigation and
encourages the speedy and prompt disposition of cases. That is why the law and the
rules provide for a number of devices to ensure the speedy disposition of cases.
Summary judgment is one of them.

Faithful therefore to the spirit of the law on summary judgment which seeks to avoid
unnecessary expense and loss of time in a trial, we hereby rule that petitioner
Republic could validly move for summary judgment any time after the respondents
answer was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the litigation. The
fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it from
moving for summary judgment, as indeed no genuine issue of fact was ever validly
raised by respondent Marcoses.

This interpretation conforms with the guiding principle enshrined in Section 6, Rule
1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that the "[r]ules should be liberally construed
in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding."[69]

Respondents further allege that the motion for summary judgment was based on
respondents' answer and other documents that had long been in the records of the
case. Thus, by the time the motion was filed on March 10, 2000, estoppel by laches
had already set in against petitioner.

We disagree. Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or

unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has
abandoned his right or declined to assert it.[70] In effect, therefore, the principle of
laches is one of estoppel because "it prevents people who have slept on their rights
from prejudicing the rights of third parties who have placed reliance on the inaction
of the original parties and their successors-in-interest".[71]

A careful examination of the records, however, reveals that petitioner was in fact
never remiss in pursuing its case against respondent Marcoses through every
remedy available to it, including the motion for summary judgment.

Petitioner Republic initially filed its motion for summary judgment on October 18,
1996. The motion was denied because of the pending compromise agreement
between the Marcoses and petitioner. But during the pre-trial conference, the
Marcoses denied ownership of the Swiss funds, prompting petitioner to file another
motion for summary judgment now under consideration by this Court. It was the
subsequent events that transpired after the answer was filed, therefore, which
prevented petitioner from filing the questioned motion. It was definitely not because
of neglect or inaction that petitioner filed the (second) motion for summary
judgment years after respondents' answer to the petition for forfeiture.

In invoking the doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only
unjustified inaction but also that some unfair injury to them might result unless the
action is barred.[72]

This, respondents failed to bear out. In fact, during the pre-trial conference, the
Marcoses disclaimed ownership of the Swiss deposits. Not being the owners, as they
claimed, respondents did not have any vested right or interest which could be
adversely affected by petitioner's alleged inaction.

But even assuming for the sake of argument that laches had already set in, the
doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the government sues as a
sovereign or asserts governmental rights.[73] Nor can estoppel validate an act that
contravenes law or public policy.[74]

As a final point, it must be emphasized that laches is not a mere question of time
but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted.[75] Equity demands that petitioner Republic
should not be barred from pursuing the people's case against the Marcoses.

(2) The Propriety of Forfeiture

The matter of summary judgment having been thus settled, the issue of whether or
not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with
the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379 now takes center stage.

The law raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired,
hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to
the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it. Hence,
Sections 2 and 6 of RA 1379[76] provide:

xxxxxx
Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired
during his incumbency an amount or property which is manifestly out of proportion
to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and
the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed
prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.

xxxxxx

Sec. 6. Judgment If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court
that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare
such property in question, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such
judgment the property aforesaid shall become the property of the State. Provided,
That no judgment shall be rendered within six months before any general election
or within three months before any special election. The Court may, in addition, refer
this case to the corresponding Executive Department for administrative or criminal
action, or both.

From the above-quoted provisions of the law, the following facts must be
established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected:

(1) ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his
incumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise, and

(2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is
grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer.

That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time
material to the instant case was never in dispute. Paragraph 4 of respondent
Marcoses' answer categorically admitted the allegations in paragraph 4 of the
petition for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a
public official who served without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate
President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 1, 1965 to
February 25, 1986.[77] Likewise, respondents admitted in their answer the contents
of paragraph 5 of the petition as to the personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos
who once served as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa from 1978 to
1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human Settlements,
from June 1976 to February 1986.[78]
Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10 of her answer the
allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition for forfeiture which referred to the
accumulated salaries of respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.[79]
The combined accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were reflected in the
Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and
Management Alberto Romulo.[80] The Certification showed that, from 1966 to 1985,
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the amount
of P1,570,000 and P718,750, respectively, or a total of P2,288,750:

Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President

1966-1976 at P60,000/year P660,000

1977-1984 at P100,000/year 800,000

1985 at P110,000/year 110,000

P1,570,00

Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister

June 1976-1985 at P75,000/year P718,000

In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couples
combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount of P30,833.33.
Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to
U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing
during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount had
an equivalent value of $304,372.43.

The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the official annual rates of exchange of
the Philippine peso and the US dollar from 1965 to 1985 as well as the official
monthly rates of exchange in January and February 1986 issued by the Center for
Statistical Information of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Prescinding from the aforesaid admissions, Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
provides that:

Section 4. Judicial admissions An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in

the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.[81]

It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the
parties; (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or
stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the
case.[82] Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are
deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not
permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or
inconsistent with such admissions.[83]

The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of
respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as
required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the
1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive any other
emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities.
[84] Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could
not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any
other source.[85] In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of
foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973
Constitution:

Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their
tenure, hold any other office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution,
nor may they practice any profession, participate directly or indirectly in the
management of any business, or be financially interested directly or indirectly in
any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
any government owned or controlled corporation.

Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel
before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned or controlled
corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.

Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to
the provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before
any court or administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any
profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as may be
provided by law.

Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly
serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the
Swiss funds.

Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for
the forfeiture of the Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential elements under
Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its
provisions are mandatory and should thus be construed strictly against the
petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses.

We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses other lawful income
or income from legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply
because, as between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better position
to know if there were such other sources of lawful income. And if indeed there was
such other lawful income, respondents should have specifically stated the same in
their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to specify
the known lawful income of respondents.

Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima
facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties
and other material possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2
must be out of proportion to the known lawful income of such persons. The
respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL)
from which their net worth could be determined. Their failure to file their SAL was in
itself a violation of law and to allow them to successfully assail the Republic for not
presenting their SAL would reward them for their violation of the law.

Further, contrary to the claim of respondents, the admissions made by them in their
various pleadings and documents were valid. It is of record that respondents
judicially admitted that the money deposited with the Swiss banks belonged to
them.
We agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses made judicial admissions of
their ownership of the subject Swiss bank deposits in their answer, the
General/Supplemental Agreements, Mrs. Marcos' Manifestation and Constancia
dated May 5, 1999, and the Undertaking dated February 10, 1999. We take note of
the fact that the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan were unanimous in
holding that respondents had made judicial admissions of their ownership of the
Swiss funds.

In their answer, aside from admitting the existence of the subject funds,
respondents likewise admitted ownership thereof. Paragraph 22 of respondents'
answer stated:

22. Respondents specifically DENY PARAGRAPH 23 insofar as it alleges that

respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the
same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false,
the truth being that respondents' aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.
(emphasis supplied)

By qualifying their acquisition of the Swiss bank deposits as lawful, respondents

unwittingly admitted their ownership thereof.

Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits by
failing to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of certain actionable
documents bearing her signature attached to the petition. As discussed earlier,
Section 11, Rule 8[86] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that material
averments in the complaint shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.

The General[87] and Supplemental[88] Agreements executed by petitioner and

respondents on December 28, 1993 further bolstered the claim of petitioner
Republic that its case for forfeiture was proven in accordance with the requisites of
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. The whereas clause in the General Agreement
declared that:

WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal
Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the $356 million belongs in principle to the
Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met, but even after
7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a final judgment of conviction
against the PRIVATE PARTY.
While the Supplemental Agreement warranted, inter alia, that:

In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE PARTY
shall be entitled to the equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be eventually
withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits.

The stipulations set forth in the General and Supplemental Agreements undeniably
indicated the manifest intent of respondents to enter into a compromise with
petitioner. Corollarily, respondents willingness to agree to an amicable settlement
with the Republic only affirmed their ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple
reason that no person would acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar
deposits if he did not in fact own them.

Respondents make much capital of the pronouncement by this Court that the
General and Supplemental Agreements were null and void.[89] They insist that
nothing in those agreements could thus be admitted in evidence against them
because they stood on the same ground as an accepted offer which, under Section
27, Rule 130[90] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that in civil cases, an
offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability and is not admissible in
evidence against the offeror.

We find no merit in this contention. The declaration of nullity of said agreements

was premised on the following constitutional and statutory infirmities: (1) the grant
of criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs was against the law; (2) the PCGGs
commitment to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the
Marcos heirs was against the Constitution; and (3) the governments undertaking to
cause the dismissal of all cases filed against the Marcoses pending before the
Sandiganbayan and other courts encroached on the powers of the judiciary. The
reasons relied upon by the Court never in the least bit even touched on the veracity
and truthfulness of respondents admission with respect to their ownership of the
Swiss funds. Besides, having made certain admissions in those agreements,
respondents cannot now deny that they voluntarily admitted owning the subject
Swiss funds, notwithstanding the fact that the agreements themselves were later
declared null and void.

The following observation of Sandiganbayan Justice Catalino Castaeda, Jr. in the

decision dated September 19, 2000 could not have been better said:
x x x The declaration of nullity of the two agreements rendered the same without
legal effects but it did not detract from the admissions of the respondents contained
therein. Otherwise stated, the admissions made in said agreements, as quoted
above, remain binding on the respondents.[91]

A written statement is nonetheless competent as an admission even if it is

contained in a document which is not itself effective for the purpose for which it is
made, either by reason of illegality, or incompetency of a party thereto, or by
reason of not being signed, executed or delivered. Accordingly, contracts have been
held as competent evidence of admissions, although they may be unenforceable.
[92]

The testimony of respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. during the hearing on the motion
for the approval of the Compromise Agreement on April 29, 1998 also lent credence
to the allegations of petitioner Republic that respondents admitted ownership of the
Swiss bank accounts. We quote the salient portions of Ferdinand Jr.s formal
declarations in open court:

ATTY. FERNANDO:

Mr. Marcos, did you ever have any meetings with PCGG Chairman Magtanggol C.
Gunigundo?

F. MARCOS, JR.:

Yes. I have had very many meetings in fact with Chairman.

ATTY. FERNANDO:

Would you recall when the first meeting occurred?

PJ GARCHITORENA:

In connection with what?

ATTY. FERNANDO:

In connection with the ongoing talks to compromise the various cases initiated by
PCGG against your family?

F. MARCOS, JR.:

The nature of our meetings was solely concerned with negotiations towards
achieving some kind of agreement between the Philippine government and the
Marcos family. The discussions that led up to the compromise agreement were
initiated by our then counsel Atty. Simeon Mesina x x x.[93]

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. FERNANDO:

What was your reaction when Atty. Mesina informed you of this possibility?

F. MARCOS, JR.:

My reaction to all of these approaches is that I am always open, we are always

open, we are very much always in search of resolution to the problem of the family
and any approach that has been made us, we have entertained. And so my reaction
was the same as what I have always why not? Maybe this is the one that will finally
put an end to this problem.[94]

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. FERNANDO:

Basically, what were the true amounts of the assets in the bank?

PJ GARCHITORENA:
So, we are talking about liquid assets here? Just Cash?

