PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still
Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial
Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in
relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law
wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in
the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped
packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them.
The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in
Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing
therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the
consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland"
(Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages.
Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's
representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4)
packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2').
Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed
with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he
pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He
made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp.
5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that
date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job
Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita,
Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the
presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the
cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have
been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis
supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He
discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The
package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that
dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6,
1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof,
after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October
7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his
passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief
Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was
invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same
day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section
for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as
certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY
SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE
UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE
UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO
HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation
of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication
(Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible
in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its
origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3],
Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States
Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal
Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme
Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20
SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search
and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's
Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of
its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is
carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de
Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA
687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were
invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized
government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and
without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can
accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation
of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the
immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government,
included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble,
is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called
upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his
life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116
US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in
construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as
shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and
history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign
authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies;
as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen
in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property,
subject to the right of seizure by process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant
who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the
knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal
possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and
seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals
(citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391
S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
 The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen the
owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel
case containing the evidence***complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's
own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police, informed them
of the bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence
obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes
governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent
reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and
seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the
argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents
conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly
indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating
procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the
Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original
Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the
same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the
parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI
agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the
postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes
into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at
that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass
has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the
contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not
the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v.
State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was
taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was
initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional
meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the
liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But
protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights
answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of
constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill
of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not
the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What
the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere
inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus,
it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it
is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum,
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by
the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not
whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p.
8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between
individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987
Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of
arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (See Soliven v. Makasiar, 167
SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The
modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not
shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against
the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with
appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed
as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the
constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private
seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of
appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him
despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation
were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and
found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his
constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers
testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they
have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given
full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on
the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as
testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did
you investigate the accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his
constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62;
Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on cross-
examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant
gave uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is more, we have examined the
assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of
appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction.
Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he
was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a
German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-
minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the
cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day (October
15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-
serving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a
complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four
(4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply
with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person
would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering
tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the
other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the
same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he
readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot
be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237
[1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he
was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of
Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a
Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from
appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244;
Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke,
37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327
[1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even
bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed,
the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the
contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the
contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a
person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At
this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed
judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.
City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this
application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in
this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if
there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if we give
expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a
government, were constituted. The primary question is Shall the judiciary permit a government of
the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove
profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the city
of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated
district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of
Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their
houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly
perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as
laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros,
and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the
police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city
of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons,
and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no
opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were
being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined
for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had
neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were
received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of
Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the
night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted
for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yigo and Rafael
Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous
notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The
further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are
of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that
some of the women married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others
went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly
portion found means to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to
Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented
an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application,
through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from
Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as
including them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged
that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The
writ was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban
and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the
writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should
have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu,
because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control, and because
their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit
attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on
the haciendas of Yigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question
of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. The
court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the
province of Davao, and Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the
persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On
motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court
sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons
in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown
that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts, were
notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated
the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the original
petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao
and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the
attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that the women were
contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales
answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the
women had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and
because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yigo answered alleging that
he did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to
obey the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second
order, which related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction
of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in
Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yigo on January
13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first
instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should
demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the
question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided and the
reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain
detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the
Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting
in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court
the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been
brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again
recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the habeas
corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had
succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were
found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee,
renounced the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other
means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for
petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked the
court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city
of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila,
Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor,
and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that
the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January
25, 1919, be struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in
the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled these one hundred and seventy women were isolated
from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with
friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions
unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such
was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was
deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret
and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the
respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question By authority of what law did
the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila
to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress.
The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands.
Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of
Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a
common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who may
have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes
providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common
prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a
quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or
order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the
Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine
Islands and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not
chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other
citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine
penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or
regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be
found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of
abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as
not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands,
even the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power than any
king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore,
has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and
the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render
the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other
municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves
such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then
all persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her
wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold
the same club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that "No freeman shall be taken, or
imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or
any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man
either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No
official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to
safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller,
delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our
system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only
the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes
upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The
very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of
life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as
being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this
explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very
beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a
government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are
three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money
damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never
intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character
in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred
kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall
be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than
three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile
or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and
twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that
any public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a
criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this action.
Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded
against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will
later be referred to "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one
unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement
was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and
punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15
Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose
principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections
to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2)
that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not
restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor
and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they
could not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and
friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it
impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the
writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a
court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction
a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor.
(Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of
Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice
that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be
presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The
writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible
anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior
court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances.
In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the
women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was
shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney,
were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands;
it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was
shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided
immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and
then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was
prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the
women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police
did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination,
acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas
corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women
from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a
distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had
been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented
from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which
began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until
they freely and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of
any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him
beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action,
could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official,
had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the
respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court
and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party
to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application
for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting
under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same
officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The
respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her
liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while
the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty
may not thus be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision.
Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any
analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or
not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction
of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been and
continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this
time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy,
justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom
concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most
distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the
writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his
conception of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have
taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are
quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present
writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half
have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its
establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on the
petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and
after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights
and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for
the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so
easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be determined without delay, that
the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject
being brought to their notice. . . .
The second proposition that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of
imprisonment within the state seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the
source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of king's bench
derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not
passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that
it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach
the former except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the
prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the
oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the
respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of
compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if
any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place
of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of
process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp. The
difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits
of the state, except as greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the
power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson
[1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts.
(Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex
parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out
of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division
upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The
judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His
return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another;
that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He
was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ
commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the
Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of
her being taken and detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and
must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of
the child. If it could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the
possession of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to
produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is
bound to produce the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not
obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift
the question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was
done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what
was done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt in
disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands.
