THE OTTOMAN TURKS AND THE PORTUGUESE

IN THE PERSIAN GULF (1534 - 1581)

SaIih zbaran

Thesis Preser*.d for the Degree of Doctor cf Philosophy -

In the University of London

October, 1969

7)
 2.

ABSTRACT

This is a study of the conflict of interests between the Ottoman

Turks and the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf in the middle decades of the

sixteenth century.

The Introduction deals with the Portuguese and the Turkish sources used

in this study - most of them still unpublished

Chapters l and U examine the establishment of the two great powers

on the shores of the Persian Gulf.

Chapters III to V seek to study their confrontation, their struggle for the

Bahrayn and also their diplomatic relations.

The study also includes a number of appendices which give, in text

and translation, some examples of the Portuguese and the Turkish archival

material
 3.

ACK NCWLEDGEMENTS

I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Mr. V.J. Parry, whose

unceasing encouragement and untiring guidance have always been of

exceptional value to me.

Secondly, I would like to thank Dr. C. Orhonlu of the Universty of

istanbul, who has been helpful to me since he initiated me into this field.

I am also indebted to Professor B. Lewis and Professor C.R. Boxer,

from whom I have always learned. I must also express my thanks to

Dr. V. L Manage, Mr. 1. Rebelo and Dr. M. 1. Correia de Matos for

clarifying certain points in my preparation of the appendices.

I am very grateful to the staff of the Turkish State Archives, particularly

to Mr. 1. liksal, and to the Director of the Torre do Tombo of Lisbon,

Mr. J. Pereira do Costa, and his colleagues for their very kind co-operation.

Lastly, my sincere thanks are due to the Gulbenkian Foundation who

has enabled me to carry out my research in Lisbon.

S. Czbaran.
 4.

ABBREVIATIONS

Cart. Ormuz Arquivo Naconal do Torre do Tombo, Casa Forte,

Cart as de Ormuz 0 D.Joo de Castro.

CC Arquivo Nocionol do Torre do Tombo, Corpo Cro-

not 6gico.

Cot. Loureno Arquivo Nocional do Torre do Tombo, Coleco de

So Loureno.

El2 Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition.

IA Islam Ansiklopedisi.

Koular 888 Topkapt Sarayi MUzesi KUtUphonesi, MS no. Koular 888.

MD Bo;bakantik Ar;ivi, Divan-i HUmayun MUhimme

Defterleri.

MD Zeyli : Ba;bakanlik Ar;ivi, Divan-i I-IUmayun MUhimme Defterleri

Zeyl i.

Mirat : Seydt AU Reis, MiratU9 MemiUk, Istanbul A.H. 1313/

A.D. 1895.

Ru*us
Ba,sbakanlik Arivi, KmII Kepeci Tasnifi, Ruts Defterieri.

ID : Istanbul Universitesi Edebiyat FakUltesi Torih Dergisi.

 5.

NOTE ON TRANSCRIPTION

No universally accepted system has been established thus far for

the transliteration of Ottoman Turkish names and expressions into Latin

characters. In this study the Ottoman names and expressions are rendered

as they would appear in modern Turkish usage. Some place names which

are difficult to read have been given in the original Ottoman script.

Words like firman (in Turkish, ferman) and pasha (in Turkish, pa;a) which

can be found in the Cxford English Dictionary are used in their English

form.
 6.

CCNTENTS
Page

ABSTRACT 2

ACK NOWLEDGEMENTS 3

ABBREV IATIONS 4

NOTE ON TRANSCRIPTION 5

INTRODUCTION A Review of the Sources 8

CHAPTER I The Coming of the Portuguese to the Persian

Gulf 20

CHAPTER II The Cttoman Turks in the Coast lands of the

Persian Gulf 28

CHAPTER III The Cttoman-Portuguese Rivalry in the

Persian Gulf (1550 - 1556) 42

CHAPTER IV The Struggle for the Island of the Bahrayn 66

CHAPTER V Relations Between the Ottomans and the

Portuguese after 1 559 84

APPENDICES WITH PLATES

APPENDIX I A Letter of D. Manuel de Lima (1547) 1 U0

APPENDIX II A Letter of Sharaf Nur al-Din (1552) 116

APPENDIX III A Letter of Sultan S5leyman to the King of

Portugal (1564) 121

APPENDIX IV The Rues Register 225, p.222 (1572) 124

APPENDIX V An Crder to the Beglerbeg of Basra (1573) 129
 7.

Contents (cont'd) Page

APPENDIX VI An Order to the Beglerbeg of Baghdad (1575) 131

APPENDIX VII The Ruts Register 238, p.146 (1580) 133

APPENDIX VIII A Note on the Trade in the Persian Guif 139

BIBLIOGRAPHY 142

MAPS OF THE PERSIAN GULF IN THE

SIXTEENTH CENTURY

(A) Persian Gulf - Northern Section 151

(B) Persian Gulf - Southern Section 152

(C) Sketch of the Bahroyn (D. Joo de Castro,

Roteiro de Goa a Dio, 1538 - 1539) 153

(D) Map of Basra Area (c. 1680 ?)/Vera Delineatio

Civiatis Bassora, Paris (?) 1680 (?), cf.. British
Museum Map Room, no. 49475 (1)7 154

PLATES 155
 8.

INTRCDUCTICN A REVIEW OF THE SCURCES

The historical literature relating to the Persian Gulf is quite rich for

the seventeenth and the following centuries. It is much less full for the

period before 1600 A. D. Indeed, there is no work which describes in

adequate detail the course of events in the Gulf during the years examined

in this thesis. The general histories which are available mention no more

than scattered incidents - e.g., the 'Asia Portuguesa' of Faria y Sousa, ill

translated into English and offering only a small amount of information, has

often been copied and followed in modern books dealing with the Persian Gulf. 1

The waters of the gulf saw, in the middle decades of the sixteenth

century, a long conflict between the Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese.

Of the sources which describe this confrontation the most important are

chronicles and archival material written in Portuguese and in Cttoman Turkish -

the documents located in the archives at Istanbul and Lisbon being as yet, in

large degree, unpublished.

The archival material written in Portuguese is to be found in the

'Arquivo Noconal da Torre do Tombo', the oldest and most important of the

Portuguese collections. There is, however, no good general guide and no

adequate published catalogue for the 'Arquivo Nacional'. The existing guide

1. cf. C.F. Beckingham, s.v. Bahr F'ris.

 9.

books offer little aid to the student who is seeking particular categories of

material. 2 Of much more value is G. Schurhammer, Die Leitgenossischen

Quellen zur Geschichte Fortugisch-Asiens und Seiner Nachbcirlander, Leipzig

1932 (reprinted 1962) for the author gives resumes of4h. Portuguese documents

dealing with Portuguese Asia and preserved not only at Torre do Tombo, but

also in other archives. This work is furnished with a detailed index.

Torre do Tombo has two main groups of material. The larger is known

as the 'Corpo Cronol6gico' and contains 82902 documents kept in 'Macos', i.e.

'bundles'. These documents, each summarized in a few brief lines, ore indexed

in manuscript volumes. Most of this material relates to the sixteenth century.

The second group of material at Torre do Tombo is the 'Gavetos', i.e.

'drawers'. There are 23 of them, containing documents referring mostly to

events of the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries. The 'Centro de Estudos

histcricos Ultramorinos' of Lisbon has published, thus far, in seven volumes, a

large number of documents selected from the 'Gavetas'. These two groups of

material contain some documents relating to the Persian Gulf - e.g., from the

Corpo Cronol6gico, letters of 1552, describing events which occurred during

the naval campaign of the Ottoman admiral, Pin Reis, against Muscat and Hormuz;3

2. cf. Mesquita de Figuerado, Arquivo Nocional do Torre do Tombo, Rote iro

Prtitico, Lisboa 1922; P.A. d'Azevedo& A. Baio, C Archivoda Torre do
Tombo. Sua Hist6nia, corpos que a compem e organizoso, Lisboa 1905;
J.M. do Silvo Marques, Arquivo NacionaF do Torre do Tombo, I, Lisboa
1935 (only one volume of this work has oppeard in print).

3. Arquivo Nacional do Torre do Tombo. Corpo Cronol6gico, Farte 1,

Mao 89, Documento 9.
 10.

or again, from the Gavetas, the report of Simo do Costa (dated 1563) which

describes in some detail, geographical, administrative, and economic, the town

and district of Basra.

The Arquivo Nacional do Torre do Tombo has several smaller col-

lections of material, of which two are important for the affairs of the Persian

Gulf - i.e., the 'Cartos de Ormuz a D. Joo de Castros (letters from Ormuz to

D. Joo de Castro, the Vice-Roy of India 1545 - 1548) and the 'Colecdo de

Sao Loureno'. The 'Cartas de Crmuz' contains seventy seven letters arranged

in chronological order and bound in one volume. Most of these letters came

from two Portuguese governors of Hormuz to India, during the years 1545 - 154b.

The more interesting amongst them bear the signature of D. Manuel de Limo,

who, in May 1547, became governor of Hormuz in succession to Luis Fal coo.5

Manuel de Limo wrote to the Vce-Roy at Goa about the state of affairs at

Hormuz and about the Cttoman Occupation of Basra in 1546. His information

was acquired from an Arab merchant, Hall I Fayat (Hagy Fayat), whom the

Cttomans sent to Hormuz soon after the capture of Basro. 6 He also obtained

some further details from a certain Domingos Borbudo, an agent whom he had

4. This report is published inAs Gavetas do Torre do Tombo, v (Lisboa 1965),

137-143.
5. On D. Manuel de Lima see E. Sanceau, Uma Narrativa do Expedico
Portuguesa de 1541 aoMar Roxo, in Studio, ix (Lisboa 1962), 200-202.

6. Cart. Ormuz, fol. 88v. See Appendix I.

 11.

ordered to go to Basra, there to gather news about the Cttoman campaign

against Basra and the adlacent lands at the head of the Persian Gulf. The

letters of Manuel de Lima offer some valuable data about the relations existing

at this time between Hormuz and Basra.

The 'Collecao de S. Loureno' consists of six volumes containing

copies of various letters. This correspondence is incomplete and k not arranged

in chronological sequence. 8 Here can be found, translated from the Arabic into

Portuguese, the letter of lbn Ulyan, an Arab chieftain from Jezayir, i.e., the

Qurna region where the Euphrates and the Tigres flow together. lbn Ulyari

was appealing to the Portuguese at Hormuz for aid against the Ottomans. The

collection has, too, a similar letter from Sheikh Yahya, the ruler of Basra.

There is also here a letter of Ayas Pasha, 1 the beglerbeg of Baghdad, to lbn
12
Ulyan.

7. Cart. Ormuz, fol. 140r.

8. cf. Jos Maria Antonio Nogueiro, Notcia dos Moniscrptos da Livraria
da ExceIentssimo cosa de So Lourenco, Ajuda 1871; cf. also T.M. da
Silvo Marques, op. cit., 103.
9. Coleco de So Loureno, iv, fol. 493.
10. Ibid., fol. 140r.
11. Ibid., fol. 140v-141r.
12. Numerous documents have been edited and published from the archives
at the Torre do Tombo, from other respositors in Portugal arid from the
archives at Gao. A useful review of Portuguese historical publications
is to be found in CR, Boxer, Some Notes on Portuguese Historiography
1930 - 1950, in History, xxxix (London 1954), 1-13; olso in J. Aubin,
Le "Cramento do Esado da India' de Ant6nio de Abreu (1574), in
Studio, iv (Lisboa 1959), 169-289. On the various archival collections
 12.

There is in Portuguese, over and above the material preserved in the

archives, a rich chronicle literature, which recounts, often in great detail, the

achievement of the Portuguese in Asia and in Africa. Indeed, the sixteenth

century is a golden age of Portuguese historioraphy.

Of the great chronicles the first to be mentioned here is that of Joao

de Barros. In 1520 Barros wrote a 'Chronica do Emperador Clorimund&, which

13
attracted the attention of the king, Manuel I (1495 - 1521). The King now

asked Barros to compose a work narrating the course of the Portuguese conquest

in Asia. Barros, in 1533, became a factor in the 'case da India e Mine' at

Lisbon, retaining this office for over thirty years. In 1552 the first volume was

published of his 'Decadr,s da Asia' - the 'Deeds done by the Portuguese in their

discovery and conquest of the seas and lands of the East'. The second volume

appeared in 1553 and the third in 1563. A fourth and final volume was published

in 1615. It contains material deriving from Barros himself, but also information

which came from the editor, i.e., from the cosmographer Royal, Joo Baptista
14
Lavanha, who used a number of other sources. The complete work, in four

Decadas, covers the even's from the voyage of Vasco da Game to India in 1497

= in Portugal, e.g., at lorre do Tombo, at the Biblioteca Nacional de

Lisboa, and at the Archivo Histori g o Ultramarino, etc., cf. Schurhammer,
op. cit., passim; and cf. also, in general, A.F.C. Ryder, Materials
for West African History in the Portuguese Archives, London 1 965.
13. C. R. Boxer, Three Historians of the Portuguese Asia (Barros, Couto and
Bocarro) in the Boletim do lnstituto Port uguese de Honkong, i (i'Aacau I
6.
14. lbid., 7ff; cf., also J. B. Harrison, Five Portuguese Historians, in
Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, ed. C.H. Philips, London 1961,
 '3.

until the Cttomon sie,j e of Diu in 1538. Barros never visited India, but he had

access to official documents and letters, available to him in the 'Casa do India'.

He notes that he made use also of two Arabic and three Persian geographers 15 -

works which officials in the service of the kind and, in addition, a slave whom

he himself owned, translated for him. 16 Barros obt&ned information on Basro

from a 'Turco' captured in 1554 when D. Fernando de Noronha, 17 near Muscat,

took six of the vessels sailing under the command of the Cttoman admiral,

Seyd Ali Reis.'8

Diogo do Couto continued the chronicle of Barros. His work is one of

the main sources underlying this present thesis. Couto went to India in 1559

and remained there for over fifty years. He was for the first ten years, a

soldier in the Portuguese service and perhaps saw action against the Cttomons

in the Persian Gulf and in the Red Sea. 19 Thereafter he became the keeper of

= 157-158. Cn Barros see also Antonio Baiao, Documentos Inditos sobre

Jo6o de Barros, Coimbra 1917.
15. "... em os Livros da nosso Geografla se vera tirada de Geografia dos
proprios Arabios, e Parseas dos quaes nos temos cinco Livros, dous
em a lingua Arabia, e tres na Parsea" (Decadas do Asia, Lisboa 178b,
Dec. iii, Parte 2, 39.
16. Boxer, Three Historians..., 9.
17. ". . .e hum Turco natural do Cairo, que se tomou, quando D. Fernando
de Noronha houve vitoria do Capito dos Turcos, o qual joje he meu
cativo, homem prudente, e de grande juizo, e memoria, me contou,. .."
(Dec. iv, Porte 1, 333).
18. Barros wrote a work, now lost, on the geography and trade of the eastern
lands (Boxer, Three Historians..., 7-8).

19. Cnthe life of Couto see the introduction - by Manuel Severim de Faria -
to the 1758 edition of the Decadas. cf. also A. Bell, Diogo do Couto,
London, 1924.
 14.

the archives at Goo and made full use of them when he came to write his

continuation of Barros. He drew some of his data from other Portuguese

officials and soldiers serving in india also from C:ttoman Turks whom SJleyman

Pasha left in Gujarat after his unsuccessful attempt to capture Diu in 1538.20

Couto began his narrative in 1562, giving a fresh account of the period to 153E.

After this date his chronicle is a true continuation of Barros, based on his own

experiences and his own particular sources of information, the narrative

extending now to the year 1600. The first portion of Couto's work was prinied

in 1602, the last section in 1645 long after the death of Couto which occurred

in 1616. A combined edition of Barros and Couto was printed at Lisbon in 1788. 21

Two other Portuguese historians make some mention of affairs in the

Persian Gulf at this time - Ferno Lopes de Castanheda and Gaspar Correa.

The 'I-iistoria do Descobrimento e Conquista do India pelos Portugueses'

of Castanheda covers the years 1497 - 1538. Couto made considerable use of this

work, the first six books of which appeared in 1552 - 1554 and the last two books

in 1561. The 'Lendas da India' of Correa narrates the events of 1497 - 1550.

His chronicle was printed for the first time only in 1864. Both Castanheda and

Correa spent some years in India. 22

20. Harrison, op. cit., 160,166; see also Documentao Ultramarina

Portugueso, (Centro de Estudos Histricos Ultramarinos), i (Lisboa 1960),
235.
21. Couto, like Barros before him, composed a treatise on Asian trade. His
work, too, has unfortunately been lost (Boxer, Three Historians..., 17).
22. Cn Castanhedo, Correa and also o'other Portuguese historian, A. Bocarro,
cf. Harrison, op. cit., passim.
 15.

The C ttoman sources relevant to the Persian Gulf in the years 1534 -

1581 are of two kinds - archival material and also chronicles.

historians, thus far, have made little use of the archival material.23
24
A few documents hove been published, e.g., by Saffet Bey, and Robert

Mantran, 25 but only Cengiz Crhon(u has studied the archival evidence in some

detail and underlined its importance for scholars interested in the Persian Gulf.26

The largest and most important of the Turkish archives is the 'Ba?bakanhk

Arivi' (Turkish State Archives) located at Istanbul. The bulk of the documents

presented there ore not earlier in dote than the middle of the sixteenth century;27

only a small number of documents has survived from the period before 1551 A. D.

Cf this archival material it is the series of'Mhimme Defterleri' (Registers of

important affairs) which contains the richest information n the conflict between

the Ottomans and the Portuguese. This series covers the years 961 H./1553-54

A.D. - 1300/1882-83 and comprises 263 volumes arranged in chronological

order. The registers contain copies of decrees (firmans, berats, etc.,) sent out

23. Professor B. Lewis has included some material relating to Basra in his
article 'The Cttoman Archives as a source for the history of the Arab
Lands' in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1951), 139-155.
24. cf. Saffet, Bahreyn'de BirVak'a, in Tarih-i Csmani Encumeni Mecmuasi
iii (Istanbul 1328/191J), 1139-1 145.
25. cf. R. Mantran, Reglements Fiscoux Ottomans, La Province de Bassora
(2 moiti du XVIs.), in Journal of the Economic and Social History of
the Orient, x/2-3 (Leiden 1967), 224-277.
26. See C. Crhonlu, 1559 Bahreyn Seferine Aid Bir Ropor, TD, xvii/22
(Istanbul 1967), 1-16.
27. Cn the Babokonlik Arivi cf. M. SertoIu, Muhteva Bokimindan Baveklet
Arvi, Ankara 1955; also B. Lewis, in El 2 , s.v. Baveklet Arsivi.
 16.

from the central governmeit and addressed to officials in the beglerbegliks

of the Empire. 28 No catalogue of the indivudial documents has yet been

mode, but there are summaries for the first sixty volumes; a subject index is

available for some of the following volumes, i.e., from no.61 onwards.

The orders Qi5kJm) relating to the Fersian Gulf were sent, for example, to

the beglerbegs of Baghdad, Basra, Lahsa, ehrizor and Diyarbekir. I\o

mJ)mme registers betweei the years 1554 - 1559 have survived. There is also

a gap between the years 1561 and 1564 during the time of the Ottoman efforts

to revive the Persian Gulf trade.

Also of importance is another collection in the same archives, i.e.,

the 'Ruus Defterleri', i.e., the Ruus Registers. The Ruus Defterleri - in contrs-

distinction to the mhimme defterleri which are mainly political in character -

contain material of an administrative nature and provide information about

appointments, honours, rewords and the like. 30 It is only from the Russ

documents that we can obtain a clear picture of the Ottoman eyalet system,

as it existed in the region of Basra and Lahsa.

2b. 'Beglerbeglik', i.e., a group of provinces (sanjaks) under a 'beglerbeg'

(governor-general). On the character of a mhimme document cf.
U. Heyd, Cttcman Documents on Palestine 1552 - 1615, (O.U.P. 1960).
29. The word russ means a diploma or a commission granting a rank, honour
or privilege; it can also mean a grade amongst the ulema (cf. J.W.
Redhouse, Turkish and English Lexicon, ConstantinopLe 1890).
30. Ca the russ see N. GyUnc, XVI. '{i5zyilda Ruis ye 5nemi, ID,
xvii/22 (Istanbul 1967), 17 - 34.
 17.

There is yet another class of material preserved in the 'BabokanIik

Ar;ivi' - the 'lapu Defterleri' (the codastral registers). Those registers often

begin with a konun-nme, i.e., a codification of the customs, fiscal and

economic, of the province in question. A collection of kanun-nmes has been

published, dating from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and embracing much

of the Ottoman Empire.'31 This collection does not include a kanun-nme for

Basra. Two kanun-nmes for Basra, dated 959/1551 and 982/1574 - 1575, and

enumerating, amongst other information, the port and customs duties levied on

incoming traffic, have been printed in a recent publication.32

The other major collection at Istanbul is the 'Topkapi Saroyl Arivi'

(the archives of the Topkopi alace). in the Palace there is a library, which

has the earliest in date of the Whimme defters known (thus far) to be extant.

This defter, doting from 959/1551 - 52 contains some orders (hk,'m) relating

to the campaign undertaken, in 1552, by Frt Reis. In the archive itself Dr.
.33
C. Crhonlu has discovered a report on the 1559 campaign against the Bahrayn.

It was written by on Ottoman officer who took port in that operation. There

may well be, in the Topkapi archive, other documents, untraced as yet, which

31. cf. b. L. Barkan, XV ye XVI mci Asirlarda Csrnanli lmparatorluunda

Zirai Ekonominin Hukuki ye Mali Esaslari. Istanbul 1943.

32. cf. Mantran, op. cit.

33. cf. Crhonlu, op. cit.

 18.

concern the Fersian Gulf and its territories. The possibilities of findng new

material in the Palace will be known only when th work cataloguing the or-
34
chive is complete.

The Cttoman chronicles which describe the events of 1534 - 1581 are

much less rich In data on the Persian Gulf than the great Portuguese histories.

The sparseness of the material available in the Cttoman chronicles is under-.

lined in the words of Saffet Bey who, with the Bahroyn campaign of 1559 in

his mind, was moved to write: "iVlay prayers be for the souls of our ancestors

who preserved our beautiful old records. If we had been left to depend on

our historians and their works we would have been able neither to read nor to

write anything correctly.35

The court historians - like All 36 - offer little information of an

original character on the conflict between the Ottomans and the Portuguese.37

Most of their data come from a small number of more specialized histories -

e.g., from the work of Seydi Au Reis, the famous Ottoman sailor and geographer

34. Only two volumes of subject catalogue, covering the letters A to H

hove been printed thus far (cf. Ariv Klavuzu, i-U, Istanbul 1939 and
1940.
35. Saffet, op. cit., 1139.
36. The author of the KnhJ 1 Ahbar. Most of his work remains in manuscript
(cf., e.g., Istanbul Universitesi KtJphonesi MS., TY., 2377. fol.
91ff.)
37. cf. B. Lewis, The Use by Muslim Historians of Non-Muslim Sources,
in Historians of the zviddle East, edd. B. Lewis and P.M. Holt,
London 1962, loU-. 191 (and in particular 184).
 19.

who in 1554 fought the Portuguese in the Gulf of Cmai and wrote a vivid

account of his adventures. 38 A later historian, Ktib elebi, wrote about

the naval affairs of the Cttoman Empire. He, too, relied on the narrative

of Seydi Ali Keis, when he came to recount the course of events in the Persian

Gulf.

The Ottoman chronicles relate in much detail the wars which the sultans

fought against Safavid persia. 0 Some of these histories include data on the

affairs of Basra and of the Persian Gulf. vatrakci Nasuh, 41 living in the time /

of Sultan Sileyman, has described the conflict between the Ottomans and the

Bedouins of Jezayir. Another chronicle, called Tevrih-i Al-i Csman, which

extends to the year 968/1560 - 61, gives some information about the Cttoman

occupation of Basra in 1546.42

38. cf. Seydi All Reis, MiratU 9 MemIik, Istanbul 1313/1895; cf. also
C. Crhonlu, Seydi AU Reis, in Journal of the Regional Cultural Institute
(Iran, Paklsta4l, Turkey), i/2 (Tebrari bol), 44-57;. Turan, in i.A.,
s.v. Seydi Ali Reis.

39. cf. Ktlb elebi, Tuhfetl Kibar fi Esfar'l Bihar, Istanbul 1329/1911.
40. see B. KJtkolu, Csmanli-1 ran Siyasi Minasebetleri, I: 1578 - 1590,
Istanbul 1962; also JJ. Walsh, the historiography of Cttoman-Safayid
Relations in the Sixteenth and the Seventeenth Centuries, in Historians
of the Middle East, 197-211.
41. Matraki iNasuh (on horn cf. H. Yurdaydin, ivatrakt Nasuh, Ankara
1963) wrote a Sileyman-nme describing the events which occurred in the
time of Sultan Sleyman KanunT. I have consulted the manuscript preserved
in Istanbul Arkeololi Kiitphanesi, MS.379. This manuscript covers the
years 960/1543 to 958/1551.
42. This chronicle was considered to be the work of R5stem Posha, who was
grand vizier of the Cttoman Empire in 1544-1553 and again in 1555-1561
(cf. . Altunda and S. loran, in IA, s.v. RUstem Paso). It has been
argued, however, that the author of this chronicle was in fact ivatraki
Nasuh (cf. H. Yurdaydin, Matraki Nasuh'un hayati ye Eserleri ile
I Igili Yeni Blgiler, in Belleten, xxix (Ankara 1965), 354.
 20.

CHAPTER I

THE COMING OF THE PORTUGUESE TO THE PERSIAN GULF

There were in the sixteenth century two great powers which came to

have an interest in the affairs of the Persian Gulf. Cf these powers the first

was Portugal. The Portuguese reached western India at the end of the fifteenth

century and established themselves at various strategic points around the

Indian Ccean, seeking to dominate the ancient trade which ran from India

through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean world. Cn

the other hand the Cttoman Turks conquered Egypt in 1517 and took control

of the Red Sea. Towards the middle of the sixteenth century, in the time of

SIeyman the avagnificent, they conquered Baghdad and made contact with

the Persian Gulf.