F. MARCOS, JR.:

Well, basically, any assets. Anything that was under the Marcos name in any of the
banks in Switzerland which may necessarily be not cash.[95]

xxx xxx xxx

PJ GARCHITORENA:

x x x What did you do in other words, after being apprised of this contract in
connection herewith?

F. MARCOS, JR.:

I assumed that we are beginning to implement the agreement because this was
forwarded through the Philippine government lawyers through our lawyers and
then, subsequently, to me. I was a little surprised because we hadnt really
discussed the details of the transfer of the funds, what the bank accounts, what the
mechanism would be. But nevertheless, I was happy to see that as far as the PCGG
is concerned, that the agreement was perfected and that we were beginning to
implement it and that was a source of satisfaction to me because I thought that
finally it will be the end.[96]

Ferdinand Jr.'s pronouncements, taken in context and in their entirety, were a

confirmation of respondents recognition of their ownership of the Swiss bank
deposits. Admissions of a party in his testimony are receivable against him. If a
party, as a witness, deliberately concedes a fact, such concession has the force of a
judicial admission.[97] It is apparent from Ferdinand Jr.s testimony that the Marcos
family agreed to negotiate with the Philippine government in the hope of finally
putting an end to the problems besetting the Marcos family regarding the Swiss
accounts. This was doubtlessly an acknowledgment of ownership on their part. The
rule is that the testimony on the witness stand partakes of the nature of a formal
judicial admission when a party testifies clearly and unequivocally to a fact which is
peculiarly within his own knowledge.[98]
In her Manifestation[99] dated May 26, 1998, respondent Imelda Marcos
furthermore revealed the following:

That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-
entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the
various foundations alleged in the case;

That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the
estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos;

xxx xxx xxx

Respondents ownership of the Swiss bank accounts as borne out by Mrs. Marcos'
manifestation is as bright as sunlight. And her claim that she is merely a beneficiary
of the Swiss deposits is belied by her own signatures on the appended copies of the
documents substantiating her ownership of the funds in the name of the
foundations. As already mentioned, she failed to specifically deny under oath the
authenticity of such documents, especially those involving William Saunders and
Jane Ryan which actually referred to Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos,
respectively. That failure of Imelda Marcos to specifically deny the existence, much
less the genuineness and due execution, of the instruments bearing her signature,
was tantamount to a judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution of
said instruments, in accordance with Section 8, Rule 8[100] of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Likewise, in her Constancia[101] dated May 6, 1999, Imelda Marcos prayed for the
approval of the Compromise Agreement and the subsequent release and transfer of
the $150 million to the rightful owner. She further made the following
manifestations:

xxx xxx xxx

2. The Republics cause of action over the full amount is its forfeiture in favor of the
government if found to be ill-gotten. On the other hand, the Marcoses defend that it
is a legitimate asset. Therefore, both parties have an inchoate right of ownership
over the account. If it turns out that the account is of lawful origin, the Republic may
yield to the Marcoses. Conversely, the Marcoses must yield to the Republic.
(underscoring supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

3. Consistent with the foregoing, and the Marcoses having committed themselves to
helping the less fortunate, in the interest of peace, reconciliation and unity,
defendant MADAM IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, in firm abidance thereby, hereby
affirms her agreement with the Republic for the release and transfer of the US Dollar
150 million for proper disposition, without prejudice to the final outcome of the
litigation respecting the ownership of the remainder.

Again, the above statements were indicative of Imeldas admission of the Marcoses
ownership of the Swiss deposits as in fact the Marcoses defend that it (Swiss
deposits) is a legitimate (Marcos) asset.

On the other hand, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.
and Maria Irene Marcos-Araneta filed a motion[102] on May 4, 1998 asking the
Sandiganbayan to place the res (Swiss deposits) in custodia legis:

7. Indeed, the prevailing situation is fraught with danger! Unless the aforesaid Swiss
deposits are placed in custodia legis or within the Courts protective mantle, its
dissipation or misappropriation by the petitioner looms as a distinct possibility.

Such display of deep, personal interest can only come from someone who believes
that he has a marked and intimate right over the considerable dollar deposits. Truly,
by filing said motion, the Marcos children revealed their ownership of the said
deposits.

Lastly, the Undertaking[103] entered into by the PCGG, the PNB and the Marcos
foundations on February 10, 1999, confirmed the Marcoses ownership of the Swiss
bank deposits. The subject Undertaking brought to light their readiness to pay the
human rights victims out of the funds held in escrow in the PNB. It stated:

WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines sympathizes with the plight of the human
rights victims-plaintiffs in the aforementioned litigation through the Second Party,
desires to assist in the satisfaction of the judgment awards of said human rights
victims-plaintiffs, by releasing, assigning and or waiving US$150 million of the funds
held in escrow under the Escrow Agreements dated August 14, 1995, although the
Republic is not obligated to do so under final judgments of the Swiss courts dated
December 10 and 19, 1997, and January 8, 1998;

WHEREAS, the Third Party is likewise willing to release, assign and/or waive all its
rights and interests over said US$150 million to the aforementioned human rights
victims-plaintiffs.

All told, the foregoing disquisition negates the claim of respondents that petitioner
failed to prove that they acquired or own the Swiss funds and that it was only by
arbitrarily isolating and taking certain statements made by private respondents out
of context that petitioner was able to treat these as judicial admissions. The Court is
fully aware of the relevance, materiality and implications of every pleading and
document submitted in this case. This Court carefully scrutinized the proofs
presented by the parties. We analyzed, assessed and weighed them to ascertain if
each piece of evidence rightfully qualified as an admission. Owing to the far-
reaching historical and political implications of this case, we considered and
examined, individually and totally, the evidence of the parties, even if it might have
bordered on factual adjudication which, by authority of the rules and jurisprudence,
is not usually done by this Court. There is no doubt in our mind that respondent
Marcoses admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits.

We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and becomes
conclusive on him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the
adverse party or not.[104] This doctrine is embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court:

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in

the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.[105]

In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents judicial

admission of ownership of the Swiss deposits is definitely binding on them.

The individual and separate admissions of each respondent bind all of them
pursuant to Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. The act or declaration of a partner or
agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The
same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other
person jointly interested with the party.[106]

SEC. 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property from another,
the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to
the property, is evidence against the former.[107]

The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever a privity of

estate exists between the declarant and the party, the term privity of estate
generally denoting a succession in rights.[108] Consequently, an admission of one
in privity with a party to the record is competent.[109] Without doubt, privity exists
among the respondents in this case. And where several co-parties to the record are
jointly interested in the subject matter of the controversy, the admission of one is
competent against all.[110]

Respondents insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in ruling that petitioner

Republic has failed to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss
deposits.

We disagree. The sudden turn-around of the Sandiganbayan was really strange, to

say the least, as its findings and conclusions were not borne out by the voluminous
records of this case.

Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that whenever any public officer or employee
has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out
of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. x x x

The elements which must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are:

(1) the offender is a public officer or employee;

(2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his
incumbency; and

(3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property.

It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were former public
officers. Hence, the first element is clearly extant.

The second element deals with the amount of money or property acquired by the
public officer during his incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired and
owned properties during their term of office. In fact, the five groups of Swiss
accounts were admittedly owned by them. There is proof of the existence and
ownership of these assets and properties and it suffices to comply with the second
element.

The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such assets, money or property
is manifestly out of proportion to the public officers salary and his other lawful
income. It is the proof of this third element that is crucial in determining whether a
prima facie presumption has been established in this case.

Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful income of
the Marcos spouses during their incumbency but also evidence that they had huge
deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under the names of five
different foundations. We believe petitioner was able to establish the prima facie
presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were
manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public
officials. Otherwise stated, petitioner presented enough evidence to convince us
that the Marcoses had dollar deposits amounting to US $356 million representing
the balance of the Swiss accounts of the five foundations, an amount way, way
beyond their aggregate legitimate income of only US$304,372.43 during their
incumbency as government officials.

Considering, therefore, that the total amount of the Swiss deposits was considerably
out of proportion to the known lawful income of the Marcoses, the presumption that
said dollar deposits were unlawfully acquired was duly established. It was sufficient
for the petition for forfeiture to state the approximate amount of money and
property acquired by the respondents, and their total government salaries. Section
9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations states:
Prima Facie Evidence. Any accumulation of assets, properties, and other material
possessions of those persons covered by Executive Orders No. 1 and No. 2, whose
value is out of proportion to their known lawful income is prima facie deemed ill-
gotten wealth.

Indeed, the burden of proof was on the respondents to dispute this presumption and
show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully
acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. A presumption is
prima facie proof of the fact presumed and, unless the fact thus prima facie
established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved.[111]

Respondent Mrs. Marcos argues that the foreign foundations should have been
impleaded as they were indispensable parties without whom no complete
determination of the issues could be made. She asserts that the failure of petitioner
Republic to implead the foundations rendered the judgment void as the joinder of
indispensable parties was a sine qua non exercise of judicial power. Furthermore,
the non-inclusion of the foreign foundations violated the conditions prescribed by
the Swiss government regarding the deposit of the funds in escrow, deprived them
of their day in court and denied them their rights under the Swiss constitution and
international law.[112]

The Court finds that petitioner Republic did not err in not impleading the foreign
foundations. Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[113] taken from
Rule 19b of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the
compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Generally, an indispensable party must
be impleaded for the complete determination of the suit. However, failure to join an
indispensable party does not divest the court of jurisdiction since the rule regarding
indispensable parties is founded on equitable considerations and is not
jurisdictional. Thus, the court is not divested of its power to render a decision even
in the absence of indispensable parties, though such judgment is not binding on the
non-joined party.[114]

An indispensable party[115] has been defined as one:

[who] must have a direct interest in the litigation; and if this interest is such that it
cannot be separated from that of the parties to the suit, if the court cannot render
justice between the parties in his absence, if the decree will have an injurious effect
upon his interest, or if the final determination of the controversy in his absence will
be inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded the
plaintiff without the presence of the other party? and (2) can the case be decided on
its merits without prejudicing the rights of the other party?[116] There is, however,
no fixed formula for determining who is an indispensable party; this can only be
determined in the context and by the facts of the particular suit or litigation.

In the present case, there was an admission by respondent Imelda Marcos in her
May 26, 1998 Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan that she was the sole
beneficiary of 90% of the subject matter in controversy with the remaining 10%
belonging to the estate of Ferdinand Marcos.[117] Viewed against this admission,
the foreign foundations were not indispensable parties. Their non-participation in
the proceedings did not prevent the court from deciding the case on its merits and
according full relief to petitioner Republic. The judgment ordering the return of the
$356 million was neither inimical to the foundations interests nor inconsistent with
equity and good conscience. The admission of respondent Imelda Marcos only
confirmed what was already generally known: that the foundations were established
precisely to hide the money stolen by the Marcos spouses from petitioner Republic.
It negated whatever illusion there was, if any, that the foreign foundations owned
even a nominal part of the assets in question.

