Iran Gulf Military Balance

Iran and the Gulf Military Balance
Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan
Working Draft
October 3, 2016
1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Anthony H. Cordesman Web version:

Email: acordesman@gmail.com www.csis.org/burke
Washington, DC 20036 Phone: 1.202.775.3270
Acknowledgements:
This analysis draws in part on the work of

Charles Ayers and Joseph Kendall in
preparing and updating the graphic
analyses and force comparisons, and Max
Markusen in editing and updating.
10/3/16 2
Table of Contents
Title Pages
The Changing Gulf Balance 4-7
The Iranian Threat: An Uncertain Mix of Positives and Negatives 8-17
The Military Spending Gap 18-22
The Modernization Gap 23-40
U.S. and Outside Allied Forces: The Other Forces Impacting
on the Regional Balance 41-58
Comparative Military Manpower 59-62
The Challenge of Asymmetric Warfare: Intimidation, Deterrence,
and Warfighting from Iran and Non-State Actors 63-77
The Land Balance in the Gulf 78-89
The Air Balance in the Gulf 90-119
The Naval Balance in the Gulf 119-124
Closing the Gulf: The Iranian Naval-Missile-Air
Threat to Maritime Traffic 125-146
Missile Forces and Threats 147-169
Missile Wars and Missile Defense 170-177
The Uncertain Nuclear and WMD Threat 178-196
10/3/16 3
The Changing Gulf
Balance
10/3/16 4
The Changing Gulf Balance - I
The classic military balance in the Gulf region is driven by an
accelerating arms race between Iran and its Arab Gulf Neighbors. The
Arab countries are decisively winning this arms race.
This aspect of the balance is also shaped by outside forces, particularly
by the level of U.S. commitment and power projection capability to
assisting its Arab security partners, although Russia and China are
potential wild cards.
The balance, however, is also increasingly shaped by internal conflicts
and divisions in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen and the impact of failed state
wars on the relative strategic influence of Iran versus other Arab states
and U.S.
It is also shaped by Irans steadily improving capabilities for
asymmetric warfare in supporting pro-Iran elements in Arab states, in
developing the capability to threaten maritime traffic in and near the
Gulf, and to pose a ballistic and cruise missile threat to its Arab
neighbors that compensates for its limited conventional capabilities.
10/3/16 5
The Changing Gulf Balance - II
The threat of violent religious extremism, and the growing impact of
non-state actors both pose another major set of threats, and make
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency increasingly important aspects
of the military balance.
The P5+1 (JCPOA) nuclear agreement with Iran delays, but does not
end the nuclear and WMD competition between Iran and its Arab
neighbors and the U.S.
The end result seems to be a high level of mutual deterrence between
regional states, mixed with extremist challenges by non-state actors
which do not show any such restraint. This does not, however, prevent
threats to use force by state actors in wars of intimidation, low level
incidents, or proxy wars in competing to support other forces.
It is also a complex mix of different and asymmetric forces, and possible
approaches to warfighting, creates a significant risk that Arab-Iranian
conflicts can start or escalate through miscalculation in unpredictable
ways.
10/3/16 6
The Changing Gulf Balance - III
The risk of conflict is also driven by the actions of non-state actors and
violent extremists and the uncertain internal stability of many regional
states.
These internal stability risks are compounded by sectarian, ethnic, and
tribal tensions, particularly ethnic tensions between Arabs, Persians, and
Kurds, and Sunnis and Shiites.
There has been a massive regional increase in internal security activity,
forces, and costs. The data on these aspects of the balance are so suspect,
however, that it is not possible to assess the trend and scale in
quantitative terms.
The civil balance in terms of the nature of politics, quality of
governance, corruption, economic development and sharing of wealth,
social changes from factors like hyperurbanization, massive population
growth and youth employment problems, has generally deteriorated
since the uprisings of 2011, and is now affected by massive cuts in
petroleum export and tourism income and limited investment.
10/3/16 7
The Iranian Threat:
An Uncertain Mix of
Positives and Negatives
10/3/16 8
Iran: Threat or Competitor
Non-Military Competition
Ideology, religion, and political systems
T e r r o r ism and violent extremism vs. counterterrorism
Energy, sanctions, and global economic impacts
Arms control, arms exports, and arms imports
International diplomacy
Military Competition
W eapons of mass destruction
Conventional forces
Asymmetric and irregular warfare
P roxy use of state and non-state actors
Threat and intimidation
Nations and Sub-Regions of Competition

G u l f Cooperation Council countries
Y emen
Iraq
Jordan
Syria
Lebanon
Israel
Gaza and West Bank
P akistan
Turkey
A fghanistan
Central Asia
Europe
Russia
China
Japan and Asia
V enezuela, Cuba, Brazil
10/3/16 9
Assessing the Full Range of Competition
10
Rhetoric vs. Reality
Reinforcement of Supreme Leader and political rhetoric vs. often solid
military assessments and study of western and outside positions.
Statements can defeat all attacks versus focus on defense in depth
Capability to close the Gulf vs. steadily upgrading asymmetric
capabilities and real world limits.
Nuclear denial vs. nuclear efforts; exaggeration of missile capabilities.
Claims of modernization versus real world limits and failures.
Real but exaggerated progress in Asymmetric warfare.
Exaggerated claims to military production and technology versus
limited reality
Claimed focus on US and Israel versus focus on Israel and GCC
Denial/Understatement of links to non-state actors: Hamas, Hizbollah,
Iraqi militias, Afghan Northern Alliance
10/3/16 11
Key Positives for Iran
The US is Irans Secret Ally: Invasion of Iraq and aftermath;
Messing up Syria from the start, Uncertain & slipping nuclear
redline, faltering effort in Afghanistan, loss of allied confidence, in
Egypt.
Success in Lebanon, growing Syrian dependence, ties to Iraqi Shiites,
presence in Western Afghanistan and role with Hazaras.
Lack of progress and coherence in GCC forces.
Instability of Yemen and Shiite populations in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia,
other GCC states, Yemen.
Asymmetric warfare progress, reposturing, Al Quds, cyber, etc.
Missile and nuclear progress.
Real progress in modernization, adaptation, selective imports.
Integration of regular and revolutionary forces.
Restructuring of Basij, internal security forces.
10/3/16 12
US Destruction of Iraqs Major Forces - I
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
Combat Combat
Main Battle Main Battle
Aircraft: Aircraft:
Tanks: 2003 Tanks: 2012
2003 2012
Iran 1565 1663 283 336
Iraq 2200 336 316 3
Source: Adapted from IISS, The Military Balance 2013, various editions and Janes Sentinel series.
10/3/16 13
US Destruction of Iraqs Major Forces 2003 vs. 2013
10/3/16 14
The Limited Recovery of Iraqs Forces: 2003 vs. 2016
10/3/16 15
Key Negatives for Iran
Unstable Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Uncertain Hamas.
US-led progress, C4I/ISAR, and training progress in GCC forces; Broad Arab
treatment of Iran as threat.
Rising Sunni versus Shiite tensions; limits to Shiite acceptance of Supreme
Leader, any form of Iranian control or proxy role.
High level of effectiveness in limits to arms, technology, and production
imports.
Lack of Power projection assets, maneuver capability, sustained air capability,
and geography of Gulf
Sanctions/delays in nuclear program, impact on military spending, stability.
Lack of nuclear and other WMD weapons, long-rang precision strike
capability. Israeli, Pakistani, US nuclear/missile forces in being; US
conventional long-range strike capability.
Instability of Yemen and Shiite populations in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, other
GCC states, Yemen.
Limits to asymmetric warfare progress, reposturing, Al Quds, cyber, etc.
10/3/16 16
Key Potential Pivots Shaping the Future
Iran deploys functional nuclear forces.
US or Israeli preventive strikes.
Missiles with terminal guidance, extreme accuracy. (w/ or w/o ,missile defenses.
Serious (Shiite) unrest in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
US tensions with GCC states (and Egypt/Jordan). Excessive US force cuts,
spending crisis
Iran access to most modern Russian and Chinese arms: advanced fighters, S-
300/S-400 etc.
Major clash in Gulf
Assad victory or defeat in civil war; clear polarization of Iraq.
Serious Iranian political upheavals, power struggle.
Hostile Iranian involvement in post-2015
Real Iran-Iraq-Syria-Hezbollah axis.
New Arab-Israel Conflict.
10/3/16 17
The Military Spending Gap
10/3/16 18
Military Spending
Trends sharply favor Arab states even if impact of U.S. and
European spending on power projection is ignored.
Estimates are uncertain. Iran and other Gulf states may conceal
significant security spending off budget. But, unlikely to affect trends
or scale of difference.
Iran has advantage from low-cost conscription, control of state
industries.
Lack of coordination, standardization, and interoperability by Gulf
states greatly reduces impact of their advantage in spending.
But, Irans programs have uncertain management, and Iran has
massive disadvantage because of lack of access to modern and high
performance arms imports.
Arab Gulf states can surge arms imports and funding of outside
power projection support in a crisis. Iran cannot to date.
10/3/16 19
Comparative Military Spending: 1997-2009
90,000
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Bahrain 387 427 472 342 355 352 350 191 559 498 550 552 697
Kuwait 3,827 3,614 3,401 3,933 3,614 3,720 3,720 1,275 4,539 3,640 4,002 6,810 6,650
Oman 2,126 1,913 1,701 2,232 2,551 2,445 2,657 2,764 3,210 3,410 3,298 4,657 4,060
Qatar 1,382 1,382 1,488 1,275 1,807 2,020 2,020 2,232 2,327 2,430 1,090 1,750 1,750
UAE 3,614 3,933 4,039 3,189 2,976 2,976 2,976 1,701 2,817 9,888 10,292 13,730 15,470
Saudi Arabia 22,323 23,386 19,878 23,386 26,256 23,599 23,599 20,515 27,000 30,810 34,020 38,200 41,200
GCC Total 33,659 34,655 30,979 34,357 37,559 35,112 35,322 28,678 40,452 50,676 52,142 65,699 69,827
Yemen 437 421 456 529 570 547 596 940 1,001 858 927 1,490 1,550
Iraq 1,982 1,382 1,488 1,488 1,488 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iran 4,996 6,165 6,060 7,972 2,232 3,189 3,189 3,720 6,590 6,759 7,310 9,590 10,000
Gulf Total 41,074 42,623 38,983 44,346 41,849 38,848 39,107 33,338 48,043 58,290 60,379 76,779 81,377
10/3/16 20
Derived from IISS, Military Balance, various editions
The Military Spending Gap Less US, UK, France
$60,000
Defense Spending (in Millions USD)
$50,000
$40,000
$30,000
$20,000
$10,000
$0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Saudi Arabia Iraq Yemen Iran
10/3/16 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 1999-2013 21

The Military Spending Gap in 2015
140
120
2015 Defense Spending in billions of USD
100
80
60
40
20
0
Saudi
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE GCC Total Iran Iraq Jordan Yemen
Arabia
2015 Military Spending 1.53 4.43 9.88 5.09 81.9 14.4 117.23 15.9 21.1 1.3 1.89
10/3/16 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016 22

The Modernization Gap
10/3/16 23
Military Modernization
The gap between Iran and the Arab Gulf states is even greater in terms
of arms transfers than in military spending, and has grown sharply in
favor of the Arab states in recent years.
The broader failure of the GCC to achieve standardization and
interoperability has been offset by the fact the two key Arab Gulf powers
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have made massive and interoperable
arms imports from the U.S.
U.S. forward basing in Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait aids their militaries,
and compensates for some of their weaknesses.
Far more is involved than arms import spending. A review of key
Iranian force elements shows many weapons are obsolete, obsolescent, or
of relatively low quality. Many date back to the Shah or were worn
during the fighting in the Iraq-Iraq War. Non-operational rates are often
high, and sustainability in combat low.
Irans problems are made worse by a lack of access to upgrades to its
systems, modern munitions, sensors, battle management, and IS&R
equipment
10/3/16
and sub-systems. These have a critical cumulative effect. 24
The New Arms Order Gap: Iran vs. GCC
180,000
160,000
GCC Orders from U.S. =

140,000 -- $50.9B in 2007-2010
-- $85.0B in 2011-2014
120,000
Millions of USD
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
-
Saudi
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE GCC Iraq Iran Yemen Total
Arabia
2011-2014 56,400 500 4,000 8,800 6,200 9,100 85,000 21,700 - 200 106,900
2007-2010 29,600 500 3,300 3,000 1,000 13,500 50,900 5,600 700 900 58,100
Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014,

10/3/16 Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2015, pp. 37-38. 0 represents any value below $50 million 25
or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million .
The New Arms Delivery Gap: Iran vs. GCC
60,000
U.S. Deliveries to GCC =

50,000
-- $15.4B in 2007-2010
-- $28.8B in 2011-2014
40,000
Millions of USD
30,000
20,000
10,000
-
Saudi
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE GCC Iraq Iran Yemen Total
Arabia
2011-2014 16,000 400 1,600 3,100 900 6,800 28,800 6,600 100 100 35,600
2007-2010 10,900 500 1,300 500 200 2,000 15,400 2,600 500 400 18,900

The Gap in New Orders and Deliveries Iran vs. GCC
10/3/16 27
The GCC Advantage in Suppliers: New Arms
Agreements in 2007-2010
35,000
30,000
25,000
Millions of USD
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
-
Saudi
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar U.A.E. Iran Iraq Yemen
Arabia
All Others 100 - - - - - 200 200 100
All Other European 1,500 - - - - 1,500 100 500 300
Major West European 14,800 - - 2,800 700 1,700 - 500 100
China - - 300 - 100 100 - 100 -
Russia - - 700 - - - 400 400 400
U.S. 13,200 500 2,300 200 200 10,200 - 3,900 -