The motives which led the Portuguese to undertake such a great

adventure are various. The economic factor, e.g., the search for spices, was

no doubt the most important. A crusading zeal inherited from their past

history and the quest for the legendary Frester John can also be counted as

motives underlying the Portuguese penetration into the lands of the East. 1

Pero de Cavilho, an Arabic speaking Portuguese, had visited Hormuz in about

14b - 1489 and collected information on the trade routes of Asia. Then in

1. The literature on the Portuguese conquests is large. Short but

authoritative surveys will be found in C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne
Emirei415-18.5, London 1969; and in Vitorino Mahalhes Godinho,
A Economia dos Descobrimentos Henriquenos, Lisboa 1o2.
 21.

14'b, after rounding the Cape of Good Hope, Vasco do Gamo with the

guidance of Ahmod ibn Madjid, an Arab pilot, reached Calicut, in India.

The Portuguese obtained from Hormuz a nominal submission in the year 1507,

during the time of Almeido, the first Portuguese governor-general of India

(1505 - 1509). It was Affonso d'Albuquerque who, well aware of the strategic

importance of the island, went now in earnest against Hormuz. He found

himself not strong enough to take t; but he plundered a number of towns on the

coast of the Cman arid Hadromaytt, e.g., Karyat, Muscat and Khfokkan.

Albuquerque, having become governor-general after Almeida, took Goa in

1510 and made it the main centre of the Portuguese in India. In 1515 he soiled

again to Hormuz with twenty-seven vessels and 1500 Portuguese and also some

Malabar troops on board. The fortress of Hormuz was surrendered to him and

the Ra'is Hamid, the vizier of Hormuz, was killed. The Portuguese control thus

established at hormuz was to lost for more than a century. The Shah of Persia,

although claiming to be suzerain over Hormuz, could do nothing b0t acquiesce

in the presence of the Portuguese.2

The Portuguese at Hormuz and their influence in the Persian Gulf:

Hormuz, owing to its geographical position, had been an important

centre of trade even before the arrival of the Portuguese. Little is known,

2. The Commentaries of the Great Alfonso Dalbuquerque, trans. Walter

de Gray Birch, (hakluyt Society), London 1884, iv, 132ff.
 22.

however, about its political, economic and social life during the period

preceding the Portuguese occupation. Such matters remain, indeed, rather

obscure, until the Portuguese began to write full accounts of their own

activities in the Persian Gulf.3

Only a few details are available about the agreement made by

Albuquerque with 'el Rey Turanxaa' of Hormuz, i.e., Turan Shah,and Nur

al-Din, his vi:ier ('guazil' in Portuguese sources). It is known that Turan

Shah had to pay a tribute of 15.000 'xerafins' 4 each year to meet the expenses

of the Portuguese fortress and garrison at Hormuz. 5 The fortress was entrusted

to a Portuguese 'governador'.

In 1521 the influence of the Portuguese wa felt in the Bahrayn and

in Lohso. 6 A certain 'Mocrim', son of 'Zamel', refus'd to pay to Hormuz the

tribute expected of him. He was also molesting ships sailing between Basra

and Hormuz. For this purpose he had acquired vessels with oars, made for him

3. Cf. The Travels of Pedro Teixeira; with his "Kings of Crmuz", and
extracts from his "Kings of Persia', trans. William F. Sinclair, London
1902, Appendix A; also Jean Aubin, Les Princes d'Crmuz du XIll
au xve siecle, in Journal Asiatique, ccxxxxi (Paris 1953), 126ff.
4. 'Xerafin' or 'xarafim' -,Portuguese expression for a coin called in Arabic
'ashrafi'. A 'xerafin' of Hormuz was worth 300 reis (cf. S. R. Dalgado,
Gloss6rio Luso-Asidtico, Coimbra 1921, ii, 424-425.
5. Simdo Botelho, C Tombo do Estodo da India, in Sabscdios para a Hist6ria
c1a India Portugueza, Lisboo 1868, 78.
6. Lahsa, i.e., the region of Al-Hasa in the north east of Arabia.
 23.

by 'alguns Turcos'. Diogo Lopes de Sequ&ra who had been appointed as

governor of India in 1518, was then at Hormuz. He sent Ant&iio Correa

with a fleet to the Bahrayn. 'Mocrim' was waiting for the Portuguese with

12,000 men, amongst them 300 Arab horsemen, 400 Persian archers and twenty

'Rumes espingardeiros', i.e., Turkish arquebusiers, who had been engaged not

only to fight, but also to teach some of the local population the use of fire arms.8

During the ensuing battle 'Mocrim' was killed and the Portuguese now compelled

the people of the Bahrayn to give to Hormuz the tribute due from them. -

The King of Portugal, D. ivtanuel, had decided earlier that Portuguese

officials should take the place of the native officials at the customs house in

Hormuz. luran Shah, resisting this change, attacked the Portuguese in Hormuz

(30 November 1521), but in vain. He and his followers withdrew now to the

island of Kishm. Soon Turon Shah was assassinated and a young prince raised

to the throne - i.e., 'ivtomedexoa', Muhammad Shah. 9 On 15 July 1523

D. Duarte de Menezes, Governor-general of India, concluded with the new

7. '.. .que lvocrim tinha feito alguns navios de remo por industria de
alguns Turcos" (Joo de Barros, Do Asia, Lisboa 1778, Dec. iii,
Liv.vi,27). 'Turcos' - a word, the precise sense of which is difficult
to discern from its use in the Portuguese sources. Sometimes it seems to
mean little more than 'Muslims' or men from the lands under Ottoman
rule. The Portuguese also made use of the expression 'Rumes' - i.e.,
men from the land of 'Rum', men, in short, from the territories under
the Ottoman Sultan.
8. ". . .doze mile homens, em que entrovam trezentos de cavallo Arobios,
e quatrocentos frecheiros Parseos, e vinte Rumes espingardeiros, corn
autros do terra a que eiies tinham ensinado este uso" (Barros, Dec. w,
Liv. vi, 33).
9. Ibid., Liv.vii,ll3ff.
 24.

prince, with his vizier the 'Roes xarafo', i.e., Sharaf al-Din, and with other

'lvires ' (i.e., amirs) an agreement stipulating that the annual tribute should be

raised to 60,000 'xaraf ins') 0 This agreement also contained a number of

regulations through which the Portuguese sought to consolidate their own

position at Hormuz and also to control, to their own advantage, the flow of

traffic to and from the island. To the ships and merchants of Hormuz, as vassals

of the King of Portugal, the Portuguese assured freedom of navigation in the

waters of the Indian Ocean with the reservation that such vessels and merchants

should not sail through the 'estreito de mequa', i.e., into the Red Sea, nor to

'coffala e portos d'aquela costa', i.e., to Sofala and the adjacent shore of East

Africa. There was also a clause limiting the use and practice of arms

amongst the 'mouros' of Hormuz, the Muslim population resident there.

The Portuguese, in the years which followed these events, did not find

it difficult to maintain control over Hormuz. A movement of resistence against

them in 1526, embracing Kalhat and Hormuz itself, was suppressed without much

trouble - the revolt had arisen from the exactions of Diogo de Mello, the then

governor of the Portuguese fortress at Hormuz. Three years later, in 1529, the

Portuguese imprisoned the 'guazil' of Hormuz, the 'Ra'is Sharaf al-Din, who

10. As noted above, it was 15,000 'xerafins' in the time of Albuquerque

(1509 - 1515), and 25,000 in the time of Lopo Soares (1515 - 1518).
It was more than 100,000 'xerafins' in the middle of the sixteenth century
(cf. CC-86-89, summarized in Schurhammer, op. cit., no.4693).

11. Sim6o Botelho, op. cit., 79ff.

 25.

had been manipulating the young prince of Hormuz, Muhammad Shad, to his

own ends and in a manner hostile to the interests of Portugal. 12

It was in 1529 that the Portuguese, for the first time, intervened in

the affairs of Bosra. A certain Rashid ibn Megamis ('Ale Magemez' in the

Portuguese chronicles) was in control of Basra. Against him stood 'el Rey de

Gizaira',' 3 the Arab chieftain who dominated the region of Jezayir near Kurna.

This chieftain had demanded tribute from Basra. Rashid ibn Megamis rejected

this demand and appealed for aid to the Portuguese at Hormuz. Christavo de

Mendoa, the Governor at Hormuz sent Belchior de Sousa Tavares to Bosra with

two 'bargantijs' (i.e., brigantines) and a force of forty soldiers, ('homens de

peleja'). Belchior de Sousa brought to an end the hostilities between Basra

and the Jezayir. The Arabs from ihe Jezayr surrendered to Basra two forts which

hod fallen to them earlier and also undertook to give an annual tribute to
,15
Basra. The Portuguese asked Rashid to hand over to them seven fustas then k

Basra, 'fustas' well armed with guns and having fifty 'Rumes' on board. lbn

Megamis declined to do so. Belchior de Sousa Tavares, after burning the

12. cf. R.S. Whiteway, The Rise of the Portuguese Power in lndia,(2d edition)
London 1967, 222-223.
13. See below, j i , iS.
14. "..., chegou de Basora Beichior de Sousa Tavarez, que o capitao
Christovo de Mendoca tinha Ia mandado corn dous bargantijs, e queranta
homens de peleja a requerimento de AU Mogamex Rey daquella cidade,
para o ajudar a defender d'ElRey de Gizaira seu vizinho..." (Barros,
Dec.iv, Liv.iii,331).
15. 'fusta' - i.e., a type of oared ship, small and light (cf. H. Leitao e
J.V. Lopes, Dicion6rio da Linguagem de Marinha Antiga e Actual,
Lisboa 1963, 217. On other uses of the word 'fusta' see Kahane and
Tietze, The Lingua Franca in the Levant, Urbana 1958, 235.
 2.

sertlements located on the adjoining coast, now withdrew to Hormuz)6

Also in the some year, 1529, the Portuguese sent a force to the

Bahrayn. The governor of that island, the Ro'is 'Barbadim (Badr al-Din ?),

a nephew of the Iguazil* of Hormuz, Sharaf al-Din, was in revolt against

Hormuz, having refused to pay the tribute due from him. On 8 September

1529, Nuno do Cunho, the governor-general of Portuguese India, despatched

his brother, Simo da Cunha, with five ships ohd almost 500 men to the

Bahrayn. At this time Belchior de Sousa, with six oared vessels, was also

patrolling in the waters adjacent to the island, seeking to prevent the Ra'is

'Badradim' from recruiting troops in the coastal areas of Persia. The Ra'is,

with some 830 Persians under his command, refused to surrender the fortress of

the Bahrayn. The Portuguese now bombarded the fort, but in vain - a shci-tage

of powder and an outbreak of sickness' 7 compelled them to withdraw to Hormuz. 18

The years after 1529 saw little of note occurring at Hormuz - but the

16. Barros, Dec. iv, Liv. iii,348-350.

17. The sources state that the east wind blowing in September often
brought with it or caused outbreaks of sickness - as, for example, on
a later occasion in 1559, when the Ottoman beglerbeg of Lahsa was
engaged in a campaign against the Bahrayn (see belowp.1l)

18. Barros, Dec.iv, Liv.iii,362ff;DiogodoCouto, DaAsia, Usboa 1778,

Dec. iv, Liv. iv, capitilos iii and iv; Gaspar Coa, Lendas do India,
Lisboa 1862, iii,325ff; Ferno ,Lopez de Castanhedo, Hist6ria do
Descobrimento e Conquista da India pelos Portugueses, Lisboa 1833,
Liv.vii, capitilos cii-ciii.
 27.

pattern of relations prevailing thus far between Christians and Muslims in

the Persian Gulf and in the adjoining territories was soon to undergo a

notable change. A new factor would influence strongly the future course of

events - the power of the Cttoman Turks, who in 534 - 535 conquered from

the Persians most of Iraq.

 28.

CHAPTER II

THE OTTOMAN TURKS IN THE COASTLANDS CF THE

PERSIAN GULF

The Cttoman Conquest of Iraq:

In 1534 the Cttomcns entered into a new conflict with Persia. The

campaign of 1534 - 1535 brought them substantial gains in asterri Asia Minor.

It also sow the conquest of the two Iraqs - Iraq-i Ajem (Persian Iraq) and

Iraq-i Arab (Arab Iraq). A number of considerations led the Cttomans to

begin this war against the Safavids. The desire to win a more effective control

over the important trade routes - e.g., the 'silk routet running from Tabriz to

Erzurum, Tokat and Bursa 1 and the 'spice route' extending from Basra to Baghdad

and Aleppo2 - must be counted no doubt amongst the reasons for the campaign.

On the political and military side the occupation of Iraq con be viewed as a

logical complement to the Ottoman conquest of Syria and Egypt in 1516-1 517.

There existed on the eastern frontiers in Asia Minor a continuing friction

between pro-Safavid Shi'i elements and the Ottoman frontier authorities.3

1. cf. f-i. Inalcik, in El 2 , s.v. Bursa; cf. also his paper 'The Ottoman
Economic Mind anJAspects of Ottoman Economy' (presented at the
Conference on the Economic History of the Middle East, London 4-6
July 1967).
2. A.H. Lybyer, The Ottoman Turks and the Routes of Criental Trade, in
the English Historical Review, LXX (London 1915), 577-588.
3. I .H. Uzun 9 orssli, Csmanli Torihi, ii (Ankara 1949), 336ff; J.vonhammer,
Histoire de L'Empire Ottoman, trans. J.J. Hellert, v (Paris 1826),
202ff.
 29.
The extension of Cttoman control in eastern Asia Minor to such areas as Erzurum

and Lake Van must have seemed to Sultan $leyman and his viziers eminently

necessary. The immediate pretext for war was the desertion to the Safavids

of the Kurdish chieftain Shorof Khan of Bitlis and the excession to the Cttornans

of an important Safavid frontier beg, Ulama Khan, who now entered the Cttoman

service. Ulama Khan besieged Bitlis but could not take it from Sharaf Khart.

However, he continued the siege, until Ibrahim osha, the Grand Vizier, at

the head of armed troops, left lsfanbul for Bitlis. lbrahim Pasho, as he was

marching eastward, heard that Sharaf Khan had been killed and that his son,

Shams al-Din, had assumed command of Bitlis in the place oi his dead father.

With the affairs of Bitlis settled, the Grand Vizier, went to Aleppo arriving there

in April 1534. He had in mind a campaign against Baghdad, but on the advice

of Defterdar lskender Pasha he now decided to march towards Tabriz. 4 Tabriz

was taken without bloodshed in July 1534. In September Sultan Sleyman

joined the Grand Vizier at Ucan near Tabriz. It was now that the real operation

against Iraq began. The Sultan marched from Tabriz to Baghdad - a difficult

journey through mountainous terrain, so severe in character that a large number

of beasts of burden died in the cold and wet weather and some of the artillery

had to be left behind. At last Sultan Sleyman entered Baghdad in December

1534. Tekeli Khan, the Safavid commander, had fled from Baghdad. This

campaign gave to the Cttomons possession of the region around Erzurum and

4. Cn the campaign of Ibrahim Pasha see 1. G6kbilgin, Arz ye laparIarina

G&e Ibrahim Pa;a'nrn Irakeyn Seferindeki Ilk Tedbirleri ye FUthati, in
Belleten xxi (Ankara 1957), 449ff.
 30.

also possession of northern and central Iraq. As yet, the Ottoman influence

did not extend to the southern areas of Iraq, i.e., to the regions of Basra

and Lahsa.

The Extension of Cttoman Power to Basra:

During his stay at Baghdad (December 1534 - April 1535) the Sultan

received the submission of Rashid ibn Megamis who had hitherto ruled at

Bosro under a loose dependence on the Shah of Persia. He sent his son Ivtani

to the Sultan with the keys of Basra and witla fulsome assurance of his loyalty.5

After the conquest of Baghdad the locai chieftains of Jezayir (i.e., the area

around Kurna), of Garraf, of Luristan and of the Huaizah marches, near

Khu zistan, also gave their allegiance to the Cttomans. 6 Also in December 1534

there came to Baghdad from the sheikhs of Katif and of the Bahrayn envoys bearing

messages of welcome to the Sultan. It was, however, far from a true submission.

Cttoman influence was also to be felt later in the region of Lahsa.7

In Basro it was not until 1538 that the name of Sultan appeared on the

coinage and was read in the Khutbo, i.e., the Friday prayer. Basra received

5. Rstem Paso, Tevorih-i A1.4 Osman, Universite Ktphanesi, Istanbul, MS.

no.2438, fol. 205r.
6. S.H. Longrigg, Four Centuries of Modern Iraq, Oxford 1925, 25. Paulus
lovius writes: '... ad eum... us que a Balsera emporio, quod est ad
ostium Euphratis in Persicum Sinum Erumpentis, Legationes Venirent.. ."
(Historiarum Sui Temporis, Tomus Primus (-secundus), Lutetiae 1558-60,
ii, fol. 148v).
7. In 1538 Sharaf al-Din, the ruler of Hormuz, sent a letter to Sultan
Sleyman, asking him to send help against the Portuguese (cf. L. Ribeiro,
Em torno do primeiro cerco de Diu, in Studo, xiii-xiv (Lisboa 1964), 102-103.
 31.
the titular status of an eyalet (or beglerbeglik), and Rashid ibn Megamis

was confirmed in his position at Basro.b He was expected to obey the orders

of the Posha of Baghdad and to maintain the Shari'a law. Not much

information, however, is available about his rule at Basra after this time.

Rashid ibn Megamis was succeeded by his son Mani. Moni, however, by the

decision of the council of local notables (icmQ-u vilayet m;averesi) at Basra

was forced to yield his position to Yahya, the sheikh of the Banu Aman.9

Yahya aligned himself with Sayyid Amir - a notable who had separated from

his tribe, the Banu Mushasha , and had received from Sultan SU Jeyman the town

and district of Zekiyye, a place of some strategic importance on the bank of

the Euphrates. These two chieftains turned, in 1545, against Hurrem Beg,

whom the pasha of Baghdad had sent out to build a fort which would control
10
the region of Lekiyye. In the end Sayyid Amir was overcome, Zekiyye

came under direct Turkish control and now the road to Basro was open.

lo the Cttomans the existence at Basra of an independent r&gme was,

of course, a direct hindrance to the realization of their aim, i.e., to bring under

8. "Mah-i me:burun yirmi yedinci gnJ divan-i h5mayunda namus-u saltanat

muktezasinca ziyofet olunub ye tekbil-i rikab-i hmayun-i pada7ahi ile
m;erref olunub Bosra hJkmeti eyalet Urivaniyla kendiye inayet olunub..."
(Peevi, Torih, Istanbul A.H. 1283/A.D. th66,i,Zc1
9. R.Jstem Paso, op. cit., fol.239v.
10. Ibid., fol.240v; see also the letter of Luis Falcdo, the governor of
Hormuz, dated 10 January 1546, to the vice-roy of India. Luis Falcao
obtained his information through a certain merchant, whose name is not
given in the letter (cf. Cart. Ormuz, fol.38r.)
 32.

their influence the Sevohil-i Arab, i.e., the coastlands at the head of the
11
Fersian Gulf. Sheikh Yahyc, the ruler of Basra, fell into further dis-

favour with the Ottomans when, in 1546, he ignored an order from the Sultan

to return to Baghdad, certain refugees who hod fled to Basra from central
12
Iraq. The refusal marked the end of his rule. Ayas Posho, the then

beglerbeg of Baghdad, was now ordered to punish Sheikh Yahya. Taking

over-all command of the Cttoman forces himself, he sent Mehmd Beg, the

sanjak beg of Musul, to Zekiyye with 120 boats and also with land forces under

the command of Zulkadir-oglu Au. The ships then sailed from Zekiyye down

the Euphrates to Kurna and took the fort of Acele ( tjj ). In the district

of Jezayir Abd aI-Huseyn ibn Ulyan 13 the ruler of Medine, a town

situated near Kurno, marched against the Cttoman troops with 3000 men, only

to encounter defeat. The Ottoman vessels now met the Ottoman land forces

and at Sadr Asare repulsed another attack from the direction of Basra.

11. Abbas al-Azzowi, Tarikh al-Iraq, Baghdad 1949, iv,49.

12. Bilal Mehmed Pasha, who was given command of Basra after the
Cttomans had taken it, explained the reasons for the campaign against
Sheikh Yahya of Basra in a letter dating from 1547. He wrote that
Yahya had oppressed all the people under his rule. Yahya is men-
tioned in the Portuguese translation of Bilal Mehmed's letter as
'xeque l-laya' (Col. Loureno, iv, fol. 141r; cf. also G. Schurhammer,
op. cit., no.2789).
13. His name is given as 'Aly ben alyom' in the Portuguese scurces (see,
e.g., Col. Loureno, iv, fol.140v., 495r.)
 33.

The rebels, realizing that further resistance against the Ottoman troops wos

inadvisable, now fled to Lahsa. The Cttomans, under the command of Ayas
1546M
Pasha himself, entered Basra on 21 eevval 952/26 December After

appointing Bilal Mehmed Pasha to be muhafaz (governor) of Basra, Ayas Pasha

15
returned to Baghdad. For this success he was given 200,000 ake as terakki.

Basra itself now became a beglerbeglik under direct Cttoman control, the office

being conferred now on Bilal Mehmed Pasha.

Immediately after the conquest of Basra the Ottomans, well aware of

the significance of the trade through the Persian Gulf, made an amicable

approach to the Portuguese. hajji Fayat, an Arab merchant, was sent with a

letter to the Portuguese governor of Hormuz, Manuel de Lima. The letter

made clear the intention of the Ottoman authorities in Iraq. 17 Manuel de

Lima, reporting to the vice-roy of India, wrote that Ayas Pasha, the chief

Ottoman official in Iraq, was determined to make Basra prosperous for the

14. cf. RUstern Pa;a, op. cit., fol.243v; also Nazmi-zjde Mrtezq, G5l,cen-i
l-1lefa, Istanbul 1143/1730, fol.62v; and the letter of Manuel de Lima
(See Appendix I). The Cttoman poet Fuzuli mentions the conquest of
Basra in one of his poems and expresses his admiration for Ayos Posha
(cf. A. Karahan, Fuzuli:Muhiti, Hayati ye Sahsiyeti, Istanbul 1949,
28, 44). Diogo do Couto, the Portuguese historian, notes in his Decadas
that 10,000 horsemen fought against the Ottomans in their campaign
against Basra (Dec.vi, Liv.iv,304; cf. also Gaspar Correa, op. cit., 524).
15. Cn terakki see Appendix IV, i',-
16. "Padiah... Ayas Paa'ya 200,000 ake terakki ye Bilal Mebmed Paa'ya
on kerre yzbin ake ile Basra vilayetinin begJerbegIiin verd" (Rstem
Paso, op. cit., fol.243v.).
17. See Appendix I
 34.

18
merchants.

At the some time the Ottomans sought to establish themselves on the

shores of the Persian Gulf. Very little is known about the Cttoman penetration

into the region of Lahso. Manuel de Limo states that the Ottoman Turks took

Labsa immediately after their capture of Basro. Domingos BQrbudo, whom

Manuel cle Limo sent to Basra in 1547 with orders to gather information there,

stated that the 'capito' of Lahsa was a certain Abdulloh ('Abedel&). This man,

the son of the former ruler of Lahsa, went to that region with the Cttoman
2%)
expedition prepared for the occupation of that area. The Pasha of Bosra,

in 1550, demanded the surrender of the fort of Katif. The Arabs mode no

resistance and yielded their fort to the Cttomans. A number of Cttoman troops,
21
with some artillery, was now stationed at Katif.

The Cttoman Administration on the Coostlands of the Persian Gulf:

The Ottomans, as noted above, conquered most of Iraq in 1534 - 1535

and gained control of Basra in 1546. Within a few years they introduced and set

18. Ibid., io.

19. Ibid., lol. Manuel de Lma refers no doubt to the northern part of
al-Hasa, which covered most of north-eastern Arabia.
20. Cart. Ormuz, fol.116r.
21. cf. Couto, Dec.vi, Liv.ix,243; I. Wicki, Documenta Indica, ii
(1omoe 1950), 69. In a letter dated 24 November 1550 Liz Thome
5erro, 'ouvdor' of the Kirig, wrote that the Turks went to Katif
with 200 men in six fusf as' andwith500 horsemen on land (Gavetos
15-16-25 in Schurhammer, op. cit., no.4539).
 35.

on a firm foundation the eyalet system in the newly conquered lands. There

were two kinds of eyalet in the empire. The first was yilliksiz (salyanesiz),

i.e., timar system hod been established within these eyalets; and the second

was yl lii ki I (salyane ii), i . e., provinces where a port ion of revenues was

not distributed in the form of timars, but was collected directly for the

treasury. In the solyoneli eyalets the salaries of the Beglerbegs, the soldiers

and other functionaries come From the annual taxes gathered in the eyalets.

The two eyalets (beglerbegliks) which are of most concern here ore Basra and

Lahsa - both of them solyaneli eyalets.

The Eyolet of Bosra: As mentioned above, Basra became a beglerbeglik

in 1546 and Bilal Mehmed Pasha was appointed as its first beglerbeg, with on

income amounting to 200,000 ake per annum. According to the letter of

Manuel de Limo there were 2,200 Ottoman troops sent against Basra in 1546.

These troops were described in the Portuguese letter as 'espingardeiros'. 23 We

are told that 1,500 of them were stationed in the actual fort of Basra and 700 of

them in the town itself. The letter also gives the information that there were

in addition 1,000 Turkish horsemen at Basra. Cn their capture of Basra in 1546

. 2
cf. H. Inalcik, mEl , s.v. Eyalet.

