Baltazar D. Amion v. Judge Roberto S.

Chiongson
301 SCRA 614
Facts: A is a policeman charged with murder. During the trial, J ordered that
he be represented by counsel de officio because As attorney was ill. A then
charged J with ignorance of the law & oppression because the fact that the
counsel de officio did not know the particulars of the case meant that A
would be denied due process.

Issue: Whether or not Amion was denied due process?

Held: Complaint dismissed. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a

judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. A judge should
always be imbued with a high sense of duty & responsibility in the discharge
of his obligation to promptly administer justice. In this case, the reason J
appointed a FLAG lawyer was because As lawyer had postponed several
hearings because he was ill or out of town. Also, A had various lawyers
during the said case who always postponed the hearings for various reasons
such as illness, lack of knowledge of the case or unavailability for trial. These
are all legal but clearly dilatory means used by the complainant to delay the
case for 4 years. J should be commended for his efforts to expedite the case.

People vs Linsangan
Facts: Ambrosio Linsangan was prosecuted for nonpayment of the cedula or
poll tax under section 1439, in connection with section 2718, of the Revised
Administrative Code. After due trial, he was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for 5 days, and to pay the costs. The case was tried and
decided before the Constitution of the Philippines took effect but while the
appeal was pending, the said Constitution became effective, and, section
1, clause 12, of Article III thereof provides that "no person shall be
imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax." Linsangan appealed,
alleging that the trial court erred in not declaring said sections of the Revised
Administrative Code unconstitutional and void.

Issue: Whether, in view of section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the

Constitution, the judgment of conviction against Linsangan can stand.

Held: Section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, provides:

All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter,
such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution,
until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and
all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine
Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government
and corresponding officials under this Constitution.

It seems too clear to require demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article III of
the Constitution, in that, while the former authorizes imprisonment for
nonpayment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that upon
the inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth, said section
2718 of the Revised Administrative Code became inoperative, and no
judgment of conviction can be based thereon.

People Vs. Alicando

251 SCRA 293

G.R. No. 117487

Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie
Mae Penecilla, a minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand.
The incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo
Santiago found the victims body and the parents and police were informed.
Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from
Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo
Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the
basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the
police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's
green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a
stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution.
He was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO.
Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted him. Hence an automatic review
for the imposition of death penalty.

Issue: Whether or Not the death penalty proper.

Held: No. The records do not reveal that the Information against the
appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information
against the appellant is written in the English language. It is unknown
whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what
dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the
Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own
dialect before his plea of guilt. The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the
rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant
his constitutional right to due process of law. It is urged that we must
presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted.
When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. There
could be no presumption. The court must be sure.

Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira

Facts: Haydee Herras Teehankee is a political detainee delivered by the

Counter Intelligence Corps, United States Army, to the Commonwealth
Government, pursuant to the Proclamation of General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur, dated 29 December 1944. She was one of the petitioners in case
No. L-44, "Raquiza vs. Bradford," of the Supreme Court. She is now confined
in the Correctional Institution for Women under the custody of the
Commonwealth Government since October, 1945, when she was thus
delivered to the said government. On 2 October 1945, Herras Teehankee,
through her husband, Alberto Teehankee, filed with the People's Court a
petition wherein, invoking the provisions of Executive Order No. 65,
promulgated by His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, dated 3
September 1945, she prayed that her immediate release be ordered on the
ground that no evidence exists upon which she could be charged with any
act punishable by law, or, alternatively, that the People's Court fix the bail for
her provisional liberty, in conformity with the aforesaid executive order, and
upon approval of such bail, that an order be forthwith issued directing the
officer having official custody of her person to immediately release her. On 9
October 1945, the Hon. Leopoldo Rovira, Presiding Judge of the People's
Court, entered an order referring the petition for provisional release for
consideration by the Fifth Division of the People's Court, but adding the
following statement: "in my opinion, it should be denied notwithstanding the
recommendation of the Solicitor General for her provisional release under a
bond of P50,000." On the same date, the Hon. Pompeyo Diaz, Associate
Judge of the People's Court, entered an order disposing of said petition and
denying the same "in view of the gravity of the offense as can be deduced
from the fact that the office of the Special Prosecutors recommends as high
as P50,000 for her provisional release." Herras Teehankee filed for
reconsideration, but the Court, through Associate Judge Pompeyo Diaz,
denied said motion. Herras Teehankee filed a petition for the writs of
certiorari and mndamus on 19 October 1945 with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether a person may file for bail even before a formal charge or
information is filed against him.