The rulings of the Swiss court that the foundations, as formal owners, must be given
an opportunity to participate in the proceedings hinged on the assumption that they
owned a nominal share of the assets.[118] But this was already refuted by no less
than Mrs. Marcos herself. Thus, she cannot now argue that the ruling of the
Sandiganbayan violated the conditions set by the Swiss court. The directive given
by the Swiss court for the foundations to participate in the proceedings was for the
purpose of protecting whatever nominal interest they might have had in the assets
as formal owners. But inasmuch as their ownership was subsequently repudiated by
Imelda Marcos, they could no longer be considered as indispensable parties and
their participation in the proceedings became unnecessary.

In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,[119] this Court ruled that impleading the firms
which are the res of the action was unnecessary:

And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not themselves
guilty of misappropriation, fraud or other illicit conduct in other words, the
companies themselves are not the object or thing involved in the action, the res
thereof there is no need to implead them either. Indeed, their impleading is not
proper on the strength alone of their having been formed with ill-gotten funds,
absent any other particular wrongdoing on their part
Such showing of having been formed with, or having received ill-gotten funds,
however strong or convincing, does not, without more, warrant identifying the
corporations in question with the person who formed or made use of them to give
the color or appearance of lawful, innocent acquisition to illegally amassed wealth
at the least, not so as place on the Government the onus of impleading the former
with the latter in actions to recover such wealth. Distinguished in terms of juridical
personality and legal culpability from their erring members or stockholders, said
corporations are not themselves guilty of the sins of the latter, of the
embezzlement, asportation, etc., that gave rise to the Governments cause of action
for recovery; their creation or organization was merely the result of their members
(or stockholders) manipulations and maneuvers to conceal the illegal origins of the
assets or monies invested therein. In this light, they are simply the res in the actions
for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in principle, no cause of
action against them and no ground to implead them as defendants in said actions.

Just like the corporations in the aforementioned case, the foreign foundations here
were set up to conceal the illegally acquired funds of the Marcos spouses. Thus,
they were simply the res in the action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and did not
have to be impleaded for lack of cause of action or ground to implead them.

Assuming arguendo, however, that the foundations were indispensable parties, the
failure of petitioner to implead them was a curable error, as held in the previously
cited case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan:[120]

Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that the failure of the
Government to implead the sequestered corporations as defendants is indeed a
procedural abberation, as where said firms were allegedly used, and actively
cooperated with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for conversion of public
funds and property or illicit or fraudulent obtention of favored government
contracts, etc., slight reflection would nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the
defect is not fatal, but one correctible under applicable adjective rules e.g., Section
10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court [specifying the remedy of amendment during trial to
authorize or to conform to the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing
amendments before trial], in relation to the rule respecting omission of so-called
necessary or indispensable parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. It is relevant in this context to advert to the old familiar doctrines that the
omission to implead such parties is a mere technical defect which can be cured at
any stage of the proceedings even after judgment; and that, particularly in the case
of indispensable parties, since their presence and participation is essential to the
very life of the action, for without them no judgment may be rendered,
amendments of the complaint in order to implead them should be freely allowed,
even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of judgment by this Court, where it
appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their identity and character as such
indispensable parties.[121]

Although there are decided cases wherein the non-joinder of indispensable parties
in fact led to the dismissal of the suit or the annulment of judgment, such cases do
not jibe with the matter at hand. The better view is that non-joinder is not a ground
to dismiss the suit or annul the judgment. The rule on joinder of indispensable
parties is founded on equity. And the spirit of the law is reflected in Section 11, Rule
3[122] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the
ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the
complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court
on its own initiative.[123]

Likewise, jurisprudence on the Federal Rules of Procedure, from which our Section 7,
Rule 3[124] on indispensable parties was copied, allows the joinder of indispensable
parties even after judgment has been entered if such is needed to afford the moving
party full relief.[125] Mere delay in filing the joinder motion does not necessarily
result in the waiver of the right as long as the delay is excusable.[126] Thus,
respondent Mrs. Marcos cannot correctly argue that the judgment rendered by the
Sandiganbayan was void due to the non-joinder of the foreign foundations. The
court had jurisdiction to render judgment which, even in the absence of
indispensable parties, was binding on all the parties before it though not on the
absent party.[127] If she really felt that she could not be granted full relief due to
the absence of the foreign foundations, she should have moved for their inclusion,
which was allowable at any stage of the proceedings. She never did. Instead she
assailed the judgment rendered.

In the face of undeniable circumstances and the avalanche of documentary

evidence against them, respondent Marcoses failed to justify the lawful nature of
their acquisition of the said assets. Hence, the Swiss deposits should be considered
ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the State in accordance with Section 6 of
RA 1379:

SEC. 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the

court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall
declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment
the property aforesaid shall become property of the State x x x.

THE FAILURE TO PRESENT AUTHENTICATED

TRANSLATIONS OF THE SWISS DECISIONS
Finally, petitioner Republic contends that the Honorable Sandiganbayan Presiding
Justice Francis Garchitorena committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing
himself on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss decisions
and their authenticated translations were not submitted to the court a quo. Earlier
PJ Garchitorena had quoted extensively from the unofficial translation of one of
these Swiss decisions in his ponencia dated July 29, 1999 when he denied the
motion to release US$150 Million to the human rights victims.

While we are in reality perplexed by such an incomprehensible change of heart,

there might nevertheless not be any real need to belabor the issue. The
presentation of the authenticated translations of the original copies of the Swiss
decision was not de rigueur for the public respondent to make findings of fact and
reach its conclusions. In short, the Sandiganbayans decision was not dependent on
the determination of the Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is this Courts.

The release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the PNB is dependent solely on the
decision of this jurisdiction that said funds belong to the petitioner Republic. What is
important is our own assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence to rule in favor
of either petitioner Republic or respondent Marcoses. In this instance, despite the
absence of the authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, the evidence on
hand tilts convincingly in favor of petitioner Republic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the

Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which
were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank
in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002,
plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
Facts

During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate
Rodrigo R. Duterte (Duterte) publicly announced that he would allow the burial of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani
(LNMB). He won the May 9, 2016 election, garnering 16,601,997 votes. At noon of
June 30, 2016, he formally assumed his office at the Rizal Hall in the Malacaan
Palace.
On August 7, 2016, public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N.
Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Subject: Interment of the late Former President Ferdinand Marcos at LNMB

Reference: Verbal Order of President Rodrigo Duterte on July 11, 2016.

In compliance to (sic) the verbal order of the President to implement his election
campaign promise to have the remains of the late former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos be interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, kindly undertake all the
necessary planning and preparations to facilitate the coordination of all agencies
concerned specially the provisions for ceremonial and security requirements.
Coordinate closely with the Marcos family regarding the date of interment and the
transport of the late former President's remains from Ilocos Norte to the LNMB.

The overall OPR for this activity will [be] the PVAO since the LNMB is under its
supervision and administration. PVAO shall designate the focal person for this
activity who shall be the overall overseer of the event.

Submit your Implementing Plan to my office as soon as

possible.1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On August 9, 2016, respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued the
following directives to the Philippine Army (PA) Commanding
General:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SUBJECT: Funeral Honors and Service

TO: Commanding General, Philippine Army

Headquarters, Philippine Army
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City
Attn: Assistant Chief of Staff for RRA, G9
Pursuant to paragraph 2b, SOP Number 8, GHQ, AFP dated 14 July 1992, provide
services, honors and other courtesies for the late Former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos as indicated:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary [x] Vigil - Provide vigil

 [x] Bugler/Drummer
[x] Firing Party
[x] Military Host/Pallbearers
[x] Escort and Transportation
[x] Arrival/Departure Honors

His remains lie in state at Ilocos Norte

Interment will take place at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ft. Bonifacio, Taguig City.
Date: TBAL.

Provide all necessary military honors accorded for a President

POC: Administrator, PVAO BY COMMAND OF GENERAL VISAYA2

Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition3 filed by

Saturnino Ocampo and several others,4 in their capacities as human rights
advocates or human rights violations victims as defined under Section 3 (c) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition
Act of 2013).

2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention5 filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his
son,6 as members of the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his
grandchild.7chanrobleslaw

3. Petition for Prohibition8 filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal

capacity, as member of the House of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson
of Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered
corporation and organization of victims and families of enforced disappearance,
mostly during the martial law regime of the former President Marcos, and several
others,9 in their official capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.
4. Petition for Prohibition10 filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson
of the Commission on Human Rights, and several others,11 suing as victims of
State-sanctioned human rights violations during the martial law regime of Marcos.

5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition12 filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former

Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of
Marcos, and several others,13 as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition14 filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and
several others,15 as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition16 filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former

Chairperson of the Regional Human Rights Commission, Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, by himself and on behalf of the Moro17 who are victims of human
rights during the martial law regime of Marcos.

8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition18 filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of

the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, public official and concerned citizen.

Issues

Procedural

1. Whether President Duterte's determination to have the remains of Marcos

interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.

3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative

remedies and hierarchy of courts.

Substantive
1. Whether the respondents Secretary of National Defense and AFP Rear Admiral
committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
when they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in compliance with the
verbal order of President Duterte to implement his election campaign promise to
have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB.

2. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and

directive violate the Constitution, domestic and international laws, particularly:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II,

Section 1 of Article III, Section 17 of Article VII, Section 1 of Article XI, Section 3(2) of
Article XIV, and Section 26 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution;

(b) R.A. No. 289;

(c) R.A. No. 10368;

(d) AFP Regulation G 161-375 dated September 11, 2000;

(e) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(f) The "Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law" of the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly;
and cralawlawlibrary

(g) The "Updated Set of Principles for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights
through Action to Combat Impunity" of the U.N. Economic and Social Council;

3. Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the
Marcoses and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos
regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former President to interment
at the LNMB.
4. Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of
former President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines as to the conditions and procedures
by which his remains shall be brought back to and interred in the Philippines.

Opinion

The petitions must be dismissed.

Procedural Grounds

Justiciable controversy

It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law

or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following
requisites for judicial inquiry are present: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the
act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.19 In this
case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders
the discussion of the last two superfluous.20chanrobleslaw

An "actual case or controversy" is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an

assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished
from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.21 There must be a contrariety
of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence.22 Related to the requisite of an actual case or controversy is the
requisite of "ripeness," which means that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as
a result of the challenged action.23 Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial
review to actual cases and controversies carries the assurance that the courts will
not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.24 Those
areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government.25cralawred As they are concerned with questions of policy and issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure,26 political
questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial review. However, the scope of the
political question doctrine has been limited by Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution when it vested in the judiciary the power to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the
remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a
justiciable controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public
domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes,
President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall
promote national healing and forgiveness. There being no taint of grave abuse in
the exercise of such discretion, as discussed below, President Duterte's decision on
that political question is outside the ambit of judicial review.

Locus standi

Defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question,27locus

standi requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.28 Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger
of sustaining an injury as a result of an act complained of, such proper party has no
standing.29 Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, in their capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims,
legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such
petitions because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct
and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose,
or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.30 In this case, what is essentially being assailed is the wisdom
behind the decision of the President to proceed with the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds,
without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either
express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.