(The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish
case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo,
Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the
defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the
cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the
negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the
District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond
his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes
because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be
evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present
in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall
until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court
afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the
negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the
last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See
also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the
respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the Supreme
Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether the contempt
should be punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and
Feliciano Yigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The
order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one
month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila
waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao.
According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there
were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do
so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the
parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They
could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they
could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely
be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in
question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They
did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show
impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by
those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were
contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were
appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at
least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality
of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the
second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in
finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the
order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities
cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas
corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an
earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his
own illegal act, he must take the consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to
get the child back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must
advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal
man could do in the matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute
impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did not show that every possible effort to
produce the women was made by the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic
action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash
between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another
chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous
and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the
constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free
transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly
contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of
literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with
it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy
incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an
executive investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made
the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing
further in this connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the
city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando
Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the
Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of
Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain
that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is
commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a
court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must
order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in
obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the
face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we
cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly
disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez,
Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public
officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance.
The hacendero Yigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by
counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no
more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent
of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of
attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When
all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the
unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for
the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and
who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the
unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to
suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ
of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban
to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of
pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to
this stern view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply
substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some
members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the
correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to
belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be
considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect
without being unduly oppressive such an amount is P100.
In resume as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The
respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt
of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk
of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the
fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los
Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that
this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect
individual liberty from illegal encroachment.
Arellano, C.J., Avancea and Moir, JJ., concur.
Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The undersigned does not entirely agree to the opinion of the majority in the decision of the habeas corpus proceeding against
Justo Lukban, the mayor of this city.
There is nothing in the record that shows the motive which impelled Mayor Lukban to oblige a great number of women of
various ages, inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, district of Sampaloc, to change their residence.
We know no express law, regulation, or ordinance which clearly prohibits the opening of public houses of prostitution, as those in
the said Gardenia Street, Sampaloc. For this reason, when more than one hundred and fifty women were assembled and placed
aboard a steamer and transported to Davao, considering that the existence of the said houses of prostitution has been tolerated for
so long a time, it is undeniable that the mayor of the city, in proceeding in the manner shown, acted without authority of any legal
provision which constitutes an exception to the laws guaranteeing the liberty and the individual rights of the residents of the city
of Manila.
We do not believe in the pomp and obstentation of force displayed by the police in complying with the order of the mayor of the
city; neither do we believe in the necessity of taking them to the distant district of Davao. The said governmental authority, in
carrying out his intention to suppress the segregated district or the community formed by those women in Gardenia Street, could
have obliged the said women to return to their former residences in this city or in the provinces, without the necessity of
transporting them to Mindanao; hence the said official is obliged to bring back the women who are still in Davao so that they may
return to the places in which they lived prior to their becoming inmates of certain houses in Gardenia Street.
As regards the manner whereby the mayor complied with the orders of this court, we do not find any apparent disobedience and
marked absence of respect in the steps taken by the mayor of the city and his subordinates, if we take into account the difficulties
encountered in bringing the said women who were free at Davao and presenting them before this court within the time fixed,
inasmuch as it does not appear that the said women were living together in a given place. It was not because they were really
detained, but because on the first days there were no houses in which they could live with a relative independent from one
another, and as a proof that they were free a number of them returned to Manila and the others succeeded in living separate from
their companions who continued living together.
To determine whether or not the mayor acted with a good purpose and legal object and whether he has acted in good or bad faith
in proceeding to dissolve the said community of prostitutes and to oblige them to change their domicile, it is necessary to
consider not only the rights and interests of the said women and especially of the patrons who have been directing and conducting
such a reproachable enterprise and shameful business in one of the suburbs of this city, but also the rights and interests of the very
numerous people of Manila where relatively a few transients accidentally and for some days reside, the inhabitants thereof being
more than three hundred thousand (300,000) who can not, with indifference and without repugnance, live in the same place with
so many unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution.
If the material and moral interests of the community as well as the demands of social morality are to be taken into account, it is
not possible to sustain that it is legal and permissible to establish a house of pandering or prostitution in the midst of an
enlightened population, for, although there were no positive laws prohibiting the existence of such houses within a district of
Manila, the dictates of common sense and dictates of conscience of its inhabitants are sufficient to warrant the public
administration, acting correctly, in exercising the inevitable duty of ordering the closing and abandonment of a house of
prostitution ostensibly open to the public, and of obliging the inmates thereof to leave it, although such a house is inhabited by its
true owner who invokes in his behalf the protection of the constitutional law guaranteeing his liberty, his individual rights, and his
right to property.
A cholera patient, a leper, or any other person affected by a known contagious disease cannot invoke in his favor the
constitutional law which guarantees his liberty and individual rights, should the administrative authority order his hospitalization,
reclusion, or concentration in a certain island or distant point in order to free from contagious the great majority of the inhabitants
of the country who fortunately do not have such diseases. The same reasons exist or stand good with respect to the unfortunate
women dedicated to prostitution, and such reasons become stronger because the first persons named have contracted their
diseases without their knowledge and even against their will, whereas the unfortunate prostitutes voluntarily adopted such manner
of living and spontaneously accepted all its consequences, knowing positively that their constant intercourse with men of all
classes, notwithstanding the cleanliness and precaution which they are wont to adopt, gives way to the spread or multiplication of
the disease known as syphilis, a venereal disease, which, although it constitutes a secret disease among men and women, is still
prejudicial to the human species in the same degree, scope, and seriousness as cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy, pest, typhoid, and
other contagious diseases which produce great mortality and very serious prejudice to poor humanity.