The GCC Advantage in Suppliers: New Arms
Agreements in 2011-2014
60,000
50,000
40,000
Millions of USD
30,000
20,000
10,000
-
Saudi
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar U.A.E. Iran Iraq Yemen
Arabia
All Others 100 - - 1,000 - 300 - 3,400 -
All Other European 2,200 100 - 300 900 700 - 1,500 100
Major West European 6,500 - 100 4,400 5,200 600 - 400 -
China 600 - - - - - - 200 100
Russia - 100 400 - - 100 - 7,900 -
U.S. 47,000 300 3,500 2,300 100 7,400 - 8,300 -

The GCC Advantage in Suppliers:
Arms Deliveries in 2007-2014
18,000
16,000
14,000
12,000
Millions of USD
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
-
Saudi Saudi Bahrai Bahrai
Kuwait Kuwait Oman Oman Qatar Qatar U.A.E. U.A.E. Iran Iran Iraq Iraq Yemen Yemen
Arabia Arabia n '07- n '11-
'07-'10 '11-'14 '07-'10 '11-'14 '07-'10 '11-'14 '07-'10 '11-'14 '07-'10 '11-'14 '07-'10 '11-'14 '07-'10 '11-'14
'07-'10 '11-'14 '10 '14
All Others - 100 - - - - - - - - - - 100 300 100 - 100 -
All Other European 700 700 - 100 - - - 100 - 100 300 1,200 200 400 - - 100 100
Major West European 4,300 5,700 - - - - 500 2,300 200 700 500 1,300 100 500 - - - -
China 600 500 - - - 100 - - - - 100 - - 100 - - - -
Russia - - - - - 100 - - - - 300 300 200 2,200 400 100 200 -
U.S. 5,300 9,000 500 300 1,300 1,400 200 700 - 100 800 4,000 2,000 3,100 - - - -

U.S. Arms Sales to the Gulf States and Jordan: 2000-2015
(U.S. Current Dollars in Thousands as of 30.9.2015)
10/3/16 Source: Defense Security Cooperation agency (DSCA), http://www.dsca.mil/print/319. 31

10/3/16 32
Source: Defense Security Cooperation agency (DSCA), http://www.dsca.mil/print/319.
10/3/16 33
10/3/16 34
10/3/16 35
Irans Reliance on Aging/ Mediocre Systems Land
MBT 1,663+: 150 M60A1; 100 Chieftain Mk3/Mk5; 540 T-54/T-55/Type-59/Safir-74;
168M47/M48 (480 T-72Z? 75+ T-62? 150 Zulfiqar?)
LT TK 80+: 80 Scorpion;
New Tanks?
RECCE 35 EE-9 Cascavel
AIFV 610: 210 BMP-1; 400 BMP-2 with 9K111
APC (T) 340+: 140 Boragh with 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 200 M113; BMT-2 Cobra
OAVs?
APC (W) 300+: 300 BTR-50/BTR-60; Rakhsh
SP 292+: 155mm 150+: 150 M109;; 175mm 22 M107; 203mm 30 M110 Attack
TOWED 2,030+; 105mm 150: 130 M101A1; 20 M-56; Copters?
122mm 640: 540 D-30; 100 Type-54 (M-30); 130mm 985 M-46; 152mm 30 D-20;
155mm 205: 120 GHN-45; 70 M114; 15 Type-88 WAC-21; 203mm 20 M115 SP Arty
AIRCRAFT 10 Cessna 185; 2 F-27 Friendship; 4 Turbo Commander 690 PAX 1 Falcon 20
ATK 50 AH-1J Cobra SHORADS?
TPT 173: Heavy 20 CH-47C Chinook; Medium 75: 50 Bell 214; 25 Mi-171; Light 78: 68
Bell 205A (AB-205A); 10 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206)
MANPAD 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail); Misaq 1 (QW-1
Vanguard); Misaq 2 (QW- 18); 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch reported); HN-54
SP 180: 23mm 100 ZSU-23-4; 57mm 80 ZSU-57-2
10/3/16 36
Irans Reliance on Aging/ Mediocre Systems Air
FTR 184+: 20 F-5B Freedom Fighter; 55+ F-5E Tiger II/F- 5F Tiger II; 24 F-7M
Airguard; 43 F-14 Tomcat; 36 MiG- 29A/U/UB Fulcrum; up to 6 Azarakhsh
reported
FGA 110: 64 F-4D/E Phantom II; 10 Mirage F-1E; 30 Su- 24MK Fencer D; up to 6 New
Saegheh reported Fighters?
ATK 10: 7 Su-25K Frogfoot; 3 Su-25UBK Frogfoot (incl. 4+ Su-25K/UBK deployed
in Iraq; status unclear) ISR?
ASW 5 P-3MP Orion
Tankers?
ISR: 6+ RF-4E Phantom II*
TKR/TPT B-707; 2 B-747 UCAVs?
TPT 117: Heavy 12 Il-76 Candid; Medium 19 C-130E/H Hercules; Light 75: 11
An-74TK-200; 5 An-140 (Iran-140 Faraz) (45 projected); 10 F-27 Friendship; 1 L- S-300/S-
1329 Jetstar; 10 PC-6B Turbo Porter; 8 TB-21 Trinidad; 4 TB-200 Tobago; 3 Turbo
400?
Commander 680; 14 Y-7; 9 Y-12; PAX 11: 2 B-707; 1B-747; 4 B-747F; 1 Falcon 20;
3 Falcon 50
HELICOPTERS
MRH 2 Bell 412
TPT 34+: Heavy 2+ CH-47 Chinook; Medium 30 Bell 214C (AB-214C); Light 2+: 2
Bell 206A Jet Ranger (AB-206A); some Shabaviz 2-75 (indigenous versions in
production);some Shabaviz 2061
10/3/16 37
Irans Reliance on Aging/ Mediocre Systems Air Defense
Air Defense Force Note:

SAM 529+: Russia has
delivered
250 FM-80 (Crotale); 30 Rapier; 15 Tigercat; the TOR-M
150+ MIM-23B I-HAWK/Shahin; 45 S-75 Dvina (SA-2
Russian S-
Guideline); 10 S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); 29 9K331Tor-M1 300 in
(SA-15 Gauntlet) (reported) Delivery.
MANPAD FIM-92A Stinger; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail) Initial
Army deployment
at Fordow
SP HQ-7 (reported)
MANPAD 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7
Grail); Misaq 1 (QW-1 Vanguard); Misaq 2 (QW-11); Igla-S (SA-
24 Grinch - reported); HN-54
38
10/3/16
Irans Reliance on Aging/ Mediocre Systems Naval
FSGM 2 Jamaran (UK Vosper Mk 5 1 more
undergoing sea trials) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802
(CSS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 single lnchr with SM-1
SAM, 2 triple 324mm Mk32 ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel
landing platform
Upgrades
FSG 5
?
3 Alvand (UK Vosper Mk 5) with 2 twin lnchr with
C-802 (CSS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 triple Mk32 Does it
324mm ASTT, 1 114mm gun matter?
2 Bayandor (US PF-103) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802
(CSS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 triple 324mm Mk32 ASMs?
ASTT, 1 76mm gun
PCFG 14 Kaman (FRA Combattante II) with 12 twin lnchr SSMs?
with C-802 AShM, 1 76mm gun
MSI 2 Riazi (US Cape) Air/UAVs
LSM 3 Farsi (ROK) (capacity 9 tanks; 140 troops) ?
LST 4 Hengam each with up to 1 hel (capacity 9 tanks;
225 troops)
LSL 6 Fouque
10/3/16 39
The GCC Threat to the GCC
Vast lead in military spending and arms imports
Support from US, Britain, France
But,
Failure to create effective structures within the GCC for command, force
planning, defense support. far too much a matter of faade and rhetoric.
Lack of national unity, common facilities, de facto dependence on U.S. Far too
much a Saudi-UAE alliance with Oman on the outside.
Poor mission focus with limited coordination
Poor adaptation to asymmetric/irregular warfare, effective cooperation in
counterterrorism, internal security.
Lack of integration, standardization, operational intreroperability
Problems in large-scale exercises and training; military realism
Problems in jointness including security services, police, and intelligence and
combined arms.
Lack of balanced force development: Manpower quality and sustainability
10/3/16 40
U.S. and Outside Allied
Forces:
The Other Forces Impacting
on the Regional Balance
10/3/16 41
The Role of Outside Forces
The balance is not simply regional. The U.S., Britain, France, and Turkey
regularly support the Arab Gulf states, and they and other European
states play an active role in Iraq and the coalition against ISIS.
The U.S, Britain, and France all have bases in the Gulf region.
The U.S. has a massive lead in global military spending and the
deployment of new weapons and technology in spite of limited recent cuts
in baseline spending.
The West has given the Arab Gulf states a massive lead over Iran in
modern weapons and imports of military technology.
The U.S. role is not determined by the forces it deploys in the region at
any given time, but by its power projection capabilities.
The U.S. offers the Arab Gulf states a monopoly over Iran in access to
satellite intelligence and advanced battle management and IS&R systems,
and major assistance through common military exercises.
10/3/16 42
SIPRI Estimate of Global Military Spending: 2014-2015
National Share of Total

for Top 15 Spenders
Source: SIPRI, Trends in Global Military Expenditure, April 5, 2016, https://www.google.com/search?q=sipri+military+spending&ie=utf-8&oe=utf- 43

8,
ISIS Estimate of Global Military Spending: 2015
Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 2016, p. 19. 44

US Defense Budget: FY2001-FY2021
Budgets Since 9/11
Proposed Outyear Topline for Base Budget
10/3/16 Source: (OSD) Comptroller,Defense Budget Overview, February 2016, p. I-5 45

US Deployments Directly Affecting the Gulf: Early 2016 - I
ARABIAN SEA: US Central Command Navy 5th Fleet: 1 DDGHM; 1 LHD; 1 LPD; 1 LSD; Combined
Maritime Forces TF 53: 1 AE; 2 AKE; 1 AOH; 3 AO
BAHRAIN: US Central Command 3,250; 1 HQ (5th Fleet); 2 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY: US Strategic Command 550; 1 Spacetrack Optical Tracker at
Diego Garcia; 1 ground-based electro optical deep space surveillance system (GEODSS) at Diego Garcia
US Pacific Command 1 MPS sqn (MPS-2 with equipment for one MEB) at Diego Garcia with 5
logistics and support
ships; 1 naval air base at Diego Garcia, 1 support facility at Diego Garcia
DJIBOUTI: US Africa Command 1,200; 1 tpt sqn with C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 1 spec ops sqn with MC-
130H; PC-12 (U-28A); 1 CSAR sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk; 1 naval air base
EGYPT: MFO 692; 1 ARNG recce bn; 1 ARNG spt bn
INDIAN OCEAN: US European Command US Navy 6th Fleet: 1 DDGHM

IRAQ: US Central Command Operation Inherent Resolve 3,500; 1 inf div HQ; 1 mne coy; 1 atk hel coy
with AH-64D Apache; MQ-1B Predator
ISRAEL: US Strategic Command 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Mount Keren
JORDAN: US Central Command Operation Inherent Resolve 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-16C Fighting Falcon;
1 AD bty with MIM-
104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3
KUWAIT: US Central Command 13,000; 1 armd bde; 1 ARNG (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 spt bde; 1 atk sqn
with 12 A-10C Thunderbolt II; 4 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3; 1 (APS) armd bde set; 1
(APS) inf bde set
10/3/16 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016, pp. 50-52
46
US Deployments Directly Affecting the Gulf: Early 2016 - II
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: US European Command US Navy 6th Fleet: 4 DDGM; 1 LHD; 1 LPD; 1
LSD; 1 LCC
MIDDLE EAST-UN: UNTSO 2 obs
PACIFIC OCEAN: US Pacific Command US Navy 3rd Fleet: 8 SSBN; 17 SSGN; 10 SSN; 4 CVN; 9
CGHM; 18 DDGHM; 6 DDGM; 4 FFHM; 3 MCO; 2 LHD; 1 LHA; 3 LPD; 3 LSD; US Pacific Command
US Navy 7th Fleet: 1 FFHM
GULF: US Central Command Navy 5th Fleet: 2 DDGM; 10 PCO; 6 (Coast Guard) PCC; Combined
Maritime Forces CTF-152: 4 MCO; 1 AFSB
QATAR; US Central Command 8,000: 1 bbr sqn with 6 B-1B Lancer; 1 ISR sqn with 4 RC-135 Rivet
Joint; 1 ISR sqn with
4 E-8C JSTARS; 1 tkr sqn with 24 KC-135R/T Straotanker; 1 tpt sqn with 4 C-17A Globemaster; 4 C-
130H/J-30 Hercules; 2
AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3; US Strategic Command 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar
SAUDI ARABIA: US Central Command 350
TURKEY: US European Command 1,550; 1 FGA sqn with 6 F-15C Eagle; 6 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 atk
sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-1B Predator UAV; 1 spec ops flt with AC-
130U Spectre; 1 air base at Incirlik; 1 support facility at Ankara; 1 support facility at Izmir; US
Strategic Command 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kurecik; NATO Active Fence: 2 AD bty with
Patriot PAC-2/3
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: US Central Command 5,000: 1 ftr sqn with 6 F-22A Raptor; 1 FGA sqn
with 12 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 ISR sqn with 4 U-2; 1 AEW&C sqn with 4 E-3 Sentry; 1 tkr sqn with 12
KC-10A; 1 ISR UAV sqn with RQ-4 Global Hawk; 2 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3
10/3/16 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016, pp. 50-52
47
US Army Global Power Projection: 2016
10/3/16 Source: U.S. Army, February 2016, http://www.asafm.army.mil/offices/BU/BudgetMat.aspx?OfficeCode=1200