Petitioners Saguisag, et al.,31 as members of the Bar, are required to allege any
direct or potential injury which the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as an
institution, or its members may suffer as a consequence of the act complained of.32
Suffice it to state that the averments in their petition-in-intervention failed to
disclose such injury, and that their interest in this case is too general and shared by
other groups, such that their duty to uphold the rule of law, without more, is
inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal standing.33chanrobleslaw

As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest.34 In cases involving such issues, the imminence and
clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence.35 In Marcos v. Manglapus,36 the majority opinion observed that the
subject controversy was of grave national importance, and that the Court's decision
would have a profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of
national life. The ponencia explained that the case was in a class by itself, unique
and could not create precedent because it involved a dictator forced out of office
and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in
the country and who, within the short space of three years (from 1986), sought to
return to the Philippines to die.

At this point in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally established as

a national military cemetery and declared a national shrine would have no profound
effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of our national life considering
that more than twenty-seven (27) years since his death and thirty (30) years after
his ouster have already passed. Significantly, petitioners failed to demonstrate a
clear and imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional rights.

As human rights violations victims during the Martial Law regime, some of
petitioners decry re-traumatization, historical revisionism, and disregard of their
state recognition as heroes. Petitioners' argument is founded on the wrong premise
that the LNMB is the National Pantheon intended by law to perpetuate the memory
of all Presidents, national heroes and patriots. The history of the LNMB, as will be
discussed further, reveals its nature and purpose as a national military cemetery
and national shrine, under the administration of the AFP.

Apart from being concerned citizens and taxpayers, petitioners Senator De Lima,
and Congressman Lagman, et al.37 come before the Court as legislators suing to
defend the Constitution and to protect appropriated public funds from being used
unlawfully. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or
the institution to which they belong, their standing as members of the Congress
cannot be upheld.38 They do not specifically claim that the official actions
complained of, i.e., the memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense and the
directive of the AFP Chief of Staff regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB,
encroach on their prerogatives as legislators.39chanrobleslaw

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and

hierarchy of courts. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, one should have
availed first of all the means of administrative processes available.40 If resort to a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
court's judicial power can be sought.41 For reasons of comity and convenience,
courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.42 While
there are exceptions43 to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
petitioners failed to prove the presence of any of those exceptions.

Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of the
assailed memorandum and directive before the Secretary of National Defense. The
Secretary of National Defense should be given opportunity to correct himself, if
warranted, considering that AFP Regulations G 161-375 was issued upon his order.
Questions on the implementation and interpretation thereof demand the exercise of
sound administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of his office to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. If
petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the decision of the Secretary, they could
elevate the matter before the Office of the President which has control and
supervision over the Department of National Defense (DND).44chanrobleslaw

Hierarchy of Courts

In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed under
exceptional cases,45 which are lacking in this case, petitioners cannot simply brush
aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires such petitions to be filed first
with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can
also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the
power to issue restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.
In fine, the petitions at bar should be dismissed on procedural grounds alone. Even
if We decide the case based on the merits, the petitions should still be denied.

Substantive Grounds

There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.46 None is present in this case.

I
The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence

Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed
because it has the effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people's act of
revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses committed
during the Martial Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution, which is a "post-dictatorship charter" and a "human rights
constitution." For them, the ratification of the Constitution serves as a clear
condemnation of Marcos' alleged "heroism." To support their case, petitioners
invoke Sections 2,47 11,48 13,49 23,50 26,51 2752 and 2853 of Article II, Sec. 17 of
Art. VII,54 Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV,55 Sec. 1 of Art. XI,56 and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII57 of
the Constitution.

There is no merit to the contention.

As the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) logically reasoned out, while the
Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not
be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely
related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.

Taada v. Angara58 already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution
are not self-executing. Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state
policies." The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the "basic
political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are
not intended to be self executing principles ready for enforcement through the
courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its
power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in
the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state
policies enumerated in Article II x x x are not "self-executing provisions, the
disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."

In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor that broad constitutional principles
need legislative enactments to implement them x x x.

xxx

The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad

constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and
the lack of judicial authority to wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making."59chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the same vein, Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing
provision considering that a law should be passed by the Congress to clearly define
and effectuate the principle embodied therein. As a matter of fact, pursuant thereto,
Congress enacted R.A. No. 6713 ("Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees"), R.A. No. 6770 ("The Ombudsman Act of 1989"), R.A. No.
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), and Republic Act No.
9485 ("Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007"). To complement these statutes, the Executive
Branch has issued various orders, memoranda, and instructions relative to the
norms of behavior/code of conduct/ethical standards of officials and employees;
workflow charts/public transactions; rules and policies on gifts and benefits; whistle
blowing and reporting; and client feedback program.

Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the
Constitution is also misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional duty
of educational institutions in teaching the values of patriotism and nationalism and
respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on
sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten
wealth. Clearly, with respect to these provisions, there is no direct or indirect
prohibition to Marcos' interment at the LNMB.

The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII pertaining to the duty of the President to
"ensure that the laws be faithfully executed," which is identical to Sec. 1, Title I,
Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987,60 is likewise not violated by public
respondents. Being the Chief Executive, the President represents the government as
a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his or her department.61 Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the
power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the law.62 The
mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature and is
intimately related to the other executive functions.63 It is best construed as an
imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power.64 The provision simply
underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President
is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.65chanrobleslaw

Consistent with President Duterte's mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not contravene R.A. No. 289,
R.A. No. 10368, and the international human rights laws cited by petitioners.

A. On R.A. No. 28966chanrobleslaw

For the perpetuation of their memory and for the inspiration and emulation of this
generation and of generations still unborn, R.A. No. 289 authorized the construction
of a National Pantheon as the burial place of the mortal remains of all the Presidents
of the Philippines, national heroes and patriots.67 It also provided for the creation of
a Board on National Pantheon to implement the law.68chanrobleslaw

On May 12, 1953, President Elpidio R. Quirino approved the site of the National
Pantheon at East Avenue, Quezon City.69 On December 23, 1953, he issued
Proclamation No. 431 to formally "withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve as
a site for the construction of the National Pantheon a certain parcel of land located
in Quezon City." However, on July 5, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation
No. 42 revoking Proclamation Nos. 422 and 431, both series of 1953, and reserving
the parcels of land embraced therein for national park purposes to be known as
Quezon Memorial Park.

It is asserted that Sec. 1 of R.A. No 289 provides for the legal standard by which a
person's mortal remains may be interred at the LNMB, and that AFP Regulations G
161-375 merely implements the law and should not violate its spirit and intent.
Petitioners claim that it is known, both here and abroad, that Marcos' acts and deed
- the gross human rights violations, the massive corruption and plunder of
government coffers, and his military record that is fraught with myths, factual
inconsistencies, and lies - are neither worthy of perpetuation in our memory nor
serve as a source of inspiration and emulation of the present and future
generations. They maintain that public respondents are not members of the Board
on National Pantheon, which is authorized by the law to cause the burial at the
LNMB of the deceased Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.
Petitioners are mistaken. Both in their pleadings and during the oral arguments,
they miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition
that the LNMB and the National Pantheon are one and the same. This is not at all
unexpected because the LNMB is distinct and separate from the burial place
envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject matter of President Quirino's
Proclamation No. 431, which was later on revoked by President Magsaysay's
Proclamation No. 42, is different from that covered by Marcos' Proclamation No. 208.
The National Pantheon does not exist at present. To date, the Congress has deemed
it wise not to appropriate any funds for its construction or the creation of the Board
on National Pantheon. This is indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at the
moment, the establishment of a singular interment place for the mortal remains of
all Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots. Perhaps, the Manila
North Cemetery, the Manila South Cemetery, and other equally distinguished
private cemeteries already serve the noble purpose but without cost to the limited
funds of the government.

Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still, petitioners'
allegations must fail. To apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the
"decent and the brave" or "hero" would be violative of public policy as it will put into
question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal remains resting therein,
and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of plots
at the LNMB is based on the grant of authority to the President under existing laws
and regulations. Also, the Court shares the view of the OSG that the proposed
interment is not equivalent to the consecration of Marcos' mortal remains. The act
in itself does not confer upon him the status of a "hero." Despite its name, which is
actually a misnomer, the purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and historical
perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of
"hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero."
Lastly, petitioners' repeated reference to a "hero's burial" and "state honors,"
without showing proof as to what kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to
the remains of Marcos, is speculative until the specifics of the interment have been
finalized by public respondents.

B. On R.A. No. 1036870chanrobleslaw

For petitioners, R.A. No. 10368 modified AFP Regulations G 161-375 by implicitly
disqualifying Marcos' burial at the LNMB because the legislature, which is a co-equal
branch of the government, has statutorily declared his tyranny as a deposed
dictator and has recognized the heroism and sacrifices of the Human Rights
Violations Victims (HRVVs)71 under his regime. They insist that the intended act of
public respondents damages and makes mockery of the mandatory teaching of
Martial Law atrocities and of the lives and sacrifices of its victims. They contend that
"reparation" under R.A. No. 10368 is non-judicial in nature but a political action of
the State through the Legislative and Executive branches by providing
administrative relief for the compensation, recognition, and memorialization of
human rights victims.

We beg to disagree.

Certainly, R.A. No. 10368 recognizes the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who
were victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance,
and other gross human rights violations committed from September 21, 1972 to
February 25, 1986. To restore their honor and dignity, the State acknowledges its
moral and legal obligation72 to provide reparation to said victims and/or their
families for the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they
experienced.

In restoring the rights and upholding the dignity of HRVVs, which is part of the right
to an effective remedy, R.A. No. 10368 entitles them to monetary and non-monetary
reparation. Any HRVV qualified under the law73 shall receive a monetary reparation,
which is tax-free and without prejudice to the receipt of any other sum from any
other person or entity in any case involving human rights violations.74 Anent the
non-monetary reparation, the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of Education (DepEd), the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED), the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA), and such other government agencies are required
to render the necessary services for the HRVVs and/or their families, as may be
determined by the Human Rights Victims' Claims Board (Board) pursuant to the
provisions of the law.75chanrobleslaw

Additionally, R.A. No. 10368 requires the recognition of the violations committed
against the HRVVs, regardless of whether they opt to seek reparation or not. This is
manifested by enshrining their names in the Roll of Human Rights Violations Victims
(Roll) prepared by the Board.76 The Roll may be displayed in government agencies
designated by the HRVV Memorial Commission (Commission).77 Also, a
Memorial/Museum/Library shall be established and a compendium of their sacrifices
shall be prepared and may be readily viewed and accessed in the internet.78 The
Commission is created primarily for the establishment, restoration, preservation and
conservation of the Memorial/Museum/ Library/Compendium.79chanrobleslaw

To memorialize80 the HRVVs, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
10368 further mandates that: (1) the database prepared by the Board derived from
the processing of claims shall be turned over to the Commission for archival
purposes, and made accessible for the promotion of human rights to all government
agencies and instrumentalities in order to prevent recurrence of similar abuses,
encourage continuing reforms and contribute to ending impunity;81 (2) the lessons
learned from Martial Law atrocities and the lives and sacrifices of HRVVs shall be
included in the basic and higher education curricula, as well as in continuing adult
learning, prioritizing those most prone to commit human rights violations;82 and (3)
the Commission shall publish only those stories of HRVVs who have given prior
informed consent.83chanrobleslaw

This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A.
No. 10368 are not exclusive as it includes the prohibition on Marcos' burial at the
LNMB. It would be undue to extend the law beyond what it actually contemplates.
With its victim-oriented perspective, our legislators could have easily inserted a
provision specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the LNMB as a "reparation"
for the HRVVs, but they did not. As it is, the law is silent and should remain to be so.
This Court cannot read into the law what is simply not there. It is irregular, if not
unconstitutional, for Us to presume the legislative will by supplying material details
into the law. That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.