If a young woman, instead of engaging in an occupation or works suitable to her sex, which can give her sufficient remuneration
for her subsistence, prefers to put herself under the will of another woman who is usually older than she is and who is the
manager or owner of a house of prostitution, or spontaneously dedicates herself to this shameful profession, it is undeniable that
she voluntarily and with her own knowledge renounces her liberty and individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, because it
is evident that she can not join the society of decent women nor can she expect to get the same respect that is due to the latter, nor
is it possible for her to live within the community or society with the same liberty and rights enjoyed by every citizen.
Considering her dishonorable conduct and life, she should therefore be comprised within that class which is always subject to the
police and sanitary regulations conducive to the maintenance of public decency and morality and to the conservation of public
health, and for this reason it should not permitted that the unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution evade the just orders and
resolutions adopted by the administrative authorities.
It is regrettable that unnecessary rigor was employed against the said poor women, but those who have been worrying so much
about the prejudice resulting from a governmental measure, which being a very drastic remedy may be considered arbitrary, have
failed to consider with due reflection the interests of the inhabitants of this city in general and particularly the duties and
responsibilities weighing upon the authorities which administer and govern it; they have forgotten that many of those who
criticize and censure the mayor are fathers of families and are in duty bound to take care of their children.
For the foregoing reasons, we reach the conclusion that when the petitioners, because of the abnormal life they assumed, were
obliged to change their residence not by a private citizen but by the mayor of the city who is directly responsible for the
conservation of public health and social morality, the latter could take the step he had taken, availing himself of the services of
the police in good faith and only with the purpose of protecting the immense majority of the population from the social evils and
diseases which the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street have been producing, which houses have been constituting
for years a true center for the propagation of general diseases and other evils derived therefrom. Hence, in ordering the
dissolution and abandonment of the said houses of prostitution and the change of the domicile of the inmates thereof, the mayor
did not in bad faith violate the constitutional laws which guarantees the liberty and the individual rights of every Filipino,
inasmuch as the women petitioners do not absolutely enjoy the said liberty and rights, the exercise of which they have voluntarily
renounced in exchange for the free practice of their shameful profession.
In very highly advanced and civilized countries, there have been adopted by the administrative authorities similar measures, more
or less rigorous, respecting prostitutes, considering them prejudicial to the people, although it is true that in the execution of such
measures more humane and less drastic procedures, fortiter in re et suaviter in forma, have been adopted, but such procedures
have always had in view the ultimate object of the Government for the sake of the community, that is, putting an end to the living
together in a certain place of women dedicated to prostitution and changing their domicile, with the problematical hope that they
adopt another manner of living which is better and more useful to themselves and to society.
In view of the foregoing remarks, we should hold, as we hereby hold, that Mayor Justo Lukban is obliged to take back and restore
the said women who are at present found in Davao, and who desire to return to their former respective residences, not in Gardenia
Street, Sampaloc District, with the exception of the prostitutes who should expressly make known to the clerk of court their
preference to reside in Davao, which manifestation must be made under oath. This resolution must be transmitted to the mayor
within the shortest time possible for its due compliance. The costs shall be charged de officio.
ARAULLO, J., dissenting in part:
I regret to dissent from the respectable opinion of the majority in the decision rendered in these proceedings, with respect to the
finding as to the importance of the contempt committed, according to the same decision, by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, and the consequent imposition upon him of a nominal fine of P100.
In the said decision, it is said:
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yigo to
present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4,
1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the
record disclosed, the mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the
provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the Attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of
his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do
so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question
being brought before the court on the day named.
In accordance with section 87 of General Orders No. 58, as said in the same decision, the respondents, for the purpose of
complying with the order of the court, could have, (1) produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ;
(2) shown by affidavits that on account of sickness or infirmity the said women could not safely be brought before this court; and
(3) presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their lawyers waived their right to be present. According to the
same decision, the said respondents ". . . did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; did not
show impossibility of performance; and did not present writings, that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead, a
few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contented with their life in Davao, some of which have since
been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the
women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated by the fact that during this time they were easily
to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the
second hearing by the respondents."
The majority opinion also recognized that, "That court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been
warranted summarily in finding the respondent guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the
order. Their excuses for the non production of the persons were far from sufficient." To corroborate this, the majority decision
cites the case of the Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case ([1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283) and added "that the return did not show that
every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents."
When the said return by the respondents was made to this court in banc and the case discussed, my opinion was that Mayor
Lukban should have been immediately punished for contempt. Nevertheless, a second order referred to in the decision was issued
on December 10, 1918, requiring the respondents to produce before the court, on January 13, 1919, the women who were not in
Manila, unless they could show that it was impossible to comply with the said order on the two grounds previously mentioned.
With respect to this second order, the same decision has the following to say:
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown
a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police
joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and
countercharges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might
reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance
with it.
I do not agree to this conclusion.
The respondent mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, let 17 days elapse from the date of the issuance of the first order on
November 4th till the 21st of the same month before taking the first step for compliance with the mandate of the said order; he
waited till the 21st of November, as the decision says, before he sent a telegram to the provincial governor o f Davao and
naturally this half-hearted effort, as is so qualified in the decision, resulted in that none of the women appeared before this court
on December 2nd. Thus, the said order was not complied with, and in addition to this noncompliance there was the circumstances
that seven of the said women having returned to Manila at their own expense before the said second day of December and being
in the antechamber of the court room, which fact was known to Chief of Police Hohmann, who was then present at the trial and to
the attorney for the respondents, were not produced before the court by the respondents nor did the latter show any effort to
present them, in spite of the fact that their attention was called to this particular by the undersigned.