48
US Navy and Marine Corps Global Power
Projection: 2016
49
Source: U.S. Navy, February 2016, http://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Pages/Fiscal-Year-2017.aspx
US 5th Fleet:
2016
Headquartered
in Bahrain
Source: USCENTCOM.
8.9.16,
http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Ta
sk-Forces/.
50
US Air Force Global Power Projection: 2016
51
Source: U.S. Air Force, February 2016, http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/
US Air Force Expeditionary Forces: 2016
AFCENT Forces deploys 5 Expeditionary Wings in the region: the 379th, 380th, 386th, 438th, and 456th.
The 379th Air Expeditionary Wing is is the largest, most diverse expeditionary wing in the Air Force with
more than 90 combat and support aircraft, including eight coalition airframes. Aircraft come from every US
service as well as the United Kingdom, Singapore and Australia. Combined, these forces t providing
provide combat airpower and combat support for Operations NEW DAWN, ENDURING FREEDOM and
through support of the Joint Task Force HORN of AFRICA.
The 380th Air Expeditionary Wing is home to approximately 3,000 personnel completing one of the most
diverse combat wings in the Air Force. The wing is comprised of six groups and 26 squadrons. Its mission
partners include an Army air defense battalion and a Navy aerial maritime surveillance detachment.
The 386th Air Expeditionary Wing has a diverse mission, which canvases the U.S. Central Command area of
responsibility. The 386th AEW provides airlift support for Operation Enduring Freedom and the Horn of
Africa. The wing is comprised of the 386th Expeditionary Maintenance, Mission Support, Medical and
Operations Groups and the 387th Air Expeditionary Group.
The 386th Air Expeditionary Wing is a Train, Advice, Assist Command - Air (TAAC-Air), headquartered at
Forward Operating Base Oqab, Kabul, Afghanistan, has two air advisory groups at Hamid
Karzai International Airport and Kandahar Airfield. TAAC-Air's mission is to train, advise, and assist our
Afghan partners to develop a professional, capable, and sustainable Air Force.
The 455th Air Expeditionary Wing is one of two Air Force wings in Afghanistan and supports members
deployed throughout the country as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. It is the primary combat wing in
Afghanistan. The commander is supported by a wing staff and oversees five Air Force groups located at
Bagram Airfield and Kandahar Airfield, with additional with additional detachments within Afghanistan.
10/3/16 52
Source: U.S. Air Forcehttp://www.afcent.af.mil/Units.aspx, accessed 8.9.16
Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC)
at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar
The Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, provides command and control of air power
throughout Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and 17 other nations. The CAOC is comprised of a joint and Coalition team that executes
day-to-day combined air and space operations and provides rapid reaction, positive control, coordination, and de-confliction of
weapon systems. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Joshua Strang)
Mission
The Combined Air Operations Center Weapons System, also known as the AN/USQ-163 Falconer Weapon System, commands
and controls the broad spectrum of what air power brings to the fight: Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power.
Located in the Air Forces Central theater of operations, the CAOC provides the command and control of airpower throughout
Iraq, Afghanistan and 18 other nations.
Serving as the operational bridge that integrates and synchronizes strategic decisions to tactical level execution, the CAOC is
comprised of a vast array of people, programs and processes that execute day-to-day combined air and space operations and
provides rapid reaction, positive control, coordination and deconfliction of weapons systems.
Function
Functioning as the nerve center of the air campaign, the CAOC plans, monitors and directs sortie execution, close air
support/precision air strike; Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance; airlift; air refueling; aerial evaluation; air drop, and
countless other mission critical operations.
Facility
The CAOC is a true joint and Coalition team, staffed by U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and Coalition
partners. Construction began in July 2002. A Total Force team of active duty, Air National Guard and Reserve personnel worked
on the project. The CAOC - both team members and equipment - was fully operational Feb. 18, 2003.
Built at a cost of $60 million, the project involved installation of more than 67 miles of high-capacity and fiber optic cable. This
capability created the most advanced operations center in history. Keeping these systems humming requires hundreds of
people, working in satellite communications, imagery analysis, network design, computer programming, radio systems,
systems administration and many other fields. With thousands of computers, dozens of servers, racks of video equipment and
display screens, the facility resembles the set of a futuristic movie.
10/3/16 Source: USCENTCOM, http://www.afcent.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/4822/Article/217803/combined- 53

air-operations-center-caoc.aspx
US and Allied Air Operations in Iraq/Syria: 2014-2016
10/3/16 Source: U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent- 54

Resolve. ,
Illustrative Coalition of the Actually Deployed ISIS/Syria War
Air Deployments in U.S.-Led Coalition Fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and Russian Air Units in Syria:
November 2015,
United States
Turkey
United Kingdom Russia
Cyprus Syria
(Incirlik Air Base)
(RAF Akrotiri) (Basel al-Assad Air Base)
6 F-15C Eagle Ftr ac
12 A-10C Thunderbolt II Atk ac 8 Tornado GR4 FGA ac 12 Su-24M Fencer FGA ac
1 Sentinel R1 ISR ac 4 Su-30SM FGA ac
1+ AC-130U Atk ac
Kuwait 4 Su-34 Fullback FGA ac
MQ-1B Predator CISR UAV
(Ali al Salem AB) 10 Su-25SM Frogfoot Atk ac
Jordan
MQ-9A Reaper CISR UAV 2 Su-25UBM Frogfoot
(Mowafaq al Salti Air Base )
6 F-16V Fighting Falcon FGA ac Qatar Atk ac
(Al Udeid Air Base) 1 Il-20M ELINT ac
Kuwait
1 RC-135W Rivet Joint ELINT 12 Mi-24P Hind Atk hel
United States
ac 6 Mi-8AMTSh Hip TPT hel
(Ahmed al Jaber Air Base)
12 A-10C Thunderbolt II Atk ac
(Ali al Salem Air Base) Netherlands
MQ-1B Predator CISR UAV Jordan
MQ-9A Reaper CISR UAV (Mowafaq al Salti Air Base )
Qatar 4 F-16AM Fighting Falcon
(Al Udeid Air Base) Ftr ac
6 B-1B Lancer Bbr ac
4 RC-135V/W Rivet Joint ELINT ac Australia
UAE UAE
(Al Dhafra Air Base) (Minhad Air Base)
6 F-22A Raptor Ftr ac 6 F/A-18A Hornet FGA ac
12 F-15E Strike Eagle FGA ac
U-2S ISR ac Canada
RQ-4B Global Hawk ISR UAV Kuwait (to be withdrawn)
(Ahmed al Jaber Air Base)
France 6 CF-18A Hornet FGA ac
Jordan 2 CP-140A Aurora MP ac
(Mowafaq al Salti Air Base)
3 Mirage 2000D FGA ac Italy
3 Mirage 2000N FGA ac Kuwait
UAE (Ahmed al Jaber Air Base)
(Al Dhafra Air Base) 4 Tornado IDS FGA ac (ISR
6 Rafale FGA ac only)
1 Atlantique 2 MP ac MQ-1B Predator ISR UAV
10/3/16 IISS estimate in the 2016 edition of the Military Balance as of November, 2015, pp. 312 and 315 55
Illustrative Coalition of the Semi Deployed - Yemen
Deployments in Saudi-UAE.-Led Coalition Fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq: November 2015, and Russian Air
Units in Syria
10/3/16 IISS estimate in the 2016 edition of the Military Balance as of November, 2015, p. 315. 56
The Wild Cards in Outside Support
Uncertain U.S. domestic politics, future security commitments, and
willingness to act decisively under pressure. Focus on terrorism threat versus
other threats.
Declining European military spending and uncertain future power
projection capabilities, particularly as they affect Britain and France.
Impact of Chinas expanding forces, role in Indian Ocean, new Silk Road(s)
and port facilities, and basing rights in Djibouti.
Growing Russian tension with U.S. and West, future Russian arms sales to
and alignments with Iran, use of power projection capabilities.
Future Character and Role of Turkey.
The impact on the Gulf of the civil wars and fighting against ISIS in Syria
and Iraq, future roles of Iran, Kurds, and broader Sunni-Shiite tensions.
Impact on the Gulf of any future Israeli conflict with Hezbollah, Palestinians.
Impact of a major political upheaval in any Gulf State.
Outcome of the fighting in Yemen,
10/3/16 57
Playing the Wild Card: Russian Forces Used or Deployed
in Syria Through July 2016
10/3/16 Source: Adapted from Wikipedia and reporting in the New York Times and Washington Post. 58
Comparative Military
Manpower
10/3/16 59
Military Manpower
Does reveal one key area of Iranian superiority: Total land force manpower.
But,
No metric is used more often in media or has less meaning. Largely
irrelevant unless tied to function, quality, training, and readiness.
Most data represent nominal authorized totals, may or may not relate to
reality.
Conscripts often poorly trained, supported. Lack effective ability to fight
modern weapons.
Paramilitary and internal security forces differ wildly in quality from
elite forces to the equivalent of armed lamp posts.
Uncertain, but real move towards giving junior officers and NCOs more
authority and independence.
Promotion sometimes not tied to valid performance; family or political.
Reserves generally too low in quality to matter in most contingencies.
Arab Gulf Forces often dependent on civilian contractors for
sustainability and support.
10/3/16 60
Comparative Military Manpower: 2016
600000
500000
400000
300000
200000
100000
0
Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen
Army 350000 54000 75000 6000 11000 25000 8500 44000 60000
Guard 125000 100000 6400 12000
Air 30000 4000 20000 1500 25000 5000 1500 4500 3000
Air Def. 3000 16000 2000
Navy 18000 3000 13500 700 2000 4200 1800 2500 1700
Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016.
Note: Given current civil war, accurate and current force counts for Yemen are difficult to determine.
10/3/16 Therefore, unless otherwise noted, force numbers from Yemen are drawn from the 2015 IISS Military 61
Balance.
Comparative Paramilitary Manpower: 2016
160000
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
Navy 18000 3000 13500 700 2000 4200 1800 2500
MOI Forces
Militias 100,000 20000
Coastguard 4500 260 500 400 1200
Border Guard 9000 10500
Special Security 500
Police 36000 9000
Facilities Security Force 9000
Guard 2000 6600 4000
Other 50000 50000
Basij
10/3/16 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016 62

The Challenge of Asymmetric
Warfare:
Intimidation, Deterrence, and

Warfighting from Iran and
Non-State Actors
10/3/16 63
Asymmetric/Irregular Warfare
There is no clear dividing line between terrorism, asymmetric warfare, and
conventional warfare.
There also is no clear line at which deterrence and intimidation move from
limited or deniable acts of violence to war.
Cyber and Internet warfare have become key components of the balance.
Strategic communications/propaganda/political/ideological/warfare are often
dominated by civilians.
Coalition warfare is increasingly coalitions of willing and able state and non-state
actors.
Ideological, religious, political, and economic warfare may rely on the balance of
deterrence and warfighting capability without using force or suddenly trigger its
use in asymmetric forms.
Laws and restraint are steadily weakening. Civilians and human shields have
become de facto weapons of war.
As Russian has shown, power projection can become a key form of asymmetric
warfare.
10/3/16 64
The Growing Role of Non-State Actors
Range from serious Non-State Forces to Lone Wolf attacks.

Large-scale mass killings, IEDs and bombings
Insurgents, however, are not terrorists, but asymmetric forces
Emerging sectarian and ethnic forces forces play a growing role,
particularly Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite and Sunni PMFs, Sunni Arab rebel
groups in Syria, and various Kurdish Forces.
Quasi-state actors also play a growing role through train and assist
missions, embedded advisors, volunteers, groups like Iranian Al Quds force.
Civilians increasingly play a role as both non-state actors and as hostages
and human shields.
Contractors and support personnel are de facto non-state actors if they
support combat operations.
So are covert Special Forces, personnel, and intelligence forces like the CIA
and MOIS.
10/3/16 65
Non-State Armies - I
ISIS, ISIL/Daesh Kurdish Pesh Merga
90,00-150,000 with police
60,000 maximum including volunteers with little combat
capability
MBT T-54; T-55; T-62
20,000-35,000 fighters
RECCE EE-9 Cascavel
10,000-15,000 inIraq
AIFV 2+ EE-11 Urutu
APC (T) MT-LB; YW-701 (Type-63)
MBT M1A1 Abrams*; T-55; T-62; T-72AV; T-72M1
APC (W) M1117 ASV; Werwolf MkII
RECCE BRDM-2
PPV HMMWV; M1114 (up-armoured HMMWV); ILAV
AIFV BMP-1; BTR-4*
Cougar 6x6; Otokar APV; IAG Guardian; Streit Spartan;
APC
Caiman; Maxxpro; Reva; up to 14 Dingo 1
APC (T) M113*; MT-LB
ARTY
APC (W) M1117 ASV*
SP 122mm 2S1
PPV ILAV Cougar*; Dzik-3*
TOWED 87.6mm 1+ 25 pdr: 122mm 6+ D-30
ARTY
MRL 107mm Type 63 (tch); 122mm BM-21 (inc mod);
SP 122mm 2S1
HM20
TOWED 122mm D-30; 130mm M-46/Type-59; 155mm
MOR 60mm M224; 81mm M252; 120mm M120; 130mm
M198*
M-46/Type-59; 152mm D-20
MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21
AT
MOR 120mm M120
MSL MANPATS HJ-8; 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger);
AT
9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14
MSL MANPATS 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel);
Spriggan); up to 60 Milan
9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14
RCL 73mm SPG-9; 88mm Breda Folgore; 84mm up to 43
Spriggan); Milan
Carl Gustav; up to 1,000 AT-4; 105mm M40
RCL 73mm SPG-9; 90mm M-79 Osa (reported); 106mm
RL 110mm up to 400 Panzerfaust 3
M40A1*
AD
AD
GUNS
SAM MANPAD FN-6; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail);
SP 14.5mm ZPU-1 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-4 (tch)
9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin)
20mm 53T2 Tarasque (tch); 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch/on MTLB);
GUNS
57mm ZSU-57; S-60 (tch)
SP 14.5mm ZPU (tch); 23mm ZSU-23-4; ZSU-23 (tch);
TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2; ZPU-4: 20mm 53T2
57mm S-60 (tch)
Tarasque; 57mm S-60
TOWED 23mm ZU-23; 57mm S-60
ARV 1+ Type-653
AIRCRAFT
Reported access to KRG transport/utility helicopters
10/3/16 Rough estimate based on IISS, Military Balance, 2016, pp. 490-492 66
Non-State Armies - I
Hezbollah
7,000-10,000 actives (4,000-8,000 in Syria