Considering the foregoing, the enforcement of the HRVVs' rights under R.A. No
10368 will surely not be impaired by the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As
opined by the OSG, the assailed act has no causal connection and legal relation to
the law. The subject memorandum and directive of public respondents do not and
cannot interfere with the statutory powers and functions of the Board and the
Commission. More importantly, the HRVVs' entitlements to the benefits provided for
by R.A. No 10368 and other domestic laws are not curtailed. It must be emphasized
that R.A. No. 10368 does not amend or repeal, whether express or implied, the
provisions of the Administrative Code or AFP Regulations G 161-
375:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so
irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be
made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible must be made
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never
presumed. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in
character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls
short of that standard does not suffice. x x x84chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
C. On International Human Rights Laws

Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB will violate the rights of the
HRVVs to "full" and "effective" reparation, which is provided under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),85 the Basic Principles and Guidelines
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law86 adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 16, 2005,
and the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights
Through Action to Combat Impunity87 dated February 8, 2005 by the U.N. Economic
and Social Council.

We do not think so. The ICCPR,88 as well as the U.N. principles on reparation and to
combat impunity, call for the enactment of legislative measures, establishment of
national programmes, and provision for administrative and judicial recourse, in
accordance with the country's constitutional processes, that are necessary to give
effect to human rights embodied in treaties, covenants and other international laws.
The U.N. principles on reparation expressly states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Emphasizing that the Basic Principles and Guidelines contained herein do not entail
new international or domestic legal obligations but identify mechanisms, modalities,
procedures and methods for the implementation of existing legal obligations under
international human rights law and international humanitarian law which are
complementary though different as to their norms[.][Emphasis supplied]
The Philippines is more than compliant with its international obligations. When the
Filipinos regained their democratic institutions after the successful People Power
Revolution that culminated on February 25, 1986, the three branches of the
government have done their fair share to respect, protect and fulfill the country's
human rights obligations, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryThe 1987 Constitution contains provisions that promote

and protect human rights and social justice.

As to judicial remedies, aside from the writs of habeas corpus, amparo,89 and
habeas data,90 the Supreme Court promulgated on March 1, 2007 Administrative
Order No. 25-2007,91 which provides rules on cases involving extra-judicial killings
of political ideologists and members of the media. The provision of the Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the prevention of the victim's re-traumatization applies
in the course of legal and administrative procedures designed to provide justice and
reparation.92chanrobleslaw

On the part of the Executive Branch, it issued a number of administrative and

executive orders. Notable of which are the following:
A.O. No. 370 dated December 10, 1997 (Creating the Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee on Human Rights)
E.O. No. 118 dated July 5, 1999 (Providing for the Creation of a National Committee
on the Culture of Peace)

E.O. No. 134 dated July 31, 1999 (Declaring August 12, 1999 and Every 12th Day of
August Thereafter as International Humanitarian Law Day)

E.O. No. 404 dated January 24, 2005 (Creating the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines Monitoring Committee [GRPMC] on Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law)

A.O. No. 157 dated August 21, 2006 (Creating an Independent Commission to
Address Media and Activist Killings)

A.O. No. 163 dated December 8, 2006 (Strengthening and Increasing the
Membership of the Presidential Human Rights Committee, and Expanding Further
the Functions of Said Committee)93chanrobleslaw

A.O. No. 181 dated July 3, 2007 (Directing the Cooperation and Coordination
Between the National Prosecution Service and Other Concerned Agencies of
Government for the Successful Investigation and Prosecution of Political and Media
Killings)

A.O. No. 197 dated September 25, 2007 (DND and AFP Coordination with PHRC Sub-
committee on Killings and Disappearances)

A.O. No. 211 dated November 26, 2007 (Creating a Task Force Against Political
Violence)

A.O. No. 249 dated December 10, 2008 (Further Strengthening Government Policies,
Plans, and Programs for the Effective Promotion and Protection of Human Rights on
the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights)

E.O. No. 847 dated November 23, 2009 (Creating the Church-Police-Military-Liaison
Committee to Formulate and Implement a Comprehensive Program to Establish
Strong Partnership Between the State and the Church on Matters Concerning Peace
and Order and Human Rights)

A.O. No. 35 dated November 22, 2012 (Creating the Inter-Agency Committee on
Extra-Legal Killings, Enforced Disappearances, Torture and Other Grave Violations of
the Right to Life, Liberty and Security of Persons)

A.O. No. 1 dated October 11, 2016 (Creating the Presidential Task Force on
Violations of the Right to Life, Liberty and Security of the Members of the Media)
Finally, the Congress passed the following laws affecting human rights:
Republic Act No. 7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained
or Under Custodia/Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and
Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof)

Republic Act No. 8371 (The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997)

Republic Act No. 9201 (National Human Rights Consciousness Week Act of 2002)

Republic Act No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003)

Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004)

Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006)

Republic Act No. 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007)

Republic Act No. 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women)

Republic Act No. 9745 (Anti-Torture Act of 2009)

Republic Act No. 9851 (Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian
Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity)
Republic Act No. 10121 (Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of
2010)

Republic Act No. 10168 (The Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of
2012)

Republic Act No. 10353 (Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act of 2012)

Republic Act No. 10364 (Expanded Anti-Trafficking In Persons Act of 2012)

Republic Act No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation And Recognition Act of
2013)

Republic Act No. 10530 (The Red Cross and Other Emblems Act of 2013)
Contrary to petitioners' postulation, our nation's history will not be instantly revised
by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting through the public respondents, to
bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial
Law are already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the
present generation of Filipinos. As to the unborn, it must be said that the
preservation and popularization of our history is not the sole responsibility of the
Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen
of this country.

Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of the Human Rights
Victims' Claims Board and the HRVV Memorial Commission in the memorialization of
HRVVs, the National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP), formerly
known as the National Historical Institute (NHI),94 is mandated to act as the primary
government agency responsible for history and is authorized to determine all
factual matters relating to official Philippine history.95 Among others, it is tasked to:
(a) conduct and support all kinds of research relating to Philippine national and local
history; (b) develop educational materials in various media, implement historical
educational activities for the popularization of Philippine history, and disseminate,
information regarding Philippine historical events, dates, places and personages;
and (c) actively engage in the settlement or resolution of controversies or issues
relative to historical personages, places, dates and events.96 Under R.A. Nos. 10066
(National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009)97 and 10086 (Strengthening Peoples'
Nationalism Through Philippine History Act),98 the declared State policy is to
conserve, develop, promote, and popularize the nation's historical and cultural
heritage and resources.99 Towards this end, means shall be provided to strengthen
people's nationalism, love of country, respect for its heroes and pride for the
people's accomplishments by reinforcing the importance of Philippine national and
local history in daily life with the end in view of raising social consciousness.100
Utmost priority shall be given not only with the research on history but also its
popularization.101chanrobleslaw

II.
The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias

Petitioners contend that the interment of Marcos at the LNMB will desecrate it as a
sacred and hallowed place and a revered national shrine where the mortal remains
of our country's great men and women are interred for the inspiration and
emulation of the present generation and generations to come. They erred.

A. National Shrines

As one of the cultural properties of the Philippines, national historical shrines (or
historical shrines) refer to sites or structures hallowed and revered for their history
or association as declared by the NHCP.102 The national shrines created by law and
presidential issuance include, among others: Fort Santiago (Dambana ng Kalayaan)
in Manila;103 all battlefield areas in Corregidor and Bataan;104 the site of First Mass
in the Philippines in Magallanes, Limasawa, Leyte;105 Aguinaldo Shrine or Freedom
Shrine in Kawit, Cavite;106 Fort San Antonio Abad National Shrine in Malate,
Manila;107 Tirad Pass National Shrine in Ilocos Sur;108 Ricarte Shrine109 and
Aglipay Shrine110 in Batac, Ilocos Norte; Liberty Shrine in Lapu-Lapu, Cebu;111
"Red Beach" or the landing point of General Douglas MacArthur and the liberating
forces in Baras, Palo, Leyte;112 Dapitan City as a National Shrine City in Zamboanga
Del Norte;113 General Leandro Locsin Fullon National Shrine in Hamtic, Antique;114
and Mabini Shrine in Polytechnic University of the Philippines - Mabini Campus, Sta.
Mesa, Manila.115 As sites of the birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or death of
great and eminent leaders of the nation, it is the policy of the Government to hold
and keep the national shrines as sacred and hallowed place.116 P.O. No. 105117
strictly prohibits and punishes by imprisonment and/or fine the desecration of
national shrines by disturbing their peace and serenity through digging, excavating,
defacing, causing unnecessary noise, and committing unbecoming acts within their
premises. R.A. No. 10066 also makes it punishable to intentionally modify, alter, or
destroy the original features of, or undertake construction or real estate
development in any national shrine, monument, landmark and other historic
edifices and structures, declared, classified, and marked by the NHCP as such,
without the prior written permission from the National Commission for Culture and
the Arts (NCAA).118chanrobleslaw

As one of the cultural agencies attached to the NCAA,119 the NHCP manages,
maintains and administers national shrines, monuments, historical sites, edifices
and landmarks of significant historico-cultural value.120 In particular, the NHCP
Board has the power to approve the declaration of historic structures and sites, such
as national shrines, monuments, landmarks and heritage houses and to determine
the manner of their identification, maintenance, restoration, conservation,
preservation and protection.121chanrobleslaw

Excluded, however, from the jurisdiction of the NHCP are the military memorials and
battle monuments declared as national shrines, which have been under the
administration, maintenance and development of the Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office (PVAO) of the DND. Among the military shrines are: Mt. Samat National Shrine
in Pilar, Bataan;122 Kiangan War Memorial Shrine in Linda, Kiangan, Ifugao;123
Capas National Shrine in Capas, Tarlac;124 Ricarte National Shrine in Malasin,
Batac, Ilocos Norte;125 Balantang Memorial Cemetery National Shrine in Jaro,
Iloilo;126 Balete Pass National Shrine in Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya;127 USAFIP, NL
Military Shrine and Park in Bessang Pass, Cervantes, Ilocos Sur;128 and the LNMB in
Taguig City, Metro Manila.129chanrobleslaw

B. The Libingan Ng Mga Bayani

At the end of World War II, the entire nation was left mourning for the death of
thousands of Filipinos. Several places served as grounds for the war dead, such as
the Republic Memorial Cemetery, the Bataan Memorial Cemetery, and other places
throughout the country. The Republic Memorial Cemetery, in particular, was
established in May 1947 as a fitting tribute and final resting place of Filipino military
personnel who died in World War II.