Held: Article III, section 1(16) of the Commonwealth Constitution -- which

provides that "All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong. Excessive bail shall not be required" -- refers to all persons, not only
to persons against whom a complaint or information has already been
formally filed. It lays down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be
bailable except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong. According to the provision, the general rule is that any person, before
being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is
charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of
course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained or
otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the
benefits of said provision. But in order that a person can invoke this
constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal
complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed
under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim
this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until
he is charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong.
Indeed if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those already
charged under a formal complaint or information, there seems to be no legal
or just reason for denying its benefits to one as against whom the proper
authorities may even yet conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of
guilt. To place the former in a more favored position than the latter would be,
to say the least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of
innocence in favor of one already formally charged with criminal offense
(Constitution, Article III, section 1[17]), a fortiori, this presumption should be
indulged in favor of one yet so charged, although already arrested or
detained.

People vs. Fortes [GR 91155, 25 June 1993]

Facts: On 26 November 1983, Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan,
Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old
daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a
rape committed against the latter by Agustin Fortes y Garra at around 11:00
a.m. of that day. Following this, Fortes was forthwith apprehended.
Thereupon, on 5 December 1983, Agripino Gine filed on behalf of Merelyn a
complaint for rape against Fortes before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Matnog-Sta. Magdalena in Matnog, Sorsogon. Finding probable
cause to exist after a preliminary examination was conducted, the MCTC
issued on 9 December 1983 an order for the arrest of Frotes. The bond for
the latter's temporary liberty was initially fixed at P30,000.00 but was later
reduced to P25,000.00 upon motion of Fortes. The latter then put up the
required bond; upon its approval, the court ordered his release on 15
December 1983. When the case was finally called for preliminary
investigation on 5 December 1984, Fortes, through his counsel de oficio,
informed the court that he was waiving his right thereto. The court then
ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon. On 25 January 1985, the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal, through 1st Assistant Provincial Fiscal Manuel C. Genova, filed with
Branch 55 of the RTC at Irosin, Sorsogon a complaint for rape against Fortes
(Criminal Case 219). Fortes pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment on 28
February 1985. The protracted trial began on 26 June 1985 and ended nearly
3 years later when the case was finally submitted for decision on 22 February
1988. On 25 January 1989, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting
Fortes of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify Merelyn Gine the sum of P20,000.00 as
damages and to pay the costs. The court also order the commitment of
Fortes to the Sorsogon Provincial Jail through the Provincial Warden or
through any of his provincial guards and eventually Fortes' commitment to
the National Penitentiary in accordance with law. On the same day, Fortes
filed his notice of appeal, wherein he requested that the amount of the
appeal bond be fixed by the trial court. The following day, 26 January 1989,
the trial court gave due course to the appeal but did not resolve the request
to fix the amount of bail. Thus, on 11 April 1989, Fortes filed an "Application
for Bail on Appeal" reiterating his earlier request that the bail bond for his
provisional liberty pending appeal be set. This was subsequently denied by
the trial court in its Order of 19 June 1989 on the ground that "the accused
has already been found guilty Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of rape and
sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and his appeal from the decision already
approved by the Court." Thereupon, on 10 August 1989, the trial court issued
a Commitment of Final Sentence turning over the person of the accused to
the Director of Prisons in Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. On 25 August 1989, the
accused filed a motion to reconsider the RTC's 19 June 1989 Order denying
his application for bail pending appeal, but the same was denied in the Order
of 6 September 1989. In the meantime, the trial court, on 12 September
1989, transmitted to the Supreme Court the records of Criminal Case 219
(GR 90643). On 9 December 1989, Fortes filed with the Supreme Court a
special civil action for certiorari to set aside the orders of the trial court
denying his application for bail and his motion to reconsider the said denial
(GR 91155). On 18 June 1990, the said cases were ordered consolidated.

Issue: Whether Fortes, a convicted rapist, is entitled to bail on appeal.