20,000 reserves
MBT T-72
ARTY MRL 122mm BM-21; 240mm Fadjr 3;
330mm Fadjr
5; 610mm Zelzal 2 (reported)
AT MSL MANPATS 9K111 Malyutka (AT-3
Sagger);
9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K115-2 Metis-M (AT-
13
Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan); Milan
MSL SRBM Fateh 110/M-600 (reported); SS-1D
Scud C
(reported); SS-1E Scud D (reported)
AD SAM MANPAD some possible
UAV some*
UCAV some
10/3/16 Rpugh estimate based on IISS, Military Balance, 2016, pp. 490-492 67
Most Likely Iranian Threats
Are Not Formal Conflicts
Direct and indirect threats of using force. (I.e. Iranian

efforts at proliferation)
Use of irregular forces and asymmetric attacks.
Proxy conflicts using terrorist or extremist movements
or exploiting internal sectarian, ethnic, tribal, dynastic,
regional tensions.
Arms transfers, training in host country, use of covert
elements like Quds force.
Harassment and attrition through low level attacks,
clashes, incidents.
Limited, demonstrative attacks to increase risk,
intimidation.
Strike at critical node or infrastructure.
10/3/16 68
The Broader Patterns in Iranian Activity
Iranian Actors Related States/ Target/Operati

Non-State Actors ng
Country
Revolutionary Guards Iran Iraq

Al Qaeda force Syria Israel
Vevak/other intelligence Hezbollah Egypt
Arms transfers Hamas Kuwait
Military and security advisors Mahdi Army Bahrain
Clerics, pilgrims, shrines Yemeni Shiites Syria
Commercial training Bahraini Shiites Yemen
Finance/investment Saudi Shiites Lebanon
Investment/training companies Afghanistan
Education: scholarships, teachers Venezuela
Cultural exchanges
Athletic visits
10/3/16 69
Blending Conventional and Asymmetric: Irans Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps - I
Close ties to Supreme Leader, steadily emerging power base relative to regular forces, in terms of
impact on industry, role in Gulf and ballistic/cruise missiles.
Estimates of total manning differ sharply, as do estimates of detailed order of battle.
Has range of different land-air-sea components plus Al Quds Force for support of foreign forces, and
Basij for defense in depth and internal security.
Estimate based largely on IISS 2016 Military Balance:
Controls Irans IRBM, MRBM, and SRBM missile forces, longer range UAVs/UCAVs/cruise missiles.
100,000+ in land forces with heavy reserve elements, and external defense, and power projection roles.
Nominal order of battle is 31 provincial corps HQ (2 in Tehran), 3 special operations divisions, 2 armored
divisions, 3 armored brigades, 8+ light infantry divisions, 5+ light infantry brigades, 1 airborne brigade.
(Equipment holdings not estimated separately.)
Naval branch has 15,000 men plus 5,000 Marines with 1 Amphibious Brigade. Has some shore batteries plus
HY-2 (CSS-C-3 Seersucker) and other land-based anti-ship missiles. Has 46 missile patrol boats with mix of C-
701 (Kosar); C-704 (Nasr); C-802;and HY-2 (CSS-C-3 Seersucker) missiles, 35 larger patrol boats without
missiles, 32 smaller patrol boats, speedboats with high explosives in prow, 4 LST landing ships (2 can lay
mines).
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force controls Irans strategic missile force. Has 1 brigade with
Shahab-1/2, 1 battalion with Shahab-3; Ghadr-1; Sajjil-2 (in development). Force has 22+ MRBMs: 12+
Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (mobile); 10 Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (silo); some Sajjil-2, and 18+ SRBMs including Fateh 110;
12-18 Shahab-1/2 (200300 missiles) and some Zelzal.
Basij Resistance Force -- up to 1,000,000 men on mobilization. The IISS describes this as Paramilitary militia,
with claimed membership of 12.6 million; perhaps 1 million combat capable; in the process of closer integration
with IRGC Ground Forces.
10/3/16 Source: Adapted from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel 70
Security Assessment - The Gulf States, Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems, April 12, 2016.
Blending Conventional and Asymmetric: Irans Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps - II
IHS Janes indicates:

Commanded by Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari.
Land forces train for both conventional and asymmetric warfare, and mosaic warfare in irregular defense in
depth tactics for attrition warfare. They have some 100,000 personnel, two armored divisions, five mechanized
divisions, up to 18 infantry divisions, as well as independent brigades, special forces elements, paratroop units in
some 31 detachments. Armor has T-54/55/69/72 tanks, APCs. 48th "Fath" Brigade secures Irans Kurds. 33
province-based special units known as Saberin (Patients), able to conduct long-range operations of various types
for a prolonged period of time, and with limited logistic support.
Naval Branch has some 20,000 personnel, trained in asymmetric warfare, including up to four naval infantry
brigades with limited sealift capabilities. Equipped withspme313 vessels including 10 Houdong missile patrol
boats with C-802 anti-ship missiles, morethan 40 other fast attack craft (with unguided rockets, missiles and
some with mine-laying capabilities), coastal defense of anti-ship missiles, up to 20 midget-submarines and
swimmer delivery vehicles. Based on islands and coastal areas like Siri Island, Farsi, Halileh, Abu Musa,
Khorramshahr, Larak, and Bandar Abbas. Coastal defence forces have naval guns and HY-2 'Seersucker' land-
based anti-ship missiles in five to seven sites along coast.
IRGCAF has five brigades. Deploys 250 FROG 7, 200 Oghab, 250 Shahin-2, 500 Nazet/Iran130, Fateh 110, Fateh
A-100, Fath-110D1, 200 Tondar 69, 250 Shahab-1, 50 Shahab-2, 25 Shahab-3, 18 BM-25,Qaim-1, and Emad.
Some 600,000 Basij regularly train for internal security and defense in attrition forms of defense in depth.
The Iranian Al Quds/Qods/Jerusalem Force
Part of IRGC, but reports directly to Supreme Leader.

Commander is Major General Qasem Soleimani
2,000 to 30,000 personnel? More likely to be smaller, more elite.
Origin is support Kurds against Saddam in Iran-Iraq War. Has steadily
expanded into support of Lebanese Hizbollah, and roles in Syria, Afghanistan,
Iraq, Latin America.
Supported creation of Hizbollahs in other countries.
May be organized into regional directorates: Europe and U.S , Iraq,
Israel/Lebanon/Jordan/Palestinian, Afghanistan/India/Pakistan, Turkey,
North Africa, FSU/Latin America?
Roles include combatants, forward advisors, train and assist, arms
transfers, intelligence. Played key role in IED supply in Iraq in 2003-2011
Coordinates with IRGC, and evidently with MOI/Vevak
10/3/16 72
Iranian Influence
Source: New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/30/world/middleeast/middle-east-alliances-saudi-

10/3/16 arabia-iran.html?_r=0 73
The Shiite Crescent
10/3/16 Source: CIA Factbook 74

Bahrains Vulnerability
Ethnic groups:
Bahraini 46%, non-Bahraini 54% (2010 census)
Languages:
Arabic (official), English, Farsi, Urdu
Religions:
Muslim (Shia and Sunni) 81.2%, Christian 9%,
other 9.8% (2001 census)
Population:
1,281,332 July 2013 est.
country comparison to the world: 157 note:
includes 235,108 non-nationals
Age structure:
0-14 years: 20% (male 130,097/female
126,067)
15-24 years: 15.9% (male 113,973/female
89,602)
247,873)
23,352)
65 years and over: 2.6% (male 16,262/female
17,685) (2013 est.)
\
10/3/16 75
Source: CIA World Factbook, September 28, 2016
Yemen and the Gate of Tears
10/3/16 Source: EIA, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=WOTC 76

Amphibious Ships & Landing Craft
30
25 Ferries and cargo vessels

can provide substantial
additional lift if can secure
20 ports
15
10
0
Amphibious Ships 1 1
Landing Craft 23 16 9 5 1 28 3
Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions, Janes Sentinel series,
10/3/16 and material provided by US and Saudi experts.. 77
The Land Balance in the Gulf
10/3/16 78
The Land Balance
IRGC has superior manpower and mass, as well as large artillery forces. Arab
Gulf states have better weapons, more armor.
Iraq no longer has the forces to directly challenge Iran, but Iran would have to
attack through Iraq by land to reach Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, and would be
exposed to massive precision air attacks.
Neither sides forces are designed, well-organized, or trained to sustain long-range
maneuver warfare.
Iran has limited forced entry amphibious warfare training, and any amphibious
force could face a major air and naval threat.
The balance in joint warfare favors the Arab Gulf states in defensive warfare,
particularly with U.S. precision air strike support.
But, the Kuwaiti hinge is vulnerable.
Much depends on Iraqs future military relations with Iran.
The uncertain unity of GCC and Arab Gulf forces makes teffective collective
defense uncertain.
The land threat also includes violent extremist and non-state actors. Civil conflicts
are a real threat.
79
10/3/16
Irans
Strategic
Depth
10/3/16 80
Comparative Land Force Manpower
1000000
900000
800000
700000
600000
500000
400000
300000
200000
100000
0
Paramilitary 40000 145000 24500 11260 7100 4400 71200
Guards 100000 6400 12000
IRGC 125000
Reserves 350000 23700
Army 350000 54000 75000 6000 11000 25000 8500 44000 60000

Note: Kuwaits Reserves include all branches of their military. Their actual ground reserve manpower is lower, but by
10/3/16 how much is not available to IISS. Also, Irans 1,000,000 man Basij Resistance force is not included because it would 81
skew the balance of forces.
Comparative Land Force Combat Units - I
70
SF Company
Independent Infantry Company
60 SF Regiment
Guard Regiment
SF Battalion
50 Commando Battalion
Guard Battalion
Security Brigade
40 Airborne Brigade
SF Brigade
Commando Brigade
30
Mechanised Brigade
Armoured Brigade
Guard Brigade
20
Infantry Brigade
Commando Division
Motor Division
10
Mechanised Division
Armoured Division
Infantry Division
0
Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC

10/3/16 82
Comparative Land Force Combat Units - II
Units (size and type) Iran Iraq Saudi Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Yemen
Infantry Division 8 4
Armoured Division 2 1
Mechanised Division 4
Motor Division 2
Commando Division 1 1
Infantry Brigade 17 1 1 2 27
Guard Brigade 1 1 1
Armoured Brigade 10 4 1 3 1 1 2 12
Mechanised Brigade 16 5 3 3 2 11
Commando Brigade 6
SF Brigade 1 2 1
Airborne Brigade 2 1
Security Brigade 1
Guard Battalion 1
Commando Battalion 1
SF Battalion 1
Guard Regiment 1
SF Regiment 1
Independent Infantry Company
SF Company 1
Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and

coastguard forces
10/3/16 83
Comparative Armor
Ground Forces Land Equipment
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
Saudi
Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait UAE Yemen
Arabia
AIFV 240 610 1,667 25 40 0 432 765 405 200
APC 2,502 640 3,981 200 190 206 260 1,573 1,552 258
LT TK/RECCE 73 115 790 22 92 174 11 310 181 130
MBT 270 1,663 1,771 180 30 117 293 730 421 880
MBT LT TK/RECCE APC AIFV
Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016. All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance,
2015 due to lack of date from 2016 due to the ongoing conflict.
10/3/16 84
Comparative Main Battle Tanks
Comparative Main Battle Tanks
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
Saudi
Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait UAE Yemen
Arabia
MBT 270 1,663 1,771 180 30 117 293 730 421 880
MBT
Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016. All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military
10/3/16 Balance, 2015 due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict. 85
Comparative Modern Tank Strength, 2016
Comparative Modern Tanks
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen
M-1A2 218 200
M-60A1 150 6 50
M-60A3 180 73 290
Challenger 2 38
Leclerc 340
M-84 75
T-72 120 480 70
OF-40 36
Zulfiqar 150
Zulfiqar OF-40 T-72 M-84 Leclerc Challenger 2 M-60A3 M-60A1 M-1A2
10/3/16 2015 due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict. 86
Comparative Artillery
Artillery, Rockets, Mortars
10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
Saudi
Iraq Iran Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait UAE GCC Yemen
Arabia
Self-propelled artillery 48 292 82 28 24 106 224 181 645 25
Towed Artilliery 60 2,030 36 12 108 0 110 93 359 310
Multiple Rocket Launchers 3 1,476 9 6 0 27 60 74 167 294
Mortars 950 5,000 24 45 101 78 437 227 912 642
Mortars Multiple Rocket Launchers Towed Artilliery Self-propelled artillery
Power Projection Limits
Army not structure for sustained maneuver outside Iran.
Limited land/air and air/sea capabilities.
Ethnic and/or sectarian limits on occupation and influence.
Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah, Hammas, Hazara not proxies
Land movement must sweep through Iraq to Kuwaiti hinge or Ar Ar in
Saudi Arabia.
Very limited amphibious forced entry capability with no credible air cover.
Closing the Gulf triggers major war Iran must lose, shuts on trade to
Iran.
Al Quds, arms transfer, volunteers, and training either need strong host
country partner or are spoiler functions.
Spoiler function more irritant than way of achieving goals.
Proliferation breed proliferation, missile breed missiles and missile
defenses.
Intimidation leads to added reliance on US.
10/3/16 88
The Kuwaiti Hinge
89
10/3/16
The Air Balance in the Gulf
10/3/16 90
The Air Balance
The Arab Gulf states have a decisive advantage in combat aircraft numbers and
quality, munitions quality, battle management, AC&W, and IS&R.
This advantage is reinforced by U.S. ad European power projection, stealth, real
time targeting, and precision strike capabilities.
Irans surface-to-air missile systems and land-based sensors are equally limited
relative to Gulf Arab and U.S. Systems.
Irans present vulnerabilities could give Arab and U.S. forces both air superiority and
survivable deep strike capabilities in a matter of days.
Irans infrastructure and military bases have many critical point targets that are
vulnerable to civilian precision strike.
Irans efforts to produce it own aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems have had
very limited results, although Iran has been able to keep systems operable and make
useful modifications of its own.
Irans ballistic and cruise missile systems offer a potential counter to Arab Gulf and
Western airpower, but now lack the required combination of precision strike
capability and conventional warhead lethality to be effective.
Russian and increasingly China can offer far more modern air and land-based air
defense systems. The Russian sale of the TOR-M and S300 are cases in point.
10/3/16 91
10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24, 2016 92
Air/Missile Threats
Precision air strikes on critical facilities: Raid or mass
attack.
Terror missile strikes on area targets; some chance of
smart, more accurate kills.
Variation on 1987-1988 Tanker War
Raids on offshore and critical shore facilities.
Strikes again tankers or naval targets.
Attacks on US-allied facilities
Use of UAVs as possible delivery systems (conventional or
Unconventional munitions)
But:
Weak capability, high vulnerability to counterstrikes, poor
escalation ladder
High risk of US and allied intervention.
Limited threat power projection and sustainability.
10/3/16 Unclear strategic goal. 93
Range of Irans Air Power

