Review

Author(s): Theda Skocpol

Review by: Theda Skocpol
Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Sep., 1985), pp. 541-543
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1879697
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 BookReviews 541
Historical Sociology. By Philip Abrams.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983. Pp. xviii+353. $29.95 (cloth)-
$1 1.95 (paper) .

Whatare or should be the relationships between history and sociology? Over

thelast several decades in U. S . academic discourse, there has certainly been an
increasingemphasis on possible interdisciplinary exchanges. Yet the discussion,
evenwhen heated and emotional, has primarily been conducted in methodological
terms:Historians should, or should not, borrow quantitative techniques or con-
ceptual apparatuses from sociologists. Sociologists should, or should not, do
theirown primary archival research or attempt comparative secondary syntheses
of historians' findings. As these debates have proceeded, most participants have
takenfor granted the existence of a basic disciplinary division of labor: historians
discover and interpret facts about particular times and places in the past, while
sociologists formulate and validate theoretical generalizations spanning all or
many times and places.
Yet the very substance of this disciplinary division of labor is exactly what
the late Philip Abrams calls into question, in this, the final book he completed
before his recent untimely death. Stylistic differences there may well be, Abrams
acknowledges in an especially well-put passage: "The historian uses a rhetoric
of close presentation (seeking to persuade in terms of a dense texture of detail)
while the sociologist uses a rhetoric of perspective (seeking to persuade in terms
of the elegant patterning of connections seen from a distance)" (p. 194). But
"in some fundamental respects the two disciplines are trying to do the same thing
and are employing the same logic of explanation to do so" (p. ix). Both must
find "a way of accounting for human experience which recognises simultaneously
and in equal measure that history and society are made by . . . more or less
purposeful human action andthat individual action, however purposeful, is made
by history and society." And both disciplines converge toward explanations that
analyze the structural conditions of action by examining temporal sequences of
events.
Before further exploring Abrams's book, l cannot resist digressing to point
out that only a British sociologist could have written this "radical" plea for
"reconstituting history and sociology as historical sociology" (p. ix). This is
true not only because Abrams deliberately echoes the metatheoretical views of
Anthony Giddens, currently the reigning guru the Talcott Parsons, if you will
of British sociology. There are also facilitating historical legacies and structural
conditions. Professional academic divisions are not so firm in elite British uni-
versities, and sociology as a specialized discipline has never been securely separated
from social work on the practical side or from history and political theory on the
intellectual side. In this context, disciplinary boundaries need not be taken for
granted and scholars may, in practice, operate more comfortably in what would
look to American sociologists like "marginal" niches. Abrams himself was a
sociology professor at Durham yet made important contributions to British in-
tellectual and political history.
The pleasure of reading Abrams's literate and heavily exegetical book lies in
the parts rather than in the lengthy and rather repetitious whole Most individual
chapters are discussions of major works by sociologists or historians, intended
to demonstrate convergences of explanatory approaches among such works at
their best. One chapter apiece is devoted to the "classical" discussions of the
accompaniments of European industrialization by Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx,

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542 Book Reviews
and Max Weber.I foundthese readablebut unexciting, as I did the chapterson
functionalismand argumentsaboutthe convergenceof nationsundergoingin-
dustrialdevelopment.Muchmoreunusualare two chapters(8 and9) thatargue
that such "microsociological"problemsas individualidentityandthe analysis
of careersare most fruitfullyhandledat the intersectionsof social psychology
and the histories of generationsand institutions.
Chapter6 surveys major comparative-historicalworks on the formationof
political systems or states; PerryAnderson'sLineages of the AbsolutistState
(London, 1974); S. M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan'santhologyon Party Systems
and VoterAlignments(New York, 1967); BarringtonMoore'sSocial Originsof
DictatorshipandDemocracy(Boston, 1966);andS. N. Eisenstadt'sThePolitical
Systemsof Empires(Glencoe, Ill., 1963). Abramsfindsvalue andfaultin all of
these attemptsto integratehistoryandsocial theory.Yet, provocativelyenough,
he argues that Eisenstadt'sbook, a ponderouslywrittentome usually disliked
by historians and antifunctionalistsociologists, is the most successful of the
four. At otherpointsin HistoricalSociology, AbramspraisesFernandBraudel's
TheMediterranean (London,1973), andI thinkthe breadthandopen-mindedness
of his perspectiveis nicely conveyedby his ability to appreciatebothEisenstadt
and Braudelat once.
Three chapters (1, 7, and 10) of Historical Sociology contain the core of
Abrams's epistemological and substantiveargument,and a readerin a hurry
mightcontenthimselfwiththese alone. Chapter7 on "ExplainingEvents" main-
tainsthatsociologistsas well as historiansmustmakesenseof eventsandtemporal
sequencesandarguesthatbothsortsof scholarsdeal, not withconcretehappenings
in all of theirpossible detail, but with happeningswhose significantaspects are
constructedwith an eye to what needs to be explained. Books and articles on
riots, revolutions, andrebellions are probedto illustratethese points.
Perhapsthe best chapterin Historical Sociology, chapter10, includes some
very telling commentson the "new quantitativehistory" and on qualitative,
anecdotalhistoriesof mentalites.Mostmemorablehere,however,is thediscussion
of Geoffrey Elton's heroic attemptto purge sociological analysis from histo-
riographyand defendthe explanatoryadequacyof sheer narrativestorytelling.
Illustratinghis argumentwith examplesfromElton's own bookon Reformation
Europe(London,1963), Abramsmaintainsthatnarrativehistoryat its best weaves
"into the textureof the story a greatdeal of interpretiveand analyticalmatter
which is not properlypart of the story at all althoughvital for its persuasive
allure" (p. 308). Aesthetically, the result may be very pleasing, and a narra-
tive form of presentationis certainlythe best way to convey the unfoldingof
actions and theirconsequencesover time. But ';an integrationof narrativeand
analysis. . . canneverbe fullyaccomplished," andanyattemptto buryexplanatory
argumentsin narrativebecomes, in the end, simplyaneffort "to protectanalysis
from the critical readingappropriateto it" (p. 309). Historiansdisagree with
one anotheraboutwhich "structuralconditions"lie behindand help to pattern
the actions they narrate.Thus good history should be sociological enough to
make explicit its own theoreticaldesign, opening the way for honest and full
debate. |
Historical Sociology is unlikely to convince sociologists or historiansto blur
their distinct disciplines into one. It may, nevertheless,succeed in persuading
thoughtfulpeoplein the two disciplinesof theiroverlappingexplanatory concerns,
thusfacilitatingdialoguesthatgo well beyondthemereswappingof methodological