Held: It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that "before
conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of
right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute." Upon the other
hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail
becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is
strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of
guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right." The clear implication,
therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer
such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor
of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not
have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong which would
have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction it would have
likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of
his appeal from the judgment of conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the Supreme Court, in
the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs. Ricardo Cortez,
ruled that "Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged
with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall
no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case
to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt
of the offense charged is strong." Herein, the rape for which the accused was
indicted is punishable by reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code; he was convicted therefor and subsequently sentenced
to serve that penalty. It is thus evident that the trial court correctly denied
his application for bail during the pendency of the appeal.

COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA

Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the
AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating
Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9,
1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the
charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was
denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but
the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty.
However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even
military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.

The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas
corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without
charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no
formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year
after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.

Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities

to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled
hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion
of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit
their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had
been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-
affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to
submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory
challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed
Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts
have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the
court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts
and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.

The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not
been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the
general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given
more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year
from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirementsof
due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special
InvestigatingCommittee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation
only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted
men were involved in the failed coup.

Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In
G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to
allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under
article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions
are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of
the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.

Government Of The USA V. Hon. Purganan

FACTS:

Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The

Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period
within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for
reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that
the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the
Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice,
filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an
order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to
prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr.
Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for
his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing, as
required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein
seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required
cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court
deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to
guide lower court.

ISSUES:
Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an
arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial

Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.
YES.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is
not as important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the
material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first
impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused. The prima
facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for
issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its
supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom
that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The
silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation
that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the
entire proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition
proceedings are summary in nature. Sending to persons sought to be
extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at
some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute
an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.

Villaseor vs. Hon. Abao, et al

FACTS

-Petitioner, a mere government employee, earning but a monthly salary, of

P210.00, and the sole breadwinner of a family of five, was charged with the
murder of a Boac police sergeant. He was admitted to a P60k bail which was
reduced to P40k. The petitioner on May 29 posted a property bond and was
set at provisional liberty.

-However, respondent Provincial Fiscal amended the information, now

accusing the petitioner with Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in
Authority with Murder" before the arraignment on the murder charge. So on
August 7, respondent judge cancelled the petitioners bond and ordered his
immediate arrest.

-On September 9 upon petitioners motion to reconsider, the respondent

judge resolved to admit petitioner to bail provided he puts up a cash bond of
P60k.

-On September 15, on petitioners motion that original bond previously given
be reinstated, respondent judge resolved to fix "the bond anew in real
property in the amount of P60,000, but to be posted only by residents of the
province of Marinduque actually staying, therein" with properties which
"must be in the possession and ownership of said residents for five years."

-On October 1, petitioner filed a prayer for prelim injunction to SC, seeking to
set aside respondent judge orders of August 7, September 9 and 15, and to
reinstate the bail bond approved on May 29 (original bond), charging the
respondent judge of having acted w/o and/or in excess of his jurisdiction and
w/grave abuse of discretion, and w/ violation of the Consti and the ROC in
issuing the disputed orders

-Oct 3: the Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a P1k bond.

-Nov 5: SC allowed continuation of the proceedings of the criminal case to

avoid delay in its prosecution.
ISSUES

WON THE P60K bond fixed by respondent judge transgress the constitutional
injunction that "(e)xcessive bail shall not be required?

HELD: NO

Ratio the principal factor considered, to the determination of which most

other factors are directed, is the probability of the appearance of the
accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment.

Reasoning Guidelines in fixing bail: (1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2)) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character
and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and
strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing at trial; (8)
forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial
in other cases.

- Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court (definition of bail): "the security

required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the
law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be
required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance."

-Circular 47 of the Department of Justice, reiterated in Circular 48, directed

prosecuting attorneys to recommend bail at the rate of P2,000.00 per year of
imprisonment, corresponding to the medium period of the penalty prescribed
for the offense charged, unless circumstances warrant a higher penalty.
Here, petitioner is charged with a capital offense, direct assault upon an
agent of a person in authority with murder. A complex crime, it may call for
the imposition of capital punishment.