Range of GCC Air Power

Comparative Gulf Fixed Wing Combat Air Strength
Fixed Wing Combat

Air Strength
400
40% to 60%
of Iranian
350
inventory is
300
not
operational
250
200
150
100
50
0
Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016. All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance, 2015
due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict.
Note: Only armed or combat-capable aircraft are counted, not trainers, recce or other aircraft. Iraq has 6 Cessna AC-208Bs
10/3/16 fulfilling dual recce and attack roles. Furthermore, 40-60% of Irans force are not operational. 96
Comparative Fighter/Attack Aircraft in 2016
Comparative Fighter/Attack Aircraft in 2016
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen
Typhoon-2 53 53
Tornado ADV
Tornado IDS 69 69
Mirage 2000 79 12 67
Mirage F-1E 10
MiG-29 36 16
MiG-25
MiG-21/21U 18
Su-25 7 10
Su-24 30 31
Su-20/22
F-18 39 39
F-16 4 123 21 24 78
F-15S 70 70
F-15C/D 81 81
F-14 43
F-7M 24
F-5 B/E/F 75 12 12 10
F-4D/E 64
Jaguar S/B
L-159 ALCA 9
Saegheh 6
Azarakhsh Azarakhsh Saegheh
6 L-159 ALCA Jaguar S/B F-4D/E F-5 B/E/F F-7M F-14
F-15C/D F-15S F-16 F-18 Su-20/22 Su-24 Su-25 MiG-21/21U
MiG-25 MiG-29 Mirage F-1E Mirage 2000 Tornado IDS Tornado ADV Typhoon-2
10/3/16 97
Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016; and the Janes Sentinel series
Comparative High Quality Fighter/Attack Aircraft
High Quality Fighter/Attack Aircraft
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Iraq Iran GCC Bahrain Qatar Oman Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen
Typhoon-2 53 53
Tornado ADV
Tornado IDS 69 69
Mirage 2000 79 12 67
MiG-29 36 16
MiG-25
Su-25 7 10
Su-24 30 31
Su-20/22
F-18 39 39
F-16 4 123 21 24 78
F-15S 70 70
F-15C/D 81 81
F-14 43
F-7M 24
F-5 B/E/F 75 12 12 10
F-4D/E 64
Saegheh 6
Saegheh F-4D/E F-5 B/E/F F-7M F-14 F-15C/D F-15S F-16 F-18
Su-20/22 Su-24 Su-25 MiG-25 MiG-29 Mirage 2000 Tornado IDS Tornado ADV Typhoon-2
10/3/16 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016. All numbers from Yemen are taken from IISS, Military Balance, 98
2015 due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict.
10/3/16 102
10/3/16 103
Comparative Gulf AC&W, ELINT, and Reconnaissance
Aircraft, 2016
Comparative Gulf AC&W, ELINT, and Reconnaissance Aircraft
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
CH-2000 8
Cessna 208B 3 8
SB7L-360 2
Da-20 Falcon ELINT
RF-4E 6
Mirage 2000 RAD 7
E-3A AWACS
Tornado IDS 69
P-3MP Orion 5
P-F3 Orion
P-F3 Orion P-3MP Orion Tornado IDS E-3A AWACS Mirage 2000 RAD RF-4E Da-20 Falcon ELINT SB7L-360 Cessna 208B CH-2000
10/3/16 2015 due to lack of date from 2016 because of the ongoing conflict.
105
Gulf Reconnaissance and AWACS Aircraft
Gulf Reconnaissance and AWACS Aircraft
18
16
14
12
10
0
Da-20 Falcon 3
P-3F 3
RF-4E 6
Mirage 2000 RAD 7
Cessna 208B 8 8
SB7L-360 2
E-3A 5
Tornado GR1A 12
Tornado GR1A E-3A SB7L-360 Cessna 208B Mirage 2000 RAD RF-4E P-3F Da-20 Falcon
Gulf Attack & Naval Helicopters
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
AH-1F 12
L-159 2
Mi-28NE 9
RH-53D 3
Mi-25 24
Mi-35 16 8
AS-332 Exocet 7
Commando Exocet 8
SH-3D 10
AH-1E 16
AH-1J 50
SA-342 HOT 11 13
AS-532 Exocet 3 10
AS-560C3
AS-565 15 7
AH-64 16 39 30
AH-64 AS-565 AS-560C3 AS-532 Exocet SA-342 HOT AH-1J
AH-1E SH-3D Commando Exocet AS-332 Exocet Mi-35 Mi-25
RH-53D Mi-28NE L-159 AH-1F
Gulf Armed Helicopters in 2016
Armed Helicopters
90
120
83 83
80 78
100
70
60
80
50
60 39
40
32
30
25
40 22
20 16
20 10 8
0
0
Helicopters 73 65 34 39 16 29 109 102 8
Country Major SAM Light SAM AA Guns
Bahrain 8 I Hawk MIM-23B 6 0 R BS-70 27 guns

18 FIM-92A Stinger 1 5 Oerlikon 35 mm
7 Crotale 12 L/70 40 mm
Iran 16/150 I Hawk SA-7/14/16, HQ-7 1,700 Guns

3/10 SA-5 29 SA-15 ZSU-23-4 23mm
45 SA-2 Guideline S o me QW-1 Misaq ZPU-2/4 23mm
29 TOR-M1 ZU-23 23m m
Some HN-5 M-1939 37mm
5/30 Rapier S-60 57mm
10 Pantsyr (SA-22) ZSU-57 - 2
Some FM-80 (Ch Crotale)
15 Tigercat
Gulf ____________
Iraq
Some FIM-92A Stinge r
Land- Kuwait 5 / 24 I Hawk Phase III

5/40 Patriot PAC-2
12
12
Aspide
S t a rburst Aspide
Stinge r
12 Oerlikon 35mm
Based Oman None Blowpipe

8 Mistral 2 SP
12 Panstsyr S1E
26 guns
4 ZU-23-2 23 mm
10 GDF-005 Skyguard 35
Air mm
34 SA-7
6 Blindfire S713 Martello
20 Javelin
12 L-60 40 mm
Defen
40 Rapi e r
Qatar None 10 Blowpipe ?
ses
12 FIM-92A Sting e r
9 Roland II
24 Mistra l
20 SA-7
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
In ________________________________________________
Saudi Arabia 1 6 /128 I Hawk
4-6/16-24 Patriot 2
17/73 Shahine Mobile
40 Crotale
5 00 Stinger (ARMY)
5 00 Mistral (ADF)
92
1,220 gun s
M-163 Vulcan 20 mm
30 M-167 Vulcan 20 mm
2011 (NG )
16/96 PAC-2 launchers
17 ANA/FPS-117 radar
73/68 Crotale/Shahine
500
5 00 FIM-43 Redeye
R e d e ye (ADF )
7 3 -141 Shahine static
128
8 50 AMX-30SA 30 mm
G DF Oerlikon 35mm
1 50 L-70 40 mm (in store)
130 M-2 90 mm (NG)
UAE 2/6/36 I Hawk 20+ Blowpipe 62 guns

20 Mistral 42 M-3VDA 20 mm SP
Some Rapier 20 GCF-BM2 30 mm
Some Crotale
Some RB-7 0
Some Javeli n
Some SA-18
Yemen S o me SA-2, 3 Some 800 SA-7 530 gu n s
Some SA-6 SP Some SA-9 SP 20 M-163 Vulcan SP 20mm
Some SA-13 SP 50 ZSU-23-4 SP 23 mm
Some SA-14 100 ZSU-23-2 23 mm
150 M-1939 37 mm
50 M-167 20mm
120 S-60 57 mm
40 M-1939 KS-12 85 mm
Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, Periscope, JCSS, Middle East
10/3/16 Military Balance, Janes Sentinel and Janes Defense Weekly. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author. 109
Comparative Land-Based Air Defenses: 2016
Country Major SAM Light SAM AA Guns
Bahrain Total: 6 Total: 7+ Total: 24
6 MIM-23B I-HAWK 7 Crotale 12 Oerlikon 35mm
RBS-70 12 L/70 40mm
FIM-92A Stinger
Iran Total: 205+ Total: 529+ Total: 1,122+
150+ MIM-23B I-HAWK/Shahin SP HQ-7 (reported) ZU-23 23mm
10 S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon) 250 FM-80 Crotale Oerlikon 37mm
45 S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) 30 Rapier 100 ZSU-23-4 23mm
15 Tigercat 80 ZSU-57-2 57mm
29 9K331 Tor- M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet ) (reported) ZPU-2 14.5mm
FIM-92A Stinger ZPU-4 14.5mm
S300 in Delivery 9K32 Strela- 2 (SA-7 Grail )
9K36 Strela- 3 (SA-14 Gremlin )
300 ZU-23-2 23mm
92 Skyguard 35mm
Misaq 1 (QW-1 Vanguard ) M-1939 37mm
Misaq 2 (QW-18) 50 L/70 40mm
9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch ) (reported) 200 S-60 57mm
HN-54 300 M-1939 85mm
Iraq Total: N/A Total: 3+ Total: Unknown
3+ 96K6 Pantsir- S1 (SA-22 Greyhound ) ZU-23 23mm
M1097 Avenger S-60 57mm
9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch )
Kuwait Total: 40 Total: 24+ Total: 12+
40 MIM-104D Patriot PAC-2 FIM-92A Stinger 12+ Oerlikon 35mm
Starburst
12 Aspide
12 Skyguard/Aspide
Oman Total: N/A Total: 62+ Total: 26
8 Mistral 2 4 ZU-23-2 23mm
14+ Javelin 10 GDF-005 35mm
9K32 Strela- 2 (SA-7 Grail ) 12 L/60 40mm
40 Rapier
Qatar Total: N/A Total: 33+ Total: N/A
24 Mistral
9 Roland II
Blowpipe
FIM-92A Stinger
9K32 Strela -2 (SA-7 Grail )
Saudi Arabia Total: 394 Total: 940+ Total: 1,380
128 MIM-23B I-HAWK 40+ Crotale 122 M163 Vulcan 20mm
108 MIM-140D/F Patriot PAC-2 GEM/PAC-3 400 M1097 Avenger 850 AMX-30SA 30mm
73 Shahine 500 Mistral 128 GDF Oerlikon 35mm
68 Crotale/Shahine FIM-92A Stinger 150 L/70 40mm (stored)
17 AN/FPS-117 Radar 130 M2 90mm
UAE Total: Unknown Total: 50+ Total: 62
MIM-23B I-HAWK Blowpipe 42 M3 VDAA 20mm
Patriot PAC-3 Mistral 20 GCF-BM2 30mm
Crotale
RB-70
50 96K6 Pantsir -S1
Rapier
Javelin
9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse )
10/3/16
Yemen* N/A N/A N/A
110
Major Surface-to-Air Missile Systems - I
10/3/16 111
Major Surface-to-Air Missile Systems - II
10/3/16 112
Major Surface-to-Air Missile Systems - II
10/3/16 113
10/3/16 114
10/3/16 115
10/3/16 116
Illustrative Iranian UAV Projects /Assets
Prime Designation Development Operation Payload Endurance Range Ceiling Mission
Manufacturer / Production Wt. (hr.) (ft.)
Unknown Stealth Underway / Deployed 700 R/S*
Underway km
HESA Ababil Complete / Deployed 45 kg 1.5+ 150 14,000 Multiple variants for
(Swallow) Underway km R/S* - attack ISR**
Shahbal Shahbal Underway 5.5 kg 12 km 4,500 R/S*