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 Book Reviews 543
techniques.If so, PhilipAbrams'shopesforhis bookwill be substantially
realized,
and scholarshipin the humansciences will be the betterfor it.

THEDA
SKOCPOL
University of Chicago

Historians, Puritanism, and the English Revolution: The Religious Factor

in English Politics before and after the Interregnum By Michael G. Fin^
layson.
Toronto:Universityof TorontoPress, 1983. Pp. x + 209.
MichaelFinlayson'sbook falls into two distinctparts. In the firsthe subjectsto
criticalexaminationthe often confusingand ambiguoususe madeby historians
of seventeenth-centuryEngland fromDavid Humeto ChristopherHill of the
concepts "revolution"and "Puritanism."In the secondhe offers his own inter-
pretationof the relationshipbetween religion and nationalpolitics duringthe
century.Those who have arguedthatthe pre-1642parliamentary oppositionwas
largely Puritaninspiredhave never, Finlaysonargues, satisfactorilyexplained
the virtualdisappearanceof Puritanismfrompolitics afterthe Restoration.The
reason, he suggests, is thatit was never therein the firstplace: few Membersof
Parliamentbefore the civil war were Puritansin any meaningfulsense of that
term.Finlaysondoes not deny thatseventeenth-century Englishparliament-men
were stronglymotivatedby religion, but arguesthatboth before 1642 and after
1660 they were inspirednot by Puritanism,but by a fierce Protestanthostility
to Roman Catholics, an often paranoidfear of Catholic conspiracyrHe thus
proclaimsthe essentialcontinuityof the seventeenthcentury,in effect minimizing
the significanceof the revolutionof the 1640s andmakingit no longerthe great
watershedthat it has usually appearedto be.
Now it is undoubtedlytruethatmanyof us haveoftenbeenregrettablyimprecise
in ourdefinitionsof bothPuritanismandrevolution,andit is usefulto be reminded
of this. Finlayson's criticisms of earlier scholars who created the ideal-type
"Puritan"andthenreifiedit into the abstraction"Puritanism"echo those made
some years ago by CharlesGeorge and have a good deal of merit. So does his
argumentthat what unitedmen like Eliot, Coke, and Phelips in the 1620s, and
Pym, D'Ewes, and Rudyardin 1641, was not Puritanism(if by that term we
mean anythinglike the radicalPuritanismof 1648-49), but a broadProtestant
consensus, a conservativedefense of the Churchof EnglandagainstPoperyand
its alleged ally, Arminianism.To some extent this is obviously a matter of
semantics, and Finlayson'suse of the vexed termdoes seem to me excessively
narrow,enabling him to exclude from the Puritancategory large numbersof
1641 M.P.'s who on good evidence were amongthe "hottersort of Protestant,"
the definitionof Puritanthat Finlaysonseems to accept (p. 85). Finlaysonalso
makes the questionableassumptionthat religious conservatismand Puritanism
were antithetical, sometimesforgetting that before 1641 it was the Laudians,
not their enemies, who were seen as the innovators.If Puritanswere in such
shortsupplyin the Long Parliamentit becomesdifficultto explainthe choice of
such well-known zealots as StephenMarshalland CorneliusBurges as official
preachers,ortheapparent easewithwhichso manyof theseconservativeProtestants
movedto an acceptanceof thefull Root-and-Branch programandtheestablishment

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