23. 'Espingardeiro' - i.e., in Turkish, 'tJfenkci', on arquebusier (see

V.J. Parry, inEI s.v. Harb).
 36.

the Ottomans found there 290 'artilharias'. 24 Ayas Pasha, the Ottoman

commander, at his departure from Basra left in the town 100 of these

ortilharias' and also three 'basaliscos'.25

The eyclet of Basra, under the control of a beglerbeg, consisted of a

number of sanjaks (livas); each sanjak was under a sanjokbeg. The beglerbeg

himself was at the head of the actual sanjak of Basra, which was called 'Papa

Sancagi', the sanjok of the Pasha. The other sanjaks, as far as we can see

from the documents existing in the Ba;bakanlik Ar;ivi, were Gorraf, Medine,.irre-
ezajIr
Rahmaniyye, Zekiyye, Sadr Sevib, 4 1(uban, Hemmar, Kurna, Fethiyye, Ky

Ta?kprU , Akakale, Arce, Muharri, erir and Caruz.26

27
The first beglerbeg of Basra, as noted above, was Bilal Mehmed Pasha.

Diogo de Couto, the Portuguese historian, mentions that in 1550, at the time

of the Portuguese campaign against Basra, a certain All Pasha held this

24. i.e. literally, 290 cannon: the number seems excessive, but should
be taken perhaps to indicate either small cannon, or, possibly, all
kinds of fire-arms.
25. 'Basaliscos' (in Ottoman Turkish Ibadalu;ka) was a large Siege gun
(cf. V.J. Parry, in El 2, s.v. Barut).P4hree examples mentioned here
came no doubt from Bidad with the Ottoman forces.
26. cf. Appendix 1V 4. ; also the Kanun-nme-i Basra, Tapu Defteri
no.282, trcnslated in Mantran, op. cit., 252ff. It isdifficult to find
some of the names of the sanjaks on the map. Some of these names
seem to have indicated no doubt the Arab tribes in the .Jezayir district.
Most of them are, however, mentioned in the 'Vera Delineatio Civitatis
Bassorae', Paris? 1630? (see the Catalogue of Printed Maps in the
British Museum, 49475 (1)).
27. See above, p.33, note 16.
 37.

appointment. In 1552, as the evidence contained in the Mirat of Seydi

AU Reis, a Kubad Posha was the beglerbeg of Basra. 29 Soon afterwards,

in 1553, a Mustafa Pasha and, in 1555, an Ibrahim Pasha had this office.30

The Ottomans had a tersane (dockyard) at Basra; timber for the buflding

of new ships was brought from the mount&ns of Mara, a town situated on the

southern edge of the Taurus range in southern Asia Minor, down to Iraq through

Birecik on the River Euphrates. 31 Smo da Costa, a Portuguese agent, who was

allowed by the Pasha of Bosra to visit the tersane in 1563, reports that he saw

there five newly made galleys, the biggest having 22 benches for the oarsmen.32

At this time the Ottoman forces stationed at Basra included a considerable

number of G'crUIflJs, i.e., of volunteers who were under the command of an

.... ..
agha (gonullu agasi).

28. "0 Baxa de Bcor, que era Alyboxa" (Dec. vi, Uv. ix, 334).
29. Mirat, 13. The document (Kouslar 888, fol.394r, 487v) refers to
a Kubad Posha (perhaps the beglerbeg of Basra in 1552?) as "Jezayir
ye Medine beglerbegisi" - an exptession which I have not encountered
elsewhere and which perhaps points to the brief and transient existence
of a separate 'province' embracing the Jezayir and Medine areas.
30. RuGs, 212, p.9; MD,, p.31 ;MD,ii,passim.
31. MD,xxii,p.70; cf. also MD,iii,pp.263,290, cited in C. Orhonlu
and L liksoJ, Osmanli devrinde nehir nokliyoti hakkinda oratirmatar,
Dicle ye Firat Nehirlerinde Nakliyat, in ID, xiii/17-18 (Istanbul 1963),
79. -
32. See below, note 39.
33. of. Ruts 218, p.l42 Oto pI'4Lt W, roe. %.
 38.

The Eyalet of Lahsa: The Ottcmans, after their conquest of Basra,

established themselves on the coastlands of north-east Arabia. The first clear

fact known to us is that the Ottoman troops occupied Katif in 1550. At first

the Cttomon governor of Lahsa held the rank of a san1ok beg. A document

dating from the year 967/1 555 reveals that sometime previously the sanjak

beg of Lahsa had been r&sed to the status of 'Mr-i Mran', i.e., of

beglerbeg. The some document indicates that now the sanjak beg of

Trabzon was to be transferred to Lohsa with the title of beglerbeg.35The

eyalet of Lahsa, which extended as far as Qatar, consisted of the sanjaks of

Katif, Hama, Muberriz, Ce;a, Haffa, Cebreyn, Tehemiyye, Bediyye, Koban

and Uyun. 36 Katif, of course, played a very important part in the conflict

with the Portuguese. It was, over and above Basra, a second Ottoman base

on the coast of the Persian Gulf.37

The Arab Tribes and the Ottoman Government

The Arab tribes, above all,, those known to the Ottomans as the

'Jezayir Arabian', i.e., the Arabs of Jezayir, 38 were most difficult to control.

34. Koular 888, fol.102r and also fol.29. A certain Mehmed Beg held
the appointment at this time.
35. cf. C. Orhonlu, 1559 BohreynSeferi.,., 6, quoHng from MD,ii,p.167.
36. cf. Appendix VII; also MD,v,p.380.
37. For the Kanun-nme of Kotif see 0. 1. Barkan, Osmanli ImparatonIuunda
ft Sinufinan Hukuks Statusu, sn LJIku, ,x,43.
38. The Jezayir consisted of about 200 small islands, with their forts and
villages, situated in the waters of the Tigris, the Euphrates and in the
delta region known as the Shatt al-Arab.
 39.

C ne reason was that these tribes could only be approached with any degree

of ease along the rivers by boat. 39 These Arab tribes were mostly Shi'i in

their religious ollegians and regarded the Ottomans as aliens. The Ottoman

authorities hod to take strong measures against them, all the more urgently in
sere 40
that influence emanating from Persia wi' active amongst them. To achieve

this end it was sometimes necessary for the beglerbeg of Basra to summon help

from other eyalets such as Baghdad, Mosul, Dyarbekir, ehrizor. The local

sheikhs of the Arab tribes at times asked the Portuguese to assist them against

the Ottomans. Au ibn Ulyon, of whom mention has been made above, wrote

in 1546 to the Portuguese governor of Hormuz, Luis Folco, expressing good-

will and saying that it was now time to stop the Cttcmans from advancing further.41

A similar letter went to Hormuz from Sheikh Yahya of Basra. The Portuguese,

however, took no effective action until 1550.

In 1549 the tribesmen of Jezayir under the leadership of Au ibn Ulyan,

cut all the routes leading to Basra. Tamarrad AU Pasha, the muhofiz- Baghdad,

39. cf. C. Orhonlu and 1. l;iksal, op. cit., 96-96; also Barros, Dec.iv,
Lfv.iii, Cap.xiii. M. Ralph Fitch, an English Merchant, who travelled
through Basro in 1583, describes the Arab tribes of Jezayir district as
follows: HBasora in times past was under the Arabians, but now is subject
to the Turke. But some of them the Turke cannot subdue, for that they
holde certain Ilandes in the river Euphrates which the Turke cannot winne
bf them. They be theeves all and have no settled dwelling, but remove from
place to place with their Camels, goates, and horses, wives and children
and all." (R. Hakluyt, Voyages (Everyman's Library), London 1 962,iU,283.
40. Carta de Simao do Costa a elrei D. Sebastio, dated 11 December 1563, in
As Govetos de Torro do Tombo, v (Lisboa 1965), 140; The Voyage of John
Huyghen von Linschoten to the East Indies, London Qlakluyt Society) 1885,i,49.
41. Col. Loureno, iv, 139r.
 40.

i.e., not the beglerbeg of Baghdad, but the soldier in charge of the troops

located there, was ordered to punish the insurgents. He marched on Garraf.

Au Beg, the sanjak beg of Garraf, joined him to besiege ibn Ulyan who was

at Medine. After a three days' conflict the rebellious tribesmen ended

42
their resistance. lbn Ulyan agreed to the following terms: that he would
43
give 15 sikke of gold each year to the Ottoman Government and that he

would rebuild the forts of Acel, Sodr Sevib and Kurna. In fact he did not

fulfil his promises. Kubad Pasha, the beglerbeg of Basra, with about 2,000

gnll forces marched in 1553 against ibn Ulyan. Auxiliary troops,

recruited amongst local Arab tribesmen, also went - by river - on this

expedition. AU ibn Ulyan was defeated and his boats were destroyed, so

once again there was peace in the Jezayir region.45

In 1559 Mirzo All, the Safavid governor of Dorak, thought to besiege

Bosra at the time when the Ottomans, and in particular the troops stationed in

Lahsa, were engaged in a campaign against the Bahrayn. Mirza All twice

42. Nazmi-zde MJrteza, op. cit., fol. 63r.

43. 'Sikke', i.e., coin. On the Ottoman sikke cf. 1. Artuk, in IA,
s.v. Sikke.
44. See Appendix IV, note I.
45. Matraki Nasuh, Sleyman-nme, Arkeoloji Ktiphanesi, Istanbul,
MS. no.379, fol. 170.
 41.

sought the aid of the Portuguese with this purpose in view. 46 There is,

however, no evidence as to what happened afterwards. In 1564 the Arabs,

with the incitement of the Portuguese, besieged Basra. A firman sent from

Istanbul at this time ordered the beglerbeg of ehrizor, with five of his

sanjakbegs/ and also six sanjak begs, from the eyalet of iyarbekir, to go
47
to the relief of Basra.

It can be said, in short, that there was often trouble between the

Ottomans and the Arab tribesmen in the eyalets of Basra and Lahsa. The

sanjak begs in these two Ottoman provinces often received orders from Istanbul,

admonishing them to be always well prepared for action against possible Arab
48
disaffection.

46. MD,iii,p.385. Cn the question of Portuguese aid to the Persians see

C. R. Boxer, Asian Potentates and European Artillery in the 16th-i bth
Centuries: A Footnote to Gibson-Hill, in Journal of the Malaysian Branch
of the Royal Asiatic Socety, xxxviii/2 (Singapore 1966), 156-172.
47. MD, vi, 579.
48. For an example of such an order to the begs of Lahsa see MD Zeyli,
ii,273.
 42.

CHAPTER III

THE OTTCMA N-PORTUGUESE RIVALRY IN THE PERSIAN GULF

(1550- 1556)

The First Portuguese Reaction to the Ottomans in the Persian Gulf

After having token Basra the Ottomans hod made an amicable approach,
1 The effort, from the political
in 1547, to the Portuguese governor of Hormuz.

point of view, had been fruitless for the simple reason that the existence of

the Ottoman Turks in the Persian Gulf was against the interest of the Portuguese

who wanted to control the trade to Basra. To the Portuguese the Cttoman

occupation of Basra was a threat to their position at Hormuz and to their hold

on the traffic in the Persan Gulf. At this time, therefore, the Portuguese were

on the alert. Clearly it would be to their advantage if they could prevent the

Ottomans from extending their control in the Gulf. The Ottomans, wishing to

exploit the advantages cIccuing to them from their possession of Basra, could

send naval assistance, at need, from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf. It was

important for them to maintain a firm hold over the waters of the Red Sea.2

The Portuguese indeed were to have little success in their attempts to pass through

1. See above,fl.
2. cf. C. Crhonlu, XVI. Asrin Ilk Yarisinda Kizildeniz Sahillerinde
Csmanlslar, TD,xii/16 (Istanbul 1962), 5ff; C.F. Beckingham, The
Red Sea in the Sixteenth Century, in Journal of the Manchester
Egyptian and Oriental Socety, xxv (1947-1953), 2b-36.
 43.

the Bob al-Mandob. Aden come into the hands of the Ottomans in 1538

and ten years later, in 1548, the town was brought still more closely under

Ottoman influence. Hostilities continued, however, at sea - as in 1550,

when an Ottoman Squadron, under a certain Sefer Reis, captured a number of

Portuguese ships near Aden. 4 it was at this time - not, however, in the Red

Sea, but in the Persian Gulf - that a further event occurred which led the

Portuguese to undertake a campaign of some importance. The Arabs of Katif

yielded their fortress to the Ottomans. This event alarmed the Portuguese and

induced them to take advantage of approaches coming from the Arab

chieftains of Bosra. 6 Some of the local Arab sheikhs in that region, even

before the Ottoman capture of Bosra in 1546, had sought the intervention of

3. See, e.g., R.htem Po,sa, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, Ciniversite K.WJphanesi,

Istanbul, MS no. 2438, fol.280r; R. B. Sergeant, The Portuguese off the
South Arabian Coast, O.U.P. 1963, 107-108.
4. Couto, Dec.vi, Liv. ix, 238 ff. Sefer Reis was appointed later in 1559 to
be high admiral 0f the Red Sea (Svey; Kapudant), leaving his former
post as captain of the vessels stationed at Mocha, to a certain Mustafa
(MD, iv,p.51 cited in T. lpksal, Arsivlermizde Osmanlilarin 5Jvey;
Tersanesi ye GUney Denizieri PolitiIasina llijkin en Eski Belgeler,
Belgelerle TUrk Tarihi Dergis, iii/18 (Istanbul 1969), 58).
5. See above,1,.31t.
6. "El Rey /i.e., the King of Portugalj o sentio muito pela perda de huma
fortoleza tao importa..." (Couto, Dec.vi, Liv. ix,244). See also Faria
e Sousa, Asia Portuguesa, trans. M. Busquets de Agular, Porto 1945,
iii,227; F.C. Danvers, The Portuguese in India (reprinted London 1966),
i,492. Faria y Sousa seems to hove been followed by most of the more
modern historians such as Danvers, Wilson etc...
 44.

the Portuguese.

/ Having read the letters of the Arab Chieftains and listened to their

envoys, D. Afonso de Noronho, the Portuguese Vice-Roy of India explained

the new circumstances to his captains, stressing that the Turks now stood not

far from the Portuguese base at Hormuz and that it would be wise to keep them

pinned down, if possible, in the Shatt al-Arab.8 To seize Katif, he argued,

would be to facilitate the realization of such an aim.f He now appointed D.

Anto de Noronha to command 1,200 men and seven galleys, ordering him to

move against the Ottoman Turks in the Persian Gulf.

The Campaign of Katif: On his arrival at Hormuz D. Antao de

Noronho was well received by the Portuguese governor. The two men now

asked Turan Shah, the ruler of Hormuz, to provide them with 3,000 men for the

venture against Katif. As his first move, Noronho appointed Manuel de Vasconcellos

as Commander of twelve light ships bearing troops and ordered him to go to Katif

in order to prevent the Turks there from obtaining help from Basra! Vasconcellos

bombarded one of the Katif forts, at high tide, from off-shore. Two months later,

7. The copies, in the collection of S. Loureno, of the letters from Au ibn

Ulyan and Sheikh Yahya to Luis Falco, the Portuguese governor of
Hormuz, have no dotes. These letters, being located amongst other cor-
respondence of 1546, perhaps belong also to that year (Col. Lourenp, iv,
fol. 139F-141r and 493r-494r). Couto, referring to the 'King of Basra'
(perhaps, in fact, Sheikh Yahya), says that he sent ambassadors to the
Vice-Roy of India, offering to the Portuguese a fort in the harbour of Basra.
Couto adds that the 'King of Basra', with the other local Arab rulers, hod
30,000 men at his disposal in the region of Basra (Dec.vi, liv. ix,244-245).
8. "... que era muito necess&io moridar-se logo huma armada, e poder, pera
tornar a tomor equella fortalezza, assim por ser de El-Rey de Ormuz, como
pera tirar Os Turcos de tao perto da nesta fortoleza. ." (Ibid., 245).
9. Ibid., 246.
 45.
Anto de Noronha himself set sail for Katif with a large armada. He took

with him 1,103 Portuguese and also 3,000 men from Hormuz and Mogistan10

under the banners of the Ra'is Sharof at-Din of Hormuz and the Amir Majid

of Mogistan. Noronho reached Katif by the end of June 1550 and was in-

formed about the state of its fort and the pressure which Vosconcellos was putting

upon it. The Portuguese forces, at high tide, disembarked upon the shore.

Some of the Turks resisted them, but after a short skirmish were forced into

the fort. Preparing trenches under the guidance of a French 1capito' whom

King D. Jo o had sent to India on account of his experience and setting up

o number of artillery pieces, the Portuguese under Noronha began the seige

of the fort, attacking with fury and vigour and destroying its towers very

quickly. The Turks, some 400 strong, defended themselves bravely, but after

eibht days surrendered to the Portuguese. Noronha now razed the fort, fearing

10. Couto refers to the troops from 'Magosto', on the southern coast
of Persia, as 'Perseos', i.e., Persions, and to the troops from Hormuz
as 'Aramuzanos': ".. Dom Anto de Noronha deo pera a desambarcoao
que hovia de ser no outro dia; e fazemdo olardo da gente que levava,
ochou mit e cern Portugueses, e trez mu Parseos e Aramuzanos de baixo
da bandera de Rax Xarafo Guazil de Ormuz, e de Mirmaxet Guazil de
Magosto, em que havia muitos Mires, e Capita'es do Reyno de Ormuz. .
(Ibid., 326). Magosto or Mina (Minam), which appears in modern
histories as Moghistan or Mughiston, is described in the Carta do Gonolo
Rodriguez, dated 31 de Agosto de 1552, as six or seven leagues from Hormuz
(J.Wicki, ocumenfa tndica, ii(Romae 1950),331 and 337). lbn Battuta
states that Moghiston was located on the shore where the old Hormuz lay
(lbn Battuto, Travels in Asia and Africa, London 1929, 118). Cf. also
Barros, Dec.iii, Liv.iv,37; and 1. Lockhart ingj2 , s.v. Harmuz.
11. His name is not given by Couto (cf. Dec. iv, Liv. ix, 327).
 46.

12
that the Cttomans might recapture it at some future time. The Amir Maj id,

believing that a Force of Turks and Arabs might be preparing to attack the

Portuguese, induced Noronha to send out some of his troops on a reconnaissance

in the adjacent area. However, no attack of this kind in fact took place.

The Campaign of Basra: After destroying the fort of Katif and having

now nothing to keep him there, D. Anto de Noronha resolved to go against

Basra. He despatched the Ra'is Sharaf al-Din and the Amir Majid with their

own forces to Hormuz. He himself, with eighteen vessels, entered into the

Shatt al-Arab. He sent a messenger with letters to let the local rulers know of
13
his arrival. Meanwhile, the Portuguese established themselves on an island

in the river - an island called in Couto sMourziquel. 14 The Turkish forces

abandoned the island, as the Portuguese fleet sailed towards it. Being aware

of what was going on, Ali Pasha, the beglerbeg of Basra, carried out a clever

plan. He made the Portuguese commander believe that the Turks and the Arabs

of Basra had formed on alliance against the Portuguese - whereupon D. Antao

de Noronho decided to withdraw to Hormuz. There he learned that he had

12. Ibid., 328 : CC, Porte 1, Maco 87, Doc.2, dated 5 October 1551,
in Schurhammer, op. cit., no.4693; Faria e Sousa, op. cit., 227;
Donvers, op. cit., 492.
13. For the appeal of the Arab sheikhs to the Portuguese see above,

14. Couto, Dec.vi, Liv.ix,334. This island is mentioned in an Ottoman

document as 'Morozi', situated at the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab
(MD,vii,p. 145).
15. Au Pasha caught the Arab messenger carrying letters for 'El Rey de Baor.'
and 'os Gzares', i.e., the Arab chieftains, from D.Ant go de Noronha.
He now forged certain letters purposing to come, to himself, from 'El-Rey
 47.
en fooled by a trick enacted against him.

Such was the end of the Portuguese endeavour to sweep the Ottorans

out of the Persian Gulf with the assistance of the Arabs. Its failure encouraged

the Ottomans to undertake further activities in I he Persian Gulf.

Turkish Activities in the Persian Gulf

As yet the Ottomans hod no adequate naval facilities in the Persian

Gulf. The ships, therefore, and the naval equipment employed for their first
S

sea campaigns in the waters of the Gulf came in fact from their naval bases

in the Red Sea. After the conquast of Egypt in 1516 - 1517, Suez became the

base for the Ottoman naval activities directed towards the Indian Ccean. It

was of course a base inherited from the Mamluks of Syria and Egypt and it had

played a significant role in the years before the Ottoman conquest. Selman

Reis, a Turkish captain in the service of the Mamluks, also served the

Cttomans after 1517. He seems to have been the first Ottoman High Admiral

of the Red Sea (Kaptsdan-i Bohr-i Ahmer). In his famous 'liyiha', i.e.,

report, presented to the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Ibrahim Pasha, in 1525, he

underlined the importance of the trade in the Indian Ocean and of the Portuguese

de Bapr' and from other local rulers and intimating that the Arab
sheikhs of the region were prepared to join with the Ottomans in the
resistance to the Portuguese. Ali Pasho had the false letters read aloud in
public at Basra. At the time when letters were read two Italian slaves
who heard the announcement were allowed to escape. These men fled to
the Portuguese on the island of 'Mourzique'. The Portuguese commander
came now to the conclusion that he could expect little support from the
Arab chieftains of the area. The term 'Gizares' derives perhaps from the
term 'Jezayir', the name given to the area around Kurno.
16. A little while later All Pasha asked an Arab merchant who was passing
through Basra to make known at Hormuz, the device which he had
 48.

position there. 17 The first and the most ambitious Cttoman attempt to

intervene against the Portuguese came in 1538. In that year Hodim SJleyman

Pasha, the Beglerbeg of Egypt, led a strong Ottoman armada into the Indian

Ccean. He visited Aden, and sailing to the western coast of India, besieged

Diu k Gujarat. The siege was unsuccessful and Sleymon Posha sailed bock

to the Red Sea, establishing Ottoman control over Aden and Zebid in the

Yemen, and then returning to Suez. This Ottoman expedition to Diu left on

the Portuguese a strong impression of the potential danger, for themselves, of

the Ottoman naval forces at Suez. Three years later Estavo de Gama, the

son of the famous Portuguese Vasco da Gama, sailed up the Red Sea to

attack Suez. 18 The Ottomans, however, were soon aware of his approach,

repulsed him and thus remained masters of the Red Sea, having now, in

addition to Suez, a second naval base at Aden. Some years later in A.H.

954/A. D. 1547 -48 an Arab Chieftain, All bin Sulainian al-Tawlaki, took

Aden from its Turkish garrison, hoping for Portuguese support in his venture.

- employed to deceive the Portuguese. On kis arrival at Hormuz the

merchant did in fact tefi D. Anto de Noronha all about it. (Couto,
Dec.v, Liv.ix, 338.)
17. F. Kurdolu, Selman Reis Lyihasi, in Deniz Mecmuasi, xxxxvii
(Istanbul 1934), 67-73.
18. In a report dating from 26 October 1540 Duarte Catonho, a Portuguese
spy who travel led from Istanbul to Aden, described the situation
existing at the Suez dockyard to the King of Portugal. According to
him there were, then, at Suez forty-six ships, amongst them being
twenty-seven galleys (golees), thirteen bg galleons (9aliones grosos)
etc... (CC, Porte 1, Ma9068, Doc.57).
 49.

The Ottomans, however, under the command of Pin Reis, regained possession

of Aden in the following year.

The Campaign of Ptrt Res: The Portuguese operations, first against

Kotif and then towards Basro, led the Ottomans to undertake a counter-

offensive. A strong fleet under the command of a veteran sailor, Pin Reis,

was now prepared for a naval campaign in the Persian Gulf. There was, in

fact, no naval squadron available to the Ottomans in those waters. The ships

for the projected campaign would have to come, therefore, from the Red

Sea. An order sent out from istanbul to Basra - dated 18 Zilhicce 959/6

November 1552 - for the information of the beglerbeg of Basra, at that time

a certain Kubad Posha, sets forth the instructions to be given to Pin Reis.

He was to capture Hormuz and then, if possible, to take the Island of the Bahrayn.20

Couto states that the main purpose of this campaign was to secure 'the Strait

of Basra' (Estreito de Baor) which Anto de Noronha had threatened only

two years before.21

19. R. B. Serjeant, op. cit. , 108. Lopez Lobato, t.t. Portuguese agent
at Hormuz, in his letter to the Vice-Roy of India, dated 31 October
1546, mentions that four Turkish ships went in 1546 to 'calayate' i.e. Kalhat.
The 'Guazil' of calayate' refused to hand the town over. Then the
Turks sailed to Muscat and set it on fire. (Col. Lourenp, iv, fol.479r,
485r. e ot i,. . it

20. Kou;lar 888, fol,487v; cf. also the letter of the Ra'is Sharaf Nur al-
Din, the 'Guazil' of Hormuz (Appendix ll,.Itq).
21. Couto also mentions that the letter of instruction sent from Istanbul to
Basra ordered Kubad Pasha to have 15,000 men and numerous 'terradas
in readiness to go against Hormuz (Dec.vi, Liv.x, 405-406). Tornado -
i.e., a kind of ship that the Portuguese used in the Persian Gulf and in
 50.

Ptri Reis spent the winter of 1551 - 1552 at Suez, preparing the

vessels under his command. InCemozielevvel 959/April 1552 he set sail

from Suez with twenty-five galleys (kodurga), four gal leoris (kalyon) and

one other ship, i.e., with thirty ships altogether. There were 850 soldiers

on board. 23 Passing Jiddo and the strait of Bob al-Mandab, he proceeded

to Ros aI-Hadd, a headland located at the entrance to the Gulf of Oman.

Meanwhile the Portuguese had become aware of the Cttoman pre-

porotions. In May 1552 D.Alvaro de Noronho, the governor of Hormuz,

sent captain Ferno Dias Cefar along the coast of the Oman and the Hadramaut

to seek information about the Ottoman fleet. Noronha, concluding that the

Ottoman movement was directed against him, also appointed two captains,

Simo da Costa and Migual Colao, to keep watch for the Turkish fleet in

the neighbourhood of Ras al-Hadd. 24 In the beginning of August there

appeared five Ottoman galleys which PirtReis had sent out under his son

the Red Sea (cf. H. Leito and J.V. Lopes, Dicion6rio do Linguagem
de Morinha Antiga e Actual, Lisboc 1963, 385. The word 'terrado'
is derived from Arabic 'tarrad' (see H. Kindermann, "Schiff" im
Arabischen, Zwickau, i.Sa.1934, 56-57; also Serjeant, op. cit., 136).
The historian AU merely notes that the campaign was undertaken to
punish the Portuguese, who hod done harm to the Muslim tates in the
Indian Ocean (IcinhC'l Ahbor, Universite KtJphones, Istanbul, MS.
no.2377, fol.91r.)
22. Kou,slar 888, fol.488r. The letter of the Ra'is Nur al-Din refers to
twenty-five 'gales' and three 'novios dalto bordo' (cf. Appendix II).
Seydt AU Reis mentions a total of thirty ships Mirat, 12); cf. also
KGt;b elebi (op. cit.,61), following here the Mirat, gives the same number.
23. Kouslar 888, fol.488r. For a different estimate see Appendix lI,p.II.
24. Couto, Dec.vi, Liv.x, 406-407.
 51.

Mebmed. Simao do Costa did in fact encounter Mehmed Reis;

finding his way at night back to Hormuz, he gave the news to the governor

that he had discovered five Ottoman ships.26

The Capture of Muscat: Mehmed Reis advanced into the Gulf of

Oman and arrived at Muscat, a town which the Portuguese had held since

1506. At Muscat was Jodo de Lisboa, whom the Vice-Roy of India, D.Affonso

de Noronha, had sent there to build a fortress for the greater safety of the

Portuguese. The fort, at this moment, held sixty Portuguese. Mehmed Reis

bombarded the fortifications for Six days. On the second day after the

arrival of Pirt Reis in person at Muscat, i.e., on the seventh day after

Me med Reis began his bombardment, Joo de Lisboa surrendered to the

Ottomans on condition that Pin Reis should allow the Portuguese garrison to

25. Couto confirms, without giving his name, that this Mebmed was the
son of PTri Res (Dec.vi, Liv x,.407). In the Turkish document
(Kou,slar 888, fol.488r) there is mention of a certain Mehmed Res,
whom PTrT Reis tent to Basra. There is, however, in this Turkish
document, no indication that he was the son of Pin Reisi s... Menedebeq
f. de peribeque... U (cf. Appendix Il,p.iii). 6%o$
Mur til- Dv. St4.4t$ 4kok *
26. Couto, Dec.vi, Liv.x, 409-410. J. tIt. .'i
r' tSS
27. None of the sources gives a precise date for the capture of Muscat. This
event must have taken place, however, in the early days of September,
for Pirt Reis reached Hormuz, after the capture of Muscat on 19 September
1552 (cf. Appendix ll,%).
28. Couto, Dec.vi, Liv.x, 408.
29. Kcu,slar 888, fol. 488r. Couto states that the siege continued for
eighteen days (Dec.vi, Liv.x, 413).
 52.

30
depart freely to Hormuz. However, rirl Keis did not keep his promise;

Jobo de Lisboa was kept as a prisoner, the remaining sixty Portuguese being
31
assigned to the oars of the galleys. The Ottomans had all the guns and
32
plunder removed to their fleet and left the fort empty and destroyed.

The Siege of Hormuz: Pirt Reis now proceeded to Hormuz and arrived

there on 19th September. The governor of Hormuz was Alvaro de Noronha,

who had held this appointment since 1550. The Portuguese governor had

almost complete control of the island, although there was a prince (shah) and

his vizier, ruling over Hormuz itself, over the southern coast of Persia

along the strait of Hormuz and also over certain territories on the shore of

Arabia. Alvaro de Noronha was well informed about the activities of the

Ottoman fleet and hod made all the necessary preparations for resistance.

The Turks bombarded the fort of Hormuz continuously. The Portuguese, 700

in number, defended themselves well against strong Turkish assaults. 33 They

were no doubt well aware that this key point in the Persian Gulf was of the

highest importance to them. 34 The situation was difficult for both sides.

30. The arrangement was reached through the mediation of Joo da

Barco, a Portuguese renegado (Couto, Dec.vi, Liv.x, 414-415).
31. cf. Appendix ll,rH.
32. Couto, Dec.vi,Liv.x, 415; Faria e Sousa, op. cit.,iii,240; Danvers,
op. cit., 497.
33. cf. Appendix II, . %% i
34. See, e.g., J. Wicki, Duos cartos oficiais de Vice-Reis da India,
escritas em 1561 e 1564, in Studia, iii (Lisboa 1959), 53.
 53.

A Ivoro de Noronha, as he informed the Vice-Roy at Goa in all haste,

was short of provisions. Prt Reis feared that a Portuguese fleet might come

and attack him, while he was still engaged in besieging the fort. 35 The

siege continued some twenty days, i.e., from 19 September 1552 to about

9 October 1552, but the Turks failed to take Hormuz. According to

Portuguese sources PZ-t Reis now withdrew to the island of Kishm, having

been informed that the richest people of Hormuz resided there. 36 He

disembarked at Kishm and no resistance was made against him in the island.

There indeed he found some rich people, i.e., thirty merchants who had

with them 20,000 cruzados. The Ottomans also took prisoner a Sponus

J ew who himself had no less than 80,000 cruzados in Gold. 38 After

plundering the island, Ptrt Reis sailed for Basra towards the end of October

1552.

At the end of August 1552 Estavo Gomes,a Portuguese agent at

'Kolayate', i.e., Kaihat, had reached Goa and reported on the danger

35. A description of the siege of Hormuz is given in some detail both by

Couto (Dec.vi, Liv.x, 415-422) and Bastio Lopes in his letter of
30 October 1552 to the Vice-Roy of India (CC, Porte 1, Mao 89,
Doc.9, fol.5v).
36. cf. the letter of Alvaro de Noronha, in CC, Parte 1, Map 89, Doc. 9,
fol.2v; cf. also Couto, Dec.vi, Liv.x, 426.
37.1 truzodo was a Portuguese coin of this time worth 400 Reis (cf. Ant6nio
de Morois Silva, Gronde Dicondrio do Lingua Portuguesa, Lisboa 1945,
iii, 725, col.2.
38. Couto mentions that 20,000 people in the island were taken prisoner. This
figure is no doubt much too high. H refers also to what he calls the
"grandes cruezes, e deshumonidadesU of the Turks (Dec.vi, Liv.x,426).
 54.

threatening from the Ottoman armada. 39 The Vice-Roy of Goa, Affonso

de Noronha, discussed the situation with his captains and wasted no time in

beginning preparations for an expedition against the Ottomans. A large

number of the Portuguese then in western India - men of all ranks - joined

this campaign. At the end of October Affonso de Noronha sailed to Hormuz

with more than eighty ships (above thirty of them being of large dimensions)

and with several distinguished soldiers at his side. On his arrival at Diu he

learned that the Ottoman fleet had sailed to Basra. He now decided not to go

to Hormuz himself and sent in his place his nephew, D. Ant5o de Noronha,

at the head of a squadron consisting of twelve large ships and twenty eight light

ones. D. Ant5o reached Hormuz towards the end of November and found it

relieved of all danger, but still bearing visible signs of the damage inflicted

during the recent siege.4

The End of Pin Reis: On the arrival of Pin Reis at Basra a report

about his activities at Muscat, Hormuz and Kishm went from Kubad Pasha,

the beglerbeg of Basra, to the Sultan at Istanbul. Being informed that the

report of Kubad Pasha was unfavouroble to him, PInt Reis departed from

Basro, taking with him all the spoils that he hod won during the campaign,4'

A second Portuguese source, the letter of Bosti6'o Lopez, notes that

the Turks took capture most of the noble and rich people in Kishm
(CC, Porte 10, Maco 89, Doc.9, fol.7r). On this cf. also Appendix Il
39. Couto, Dec.vi, Liv.x,411 and 427.
40. Ibid., 439 and 465.
41. The spoils are said to have been worth more than a million of gold;
"mais de hum milho de ouro" (Couto, Dec.vi, Liv.x, 468).
 55.

including his Portuguese prisoners. He set safl for Suez, having with

him three galleys and intending to go to Istanbul and there give his own

account of his unsuccessful campagn. 42 One of the three galleys was

wrecked near Katif. Pirt Reis, however, in February 1553, passed through

the strait of Hormuz and made good his escape, the Portuguese following

him, but in vain, as far as Ras al-Hadd. 43 After his arrival at Suez Firt

Reis was arraigned for his lack of success in the Persian Gulf and was

beheaded lii the same year, 1553.

Such was the end of a man who hod been a notable Ottoman geo-

grapher and cartographer as well as one of the most famous of Turkish seamen.

This episode was in no wise the end of the Ottoman attempt to gain control

of the Persian Gulf. Their effort to possess themselves of the eastern shore

of Arabia, to win the island of Bahrayn and to keep open the strait of Hormuz,

was now to become more sustained than it had ever been before.

42. Couto gives what would seem to be a plausible explanation for the
return of Pirt Reis to Suez (Dec.vi, Liv.x, 468-469). Other sources,
however, attribute his withdrawal to his fear that the Portuguese fleet
might sail into the Persian Gulf (cf. Mirat, 13; Peevi, Tarih,i,352).
43. Couto, Dec.vi, Liv.x, 468-470.
44. Couto states that his execution took place in Istanbul ec.vi, Liv.x,
486), whereas Mi (op. cit., fol.303r) and Pecevi (op.cit. ,f,350 and
352) assert that it occurred in Egypt.
45. D.Alvoro de Noronha, the governor of Hormuz, describes Ptrt Res
as 'a great man at sea and in wor' and kim toBarbarassa
(CC, Parte 10, Map 89, Doc.9, fol.2v). On Pin Reis s career
in general, see F. Ezg infA, s.v. PtrtReis.
 56.

The Expedition of Murad Res: Prri Reis had sailed from Basra

to Suez with only three galleys, one of which was lost en route. He hod

left the greater part of his original squadron at Basra. There was a con-

siderable Fear that the Portuguese might now take reprisals for the harm

which the operation of Pir? Reis had caused them. In fact, a Portuguese

fleet under Pero de bide Inferno was patrolling in the Red Sea area.

The Sultan therefore lost no time in appointing a new captain to bring back

to Suez the Ottoman ships still at Basra.

Murad Re is, who hod been the sanjok beg of Katif but was dismissed

from that post47 when Anto do Noronha destroyed the fort of Katf in

1550, was now made Kapudan' or admiral of the Suez fleet, i.e. Misir
.48
Kapudani. He was ordered to go overland to Basra and to bring the ships

back to the Red Sea. 49 Murad Reis left Istanbul for Basra at the end of

July 1553. The date of his arrival at Basra is not known;

but he must have completed the journey quickly, for in August 1553 he set

46. Couto, Dec.vi, Liv.x, 485.

47. Katifsancaindonmazul". Cf. e.g., Peevi, op. cit.,,366.
48. uSabiko Katif sancai yz bin ile virilb bade elIi bin terakki
inayet olunub Misir kapudani ii inayet olunan Murad Beg..." (Russ
212, 25).
49. Ktb eleb; declares that AU Beg, who had been the commander of
the land forces in the campaign of P Reis, was asked to take the
fleet back to Suez, but he refused to do so (TuhfetJ'l Kibor, 61).
 57.

sail fro:. !isra for the Red Sea, tcking with him fifteen galleys, one
50
galleon cnd cn other vcscl (Sarco) and leaving five galleys, two
52
barcos and one kclyote Ct Cara.

ivecnwhilo, et the !xginning of August, Dom Diogo de Noronha, at

this time commanding the Portuguese fleet, left Hormuz for Musandam, on

the headland of the Oman Peninsula. From there he sent Games de Siqueira

and Luiz Auiar, with a number of troops, to the mouth of the Shaft al-Arab.

Their orders were to seek information about the Cttoman fleet. There two men,

arriving in the Shaft ol -AraS, captured a 'terranquim with its crew of

'Mouros'55 ar.d !cirned that Murad Reis was about to set out on his journey.

Later, towards the end cf Aupust, further news came to the Portuguese that the

Ottoman fleet was sailing aton the coast of Persia somewhere in the region of

Hormuz. The Portuguese encountered the Ottoman fleet in the strait of Hormuz

near the Persian coast. The ship of Diogo de Noronha himself was damaged by

50.. j . Wicki, cLumenta lndic, iii (Romoe 1954), 25-26.

51. 'Kalyote' - i.e., the Ottoman name for galleot. It was an oared
ship with ninetten to twenty-four benches for rowing (I .11. Uzunar;ili,
Osmanli Devletinin Merkez ye Bahriye Tekilati, Ankara 1948, 460.
52. cf. Mirat, 13; Katib elebi, op. cit., 62; Pepvi, op. cit., 1,366;
Couto, Dec. , Liv. , 487.
53. Couto describes them as sailing noThe Shatt al-Arab but to the 'Eufrates'
(Dec.vi, Liv.x, 487).
54. 'terronquim', i.e., a small oared ship having sails also - it was much used
in India (cf. Correa, o. cit., ii,749citod in Leito and Lopez, op.cit.,
385.
55. 'Mouros' - hero to be understood, no dou6t, as Arabs from the Shaft ci-
Arab area.
 58.

gun-fire and went down, but he was able to leave the sinking vessel in good

time. Now, because the wind dropped, the Portuguese fleet was unable

to continue the action. One of their ships, having on board 120 soldiers

under Gonalo Pereira Marramaque, became isolated from the others. The

Ottomans concentrated their forces against this ship, but Gonalo Pereira,

showing great determination, inspired his men and fought so well that he

caused a good deal of harm to the Ottomans. Two of the Ottoman captains,

Receb Reis and S'dleyman Reis, and a number of the Ottoman soldiers died

during the battle and some of the Cttoman ships were destroyed. One other

ship was driven to the coast of Laristan, the region of the Persian mainland

adjacent to Hormuz, and taken by the Portuguese. Abandoning at the island

of Kishm a Portuguese vessel that he had captured in the course of this naval

action, Murad Reis now decided to sail back to Basra. The outcome of this

expeditkn was reported in due course to the Sultan. Diogo de Noronha

and his fleet went back to Musondam and then to Hormuz, from whence he

soon returned to India.56

The Adventure of SeydtAli Reis and its Aftermath: The attempt of

Murad Res to bring the Ottoman fleet back to Suez from Basra had been

56. On the expedition of Murad Reis and the activities of the Portuguese
fleet cf. Couto, Dec. vi, Liv.x, 487-494; also Mirat, 13; Faria e
Sousa, op. cit., 244-245; Ali, op. cit., fol.91r; Pepvi, op. cit., i,
366-367; Donvers, op. cit., 499-500.
 59.

unsuccessful. In spite of this the Sultan still wonted to have the fleet taken

to Suez. Now, the famous Ottoman sailor SeydIAli Reis, who had served

on a number of naval expeditkns in the Mediterranean Sea and had won a

high reputation as a seaman, was appointed to be the Kapudan of the Suez

fleet with instructions to bring the Ottoman ships back from Basra to Suez.

Seyd? Au Reis was at Aleppo with the Ottoman forces going on

campaign to Adharbaydjan against the fortress of Nakhjevan in 960/1553,

when he received his orders from Sultan SWeyman. Seyd? AU arrived at Basra

on the last day of Safer 961/3 February 1554. Mustafa Pasha, the then

beglerbeg of Basro, handed over fifteen ships to him. SeydtAli, in com-

pliance with the request of Mustafa Pasha, remained at Bosra for some time, in

order to protect the town from rebellious Arabs under one of the UIyon-olu

(ibn Utyan) - the Pasha himself now leading on expedition (ultimately unsuccess-

ful) against Arab tribesmen of the Huwayzah. At this moment there came to

Basra the news that the Portuguese had only four ships in the Persian Gulf.59

Seyd? Ali now set sail from Basro on 1 aban 961/2 July 1554 with his fifteen
60
ships.

57. "150 Ake yevmiye Ue" (with 150 oke of pay per diem), cf. erofettin
Turon in IA, s.v. Seyd? AU Reis, referring to MD, iv, p.26.
58. On the activities of lbn Ulyan see above,
59. Mustofa Pasha had sent to the Persian Gulf a man called Mahir Serif to
find out what the Portuguese were doing (Mirat, 17).
60. Mirat, 17; K&ib elebi, op. cit., 63. Couto sets the date as late as
the beginning of August 1554 (Dec.vi, Liv.x, 538).
 60.
Meanwhile, D. Fernando de Menezes, the commander of the Portu-

guese fleet, then at Muscat, sent out three vessels, with some troops on

board, to watch for the Ottoman fleet at the mouth of the Shott al-Arab.

These ships obtained information from some 'terradas' which they captured

in the course of their search. They learned that Seyd? AU Reis was
61 . -
to begin his lourney. Having heard about the Ottoman fleet, Fernando

de Menezes made ready his ships, having fresh provisions brought on board

and preparing his guns for action. He then sailed from Muscat to Musandom,

where he encountered the Ottoman fleet. 62 Seydt Au Reis, meanwhile,

had soiled along the coast of Shiraz, calling at the island of Muharraq

0-I arek) and also at Katif. En route, he had received information from

Murad Shah, the ruler of the Bahrayn, that the strait of Hormuz was open -

and he was indeed able to pass Hormuz without trouble.

The Portuguese fleet consisted of twenty-five ships, including six

'karavele'63 and twelve grabs.M Amongst the Portuguese captains was

D. Ant5o de Noronha, commanding a galleon. On 10 Ramozan 961/9 August

61. Some of the Portugqese mi without showing themselves to the

Ottoman vessekdisguised as fishermen of the Shatt al-Arab (Couto,
Dec.vi, Liv.x, 538).
62. Mirat, 18.
forni
63. 'Karavele' - i.e., the Ottoman i.etoge of the word caraval (cf. Kohane
and Tietze, The Lingua France in the Levont, Urbana, 1ff. 1958, 247)...wai
a ship with three masts rigged with traingular sails (see A. Toussaint,
History of the Indian Ocean, Trans. .1. Guicharnaud, London, 1966, 98-1001
64. Mirat, 19. A Igrabi was a kind of oared ship. Large grabs resemble large
galleys, and small ones are shaped like oared galleots (Uzunar;ili, op. cit.,
461;Serjeant, op. cit., 143).
 61.

1554, near Khawr Fakkon (Horfakan) on the coast of Oman there took place

one of the most violent sea battles fought between the Ottomans and the

Portuguese. With one of their ships damaged by gun-fire and wrecked

on the island of Fak ol-Asdad (.J), the Portuguese retreated to the

Gulf o Limo. The Ottoman fleet, aided by a favourable wind, now made

for Khawr Fakkan, where fresh water was token on board. From Khawr Fakkan,

after a voyage of seventeen days along the coast of Arabia, SeydT AU Reis

reached Muscat. There, two leagues from Muscat in clear water (aqua

limpa) he encountered once more the Portuguese armada, which seems to

ave withdrawn to Muscat to refit. The Portuguese armada, consisting

68
now of thirty-four ships under D.Fernando de Noronha, went against the

Ottoman fleet. In the course of the fighting both sides suffered heavy losses.

D. Jeronymo de Costello, with his brother D.Antnio, was serving in the

Portuguese fleet. These two men caused a lot of damage to the Ottomans.

Seydt All, in his account of this event, descilbes the battle as much more

terrible than those of Barbarossa, the famous Ottoman admiral with whom he

65. "...bir mertebe top ye tifenk cengi oldu ki vasf olunmaz..."(Mrat, 19).
66. Seyd7 AU counts this first meeting with the Portuguese as a success for
himself (Mirat, 19).
67. Couto points out that 'Alecheluby', i.e., Ali elebi, as he calls
Seydi All, did not expect the Portuguese armada at Muscat, for he
believed it to be at Hormuz (Dec.vi, Liv.x, 544).
68. Mirat, 20.
 62.

had served in the Mediterranean Sea. 69 In order to save nine galleys

now left to him, Seyd? AD sailed along the Arabian shore down the Gulf

of Oman. The wind, however, took his ships across the Gulf towards the

coast of Persia. 7 Sailing along that coast, the Ottomans succeeded in reaching

Jask, Bender Shehbar and then Bender Gevader. The governor of Gevader

(Gevader hkimi), Jelal al-Din, the son of MaUk Dinar, supplied the ships

with provisions. Seydi AU, with his nine ships, made now for the Yemen,

intending to sail to Suez. On his arrival off Dhufar, on the south Arabian

coast, the westerly winds began to blow. The ships suffered much damage and

most of the stores and provisions had to be thrown overboard in order to lighten

the ships. 71 The Ottoman vessels were driven off course to the coast of India

near Diu, whkh was then under Portuguese rule. Seydt Ali went to the port

of Damon, in Gujarat, but there he lost three of his ships. The Hokim of

Damam, Malik Asad, ( L13 ), being afraid of the Portuguese, told

Seydt AU to leave his harbour. Some of the Ottoman soldiers now deserted Seydi

69. Mirat, 21.

70. Mirat, 21; Ktib elebi, op. cit., 64. Couto states that Seydt All
wanted to go to 'Cambaya' for fear that the Sultan would behead him
(Dec.vi, Liv.x, 546). This statement is quite wrong: it is known
that Seydt Au tried in fact to reach Suez, but without success. After
a long adventure he arrived at Istanbul in 1557 and saw the Sultan at
Edirne. He was received with kindness by Sultan S'Weyman and by the
Grand Vizier, Rustem Pasha.
71. K8tib elebi, describing the tempest, which he calls 'fil tufani', states
that storms in the Mediterranean Sea ore not as violent as the storms in
the Indian Ocean (op.cit., 64-65).
 63.
jkk re.,otieet
All and went to Surat. The ships r&rn lty.l to Seydt Au ; in the end

fell into the hands of the Portuguese. 72 Seyd? All stayed in Gujarat for

some time and completed there his famous work, the Muhit - a guide to the

navigatkn of the Eastern Seas. 73 After three years of adventure he arrived

once more at Istanbul on Receb 964/May 1557.

According to Diogo de Couto, at the time when Seydi All Reis was

operating in the Persian Gulf Sultan S5leyman sent out another admiral

1Cafar Capita'o' - i.e., Sefer Reis - to look for the Ottoman fleet. 74 He

left Suez with two galleys and two 4!brigantes' in August 1554. En route

to the Persian Gulf - at 'Macieira', i.e., Masira, an island off the coast

of Oman - Sefer Reis was able to capture some Portuguese ships which

were sailing from Hormuz to Diu. He took these ships to Jidda on the

Arabian shore of the Red Sea.

Sultan SUleyman continued to be anxious about the situation in the

Indian Ocean, where there was now no effective Muslim resistance to the

Portuguese. He sent orders, therefore, to Suez for the building and repair

;'t.:
72. 1. Dames, The Portuguese and the Turks in the Indian Ocean in the
Sixteenth Century, in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (
1921), 23.
73. cf. J. von Hammer, Extracts from the Mohit in Journal of the Asiatic
Society of Bengal, iii (Calcutta 1834),545-554; v(talcutta ItSJo),441-468
vi (Calcutto 1837),805-81 2; vii (Calcutta 1838),767-780; viii (Calcutta
1838), 823-830. The narrative of his naval expedition, i.e., MirotJ'l
Memalik, in the Persian Gulf and its aftermath was completed after his
return to Istanbul. On the naval career of Seydt All Reis and on his works
and their importance cf. C. Orhonlu, Seydi All Reis, in Journal of the
Regional Cultural Institute (Iran, Pakistan, Turkey) 1/2 (Tehran IYo/),44-57.
74. Sefer Reis was "grande corsairo, esforado, e de born conselho" (Couto,
Dec.vii,Liv.i, 46). Couto, under the year 1561, refers once more to =
 64.

of ships. At this time the influence of the Ottomans was being extended

in the ands bordering on Abyssinia. On 6 July 1555, at the command of

the Sultan, zdemir Pasha organised a new Beglerbegflk of Habe,s,

embracing the ports of Massowa and Sevakin. 76 The Persian Gulf was still

open, however, to the Portuguese, for the Ottomans, at this moment, hod

there no naval resources sufficient to counter the advance of the Christians.

The Expedition of D.AlvarodaSilveiro:ln 1556 D.Alvaroda Silveira,

a Portuguese admiral (Capit5o Mor) from Goc, soiled towards Basra. This

further expedition of the Portuguese to Basra was also unsuccessful. The

77 1
Portuguese f eet came to anchor off the Shott al-Arab. D.Alvaro

expected to receive there a message from the Arab chieftains of Basra.78

Suddenly a storm broke out, so that the Portuguese could not remain on their

station, but were driven by the winds back to Hormuz, with no achievement

a 'Cofor Capitao', then operating off the shore of Eastern Africa (Dec.vn,
Liv.vii1(). Cf. the mention, without specific details, of a certain
Safar al-Rumi in the Tarikh al-Shibri under the year A.H. 975/A. D. 1564-
65 (Serjeant, op.cit., 110). For the earlier mention of Sefer Reis, see
above,
75. Couto, Dec.vii, Liv.i, 50.
76. C. Orhonlu, Osmonlitarun Habesistan Siyaseti 1554-1560, ID, xv/20
Istanbul 1965), 45.
77. Couto, who alone describes this event, mentions the 'rio Eufrates'
(Dec.vii, Liv.iii,206).
78. Couto (bc. cit., 206) once more refers to these Arab chieftains as
'Gizares' (see above, note 15), and mentions also a 'Rey' of Basra.
 65.

to their credit. In fact most of the Portuguese ships were considerably

damaged by the storm. D.Alvoro now proceeded to Muscat and then mode

his way back to Goa.

Couto states that one purpose of this Portuguese expedition in 1556

was to help the Arab chieftains against their Ottoman masters. The

Ottomans at Basra offered no resistance, for the simple reason that their

naval vessels had been lost in the course of recent operations in the Persian

Gulf and in the Gulf of Oman. On the other hand, Ottoman control was

now well established on the north-western shores of the Persian Gulf, where

the Beglerbeglik of Lahsa had just been created. 79 The new beglerbeglik

depended for its maintenance on the continuing provision of troops, munitions

and supplies from Basra itself.

79. See above,

 66.

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE ISLAND OF BAHRAYN

The Babrayn, situated between al-Hasa and Qatar, was at this time

an intermediate point of some importance on the sea-route between Hormuz

and Basra. It was also the centre of pearl fishing in the Persian Gulf. For

these reasons, the island often attracted to itself the attention of its more

powerful neighbours. Since 1521, after defeating the local ruler Mukrim,

the Portuguese had exerted some degree of influence upon the island. In

1535, however, the ruler of the Bahrayn sent his submission to the Ottoman

Sultan, Sleyman, just after the Ottoman conquest of Baghdad. The ruler of

the island, in fact, turned at this time, now to the one and now to the other

of his two powerful neighbours, according to the profit or advantage which

1
the situation of the moment seemed to offer him. With the arrival of the

Ottomans on the north western shores of the Persian Gulf, the local rulers who

had submitted to the Ottoman Sultan, received from Istanbul the title of Sanjak

Beg - e.g., in 1559 the then ruler of the Bahrayn, Ra'is Murod, was given

1. To write, however, as Stripling has done (The Ottoman Turks and the
Arabs 1511 - 1574, Urbana, Itt. 1942, 94) that the Ottomans by 1554
had conquered the Bahrayn, is to misrepresent the actual situation.
In 1554, during his journey towards Hormuz, Seydi AU Reis obtained
at the Bahrayn information about the Portuguese fleet.
 67.

this status. 2 Even so, the influence of the Portuguese on the island was

not negligible, for there were still links between the Bahrayn and Hormuz.

The Ra'is Muracimentioned above was married to the daughter of the R&is

Nur al-Din of hormuz, a fact which tended to draw him within the Portuguese

influence radiating from Hormuz.