Group, Sharif
Univ.
Asr-e Talai Mini-UAV Underway Surveillance
Factories
FARC Sobakbal Underway / Deployed 0.35 kg 2 2.7 - 19,686 Surveillance
Underway 13.5
mi
Qods Mohajer Complete / Deployed Multirole aka Lightning
Aeronautics II/III Underway Bolt Target drone -
Industries (Dorna); aka Target 3000
Mohajer IV
(Hodhod);
Saeqeh I/II;
Tallash
I/Endeavor;
Tallash II
Hadaf 3000
Iran is developing a range of UCAVs, and has made recent claims
to a long-range stealth UCAV bomber
Source: Adapted by Adam C. Seitz from AIAA Aerospace 9 Worldwide UAV Roundup; available at:
10/3/1 http://www.aiaa.org/Aerospace/images/articleimages/pdf/UAVs_APR2009.pdf. 117
6 *R/S: Reconnaissance / Surveillance; **ISR: Intelligence / Surveillance /Reconnaissance
Key Targets that Illustrate Irans Vulnerability
Critical dependence on refineries with high cost, long lead facilities and on
imports of product.
Minimal power grid that can be crippled or destroyed selectively on a
regional or national basis.
Gas production and distribution facilities needed by Irans domestic
economy.
Key bridges, tunnels, overpasses and mountain routes for road and rail
traffic.
Gulf tanker loading facilities, oil storage and and tanker terminals for
mining or direct attack.
Key military production facilities
Command and control centers.
Communications grids.
Airfield and air bases.
IRGC land, air, and naval facilities.
Coastal naval bases and port facilities.
10/3/16 118
The Naval Balance in the Gulf
10/3/16 119
The Naval Balance
There really is no naval balance in so limited an AOR, just a naval
component to joint naval-air-missile warfare.
Surface, submarine, and air-sea warfare dominated by U.S. naval and air
presence;
Arab Gulf states have superior modern surface ships.
Iran has lead in asymmetric warfare, land-based anti-ship missiles.
Mine warfare is a key issue. Iran has over 6,000 mines and stocks of smart
mines; can use virtually any surface ship to emplace them.
Submarines and submersibles, dispersing smaller ships will allow Iran to
operate for a while, but capability is uncertain, as is value of such operations.
Both sides face reality that any major conflict can escalate to broader land
and air, shut off or sharply cut petroleum exports.
Arab-U.S. joint warfare advantage less clear if Iran can lock the conflict into
a low level irregular war of attrition where decisive escalation is difficult.
Balance would shift if Iran could gain basing in Yemen.
10/3/16 120
Naval Threats
Low intensity naval war of attrition, random acts of mining, raids, etc.
Iranian effort to close the Gulf.
Iranian permissive amphibious/ferry operation.
Variation on 1987-1988 Tanker War
Raids on offshore and critical shore facilities.
Deep strike with air or submarines in Gulf of Oman or Indian Ocean.
Attacks on US and allied (ally) facilities
But:
Very weak air-sea capabilities, vulnerable escalation ladder.
Unclear strategic goal.
10/3/16 121
Total Naval Forces
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Support 50 21 2 2 6 2 5 2
Amphibious Ships 17 1 1 1
Landing Craft 11 16 9 4 5 1 28 3
Mine 5 7 2 1
Other Patrol 108 32 70 6 42 42 16 6 39
Missile Patrol 68 9 4 10 4 7 20
Corvettes 7 4 2 2 9
Frigates 4 1 3
Destroyers 3
Submarines 29 2 10
10/3/16 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and coastguard forces 122
Key Combat Warships and Submersibles in 2016
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Missile Patrol 68 9 4 10 4 7 20
Major Surface Combatants 7 1 3
Submarines 29 2 10
Submarines Major Surface Combatants Missile Patrol
Missile-Armed Combat Warships
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Corvettes 7 4 2 2 9
Frigates 4 1 3
Destroyers 3
Patrol Boats with Guided Missiles (PBG) 8
Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missles with CIWS missile
2
or SAM (PCFGM)
Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missles (PCFG) 14 9 4 2 4 7 6
Fast Patrol Boat with Guided Missles (PBFG) 54 12
Source: Adapted from IISS, The Military Balance, Periscope, JCSS, Middle East Military Balance, Janes Sentinel and
10/3/16 Janes Defense Weekly. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author. 124
.
Closing the Gulf:
The Iranian Naval-Missile-Air

Threat to Maritime Traffic
10/3/16 125
Closing the Gulf
Far better for political leverage and intimidation than in actual fighting.
So critical to world economy may well lead to immediate military intervention;
so critical to Gulf economies that will push Arab states to decisive escalation to
force Iran to halt.
U.S. and Arab Gulf can achieve rapid air superiority, put Iranian targets at
risk. Iranian conventionally armed missiles now too inaccurate to be real
counter threat.
Even conflict contained to Gulf affects exports and imports of Iran as well as
Arab Gulf states.
Also pushes all Arab Gulf states to act together.
Limited military action and attrition might work, but still presents major risk
of escalation.
The key issue is can every incident or clash be controlled, what happens if
Irans leadership feels it faces a critical threat to its survival.
10/3/16 126
Most Alternative Routes Have Little or No Surplus
Capacity or Are Not Operating
10/3/16 EIA: 127

http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/images/Oil%20and%20Gas%20Infrastructue%20Persian
%20Gulf%20%28large%29.gif
IRGC Naval Forces
The IRGC has a naval branch consists of approximately 20,000 men, including marine units of around
5,000 men.
The IRGC is now reported to operate all mobile land-based anti-ship missile batteries and has an array
of missile boats; torpedo boats; catamaran patrol boats with rocket launchers; motor boats with heavy
machine guns; mines as well as Yono (Qadir)-class midget submarines; and a number of swimmer
delivery vehicles.
The IRGC naval forces have at least 40 light patrol boats, 10 Houdong guided missile patrol boats
armed with C-802 anti-ship missiles.
The IRGC controls Irans coastal defense forces, including naval guns and an HY-2 Seersucker land-
based anti-ship missile unit deployed in five to seven sites along the Gulf coast.
The IRGC has numerous staging areas in such places and has organized its Basij militia among the
local inhabitants to undertake support operations.
IRGC put in charge of defending Iran's Gulf coast in September 2008 and is operational in the Gulf
and the Gulf of Oman, and could potentially operate elsewhere if given suitable sealift or facilities.
Can deliver conventional weapons, bombs, mines, and CBRN weapons into ports and oil and
desalination facilities.
Force consists of six elements: surface vessels, midget and unconventional submarines, missiles and
rockets, naval mines, aviation, and military industries.
Large numbers of anti-ship missiles on various types of launch platforms.
Small fast-attack craft, heavily armed with rockets or anti-ship missiles.

10/3/16 128
Source: Adapted from IISS, The Military Balance 2011, various editions and Janes Sentinel series
Iranian Gulf Military Installations
Bandar-e Khomeini (3025'41.42"N, 49 4'50.18"E)
Bandar-e Mahshahr (3029'43.62"N, 4912'23.91"E)
Khorramshahr (3026'2.71"N, 4811'34.25"E)
Khark Island (2914'48.01"N, 5019'48.88"E)
Bandar-e Bushehr (2858'2.58"N, 5051'50.74"E)
Asalouyeh (2727'21.08"N, 5238'15.55"E
Bandar-e Abbas (Naval base: 27 8'35.79"N, 5612'45.61"E; IRGCN missile boat base: 27 8'30.91"N, 5612'5.58"E; IRGCN torpedo &
MLRS boat base: 27 8'21.13"N, 5611'53.28"E; Hovercraft base and nearby naval air strip: 27 9'15.68"N, 56 9'49.97"E)
Jask (2540'40.90"N, 5751'4.54"E)
Bostanu (27 2'58.22"N, 5559'3.22"E)
Chabahar
IRGCN base. It is the farthest east of all of Irans military port facilities.
Qeshm (2643'10.09"N, 5558'30.94"E)
Sirri Island (2553'40.20"N, 5433'7.82"E)
Abu Musa (2552'22.32"N, 55 0'38.62"E)

Occupied by Iran but claimed by the UAE. Suspected to house a small number of IRGCN forces. Also known to house HAWK
SAMs and HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship missiles.
Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb (GT: 2615'54.33"N , 5519'27.75"E; LT: 2614'26.08"N, 55 9'21.18"E)
Occupied by Iran but claimed by the UAE. Home to heavily fortified airstrips and AA guns.
Abu Musa
10/3/16 130
Source: Google maps
Key Iranian and Gulf Ships for Asymmetric Warfare
A wide range of
civilian ships,
including small craft
and ferries, and
aircraft can easily be
adapted for, or used
as is, for such
missions
10/3/16 Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Janes Sentinel series; Saudi experts 131
Patrol Boats
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Fast Patrol Boat (PBF) 51 6 25 32 3 7 58 10
Patrol Boats 42 20 64 33 20 31 9 59 28
PTG 15
Off-shore Patrol Craft (PCO) 2 4 1
Coastal Parol Craft (PCC) 4 3
Riverine Patrol Boat (PBR) 6
Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missles with CIWS
2
missile or SAM (PCFGM)
10/3/16 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and coastguard forces
132
Missile Armed Patrol Boats
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missles with CIWS
2
missile or SAM (PCFGM)
Midget Submarines
IS-120 Qadir midget submarine
Number in Service: 16
Displacement: 120 tons
Speed: 11 kts surfaced/8 kts submerged
Max Depth: Unknown
Armament: 2 x 533 mm torpedoes. Can carry mines instead of torpedoes. Some
reporting indicates that MANPADs are carried aboard.
Electronics: I Band surface search or navigation
Sonar: Active/Passive
Nahong-class:
Number in Service: 1
Displacement: 100 tons
Speed: 8kts
Max Depth: 200 m
Armament: 2 x 533 mm torpedoes in drop collars. Can also carry 4 MDM-6 or EM-52
smart mines.
Electronics: Surface search or navigation radar.
Sonar: Bow-mounted active/passive sonar.
EW: ESM mast similar to Russian Stop Light type.
Note: The Nahong is reportedly stationed in the Caspian Sea, but can be transported
overland to the Gulf.
Mine Warfare Ships
0
Ocean Mine Sweeper (MSO) 1
Ocean Mine Hunter (MHO) 2
Coastal Mine Hunter (MHC) 3
Coastal Mine Countermeasures (MCC) 4
Inshore Mine Sweeprs (MSI) 2
Coastal Mine Sweepers (MSC) 3

Note: A wide range of civilian and military ships, including small craft and aircraft can easily be adapted or used
as is for mine laying, including the use of free floating mines
10/3/16 135
Amphibious Ships & Landing Craft
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
Amphibious Ships 17 1 1 1
Landing Craft 11 16 9 4 5 1 28 3

10/3/16 Note: Ferries and cargo vessels can provide substantial additional lift if can secure ports. 136
Hormuz: Breaking the Bottle at the Neck
280 km long, 50 km wide

at narrowest point.
Traffic lane 9.6 km wide,
including two 3.2 km wide
traffic lanes, one inbound
and one outbound, separated
by a 3.2 km wide separation
median
Antiship missiles now have
ranges up to 150 km.
QuickTime and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
Smart mines, guided/smart

torpedoes,
Floating mines, small boat
raids, harassment.
Covert as well as overt
sensors.
137
10/3/16 Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/hormuz_80.jpg; DOE/EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, 137

February 2011,
Hormuz: Depth EIA Estimate in 11/2014:
The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most important

chokepoint with an oil flow of 17 million barrels per day
in 2013, about 30% of all seaborne-traded oil.
Located between Oman and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz
connects the Persian Gulf with the
Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The Strait of Hormuz
is the world's most important oil chokepoint because of
its daily oil flow of 17 million barrels per day in 2013.
Flows through the Strait of Hormuz in 2013 were about
30% of all seaborne-traded oil.
EIA estimates that more than 85% of the crude oil that
moved through this chokepoint went to Asian markets,
based on data from Lloyd's List Intelligence tanker
tracking service.
Japan, India, South Korea, and China are the largest
destinations for oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz.
Qatar exported about 3.7 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year
of liquefied natural gas (LNG) through the Strait of
Hormuz in 2013, according to BP's Statistical Review of
World Energy 2014.This volume accounts for more than
30% of global LNG trade.
Kuwait imports LNG volumes that travel northward
through the Strait of Hormuz.
At its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is 21 miles
wide, but the width of the shipping lane in either
direction is only two miles wide, separated by a two-
mile buffer zone.
The Strait of Hormuz is deep and wide enough to handle
the world's largest crude oil tankers, with about two-
thirds of oil shipments carried by tankers in excess of
150,000 deadweight tons.
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/special_topics
10/3/16 /World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf. 138
The Entire Gulf: Breaking the Bottle at Any Point
Pipelines available as bypass options
Most potential options to bypass Hormuz

are currently not operational. Only
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates
(UAE) presently have pipelines able to ship
crude oil outside of the Persian Gulf and
have additional pipeline capacity to
circumvent the Strait of Hormuz.
At the end of 2013, the total available
unused pipeline capacity from the two
countries combined was approximately
4.3 million bbl/d
Operating pipelines
that bypass the
Strait of Hormuz
Source: EIA,
10/3/16 https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/special_topics 139
/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf.
Map of Arabian Sea
10/3/16 140
Location of Gulf Oil Fields
Hunbli
141
10/3/16 141
Source: M. Izady, 2006 http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml
Avoiding Hormuz: Limited Options
Most potential options to bypass Hormuz are currently not operational. Only Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) presently have pipelines able to ship crude oil outside of the Persian
Gulf and have additional pipeline capacity to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. At the end of 2013,
the total available unused pipeline capacity from the two countries combined was approximately 4.3
million bbl/d
Saudi Arabia has the 746-mile Petroline, also known as the East-West Pipeline, which runs across
Saudi Arabia from its Abqaiq complex to the Red Sea. The Petroline system consists of two pipelines
with a total nameplate (installed) capacity of about 4.8 million bbl/d. The 56- inch pipeline has a
nameplate capacity of 3 million bbl/d, and its current throughput is about 2 million bbl/d. The 48-
inch pipeline had been operating in recent years as a natural gas pipeline, but Saudi Arabia
converted it back to an oil pipeline. The switch increased Saudi Arabia's spare oil pipeline capacity
to bypass the Strait of Hormuz from 1 million bbl/d to 2.8 million bbl/d, but this is only achievable if
the system operates at its full nameplate capacity.
Saudi Arabia also operates the Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids pipeline, which has a capacity of
290,000 bbl/d. However, this pipeline is currently running at capacity and cannot move any
additional oil.
The UAE operates the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (1.5 million bbl/d) that runs from Habshan, a
collection point for Abu Dhabi's onshore oil fields, to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman,
allowing crude oil shipments to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. The pipeline can transport more
than half of UAE's total net oil exports. The government plans to increase this capacity in the near
future to 1.8 million bbl/d.
142
10/3/16 Source: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=18991; DOE/EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, 142