On October 23, 1954, President Ramon D. Magsaysay, Sr. issued E.O. No. 77, which
ordered "the remains of the war dead interred at the Bataan Memorial Cemetery,
Bataan Province, and at other places in the Philippines, be transferred to, and
reinterred at, the Republic Memorial Cemetery at Fort Wm Mckinley, Rizal Province"
so as to minimize the expenses for the maintenance and upkeep, and to make the
remains accessible to the widows, parents, children, relatives, and friends.

On October 27, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 86, which
changed the name of Republic Memorial Cemetery to Libingan Ng Mga Bayani to
symbolize "the cause for which our soldiers have died" and to "truly express the
nations esteem and reverence for her war dead."130chanrobleslaw

On July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423, which
reserved for military purposes, under the administration of the AFP Chief of Staff,
the land where LNMB is located. The LNMB was part of a military reservation site
then known as Fort Wm McKinley (now known as Fort Andres Bonifacio).

On May 28, 1967, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 208, which excluded the LNMB
from the Fort Bonifacio military reservation and reserved the LNMB for national
shrine purposes under the administration of the National Shrines Commission (NSC)
under the DND.

On September 24, 1972, Marcos, in the exercise of his powers as the AFP
Commander-in-Chief, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21,
1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, as amended, issued
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 which reorganized the Executive Branch of the
National Government through the adoption of the Integrated Reorganization Plan
(IRP). Section 7, Article XV, Chapter I, Part XII thereof abolished the NSC and its
functions together with applicable appropriations, records, equipment, property and
such personnel as may be necessary were transferred to the NHI under the
Department of Education (DEC). The NHI was responsible for promoting and
preserving the Philippine cultural heritage by undertaking, inter alia, studies on
Philippine history and national heroes and maintaining national shrines and
monuments.131chanrobleslaw

Pending the organization of the DEC, the functions relative to the administration,
maintenance and development of national shrines tentatively integrated into the
PVAO in July 1973.

On January 26, 1977, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1076. Section 7, Article XV,
Chapter I, Part XII of the IRP was repealed on the grounds that "the administration,
maintenance and development of national shrines consisting of military memorials
or battle monuments can be more effectively accomplished if they are removed
from the [DEC] and transferred to the [DND] by reason of the latter s greater
capabilities and resources" and that "the functions of the [DND] are more closely
related and relevant to the charter or significance of said national shrines."
Henceforth, the PVAO through the Military Shrines Service (MSS), which was created
to perform the functions of the abolished NSC - would administer, maintain and
develop military memorials and battle monuments proclaimed as national shrines.
On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued the Administrative Code. The
Code retains PVAO under the supervision and control of the Secretary of National
Defense.132 Among others, PVAO shall administer, develop and maintain military
shrines.133 With the approval of PVAO Rationalization Plan on June 29, 2010,
pursuant to E.O. No. 366 dated October 4, 2004, MSS was renamed to Veterans
Memorial and Historical Division, under the supervision and control of PVAO, which
is presently tasked with the management and development of military shrines and
the perpetuation of the heroic deeds of our nation's veterans.

As a national military shrine, the main features, structures, and facilities of the
LNMB are as follows:
Tomb of the Unknown Soldiers - The main structure constructed at the center of the
cemetery where wreath laying ceremonies are held when Philippine government
officials and foreign dignitaries visit the LNMB. The following inscription is found on
the tomb: "Here lies a Filipino soldier whose name is known only to God." Behind the
tomb are three marble pillars representing the three main island groups of the
Philippines - Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Buried here were the remains of 39,000
Filipino soldiers who were originally buried in Camp O'Donnell Concentration Camp
and Fort Santiago, Intramuros, Manila.

Heroes Memorial Gate - A structure shaped in the form of a large concrete tripod
with a stairway leading to an upper view deck and a metal sculpture at the center.
This is the first imposing structure one sees upon entering the grounds of the
cemetery complex.

Black Stone Walls - Erected on opposite sides of the main entrance road leading to
the Tomb of the Unknown Soldiers and just near the Heroes Memorial are two 12-
foot high black stone walls which bear the words, "I do not know the dignity of his
birth, but I do know the glory of his death." that General Douglas MacArthur made
during his sentimental journey to the Philippines in 1961.

Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor Memorial Pylon - Inaugurated on April 5, 1977

by Secretary Renato S. De Villa in memory of the defenders of Bataan and
Corregidor during World War II. This monument is dedicated as an eternal
acknowledgment of their valor and sacrifice in defense of the Philippines.

Korean Memorial Pylon - A towering monument honoring the 112 Filipino officers
and men who, as members of the Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea
(PEFTOK), perished during the Korean War.
Vietnam Veterans Memorial Pylon - Dedicated to the members of the Philippine
contingents and Philippine civic action groups to Vietnam (PHILCON-V and PHILCAG-
V) who served as medical, dental, engineering construction, community and
psychological workers, and security complement. They offered tremendous
sacrifices as they alleviated human suffering in war-ravaged Vietnam from 1964-
1971. Inscribed on the memorial pylon are the words: "To build and not to destroy,
to bring the Vietnamese people happiness and not sorrow, to develop goodwill and
not hatred."

Philippine World War II Guerillas Pylon - Erected by the Veterans Federation of the
Philippines as a testimony to the indomitable spirit and bravery of the Filipino
guerillas of World War II who refused to be cowed into submission and carried on the
fight for freedom against an enemy with vastly superior arms and under almost
insurmountable odds. Their hardship and sufferings, as well as their defeats and
victories, are enshrined in this memorial.134
Contrary to the dissent, P.D. No. 105135 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the
fact that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D. No. 105,136 the LNMB was not expressly
included in the national shrines enumerated in the latter.137 The proposition that
the LNMB is implicitly covered in the catchall phrase "and others which may be
proclaimed in the future as National Shrines" is erroneous because:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) As stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D.

No. 105.

(2) Following the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis,138 the
LNMB is not a site "of the birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or death of great and
eminent leaders of the nation." What P.D. No. 105 contemplates are the following
national shrines: Fort Santiago ("Dambana ng Kalayaan"), all battlefield areas in
Corregidor and Bataan, the site of First Mass in the Philippines, Aguinaldo Shrine or
Freedom Shrine, Fort San Antonio Abad National Shrine, Tirad Pass National Shrine,
Ricarte Shrine, Aglipay Shrine, Liberty Shrine, "Red Beach" or the landing point of
General Douglas MacArthur and the liberating forces, Dapitan City, General Leandro
Locsin Fullon National Shrine, and Mabini Shrine. Excluded are the military
memorials and battle monuments declared as national shrines under the PVAO,
such as: Mt. Samat National Shrine, Kiangan War Memorial Shrine, Capas National
Shrine, Ricarte National Shrine, Balantang Memorial Cemetery National Shrine,
Balete Pass National Shrine; USAFIP, NL Military Shrine and Park, and the LNMB.

(3) Since its establishment, the LNMB has been a military shrine under the
jurisdiction of the PVAO. While P.D. No. 1 dated September 24, 1972 transferred the
administration, maintenance and development of national shrines to the NHI under
the DEC, it never actually materialized. Pending the organization of the DEC, its
functions relative to national shrines were tentatively integrated into the PVAO in
July 1973. Eventually, on January 26, 1977, Marcos issued P.D. No. 1076. The PVAO,
through the MSS, was tasked to administer, maintain, and develop military
memorials and battle monuments proclaimed as national shrines. The reasons being
that "the administration, maintenance and development of national shrines
consisting of military memorials or battle monuments can be more effectively
accomplished if they are removed from the [DEC] and transferred to the [DND] by
reason of the latter's greater capabilities and resources" and that "the functions of
the [DND] are more closely related and relevant to the charter or significance of
said national shrines."

The foregoing interpretation is neither narrow and myopic nor downright error.
Instead, it is consistent with the letter and intent of P.D. No. 105.

Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and
hallowed" refer to the LNMB as a place and not to each and every mortal remains
interred therein. Hence, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said
cemetery as a revered and respected ground. Neither does it negate the presumed
individual or collective "heroism" of the men and women buried or will be buried
therein. The "nations esteem and reverence for her war dead," as originally
contemplated by President Magsaysay in issuing Proclamation No. 86, still stands
unaffected. That being said, the interment of Marcos, therefore, does not constitute
a violation of the physical, historical, and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national
military shrine.

At this juncture, reference should be made to Arlington National Cemetery

(Arlington), which is identical to the LNMB in terms of its prominence in the U.S. It is
not amiss to point that our armed forces have been patterned after the U.S. and
that its military code produced a salutary effect in the Philippines' military justice
system.139 Hence, relevant military rules, regulations, and practices of the U.S.
have persuasive, if not the same, effect in this jurisdiction.

As one of the U.S. Army national military cemeteries,140 the Arlington is under the
jurisdiction of the Department of the Army.141 The Secretary of the U.S. Army has
the responsibility to develop, operate, manage, administer, oversee, and fund the
Army national military cemeteries in a manner and to standards that fully honor the
service and sacrifices of the deceased members of the armed forces buried or
inurned therein, and shall prescribe such regulations and policies as may be
necessary to administer the cemeteries.142 In addition, the Secretary of the U.S.
Army is empowered to appoint an advisory committee, which shall make periodic
reports and recommendations as well as advise the Secretary with respect to the
administration of the cemetery, the erection of memorials at the cemetery, and
master planning for the cemetery.143chanrobleslaw

Similar to the Philippines, the U.S. national cemeteries are established as national
shrines in tribute to the gallant dead who have served in the U.S. Armed Forces.144
The areas are protected, managed and administered as suitable and dignified burial
grounds and as significant cultural resources.145 As such, the authorization of
activities that take place therein is limited to those that are consistent with
applicable legislation and that are compatible with maintaining their solemn
commemorative and historic character.146chanrobleslaw

The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO,
which is empowered to administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, is under
the supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in turn, is under the Office of the
President.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-
executing provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory
implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the
legislature.147 This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992
Agreement148 between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the
remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is
free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his
predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed
judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.

Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for
public use and for specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain
and that the reserved land shall remain subject to the specific public purpose
indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation.149 At present, there is
no law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is
located from the use it was originally intended by the past Presidents. The allotment
of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and Commander-in-
Chief,150 a legislator,151 a Secretary of National Defense,152 a military
personnel,153 a veteran,154 and a Medal of Valor awardee,155 whether recognizing
his contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the public use requirement.
The disbursement of public funds to cover the expenses incidental to the burial is
granted to compensate him for valuable public services rendered.156 Likewise,
President Duterte's determination to have Marcos' remains interred at the LNMB
was inspired by his desire for national healing and reconciliation. Presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty prevails over petitioners' highly
disputed factual allegation that, in the guise of exercising a presidential prerogative,
the Chief Executive is actually motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and
bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses. As the purpose is not self-evident,
petitioners have the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of their claim.
They failed. Even so, this Court cannot take cognizance of factual issues since We
are not a trier of facts.

C. AFP Regulations on the LNMB

A review of the regulations issued by the AFP Chief of Staff as to who may and may
not be interred at the LNMB underscores the nature and purpose of the LNMB as an
active military cemetery/grave site.

On May 13, 1947, the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, by the direction of the
President and by order of the Secretary of National Defense, issued General Orders
No. 111, which constituted and activated, as of said date, the Graves Registration
Platoon as a unit of the Philippine Army.