The result of the said second order was, as is said in the same decision, that the respondents, on January 13th, the day fixed for
the protection of the women before this court, presented technically the seven (7) women above-mentioned who had returned to
the city at their own expense and the other eight (8) women whom the respondents themselves brought to Manila, alleging
moreover that their agents and subordinates succeeded in bringing them from Davao with their consent; that in Davao they found
eighty-one (81) women who, when asked if they desired to return to Manila with free transportation, renounced such a right, as is
shown in the affidavits presented by the respondents to this effect; that, through other means, fifty-nine (59) women have already
returned to Manila, but notwithstanding the efforts made to find them it was not possible to locate the whereabouts of twenty-six
(26) of them. Thus, in short, out of the one hundred and eighty-one (181) women who, as has been previously said, have been
illegally detained by Mayor Lukban and Chief of Police Hohmann and transported to Davao against their will, only eight (8) have
been brought to Manila and presented before this court by the respondents in compliance with the said two orders. Fifty-nine (59)
of them have returned to Manila through other means not furnished by the respondents, twenty-six of whom were brought by the
attorney for the petitioners, Mendoza, on his return from Davao. The said attorney paid out of his own pocket the transportation
of the said twenty-six women. Adding to these numbers the other seven (7) women who returned to this city at their own expense
before January 13 we have a total of sixty-six (66), which evidently proves, on the one hand, the falsity of the allegation by the
respondents in their first answer at the trial of December 2, 1918, giving as one of the reasons for their inability to present any of
the said women that the latter were content with their life in Mindanao and did not desire to return to Manila; and, on the other
hand, that the respondents, especially the first named, that is Mayor Justo Lukban, who acted as chief and principal in all that
refers to the compliance with the orders issued by this court, could bring before December 2nd, the date of the first hearing of the
case, as well as before January 13th, the date fixed for the compliance with the second order, if not the seventy-four (74) women
already indicated, at least a great number of them, or at least sixty (60) of them, as is said in the majority decision, inasmuch as
the said respondent could count upon the aid of the Constabulary forces and the municipal police, and had transportation facilities
for the purpose. But the said respondent mayor brought only eight (8) of the women before this court on January 13th. This fact
can not, in my judgment, with due respect to the majority opinion, justify the conclusion that the said respondent has substantially
complied with the second order of this court, but on the other hand demonstrates that he had not complied with the mandate of
this court in its first and second orders; that neither of the said orders has been complied with by the respondent Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, who is, according to the majority decision, principally responsible for the contempt, to which
conclusion I agree. The conduct of the said respondent with respect to the second order confirms the contempt committed by non-
compliance with the first order and constitutes a new contempt because of non-compliance with the second, because of the
production of only eight (8) of the one hundred and eighty-one (181) women who have been illegally detained by virtue of his
order and transported to Davao against their will, committing the twenty-six (26) women who could not be found in Davao,
demonstrates in my opinion that, notwithstanding the nature of the case which deals with the remedy of habeas corpus, presented
by the petitioners and involving the question whether they should or not be granted their liberty, the respondent has not given due CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO
attention to the same nor has he made any effort to comply with the second order. In other words, he has disobeyed the said two
orders; has despised the authority of this court; has failed to give the respect due to justice; and lastly, he has created and placed MARTIN, respondents.
obstacles to the administration of justice in the said habeas corpus proceeding, thus preventing, because of his notorious
disobedience, the resolution of the said proceeding with the promptness which the nature of the same required.
DECISION
Contempt of court has been defined as a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court; and he is guilty of
contempt whose conduct is such as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or MENDOZA, J.:
disregard. . . ." (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 488.)

It is a general principle that a disobedience of any valid order of the court constitutes contempt, unless the defendant This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
is unable to comply therewith. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 502.) Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers
taken by her from private respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and consent.
It is contempt to employ a subterfuge to evade the judgment of the court, or to obstruct or attempt to obstruct the
service of legal process. If a person hinders or prevents the service of process by deceiving the officer or
circumventing him by any means, the result is the same as though he had obstructed by some direct means. (Ruling The facts are as follows:
Case Law, vol. 6, p. 503.)

While it may seem somewhat incongruous to speak, as the courts often do, of enforcing respect for the law and for
the means it has provided in civilized communities for establishing justice, since true respect never comes in that
way, it is apparent nevertheless that the power to enforce decorum in the courts and obedience to their orders and just
measures is so essentially a part of the life of the courts that it would be difficult to conceive of their usefulness or
efficiency as existing without it. Therefore it may be said generally that where due respect for the courts as ministers
of the law is wanting, a necessity arises for the use of compulsion, not, however, so much to excite individual respect
as to compel obedience or to remove an unlawful or unwarranted interference with the administration of justice.
(Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 487.)
The power to punish for contempt is as old as the law itself, and has been exercised from the earliest times. In
England it has been exerted when the contempt consisted of scandalizing the sovereign or his ministers, the law-
making power, or the courts. In the American states the power to punish for contempt, so far as the executive
department and the ministers of state are concerned, and in some degree so far as the legislative department is
concerned, is obsolete, but it has been almost universally preserved so far as regards the judicial department. The
power which the courts have of vindicating their own authority is a necessary incident to every court of justice,
whether of record or not; and the authority for issuing attachments in a proper case for contempts out of court, it has
been declared, stands upon the same immemorial usage as supports the whole fabric of the common law. . . . (Ruling
Case Law, vol. 6, p. 489.)