December 1, 2014
The Saudi Petro-Target Base
143
10/3/16 Source: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=SAU; DOE/EIA, September 2104, 143

The UAE Petro-Target Base
144
10/3/16 Source: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=ARE; DOE/EIA, May 2015, 144

Irans Equally Vulnerable Petro Facilities - I
Kharg Island, the site of the vast majority of Iran's
exports, has a crude storage capacity of 20.2 million
barrels of oil and a loading capacity of 5 million
bbl./d.
Lavan Island is the second-largest terminal with

capacity to store 5.5 million barrels and loading
capacity of 200,000 bbl./d.
Sirri Island serves as a loading port for the Sirri

Blend that is produced in the offshore fields
off the island. Its storage capacity is 4.5 million
barrels.19
Neka is Iran's Caspian Sea port that was built in 2003

to receive crude oil imports from the
Caspian region producers under swap agreements.
The port has a storage capacity of 1 million barrels
and can handle 100,000 b/d of crude oil, according to
FGE.20 The terminal, which has not operated since
2011, was previously used to facilitate swap
agreements with
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Under
these agreements, Iran received crude oil at its
Caspian Sea port of Neka, which was processed in
the Tehran and Tabriz refineries. In return, Iran
exported the same amount of crude oil through its
Persian Gulf ports.21 There
have been talks to revive the swaps, but it is unclear
when they might restart.
The export terminals Bandar Mahshahr and

Abadan (also known as Bandar Imam Khomeini) are
near the Abadan refinery and are used to export
refined product from the Abadan refinery.
Bandar Abbas, located near the northern end of the

Strait of Hormuz, is Iran's main fuel oil export
terminal Iran has an expansive domestic oil network
including more than 10 pipelines that run between 63
and 630 miles in length.
10/3/16 145
EIA, Country Briefs, Iran, June 15, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRN
Irans Equally Vulnerable Petro Facilities - II
Refineries Gas Infrastructure
EIA, Country Briefs, Iran, June 15, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRN

10/3/16 146
Missile Forces and Threats
10/3/16 147
Air/Ballistic and Cruise Missile/UCAV Threats
Precision air strikes on critical facilities: Raid or mass attack. Growing
possibility of precision ballistic and cruise missile and UCAV attack with
conventional warheads
Terror missile strikes on area targets; some chance of smart, more accurate
kills.
Variation on 1983-1986 air confrontation tactics, Fahd line
Strikes on offshore facilities.
Strikes again tankers or naval targets.
Attacks on US-allied facilities
Use of UAVs as possible delivery systems (conventional or Unconventional
munitions)
But:
Weak capability, high vulnerability to counterstrikes, poor escalation
ladder
Unclear strategic goal
10/3/16 148
Estimates of Irans Uncertain Missile Forces 2010-2014- I
10/3/16 151
Estimates of Irans Uncertain Missile Forces 2010-2014 - II
10/3/16 152
Estimates of Irans Uncertain Missile Forces 2010-2014 -III
10/3/16 153
Estimates of Irans Uncertain Missile Forces in 2015-
IISS Estimate: 2016 - I
IRGC Controls Irans IRBM, MRBM, and SRBM missile forces, longer range UAVs/UCAVs/cruise
missiles. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force (IRGCASF) controls Irans strategic missile
force.
Has 1 brigade with Shahab-1/2, 1 battalion with Shahab-3; Ghadr-1; Sajjil-2 (in development).
Force has 22+ MRBMs: 12+ Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (mobile); 10 Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (silo); some Sajjil-2,
and 18+ SRBMs including Fateh 110; 12-18 Shahab-1/2 (200300 missiles) and some Zelzal
Janes IHS Estimate:
IRGCASF), consists of five brigades, as follows:
15th Ghaem Missile Brigade, equipped with short-range missiles such as Fajr.
5th Ra'ad Missile Brigade equipped with Shahab-3/4, based in the Karaj area, northwest of Tehran.
7th Al-Hadid Missile Brigade equipped with Shahab 1 and 2 (Scud B and C) missiles, based in the Karaj area;
facilities under the control of this brigade are said to include the Imam Ali Missile Site in Khorramabad,
western Iran.
19th Zulfeqar Missile Brigade, equipped with Nazeat and Zelzal short-range missiles, based in the Karaj area.
23rd Towhid Missile Brigade, based at Khorramabad.
Deployed Missiles Include:
200 Oghab Tactical missile 200 (40 Km)
250 FROG 7 Tactical rocket system (70 Km)
500 Nazeat/Iran 130 Tactical missile (140-300 Km)
? 200 Tondar 69 (CSS-8/M-7) Ballistic missile (150 Km)
? Fateh 110 Ballistic missile (160-250 Km)
Estimates of Irans Uncertain Missile Forces in 2015-2016- II
? Fateh A-110 Ballistic missile (250-300 Km)
250 Shahab-1 (SS-1c 'Scud B') Ballistic missile (300 Km)
50 Shahab-2 (SS-1d 'Scud C') Ballistic missile (500 Km)
? Fateh-110-D1 (Fateh 313) Ballistic missile (500 Km) Precision strike
? Qiam 1 Ballistic missile (700 Km)
25 Shahab-3 (No-dong 2) Ballistic missile (1,100-1,400 Km)
? Emad Ballistic missile (1,700 Km)
250 Shahin-2 Tactical missile (2,000 Km)
? BM-25 (Zelzal) ballistic missile (18 reported) (2,500 Km
Other Claimed or Developing Types Include:
? Khalij Fars (150-300 Km) Anti-ship variant of Fateh 110
? Hormuz-1 (300 Km) anti-radiation homing
? Hormuz-2 (300 Km) electro-optical guidance
? Qadr F (1,600 Km)
? Ghadr-1 (1,800 Km)
? Shahab 3A (1,500-1,800 Km)
? Shahab 3B (2,000-2,500 Km)
? Qadr H ( 2,000 Km) improved MRV
? Qadr S (2,000 Km) cluster munitions warhead
? KH-25/Soumar cruise missile (2,000-3,000 Km)
? Seiji-2 (ex-Ashura) ballistic missile (2,000-2,200km)
? ICBM
Source: Adapted by Dr. Abdullah Toukan from various sources including IISS, Military Balance 2016, and
IHS Janes, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Gulf States, Iran, Strategic Weapon Systems, April
10/3/16 12, 2016. 156
Arab Gulf Missile and Artillery Rocket Forces
Bahrain: 9 M270 MLRS artillery rocket fire units with 30 ATACMS missiles.
Egypt: 26 M270 MLRS artillery rocket fire units plus; 48 BM-24 240mm artillery rocket fire
units in storage. Missile forces include 42+ launchers: 9 FROG-7, 24 Sakr-80 and 9 Scud-B.
Iraq: 3 TOS-1/1A artillery rocket launchers
Israel: Israel is widely believed to have a nuclear armed missile capability with 3 Jericho
squadrons with Jericho 1 SRBMs and Jericho 2 IRBMs, and Dolphin-class SSKs with land-attack
cruise missiles.
Jordan: 12 227mm HIMARS and 2+ 273mm WM-80 artillery rockets.
Kuwait: 27 9A52 Smerch artillery rockets.
Oman: N/A
Qatar: 4 ASTROS II Mk3 127mm artillery rocket launchers.
Saudi Arabia: 60 ASTROS II Mk3 127mm artillery rocket launchers. Ballistic missiles include
10+ DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBM fire units with 40 missiles, and some DF-21 (CSS-5 variant unclear)
MRBM fire units.
UAE: 20 227mm HIMARS and 6 9A52 Smerch artillery rockets.
Yemen: The following forces were reported before Saudi Arabia claimed to have largely
destroyed them in its April 2015 bombing campaign: 12 FROG-7 launchers, 10 SS-21 Scarab
(Tochka) launchers; and 6 Scud-B (33 missiles).
Sources: Based on Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, in The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, 303-362;
material form HIS Janes as adjusted by the authors.
10/3/16 157
Iran: Major Open Source Missile and WMD Facilities
10/3/16 Source: NTI, http://www.nti.org/gmap/?country=iran&layers, September 2012 158

Range of Deployed Missiles
Source: AFP,
https://www.google.com/search?q=Iran+missile+range+maps&tbm=isch&imgil=6feBjAG6bPEEMM%253A%253B4PgfBV6eI_2DnM%253Bhttp%25253A%2
5252F%25252Fwww.nbcnews.com%25252Fid%25252F6643614%25252Fns%25252Fworld_news%25252Ft%25252Fnew-concern-iran-developing-long-
10/3/16 range- 159
missile%25252F&source=iu&pf=m&fir=6feBjAG6bPEEMM%253A%252C4PgfBV6eI_2DnM%252C_&usg=__YWqUhbXUBBDGOqaM_CLOxS9P8LU%3D&
biw=1239&bih=726&ved=0ahUKEwiSgdiouP_NAhWFej4KHTlHBQ4QyjcIKw&ei=JBGOV5LfKYX1-QG5jpVw#imgrc=i0Bz7UEiTqz2IM%3A
Iranian Missile Range
Source: Stratfor,
http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://digitaljournal.com/img/1/2/2/8/5/5/i/5/7/1/o/iran_missile_map.jpg&imgrefurl=http://digitaljournal.co
10/3/16 m/image/57146&h=364&w=400&sz=56&tbnid=nAmeBGGgErdwGM:&tbnh=90&tbnw=99&zoom=1&docid=fih86K5v8K5dAM&sa=X&ei=A947T 160
_D9Ncbr0gHIvMjRCw&ved=0CDUQ9QEwAw&dur=235
How Estimates of Range-Payload Vary: Shehab 3
10/3/16 161
Missile Attack Range and Density
Source: Adapted from Mark Gunzinger and Christopher Dougherty, Outside-In Operating from Range to
10/3/16 Defeat Irans Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats, CBSA, Washington DC, 2011.. 162
Iranian Missile Range for 1,000 kg Payload

Missile Attack Timing
Source: Adapted from Mark Gunzinger and Christopher Dougherty, Outside-In Operating from Range to
10/3/16 Defeat Irans Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats, CBSA, Washington DC, 2011.. 166
Missile Accuracy, Reliability, and Targeting
10/3/16 167
Source: Digital Globe And 2012 Annual Defense, Report, Janes Defence Weekly, ,12 December 2012, p.,
Illustrative Key Target: Ras Tanura
10/3/16 168
Source: Google maps
Illustrative Key Target: Desalination Plant
10/3/16 169
Source: Google maps
Missile Wars and Missile
Defense
10/3/16 170
Missile Defenses
Many of the Arab Gulf states already have Patriot systems that provide limited point defense capability
against most Iranian ballistic missile missiles, and cruise missiles.
Qatar and the UAE have indicated they will acquire THAAD theater missile defense systems with wider
area coverage.
The U.S. has deployed two AEGIS/Standard missile defense ships, provides radar coverage, and has
indicated it will provide satellite launch warning and vector data.
The GCC has discussed an integrated missile defense system with an initial emphasis on
AEGIS/Standard.
No clear architecture for a missile defense system has been publically proposed, and there has been no
open discussion of a layered system to cover artillery rockets of the kind proposed by Israel.
Experts differ on Irans ability to create penetration aids, and launch salvos of missiles and rockets that
could saturate Arab Gulf and U.S. defenses.
Reliable public data are not available on the ability to discriminate between systems that could hit key
target categories vs. misses, between newer and older missile types, and single out precision-guided
Iranian systems once deployed.
Costs are an issue. Advanced anti-missile missiles are far more costly than older Iranian ballistic missiles.
Low flying cruise missiles pose a very different challenge.
There has been no open discussion of the level of mutual deterrence provided by the overall balance of
ballistic and cruise missiles. land-based air and missile defenses, and air strike capabilities.
Iran may acquire some missile defense capability from Russia with the TOR-M and S300 and obtain
more advanced systems.
The Arab Gulf states may acquire more offensive missiles, and/or obtain extended deterrence through
U.S. ballistic or cruise missile deployments.
10/3/16 171
Sea Based Air Defenses:
U.S. Navys Role in Missile Defense Network
Role of the U.S. Navy Aegis System:

Will provide an efficient and highly mobile sea-based defense against Short and Medium Range
Ballistic Missiles in their midcourse phase.
The system will allow the BMD Command to move its defense capabilities close to the enemy sites.
The system will have the Engagement & Long Range Tracking Capability
Intercepting Short to Medium Range Ballistic Missiles in the midcourse phase of the flight with Standard
Missile 3.
Serves as a forward deployed sensor, providing early warning and long range search & track capabilities
for ICBMs and IRBMs.
Contributions:
Will extend the battle space of the BMDs and contribute to an integrated layered defense. The Naval
Aegis system extends the range of the Ground Missile defense (GMD) element by providing reliable track
data used to calculate firing solutions.
Aegis BMD will coordinate engagements of short and medium range ballistic missiles with terminal
missile defense systems.
As tracking information is shared among these systems, the BMDS will have the opportunity to follow
the engagement of a target during the midcourse segment with coordinated terminal engagements.
10/3/16 (Source: Missile Defense Agency. (MDA) Department of Defense. Testing Building Confidence, 2009 ) 172
Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24, 2016 174
GCC Missile Defense Upgrades
Country TBMD System
UAE The UAE is so far the first GCC country to buy the Terminal High
Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) missile system.
On Dec 31, 2011 Pentagon announced that the UAE will be
buying 2 full THAAD batteries, 96 missiles, 2 Raytheon AN/TPY-2
radars, and 30 years of spare parts. Total Value $3.34 billion.
In 2008 the UAE ordered Patriot PAC-3: 10 fire units, 172 missiles,
First delivery 2009.
Kuwait July 2012, Pentagon informed Congress of a plan to sell Kuwait $4.2
billion in weapon systems, including 60 PAC-3 missiles, 20 launching
platforms and 4 radars. This will be in addition to the 350 Patriot
missiles bought between 2007 and 2010. In 1992, Kuwait bought
210 of the earlier generation Patriots and 25 launchers. Kuwait
bought a further 140 more in 2007.
Saudi Arabia In 2011 Saudi Arabia signed a $1.7 billion US contract to upgrade its
Patriot anti-missile system.
Qatar The U.S. is building a Missile Warning Facility in Qatar that would
utilize an AN/TPY-2-X Band Radar.
(Source: Anthony Cordesman and Alexander Wilner, Iran and the Gulf Military Balance -1 July 11, 2012)
10/3/16 175
(Source: Abdullah
Toukan)
The Uncertain Nuclear and
WMD Threat
10/3/16 178
The Nuclear and WMD Balance
The successful Implementation Day phase of the UN/P5+1 nuclear

agreement with Iran has deprived it if its known near-term ability to deploy a
meaningful nuclear weapons force.
Israel, India, Pakistan, the U.S. and Russia, however, are all nuclear powers.
Iran has kept all of its past weapon design technology, many key production
capabilities, and remains on the edge of the nuclear threshold. The problem is
deferred, not solved.
Precision-guided conventional missiles may, however, offer Iran a safer and
more usable alternative.
Arab state ability to actually develop and produce nuclear weapons is
uncertain. But Pakistan might sell them, and/or the U.S. might offer extended
deterrence.
Iran and the larger Arab states are capable of developing and producing
genetically engineered biological weapons. There are no reports of such activity,
but they are very easy to conceal.
Iran has reported that it is a chemical weapons state. It has said it no longer has
such weapons, but has not provided a detailed inventory or indication of what
happened to them.
10/3/16 179
Missiles and States with Nuclear Weapons
SRBM : Short Range Ballistic Missile

MRBM : Medium Range Ballistic Missile
IRBM : Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
ICBM : Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 180
Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24, 2016
The Impact of the JCPOA
Key Positives
Lost near-term capability to produce fissile material.
Now under tight and demanding inspection regime.
No-expiration date to non-proliferation, ten years of effective controls
unless withdraws.
Drop in oil prices sharply cuts benefits.
Key Negatives
Retains nuclear technology and weapons design data, centrifuge upgrade
capability: Semi Threshold State.
Missile developments continue.
Some covert capabilities: Design, simulation, components.
Major increase in export capability, several $billion in income released.
Uncertain snap back of sanctions.
10/3/16
Easing of access to other arms sales 181
What Happened on Implementation Day
Verifiably dismantled and stored under IAEA seal more than 13,000 centrifuge machines,
including its more advanced centrifuges, leaving Tehran with 6,104 first-generation IR-1
machines, of which 5,104 were to be allowed to continue to enrich uranium to low levels
(3.67 percent U-235) for energy production purposes. The remaining 1,044 centrifuges were
located at the underground site in a mountain at Fordo , which can only be used for medical
isotope production.
Agreed to limit uranium enrichment to the agreed levels for 10 years, after which the two
sides agreed that Irans uranium enrichment capacity would remain constant for several
years, but the Iran could slowly phase in more advanced centrifuges to slowly replace it IR-
1s.
Shipped over 8.5 tons of all forms of low enriched uranium material to Russia, leaving Iran
with a working stockpile of just 300 kilograms of uranium enriched to no more than 3.67
percent U-235 far less than necessary to enrich further for one bomb. The stockpile cap
and prohibition on enrichment above 3.67 percent will remain in place for the next 15 years.
Removed the core of the Arak reactor and fill the channels with cement, rendering it
inoperable. The worlds six major powers, also known as the EU3+3 or P5+1, worked with
Iran on a new design, which will optimize medical isotope production. The changes will also
significantly lower the output of weapons-grade plutonium to less than one kilogram per
yearfar below the amount necessary for one weapon. China agreed to approved the
modified design.
Allowed the IAEAs monitoring and inspections authority to be strengthened, in addition to
the standard IAEA monitoring already in place. This included the implementation of Irans
Additional Protocol agreement with the IAEA, which gave the U.N. nuclear watchdog short-
notice access to virtually any site the agency believes may be involved in illicit nuclear
activities, even military facilities. Iran was also required to implement Code 3.1 of Irans
existing comprehensive safeguards agreement, which requires earlier notification of nuclear
activities and facility design changes.
Iran began allowing continuous IAEA monitoring of enrichment activities at the Natanz and
the Fordo facilities and centrifuge production. The monitoring will continue for 20 years.
Iran also agreed to allow the IAEA to begin continuous monitoring of all of its uranium mines
10/3/16 and mills, a requirement that will last for 25 years. 182
Lashkar Abad
Sites circled in red
unknown pre-mid 2002
Ardekan
Gachin
183

Iran: The Broader Nuclear Target List: 54+
Source: Adapted from list by Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 2012, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/facilities/.
10/3/16 184
Natanz Upgrades in 2012
Source: Google http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2060213/Google-releases-satellite-images-Iranian-cities-UN-says-

10/3/16 used-nuclear-weaponisation.html/ 185
Vehicle Entrance Ramp
(before burial)
Bunkered underground
production halls
20 SEP
Admin/engineering 02
office area
186
10/3/16 186
DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image
Vehicle Entrance Ramp Bunkered underground
Centrifuge cascade halls
(after burial)
Helicopter
pads
New security
wall
Dummy building
concealing tunnel
entrance ramp
Admin/engineering 21 JUL
office
187 area 04
10/3/1
187
6 DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image
Natanz: Effective Concealment
10/3/16 188
Heavy Water Reactor Facility at Arak in 2011
Source: Google http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2060213/Google-releases-satellite-images-Iranian-cities-UN-says-

10/3/16 used-nuclear-weaponisation.html/ 189
Fordow: 3,000 Centrifuges in a Mountain
Source: Ynet
10/3/16 News:http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.ynetnews.com/PicServer2/13062011/3669116/AFP0661600-01- 190
08809249_wa.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/
Razed Test Site (?) At Parchin
Source: ISIS and CNN, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/30/cleanup-at-irans-parchin-site/

10/3/16 191
Iranian Counter Vulnerabilities:
Highly populated, state dominated, corrupt economy with high military spending and major state interference.
Halting all oil exports critical to Iran. EIA reports that,
Pre-sanctions, Iran exported approximately 2.2 million bbl./d of crude oil. Iranian Heavy Crude Oil is Iran's largest crude export followed by
Iranian Light. In 2011, Iran's net oil export revenues amounted to approximately $95 billion. Oil exports provide half of Iran's government
revenues, while crude oil and its derivatives account for nearly 80 percent of Iran's total exports.
Kharg Island, the site of the vast majority of Iran's exports, has a crude storage capacity of 20.2 million barrels of oil and a loading capacity of
5 million bbl./d. Lavan Island is the second-largest terminal with capacity to store 5 million barrels and loading capacity of 200,000 bbl./d.
Other important terminals include Kish Island, Abadan, Bandar Mahshar, and Neka (which helps facilitate imports from the Caspian region).
Iran is the second-largest oil consuming country in the Middle East, second only to Saudi Arabia. Iranian domestic oil demand is mainly for
diesel and gasoline. Total oil consumption was approximately 1.8 million bbl./d in 2010, about 10 percent higher than the year before. Iran has
limited refinery capacity for the production of light fuels, and consequently imports a sizeable share of its gasoline supply (Imports 300,000
bbbl of gasoline per day.). Iran's total refinery capacity in January 2011 was about 1.5 million bbl./d, with its nine refineries operated by the
National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC), a NIOC subsidiary.
Refineries and gas distribution critical to economy. Are highly vulnerable.

Natural gas accounts for 54 percent of Iran's total domestic energy consumption.
Key aspects of transportation and power grid are highly vulnerable. Todays precision strike assets allow to know out key,
repairable links or create long term incapacity. They have become weapons of mass effectiveness.
EIA reports Some power plants are running as low as 10 percent of their nameplate capacity as Iran's electricity infrastructure is largely in a
state of dilapidation and rolling blackouts become endemic in summer months. The amount of generation lost in distribution is a central
indicator of the disrepair of the electricity network, with upwards of 19 percent of total generation lost during transmission.
Limited and vulnerable air defenses with only one modern and very short-range air and cruise missile defense system. Will
remain vulnerable to stealth, cruise missiles, and corridor suppression of enemy air defenses unless can get fully modern mix
of radars, C4I/BM assets, and S-300/400 equivalent.
Needs imports of food and product.
Rail system vulnerable. Can use smart mines on all ports.
Naval embargo presents issues in maritime law, but can halt all Iranian traffic, inspect all incoming shipping.
No fly zone would affect operations, especially if include helicopters. Warning could affect civil aviation.
Source: See http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=IR & cabs/OPEC_Revenues/Factsheet.html for energy data. 192

193
Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24, 2016
Nuclear Capability and Risk
Tehran: 1 Megaton Tel Aviv: 20 Kilotons
Population:
410,000+
Area: 52 km2
(20 sq mi)
Population: 8.3 million

urban,14 million wider area
Urban: 730 km2 (280 sq mi)
Wider Area: 1,274 km2
(492 sq mi)
10/3/16 194
Maps based on estimates by dr. Abdullah Toukan
Countervalue Targeting of Iran
10/3/16 195
Irans Ethnic Vulnerability to Nuclear Strikes
10/3/16 196

Iran Gulf Military Balance

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Iran Gulf Military Balance

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Iran and the Gulf Military Balance

Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Anthony H. Cordesman Web version:

This analysis draws in part on the work of

Nations and Sub-Regions of Competition

10/3/16 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 1999-2013 21

10/3/16 Source: Adapted from the IISS, Military Balance, 2016 22

GCC Orders from U.S. =

Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014,

U.S. Deliveries to GCC =

Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014,

Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014,

Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014,

Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014,

10/3/16 Source: Defense Security Cooperation agency (DSCA), http://www.dsca.mil/print/319. 31

Air Defense Force Note:

National Share of Total

Source: SIPRI, Trends in Global Military Expenditure, April 5, 2016, https://www.google.com/search?q=sipri+military+spending&ie=utf-8&oe=utf- 43

Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 2016, p. 19. 44

Proposed Outyear Topline for Base Budget

10/3/16 Source: (OSD) Comptroller,Defense Budget Overview, February 2016, p. I-5 45

EGYPT: MFO 692; 1 ARNG recce bn; 1 ARNG spt bn

INDIAN OCEAN: US European Command US Navy 6th Fleet: 1 DDGHM

ISRAEL: US Strategic Command 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Mount Keren

MIDDLE EAST-UN: UNTSO 2 obs

SAUDI ARABIA: US Central Command 350

10/3/16 Source: U.S. Army, February 2016, http://www.asafm.army.mil/offices/BU/BudgetMat.aspx?OfficeCode=1200

10/3/16 Source: USCENTCOM, http://www.afcent.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/4822/Article/217803/combined- 53

10/3/16 Source: U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent- 54

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016.

10/3/16 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016 62

Intimidation, Deterrence, and

Range from serious Non-State Forces to Lone Wolf attacks.

7,000-10,000 actives (4,000-8,000 in Syria

Direct and indirect threats of using force. (I.e. Iranian

Iranian Actors Related States/ Target/Operati

Revolutionary Guards Iran Iraq

IHS Janes indicates:

Part of IRGC, but reports directly to Supreme Leader.

Source: New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/30/world/middleeast/middle-east-alliances-saudi-

10/3/16 Source: CIA Factbook 74

10/3/16 Source: EIA, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=WOTC 76

25 Ferries and cargo vessels

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016.

Independent Infantry Company

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2016. Includes IRGC and

MBT LT TK/RECCE APC AIFV

Zulfiqar OF-40 T-72 M-84 Leclerc Challenger 2 M-60A3 M-60A1 M-1A2

Mortars Multiple Rocket Launchers Towed Artilliery Self-propelled artillery

10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24, 2016 94

10/3/16 Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 24, 2016 95

Fixed Wing Combat

F-15C/D F-15S F-16 F-18 Su-20/22 Su-24 Su-25 MiG-21/21U

AH-64 AS-565 AS-560C3 AS-532 Exocet SA-342 HOT AH-1J

AH-1E SH-3D Commando Exocet AS-332 Exocet Mi-35 Mi-25

RH-53D Mi-28NE L-159 AH-1F

Bahrain 8 I Hawk MIM-23B 6 0 R BS-70 27 guns

Iran 16/150 I Hawk SA-7/14/16, HQ-7 1,700 Guns

Land- Kuwait 5 / 24 I Hawk Phase III

Based Oman None Blowpipe

Qatar None 10 Blowpipe ?

UAE 2/6/36 I Hawk 20+ Blowpipe 62 guns