On February 2, 1960, the AFP Chief of Staff, by order of the Secretary of National
Defense, issued AFP Regulations G 161-371 (Administrative and Special Staff
Services, Grave Registration Service), which provided that the following may be
interred in the LNMB: (a) World War II dead of the AFP and recognized guerillas; (b)
Current dead of the AFP; (c) Retired military personnel of the AFP; (d) Remains of
former members of the AFP who died while in the active service and in the Retired
List of the AFP now interred at different cemeteries and other places throughout the
Philippines or the Secretary of National Defense; and (e) Others upon approval of
the Congress of the Philippines, the President of the Philippines or the Secretary of
National Defense. The regulation also stated that the AFP Quartermaster General
will be responsible for, among other matters, the efficient operation of the Graves
Registration Service; the interment, disinterment and reinterment of the dead
mentioned above; and preservation of military cemeteries, national cemeteries, and
memorials.

On July 31, 1973, the AFP Chief of Staff, by order of the Secretary of National
Defense, issued AFP Regulations G 161-372 (Administration and Operation of AFP
Graves Registration Installations), which superseded AFP Regulations G 161-371. It
provided that the following may be interred in the LNMB: (a) Deceased Veterans of
the Philippine Revolution of 1896/World War I; (b) Deceased World War II members
of the AFP and recognized guerillas; (c) Deceased military personnel of the AFP who
died while in the active duty; (d) Deceased retired military personnel of the AFP; (e)
Deceased military personnel of the AFP interred at different cemeteries and other
places outside the LNMB; and (f) Such remains of persons as the Commander-in-
Chief of the AFP may direct. The remains of the following were not allowed to be
interred in the LNMB: (a) The spouse of an active, or retired, deceased military
personnel, recognized guerillas who himself/herself is not a military personnel; and
(b) AFP personnel who were retireable but separated/reverted/discharged for cause,
or joined and aided the enemy of the Republic of the Philippines, or were convicted
of capital or other criminal offenses, involving moral turpitude. The regulation also
stated that the Quartermaster General shall be responsible for, among other
matters, the efficient operation of the AFP graves registration installations; the
interment, disinterment and reinterment of deceased military personnel mentioned
above; and the preservation of military cemeteries, proper marking and official
recording of graves therein.

On April 9, 1986, AFP Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos, by order of National Defense
Minister, issued AFP Regulations G 161-373 (Allocation of Cemetery Plots at the
Libingan Ng Mga Bayani), which superseded AFP Regulations G 161-372. It
enumerated a list of deceased person who may be interred at the LNMB, namely: (a)
Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c) Ministers
of National Defense; (d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f)
Active and retired military personnel of the AFP; (g) Veterans of Philippine
Revolution of 1896, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; and (h) Government
Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artist and other deceased persons whose
interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Batasang
Pambansa or the Minister of National Defense. The regulation also stated that the
Quartermaster General shall be responsible for the allocation of specific
section/areas for the said deceased persons, while the Commanding Officer of the
Quartermaster Graves Registration Company shall be charged with the preparation
of grave sites, supervision of burials at LNMB and the registration of graves.

On March 27, 1998, the AFP Chief of Staff, by order of the Secretary of National
Defense, issued AFP Regulations G 161-374 (Allocation of Cemetery Plots at the
Libingan Ng Mga Bayani), which superseded AFP Regulations G 161-373. It provided
that the following may be interred in the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b)
Presidents or Commanders-inChief, AFP; (c) Secretaries of National Defense; (d)
Chiefs of Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired
military personnel of the AFP; (g) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI,
WWII and recognized guerillas; (h) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National
Artists and other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been
approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of National Defense;
and (i) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, CSAFP, Generals/Flag Officers,
Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of
National Defense and Chief of Staff. The remains of the following were not allowed
to be interred in the LNMB: (a) Personnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b) Authorized personnel who
were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude. Like AFP
Regulations G 161-373, it stated that the Quartermaster General shall be
responsible for the allocation of specific section/areas for the deceased persons,
whereas the Commanding Officer of the Quartermaster Graves Registration Unit
shall be charged with the preparation of grave sites, supervision of burials, and the
registration of graves.

Finally, on September 11, 2000, the AFP Chief of Staff, by the order of the Secretary
of National Defense, issued AFP Regulations G 161-375 (Allocation of Cemetery
Plots at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani), which superseded AFP Regulations G 161-374.
The regulation stated that the Chief of Staff shall be responsible for the issuance of
interment directive for all active military personnel for interment, authorized
personnel (such as those former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined
the Philippine Coast Guard [PCG] and the Philippine National Police [PNP]), and
retirees, veterans and reservists enumerated therein. The Quartermaster General is
tasked to exercise over-all supervision in the implementation of the regulation and
the Commander ASCOM, PA through the Commanding Officer of Grave Services Unit
is charged with the registration of the deceased/graves, the allocation of specific
section/area at the LNMB for interment of deceased, the preparation of grave sites,
and the supervision of burials.

Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the
LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c)
Secretaries of National Defense; (d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of
the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include active
draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active
Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations or combat related activities; (g)
Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the PCG and the PNP;
(h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas;
(i) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons
whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief,
Congress or the Secretary of National Defense; and G) Former Presidents,
Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of Former
Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff. Similar to AFP
Regulations G 161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in the LNMB:
(a) Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the
service; and (b) Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude.

In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations
G 161-375 remains to be the sole authority in determining who are entitled and
disqualified to be interred at the LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were empowered
to do so, former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III,
who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the rules by
expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB. The validity of AFP
Regulations G 161-375 must, therefor, be sustained for having been issued by the
AFP Chief of Staff acting under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense,
who is the alter ego of the President.
x x x In Joson v. Torres, we explained the concept of the alter ego principle or the
doctrine of qualified political agency and its limit in this wise:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryUnder this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment

of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of
the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive. (Emphasis ours, citation omitted.)157chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It has been held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the
force and effect of law and, until set aside, is binding upon executive and
administrative agencies, including the President as the chief executor of
laws.158chanrobleslaw

1. Qualification under the AFP Regulations

AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the absence of clear and
unmistakable showing that it has been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Neither could it be considered ultra vires
for purportedly providing incomplete, whimsical, and capricious standards for
qualification for burial at the LNMB.

To compare, We again refer to the U.S. Army regulations on Arlington. In the U.S.,
the Secretary of the Army, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense,
determines eligibility for interment or inurnment in the Army national military
cemeteries.159 Effective October 26, 2016, the rule160 is as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Only those who qualify as a primarily eligible person or a derivatively eligible person
are eligible for interment in Arlington National Cemetery, unless otherwise
prohibited as provided for in 553.19161-553.20,162 provided that the last period
of active duty of the service member or veteran ended with an honorable discharge.
(a) Primarily eligible persons. The following are primarily eligible persons for
purposes of interment:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Any service member who dies on active duty in the

U.S. Armed Forces (except those service members serving on active duty for
training only), if the General Courts Martial Convening Authority grants a certificate
of honorable service.

(2) Any veteran retired from a Reserve component who served a period of active
duty (other than for training), is carried on the official retired list, and is entitled to
receive military retired pay.

(3) Any veteran retired from active military service and entitled to receive military
retired pay.

(4) Any veteran who received an honorable discharge from the Armed Forces prior
to October 1, 1949, who was discharged for a permanent physical disability, who
served on active duty (other than for training), and who would have been eligible for
retirement under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 1201 had the statute been in effect on
the date of separation.

(5) Any veteran awarded one of the following decorations:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(i) Medal of Honor;163chanrobleslaw

(ii) Distinguished Service Cross, Air Force Cross, or Navy Cross;

(iii) Distinguished Service Medal;

(iv) Silver Star; or

(v) Purple Heart.

(6) Any veteran who served on active duty (other than active duty for training) and
who held any of the following positions:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(i) President or Vice President of the United States;

(ii) Elected member of the U.S. Congress;

(iii) Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States or Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States;

(iv) A position listed, at the time the person held the position, in 5 U.S.C. 5312164 or
5313165 (Levels I and II of the Executive Schedule); or

(v) Chief of Mission of a Category 4, 5, or post if the Department of State classified

that post as a Category 4, 5, or 5+ post during the person's tenure as Chief of
Mission.

(7) Any former prisoner of war who, while a prisoner of war, served honorably in the
active military service, and who died on or after November 30, 1993.

(b) Derivatively eligible persons. The following individuals are derivatively eligible
persons for purposes of interment who may be interred if space is available in the
gravesite of the primarily eligible person:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) The spouse of a primarily eligible person who is or

will be interred in Arlington National Cemetery. A former spouse of a primarily
eligible person is not eligible for interment in Arlington National Cemetery under this
paragraph.

(2) The spouse of an active duty service member or an eligible veteran, who was:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(i) Lost or buried at sea, temporarily interred overseas

due to action by the Government, or officially determined to be missing in action;
(ii) Buried in a U.S. military cemetery maintained by the American Battle
Monuments Commission; or

(iii) Interred in Arlington National Cemetery as part of a group burial (the

derivatively eligible spouse may not be buried in the group burial gravesite).

(3) The parents of a minor child or a permanently dependent adult child, whose
remains were interred in Arlington National Cemetery based on the eligibility of a
parent at the time of the child's death, unless eligibility of the non-service
connected parent is lost through divorce from the primarily eligible parent.

(4) An honorably discharged veteran who does not qualify as a primarily eligible
person, if the veteran will be buried in the same gravesite as an already interred
primarily eligible person who is a close relative, where the interment meets the
following conditions:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(i) The veteran is without minor or unmarried adult

dependent children;

(ii) The veteran will not occupy space reserved for the spouse, a minor child, or a
permanently dependent adult child;

(iii) All other close relatives of the primarily eligible person concur with the
interment of the veteran with the primarily eligible person by signing a notarized
statement;

(iv) The veteran's spouse waives any entitlement to interment in Arlington National
Cemetery, where such entitlement might be based on the veteran's interment in
Arlington National Cemetery. The Executive Director may set aside the spouse's
waiver, provided space is available in the same gravesite, and all close relatives of
the primarily eligible person concur;

(v) Any cost of moving, recasketing, or revaulting the remains will be paid from
private funds.
There is a separate list of eligible with respect to the inurnment of cremated
remains in the Columbarium,166 interment of cremated remains in the Unmarked
Area,167 and group burial.168 As a national military cemetery, eligibility standards
for interment, inurnment, or memorialization in Arlington are based on honorable
military service.169 Exceptions to the eligibility standards for new graves, which are
rarely granted, are for those persons who have made significant contributions that
directly and substantially benefited the U.S. military.170chanrobleslaw

Judging from the foregoing, it is glaring that the U.S. Army regulations on Arlington
and the AFP Regulations G 161-375 on the LNMB, as a general rule, recognize and
reward the military services or military related activities of the deceased. Compared
with the latter, however, the former is actually less generous in granting the
privilege of interment since only the spouse or parent, under certain conditions,
may be allowed "if space is available in the gravesite of the primarily eligible
person."

It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to

argue that the word "bayani" in the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a
symbolism of heroism may attach to the LNMB as a national shrine for military
memorial, the same does not automatically attach to its feature as a military
cemetery and to those who were already laid or will be laid therein. As stated, the
purpose of the LNMB, both from the legal and historical perspectives, has neither
been to confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only
those interred therein should be treated as a "hero." In fact, the privilege of
internment at the LNMB has been loosen up through the years. Since 1986, the list
of eligible includes not only those who rendered active military service or military-
related activities but also non-military personnel who were recognized for their
significant contributions to the Philippine society (such as government dignitaries,
statesmen, national artists, and other deceased persons whose interment or
reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary
of National Defense). In 1998, the widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of
National Defense and Chief of Staff were added to the list. Whether or not the
extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be restricted in
order to be consistent with the original purpose of the LNMB is immaterial and
irrelevant to the issue at bar since it is indubitable that Marcos had rendered
significant active military service and military-related activities.

Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-in-
Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran,
and a Medal of Valor awardee. For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt
practices, we may disregard Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but we
cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he held
or the awards he received. In this sense, We agree with the proposition that Marcos
should be viewed and judged in his totality as a person. While he was not all good,
he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human who erred like us.
Our laws give high regard to Marcos as a Medal of Valor awardee and a veteran. R.A.
No. 9049171 declares the policy of the State "to consistently honor its military
heroes in order to strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the
military."172 For the "supreme self-sacrifice and distinctive acts of heroism and
gallantry,"173 a Medal of Valor awardee or his/her dependents/heirs/beneficiaries
are entitled to the following social services and financial rewards:
Tax-exempt lifetime monthly gratuity of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which
is separate and distinct from any salary or pension that the awardee currently
receives or will receive from the government of the Philippines;174chanrobleslaw

Precedence in employment in government agencies or government-owned or

controlled corporation, if the job qualifications or requirements are met;

Priority in the approval of the awardee's housing application under existing housing
programs of the government;

Priority in the acquisition of public lands under the Public Land Act and preferential
right in the lease of pasture lands and exploitation of natural resources;

Privilege of obtaining loans in an aggregate amount not exceeding Five Hundred

Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) from governmentowned or controlled financial
institutions without having to put up any collateral or constitute any pledge or
mortgage to secure the payment of the loan;

Twenty (20%) percent discount from all establishments relative to utilization of

transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants,
recreation and sport centers and purchase of medicine anywhere in the country;

Twenty (20%) percent discount on admission fees charged by theaters, cinema

houses and concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture,
leisure and amusement;

Free medical and dental services and consultation in hospital and clinics anywhere
in the country;

Exemption from the payment of tuition and matriculation fees in public or private
schools, universities, colleges and other educational institutions in any pre-school,
baccalaureate or post graduate courses such as or including course leading to the
degree of Doctor of Medicine (MD), Bachelor of Laws (LLB), and Bachelor of Science
in Nursing (BSN) or allied and similar courses; and cralawlawlibrary

If interested and qualified, a quota is given to join the cadet corps of the Philippine
Military Academy or otherwise priority for direct commission, call to active duty
(CAD) and/or enlistment in regular force of the AFP.
On the other hand, in recognizing their patriotic services in times of war and peace
for the cause of freedom and democracy; for the attainment of national unity,
independence, and socioeconomic advancement; and for the maintenance of peace
and order,175 R.A. No. 6948, as amended,176 grants our veterans177 and their
dependents or survivors with pension (old age, disability, total administrative
disability, and death) and non-pension (burial, education, hospitalization, and
medical care and treatment) benefits as well as provisions from the local
governments. Under the law, the benefits may be withheld if the Commission on
Human Rights certifies to the AFP General Headquarters that the veteran has been
found guilty by final judgment of a gross human rights violation while in the service,
but this factor shall not be considered taken against his next of
kin.178chanrobleslaw

2. Disqualification under the AFP Regulations

Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the
disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G 161-375. He was neither convicted by
final judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.

Petitioners, however, protest that a narrow interpretation of the AFP regulations

disregards historical context and the rule on statutory construction. They urge the
Court to construe statutes not literally but according to their spirit and reason.

It is argued that Marcos committed offenses involving moral turpitude for his gross
human rights violations, massive graft and corruption, and dubious military records,
as found by foreign and local courts as well as administrative agencies. By going
into exile, he deliberately evaded liability for his actions. And by allowing death to
overtake him, he inevitably escaped the prospect of facing accountability for his
crimes. They also contend that his removal in the 1986 popular uprising is a clear
sign of his discharge from the AFP. The People Power Revolution was the direct
exercise of the Filipinos' power to overthrow an illegitimate and oppressive regime.
As a sovereign act, it necessarily includes the power to adjudge him as dishonorably
discharged from the AFP.
Furthermore, according to petitioners, to limit the application of the disqualifying
provisions of AFP Regulations G 161-375 only to soldiers would be unfair (since,
unlike Presidents, soldiers have an additional cause for disqualification) and lead to
absurd results (because soldiers who were dishonorably discharged would be
disqualified for acts that are less atrocious than that committed by Marcos). Also,
the AFP regulations would place Marcos in the same class as the other Philippine
Presidents when in fact he is a class of his own, sui generis. The other Presidents
were never removed by People Power Revolution and were never subject of laws
declaring them to have committed human rights violations. Thus, the intended
burial would be an act of similarly treating persons who are differently situated.

Despite all these ostensibly persuasive arguments, the fact remains that Marcos
was not convicted by final judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude. No
less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a person shall not be held to answer
for a criminal offense without due process of law and that, "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presum innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf."179 Even the U.N. principles on reparation and to combat impunity cited by
petitioners unequivocally guarantee the rights of the accused, providing
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
XIII. Rights of others

27. Nothing in this document is to be construed as derogating from internationally

or nationally protected rights of others, in particular the right of an accused person
to benefit from applicable standards of due process.

xxx

PRINCIPLE 9. GUARANTEES FOR PERSONS IMPLICATED

Before a commission identifies perpetrators in its report, the individuals concerned

shall be entitled to the following guarantees:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) The commission must try to corroborate information

implicating individuals before they are named publicly;
(b) The individuals implicated shall be afforded an opportunity to provide a
statement setting forth their version of the facts either at a hearing convened by
the commission while conducting its investigation or through submission of a
document equivalent to a right of reply for inclusion in the commission's file.
To note, in the U.S., a person found to have committed a Federal or State capital
crime (i.e., a crime which a sentence of imprisonment for life or death penalty may
be imposed) but who has not been convicted by reason of not being available for
trial due to death or flight to avoid prosecution, may be ineligible for interment,
inurnment, or memorialization in an Army national military cemetery. Nevertheless,
such ineligibility must still observe the procedures specified in
553.21.180chanrobleslaw

The various cases cited by petitiOners, which were decided with finality by courts
here and abroad, have no bearing in this case since they are merely civil in nature;
hence, cannot and do not establish moral turpitude.

Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no property right
to safeguard because even if one is eligible to be buried at the LNMB, such fact
would only give him or her the privilege to be interred therein. Unless there is a
favorable recommendation from the Commander-in-Chief, the Congress or the
Secretary of National Defense, no right can be said to have ripen. Until then, such
inchoate right is not legally demandable and enforceable.

Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites of equal protection
clause are not met.181 In this case, there is a real and substantial distinction
between a military personnel and a former President. The conditions of dishonorable
discharge under the Articles of War182 attach only to the members of the military.
There is also no substantial distinction between Marcos and the three Philippine
Presidents buried at the LNMB (Presidents Quirino, Garcia, and Macapagal). All of
them were not convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. In addition, the
classification between a military personnel and a former President is germane to the
purposes of Proclamation No. 208 and P.D. No. 1076. While the LNMB is a national
shrine for military memorials, it is also an active military cemetery that recognizes
the status or position held by the persons interred therein.

Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO expressly
recognized him as a retired veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended.
Petitioners have not shown that he was dishonorably discharged from military
service under AFP Circular 17, Series of 1987 (Administrative Discharge Prior to
Expiration of Term of Enlistment) for violating Articles 94, 95 and 97 of the Articles
of War.183 The NHCP study184 is incomplete with respect to his entire military
career as it failed to cite and include the official records of the AFP.

With respect to the phrase "[p]ersonnel who were dishonorably

separated/reverted/discharged from the service," the same should be viewed in
light of the definition provided by AFP Regulations G 161-375 to the term "active
service" which is "[s]ervice rendered by a military person as a Commissioned
Officer, enlisted man/woman, probationary officer, trainee or draftee in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and service rendered by him/her as a civilian official or
employee in the Philippine Government prior to the date of his/her separation or
retirement from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for which military and/or
civilian service he/she shall have received pay from the Philippine Government,
and/or such others as may be hereafter be prescribed by law as active service (PD
1638, as amended)."185 To my mind, the word "service" should be construed as
that rendered by a military person in the AFP, including civil service, from the time
of his/her commission, enlistment, probation, training or drafting, up to the date of
his/her separation or retirement from the AFP. Civil service after honorable
separation and retirement from the AFP is outside the context of "service" under
AFP Regulations G 161-375.

Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency
during the EDSA Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion
or discharge from the military service. The fact that the President is the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the 1987 Constitution only enshrines the
principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military. Not being a military
person who may be prosecuted before the court martial, the President can hardly be
deemed "dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service" as
contemplated by AFP Regulations G 161-375. Dishonorable discharge through a
successful revolution is an extra-constitutional and direct sovereign act of the
people which is beyond the ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere administrative
regulation.

It is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the people
through the so-called EDSA Revolution. Said political act of the people should not be
automatically given a particular legal meaning other than its obvious consequence-
that of ousting him as president. To do otherwise would lead the Court to the
treacherous and perilous path of having to make choices from multifarious
inferences or theories arising from the various acts of the people. It is not the
function of the Court, for instance, to divine the exact implications or significance of
the number of votes obtained in elections, or the message from the number of
participants in public assemblies. If the Court is not to fall into the pitfalls of getting
embroiled in political and oftentimes emotional, if not acrimonious, debates, it must
remain steadfast in abiding by its recognized guiding stars - clear constitutional and
legal rules - not by the uncertain, ambiguous and confusing messages from the
actions of the people.

Conclusion

In sum, there is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which would justify
the Court to interpose its authority to check and override an act entrusted to the
judgment of another branch. Truly, the President's discretion is not totally
unfettered. "Discretion is not a freespirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it
pleases but is reined in to keep it from straying. In its classic formulation, 'discretion
is not unconfined and vagrant' but 'canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing.'"186 At bar, President Duterte, through the public respondents, acted
within the bounds of the law and jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the call of human
rights advocates, the Court must uphold what is legal and just. And that is not to
deny Marcos of his rightful place at the LNMB. For even the Framers of our
Constitution intend that full respect for human rights is available at any stage of a
person's development, from the time he or she becomes a person to the time he or
she leaves this earth.187chanrobleslaw

There are certain things that are better left for history - not this Court - to adjudge.
The Court could only do so much in accordance with the clearly established rules
and principles. Beyond that, it is ultimately for the people themselves, as the
sovereign, to decide, a task that may require the better perspective that the
passage of time provides. In the meantime, the country must mov'e on and let this
issue rest.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petitions are DISMISSED. Necessarily, the

Status Quo Ante Order is hereby LIFTED.