The undisputed importance of the orders of this court which have been disobeyed; the loss of the prestige of the authority of the
court which issued the said orders, which loss might have been caused by noncompliance with the same orders on the part of the
respondent Justo Lukban; the damages which might have been suffered by some of the women illegally detained, in view of the
fact that they were not brought to Manila by the respondents to be presented before the court and of the further fact that some of
them were obliged to come to this city at their own expense while still others were brought to Manila by the attorney for the
petitioners, who paid out of his own pocket the transportation of the said women; and the delay which was necessarily incurred in
the resolution of the petition interposed by the said petitioners and which was due to the fact that the said orders were not
opportunately and duly obeyed and complied with, are circumstances which should be taken into account in imposing upon the
respondent Justo Lukban the penalty corresponding to the contempt committed by him, a penalty which, according to section 236
of the Code of Civil Procedure, should consist of a fine not exceeding P1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding months, or both
such fine and imprisonment. In the imposition of the penalty, there should also be taken into consideration the special
circumstance that the contempt was committed by a public authority, the mayor of the city of Manila, the first executive authority
of the city, and consequently, the person obliged to be the first in giving an example of obedience and respect for the laws and the
valid and just orders of the duly constituted authorities as well as for the orders emanating from the courts of justice, and in
giving help and aid to the said courts in order that justice may be administered with promptness and rectitude.
I believe, therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred pesos (P100), there should be imposed upon the respondent Justo
Lukban a fine of five hundred pesos (P500), and all the costs should be charged against him. Lastly, I believe it to be my duty to
state here that the records of this proceeding should be transmitted to the Attorney-General in order that, after a study of the same
and deduction from the testimony which he may deem necessary, and the proper transmittal of the same to the fiscal of the city of
Manila and to the provincial fiscal of Davao, both the latter shall present the corresponding informations for the prosecution and
punishment of the crimes which have been committed on the occasion when the illegal detention of the women was carried into
effect by Mayor Justo Lukban of the city of Manila and Chief of Police Anton Hohmann, and also of those crimes committed by
reason of the same detention and while the women were in Davao. This will be one of the means whereby the just hope expressed
in the majority decision will be realized, that is, that in the Philippine Islands there should exist a government of laws and not a
government of men and that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly Government of laws and to protect
individual liberty from illegal encroachments.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X,
which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or those
further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person
acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as
nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit.
The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and
her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the
documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent,
Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his
knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be
properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined
her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the trial courts decision, petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1 this
Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-i to J-7 of respondents comment in
that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix,
Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For this reason it is contended that the Court
of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondents
complaint.
 Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment.
Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged
that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct
because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr.,
this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be impressed with
merit:2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he
maintains that:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court,
there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the
documents Annex A-I to J-7. On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this
Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order
temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Courts
order, respondents request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject
annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the
truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that point in time, would it have been
malpractice for respondent to use petitioners admission as evidence against him in the legal
separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is- not
malpractice.
Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself
under oath. Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence
against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husbands
admission and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martins
admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order
of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the
documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the
documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this
Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner against the trial courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the
further use of the documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable 3 is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. 4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as
an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. 6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
save for specified exceptions.7But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the
duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA
CATOLICO, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR. J.:
Nor is he a true Servant [who] buys dear to share in the Profit with the Seller.[1]
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to declare private
respondent Antonia Melodia Catolico (hereafter Catolico) not a true Servant, thereby assailing the 30
September 1993 decision[2] and 2 December 1993 Resolution [3] of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93, which sustained the reinstatement and
monetary awards in favor of private respondent [4] and denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[5]
The facts are as follows:
Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation (hereafter
WATEROUS) on 15 August 1988.
On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum[6] from WATEROUS Vice President-General
Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latters
accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another
memorandum[7] to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without
consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the companys control of purchases and,
besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act
was due to negligence, since fellow employee Irene Soliven obtained the medicines in bad faith and
through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting
Dept. Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven. [8]
In a memorandum[9] dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro
warned Catolico against the rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents.
On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an
irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter YSP), which he
described as follows:
A case in point is medicine purchased under our Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 19045 with YSP Sales
Invoice No. 266 representing purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00 per unit.
Previous P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00 while P.O. No. 19045
is priced at P384.00 or an over price of P64.00 per bottle (or total of P640.00). WDRC paid the
amount of P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832 dated December 15, 1988. Verification was
made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed
overpriced. YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference
represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as per their
check voucher no. 629552 (shown to the undersigned), which was paid to Ms. Catolico through
China Bank check no. 892068 dated November 9, 1989....
The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she denied having received it and
that she is unaware of the overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana
Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms.
Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope
containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her talagang ganyan, bukas. It appears that the
amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico.[10]
Forthwith, in her memorandum[11] dated 31 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within
twenty-four hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her
explanation,[12]and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2
February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be
placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company.[13]
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice
No. 266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaas
invasion of her privacy when Saldaa opened an envelope addressed to Catolico. [14]
In a letter[15] to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the
check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a refund of overprice. She also averred
that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her
and Cos secretary, Irene Soliven.
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a
memorandum[16] notifying Catolico of her termination; thus:
We received your letter of explanation and your lawyer's letter dated Feb. 2, 1990 and Feb.
10, 1990 respectively regarding our imposition of preventive suspension on you for acts of
dishonesty. However, said letters failed to rebut the evidences [sic] in our possession
which clearly shows that as a Pharmacist stationed at Espana Branch, you actually made
Purchase Orders at YSP Phils., Inc. for 10 bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00/bottle with
previous price of P320.00/bottle only. A check which you received in the amount
of P640.00 actually represents the refund of over price of said medicines and this was
confirmed by Ms. Estelita Reyes, YSP Phils., Inc. Accounting Department.
Your actuation constitutes an act of dishonesty detrimental to the interest of the
company. Accordingly, you are hereby terminated effective March 8, 1990.
On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair
labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. [17]
In his decision[18] of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair
labor practice against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners
failed to prove what [they] alleged as complainants dishonesty, and to show that any investigation
was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due process. He thus declared the
dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest
of the parties. Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half months pay
for every year of service; back wages for one year; and the additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal
suspension representing 30 days work. Arbiter Lopez computed the award in favor of Catolico as
follows:
30 days Preventive Suspension P 2,000.00
Backwages 26,858.50
1/12 of P26,858.50 2,238.21
Separation pay (3 years) 4,305.15
TOTAL AWARD: P35,401.86
Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because
the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just
cause to terminate her services.