MANOLET O. LAVIDES vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On 3 April 1997, the parents of Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that
their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by Manolet Lavides for
an assignation that night at Lavides' room at the Metropolitan Hotel in
Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police
received reports of Lavides' activities. An entrapment operation was
therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 p.m. of the same date, the police
knocked at the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where Lavides
was staying. When Lavides opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie,
who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested
him. Based on the sworn statement of Lorelie and the affidavits of the
arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for
violation of Article III, 5(b) of RA 7610 (An Act Providing for Stronger
Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and other Purposes) was
filed on 7 April 1997 against Lavides in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City
(Criminal Case Q-97-70550). On 10 April 1997, Lavides filed an "Omnibus
Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the
Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful
Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above
Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the
Law on Which He is Charged." On 29 April 1997, 9 more informations for
child abuse were filed against Lavides by Lorelie San Miguel, and by three
other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn
Talinting (Criminal Case Q-97-70866 to Q-97-70874). In all the cases, it was
alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, Lavides had
sexual intercourse with complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution
and given money as payment for the said acts of sexual intercourse." No bail
was recommended. Nonetheless, Lavides filed separate applications for bail
in the 9 cases. On 16 May 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving
Lavides' Omnibus Motion. finding that, in Criminal Case Q-97-70550, there is
probable cause to hold the accused under detention, his arrest having been
made in accordance with the Rules, and thus he must therefore remain under
detention until further order of the Court; and that the accused is entitled to
bail in all the case, and that he is granted the right to post bail in the amount
of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under
certain conditions. On 20 May 1997, Lavides filed a motion to quash the
informations against him, except those filed in Criminal Case Q-97-70550 or
Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to
suspend the arraignment scheduled on 23 May 1997. Then on 22 May 1997,
he filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be
reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his
arraignment. On 23 May 1997, the trial court, in separate orders, denied
Lavides' motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to
suspend arraignment. Accordingly, Lavides was arraigned during which he
pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then ordered him released
upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the
conditions in the 16 May 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order of 10
April 1997. The pre-trial conference was set on 7 June 1997. On 2 June 1997,
Lavides filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailing the
trial court's order, dated 16 May 1997, and its two orders, dated 23 May
1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth
in its order of 16 May 1997, respectively. While the Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) case was pending in the Court of
Appeals, two more informations were filed against Lavides, bringing the total
number of cases against him to 12, which were all consolidated. On 30 June
1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, invalidating the first two
conditions under 16 May 1997 order -- i.e. that (1) the accused shall not be
entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall
and must always be present at the hearings of these cases; and (2) In the
event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically
cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued
and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia -- and maintained the orders
in all other respects. Lavides filed the petition for review with the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the court should impose the condition that the accused shall ensure
his presence during the trial of these cases before the bail can be granted.

RULING:

In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment,

otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if
the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no
need for the arraignment of the accused. Further, the trial court could ensure
Lavides' presence at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering
his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under
Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of
bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so
required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the
presence of the accused at the arraignment is required. To condition the
grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and
thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be
resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a
motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be
released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused's
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or
information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. The
court's strategy to ensure the Lavides' presence at the arraignment violates
the latter's constitutional rights.

MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed
before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to
leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United
States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The
prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges
denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9
and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the
communication-request of the Securities and ExchangeCommission, denying
his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the
appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief
of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The
Court of Appeals denied the petition.

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right,

neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities
and ExchangeCommission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could
prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.

Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from
leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and
function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused
were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the
necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business
transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.

Parada v. Veneracion

Facts: Danilo Parada was charged with 4 counts of Estafa. He was duly
bonded with an accredited bonding company. In October of 1993,
Paradas counsel formally notified the court and the manager of the
bonding company of change of address. Apparently, the notice of
hearing was sent to complainants former address. For failure to
appear on the date of hearing, respondent judge ordered the arrest of
the accused, confiscation of the bond and a trial in absentia was
conducted. No bail was recommended for Paradas arrest.

Issues: Whether or not respondent judge was correct in not recommending

bail for Parada

Whether or not the trial in absentia was correctly held

Held:No, the judge was not correct in not recommending bail

Ratio: First Issue: Regarding bail (Main)

The warrant of arrest with no recommendation for bail that was issued
by respondent Judge is a downright violation of Paradas constitutional
right to bail. The rule is clear that unless charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong,
all persons detained, arrested or otherwise under the custody of the
law are entitled to bail as a matter of right. It should be noted that the
crime with which Parada was charged is estafa which is undoubtedly a
bailable offense. This circumstance could not have escaped the
attention of the respondent judge when he issued on June 3, 1994 the
order of arrest of Parada with no recommendation for his bail. In so
doing, respondent judge exhibited that degree of ignorance so gross
which the Court can not countenance.