The 1559 Campaign

The instructions given to PW Reis for his campaign of 1552 ordered

him to bring under Cttomon control not only Hormuz, but also the Bahrayn.4

He had not been able to realize these aims. It was not until 1559 that the

Ottomans made a serious effort to establish themselves in the Bahrayn. In

this year Mustafa Pasha, the beglerbeg of Lahsa, undertook a camp&gn

against the island. This campaign was undertaken, however, with no

permission from the Sultan. According to on order of Sultan Sleyman sent to

the ruler of the Bahroyn and dated 28 Zilhicce 966/ 1 October 1559 the

Sultan made specific reference to the fact that Mustafa Pasha had acted

2. MD, iii, 139.

3. In the MUhimme registers his name is given as 'Murad ah'; in
Feridun Beg (MUneatUs-Seltin, Istanbul 1274/1857, i, 610) as
'Murad Han'; and in Couto (Dec.vii, Liv.vii, Ill) as 'Rax Morado',
the 'guazil' of the Bahrayn. Of these various designations Ra'is is
perhaps the most appropriate (cf., e.g., Nor al-Din, the then Ra'is
of Hormuz). This Ra'is Murad of the Bahrayn is not to be confused
with the Ottoman kopudan, Murad Reis (cf. obove,.56).

4. See Kou;lar 888, fol.487v.

 68.

without orders from Istanbul. On the other hand Couto, who describes

this campaign in great detail, states that Mustafo Posha prepared this
6 r
campaign with the co-operation of the beglerbeg of Basra.

Mustafa Pasha went against the island of Bahrayn with two fighting

galleys (kagirga), seventy light ships of various kinds and one brigantine.

He had with him 1,200 soldiers, including a certain number of janissaries

from Baghdad, and ample supplies and munitions. 7 A Turkish document6

from an Ottoman beg who fought in this Campaign mentions that, before the

expedition set out, 200 mounted troops and 400 orquebusiers 9 had been sent
10
from Basra to Lahsa. Mustafa Posha, on 26 Ramazan 966/ 2 July 1559,

began to besiege the fortress of the Bahrayn, i.e., Manama, on the northern

coast of the island. The R&is Murod, having gathered together supplies and

placed some 400 soldiers inside the fort, resisted the Cttomans. With the

5. "... Haliya Lahsa beglerbegisi olan Mustafa SJdde-i Soadetime arz

ye ilam itmeden fuzuli bazi mera ye asakirle taht tasrifinde olan
Cezirs-i Bahreyn'e gecib..." (Saffet, Bohreyn'de Sir Vak'a, Torih-i
Qsmani EncJmeni Mecmuasi, iii (Istanbul 1328/1910), 1142). Mustafa
Pasha is mentioned as beglerbeg of Lahsa in 963/1555 QvtD, ii, 18).
6. Dec.vii, Liv.vii, 110. Couto arrived in Goa from Portugal, during
this year, as a soldier, and he was able to acquire abundant and good
information about the Bohrayn campaign.
7. Ibid., 110: i... duos gales e setenta terrodas, e terranqu ins e hum
bargamtim de dez bancos, em cujas vasilhas embarcou mu e duzentos Turcos,
e Janissares, e muitos mantimentos, e munies e petrechos de guerra..."
8. Topkapi Sarayi Mizesi Aiivi, No. N. E. 3004.
9. "200 atlu ye 400 tJfengci" (cf. below, note 10).
10. C. Orhonlu has published the above mentioned document in his '1559
Bahreyn Seferine Aid Sir Rapor': cf. ID, xvii/22 (Istanbul 1967), 1-16.
Orhonlu estimates their number as peTps about 800 (op. cit., 9).
 69.

help of some guns he repulsed several determined Cttoman assaults. The

Ottomans now sought to fill in the ditch surrounding the fortress and, to

this end, began to excavate approach trenches - a difficult task because

the ground was of loose sand.

Meanwhile, the news of the Ottoman descent on the Bahrayn had

reached Hormuz. D. Antao de Noronha, the Portuguese governor of

Hormuz, discussed the situation with the other Portuguese captains and

requested them to get together soldiers and munitions for the relief of the

Bahrayn. He made his nephew, D. Jo'o de Noronha, 'capito mor', i.e.,

the commander-in-chief for the campaign against the Ottomans. D. Antdo

in order to expedite the sending of aid to the Bahrayn instructed D. Alvaro

da Silveira to go to the island of 'Ango', i.e. Angan or Hengam, near Kishm.

He also sent to 'Angao', Francisco Jaccme, 'Escravo da fazenda', from

Hormuz, with munitions and supplies for da Silveira, who,having taken

them on board set sail at once towards the Bahrayn. D. Joo, 'capito

mar', sailing for the Bcihrayn, halted at the island of 'Samaim', two leagues
12
from the Babrayn. The Portuguese fleet consisted of twenty-two grabs13

11. Couto, Dec.vii, Liv.vii, 115.

12. Ibid., 115.
13. In the Turkish document t s stated that these grabs were the same size
as the Sultan's 'kayik' and had ont'' or three zarbuzan: "... grablari
Padi,sah-i Alem Penah kayii kadar vardir" (Crhonlv, Bahreyn Seferi, 12).
On grab see Chapter III, note 64.
 70.

in all. Mehmed Beg, who was in command of the Ottoman galleys which

had come from Basra, having on board, for this campaign, a force of

janissories from Baghdad 14 , moved towards the Portuguese fleet, but

withdrew and took refuge in the harbour of the Bahrayn. D. Joo de

Noronha, on the advice of his captains, now sought to lure the Turkish
15
galleys out of the harbour into deep water. With the aid of Joo de

Gadros, a captain endowed with a long experience of navigation in the

Gulf, the Portuguese ships moved in the direction of Katif. The Turkish

galleys followed them. One of the Portuguese was able to approach the

harbour of the Bahrayn and set on fire the Cttoman supply ships there. D. JoGo

de Noronha now went to the Island of 'C&s', i.e, Qais, off the coast of

Loristan, where do Silveira joined jim. At the same time the Turkish galleys
16
returned to the harbour at Bahrayn. While at 'Ang3o', D. Alvaro do

Silvera had learned that the Turks were expecting reinforcemenl and supplies

from Basra. He moved first to the island of 'Romans', before Katif, and then,

making a large circular approach, was able, with the fortunate assistance of

a sea-mist, to draw near to the Bahrayn unseen. With the element of surprise

14. Couto states (Dec.vii, Liv.vii, 117) that each galley had 150 men
on board.
15. Ibid., 117.
16. Orhonlu, Bahreyn Seferi, 12.

17. Couto, Dec.vii, Liv.vii, 120.

 71.

on their side the Portuguese entered the harbour and on 3 Sevval 966/

9 July 1559 captured the two Ottoman galleys. Mehmed Beg was kHled

and some of the Ottoman soldiers were taken prisoner. 18 It was now that

Mustafa Posha, the Ottoman general in command, seeing his two galleys lost

and knowing the supply situation to be 4h. most unfavorable, resolved to

launch a direct assault on the fortress of the Bahroyn. The defenders

of the fortress resisted stubbornly, inflicting with their guns considerable

damage on the Ottoman troops. Mustafa Pasha, at length, broke off the

siege and withdrew his forces to an encampment located amidst some palm

trees out of range of the fortress cannon. He also recalled a certain sanjak beg,

the puth gj- i,f the ab.jientiened Turkkh da.ument. who was still keepng

watch over the Portuguese ships. 21 On the advice of the R&is Murad and of

J000 de Qadros the Portuguese admiral, do Silveira, placed his ships around

the island of Bahrayn to prevent the Ottomans from sending a request for

assistance to Basra. On the other hand the Portuguese themselves had reason

to be anxious. It was now the month of September and soon, at the beginning

of October, the east winds (os levantes) would begin to blow, bringng with

them malignant fever. The Portuguese in the fleet of D. Alvaro do Silveira,

18. Orhonlu, Bahreyn Seferi, 12.

19. Couto, Dec.vii, Uv.vii, 123.
20. Orhonlu, BahreynSeferi, 13.
21. Ibid., 3 and 13. TII VJ FIt D.4(tiI.P V he

4. ie,k.ap uijs ?Lz.ei Ai (sLi

 72.

bearing in mind the not distant arrival of os levantes', demanded to be

led into bottle against the Cttomans - a course of action to which do Silveira
Sq ni
at last gave his reluctant consent, at the4time ordering the Raisto

prepare his troops for the conflict. Da Silveira, his own preparation com-

pleted, marched against the Ottomans. He was joined en route by the Ra'is

Murad, who came out of the fortress with 300 Persian soldiers, all very well
22 , Rehal-olu1 . 23
armed, and also by a certain and his men. Do Silveira

arranged his forces in a square and placed the troops of the Ra'is Murad to one

side. The Ottomans awaited the advance of the foe in s, palm grove not far

from the fortress. The Pasha set the above mentioned beg with a number of

horsemen (about 200 in all) behind some bushes at the end of his encampment.24

Under the pressure of the Portuguese advance the Ottomans began to retreat;

but at this critical moment the mo.t4ofn-sanjak beg, who had been placed in

the ambush, struck the Portuguese with his 200 horsemen. It was naw that

da Silveira received an arquebus shot in the groin and soon thereafter a

second shot in the neck, this latter wound being mortal. The Portuguese

forces, seeing the fate of their commander, fell now into confusion, but the

Ra a is Murad gathered them together and held off the Ottomans, while he and

22. Couto, Dec.vii, Liv.vii, 125.

23. lbn Rehal (Rehal-clu) came, it would seem, from the Bahrayn. He also
hod lands in the sanjak of Katif (Crhonlu, Bahreyn Seferi, 14).

24. Ibid., 14.

 73.

his Persian horsemen covered the withdrawal of the Portuguese into the

fortress. 25 Seventy men of the Portuguese force were killed and about

thirty taken captive. Pero Peixoto now took command of the Portuguese

fleet in the place of the dead Silveiro. 26 He held at once a council of war,

in which it was agreed that D. Joo de Noronha, with the troops from

Hormuz, should j&n the garrison of the fortress at the Bahroyn, that the

ships of da Silveiro should continue to blockade the island, thus cutting off

the Cttomans from fresh supplies and reinforcements, and that the local vessels

of Hormuz27 should return to their base (bearing the wounded with them), in

case D. Antao de Noronha, the governor of Hormuz, wished to come to the

Bahroyn in person or send further aid, for which purpose he would need the

ships.

Mustafa Pasha, now confronted with a shortage of supplies and

munitions so great that the Ottoman bombardment of the fortress of Bahrayn

had to be discontinued, sent one of his Portuguese prisoners, Gil de Goes de

Lacerda, to Pero Peixoto, asking that negotiations for peace should be set

in train. Peixoto gave his assent and agreed, eventually, to make available

25. For a full account of this battle see Couto, Dec.vii, Liv.vii, 125-132.
26. Ibid., 132.
27. Ibid., 132-133.
28. At one stage of the negotiations Mustafa Pasha gave to Peixoto, in
order to bring the whole matter to a successful conclusion, thirty
five horses and 240,000 ake (cf. Crhonlu, Bahreyn Seferi, 14).
 74.

ships which would take the Cttomans to Katif, the Pasha releasing all

his Portuguese prisoners of war. At this moment a ship arrived from

Hormuz with a message from D. Anto de Noronha. D. Ant&o, having

received news of the above events, sent Aleixo Carvalho, in a light

'cotur'29 laden with supplies and munitions, to take letters to Pero Peixoto.

D. Ant 6o, in these letters, declared his intent ion to sail to the Bahrayn with

all haste. He now gave orders that the galleys which were captured earlier

from the Ottomans, and also a number of other vessles should be prepared

for the voyage. Turan Shah, the ruler of Hormuz, agreed that in the course

of the expedition he should recruit Persian troops from 'Vidican' and

'Verdestan'. 30 To this cI Turan Shah made available a number of 'terran-

quins'. 3 ' With all the preparations completed, D. Anto set sail in

September 1559. At Hormuz the 'alcaid mor', with some 'casados',

was left in charge of affairs. The main Portuguese fleet, with D. Ant3'o,

29. 'Catur', i.e., a light, fast boat used in India and furnished with
oars. It was employed for the conveyance of messages; and it
was also much in use amongst the pirates of these waters (cf. P. E.
Pieris and M.A.H. Fitzler, Ceylon and Portugal, Pt.I: Kings and
Christians 1539 - 1552, Leipzig 1927, 357.
30. cf. Couto, Dec.vii, Liv.vii, 135. 'Verdistan', i.e., Berdistan - a
coastal area in southern Persia, forming part of the region of Laristan.
31. On 'terranquim' see Chapter III, note 54.
32. "em olguns dias de setembro ja andodo.." (Couto, Dec.vii, Liv.vii, 136).
33. On 'alcaide more' see Appendix I, note 1.
34. 'cosados' - i.e., the name given to the married Portuguese in the East
(cf. Pieris-Fitzler, op. cit., 309 - 310).
 75.

remained for several days on the coast of Berdistan (Verdestan) in southern

Persia, while the Ra'is Nur al-Din recruited troops locally. Meanwhile,

Aleixo Carvoiho soiled straight for the Bahrayn, bringing with him letters

for the Ra'is Murad, and also for Pero Peixoto, who was now instructed to

defend the island until the arrival of the Hormuz fleet. Although he had been

asked to bring news from the Bahrayn as soon as possible, Carvalho - a man

well versed in the Persian language - wanted to go to the Ottoman encamp-

ment and to see his countrymen who were captives there. The guazil',

Ra'is Murod, obtained from Mustafa Pasha, the Ottoman beglerbeg of

Labsa, permission for Carvoiho to see the Portuguese prisoners of war. Mustafa

Pasha received Carvalho well and sought his assistance to mediate between

himself and D. Anto de Noronha about peace terms. 35 Carvalbo now went

back to the fortress and then soiled towards Hormuz, taking with him letters

from the Ra'is Murad and from Pero Peixoto. He met the fleet of D. Ant8'o,

already en route for the Bahrayn, near the island of Hengam. Carvalho went

at once to see D. Anto de Noronha and gave him an account of the

situation in the Bahrayn, underlining to what a degree of desperation the

toman forces had been reduced through their lack of supplies. At this

35. Couto (Dec.vii, lJv.vii, 137) notes that Mustafa gave this man a Turkish
robe and promised him a sum of money if he were able to win over
D. Ant6o de Noronha.

36. There was on the island nothing to eat but dates. The Ottoman soldiers
even had to eat donkey meat (cf. Orhonlu, Babreyn Seferi, 15).
 76.

time, too, the Ra'is Murad, together with D. Joo de Noronha, came

from the Bahrayn to see D. Ant6o. The Portuguese admiral now sent a

message to Pero Peixoto exhorting him to maintain a close watch along the

coast of the Bahrayn. To decide what would be the best course for the

future D. Antdo held a council with the captains of his fleet, with the

'guazil' of' Hormuz, the Rasis Nur al-Din, and with the 'guazil'of the Bahrayn,

the Ra'is Murad. It was resolved that the best scheme would be to maintain

a rigorous blockade of the Bahrayn, and thus to reduce the Ottomans to

defeat, without having to take the risk of fighting an open battle against

them. With his resolution made, D. Ant5o once more urged Pero Peixoto to

keep a careful guard over the island and to aid him in this task, sent him all

his light vessels, including the 'terranquins'.

Mustofa Posha, realizing how grave the situation was for the Ottomans,
4,. e.,hta44.r . H1.1;44-.' Du4 lit, t)..'%t,tISL
u- i14. 5t4*i i.,I..o -cr&4
sent the abo.-montioned sanjak begto see the Ro'is Murad in the fortress of /

the Bcihrayn. 37 This sanjak beg saw the 'guazil', and told him that the

Sultan would soon send reinforcements to the Ottomans on the island. The

Ra'is, however, expressed his resentment that the Sultan had sent troops

against the island. He did not know that the campaign had been undertaken

37. The exact moment when this sanjak beg saw Ra'is Murad at
the Bahroyn fortress - whether the meeting occurred before the
Ra'is Murod went to see D. Antao de Noronha or after his return
(at on Unspecified moment) to the Bahroyn - is not clear from the
available sources.
 77.

with no orders from the Sultan. He was, however, willing to take the

Ottoman forces to Katif.

At this moment four hundred Persian soldiers arrived and encamped

near the fortress. 38 These Persian soldiers are no doubt the troops mentioned

by Couto - troops whom the guazil of Hormuz ad recruited in Berdistan

and whom the Portuguese admiral D. Ant8o must have sent to the Bohrayn

in advance of his own fleet - perhaps on the light vessels arid 'terranquins'

which he sent off to strengthen the vessels of Pero Peixoto then blockading

the island. About this time the above mentioned sanjok beg made a night

attack and inflicted considerable damage on these Persian troops from Berdistan.40

In general, however, the situation remained without notable change until at

last - about a month after the night attack of the sanjak beg - D. Ant& de

Noronha reached the island and received from the Ra'is Murad and from

D. Joo de Noronha an account of where matters stood at the moment.41

Knowing the desperate situation of the Ottomans - now reduced, in the

absence of suppUes, to eating pOisonous herbs which caused some deaths

among them - D. Anto had no intention of meeting them in open bottle, but

38. Orhonlu, Bahreyn Seferi, 15.

39. See above, j,i4.
40. Orhonlu, Bahreyn Seferi, 16.
41. Couto, Dec. vii, Liv.vii, 138.
 78.

preferred to let them die of hunger. The Ottoman soldiers began to blame

their commander for not extricating them from their difficult situation. At

this same time Mir Sultan Au, the sanjak beg of Katif - perhaps because

he had fallen out of favour with the Ottoman authorities 42 - was seeking

to place himself on good terms with loran Shah, the ruler of Hormuz, and

with the Portuguese. He now sent to D. Ant8'o de Noronha messengers

bearing lavish offers of co-operation. D. Anto received these emissaries

well and sent them back with words of encouragement. There was also

in Katif a captain (copito) named 'Mamede Bec', i.e., Mehmed Beg, 'Turco

de naao, and a determined foe of the Portuguese. Through one of the

messengers of Mir Sultan Ali to D. Anfo, Mehmed Beg sent off in secret a

letter for the Ottoman commander in the Bahroyn, Mustafa Posh. The men

who carried the letter bribed some of the Persian troops serving with the

Portuguese at the Bahroyn to get the letter into the hands of Mustafa Pasha.

This letter exhorted the beglerbeg of Lahsa to stand firm, stating that relief

would not be long in coming to the Ottomans on the island. The Ottoman

troops now recovered their determination to hold out as long as possible

against their enemies - a renewal of courage which was most unwelcome to

42. Ibid., 140: "... que foi desejando de se sanear corn El Rey de Crmuz
e corn as Portuguezes, pela culpa em que tinha cohida...'

43. Ibid., 140. This man would not seem to be identical with the Mehmed
Beg mentioned a little later in Couto as taking over the command
of the Ottoman forces there after the death of Mustafa Pasha (cf.
below, note 46).
 79.

D. Antao, since it was now the month of October when 'os levantes', the

east winds which brought sickness on that area, would begin to blow.

D. Ant6o de Noronho resolved therefore to disembark the soldiers in his

ships and set them around the fortress, with the Persian mercenaries under

the 'guazil' of Hormuz lodged in a separate encampment.

At this same time some of the Muslim troops Serving wth the

Portuguese were secretly selling supplies to the Ottcmans. D. Ant'o

de Noronha, aware of this traffic, seized a number of the troops engaged

in it and had them hanged publicly in the sight of his assembled forces. He

was now resolved to give battle to the Ottomans and sought assistance

from Inofre de Carvalho, a Portuguese 'arquitecto', whom the King of

Portugal, D. Sebastio, had sent out to repair the defences of Hormuz.

This man built a tower-like structure of timber, on wheels, from the summit

of which arquebuses could be fired at the Ottomans inside their defences.

It was at this moment the Ottoman commander, Mustafa Posha, died

of wounds that he had receved earlier in conflict against the men of

I. .45 . . I.
D. Alvaro da Silve ira. A certain san1ak beg named Mahemede , i.e.,

44. The source refers in fact to these Muslims in the following words: "e
ccmoestes eram Mouros..." (cf. Couto, Dec.vU,lJv.vii, 14fl.
45. A Mhimme register (MD, iU, p.l43) indicates that Mustafo Pasha
was dismissed from the beglerbeglik of Lahsa during the course of
the Bahrayn campaign and that a certain Murad, the sanjak beg of
Musul, was appointed to replace him cit Lahsa.
 80.

Mehmed, succeeded to the command of the Ottoman forces. The Ottomans,

through the Persians serving with the Portuguese, mode contact with D. Ant5o

about terms of peace. D. Anta'o warned the Ottomans that no negotiations

would be possible, unless the Cttomans surrendered their captives and their

arms. On this basis, however, the tentative moves towards peace made no

effective progress. At this juncture of affairs aVUr Sultan AU entered into

the negotiations. After informing D. Anto de Noronho of his intent ion, he

wrote to Mehmed Beg, the Ottoman commander, urging him to undertake

serious discussion with D. Anto de Noronha and declaring that, if he did

not do so, the Portuguese would never leave the Bohrayn until all the

Ottomans had been slain.

These representations from Mir Sultan AU discouraged the Ottomans.

In an effort to bring D. Anto to a more favourable frame of mind, Mehmed

Beg sent him a fine 'ginete', i.e., a horse; it was a gift which the Portuguese

commander declined to accept. The Portuguese Aleixo Corvaiho came forward

now, offering to go and see the Ottoman commander. Armed with instructions

from D. Anto, he did in fact have talks with Mehmed Beg, but to no

result. The janissaries, suspicious of their commander and fearing that he

might be about to betray them, placed him under guard - and the peace

negotiations again come to nothing.

46. u, que era hum sangiaco, que se chama Mahamede..." (Couto,

Dec. vii, Livvii, 142).
 1.

For some days no further progress was made, although in fact both

sides, being apprehensive about the arrival of the east winds and the time

of fever, wanted to come to a conclusion as soon as possible. it was now

that 'Coge Ocem Carnal', a Persian aiim who hod joined the 'guazil' of

Hormuz, Nur al-Din, for the Bahrayn campaign, entered into the affair. lie

obtained from D. Anto de Noronho permission to visit the Ottoman commander,

Mehmed Beg, to whom he suggested that the Ottomans should hand over their

Portuguese captives and two or three pieces of artillery taken in the earlier

fighting. Mehmed Begs and the janissaries accepted this proposal and asked

'Coge Ccem Carnal' to undertake the negotiations with the Portuguese. D. Anto

de Noronha was glad to receive this offer, since there were a number of

distinguished soldiers and noblemen amongst the Portuguese in Ottoman hands.

He now sent a present to Mehmed Beg.

However, the Mehmed Beg from Katif, who has been mentioned above

as a stubborn foe of the Portuguese, was still urging the Cttoman commander

in the Babrayn not to reach an agreement with the Portuguese, but to await

the arrival of reinforcements from Basra. tvtir Sultan All, who understood

how much Mehmed of Katif hated the Portuguese, advised him to go to the

Bc4rar and take council with D. Anto, promising that he himself, i.e., Iviir

Sultan AU, would send letters to D. Ant5o de Noronha and to the Ottoman

Commander.
 2.

Mehmed Beg, having received letters from Mir Sultan AU, set out

for the Bobrayn with a number of terronquins'. With him there went

also, in secret, a trusted confident of ivir Sultan AU, who had other letters

for D. Anto - letters in which it was affirmed that Mehmed Beg of Kotif

was the greatest foe that the Portuguese had and that he was the real reason

for the ill-success, thus far, of the peace negotiations. D. Anto received

Mehmed Beg of Katif well and allowed him to visit the Ottoman commander,

Mehmed Beg. Returning to D. Anto, Mehmed Beg of Kotif declared that

he would have to go back to Katif for further talks with Mir Sultan Au. he

embarked therefore in a light 'terranquim'. There went with him Aleixo

Carvaiho and two other Portuguese, named Manoel Coelho, later to be

'alcaide' in Goa, and Sagramor Concalves,a native of the Algarve, both

men being well instructed as to their course of action.

Once the 'terranqum' had sailed about half a league from the

Bahrayn, Carvalho and his two Portuguese attacked Mehmed Beg of Kotif.

The small 'terranquim' overturned, the men on board fell into the shallow

water and there Mebmed Beg was done to death. Carvaiho and the other

two Portuguese returned now to the Bahrayn. 48 News of this event reached

48. Ibid., 15O-51.

 83.

the Ottomans - perhaps through one of the crew from the 'terranquim' -

and their anger was such that it seemed as though the moves towards peace

would cane once more to nothing. The east winds, however, had begun

to blow, and fever was rife, causing numerous deaths amongst the Portuguese

and also amongst the Ottomans. Under these circumstances there was little

recourse left to the combatants save to make peace at last. The terms of

agreement were now concluded in some haste. To the Portuguese the

Ottomans surrendered their arms and gave also a payment of 12,000 'cruzados'.49

The Portuguese, on their side, undertook to transport the Ottoman troops

bock to the mainland. The 'guazil' of Hormuz, Nur al-Din, together with

Gil de Goes de Lacerda and inofre do Soveral, arranged for the evacuation

of the Ottoman forces - which was in fact carried out in the 'terronquins'

of the 'guazil'. The Ottomans now went to Katif 50 while the Portuguese

withdrew to Hormuz.

49. 'Cruzad&, i.e., a Portuguese coin worth 400 reis (see Chapter Ill,
note 37). The Ottoman source refers at this point to "10 yik pa,sa
okesi" (cf. OrhonI, Bahreyn Seferi, 16).

50. According to the Ottoman source (cf. Orhonlu, Bahreyn Seferi, 9 and
16) the Ottomans crossed over from the Bobrayn to Katif on 5 Safer 967/
6 November 1559. Couto states that the Cttomans who survived the
hardship and sickness encountered in the Bahrayn campaign did not
number more than 200 (Dec. vii, Liv. vii, 145).
 84.

CHAPTER

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE OTTOMANS AND THE PORTUGUESE

AFTER 1559

Since the Ottoman occupation of Basra in 1546 the Persian Gulf hod

been the scene of conflict between the Portuguese and the Ottomans. The

Portuguese were unable to establish themselves on the shores of Bosra and

Katif; on the other hand the Ottcmans failed to win control over the strait

of Hormuz. The Bahroyn remained as a Sbuffert island, separating the rival

powers and their limits of influence. On the whole, the conflict had been

harmful to Ottoman interests. Realizing that it would be more advantageous

to encourage the flow of trade to and from the Ottoman lands, the beglerbeg

of Bosro in 1562 sent an envoy to Hormuz to negotiate with the Portuguese

for a resumption of commercial relations through the Persian Gulf.

This attempt at negotiation was not the first which had been made

from Basra. In 1547 Mehmed Pasha, the then beglerbeg of Basra, had sent

out an envoy, by name l-lajji Fayat, not long after the Ottoman occupation

of Basro. The attempt of this man to promote amicable relations with the

Portuguese hod been fruitless. Ten years later, in 1557, we learn from the

Portuguese documents that negotiations were in hand for a settlement between

the Ottomans and the Portuguese. A letter, dated 6 January 1557, from
 85.

Francisco Barreto, the governof of 'Ba?aim', i.e. Bassein, on the west coast

of India, refers in general terms to such negotiations. 1 So, too, does a letter

of Diogo de Noronha, dated 17 December 1557, which reveals that an envoy

hod come to the Pasha of Basra from Sjemrro do turquo', i.e., from the

Grand Vizier RUstem Pasha. 2 The letter makes reference to earlier efforts

undertaken in order to bring about an entente between the contending parties

and to release the tenSions prevailing between their respective forces at sea

near the southern reaches of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

The conflict in the Persian Gulf had no doubt reacted adversely on

the flaw of trade to and from Bosra. There was reason to think that a resumption

of unimpeded commercial relations would be more profitable I'hacontinuation

a1 hostilities. 3 Such at least was the view of the Pasha of Basra, who held

1. J. Wicki (ed.), Monumenta Missionum, Documenta Indica, iv cmae

1956), 18O-81.
2. "Mandado asy 00 baxa pelo jemrro do turquo" (CC, Porte 10, Mao
102, Doc.47). RJstem Posha, Grand Vizier (1544-53)and 155-61) was
indeed a son-in-law of Sultan SUleyman.
3. In 1561, for example, the Portuguese were apprehensive lest a certain
'mouro grande cossairo' - in fact 'o Turco Sofor, i.e., Sefer Reis (see
Chapter Ill, note 4 and 74) - should attack merchant vessels sailing
off the western shore of India (Couto, Dec.vi, Liv.viii, 2U7 and also
Dec.vii, Liv.x, 447). The Portuguese Vice-Roy at Goa, I). Francisco
Coutinho, had news that Sefer Reis might sail from the Red Sea to
plunder the ships bound from Hormuz to Goa. A Portuguese squadron
was now placed under the command of Dom Francisco Moscarenhas,
who sailed northward from Goa to Bossein and Diu and thence 'de
lange do costa de Por, e Mangalor' to the 'liha dos Vacas', where he
halted to take fresh water on board. Here he learned from some 'CiaS'
i.e., a kind of small Indian vessel (ci. Leito e Lopes, Dicionrio do
Linguagem de Marinha Antiga e Actual, Lisboo 1963, 146) or perhaps =


86.

office in the time of the Ottoman Grand Vizier, AU Pasha. 4 This Posha,

finding Basra, soon after his arrival, to be in a stroitened condition, wrote

to All Pasha, urging that much benefit would come to the Ottomans from a

restoration of the trade through Basro. These observations won the approval

of All Pasha, who empowered the Posha of Basro to make contact with the

Portuguese governor of Hormuz, i.e., with D. Jo5o de Ataide. The Posha

of Basra now, in 1562, sent an envoy to Hormuz. 5 D. Joo replied that he

could do nothing without the assent of the Vice-Roy of India (then the Conde

do Redend4 The Conde replied that he could not give his approval to a

peace settlement unless he had evidence of the intentions of the Sultan. He

had decided, therefore, to send to the Sultan, as his ambassador, a certain

Antbnio Teixeira, who knew Persian well and also some Turkish.6
'

t chaturis', a type of Indian vessel (see R. Mookerj, Indian Shipping,

London 1912, 204) that Sefer Reis intended also to findwater at the
'liha dos Vacas'. Sefer Reis, learning that the Portuguese were close
at hand, visited the island, obtained a little water and sailed off
hurriedly towards ,v'tocha in the Red Sea, losing in this affair one of
his galleys. D. Francisco Moscarenhas went to Hormuz and, at the
beginning of January 1562, brought back safely with him the ships
waiting there to go to Goa. A little later, in March 1562, the
Portuguese were still keeping watch in case SeferReis should attempt
once more to interfere with the traffic between Hormuz and Goa (Couto,
Dec.vii, Liv.x, 450).
4. Semiz All Pasha held the Grand Vizirate from 1561 to 1565 (ci.
1. G6kbilgin in IA, s.v. All Pa;a, Semiz).
ano de myll e quinhentos e sasemta e dous veo ha Ormuz hum
embaixczdor do turquo envyado pelo baxa do Baora. .." (ci. As
Govetos do Torre do Tombo, v (Lisboa 1965), 137).
6. Couto, Dec.vii.,44.
 87.

Teixeiro, in the summer of 1563, left Hormuz for Basra. With him

there travelled a certain merchant (bezirgan) named Had Mehmed.7

Teixeira went from Basra to Baghdad and thence to 'o mar maior', 8 i.e., to

the Mediterranean coast, whence he sailed on a ship bound for Golata.

At lstanbul heJtgivon on audience with #1e Sultan SJleyman and

explained to him that the Pasho of Basra hod tried to negotiate a peace

with the Vice-Roy of India, in orderto ensure the continued flow of trade

between Hormuz and Basro. According to Couto Sultan Sileyman replied

that he asked peace from no one. if the King of the Portuguese required

peace, he should send to Istanbul a great man from his court to discuss the

matter. The Sultan now ordered that a letter should be given to Teixeira,

who in due course travelled from Istanbul to Portugal, for transmission to the

Cardinal who was then in charge of the government there. 9 Teixeira submitted

to the Cardinal the letter and also a verbal account.

The letter which Sultan Sleymon sent to the King of Portugal was

dated 28 Muharrem 972/6 September 1564. it asked the King to ensure

secure passage on land and on sea for the people and merchants of the Ottoman

7. cf. Russ 218,p.i.Perhaps this Haci Mehmed is identical with the

'Arobio' who, according to Couto, accompanied from Basra to Hormuz,
and then to Goa, the Ottompnnvoy who bore letters from AU Pasha,
the Grand Vizier Istanbul'.tCouto, Dec.v.i, Iit,

8. Couto, ibid., 45.

9. "ao Cordeol que governava' (Ibid., 46).

 (iv.

Empire trading to and from the lands of the Portuguese. Friendship between

the two powers would be established, if the King complied with1hls request.

No further information seems to be available about these attempts

to negotiate peace. The Persian Gulf was, in fact, comparatively quiet in

the years following 1564, although minor incidents did occur from time to

time between the Muslims and the Christians.

The Ottomans and the Portuguese 1565-1577

Occasional 'incidents' in the waters of the Indian Ocean continued

to disturb, from time to time, the relations existing between the Ottomans and

the Portuguese. There is mention of a Portuguese attack, in February 1565,

on a big At1ehnese ship sailing off the Hadramawt and having on board 400

men, amongst them, according to Diogo do Couto, a number of 'Broncos

Turcos' 13 . Moreover, in 1566 and 1567 alsolthe Portuguese tried to intercept

10. See Appendix Ill.

11. There hod in fact been another Imperial letter sent, on 6 Rebi 9 evvel
973/ 1 October 1565, to the King of Portugal. It gives the impression
that the Portuguese did not take the business seriously (cf. Saffet, Br
Osmanli Filosunun Sumatra Sef'eri, in Tarih-i Osmani Enctimeni
Mecmuasi, fasc. 1-12 (Istanbul 1910-1912),614 and 678.
12. Atjeh - a state in North West Sumatra, The Cttomans had entered
into relations with the ruler of Atjeh as early as 1537 or 1538 (cf.
A. F.S. Reid, 'Sixteenth Century Turkish Influence in Western Indonesia',
a paper read cit the International Conference on Asian History, 5th-i 0th
August 1968, University of Malaya).
13. Couto, Dec.viii, 60ff. The word 'Turcos', as the Portuguese used it,
seems to mean little more than 'a Muslim from the lands of the Ottoman
Sultan'. By the expression 'brancos Turcos' Couto perhaps is seeking to
indicate men from the central regime at tstanbul, i.e., Osmanlis - here iin
 89.

Atjehnese vessMs bound 'por Meca', i.e., sailing to Jidda in the Red

Sea and no doubt bearing Muslims on piigrirna je) 4 The Portuguese, in 1572,

seem to have been nervous about the situation in the Persian Gulf. At this

time most of their vessels stationed in the Gulf had left to esco a

convoy of merchant ships (cafillas) to India. The Portuguese Vice-Roy at

Goa n ordered Ferno Telles, the 1copitania de Ormuz', to send back, from

the escort ships, one galley and three other 'navios' to keep watch in the

waters of the Gulf. An Ottoman document of 14 Receb 977/ 23 December 1570

b*n for
makes it clear that the Porte hadA eenidorcd - though onlyAa time - the
16
preparation of a campaign against Hormuz. The Beg lerbeg of Basra caused

20 'kadirg& to be built for such a venture - but the scheme came to nothing.

An order sent to the beglerbeg of 'ehrizol' 17 and dated 15 Cema-

zielevvel 981/ 12 September 1573 states that the Portuguese had sailed to the

Babroyn, seized some of the people on the island and also captured one or two

= perhaps Ottoman ambassadors or techniciens (e.g., artillerists)

returning from Atjeh. Cf. also C. R. Boxer, 'A Note on Portuguese
Reaction to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade and the Rise of
Afjeh 154) - 1600', a paper read at the International Conference on
Asian History, 5th-lOth August 1968, University of Malaya; MD, vi,
p.166; and Serjeant, op. cit., HO.
14. Couto,Dec.viii, 68ff and 102ff; cf. also Boxer, Revival of the Red
Sea Spice Trade.
15. Couto, Dec.ix, 56. An Ottoman document (MD, vii,p.321) dating
from 1568 notes that in that year no Portuguese war vessles appeared
on the coast of Lohsa and that therefore no reinforcement of troops
hod been needed in that region.
16. MD,ix,p.8.
17. i.e., Shahrizcr, an Ottoman beglerbeglik in North Eastern Iraq.
 90.

ships. A further 3cumen sent from Istanbul to the beglerbeg of Basra

and bearing the same date notes that the Portuguese arrived at the Bahrayn

with twelve galleys and two galleons; this same document adds that the

Portuguese took several merchant ships and made captive, in addition, on

envoy from Lar 20 (elci..destination not given). These two documents of 981/

1573 indicate also that the Ottoman government regarded as possible a

descent on the territories near to the Bohrayn - i.e., Katif and Lahsa - and that

it sought therefore to impress on the beglerbegliks of Baghdad and Basra

the need for a careful watch on the activities of the Portuguese in the Persian

Gulf. Another Ottoman document dating from 6 Receb 981/ 1 November 1573

states that the ruler of Let (Lar Hakimi) had made on attack on Hormuz, while

the Portuguese ships stationed there were absent elsewhere - perhaps at the
21
Bahrayn.

At Istanbul the climate of opinion had begun to change and there were

some elements amongst the dignitaries surrounding the Sultan, who advocated

return to more aggressive policies in the Persian Gulf. The Bahrayn, in

particular, was now the object of Ottoman attention. The first need was to

18. MD,xxii,p.317.
19. MD,xxii,p.322 (cf. Appendix V).
20. icr, i.e,, Laristan, a region in southern Persia. The ruler of icr s
sometimes described in the Ottoman documents as 'Lar Hakimi (i.e.,
the governor of tar) and at other times as 'Lar Padi;ahi' (here the
exalted title of Padishah (emperor) s used to denote a small local ruler).
Couto calls the ruler of Laristan'El Rey de Lara'(Dec.x, Liv.ii,219). Cf.
also i Aubin, Les Sunnites du L&isf an et Ia Chute des Safovides, in
Revue des Etudes lslamques, xxxiii (Paris 1965), 158.
21. This episode is mentioned in the letter of a certain Abu al -Nasr, who wrote
from the Bahrcyn to the beglerbeg 0f Baghdad (MD,xxiii,301).
 91.

gather together in Lahsa, the mainland area close to the Bahrayn, all the

troops and equipment essential for a new campaign. A document dated 23

Muharrem 9b1/ 25 May 1573 asks the beg lerbeg of Lahsa whether or not

the reduction of the Bahrayn was feasible, what preparations would be

required for such on enterprise and what would be a possible time for

In due course the beglerbeg of Diyarbekir was requested 23 to state whether or

not he could furnish some of the resources which the beglerbeg of Lohsa had

declared to be indispensable for the proposed campaign - i.e., 300 kontar24

of iron, various Salat y e esbab' (munitions and supplies) and also fifteen
,25
zarbuzan.

The Ottoman interest in the Babrayn persisted into the year 1575. A

document 26 dating from that year indicates that there were some elements in

the island well disposed towards the Ottomans, even willing to attempt the

surrender of the fortress of the Bahrayn to them. More revealing still is a

hk1mV' addressed to the beglerbeg of Baghdad and dating from 9 Safer 983/

22. MD,xxii,p.43.
23. MD,xxvii, p.81 (cf. Appendix VI).
24. Kantar - a measure ci weight. The Istanbul kantar, of c. 1570, was
equal to 48 vukyye (vakiyye) - cf Orhontu and l3iksol, Dicle ye
Firat Nehirlerinde Nakliyat, 93. One vukiyee (or okka) was equal
to 1.2825 kg see W. Hinz, Islamische Masse und Gewchte, leiden
1955, 24).
25. Zarbuzan -o kind of light cannon (ci. El , s.v.Barad, col.13).
26. MD Zeyli,iii,p.128.
27. MD,xxvii,p.81.
 92.

20 May 1575. According to this document the beglerbeg of Lahsa had

told the Porte at Istanbul that the galleys at Bosra and the 'cenkci'28

with them would be sufficient for the capture of the Bahrayn. The

authorities at Istanbul thought it appropriate to seek another opinion on this

matter and sent, this hJkm of 983/1575 to Baghdad, asking to be informed

as to the number ond amount of men, ships 29 and guns which would be

needed for a well prepared expedition against the Bahrayn - the number of

cenkci , of siege guns, of asker , and of munitions and supplies, also

the number of guns and the amount of munitions available at Baghdad and

Basra. The beglerbeg of Baghdad had, in addition, to state whether more

troops would be required for an attack on the Bahrayn and where it might be

possible to find them. He was, moreover, required to send to Istanbul in-

formation about the Portuguese war ships in the Persian Gulf.32

A hJkSm of Safer 983/May-June 1575 sent from Istanbul to the

beglerbeg of Basra gives some idea of the Ottoman preparations for an

28. See below, note 31.

29. The document refers to an earlier hkim (date not given) which hod
outhorised the building at Basra of eight galleys.
30. 0 kal 'e cmege kac aded top" - Le., "guns for bombarding fortresses.
31. The wording of the document indicates that a distinction should be
made between 'cenkci' and 'asker' - the former meaning perhaps 'second
line soldiers' used for various purposes and the latter having the sense
of 'regular troops', on whom most of the fighting would no doubt fall.
32. The beglerbeg of Lahso estimated the annual revenue to be derived
from the Bahrayn was at 40,000 'filori'. The 'filori' was the Ottoman
name for the standard gold coin of Europe, equalling 45 oke in 1468,
50 ake in 1568 (cf. H. Inalcik in El 2, s.v. Filori).
 93.

expedition against the Bahrayn. The document reflects earlier correspondence

relating to the guns and munitions available in Lahsa and in Basra. 33 At

Lahso there were no siege guns. Basra was able to provide two large

cannon; Remne one additional gun (which was actual y in Basra at t is

time); and there were three further siege guns to hand - i.e., six in all.

Basra had also fourteen 'kadirg&, together with supplies or iron, of axes and

of digging implements (kazma, kirek), gunpowder and arquebuses. The

beglerbeg of Basra had sought earlier to bbtoin supplies. It would seem that

Diyarbekir had available 100 kantar of iron; also a number of 'laimci'

and 1100 kumbara . It could also provide ten zarbuzari . The Cttoman

Government at Istanbul enquired, in this hkJm, for details about the size of

the large siege guns - what weight were the iron cannon balls used in them;

bow many cannon balls were to hand. There is, in addition, a request for

information about the guns on the 'kadkgas' present at Basra; and also a

reference to the permission, given earlier, for the building of two 'kadirgos'

there,

These initial preparations for an attack on the Bahrayn came to nothing.

An order from the central regime informed the beglerbeg of Basra, in 984/1576,

33. MD,xxvii,p.76.
34. Remne - a liva or sanjak in the beglerbeglik of Basro.
35. 'Laimci' or 'laghimj', i.e., a sapper orminr (cf. El 2 , s.v. Brd,
cot. 14). -
36. 'Kumbora', i.e., bomb (ci. El 2, s.v. B&d, col.14).
 94.

that, even though there should be no campaign at that time, he was

nevertheless to keep watch over the coast of Lahso and to send two galleys

there for that purpose.37

At this time there were events of some importance happening in

the Bahrayn itself. A hikJm sent from Istanbul to the beglerbeg of Lahsa

and doted 26 Zilhicce 985/ 3 February 1577 contains the following

information - that Mabmud Shah, the ruler of the Bahrayn, had died, that

his son Hizir Shah had succeeded him and that the vizier of Hormuz,

Nur al-Din, had descended on the Bahrayn and captured the new ruler of

the island. The beglerbeg of Lahsa is now ordered to hand over his galleys

with their munitions and equipment to the beglerbeg of Basra. 38 How far this

order came into effect is not clear, for documents written in October 1577

show that the beglerbeg of Lahso still had some 'kadirgas' under his control.

It would seem that, by the beginning of the year 1577, the

Government at istanbul had abandoned the project of a large-scale campaign

for the occupation of the Bahrayn. None the less, the island is mentioned

from time to time in correspondence of later origin - correspondence dealing

with the harmful activities of the local Arab population along the shores of

Lahsa. On 21 Receb 985/4 October 1577 Mohmud, the officer in charge of

37. MD Zeyli, iU,p. 166.

38. MD,xxx,p.353.
 95.

the fleet (Donanma-i HUmayn kethudasi) at Basra was appointed to be

'Lahsa Kapudani', i.e., captain of the vessels stationed on the shores of

Lahso. 39 A document of 23 Receb 985/ 6 October 1577, addressed to the

beglerbeg of Basra, 40 reveals that Ahmed Pasha1 the beglerbeg of Lahsa,

had asked for additional 'kadirgas to be assigned to him. He told the Govern-

ment at istanbul that the Arabs - 'kofere Arabian' - caused so much damage

to the local markets in Katif that the merchants had transferred themselves to
42
the Bahrayn. Ahmed Pasha, noting that he had two galleys at his disposal,

mode a request for three more. With five galleys he expected to be able to

keep the Arabs in check. The beglerbeg of Basra was now ordered to send one

further galley to Lahsa.

The Raid of Mi Beg (1581)

Of the long contention between the Ottomans and the Portuguese the

last episode to be considered here is the raid of Au Beg on Muscat in 1581.

It was, however, a raid carried out not from the Persian Gulf, but from the

Red Sea. The 'terradas' or small vessels wont to sail each year from 'Coriate',

39. Russ 231, 127; MD,xxxiii,p.184.

40. MD,xxxi,p.338.
41, These are perhaps 'nautoques' or 'nodhokis' operating in the waters
near the Bahrayn (cf. below, note 49).
42. See above, note +
43. An Ottoman document of 22 Ramazan 1003/31 May 1594 Qv%D, lxxiii,
p.48l) states that "inhabitants of the island called Bohrayn' (Bahreyn
nam ata sakinleni) had committed various depredations on land and at
sea (berr bahrda), killing and plundering some of the local Muslim
 96.

i.e. Karyot in Arabia, along the coast to Ras al-I-todd and thence to the

Yemen brouit back to Muccct, then under Portuguese domination, the news

that Sinan POsha, the Ottoman beglerbeg of the Yemen, had ordered

the preparation, at !.iocha, of four galleys with a view to an assault on

Muscat. 45 Sinan Pcisho had indeed received encouragement to undertake

such an expedition/or 'as mouros' of Muscat assured him that their town was

a rich one. The beglerbeg set in command of this small squadron a cert&n

'alibac', i.e., AU Deg - a 'Turco' by origin and at the same time a'cossairo

salto, arrebatodo, e pouco capito (a virulent and violent pirate, but bad

captain). The Portuguese factor at Muscat, in September 1581, gave orders

for a 'fusta', under Alvcro Mourato, to keep watch for the Ottomans in the

waters off Ras ol-Hadd. Alvaro Mouroto took with him also two light 'taranquis'

and, arriving at Ras al.-Hadd, did in fact maintain a close watch, both at

sea and from the summit of the mountains there.

Meanwhile, at the end of August 1581, Au Beg had set sail from

Mocha, but the west winds bearing him along blew with such force that he last

population. These "inhabitants of the Bahrayn m are described as "bi-din

ye b-mezheb raflzi ler" - rafizi being an expression used to denote
men of heterodox, and in particular of Shi'i, religious allegiance,
although here it should be perhaps construed in a somewhat loose sense,
approximating to the 'kefere Araplari' of an earlier document (see above
note 41). The beg lerbeg of Lahsa had indeed suggested to the Sultan at
Istanbul that the Ottomans should take control of the Bohrayn and establish
a separate beglerbeglik there.
44. Sinan Pasha is described as '.. Este Miraseno era natural de Outrato,
costa christa e governova toda aquella parte dos Arabias Feliz, e Patrea,
a que o Arabios chamim Aymafl"(Couto, Dec.x, Liv.i, 86).
45. Ibid., 87.
 97.

one ship on the southern shore of Arabia. He was well aware that a watch

would be made at Ros ol-Hcidd to obtain news of his arrival. None the less,

he managed to slip past the headland safely, the Portuguese under Alvoro

Mourato foiling to notice him. He made now for the boy of 'Sedabo' and

disembarked his forces there on 22 September 1581. The Ottomans now

46
entered Muscat and took control of it for six days, burning the church,

Jooting the houses and loading their plunder on their three ships. At this

ju1flctiire the news that the Ottomans were in Muscat reached Koihat

(Calayat e), where Joo do Rego, an official in the service of D. Gonsalo

de Meneze#, the Portuguese governor of Hormuz, was acting as factor. Do

Rego at once sernt a light 'teranquim' to find the 'fusta ' of Alvaro Mourato,

who was still at Ros' ol-Hadd and quite unaware of what had been happening
Mdc n. MGi 4v
at Muscat. D. Gonsa(o t.Gkjfl with him Lopes Carrosco and some soldtrs,

set off from Hormuz in a 'catur", with orders to join Alvaro Mourato and

keep a watch on the Ottoman galleys. Thereafter D. Gonsalo armed a number

of merchant vessels, hoping to use them as a squadron for the relief of Muscat.

Alvaro Mourato, receiving news of what had occurred from Joo do Rego,

sailed to Mustat, entered the harbour at night, attacked one of the Ottoman

vessels and then withdrew in hQste, the Cttomans pursuing him as for as the

46. In the Portuguese text '0 Templo' (Couto, Dec.x,Uv., 93).

 98,

'ilheos de Victoria', one league from Muscat. During the unfolding of these

events the inhabitants of Muscat had retired to 'Matora', i.e., Matrah, near

Muscat and then,feeling unsafe there, went to the 'Fortaleza de Bruxes',

some four leagues inland, a region under the control 0f an Arab tribal
'47
chieftain named Cotane

It was not in fact until after the departure of Au Beg from Muscat,

in late September 1581, that the Portuguese governor of Hormuz, D.Gonsalo

de Menezes, was able to send out vessels in pursuit of the Ottomans. He

got together a number of vessels within the short space of eight days, placed

them under the command of D. Luis de Almeida and sent on board 400 soldiers

equipped with breast plates, 'espingardas' and other arms, 48 and also pro-

visions for two months. D. Gonsalo gave clear-cut instructions to D. Lufz,

ordering him to chase All Beg as for as Mocha, if necessary; should he fail

to find AU Beg, then he was to turn against the 'Nautaques'49 and attack

47. Ibid., 96.

48. These troops are described as "gente toda muito limpa, e custosa"
(Ibid., 97).
49. Of the Nautaques or Nodhakis it is written in the 'Suma OrenoIof Tom&
Pires' (Hahluyt Society, London 1944),i,31 that "... Mostf them are
Pirates and go in light boats. They are archers, and as many as two hundred
put to sea and rob... sometimes they get as far as Ormuz and enter the
straits in their marauding, that is what they live on". Pedro Teixeiro
(op. cit. ,21) calls them Arabs who dwell on the Persian shore. M. L. Dames(ed.)
The Book of Duorte Barbosa O-lakluyt Society, London 1918), 1,87 states
that they were 'Baloclii'. On the Baluchis see The Cambridge Histoof
Iran, i (ed. W.B. Fisher), Cambridge 1968, 1414.
 99.

the ships of these people who, by reason of their piracy, had been the cause

of so much damage and destruction5

As the vessels of AU Beg sailed off from Muscat towards the Indian

Ocean, 5 ' the two Portuguese captains assigned earlier to watch the Cttomans,

i.e., Alvaro Mourato and Martin Lopes, followed in thd r wake as far as

'Cabo de Rasalgate', i.e., Ras al-Hadd, then returned to Muscat and after-

wards to llormuz. 52 Meanwhile, the Portuguese squadron arrived at Muscat

under D. Luiz de Almeida and rested there for eight days. Having held a

council of war with his captains, D. Luiz now resolved not to pursue AU Beg

further, but to descend 'a costa dos Nautbques'. 53 Here he made an assault

on the town of 'Penani', which he plundered, burning there 47 'terrados'

which were in the process of construction or else afloat in the harbour.

D. Luiz now attacked 'Goodel' on the same coast, a port much frequented

by merchants from 'Canbaya' in western India. After plundering 'Goadel',

D. Luiz went to 'Teim', also on the same coast. Having laid waste this

port of 'Teim', the Portuguese now sailed back to Hormuz.

50. Couto, Dec.x, Liv.i, 97.

5. The T&rkh al.&hihri (cf. Serjeant, op.cit.,lll) mentions that Ali Beg
now captured a large galliot and also a galleon.
52. The ship of Alvaro Mourato was, however, lost in a storm during the
voyage to Hormuz (see Couto,Dec.x, Liv.i,98).
53. lbid.,99.
54. This port is said to belong to the people called 'Abindos' above the
river 'Calamato': "Abindos, gentes barbaros, e ferozes, que vivem sobre
o rio de Calamate em campanhia dos Nautaques; andam pelo mar as
prezas, que so os dersadeiros dos Gedrosios de Carmonia" (Couto,
Dec.x, Liv. i,102).
 100.

APPENDIX I

Cart. Crmuz, fol.88r - 92r. (Paes i-i)

The letter of Dom Manuel de Lima, Governor of Hormuz
to D. Jo6o de Castro, Vice-Roy of India :

Ormuz, 23 June 1547

Se nhor,

I arrived at this fortress of Hormuz on 18th May /bu/ I did not take

charge of the fortress for one month, because Luis FaIc5o wanted to complete

his time [as governo!7, which was 5ndeed a month mor7. I took charge of

the fortress on 19th June and I found the place very uneasy, having in it not

even one merchant nor anyone else buying beatilha or any kind of spices

or any other merchandize. And all the people who were coming to do business

at Hormuz were surprised for the reason of this situation. Moreover, a

captain of the ruler of Loristan, one of his principal men, was located opposite

this island [of Hormu7, on the mom land, with many horse and foot; and it

was already some months that he had been there with his encampment at

certain well . from which this city of Hormuz draws its water. And the people

of Mogistan (Mogosto), fearing these people, took refuge in this city. And

it was here that the 'cafillas' passed, so that these people /Irom Laristo7

1. 'Beatilha' - i.e., fine linen.

 101

stopp. them, with the result that none came to pay the tools at the

customs house of the King, Our Lord. With regard to Basro, things ore

as v.s. knows and, in addition, I shall proceed to tell V.5. more

about that land and about the affairs of Basra.

Luis Falcao had given permission to certain 'terrados', to go with

their merchondize to Basro. And since my arrival in this city/f l-lormuz7

he has also allowed some ,Thher7 people to go there with nine 'terrodos'.

When I reached this city, I was informed that the capito of Basra, who was

called Mehmed Pasho (Mahomed boxo turco), hod resolved to send on

4
embassador tome.
7th
On July there came his embossador with a letter for me. This

embassador is an Arab merchant who is called Hojji Foyat ('hagy foyat'). He

is. a man much esteemed and known amongst the Portuguese. I am sending

V.5., with this /1tter the translation of the letter which he/Ce. the

beglerbeg7 wrate to me. I hod conversation with this Hajji Foyat on

several occasions, in the course of which he said to me that I should give

full credence to the things that he told me. He was willing to swear on

his Koran (moafo) that everything which he told me was indeed true. I

asked him whether he were willing to swear that his actions were in good

2. V. S., i.e., 'Vossa Senhoria' meaning 'Your Lordship'.

.3. 'Capito' - i.e., here, the beglerbeg of Basra.
4. See above, p. 53
 102.

faith5 and I ordeid him to give a great oath through Garcia della Pinha,

the interpretor of this fortress/of Hormu7. In this oath he affirmed

that the main reason For his coming here was to be a true Friend of the

Portuguese. And/1e rekted7 oil the things that he knew about Ayos

Posha, Loting7 that he is the 'principal cpta'o'/t.., beglerbeg7

in Baghdad and that t was he who came to take Basra. He also /oke

about 7 Mehmed Pasho who is 'capito' of Basra, and, in addition, he gave

me information about all the other regions. He was aware of the resolve

of Ayas Pasha to make Bc!sra very prosperous through commerce, so that it

might yield a large revenue to the Great Turk also that Rstem Pasha,

the grand vizier ('guazil') and son-in-law of the Great Turk, ,cgarded as7

detrimental this capture of Basra, saying that it was worth nothing at all,

a ruined place. Over these matters the two men were opposed to one another

and even at on earlier time hod ceased to be frends. Ayas Pasha therefore

strove very much to make Bcsra important so that If might give a great revenue

to the Great Turk. And over these and other matters he works as hard as he can.

I asked him /1..., Hajji Fayat7 about the fortress of Basra; In what

condition it was or if they had carried any mflitary works in it. He told me

that they hod done nothingere7. I/iIso7 asked him what troops were

5. I.e., literally, in Portuguese: que era muy bern feito - it was very
well done.
 103.

at Basro. He told me that Mehmed Pczsha, the beglerbeg of Bosra had placed

there 500 Turkish arquebusiers ('turcos espimgardeiros9 6 ; and 'alcaide mor'7

holds office there, standing in the citodol of the fortress; moreover the

'alcaide mor' and these five hundred Turkish arquebusiers never go outside the

fortress for any reason at all; and in the town /ltself 7 there are a thousand
Turkish horsemen and seven hundred crquebusiers, all of which makes two

thousand and two hundred mounted Turks. 8 At the mouth of the strait of

Bosra where there was a mosque they built a circular wall, not a strong

one, irsde which there are ten pieces of artillery, 1o11 of thern7 small guts;

and every night fifty orquebusiers keep watch. When the Turks took this

fortress of Basra, they found in it two hundred and ninety pieces of artillery,

sixty of which were bronze cannon ('beros de metal')9, but the greater

number were of iron; and the fortress contained olso7twenty 'candis"0

of powder.. When Ayas Pasha departed after the taking of the fortress he

left in it one hundred pieces of artillery and three 'basaliscos" which he

6. See Chapter $1 note 1.3.

7. 'Alcaide mar' - i.e., in Ottoman parlance, 'dizdar' - the senior
officer in command of the garrison troops. The word, 'alcaide' is de-
rived from the Arabic 'al-kaid' (cf. Delgado, Glossario Luso-
Asitco,i,21).
8. The text contains here - perhaps as a result oftsbb(error -a
repetition of the phrase : "e setecento espimgardeiros quo per todos
s5o dous mU e duzentos turcos".
9. 'Bercos' - a word denoting an old type of gun (see Appendix II, note I.
10. 'Candil' or 'camdil', pl. 'camclis' - a measure of weight equivalent to 20
or about 500 'arrates' - i.e., nearly 250 lbs (cf. Daldodo, op. cit.,
1, 199).
11. See Chapter II, note 25.
 1J4.

hod brought with him; but most of the guns /lound in the fortress7 he took

with him to Baghdad.

Furthermore, I asked him about the f'urkish7 armada of Suez.

He told me that there were/it Suez7 forty four galleys, some of which had

come to Diu under the eunuch (Sleyman Pasha7. They were all in good

condition. I asked him what ships these were which had come to Mocha and

why they had gone there. He told me that they were fourteen oared vessels

which had come from Suez under the command of a Turkish captain called

Oez baxa Oez boxa rought troops to make war and to fig t against

an Arab chieftain who is called 'Zoidi Imam' (emom zeidi). But he/i.e.

HajiFayat7 did not know at all whether or not there was talk at Basra

that these ships would set out for India. I asked him, too, about the

intention of Ayas Posha and of Mehmed Pasha - whether it was their intention

to attempt something against this fortress fof Hormuz7. He stated that he

knew nothing of their desires, save that the Turks wanted very much to

establish a flourishing trade in Basra, that on many evenings they sent for

him and he never heard anything about that/Intention 7; and if the Turks

12. 'Oez baa' - perhaps to be construed as i3veys Pasha. C. Orhonlu

wrtes, however, that Ozdemir Posha had been perhaps operating in the
Red Sea long before he established the beglerbeglik of I-Iabe in 1555
LXVI. Asrin Ilk Yorisinda Kizildeniz Sahillerinde Osmanhiar, in ID xii/16
(Istanbul 1962), 17.
13. This is a Shi'ite Laidi dynasty in the northern part of the Yemen (cf.
- Serjeant, op. cit., 7 and 112).
 05.

had such an evil purpose, they could build in the river Euphrates as many

ships as they wanted, because near the town of Birejik Cbiraa'), 14 seven

days journey /lrom Basra7, there are great forests, frcm which comes much

fine timber and, in addition, there is also pine-wood from whkh they could

build as many ships as they desired, both large and small, by reason of the

abundance of timber to be found there. This town of Birejik is large and

well-populated and has a great traffic with Persia and with other regions.

From this place, two dayst journey away, there is the city of Aleppo,

situated between Persia and Turkey.

He said that from this town of Birejik there are two routes which

go to Basra - one of them runs through a town which is called 'llla&' 5 and

the other goes through Baghdad. And this flatter7 route is more direct, but

since, three months of the year, /ihe channel oVthis river /Tends to7 dry

up, then whoever wants to use sailing ships it is better to go through 'lllaa'

because there is always water flowing and there are many frrigation7

channels cut through the cultivated lands (sememteiras). The lowest level

Cof water7, throughout the year, remains at two and a half to three fathoms
('braas') in depth, so that all ships and boats, however large they are, con

14. Birejik - an important river port and crossing on the Euphrates (cf.
V.J. Parry in El 2 , s.v. Birejik; also Orhonlu and lsiksal, op. cit.,
77-102). -
15. 'lllaa' - i.e., al.Hilla, on the river Euphrates (cf. J. Lossner in
El 2 , s.v. al-Hilla).
 106.

sail therein. And to come from the town oi Birejik to Basra takes twenty

four days even when the water in this river is running at its lowest towards

Bosra. And the river winds about from one end to the other, yet it is none

the less so broad and welt-known that it can easily be distinguished from

other channels which are made for fhe purpose of7 irrigation.

Hajji Foyat also told me that there came now to Basro a messenger

('escravo')of the Great Turk with a letter to Mehmed Pasha. It took him

forty two days to come to Bosra from Constantinople. Hajji Foyat, by a solemn

oath that he took on his Koran, fiwore that7 he would tell me the truth in

all these things; and also that he would send me from there /T.e., from Basra7

at I the news which he might learn and that I would give him certain signs

by which it would be known what the Turks at Basra intended to do; and that

he would send me this information by one of his sons. This Hajji Fayat and

his son are men who, each year, visit Afeppo, Alexandria and many other

places, so that necessarily they come to know many things about all that

the Great Turk decrees. He told me that I should put my trust in these things

because he belonged to a sect amongst the Turks - who were themselves of

a different belief - and that he was a friend of the Turks, because he was

nothing but a merchant, trading always in these regions; and that the other

Arabs who lived in Basra were of the same kind. He assured me also that

Mehmed Pasho wanted to make friendship only with me and that the Turks
 107.

waited in hope until I arrived in the fortress fof Hormuz7, where I

would remain for three years. And all these matters that I-Iojji Fayat

told me - he begged that I would keep them in great secrecy.

In the time of Luis Falco, Mehmed Pasho, the beglerbeg of

Basra, ordered that a place called Lahsa ('tacaa')rsituoted7 on the

coast of Arabia, not for from Basra, should be taken, and gave it to an

Arab and made him the ruler ('rey' 6 of it.

This Hojji Foyat asked me many times to send a factor ('feitor')

of mine to Basra. This was the main thing that Me med Pasha had as ed

me and it was what he wished most of all; because the 'cafiltos' and the

merchants did not wont to go to Basra until they saw that there was a factor

of mine there. To take advice on this matter in order to do what would be

best for the service of the Kirg, Our Lord, I summoned the most important

persons of this town/i.e., of Hormuz7, who were about twenty eight or

,18
thirty fn number 7. Through the ouvydor I requested them to swear

on the Holy Gospels that it would be advantageous for the service of the

King, Our Lord, that this factor of mine shouldgoto Basro and that certain

16. 'rey' - i.e., presumably the sanjok beg of Labsa. This sonjak was
later - in 1555 - to become begierbeglik.
17. i.e., a Portuguese factor.
18. 'ouvydor' - i.e., the legal representative of the King of Portugal.
 108.

'terrodos' which were at Hormuz should also go to Bosra. All of them

declared in oath which they took that it would be well for a trusted

man to be in Bosra, one who could send me from there all the news and

whatever else might be needful, also for the 'terrodos' to be allowed to go

rto Bcsro7. It seems to me that it would be radvantageous7 for the

service of the King, in that /1 he Turks 7 would not be able to make any

decision without my knowing about it. Moreover, it wilt be possible to get

news of (what is happening oL7 Suez and au the other regions, for to

Bosra come the merchants from all parts, more commonly from Cairo, Damascus,

Birejik and Aleppo; and inevitably there will be means of knowing what /ihe

Turks 7 ore doing and what they intend to do. In addition, the Arabs who

dwell in Basra, will also give me news truthfully about these matters, because

they are the enemies of the Turks.

I am sending to Bosra a certain Domingos Barbudo, and he is taking

with him a letter of mine to Mebmed Pasha in response to his /letter7 which

he sent to me -rmy Ietter7 making no agreement about anything, but

written with fine words /ior the Pasha7. And with regard to what he writes

tome and with regard to Basra/iheIf7, I shall always stand with a drawn

sword in my hand; and the more words he writes to me, the more diligent I

shall be and thereby the more alert in relation to them. This Domingos Barbudo

is a man of good repute at Hormuz, a man of much knowledge, sociable, and

 109.

who is well known in Basra amongst the Arabs and amongst the merchants,

and he has a great experience of that land. Over the opinion of these

people who think that he should remain in Basra, I am sending him there

for no more than three months, because within this time he will see all the

affairs of Basra and will learn also the news from the merchants coming from

Alexandria and all other regions. He will be able to be in Hormuz again at

the beginning of November, so that everything which may seem advisable

to V. S. in connection with the affairs of Basra and advantageous for the

19
service of S.A. may be done.

According to what the old people say in this land, there come, in most

years, from Basra, six to eight hundred horses, on which /ile merchants 7
pay at Goa the customs duty that V. S. knows. The spices which came

this year from India were so scant that it was a pity to see them, for I did not

hear of any merchant who bought even a handful of spices; but when these

merchants of Basra came they bought a good quantity of spices. There is

indeed no other outlet for the spices save through Basrci, because all 'The

sub1ects of xeque Ismael did not buy reven ten candis of spice.

19. S.A. - i.e., 'Sua Alteza' (His Highness), here referring no doubt to
the King of Portugal.

20. i.e, Shah Ismail of Persia. At this time - in 1547 - It was Shah
Tahmasp (1524 - 1576) who reigned in Persia.
 110.

Hojlf Fayct requested me to write toV.S. about three nephews of

his, who are rnow7 at Goa. Cne of them is called 'Jober equirami',

the second /Ts7 'xaacoar equirami' and the third one /1s7 'obaz royal';

and theserthree7 went there from here, Hormux, on a ship of 'Comboyc'.

It seems tome that/It was 7 the ship which Ant6nio Monez captured.

Furthermore, this Hajji Fayat shows himself well disposed for the servke of

the King and of V.5. deserves all the favor that V.5. might order to be

shown to him; because if he, indeed, wants to do so he can learn all the

news about the fGreat 7 Turk and his intentions.

The 'guazil' of Koihat ('collayote') and sheikh Rabia ('xeque robia')

and also the factor of Kalhat wrote rand gave 7 to me the news about the

strait rof Mocha 7. They said that there had come from Adenfio Kalhot7a

certain sheikh Abdulloh and also another 'terrcida'. They ralso7 said that

there had come from the port of Suez to the port of Mocha a 'capito' with

twenty galleys and two large ships, with three thousand Turks on board.

/The Turks 7 had been given orders to take all the land which was then in

the possession of the Zoidi Imam who is a ruler ('rey') in these territories of

Arabia. Before the Turks ('rumes') come, a son of the zaidi Imam hod control

of all the troops of his father. This son was at variance with the Imam. He

took no heed whether his father would fight against the Turks or not. And

when the Turks arrived, they attacked and captured the fortress of Ta'izz ('toez');

and, in addition, they seized five other ports, attacking them by treachery.
 111.

However, they were unable to take the fortross of San'o ('canoa').

Although the son was on bad terms with his father, once he saw the land was

being lost /io the Turks7, he entered into amicable relations with his father,

mode ready all his soldiers one night and fell on the Tu+s, killing four

hundred of their horsemen. ,I!hekh Abudllah7 says /iso7 that there

will come to Muscat and Kaihat, within this first monsoon, which is in three

months time, ten or twelve/'Turksh7 'fustas', as they did last year. it

iS certain that there are /lready7 at Aden three well equipped 'fustas'

and more /of them 7 will come from the Port of Mocha. Sheikh Abdul lob
states that beyond doubt they will come. Many of his friends have told him

they ore certain that these ships will come this year and they have advised

him to remove his residence out of Kaihat. Last year there come no more than

four 'fustas' but none of the Portuguese stiyed at Kalhat, all of them going to

Muscat. The 'guazil' of Kalhat, last year, with the help of the King, Our

Lord, drove them from the port and did not even allow them to take water.

Now, if these ten or twelve ships come with many troops, it would be

necessary for the Portuguese and the Muslims ('mouros') to help him (i.e.,

the 'guozil' of Kalhat7 in such a manner as to make possible a resistance

/To the Turks7. And it will not be more than two months and a half before

these Turks arrive.

At tho end of the month of June there arrived at ths town of Hormuz
 112.

a ship which came from Mecca Cmequa') and in it there came a merchant

who lives here in Hormuz and is a native of the place. He told me that he

hod come through Mocha, that there were seven or eight oared ships

lying there and that he had not seen more than this number. The Turks kept

him there /at Mocha 7 for three days and did not let him go outside the

gates so that he should not warn the 'fustas' which V.5. had sent to the

strait /of Mocha 7, fe stated 7 that the Turkish vessels were waiting

there, thinking that the 'fustas' might enter into the harbour. It seemed to

him that it was there eight ,rlurkish7 ships which came to Kaihat and Muscat

/last year 7.

I believe that this information may well be true. I have ordered to

be made ready nine 'fustos' and 'catures', which ore here rat Hormuz7. At

the end of this month of July they will leave for Muscat, in order to lie in

wait there for the 'fustas' of the Turks, in case they should come in August or

at the beginning of September. I am writing to She ikh Rabia and also to

the 'guazil of Kalhat /Eidding7 them hold in readiness the best 'terraquis'

which they have there. And there are ships which /can7 hold ten or

twelve Portuguese and which row well; for the rest, if there is need, Arab

archers ,rcan7 be put in them, to give aid in what may be necessary. To

Muscat, according to what I was told by people on the ships which have

arrived from those parts after I passed that way, there came forty or fifty
 113.

Portuguese /7oldiers7 - this is an excellent reinforcement which can go on

board whenever it is most needful, in order, with the aid of Our Lord, to

fight the Turkish ships, if they should come to Muscat. And over the Turkish

ships Our Lord will surely give us a complete victory.

It seems tome that/it will be for7 the service of S.A, and of V.S.

to send these ships to sea, because the vessels which are setting forth from

/iHormuz7 for India carrying reach of them 7 two or three Portuguese and

much money; ond if these Turks succeed in plundering Muscat, in finding the

ships rwhich hove on board 7 many 'xerafins' and 'tamgas' 21 and then in

making off with their prizes to the strait rof Mocha 7, it will be on inducement

for them to come each year against Muscat.

Dom Payo thought that he had better stay here /Tn Hormuz7 and he

asked me for fcommand of7 the fleet, for it seemed to him that in this manner

he could do better service for the King. And I gave the fleet to him and he is

going with it as admiral-in-chief ('capito mor'). The captains and the soldiers

who are on board can be expected to oct as honourable and reliable men.

At the beginning of Aug.ist I am going to send to the cape Ras al-Hadd

('cabo do rroalgate') two 'catures', the ones with the most oars, rwith orders7

21. 'Tamgo' (or tango) - a Portuguese coin worth 60 'reis' (cf. Dalgado,
op. cit., 11,355).
 fl4.

to stand on watch and discover the Turkish vessels coming from the str&t

rof Mocha 7 and to see what their number is; and, if/These 'catures'/
see such vessels before them, then, to warn the fleet which wiU be/waiting7

at Muscat.

In the event that these ships do not come from the strait /of MochaZ

there will be much to be done against the 'noutaques'. fThese 'noutaques7

are impudent rpeople7. A large Portuguese ship, having on board Amdre

Cortes and laden with much fine merchandize, was wrecked on a sandbank

as it came from the island of Maceira' and was lost there. The 'noutoques'

took and carried off all the merchondize in the ship and killed all the

Portuguese on board, leaving no one alive, except Amdre Cortes, his

wife and one of his daughters, who made their escape. Amdre Cortes lost all

his possessions but, because he fought well, he got away, although he was

wounded by eight large arrows and he could not reach to his own 'paro'

until he was carried there. In addition ,"The 'noutaques'7 attacked a

Muslim 'terrada' and wounded some of the people on board who resisted

them. And because of these and other happenings like Poriuguese7,

each year, send /Their fleet 7, with the help of Our Lord, to plunder
the coast of the 'noutaques' and to burn the 'terradas' ,rof the 'noutaques'7,

as much as possible. And this fleet, each year, will watch over the

merchant ships; it will, for S.A., serve two purposes now - to go against
 115.

the 'fustas' of the Turks and ralso7 to sail wherever it has gone in past

years.

I shall write toV,$.,, by other means, more about this land. I kiss

the bonds of V. S. May your life and the affairs of Cur Lord flhe i;ng7

prosper. From Crmuz the 23rd of June, in/The year7 1547.

Dom Manull de Lyma

 116.

APPENDIX II

CC, Parte 1, Map 89, Documento 9, fol. 3v_5r.( PLciI.ts 10- 13)

Translated from the letter of Ra'is Nur al-Din/To the

ViceRoy of India 7 which Fern5o Farto has brought
/iGoa 7:

Ormuz, 30th October 1552

Senhor,

Fern6o Farto gave me a letter of V.5., which came in such a good

time it could not be better, so set beyond doubt /& make certain7 the great

concern that V.S. takes for this land and for the service of the King, Cur

Master. Because this land has been so ruined, /Then7 all will be lost. We

all believe, however, that V.5. will fiend akl7 as fully as the necessity

requires, in accordance with the news we now have that V.5. is preparing /To

send to7 this land a great armada, should the need arise. Please believe

that, lust because V. S. is mindful of us, we feel free already of all these

troubles that we expected.

I wrote to V.5., by Ruy Lopez, how we were besieged on land and

sea by the Turks, in the course of which /ilege7 1'These Turks 7 placed six

pieces of heavy artillery, fLe.,7/four7 basatisks, one tespalhafat&,l one

1. Pieris and Ftzler (Ceylon and Portugal, 304) write the folIowing'... the
greatest of all /gu7 wos Bazolisco, which reached a weight of 150
quintes with cflengTh of 35 palms. Smaller basiliscos weighing 70 quintaes
 117.

'salvage', 2 together with some small pieces fiet7on the flat roofs of

certain buildings belonging to the King. During the eleven days the Turks

bombarded the fortress, they did little harm to it, because it was so strong.

The Turks destroyed one of our 'comello de ferro' 3 ond with one of our shots

we ruined, from the fortress, their 'espalhafato'. They killed four Portuguese

and wounded some ten or twelve; but as it appeared after their departure - they

received (evet7 greater damage from the good shooting that our gunners made

against their mantelets.

On the last night when the Turks gathered together their cannon and

raised the siege, they brought to the walls a Portuguese bombardier, whom they

had captured at the fortress of Muscat. 'This man7 come to speak with the

men on the /Trtress7woll, asking that they should try to rescue him and the

other captured. Until that moment we knew nothing about him, though in

fact on numerous occasions at night our men had called out the renegades /in

the Turkish camp 7, asking them to come to speak with the soldiers who stood

on the wall - but the renegades had never replied to this request. On the day

that the Turks went away they left with us two Christians, the one a Russian

by race nd the other an Italian; through these men we learned all that

were described as Bastardos. The Espalafatto was heavier than these

latter, though it was only sixteen palms in length, which was also
the length of the salvage, a piece of 40 quintes. There were
smaller guns like the camello and the camalete which were used with
stone balls, as well as the Leo (lion), Aguia (eagle), Serpe (serpent)
and cao (dog)".
2. See above, note 1.
3. See above, note 1.
 118.

occurred at Muscat - that Mebmed Beg, the son of P?rt Beg ('Barba Negra')

who was admiral of the Ottoman fleet, attacked the fortress for six days.

At the end of that time his father /Ptr Bed7 arrived with thirteen galleys.

The son CMehmed Beg7 had begun to bombard the fortress with six galleys

only. On the second day following the arrival of Beg, Joo de Lisboo

and all the Portuguese yielded on condition of being allowed to depart

safely for this fortress, /T.e., Hormuz7. But Pri Beg managed the affair

with such address that he put them as galley slaves bound to their bench with

iron chains and subjected to the lash. For a man who/like Joo de Lisboa_7

showed such weakness, t was a well merited judgement. The rottcmar7

admiral would never discuss a ransom for them, even though on a number of

occasions there were offers made for the women only - but these /Tnfidei7

dogs treated the matter in such a fashion that it seemed there would never be

a successful result.

After this event Pin Beg, on a Monday morning - the 19th September -

arrived at this island fo1 Hormuz7 with twenty five galleys and three 'navios

dalto bordo' and one 'cotur' - that is to say, the twenty five galleys and one

galleon with which he departed from Suez; also another galleon which he

was bringing, together with two 'quarta'os' 4 and numerous guns and all the

powder, cannon balls and munitions /ihis vessel7 was lost in shallow water

4. 'quarto' - i.e., an old type of gun (cf. Pieris and Fitzler, op. cit.,
302).
 119.

at Aden. After 'Barbonegra' had set out for this place rHormuz7, he

took two ships and one 'catur' at Muscat. What he did here fat Hormuz7

I have already written to V. S. Moreover, he captured here a large ship of

a certain Joao Nunez, a man from Chaul. Having stayed at Hormuz for

sixteen days like Turks 7 wnt4 to the island of Kishm ('Queyxome') which

is three leagues from here. At Kishm were the principal people and merchants

from this town rof Hormuz 7with a great quantity of goods, of gold and

silver, and of cash. The Turks took all these things, nothing to escape them

and V.S. can be assured that this was the richest prize that could be found in

all the world. Firt Beg did all these things with only seven hundred fighting

men and two thousand or two thousand and five hundred sailors and galley

crews. In this fortress /of Hormuz7 there were seven hundred soldiers much

esteemed and the best arquebusiers that there were. If we had known more

about the Turks, it might have been possible to seize their guns and to

inflict much harm /&, them 7. According to what we have learned, '0

Turco' ordered PM Beg not to seek out Hormuz before he had gone to

Basra to take on board other troops there - but ros a result o17 weakness

he found at Muscat, Ptrt Beg thought that it would be the same here /t

Hormuz7 and so, with the powder that he brought from Muscat, he subjected

us to a bombardment.
 120.

From bra and Shiraz news came that Shah Tohmasp was marching

into the lands of the Ottoman Sultan across the frontier of Tabriz.

Subsequently I hove heard nothing more about this matter. Should /lresh7

news arrive, I will write to V.5. rand send the letter 7 by ships leaving
for that quarter.

I hove sent a 'terraquim' to the island of Kishm to get news about

the intentions of the Turks. I am writing to V. S. today, in the afternoon,

Sunday the 30th of Cctober - a 'terraqui.m' has come, from which we have

learned that this same day all the fleet of the Turks has assembled at the

point of the island of Kishm and deported - from that spot where they have

been all the time since their departure from this place ,rHormuz7. They

have taken the road to Basra - setting out this very night just gone.

Trust in God that all this will be for the great destruction of these

people, by reason of the coming of V. S. to this land and by your going

towards Basro, so that Ptri Beg will in no wise escape from the net. The

letter V.5. sent to me for Murad Ra'is, ,"The ruler of the Bahrayn 7, this
I have despatched to him forthwith and I wrote and bade him gather his

strength in case the Turks come to seize /iIe Bahrayn7, so that he could

defend himself as it might be needful for the service of S.A., Our Lord. May

the life and affairs of V.5. increase for many years. rWritten7 from Hormuz

on the 30th day of Cctober 1552.

rrex nordim
a'is Nur al-Din)
 121.

APPENDIX III

MD, v, p.70 (PLoL '+)

Kostontliyye, 28 Muharrem 972/

5 September 1564

An imperial letter/written7 to the King of Portugal:

To Cur Exalted Court which is the refuge of felicity and Our

High Porte which is the seat of good fortune, so that it is the asylum of

famo..s Khagans and the recourse of sultans possessed of power, there has

come your friendship - bearing letter which has arrived through your man

Nikolo, who is one of the notables of the Christian millet. itlf about 7

matters set forth in the well intentioned contents of the letters which have

reached our exalted court sometime ago from your own person and from

your vice-roy (Kaim makam) in the land of India. You have sought our

imperial permission that your esteemed embassador should come ho discuss. 7

the friendship desired with our court which is famed for justice. Our felicity

bearing letter has been sent in respect of that matter and our imperial per-

mission has been given that your embassador shall come /To us7, for the

sovereign elevation of our thoughts has ever been well-intentioned and

directed towards those who make, to our high court, a request in friendship
 122.

and sincerity. Your province r0f India 7 is far off and the journey is

dangerous, wherefore your embassador has been delayed here, while we sought

consultation with the people of your province: but do not have any doubts

about the sincerity of our desire for friendship; our embassador is about to be

sent. You have requested that your man who has come /10 us7 should send
back promptly, fEearing7 joyful news. All that was included have been

submitted, in their entirety, to our victorious stirrup and our noble world -

adorning consciousness has comprehended and embraced it. Matters being

so, our felicitous court is ever open and accessible and there is no impediment

to the desire of anyone who /wishes7 to come and go. By the favour of

Allah - praise be unto him, may His Name be exalted - now, at this present

time, the caliphate of the world is in the hands of our possession and power.

The people (re'ayo) of the East and the West seek the protection of our State.

Since the abundance of our imperial compassion is ever decided /Tn favour 7
of rother 7 people, and since - for the well-being of the people and the

merchants in these regions - there is no wthdrawing from the friendship / now7

desired, you shall establish, on land and on sea, safety and security for

the people and the merchants of our well protected dominkns, who are in

the land of India, in the region of Jezayir and in other lands. Your present

embassador has - without delay - been accorded our noble permission, and,

with our imperial letter, he has been sent back to that land. Now it is

1. Seeabove,p.-.
 123.

needful that, when /This letter 7 reaches you, you shall, without delay,
despatch to us your embassador, who shall be sent for this laudable purpose,

that is, for the bettering of the conditions of the people and for the good

ordering of affairs of state. And you shall act promptly, so that the con-

ditions of /&,r 7 friendship may be decded on both sides and so that the

people and the merchants in those lands may be relieved of anxiety and

distress and live on good terms.

 124.

APPENDIX IV

Rufls 225, p.222 ( IO(I is).

Konstantiniyye, 27 Ziklade 980/
30 April 1572

These are the changes in the subdivisions of

the Province and the appointments which have
been ordered in accordance with the submission
(arz) of Au Pasho, the Beglerbeg of Basro. The
orz was made on 15th Zilkade /i.e., on 19t1 March7 :

The liva of Corral ( ( , ), with its revenue, has been con-

ferred on Hoydar Beg, the Beg of Med me ( '

The liva of Medine, with its revenue, has been conferred to Said Beg,

the Beg of Garraf.

The liva of Rahmaniyye ( ' L U, ), with its revenue, has been con-
ferred on Mehmed Beg, the Beg of Haifa ( t.iP 1'?)

The liva of Haifa, in the Beg lerbeglik of Lohsa, with its revenue, has

been conferred on Pervez Beg, the Beg of Rahmaniyye.

The liva of Tk'cprU (JJ ), with its revenue, has been

conferred on Sam Beg who had been removed from the above-mentioned liva

/l.e., H0f0 7.

1. Bedellyle - i.e., with the annual revenues. These provinces in

the beglerbeglik of Bosra were of salyone status (see above, p. 35 ).
 125.

The liva of Akakol'e ( 44 1 ), with its revenue, has been

conferred on Hseyin Beg who had been removed from Kinahiyye ( tj ).

The livo of Kinahiyye has been conferred on Arsian, the Kapudan

ofRemle( Ji)).

The liva of Keyn Kinad ( .L4 jJ ?), with its revenue, has been

conferred on Sinan Beg, at present, the Beg of Hemmar ( #L ).

The liva of Hemmar in the vilayet of Basra :

The Beglerbeg of Basra has sent a letter, /7eferring7 that Sinan,

formerly, the Kapudan of Bosra, has undertaken to farm (iltizam) the has3

/of Hemmar7 at more than 200 , 000 rakce 7, on condition that the afore-

said province be assigned to him. Veil, the present ao 4 of the Azaptar5

in the above-mentioned liva, has/lso7 undertaken to farm (iltizam) the

has at more than 200,000 akp, on condition that the province be assigned

to him. /The Beglerbeg of Basra7 has presented an arz that the aforesaid

liva be duly and legally assigned to Veil. Order has been made that the

2. There is no mention here in the text of 'bedeliyle' - no doubt

the omission is due to the error of the scribe.

3. Has - i.e., the biggest type of fief, the minimum annual income of
which was 100,000 akce.

4. Aa,feoning in Cttoman Turkish 'chief' or 'master': ci. H. Bowen,

mEl , s.v. Agha.

5. The name given to a corps of Ottoman marinesparc.uL1 (.our cc 0oPno.4t

roD rs u . s..
 126.

province be so conferred on the conditions rmentioned abov7.

7
The Agal ik of the Azeban has been conferred on Muzaffer, one
b 9
of the cavuses at Basra, with 15 akce.
I
S

The liva of Turre-i Cezayir ,) ? ) has been conferred on

Hseyin Beg, the Aa of the GnJlr Icr 1 at Kuban ( U ).

And the Aalik of the above-mentioned /Tiva7 has been conferred

on 3veys Ago, the Aa of the Azablar at Carur (,... t 9).

And the above-mentioned Aol k of Uveys has been conferred on

1
eref, the Kethuda1 of the fortress of Carur.

And the Kethudalik 12 of the above-mentioned /Iortress7has been

conferred on a certain person called Ferrub, one of the Brkbais13/ationed7

at Rahmaniyye, with 15 okp.

6. Aaluk - i.e., the office of Aba.

7. Azebon-i.e., Azablar.

b. avu; - i.e., a member of the corps of Pursuivants.

9. i.e., per diem.

10. G'drUl r, meaning volunteer - a term often used in the plural

'lIyan . Onthesetroopscf. H. Inalcik, in El 2, sv. Gcrlfl..

11. Kethuda - i.e., an adjutant.

12. i.e., the office of Kethudo.

13. B6rkba;i - i.e., the commander of a brJk. On the word b6Jk,

meaning a regiment' of troops, cf, l.H. Uzunar;ih, in El 2, sv.
B6likbasi.
I
 127.

Terakki : in response to the arz of the above-mentioned i.e., the

Beglerbeg of Basra7 a terakki of 20,000 okce has been conferred on All

Beg, the Beg of Ma'dan (

Terakki : in response to the arz of the above-mentioned 7E. b. of Basra7

a terakki of 20,0O0/kce7has been.conferred on AU Beg, the Beg of Katif.

Terakk : in response to the arz of the above-mentioned /b.b. of

Basra7a terakki of 20,000 okce has been conferred on Hemmad Beg, the

BegoFEbuArba(4./y' '1).

Terokki: hi response to the orz of the above-mentioned rb.b. of Basra7

a terokki of 20, 000 rakce7 has been conferred on Ahmed Beg, the Beg of

Sodr Sevtb ( ' - ' ..- P ).

Terakki : in response to the arz of the above-mentkned /. b. of
Basra7 a terakki of 20,000rakce7 has been conferred on Ahmed Beg, the

Beg of Zernuk ( f}j .4.

Terakki : in response to the orz of the above-mentioned /. b of

Basra7 a terakki of 20,003 akp has been conferred on arikoglu Mehmed

Beg, the Beg of affa.

Terakki : in response to the arz of the above-mentioned /.b. of

Basra7 a terakki of 20,000 rakce7 has been conferred on his own son,

14. Terakki, meaning here on addition to his annual salary..

 128.

Murad Beg, the Beg of Tehemiyye.

The liva of Tavil ( J-. ,i' !) has been conferred on Zaim

Salih, one of the zemo 15 at Aleppo, n serving in the vilayet /of

Basra7,

The liva of Remle, having a salyane of 2U0,000 akp has been

conferred with its revenue, on Mehmed Beg, who was a sanjak Beg in

Lahso and s now in the service of the defterdarlik'

A liva in Lahsa with Salyane : A muhafaza sanjak in Lahsa has

been conferred on Ferrub Beg, now the Beg of Remle, with the /ame7

salyane as Mehmed Beg /eceived7.

The liva of Vaki ( (f ' ) in the neighbourhood of Cezayr has been

conferred on Ferhod Aa who holds a zeamet of 50,000 ake in ,iie province

oFT Basro.

The avu;luk of the Imperial Court : The Zaim called Abdi, who

holds a zeamet of 20,000 akp at Aleppo and who has done good and able ser-

vice in the collection of taxes at Basra, has been made a member of the

aforesaid corps ff avu;7.

15. Ziema, the plural of z&im. A za'im was the holder of a ze'amet,
a type of fief yielding an annual revenue of more than 20,000 akp.

16. Defterdarlik - i.e., the office of defterdar. Defferdar was the term
used for the officials of the financial administration: cf. B. Lewis,
in 2, s.v. Daftord&.
 129.

APPENDIX V

MD,xxii, p.322 ( tb).

15 Cemaziel evvel 981/
12 September 1573

Order to the Beg lerbeg of Basra :

Au, who is now the Beglerbeg of Baghdad,- May his good fortune

endure for ever - sent a letter to my exalted cot.rt (dergah-i mual Ia) and

has reported that twelve galleys (Kadirga) and two galleons (Kalyon) of the

miserable infidels have reached the Bahrayn and have seized one or two

merchant ships and also made captive at sea the embassador (eli) of the

ruler of Lar/Ttan7. These infidels are now giving trouble continuously at

sea and agents have informed /'s7 that they may cause damage along the

coasts of our well protected dominions (memalik-i mahruse) near the Babroyn.

The letter which you have sent also makes known that you hove launched your

ten galleys and mode them ready with oarsmen (Kreki) and other arms and all

necessaries. You hove made a submission (arz) /i us7 that the expulsion

of the enemy is very important. My imperial command (emr-i ,serif) has been

sent to the aforesaid /Ali, the Beglerbeg of Baghdad 7 ordering that,

while measures are in train to drive the infidels /Trom the Bahrayn7, you

who ore the Beglerbeg of Basra shall watch over the affairs of Lahso, that
 1 3J.

the above-mentioned CAlL 7 shall take care of Basro and also the

Beglerbeg of ehrizor shall watch over Baghdad. My imperial order

has also been given that, if the wretched infidels as noted above - shall

do harm to any of our well guarded territories, you shall equip/nd send

out7 from Basra as many ships as possible. And I have commanded, too,

that help made available to you and that, if necessary, troops be sent

to your assistance by land. It is my decree that when /This firman7

arrives, you shall keep a careful watch on the infidels who have come

the Bahrayn7. Should the enemy do any damage, you must send the news

to the aforesaid /A1i7 and ask either for ships that you need or for the

necessary troops /To be sent 7 overland. And you shall make every effort

to expel the enemy /Trom the Bahrayn7, in the manner that seems most

appropriate to you. Until the Beglerbeg of Lohsa reaches Lahsa 1 and the

foe is indeed off, you shall give your protection /To the province 7, but

without assuming the beglerbeglik/f Lahsa7. And, where the need is

most necessary for protection and in those places where there is trouble,

you are to place sufficient defences, troops and munitions and you must

lose no time in protecting these lands.

1. A new beg lerbeg of Lahsa was perhaps just appointed or he was

engaged elsewhere.
 131.

APPENDIX VI

MD, xxvii, p.81( ii).

9 Safer 983/
20 May 1575

Given to l;tipri (?) All ovu

Order to the Beglerbeg of Baghdad :

The Beglerbeg of Lahsa has sent a letter, stating that the conquest of

the Bahrcyn would (with God's favour) be easy. He writes that there are

few cenkcs in the fortress, also that the galleys (kadirga) actually at

Basra are sufficient. Now it is not admissible to treat the foe as of no

account, but it is essential to makefproper7 preparation for it. You,

who were once beglerbeg of that region, must know the local conditions;

I have commanded that when /ikis firman7 reaches you, you shall inform

yourself of all details and report according to your knowledge and

accurately how best to prepare for this enterprise - he., what number of

galleys are needed to sail to the island, how many cenkcis are required for

the galleys, and what number of siege guns, of 'asker' and of munitions and

supplies are necessary to attack the fortress. /Vou shall state also 7 if these
essential guns, munitions and supplies are available in Baghdad and Basro;

also if there are enough asker /Tn hand 7 or whether more of them are

needed and /Tf so7 where such troops can be found. 4 7urthermore_7, is
 132.

it likely that the Portuguese foe, who has his main fleet at Ormuz, to come

to oppose/Tn expedition to the Bahrayr7, you are to take special core

that no situation should arise which mayfOod forbid 7 be contrary to the

honour and good name of the Sultanote. The Beglerbeg of Lahsa declares

that if the above-mentioned island be conquered, its annual yield will

be 40,000 filori. You shall write and inform us if ths annual revenue will

in fact be forthcoming, over and above locai expenses, or if the island

can produce more. You shall make known, in addition, whether or not the

ships at Basra are sufficient or if it is important to build the eight galleys,

the construction of which was ordered in an/eorlier7firmon; you shall

state also where you will get the fnecessary7 guns if these feight galleys 7

are indeed constructed. You shall build ships as soon as the timber arrives

and in short you shall take note of all the conditions relating to the afores&d

island and tell us in detail about them.

 133.

APPENDIX VII

Rues 238, p. 146( oce i)

Kostontiniyye, 6 Sevval 988/

14 November 1580

Liva of Tehemmiyye, dependant on Lohsa :

Mehmed Posha, the Beglerbeg of Lobsa has reported that Abmed Beg,

the Beg of the above-mentioned liva, has entered into a conspiracy, he

has been subverting astray the 'Kul taifesi', 1 he has incited the local

population to revolt and he/limself7 is on the point of rebellion. He

/T.e, the Beglerbeg of Lahsa7 has presented an arzfiequesting7 that

the livo be given to Mehmed Beg, at present the Beg of the sanjok of Cebreyn

( j .c. .), with its annual revenue. It has been commanded so.

Liva of Cebreyn, dependant on Lahsa :

The above-mentioned /L b. of Lahsa7 has reported that Mehmed

Beg, the beg of aforesaid iivo /o1 Cebreyn7, has been appointed to

onciherfianjak7 and that his former sanjak is now vacant. ,'The BegIerbeg7

has presented an arz requesting that it be given to Seycfl Abmed, at present

the Ao of G'nJlrtIer of Mberriz ( ,.. ). The order has been given

that this appointment be made, with an annual revenue of 200,000 okFe.

1 Kul taifesi, meaning here no doubt the garrison of the fortress,

i.e., the jonissaries.
 134.

The AaIik of the Gnillyan, dependant on Lahsa :

The above-mentioned /1.b. of Lahsa7 has reported that the

sanjak of Cebreyn has been given to Seyd? Ahmed, who has been aa

with a revenue of 55 akp, and now his aalik is vacant. (The beglerbeg

has presented an arz that it be given to Mustofa, who was kethuda of avu;lar

at Budin with a zeame t, and who has been given on imperial firman con-

ferring on him a rnew7 appointment as aa, in Lahsa, when such an office

should become vacant there.

Liva of Haffo, dependant on Lahsa

The above-mentioned/t.b. of Lahsa7 has reported that Dervis

Beg, the beg of the aforesaid liva, has abandoned of his own will the sanjak

of Hoffo. /The beglerbeg7 has presented an arz that t should be given with

200,000 akce to Hizir, formerly the aa of kullar at Katif. It has been

commanded so.

Teka'd3

The above-mentioned /. b. of Lahsa7 has reported that H'seyin

Beg, the beg of the Sonjak of Uyun, is now weak and ill arid is incapable of

holding an appointment as sanjak beg. A village named Mah ( ot 1) and a

2. Presumably, per diem.

3. i.e., retirement.
 135.

garde I fconstituting7 as one unit a zeamet with 35,000 ake, are

now in fact unassigned and are vacant. The Beglerbeg has presented

on arz/equesting7 that the aforesaid rvillage and gardeL7 be given,

as a provision for retirement, /io FWseyin Beg/. Order has been given

that, flhe village and the gordeL7 are vacant, the appointment be

made, as a provision for retirement ot a rate of 20,000 akp.

Liva of Uyun, dependant on Lahsa

The above-mentfoned/E.b. of Lahsa7 has reported that Hseyin

Beg, the beg of the aforesaid liva, has retired and his sanjak is vacant.

/The Beglerbeg7 has presented an arz/Tequesting7 that it should be

given to Musa, at present aa of the Azablar at Lahsa, with / revenue of 7

60 akFe. Order has been given that the appointment be made with a revenue

of 200,000 ake.

The AaIik of the Azeban at Lahsa :

The above-mentioned /. b. of LahsaT has reported that Musa, who

was aa, with ra revenue of 7 60 okp, has been given a sanjak and that

his aalik is n vacant. /The Beglerbeg7 has presented an arz requesting

that it be given to Davud, the son of SWeyman Beg who died while he was

a sanjok beg of Haifa, Davud being one of the MJtef ITj of Lohsa, with

a revenue of 35 akp. Order has been given that the appointment be made.
 136.

The above-mentioned /. b. of Lahsa7 has reported that Kosim,

the ago of the G'cn'tJlflJs at Ce;e ( 't4) is a capable man, who has

seen long service on the frontier. 4 [The Beglerbeg7 has therefore

presented an orz, requesting that favour be shown to him. It has been

commanded that he be given a sanjok in the vilayet of Basra when one

shall become vacant.

The Aalik of the GnJlrtyan of Ce ,se, dependant on Lahsa

The above-mentioned/.b. of Lahso7 has reported that Kasim

who was an oga, with /a revenue of 760 oke has been given a sanjak,

and his aahk is now vacant. rlhe Beglerbeg7 has therefore presented

an arz requesting that the aatik be given to Mehmed bin Vunus, the Kethuda

of the aforesaid groups of GnlIUyan with ro revenue of7 30 okp; also

that the Kethudalik be granted to Haci bin ems, one of the

at Lahsa, with ra revenue of 7 27 akFe. It has been commanded so.

The Aalik of G&i3Iflyan of Katif, dependant on Lahso

The above-mentioned/.b. of L.ahsa7 has reported that Ebubekir

who was aa with ra revenue of 7 60 okp, he has now renounced his

appointment. liThe Be 9 lerbeg7 has therefore presented an arz/requesting_7

the agalik be given to Abdullah-Cglu Mustafa, who is one of the Mtefi!uitc

at Labsa, with ra revenue of 7 40 okce. It has been commanded so.

4. Yaror ye serhaddin emekdari".

 137.

The Aalik of the G'&iJIrJyan at Lohsa

The above-mentioned 7E. b. of Lahso7 has reported that Osman who

has been made aa with /a revenue of7 80 akce, has not attended to his

duties. ,TYhe Beglerbeg7 has therefore presented an anz/questing7 that

the aalsk be given to I-IJseyin, who has been Kethudo of the groups/sf the

GIryan7 as aforesaid, with /a revenue of 7 44 ake; also that the

Kethudalak should be given to Budak-oIu Maksud who has been the

bfl.kbat of the G'&iThri.yan of the above-mentioned place with ra revenue

of 7 31 ake. It has been commanded so.

Terakki :

The above-mentioned /E. b. of Lohsa7 has reported that Be,sarot Beg,

the beg of Katif, is a capable man and has therefore presented an arz request-

ing that favour be shown to him, It has been commanded that he /i.e.,

Bearet7 be given a terokki ho the amount 7 of 20,000 oke.

Mir alemlik5 of the vilayet of Labsa

The above-mentioned /1. b. of Lohsa7 has reported that Memi who

was Mir-i Alem, has died. 'The Beglerbeg7 has therefore presented an

orz/questing7 that his office be given to Mabmud bin Abdullah, one of

the MUterL.ahsa, with revenue of7 50 oke. It has been commanded

so.

5. Mir-i alemlik - i.e., the office of mir-i alem. Mir-i alem was
meaning the standard bearer.
 138.

The above-mentioned beglerbeg has reported that AU Abdullah,

one of the avular at Lahsa, with /a revenue of 7 34 ake, is a capable

man, who has used his best endeavours in the collection of the mci-i MiII.6

rlhe Beglerbeg7 has reported requesting that his appointment as avu; be

made permanent. It has been commanded so.

6. Mci-i M1It - i.e., the taxes due to the state.

 139.

APPENDIX VIII

A Note on the Trade in the Persian Gulf

It would be superfluous to adduce here the evidence which demon-

strates the disruption of the transit trade from India through the lands of the

Middle East to the Mediterranean world after the arrival of the Portuguese

in Calicuf in 1498 and the subsequent revival of that trade during the middle

decades of the sixteenth century. This task has been done by a number of

modern scholars. The unpublished documents which underlie this thesis

contain only fragmentary material to the flow of commerce through the

Persian Gulf in the years 1534-1581.

Various letters sent in 1547 from Hormuz to the Portuguese Vke-Roy

of India at Goa make clear that the spice trade was re-established immediately

after the Ottoman conquest of Basra in 1546. More particularly the Ra'is Nur

al-Din wrote on 25 July 1547 to Gao that Hormuz was flourishing, and that

caravans were arriving in Hormus, because of the good relations prevailing

1. Cf., for example, F. C. Lane, The Mediterranean Spice Trade: Further

Evidence of its Rei vol in the Sixteenth Century, in American
Historical Review, XLV (New York 1940), 581-590; F. Braudel, La
Mediterrane et Ic Monde Mediterroneen PEpoque de Philippe IT
Panis 1966 (evised andinlarged edition), i, 493 ff;M.A. Meilink-
Roelofsz, Askn Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian
Archipelago Between 15U0 and about 1630, The Hague 1962, 124ff;
V. Magoihoes Godinho, Cs Descombrimentos e a Economia Mondiol,
ii (Lisboa 1967), 162 if; C.R. Boxer, A Note on Portuguese Reaction
to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade and the Rise of Atjeh 1540-1600,
a paper read at the International Conference on Asian History 5th-i 0th
August,1968, University of Malaya.
 140.

with Basra. 2 Manuel de Limo, writing to the Vice-Roy at Goa a month

earlier than the Ra'is, observes, however, that few spices had reached

Hormuz from India; none the less, he also states that merchants from Basra

hod bought a good amount of spices at Hormuz.3

The Cttoman beglerbeg of Basra,in 1562, attempted to improve

trade relations with the Portuguese at Hormuz4 - and not, it would seem,

without some degree of success, for the Venetian bailo at stanbuI, Doniele

Borbarigo, reporting to the Signoria in 1564, stated there was an active

trade between Hormuz and Basra 5 The Cttoman records - i.e., MUhimme

Defterleri - reveal that, in 1565 and in 1567 at least, merchants were

coming to Basra from the Yemen, from India and Persia. 6 One Muhimme

document, dated 21 Saban 982/6 December 1574, notes on interruption in

the traffic to Basra - not because of opposition on the part of the Portuguese

2. Cart. Ormuz, fol. 11 5r.

3. Cf. Appendix I, p 1L7'1.

4. See above, rr -

5. Cf. E. Alberi, Relazioni degli Ambasciotori Veneti ol Senato,
Serie iii, vol.iii (Firenze 1884), 6.

6. MD, vi, p.517; also MD, vii, p.144.

 Ml.

nor because of piracy in the waters of the Persian Gulf, but on account

of the high duties levied on merchandize by the Cttoman authorities at

Basra. The Ottoman Government, wishing to restore the trade, gave orders

that the officials at Basra should not exact duties of more than 1/15 ad valorem

on spices and 1/20 ad valorem on other articles of commerce.7

7. MD Zeyli, ii, p.49; also Mantran, op. cit., 227.

 142.

BBLICGRAPHY

A. PORTUGUESE SOuRCES

(i) Unpublished Archival Material

Arquivo Nocional do Torre do Tombo, Lisboa:

Cartas de Ormuz a D. Joo do Castro, Casa Forte.
Colecao de So Loureno, vol.iv.
Corpo Cronol6gico, Porte 1, MaFo, 68, 87, 89, 102.

(ii) Publshed Archival Material

Aubin, J., Le " Cr?amento do Estodo do India" do Antnio de Abreu (1574),

in Studio iv (Lhboo 1959), 169-289.

Baio, A., Documentos Ineditos sobre Joo de Barros, Coimbra 1917.

Documentao Ultramarina Portuguesa, I (Lisboc 1 960).

As Gavetas do Torre do Tombo, v (Lisboo 1965).

Rego, A. do Silva (ed.), Documentoao_pora a Hstoria dos Misses do Podroado

Portugues do Oriente, India, iv-vi (Lisboa 1953-1951).

Ribeiro, L., Em torno do primiero cerco do Diu, in Studio xiii-xiv

Usboa 1964), 41-104.

Sanceau, E., Uma Narrativa do Expedio Portuguesa de 1541 ao Mar Roxo, in

Studio, ix (Lisboa 1962), 199-234.

Wicki, .1., Documenta Indica, ii-iv (Lisboa 1950-1956).

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.. a
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