 In its decision[19] of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter
on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolicos dismissal from her
employment. It found that petitioners evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by
YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But,
it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of
Article III of the Constitution.[20] It concluded:
With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of
the constitutional right invoked by complainants, respondents case falls apart as it is bereft
of evidence which cannot be used as a legal basis for complainants dismissal.
The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the
appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in
the computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this special civil action
for certiorari, which is anchored on the following grounds:
I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of facts.
II. Due process was duly accorded to private respondent.
III. Public respondent gravely erred in applying Section 3, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving
commissions from YSP, or probably from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9
November 1989 was not the first or the last. They also maintained that Catolico occupied a
confidential position and that Catolicos receipt of YSPs check, aggravated by her propensity to
violate company rules, constituted breach of confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC,
Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her side of the controversy.
Anent the third ground, petitioners submit that, in light of the decision in the People v. Marti,
[21]
the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of
ones person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagreed
with the NLRC's decision, as it was of the persuasion that (a) the conclusions reached by public
respondent are inconsistent with its findings of fact; and (b) the incident involving the opening of
envelope addressed to private respondent does not warrant the application of the constitutional
provisions. It observed that Catolico was given several opportunities to explain her side of the check
controversy, and concluded that the opportunities granted her and her subsequent explanation satisfy
the requirements of just cause and due process. The OSG was also convinced that Catolicos
dismissal was based on just cause and that Catolicos admission of the existence of the check, as well
as her lame excuse that it was a Christmas gift from YSP, constituted substantial evidence of
dishonesty. Finally, the OSG echoed petitioners argument that there was no violation of the right of
privacy of communication in this case, [22] adding that petitioner WATEROUS was justified in
opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a
business communication in which it had an interest.
In its Comment which we required to be filed in view of the adverse stand of the OSG, the
NLRC contends that petitioners miserably failed to prove their claim that it committed grave abuse
of discretion in its findings of fact. It then prays that we dismiss this petition.
In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners evidence is too flimsy to justify her
dismissal. The check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her
employer. Company rules do not prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients, and there is
no indication in the contentious check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced
medicines. Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right
to privacy and communication; hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it was inadmissible in
evidence.
Catolico likewise disputes petitioners claim that the audit report and her initial response that
she never received a check were sufficient to justify her dismissal. When she denied having received
a check from YSP, she meant that she did not receive any refund of overprice, consistent with her
position that what she received was a token gift. All that can be gathered from the audit report is that
there was apparently an overcharge, with no basis to conclude that Catolico pocketed the amount in
collusion with YSP. She thus concluded that her dismissal was based on a mere suspicion.
Finally, Catolico insists that she could not have breached the trust and confidence of
WATEROUS because, being merely a pharmacist, she did not handle confidential information or
sensitive properties. She was doing the task of a saleslady: selling drugs and making requisitions
when supplies were low.
A thorough review of the record leads us to no other conclusion than that, except as to the third
ground, the instant petition must fail.
Concededly, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an
employee be apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed
ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee
so desires.[23] Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. [24]
In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was
dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after
receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were
joined through said letters. The Supervisors memorandum spoke of evidences [sic] in [WATEROUS]
possession, which were not, however, submitted. What the evidences [sic] other than the sales
invoice and the check were, only the Supervisor knew.
 Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove
just and valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result
in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.[25] Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task.
It is evident from the Supervisors memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of an
alleged anomalous transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not
establish that there was an overcharge. Control Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez, who claims to have
discovered Catolicos inappropriate transaction, stated in his affidavit: [26]
4. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31, 1989, Ms. Catolico in
violation of the [company] procedure, made an under the table deal with YSP Phils. to
supply WDRC needed medicines like Voren tablets at a jack-up price of P384.00 per bottle
of 50 mg. which has a previous price of only P320.00;
5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the discrepancy and I found out that the
cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. The Accounting Department of YSP Phils. through
Ms. Estelita Reyes confirmed that there was really an overprice and she said that the
difference was refunded through their check voucher no. 629552 which was shown to me
and the payee is Melodia Catolico, through a China Bank Check No. 892068 dated
November 9, 1989.
It clearly appears then that Catolicos dismissal was based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes
never testified nor executed an affidavit relative to this case; thus, we have to reject the statements
attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence carries no probative value. [27]
Besides, it was never shown that petitioners paid for the Voren tablets. While Valdez informed
Co, through the formers memorandum[28] of 29 January 1990, that WATEROUS paid YSP P3,840.00
thru MBTC Check No. 222832, the said check was never presented in evidence, nor was any receipt
from YSP offered by petitioners.
Moreover, the two purchase orders for Voren tablets presented by petitioners do not indicate an
overcharge. The purchase order dated 16 August 1989 [29] stated that the Voren tablets
cost P320.00 per box, while the purchase order dated 5 October 1989 [30] priced the Voren tablets
at P384.00 per bottle. The difference in price may then be attributed to the different packaging used
in each purchase order.
Assuming that there was an overcharge, the two purchase orders for the Voren tablets were
recommended by Director-MMG Mario R. Panuncio, verified by AVP-MNG Noli M. Lopez and
approved by Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co. The purchase orders were silent as to
Catolicos participation in the purchase. If the price increase was objectionable to petitioners, they or
their officers should have disapproved the transaction. Consequently, petitioners had no one to blame
for their predicament but themselves. This set of facts emphasizes the exceedingly incredible
situation proposed by petitioners.Despite the memorandum warning Catolico not to negotiate with
suppliers of medicine, there was no proof that she ever transacted, or that she had the opportunity to
transact, with the said suppliers. Again, as the purchase orders indicate, Catolico was not at all
involved in the sale of the Voren tablets. There was no occasion for Catolico to initiate, much less
benefit from, what Valdez called an under the table deal with YSP.
