Espero Santos Salaw v.

NLRC
27 September 1991 | Sarmiento, J. |
Termination of Employment > Procedural Requirements > Right to Counsel
Digested by: Precious Gan

PETITIONER: Espero Santos Salaw

RESPONDENTS: NLRC; Associated Bank; Jose R. Tengco, Chairman of the Board; Rollie Tuazon, Manager

SUMMARY: The Criminal Investigation Services of the NCR PC extracted a sworn statement from Espero without the assistance
of counsel, wherein he stated that he, in cahoots with a supervisor, sold properties foreclosed by Associated Bank and that divided
the proceeds equally. On the basis of such statement, Espero was requested to appear before the banks investigation committee
without counsel or representative. Espero was subsequently dismissed, by reason of which he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
LA ruled that he was illegally dismissed. NLRC reversed the LA Decision. SC reinstated the LA Decision.

DOCTRINE: While administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by technical rules of procedure, the right to counsel
remains a very basic requirement of substantive due process that must be observed.

FACTS: worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend

1. September 1967: Espero was employed by Associated
Bank as a credit investigator-appraiser. His duties included
inspecting, investigating, appraising, and identifying the
companys foreclosed assets, giving valuation to its real
properties, and verifying the genuineness and
encumbrances of the titles of properties mortgaged to AB.
2. 27 November 1984: Espero wrote a Sworn Statement,
without the assistance of counsel, that made it appear that
he, in cahoots with Reynaldo Madrigal, a supervisor in
charge of the acquired assets of AB, sold 20 foreclosed
sewing machines and electric generators for P60,000.00
and divided the proceeds equally. The Statement was
extracted by the Criminal Investigation Services (CIS) of
the NCR Phil. Constabulary.
3. 5 December 1984: Espero was requested by Rollie Tuazon,
bank manager, to appear before ABs Personnel Discipline
and Investigation Committee (PDIC). When Espero agreed,
Rollie sent him a letter formally requesting his appearance
before the PDIC without counsel or representative.
4. 1 April 1985: Espero was terminated effective 27 March
1985 for alleged serious misconduct or willful
disobedience and fraud or willful breach of trust. Espero
subsequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
NLRC.
5. LA declared the dismissal illegal. On ABs appeal to the
NLRC, the LA Decision was reversed. Esperos MR was
denied. Espero appealed to the SC.
ISSUE: WON Espero was illegally dismissed. YES.
RULING: NLRC Decision set aside. LA Decision reinstated.
RATIO:
1. The investigation of Espero violated his right to due
process inasmuch as he was not given a chance to defend
himself.
a. Sec. 5, Rule XIV, Book V of the IRR of the Labor
Code requires that the employer shall afford the
himself with the assistance of his representative, if he
so desires.
b. Espero was perfunctorily denied the assistance of
counsel during the PDIC investigation and AB, et al.
provided no explanation to counter the presumption
that the denial was attended by irregularity and
unfairness.
2. While administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not
bound by technical rules of procedure, the right to
counsel remains a very basic requirement of
substantive due process that must be observed. The
rights to counsel and to due process of law are two of
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution to any person under investigation, be the
proceeding administrative, civil, or criminal.
a. 1987 Consti., Art III, Sec. 12(1). Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to xxx have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the service of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
b. Id., Sec. 12(3). Any confession or admission obtained
in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
3. AB, et al. premised Esperos dismissal on his supposed
admission of the offense carried in his Sworn Statement
and presented no other evidence to establish his culpability.
Even the minutes of the PDIC investigation were not
presented. This is a glaring denial of due process.
4. The following cardinal primary rights that must be
respected even in proceedings of an administrative
character were enunciated by Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay
v. CIR:
a. The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and
adduce evidence in support thereof.
b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
 c. There must be evidence to support the tribunals
conclusion or finding.
d. The evidence supporting the conclusion must be
substantial, which means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
f. The CIR (now NLRC) must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate.
g. The CIR (now NLRC) should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.

5. Considering further that Esperos admission was extracted

from him also without the assistance of counsel, the same
cannot be admitted in evidence against him. As such
admission was the sole basis of the PDICs finding of
Esperos guilt, such finding no longer has a ground to stand
on. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity.

6. Significantly, the dismissal of the petitioner from his

employment was characterized by undue haste. The law is
clear that even in the disposition of labor cases, due process
must not be subordinated to expediency or dispatch.