Catolicos dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can
justify an employees dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code
for the termination of employment; [31] and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and
confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employers arbitrariness, whims, caprices,
or suspicion.[32]Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of
employees the term trust and confidence is restricted. [33]
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no
reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti[34] that the Bill of Rights does not protect
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as
counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary,
and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolicos reinstatement would
not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one months salary for every year of service. [35] In this
case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half months salary for every
year of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of
separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and
resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December
1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for
upholding the Labor Arbiters decision, viz., that the evidence against private respondent was
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of
communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set aside.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G. LIMITATIONS (THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE)
DIGEST
JMM PROMOTION VS. CA
Police Power
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing artists
to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment
Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train performing
artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4
step plan to realize the plan which included an Artists Record Book which a performing artist must
acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines
assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts
and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of
FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police power.
Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department
Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate
that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the
women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban
against the deployment of performing artists to high risk destinations, a measure which would only
drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of
screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and
limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of
employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for
exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
AGUSTIN VS. EDU
Generally Accepted Principles of International Law Police Power
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction
No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them
with a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning devices. Agustin is arguing that this order is
unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped
with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the
mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and
would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for
car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor
vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes
on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the
Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna
Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any
motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early
warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking,
that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor
vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the
other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the
petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what
that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an
ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than
decrease, the danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded
by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however,
that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection
safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad
and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of
the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more or less than the powers of
government inherent in every sovereignty was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta
thus: Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v.
Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus
be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the
doctrine, such a competence being referred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The
concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court
in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most essential, insistent,
and at least illimitable powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public
needs. Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: Needs
that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the
nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time. The police power is thus a dynamic agency,
suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the
state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment
of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the particular
police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare
occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None
has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point,
Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same
end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which
was: To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national
roads . . . As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted
by the imperative demands of public safety.
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to
prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples
economic life.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of
which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business,
unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In
case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on
nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry.
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and
property without due process
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
the Act violates international and treaty obligations
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal
protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an
alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification
in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade.
It is this domination and control that is the legislatures target in the enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a
trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he
temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the
State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the
alien may become the potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he
makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now
enjoys a monopolistic control on the nations economy endangering the national security in times of
crisis and emergency
Association of small landowners vs. DAR
175 SCRA 343 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection Valid
Classification
Eminent Domain Just Compensation
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a
call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake
an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated
in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-
farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon
Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and
providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of
their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP)
was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131s) implementation, was
also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives
them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of
ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their
landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their
tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short,
they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different
class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the
ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the
specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred
that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property
shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in
bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the
form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from
the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these
same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both
as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they
belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing
land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners
that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In
any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision
is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused
to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying
small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just
compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the
government even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can
determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial
intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation
determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with
the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the
determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of
eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The
program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash if
everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other
securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.
KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct 1920]
Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the
same interest, filed a complaint for a preliminaryinjunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the
validity of enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the
receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles
delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction was
denied by the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation;
putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar
circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest
that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In view of
the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power
(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.
Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police
power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444,
paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the
municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx.
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between
laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to
decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of
Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no
fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an
attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor
unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they
belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each
every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection for
the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although,
an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such
as that of theappellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but
mostlyArabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast
upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and even if
loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for
failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police power is the
control of private interests for the public welfare.
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a
preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants.
Tablarin vs. Gutierrez [G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987]
Facts: The petitioners seek admission into colleges or schools of medicine. However the petitioners
either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT).
Republic Act 2382 as amended by R.A. 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical Act of 1959 created,
among others, the Board of Medical Education (BME) whose functions include "to determine and
prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine" (Sec. 5 (a). Section 7 of
the same Act requires fromapplicants to present a certificate of eligibility for entrance (cea) to
medical school from the BME. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports, established a uniform admission test called National Medical
Admission Test as additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility.
Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Sec. of educ, BME
from enforcing Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 and from requiring the taking
and passing of the NMAT as condition for securing (cea).
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 violate the constitution
as they prescribe an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement
Held: The legislative and administrative provisions impugned in this case constitute a valid exercise
of the police power of the state.
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation
between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the
one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of
medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health
and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well
recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as
valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-
for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the
regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the
regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of
medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting,
among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude
for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need tomaintain, and the difficulties of
maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular,
in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely known.
The Court believes that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical
schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country."
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON
CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial
park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have
been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon City
engineer required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the
required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 null and void.
Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondents property is a valid and reasonable exercise of
police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of
paupers. They further argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the
exercise of local police power, to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to
law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.
On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or confiscation of
property was obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property
such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of
his property.
Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
Held:
No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1,
Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state
interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation.
These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision
that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City.
Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and
regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City.
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in
question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery.
Police power is defined by Freund as the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use
and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for
public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner
does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof.
Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a city,
by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and the best
and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of
well-ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds
it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community.
A property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are necessary to the common
good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject
to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to
such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the governing
and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The
state, under the police power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the
general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive
inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to
justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.
However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six
(6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to
benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a
public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section
12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to
prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their
burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and
cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177
(q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such
manner as prescribed by law or ordinance it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city
owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been
the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires
payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations
requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other
public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety,
health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the
development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to
home-owners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court
is affirmed.
TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC [207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac.
Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of
the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the
municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the
warehouse of the petitioner created a danger tothe lives and properties of the people in the
neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said
warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to
respondent municipal officials, petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No.
13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the
poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of
houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends
that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the meaningArticle 694 of the
Civil Code
(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional
and void.
Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of
Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal
Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid
municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or
oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5)
must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of
the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of
the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.
People v Fajardo G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958
J. B. L . Reyes
Facts:
 Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance that
prohibits the construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects
the grant of permission to the mayor.
After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station
near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the construction under
the rationale that he needed a house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon.
He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing view.
He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the ordinances
constitutionality.
Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?
Held: No, petition granted.
Ratio:
The ordinance doesnt state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary
and unlimited conferment.
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which
may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance
should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the
authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.
The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants
of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to
a taking of appellants property without just compensation.
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may eliminate
structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of
the community.
Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To do this
legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the
property.
The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. The municipal council shall
have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be
constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a
fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos
for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the
provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.
Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established
fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be
constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said
ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c)
NATIONAL POWER CORP. VS. GUTIERREZ [193 SCRA 1; G.R. No. 60077; 18 Jan 1991]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner filed an action to acquire a right of way over the land of Respondents for the
construction of transmission lines. Petitioner was adjudged to pay the full market value of land
traversed by the transmission lines. Petitioner argued that it was only asking for a right of way.
Issue: Whether or Not the acquisition of the right of way constitutes "taking" and such the case will
be entitled just compensation.
Held: The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. It perpetually deprives Respondents of
their proprietary rights. No plant higher than three meters is allowed below the transmission lines.
Because of high tension current conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life and limbs
cannot be discounted. The owner of the property is entitled to just compensation.
PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA [95 PHIL 46; NO.L-4817; 26 MAY 1954]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together with the law
authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance imposes a
municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-
payment of the same. The law authorizing said ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the city
to impose a municipal occupation tax on persons engaged in various professions. Petitioners, having
already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the
tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court declared the ordinance invalid
and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it.
Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation,
and authorize what amounts to double taxation.
Held: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its
discretion may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not
for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation
taxes aside from that imposed by the National Government. That matter is within the domain of
political departments. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is
imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there is nothing
inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation by
both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is reversed with
regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.
Reyes vs. National Housing Authority (NHA) (January 20, 2003)
Post under case digests, Political Law at Sunday, March 18, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: National Housing Authority filed several expropriation complaints on the sugarland owned by
the petitioners Reyes. The land is located in Dasmarinas, Cavite. The purpose of the expropriation is
for the expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were
relocated from Manila. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots
with payment of just compensation. It was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The petitioners Reyes alleged the failure of the respondents to comply with the Supreme Court order,
so they filed a complaint for forfeiture of their rights before the RTC of Quezon City. They also said
that NHA did not relocate squatters from Manila on the expropriated lands which violate the reason
for public purpose. The petitioners prayed that NHA be enjoined from disposing and alienating the
expropriated properties and that judgment be rendered forfeiting all its rights and interests under the
expropriation judgment.
In the answer of NHA, they already paid a substantial amount to the petitioners. Thus, several issues
are already raised in the expropriation court.
The trial court dismissed the case. It held that NHA did not abandon the public purpose because the
relocation of squatters involves a long and tedious process. It also entered into a contract with a
developer for the construction of a low-cost housing to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries.
The payment of just compensation is independent of the obligation of the petitioners to pay capital
gains tax. Lastly, the payment of just compensation is based on the value at the time the property was
taken.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the property expropriated is taking for public purpose.
Held: The decision appealed is modified.
ownership, control and operation of said water works without just compensation and due process of
law. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss ion the ground that it is not a proper exercise of police
power andeminent domain. The court denied the motion and ordered the defendantsto file an answer.
The court holds that the water works system of Baguio belongs to private property and cannot be
expropriated without just compensation. Sec. 8 of R.A.1383 provides for the exchange of the
NAWASA assets for the value of the water works system of Baguio is unconstitutional for this is not
just compensation. Defendants motion for reconsideration was denied hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not there is a valid exercise of police power ofeminent domain.
Held: R.A. 1383 does not constitute a valid exercise of police power. The act does not confiscate,
destroy or appropriate property belonging to a municipal corporation. It merely directs that all water
works belonging to cities, municipalities and municipal districts in the Philippines to be transferred
to the NAWASA. The purpose is placing them under the controland supervision of an agency with a
view to promoting their efficient management, but in so doing does not confiscate them because it
directs that they be paid with equal value of the assets of NAWASA.

The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over the The Baguio water works system is not like a public road, the park, street other public property held
private properties upon payment of just compensation. Sec. 9, Article III states that private in trust by a municipal corporation for the benefitof the public. But it is a property of a municipal
propertyshall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are corporation, water works cannot be taken away except for public use and upon payment of just
public use and just compensation. compensation. Judgment affirmed.

The expropriation judgment declared that NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners properties for
the public use or purpose of expanding the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project.
MANOSCA VS. CA
The public use is synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare, and
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro
public convenience. The act of NHA in entering a contract with a real estate developer for the
Manila (492 square meters.) When the parcel of land was ascertained by the NHI to have been the
construction of low cost housing cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public
birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution declaring the land
purpose of their taking.
to be a national historical landmark. Which was approved.
Expropriation of private lands for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose
So on on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a
even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and
complaint for expropriation3 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.
service companies and other private concerns.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was
The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized
not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public
sector is in furtherance of the social justice provision under Section 1, Article XIII of the
funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesiani Cristo, a religious entity.
Constitution.
Hence this petition.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise
of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the said parcel of land is for the purpose of public use
may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the
estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.
Held: Petition is DENIED.

The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by
CITY OF BAGUIO V. NAWASA [106 Phil; G.R. No. L-12032; 31 Aug 1959]
most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
Facts: Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a complaint against defendant a public corporation,
created under Act.1383. It contends that the said act does not include within its purview the Baguio
Water Works system, assuming that it does, is unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiff