Diwa: Studies in Philosophy and Theology 42 No. 1 (2017)

Volume 42, No.
1 - May 2017
v-vi In Memoriam: Fr. Martin Mandin, SVD (1955-2017)
1-28 The Necessity of the Postulate of God in Kants Moral

Philosophy
Jerome S. Montesclaros, SVD
29-46 The Digression on Mercy in the Book of Wisdom
(11:1712:22)
Randolf C. Flores, SVD
47-66 Mercy as Gospel according to the Book of Tobit
Francis M. Macatangay
67-79 Admission to the Seminary: Notes and Comments on
Canon 241
A. N. Dacany, SJ
80-88 Theses Abstracts
Rene Hernandez, New Evangelization as Mission:
Challenges and Prospects in the Apostolic Vicariate of
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, Philippines
Dennis Beltran, Doing Mission in Context: Case in
Point, Migration in Cavite Today
Thomas Aquino Nuwa Wele, A Study of a Jewish Scribal
Sage in the Hellenistic Period and Sirach 38:34cd39:11
EDITORIAL BOARD
Editor Randolf Flores, SVD, SThD, PhD
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Divine Word Seminary Tagaytay.
DIWA
Studies in Philosophy and Theology
Title Header
Diwa is a refereed journal published twice a year by the
Graduate Schools of Divine Word Seminary, Tagaytay City
and Christ the King Mission Seminary, Quezon City, Philippines
Volume 42, no. 1 May 2017
CONTENTS
v-vi In Memoriam: Fr. Martin Mandin, SVD (1955-2017)
1-28 The Necessity of the Postulate of God in Kants Moral

Philosophy
Jerome S. Montesclaros, SVD
29-46 The Digression on Mercy in the Book of Wisdom

(11:1712:22)
Randolf C. Flores, SVD
47-66 Mercy as Gospel according to the Book of Tobit

Francis M. Macatangay
67-79 Admission to the Seminary: Notes and Comments on

Canon 241
A. N. Dacany, SJ
80-88 Theses Abstracts

Rene Hernandez, New Evangelization as Mission:
Challenges and Prospects in the Apostolic Vicariate of
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, Philippines
Dennis Beltran, Doing Mission in Context: Case in
Point, Migration in Cavite Today
Thomas Aquino Nuwa Wele, SVD, A Study of a
Jewish Scribal Sage in the Hellenistic Period and Sirach
38:34cd39:11
Contributors
(Diwa 42, no. 1)
1. FR. JEROME S. MONTESCLAROS, SVD obtained his M.A. in

Philosophy from the Christ the King Mission Seminary (Quezon City). After
he was ordained priest, he was sent to Agusan del Sur for pastoral work and
then to the University of San Carlos (Cebu City) as a faculty member. He is
currently working on his PhD dissertation on Kants Ethics at the Univeristy
of Santo Tomas (Manila).
2. FR. FRANCIS M. MACATANGAY is adjunct professor of Sacred

Scripture at the University of Santo Tomas School of Theology at Saint
Marys Seminary in Houston, Texas. Author of The Wisdom Instructions of the
Book of Tobit (De Gruyter, 2011), Fr. Macatangay obtained his SThD from
the Pontificial Gregorian University in Rome.
3. FR. RANDOLF C. FLORES, SVD is Dean of Studies of the Divine

Word Seminary Tagaytay. He is a visiting professor of the Faculty of Religious
Studies, University of St. Joseph in Macau, China. He holds a licentiate in
Sacred Scripture (SSL) from the Pontifical Biblical Institute, Rome; PhD
from the Ateneo de Manila University; and SThD from the Loyola School of
Theology in Quezon City.
4. FR. ADOLFO N. DACANAY, SJ holds a doctorate in Canon Law

(JCD) from the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome (1989). He teaches
theology at the Ateneo de Manila University. He authored Canon Law on
Marriage: Introductory Notes and Comments (Ateneo de Manila, 2000) and
The Sacraments of Initiation: A Commentary on Cc. 849-958 of the Code of
Canon Law (Anvil, 2006).
Outside Header Right vv
In Memoriam
In Memoriam
Fr. Martin I. Mandin, SVD

November 11, 1955 February 14, 2017
Professor of Moral Theology
Divine Word Seminary, Tagaytay City
F
r. Martin Mandin was born on November 11, 1955 in Loboc, Bohol.
His parents were Teodrico Mandin and Tita Inres. He was the fourth
of five children in the family. He first joined the CICM in their minor
seminary in Butuan, Agusan Del Norte where he finished his high school
education. He was then sent by the bishop of Butuan to study in the college
seminary in Davao. After two years there he decided to join the SVD, perhaps
influenced by relatives who were SVD seminarians. He entered the SVD
Formation Center in Cebu in 1974. He made his first vows in 1978, his final
vows in 1982, and was ordained to the priesthood on October 22, 1982. His
first assignment was at the Divine Word University in Tacloban, Leyte. In
his four years stay there he worked in the campus ministry, served as director
of the Grade School and High School departments, and as director of Plant
Operations. In 1988, he went to Rome and obtained a Licentiate in Moral
Theology. After his studies, he returned in 1991 to Tacloban and was the Dean
of the College of Arts and Sciences. In 1993 he returned to Rome but was
unsuccessful in his pursuit of a doctoral degree. Returning to the Philippines
in 1997, he accepted an assignment to be Moral Theology professor and
formator at the Regional major Seminary (REMASE) in Davao. In 2004
he was transferred to the Divine Word Seminary in Tagaytay to teach Moral
vi Diwa 42 (2017): v-vi
Theology. He also acted as the Prefect of Apostolate. In 2008, he asked for

parish work and was assigned at the Saint Arnold Janssen Parish Shrine in
Cainta, Rizal, but he continued his teaching in Tagaytay on a part time basis.
In December 2016, he complained of back pains. He went for a checkup and
was told he might have lung cancer. A second opinion confirmed the earlier
findings, and possibility of bone cancer was also added to the diagnosis. He
was given a few months to live as the cancers were in the advanced stages.
Fr. Martin, or Martz, as he was fondly called by his classmates and
contemporaries was well-liked because of his jolly and friendly nature. When
he was in Davao, a diocesan priest who worked with him would describe him
as the life of the community. He would be perceived as easy-going and
having a laid back and relaxed attitude, which made him easily approachable
by many. His illness was a shock to all, as he showed no indication that he
was sick. Prior to that checkup, he had an enjoyable time with the confreres
of Manila District in their Christmas gathering last December 2016.
Fr. Martin finally breathed his last at 4:45 PM on February 14, 2017.
May he rest in peace!
[Source: Obituary of the Philippine Central Province]

The Necessity of the Postulate of God in
Kants Moral Philosophy
JEROME S. MONTESCLAROS, SVD
University of San Carlos
Cebu City
Introduction
K
ants oeuvre can be roughly divided into three: the pre-critical, the
critical and the post- critical, and in all of these the theme of God is
recurrent.1
In his critical work, Critique of Pure Reason, Kants treatment of the
rational proof of the existence of God is rather monumental so that many
consider him as the turning point leading to postmodernism.2 He rules out
the traditional ontological argument of the existence of God that has its roots
in St. Anselm and found again in Descartes. Kant plausibly demonstrates
that the knowledge we have to prove the existence of God as yielded by
pure reason a priori is highly theoretical and speculative so that, remarkably,
the same reason can speculate, with equal plausibility, that there is no God.
Both ontological proofs for and against Gods existence lead to the sceptical
conclusion that the notion of God is simply beyond the range of pure reason.
With this, one may be quick in judging Kant as unbelieving in the existence
1
Based on the chronology of Kants oeuvre, it can be construed that the notion
of God, particularly His existence and His role as the provenance of design and
order of the universe, has preoccupied Kant already at the earliest stage of his active
mind, that is, even before his critical works, for which he is most renowned. His
Universal Natural History and the Theory of Heavens published in 1755, his New
Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition published in the same
year, his first essay on Earthquakes, published in 1756, and his The One Possible Basis
for a Demonstration of the Existence of God published in 1763, are works that testify
to validate the claim.
2
Stephen R. C. Hick, Explaining Postmodernism: Skepticism and Socialism from
Rousseau to Foucault (New Berlin: Scholargy Publishing, 2004), 6. Postmodernism
can roughly be described in relation to epistemology as anti-realist, denying any
possibility of acquiring knowledge of things-in-themselves through reason.
2 Diwa 42 (2017): 1-28
of God. But this is a mistake. Kant believes in a God who is perfect,

omniscient, omnipotent, holy and just.3 But what is the foundation of his
belief in God if pure theoretical reason is to be precluded? Kants answer can
be found in his philosophical morality.
In the Critique of Practical Reason and Lectures on Philosophical Theology
we are informed that the foundation of the belief in the existence of God is
found in morality. In Kants posthumously published work, Opus Postumum,
he claims that Moral-practical reason, if it contains laws of duty (rules of
conduct in conformity with the categorical imperative), leads to the concept
of God.4 There seems to be a necessary relation between God and morality
in Kants philosophical moral matrix. The task at hand is primarily to unravel
how Kants moral philosophy proves the existence of God and to show that
Gods necessary role in morality is something that is contentious. To do this
job demands that we revisit Kants main moral tenets.
The Moral Act
Moral Law
When Kant asks the question What ought I to do?, he is actually
searching for a moral guide for human acts, a guide that serves universally,
that is, applicable to all thinking beings. This guide he calls moral law.
Crucial to his concept of a moral law is the inspiration or motivation behind
the law which justifies its worthiness as a universal law. Universality is what
defines a moral law and the only way for it to acquire such a universal quality
is by way of motivation. Before Kant, the moral law had been motivated
by different inclinations, which can all together be collected under one
name, happiness. But happiness is subjective. Thus, under the criterion of
universality, a moral law founded on happiness cannot be a moral law at all.
Moral law is universal only when it can command universally.
For Kant, there is only one motivation that can make moral law acquire
universal character, that is, duty. Telling the truth for a reward is not an act of
duty. But telling the truth for dutys sake, regardless of any reward, is an act
of duty. So, the motivation proper to moral law is duty, that is, doing things
not for any other reason than that it is your duty. But what defines duty? An
act is considered a duty when it has the quality of a categorical imperative,
Kant, Lectures on Philosophical Theology, 41.

3
Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, ed. Eckart Forster, trans. Eckart Forster and
4
Michael Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 200.

J. Montesclaros, Necessity of the Postulate of God 3
an imperative that commands categorically or absolutely. And it commands

absolutely because it is legislated a priori by the pure practical reason, that is,
not empirically or, in other words, without the aid of experience. A moral
law can then be considered as the receptacle of the necessary concepts of
the moral philosophy of Kant, such as duty, categorical imperative and pure
practical reason. These concepts are inexorably related and such relation
reflects the possibility of the moral law.
In all this, Kant hopes to free the moral law from any empirical
component so that it can rest on mere ideas of pure reason and thus be
cognized a priori. Only then can it determine completely a priori (without
regard to empirical motives, i.e., to happiness) the doing and the refraining,
i.e., the use of the freedom of a rational being as such, [so] that these laws
command absolutely and are therefore necessary in every regard.5 The
finished product of this process is the moral law, a law that commands
absolutely.
I think, this conviction of Kant grants the ground for some criticisms
of his moral philosophy, such as: it allows every conceivable action and
therefore demands none or it is too abstract or devoid of any content
to hold ground.6 But Kant is not blind to this proclivity of his moral
philosophy. If he insists on the preponderant position of pure practical
reason in his moral philosophy, it is because for him a particular action can
by no means authoritatively provide the concept of morality.7 The moral
procedure will always be that an example has to fit the moral principle
before it (the example) becomes a model of morality. The sequence is always
the principles first. In this sequence, Kant is able to avoid getting the moral
principles by empirical or subjective principles. Only in this way can the
universality of morality be secured.
Freeing moral law from motivation does not mean that Kant is nave or
indifferent to what obedience to moral law might gain for the moral agent. He
is actually being very sensitive to it; thus, he further asks: What do we hope?
Granted that we have acquired knowledge of what we ought to do, but
what can we hope or expect from it? This question for Kant is simultaneously
a practical and theoretical question, wherein the latter is only a guide that
5
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Cambridge:
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1996), 737.
6
Robert, Greenberg, The Bounds of Freedom: Kants Causal Theory of Action
(Germany: Walter De Gruyter GmbH, 2016.), 1.
7
Immanuel Kant, The Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton
(New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1965), 21.
4 Diwa 42 (2017): 1-28
leads to the answering of the former.8 We should take note that Kant is here
already sceptical about the pure theorizing power of the mind, but now he is
introducing a new kind of theorizing, one that is practical. It is practical in
the sense that it can anticipate something because something ought to occur.9
Since Kant claims that all hope aims at happiness,10 the something here
refers to a possible outcome of what ought to occur, and this is happiness.
Kant acknowledges that as a moral law commands us to perform an
act we can hope for happiness as a kind of reward from our obedience to it.
But his acknowledgement of happiness as something that we can hope for
in obedience to moral law is never to be the point for having it as a principle
behind the performance of the act. For Kant a law that is directly aiming
at happiness is not a moral law but a pragmatic one, hence not a moral law
strictly speaking. Here we observe Kants anti-pragmatic or anti-utilitarian
stance. For him the law is moral when it does not directly aim at happiness.
He says:
The practical law issuing from the motive of happiness I call

pragmatic.... But the practical law that has as its motive nothing
but the worthiness to be happy - if there is such a law - I call moral
(moral law).11
We usually ask the question: what should I do to be happy? This question

evinces a pragmatic law that would guide one to behave such that one deserves
to partake in happiness. Happiness is thus also an aim of the act. Kant
argues that pragmatic law is based on empirical principles since it is only
through experience that one knows what kind of inclination needs to be
satisfied and with what means.12 Pragmatic law evolves empirically, that is,
from experience. Kant is in total disagreement with having experience as the
principle by which to identify what actions are to be pursued, for this would
necessarily imply subjectivity. Besides, as we shall show later, in matters of
pragmatic law, one would be mistaken to believe that with ones obedience to
moral law, one becomes the cause of ones happiness. Yes, we can legislate the
moral law to direct our actions but to be happy is rather beyond our scheming.
So, having happiness as a principle behind our laws provides us not with a
moral law but with a pragmatic law aimed at happiness, for happiness is not
8
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 736.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid., 736-737.
12
Ibid., 737.
something that we can directly produce at will but something that we can
only hope for.
To be moral is to be in consistent obedience to the moral law for it is
only in this way that we can be moral and thus worthy of happiness. Duty
as the principleof moral law should not be preceded by any other motivation,
otherwise the moral law ceases to be moral. Only in this order can happiness
be consistent with morality. Kant says: If the feeling of pleasure precedes
the law, it is pathological; in the reverse case, the pleasure is moral.13 So
Kants moral philosophy is not a kill-joy. It accommodates happiness, not
as the main aim of the act but as something that is hoped for.
Good Will
Another important term in Kants moral philosophy, which is actually a
project of reason as its highest practical vocation,14 is good will. What is
the good will? I think, in trying to understand Kants notion of good will,
we should first ask the following leading question: What makes the good
will good? With this question, Kants notion of good will becomes a project
rather than simply a definition or description of a state of being or a course
of nature. His project is to make our will good for he believes that our will
can be bad. He says, Understanding, wit, judgment courage, resolution,
and perseverance in ones plan, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly
good and desirable for many purposes/ but they can also be extremely evil
and harmful if the will which is to make use of these gifts of nature is not
good.15 In fact, he considers the human will as imperfect.16 People with
bad will are popularly known by us as bad people. And no one, whether at
the level of rational impartiality or common sense, likes bad people even if
such people are physically attractive or prosperous in life. Maybe we envy
their endowments or prosperity but never their bad-willed character, for it
is this bad will that causes trouble or immorality in communal life. But all
of us like good people and we believe that what the world needs are good
people. Therefore, we are one with Kant in his intent to make peoples will
good for the reason that, as he puts it: There is no possibility of thinking of
anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good
without qualification, except a good will.17 People can be good in various
13
Kant, Opus Postumum, 201.
14
Kant, The Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, 10.
15
Ibid., 7.
16
Ibid., 25.
17
Ibid., 7.
6 Diwa 42 (2017): 1-28
ways. They can be good in sports or in arts or in some other talents or what
have you. But their goodness needs qualification for it can be just a means to
achieve other values or goods and is thus of lesser worth in the hierarchy of
values. But good will is good in itself;18 thus, it does not need to be qualified.
The quality of a good will is in no need of qualification. This is clearly
featured in the example given by Christine Korsgaard.
But suppose that someone performs a morally fine action: say, he

hurries to the rescue of an endangered enemy, at considerable risk
to himself. Many things may go wrong with his action.Perhaps
the rescuer fails in his efforts to save his enemy. Perhaps he himself
dies in the attempt. Perhaps the attempt was ill judged; we see that
it could not have worked and so was a wasted effort. In spite of all
this, we cannot withhold our tribute from this action, and from
the rescuer as its author.19
It is good will that propels the moral agent to do the act of saving. Let
us examine the circumstances surrounding the act to be able to comprehend
the true quality of a good will. First, the moral agent is saving an enemy.
Who among us would even entertain the thought of saving an enemy except
the one who has a good will? This is because good will is not founded on any
emotion of hatred or even joy. It is, so to speak, emotion-free. This is also
a quality of the moral law as elucidated above. Good will is good when it is
totally aligned to the moral law.
Second, the moral agent is not sure if ones effort will be successful.
Again, who among us would dare to exert an effort of saving an enemy when
we are not even sure to succeed except the one with a good will? This is
because a good will is not after what it effects or accomplishes;20 rather,
it is a volition or desire whose sole object is what is moral or good.21 And if
obedience to the moral law is what makes us moral, then the object of a good
will is the moral law.
Third, the act could even end up with oneself getting killed. This is the
worst scenario of the act. But the good-willed person will still pursue the act
because good will is not dictated upon by self-preservation per se but only by
the object of the will, that is, the moral law considered as duty.
18
Ibid., 8.
19
Kant, The Ground of Metaphysics of Morals, xii.
20
Ibid., 8.
21
Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans., James Creed Meredith (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 332.
The act, including all the surrounding circumstances, could not pass
without admiration from us who understand that such an act must come
from a person of good will, one whose character is extraordinary, short of
saying a saint. But how about if one only intends to help the enemy but is
unable to actualize the intention, can we still consider the person as good-
willed according to Kants estimation? No. Mere wishing does not qualify
in Kants understanding of good will. There must be an effort from the
moral agent to summon all the powers at ones disposal to achieve what one
wills.22 There is no room for mediocrity here. The effort must be exhaustive.
No matter how seemingly little, but if the effort is the maximum that one
can do under the given circumstances, then that act is expressive of a good
will. Only then can the good will become like a jewel and still shine by
its own light as something which has its full value in itself.23
The absolute value of a person is ones good will, a value that not even
God would give,24 but that one alone can give to oneself by acting in freedom
on moral principles.25 It is then not in having but in doing that we gain this
value. Doing moral acts makes us who we are as a person of value.
Human Nature
Freedom
Kants moral philosophy is popularly known for its humanistic stance.
It is humanistic in the sense that it fully appreciates human capacity in
determining what actions to be pursued. Although his moral philosophy
accommodates the notion God, such notion is never to the point of
undermining the human capacity to determine ones actions. It is human, not
God, that admonishes oneself to be good and even aim at the highest good
through the urging of ones own pure practical reason for which freedom is
a necessary postulate.26 So what are essential to Kants moral philosophy are
freedom and reason. In this section we shall focus on freedom.
22
23
Ibid.
24
Kant, Opus Postumum, 237.
25
Kant, Critique of Judgement,, 332.
26
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing, Inc., 2002), 168.
8 Diwa 42 (2017): 1-28
As a postulate, freedom figures in reasons moral consideration. Human

beings have many interests or inclinations that are in want of fulfillment
or satisfaction, such as beauty, food, pleasure, comfort and, in general,
happiness. Any of these could be considered to be so compelling that one
cannot continue living without its continued satisfaction, as if one is already
tied up to it, therefore not free. But once reason legislates a moral law, one
that is worthy of a universal character and thus compelling to all, one would
be led in a natural yet forceful way to free oneself from other inclinations,
even those considered most compelling. Therefore, human beings have
freedom, which is a property of the will that can be efficient independently
of alien causes determining it.27 Freedom in this sense is seen negatively
(freedom from), that is, human beings are free from any inclinations, that
is, independent from the world of sense.28 We are free from the lure of
the senses or inclinations and therefore can prevent our manner of behaving
from being influenced by them. In this sense freedom is not productive.
But there is a positive concept of freedom, which is so much the richer
and more fruitful.29 In this concept (freedom for), human beings are free
to do things according to the dictate of moral law as legislated by reason.
Freedom here becomes the cause of desired effects and for this matter is
fruitful; such causality is always a heteronomy of moral law, which freedom
wills for itself. That is why freedom is never lawless, for it is under the
guidance of moral law that, in the first place, it legislates for itself.30 So, in
this positive concept of freedom, freedom is richer and productive for it wills
the moral laws; it is the author of the moral laws for itself to obey, thereby
making itself productive in virtuous acts.
Pure Practical Reason

Among many human characteristics, being reasonable is what I think as
the most prominent in Kants assessment of human beings. At first blush this
may sound unoriginal since it seems to have already been said even in ancient
times especially by Aristotle. But it makes a big difference especially when
that reasonableness refers to the speculative reasoning of traditional logic
or metaphysics. Kants utilization of reason in morality is not speculative
but practical and yet pure, thus deserving the name pure practical reason.
Kants two-pronged critique of pure and practical reason has found its way
27
28
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 168.
29
30
Ibid.
in his first and second Critiques respectively, an indication that he disagrees

with the use of reason in a purely speculative way especially in dealing with
moral matters. But this should not lead one to think that, in using pure
practical reason, Kant is merely trying to strike a balance between the pure
(a priori) and the practical (empirical or experiential) uses of reason. Kant is
convinced that pure reason has the supreme authority to determine the will
and secure its goodness by legislating moral law as a matter of duty; other
than this, everything we do could be evil or immoral. This conviction is
found in Groundwork where he states, For, the pure thought of duty and
in general of the moral law, mixed with no foreign addition of empirical
inducements, has an influence on the human heart so much more powerful
than all other incentives, on the other hand a mixed doctrine of morals,
put together from incentives of feeling and inclination, can very often also
lead to what is evil.31
So, Kants exposition of the inherent limit of pure reason that leads to the
preclusion of any traditional demonstration of God, freedom and immortality
does not make his moral philosophy non-rational. On the contrary, it is
rational for he refrains from all other motivations or inclinations that tend
to undermine pure reason or at least clarifies these motivations to be other
than rational. Reason is practical in a popular sense when it can provide
principles that lead to the satisfaction of our inclinations. But for a moral law
to have universal applicability, such a law requires pure practical reason as
its legislator, which implies that it is freed from any influence of experience.
Though Kants thorough discussion of pure practical reason is found
in his second Critique, the first Critique already mentions it. He says, for
instance, that it is always still pure reason alone, but only in its practical
use, that has the merit of connecting a cognition to our highest interest,
and this is so because our concept of it is in perfect harmony with moral
principles legislated by pure practical reason.32 The way to an understanding
of a notion of a divine being, God, is no longer through pure theoretical
scheming but through moral principles legislated by pure reason. When
pure reason legislates a moral principle, the product is naturally in harmony
with the notion of God. So Kant is not ready yet to throw away the notion of
God; all he claims is that the traditional notion is not demonstrable through
purely rational theory and that such a notion can still be salvaged through
morality.
Ibid., 22-23.
31

32
10 Diwa 42 (2017): 1-28
Pure practical reason is still pure reason but in its practical use and it is
practical in the sense that it has an influence on the will; its true function
must be to produce a will which is not merely good as a means to some further
end, but is good in itself.33 Practical cognition is knowledge of objects that
determine the will, which in turn will bring them into existence.34 Unlike
our theoretical35 knowledge which is indifferent to its objects, that is, the
objects do not need our understanding for them to exist, practical cognition,
by determining the will, is the cause of the existence of its objects. Objects
are provided by pure practical reason in thought, expressed in the form of a
moral law. Our knowledge, for example, that we ought not to cheat during
exams can move us not to cheat and even to prepare for the exam; this is what
makes it a practical knowledge. So, pure practical reason is practical precisely
because it yields practical knowledge that determines the will, which in turn
produces the very object of such knowledge. This is the meaning of practical
in pure practical reason. But how about the meaning of pure?
In the preface to the second Critique, Kant claims that there is pure
practical reason.36 Here practical reason is pure because of its self-sufficiency
in formulating principles without the aid of experience. Only in this case can
pure reason become an absolutely necessary condition, not an instinct, that
can produce such a will that is virtuous, which Kant considers as the highest
good subordinating happiness to it.37
Knowing what we must do is a kind of knowledge given to us by pure
practical reason. It is this reason that provides the ground as to what moral
principles can necessarily and absolutely duty-bound us.38 It is this reason
that provides the a priori principles of what is considered duty taken as our
33
Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: On a Supposed Right to Lie
becauseof Philanthropic Concerns, 3rd ed., trans. James W. Ellington (Cambridge:
Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 1993), 9.
34
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, xix.
35
Our knowledge, for example, that human beings need to eat in order to
survive is not the reason why humans eat. The same is true with our knowledge
that whatever goes up goes down. This knowledge is not the reason for things to go
down after they are pushed up. In other words, this knowledge is only a deduction
from the experiences of life and as such is not necessary for the continual operation
of things in nature.
36
37
Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 9.
38
Kant on the Foundation of Morality: A Modern Version of the Grundlegung,
trans. Brendan, E. A. Liddell, Brendan E. A (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1970), 25.
moral categorical imperative, which cannot be established by experience or

external authority,39 a point we will elaborate later. It is our pure reason that
gives us the practical cognition of things that we ought to do.40
If Kants moral project is the possibility of moral law, which has to have
a universal character, he has to make sure that its source must be capable of
providing the required quality of universality. And he argues that it cannot
be provided by a deduction from experiences because a moral law must be
independent from them. That is why he first establishes the fact that there
is indeed a pure practical reason, a kind of reason that is not dependent on
any empirical sources or experience, that is, a priori. As it legislates a moral
law, it does not listen to any motivations that are provided by experience;
rather, it listens only to itself. Once successful in proving that there is indeed
pure practical reason, Kant argues that this reason is in no need of a critique;
what is in need of a critique is the practical reason, or the empirically limited
reason.41
Simply put, pure practical reason is practical for the fact that it is not
indifferent but actively engaging in human affairs. And what makes the pure
practical reason pure is the fact that it determines the will by procuring for it
the principle a priori, the very principle we recognize to be operative in our
practical life as the moral law (which) is the source of practical knowledge.42
Human actions are not done without a thought or principle behind them
and it is this principle that becomes the driving force that compels us to act.
What is the source of such a principle? Where is this principle coming from?
In the Kantian moral system, it is our pure practical reason that is the origin
of the moral principle which governs our actions.43
Categorical Imperative
What constitutes the goodness of a good will, which is in no need
of any qualification and is thus absolute and without limitation,44 is its
perfect alignment to the moral law by which it wills nothing other than
being obedient to it. The next question we should ask is: what kind of law
determines a will so that the will becomes good, that is, has no need of any
39
Ibid., 24.
40
Ibid., 8.
41
42
Ibid., xx.
43
Ibid., xv.
44
12 Diwa 42 (2017): 1-28
qualification? This law is called: categorical imperative. It will be easier for us

to have a full grasp of a categorical imperative if we first enlighten ourselves
about Kants notion of maxims because a categorical imperative is simply
a maxim of the highest kind.45 What we are trying to understand about
categorical imperative is the origin of its authority to command universally.
Maxim
Maxim is what one upholds as the reason for ones act. It is the case
that when we want to pursue an act there is always a reason or principle
that impels us to do it, that is, a maxim. I think this principle will surface
when we ask the question why. Why do you tell the truth? Whatever your
reason is, if it is a maxim, the act does not on that account have moral worth,
according to Kant. Maxims have no place in Kants moral philosophy. They
are to be avoided by all means. Let us examine Kants argument.
Maxims are subjective principles behind every human act, obtained not
from the character of the object, but from reasons interest concerning a
certain possible perfection of the cognition of this object.46 Maxims in this
sense are reasons interests to which the understanding of things is made to
fit rather than allowing the things to appear as they are. Since they are not
obtained from the object itself, they can conflict with each other and they
can be obstacles, which can greatly delay the truth.47
In the moral realm there are maxims, which are the subjective bases of
actions.48 They are subjective, or maxims, if the condition [under which
they apply] is regarded by the subject as valid only for his will.49 It is the
quality of being subjective that makes maxims unfit to become a determining
basis of the will. We remember that for a law to be considered a moral law
it has to have a universal character, that is, it should be applicable to all. In
the legislation of moral law then we should always be mindful that no mere
maxim can meddle in the process.
Kant provides four examples, which are numbered from one to four,
which show how mere maxims cannot be proposed as a universal law. To
expedite our discussion, we will be expounding only two of them, namely,
examples 2 and 4.50
45
46
Ibid., 635.
47
Ibid., 637.
48
Ibid., 741.
49
50
Examples 1 and 3 are found in The Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, 31-33.
Example 2 is about one who plans to borrow money promising to pay it

but actually has no intention at all of paying back. Let us try to universalize
his maxim and see if it works as a universal law. This is how Kant puts it.
his maxim of action would go as follows: when I believe myself

to be in need of money I shall borrow money and promise to
repay it, even though I know that this will never happen. Now
this principle of self-love or personal advantage is perhaps quite
consistent with my whole future welfare, but the question now is
whether it is right. I therefore turn the demand of self-love into a
universal law and put the question as follows: how would it be if
my maxim became a universal law? I then see at once that it could
never hold as a universal law of nature and be consistent with
itself, but must necessarily contradict itself. For, the universality of
a law that everyone, when he believes himself to be in need, could
promise whatever he pleases with the intention of not keeping it
would make the promise and the end one might have in it itself
impossible, since no one would believe what was promised him but
would laugh at all such expressions as vain pretenses.51
The maxim is not practical because once it is made public no one will
ever lend money to anyone, knowing that no one will ever fulfill the promise
to pay back. So this maxim cannot be willed to be a universal law for it
contradicts its very goal, which is, financial assistance.
Example 4 is all about one who has a maxim, which holds that it is just fine
to be apathetic or indifferent to people in need while enjoying ones own life
in prosperity as long as one is not causing the suffering of others. According
to Kant, this maxim cannot pass the scrutiny of the universalization of
maxims for it surely will self-contradict ones own concern for oneself. He
says that a will that decided this would conflict with itself, since many cases
could occur in which one would need the love and sympathy of others and
in which, by such a law of nature arisen from his own will, he would rob
himself of all hope of the assistance he wishes for himself.52 This maxim will
eventually hurt its owner, is therefore self-contradicting and cannot be willed
as a universal law. This example shows the reasonableness of sympathy or
social cooperation which in general will always benefit everyone. John Rawls
and even Aristotle, on idea of philia, hold the same opinion.

51
Ibid., 32.
52
14 Diwa 42 (2017): 1-28
Rawls considers social cooperation as crucial for the stability of any

society and considers our sense of justice as simultaneously a great good
for ourselves.53 It is in the healthy cooperative venture of a society that our
potentials and inclinations are best expressed and developed. The mutual
inspiration and the security of acceptance it provides, not to mention the
greater richness and diversity of a collective activity, are goods that are only
possible if the cooperative venture of a society is secured. In acting out our
sense of justice we acknowledge this arrangement which, for sure, will benefit
us. This reminds us of Aristotles idea of philia (friendship),54 according to
which we are not alone in our journey towards human flourishing. We need
friends. In fact, human flourishing would seem impossible to achieve if the
person is alone.
Kant is in search of a ground wherein the principle of an act can be
proposed universally. Mere maxims do not offer this ground and this is the
reason why they cannot be proposed as universal laws.
Categorical Imperative: Universalized Maxims

Kants moral philosophy has no intention of prescribing to us the concrete
dos and donts of moral life. What it provides, however, is a formula, which
guarantees the moral worth of an act we plan to pursue. This formula is no
other than the categorical imperative.
An imperative is understood as a command, like: Do your assigned
house chores, or Fall in line, or Do not be absent, or Pay your debt.
Imperatives can be either hypothetical or categorical. They are hypothetical
when they determine the will not absolutely as will but only in regard
to a desired effect.55 The imperative do your assigned house chores is a
command that is designed after a desired effect or result, which could be the
cleanliness or orderliness at home. Kant considers hypothetical imperatives as
mere practical precepts, but not laws because for Kant laws must sufficiently
determine the will as will and only in this sense can an imperative qualify
to be categorical.56 There is no other reason that can make a law compelling
53
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition (Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1999), 500.
54
Luis S. David, S.J. Aristotles Conception of Eudaimonia or Human Flourishing.
In Commentaries on Moral Philosophy, eds. Rainier R. A. Ibana and Angelie F. Tugado
(Pasig City: The Philippine Commission on Higher Education, 1998), 42.
55
56
Ibid.
except the will57 itself. This is what Kant calls a practical law, which is made
possible by the pure practical reason that is sufficient to determine the will.58
Categorical means that it is binding to everyone who acknowledges it
with his or her pure practical reason, at all times and in all situations or
circumstances. Thus, a categorical imperative59 has an absolute power or
authority over us so that we have no other option but to obey it. In other
words, it commands absolutely.60 The authority of a categorical imperative
comes neither from external authority like the church or religion nor from
the authority of experience, such as When driving always keep your eye
on the road.61 The authority of this rule comes from experience because
experience tells us that if you do not put your eyes on the road, accidents
happen. Rather, the authority of the categorical imperative rests on the fact
that it is legislated by pure practical reason a priori, not by experience. It is a
concoction of pure reason, that is, not out of experience, which is subjective,
but by pure reasoning; it is in this manner that it can be proposed as a
universal law. To obey this command is so necessary that one cannot disobey
without becoming immoral.62
The categorical imperative states: Act only in accordance with that maxim
through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.63
Whatever maxim can be proposed as a universal law is worthy of the name
moral law, the execution of which constitutes duty.
The maxims of the two examples mentioned above do not have the
quality for them to be proposed as a universal law. Thus they cannot be
considered a categorical imperative. And so we ask: what can qualify a maxim
to become a categorical imperative? It is actually the ground or the very end
of the imperative that can give that qualification. Kant is in search for this and
57
Will is a kind of causality of living beings insofar as they are rational. The
Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, 52.
58
Ibid., 29.
59
The categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as
objectively necessary of itself, without reference to another end (Ibid., 24). The
categorical imperative is limited by no condition and, as absolutely although
practically necessary, can be called quite strictly a command (Ibid., 27). The
categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as objectively
necessary of itself, without reference to another end (Ibid., 25)..
60
61
Kant on the Foundation of Morality, 15.
62
Ibid.
63
16 Diwa 42 (2017): 1-28
he identifies it as the nature of human beings as ends and never as means,64

which is an instrument used to achieve another end. Kant calls this as the
principle of humanity.65 A maxim has to serve nothing but humans as ends
and only then can it be proposed as universal law. With this the categorical
imperative can be now formulated in this way: So act that you use humanity,
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time
as an end, never merely as a means.66
This formulation gives more light as to why the two examples we
examined above cannot be considered a categorical imperative. Example
2 simply violates this for he who has it in mind to make a false promise
to others sees at once that he wants to make use of another human being
merely as a means.67 Example 4, though correct in keeping oneself as an end
in itself, fails in the sense that the agent did not try to further the ends of
others.68 What follows is Kants concept of the principle of humanity.
It now follows on its own that in the order of purposes the human
being (and with him every rational being) is a purpose in itself, i.e.,
he can never be used merely as a means by anyone (not even by
God) without being in this at the same time a purpose himself,
and that therefore the humanity in our person must be holy to
ourselves. For he is the subject of the moral law and hence of that
which is holy in itself [and] on account of which and in agreement
with which alone anything can indeed be called holy at all.69
Among all the purposes or ends that we aim at there is one that has
nothing beyond it. Whereas some ends can be used to attain other ends this
end, which is humanity, is the final one. As a final end it should not be used
to attain another end. Humanity, which is present in others and in me, is to
be considered holy70 at all times and in all places and in all circumstances.
This dignity, so highly portrayed by Kant that not even God should violate
it, has its provenance from the fact that humans are the subject of the moral
law. Humanity is the author of the moral law, the one expected to obey it
64
Ibid., 37.
65
Ibid., 39.
66
Ibid., 38.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid., 39.
69
70
A will whose maxims necessarily harmonize with the laws of autonomy is a
holy, absolutely good will. Kant, The Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, 46.
and whose durable or absolute obedience to it constitutes its holiness. At this

point we can already tell that indeed the primary aim of Kants morality is
not happy people but holy people.
A categorical imperative is founded on the principle of humanity and it
is on the basis of this principle that it can be willed to be a universal law. To
attain ones holiness then amounts to ones having this universal law (moral
law) as ones duty.
Duty
Duty in Kants ethical system implies the right principle, the principle of
humanity, which guarantees the morality of the act. The right principle gives
us the inner compulsion to make any act founded on such a principle a duty.
For example, one treats his fellows well not because he really likes them but
because he wants their votes when at some future time he runs for public
office.71 Obviously, here the principle behind the act of treating well ones
fellows is ones own future benefit. Thus, this act does not qualify as a duty
for it is not founded on the right principle; therefore, this is not a moral act.
There are things we do that we loosely call our duty, but actually they
are not moral in Kants estimation since they are not done out of duty. We
feed our children, we go to school and study well, we diligently do our task
as demanded by our position in an institution or society, we go to church, we
pray, we preach the word of God, we teach others to be good and all because
we think they are our duty. However, if these acts are not pursued with the
right principle, then our performance of them does not qualify as something
done out of duty and are therefore not moral. Let us turn to Kants example
for us to be enlightened about duty.
Although to preserve ones life is a duty, everyone has also an immediate
inclination to do so. On this account, the often anxious care taken by most
men for it has no intrinsic worth, and the maxim of their action has no moral
content. They preserve their lives, to be sure, in accordance with duty, but
not from duty. On the other hand, if adversity and hopeless sorrow have
completely taken away the taste for life, yet an unfortunate man, strong in
soul, and indignant at his fate without loving it, decides to keep his life not
from inclination or fear, but from duty then his maxim indeed has a moral
content.72
One has an inner inclination to preserve ones life, thus making it ones
duty to preserve ones own life. But Kant claims that most of the peoples
Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 10.

71
Ibid.
72
18 Diwa 42 (2017): 1-28
anxious care to preserve their lives has no intrinsic worth and the maxim or
principle that propels them has no moral content. How is this possible?
In preserving our life, we have different personal maxims. It could be that
life is beautiful; thus, I want to prolong and preserve my life. It could be
that one has many dependents that one dearly cares about; thus, one has
to stay alive for them to survive, too. If you are acting from this maxim of
self-preservation, Kant says that you are acting in accordance with duty but
not from duty. But when, even if in destitute situation wherein a person
is in the point of breaking because of so many problems and feels so alone
and helpless and is already contemplating suicide as the last and the most
convenient way out of the situation, yet the person still resolves to take care
of himself and stay alive because he is convinced with ones reasoning that
it is his duty to stay alive, then this person is doing his act out of a principle,
which is duty. Duty in this case becomes the performance of an act for dutys
sake. Duty compels one to perform an act not for any reason of self-love or
happiness or any other selfish purposes but for duty itself. Only in such a
case does the persons act of preserving ones life have a moral value. In the
performance of ones duty, there is nothing that refers directly to personal
benefit that motivates the person to preserve ones life.
Kants notion of duty may sound robotic in the sense that robots perform
their duties without any emotion. Indeed Kants morality is anti-emotive
because emotions are externally triggered and no external stimulus can evoke
in us the exact emotion which can propel us to do the correct moral act. In
one instance, I met a beggar who was asking for money to buy food, so I
gave the beggar money because I pity the person. In another instance, I met
another beggar who was also asking for money to buy food, but this time
I did not give because I was in a hurry and not really in the mood to act
generously. The factual situation of someone being hungry does not always
trigger the same emotion or the same act of generosity. This is because there
is something lacking in the factual situation to evoke in us the same emotion
which can propel the same moral act. That is why Kant prefers the principle
of duty to the principle of emotion.
Kants principle of duty has the wisdom that may serve our family and
society at large. There is for him only one act deserving of moral worth,
and that is doing things out of duty with no other motivation. This can be
disheartening for we usually do things with emotional motivation which is,
at times if not all the time, connected to our personal gain or interest. This
is the case when we do good things to our family, friends, co-workers and
the like. We even wonder if we ever have done good things to people that
we do not care about, and if we so, how often. If all the good things we have
done are to people we care about, those acts are marred with motivations
other than duty, and so we have done nothing good that is worthy of praise
in terms of Kantian morality. Disheartening though this may be, Christians
just have to remember that Jesus himself instructs:
When you give a luncheon or a dinner, do not invite your friends

or your brothers or your relatives or rich neighbors, otherwise they
may also invite you in return and that will be your repayment.
But when you give a reception, invite the poor, the crippled, the
lame, the blind, and you will be blessed, since they do not have the
means to repay you; for you will be repaid at the resurrection of
the righteous.73
But Kants moral philosophy goes further. Do not feed the poor only
because doing so will reward you with resurrection; rather, feed them for the
simple reason that it is your duty to do so.
The recipients or beneficiaries of our good acts are usually those whom
we care about precisely because they also care about us. But how about if
they stop caring and loving us in spite of our love and care for them, would
we still continue to do so? The facts of life give no as an answer. Family
relationships break up precisely because when one party stops caring, the
other party also stops. This problem of broken families can be accounted for
by the fact that we perform our duties to our families not for the reason of
duty. Can a father continue to love and support his son even if the son has
turned drug addict? Can a husband continue taking care and being faithful
to his unfaithful wife? Yes if he is doing it for no other reason than duty.
Moreover, the duty to preserve life seems easy when the people around
you consider not killing as their duty as well. But when they start becoming
violent to the point that killing seems to be a part of their nature, one cannot
only wish that they die but also kill them oneself if given the chance. Those
who are victims of violence seem to have no problem with death penalty and
this is true for one obvious reason, that is, vengeance, which is driven by
emotion and not by reason. What could make a father think of preserving
the life of a person who raped and killed his daughter? It is only the resolve
to preserve life not for any reason other than duty. Forgetting our duty to
preserve life for dutys sake would mean chaos and annihilation of humanity.
It is this thought of duty that will always make the duty to preserve life
relevant, whatever the circumstances may be.
I think Kants conviction of doing duty for the sake of duty is a very solid
foundation for morality. It compels us, even if we are the only ones who
73
Lk 14:12-14.
20 Diwa 42 (2017): 1-28
remain doing good acts, or even if the beneficiaries are not those whom we
care about or our enemies, or even if it will not serve our personal purposes.
We continue doing moral acts because it is our duty.
Kants Notion of the Highest Good

Kants moral philosophy sees duty as the only principle that can guarantee
the moral worthiness of an act. This is doing things not for any other reason
than duty, that is, doing duty for dutys sake. We have elucidated that the
principle of duty is founded on its quality as a categorical imperative, which is
legislated a priori by pure practical reason. All these terms - duty, categorical
imperative and pure practical reason - are contained in the concept of moral
law. Thus, we can say that the goodness of the will rests upon its willing to
respect and obey the moral law.
It would seem at this point that Kants moral philosophy is already
complete for his project, but this is not yet so because pure practical reason
cannot but presuppose the highest good.74 Pure practical reason could not
but point to us the good, the highest good for that matter. We cannot deny
the fact that we always desire that all human affairs, whether in terms of
doing or having, are to be had by us in their highest degree. But as pure
practical reason presupposes the highest good, it also presupposes the
freedom of man, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God.75 We
have already justified the possibility of freedom. Now let us do the same with
the remaining two: How have the immortality of the soul and the existence
of God become necessary postulates of pure practical reason as it conceives
of the highest good? This question provides the clue to understanding the
possibility of these two concepts through the notion of the highest good.
Two Elements of the Highest Good:

Immortality of the Soul and Existence of God
Traditionally, following Aristotle, happiness is identified with the
highest good.76 For his part, Kant identifies two elements of the highest
74
To aim at the highest goodan aim necessary because of respect for the
moral lawalong with the presupposition, flowing from it, of the objective reality
of this good, thus leads through postulates of practical reason to concepts that
speculative reason could indeed set forth as problems but that it could not solve.
(Kant, Critique of Practical, 168.)
75
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 170-171.
76
Aristotle opens up his discussions on his ethical principles with the following
good: morality and happiness. He argues that the moral law, which is the
sole determining basis of the pure will, is merely formal and hence bereft
of matter and any object of volition.77 Behind every act is a subjective
principle or inclination that an agent may have. Kant considers such a
subjective principle as a mere maxim which has no moral value unless it
passes through universal legislation. In this sense, a moral law is necessarily
a priori; it has no particular concrete content but includes all individual
subjective principles, a form under the name: highest good.
The highest good is highest in two senses. First, it is highest in the sense
that it is itself unconditioned, . . . not subordinate to any other condition
and second, it is highest in the sense that it is whole which is not part of a
still greater whole of the same kind.78 In other words, it is highest because
there is no other condition above it and it is complete because virtue and
happiness are simultaneously present.
The actualization of the highest good requires that actions aim at
making the highest good actual;79 a complete adequacy of attitudes to the
moral law is the supreme condition of the highest good.80 Since it is the
highest good, attaining it must require an equally high quality of will and that
kind of will is construed by Kant as holiness.81 It is true that this quality is
nowhere to be found, but it does mean that that highest good is not practical
or not realizable. If the highest good is seen as practical, then its condition
must also be practical. Now if our way to the highest good is through our
moral attitude, which is deficient, we need then to further a moral conduct
which is completely adequate for the actualization of the highest good. The
words: Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is
thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared
to be that which all things aims. [Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence
Irwin (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), 13.], Aristotle defines
happiness, which is understood as the highest human good, as . . . the activity of
soul in accordance with virtue, with the best and most complete. (Ibid., 13-14.)
We can say that what constitutes Aristotles notion of the highest good is its resolved
patronage to happiness as the highest good and its uncompromising adherence to
virtue, which is made possible by reason, as the only means of achieving it. This leads
us to the conclusion that the two are identical, or at least one is already contained in
the other so that attaining one is also attaining the other.
77
78
Ibid., 141.
79
Ibid., 151.
80
Ibid., 155.
81
Ibid.
22 Diwa 42 (2017): 1-28
only thing we can do then is to progress in moral conduct and this progress
is seen by Kant as ad infinitum.82 It is in this circumstance that Kant argues
the immortality of the soul. Since our progress to virtue or morality is ad
infinitum or eternal, the situation necessarily requires an eternal soul. If the
path to virtue is eternal and if we claim that there is no eternal soul, then
it is tantamount to saying that the road to virtue is impossible ab initio.
If thats the case, whats the use of trying to be virtuous since after all it
is impossible? But pure practical reason sees the highest good as practical
since our every single act towards it is practical. It is practical that one can
be honest in a particular situation. This act and every single virtuous act
is a progress towards the highest good, only that this progress is eternal.
And since the highest good is practical, all the necessary requirements for its
attainment must also be practical, and that includes the immortality of the
soul. Therefore, there should be an eternal soul.
But not only is the immortality of the soul needed as a postulate for the
attainment of the highest good; God has to be postulated as well. As far as
moral law aims at the highest good which includes happiness as its element,
so far does this necessitate the existence of God as a postulate.83 Let us
pursue this claim.
Happiness
We have seen that happiness is one element of the highest good.
Happiness is defined by Kant as the state of a rational being in the world for
whom in the whole of his existence everything proceeds according to his wish
and will; it therefore rests on the harmony of nature with his whole purpose
as well as with the essential determining basis of his will.84 If everything
is well, that is, if everything goes according to my wish and will, then I am
surely happy. This state rests on the harmony of nature with the wills pursuit
of a course of life dictated by pure practical reason in the form of a moral law.
But there is nothing in moral law that suggests a linkage that necessarily or
logically connects the two together. If our actual life matches perfectly with
our intent to live a virtuous life as defined by the moral law, which is the
determining ground of our will, then happiness necessarily ensues without
us being actually directly responsible. In other words, strictly speaking, to
be happy is not of our own making; it is natures. It can be construed that it
is a gift from nature.
82
Ibid.
83
84
Ibid.
Being free, what we do, or how we act is our making, but to be happy
at the same time is rather beyond the range of our scheming. Nature has
it that our acts performed in accordance with moral principles or laws are
met with happiness, but we really do not know how. This is the meaning
of Kants statement that moral law considers only the freedom of a rational
being as such, and the necessary conditions under which alone this freedom
harmonizes with a distribution of happiness that is made in accordance with
principles.85 We can imagine happiness here as an award of our virtuous acts
wherein such acts are correlated with happiness proportionate to the quality
of our acts. The better the quality is, the greater the happiness will also be.
We need to emphasize that Kant considers happiness not as identical
with the highest good, but only as a part or element of the highest good, that
is, not even the most important but nevertheless a necessary element of the
concept. He says: happiness amounts indeed to the second element of the
highest good, but in such a way that it is only the morally conditioned but
yet necessary consequence of morality.86 It must be a necessary consequence,
for without happiness, the highest good will not be the highest. However, in
relation to the highest goods authority to determine the will, it cannot be so
if it only contains happiness. It can only have that authority if happiness is
conditioned by virtue. In other words, the highest good has to include the
moral law and only then can it be considered the determining basis of the
will.87 Happiness alone cannot guarantee moral law with such authority.
Moreover, since the highest good is necessarily a priori, happiness is to
be considered a priori as well. And for this reason, the possibility of its
practicality is always in the future tense, which directs us to eternity.
Happiness Cannot be a Determining Basis of the Will

Happiness is not an absolute good but needs a condition, a morally lawful
conduct, for it to be so.88 With this, morality remains the supreme good,
making happiness subordinate to it and thus cannot be construed as identical
with the highest good. The completeness of the highest good is constituted
by our resolved will to pursue morality and, if successful, will earn for us
the necessary consequence, happiness. If we accept in the first place that we
want happiness and later decide not to partake of it after we have earned it,
85
86
87
Ibid., 140.
88
Ibid., 142.
24 Diwa 42 (2017): 1-28
this would rather be inconsistent to reason. That is why in Kant the two are
inseparable and together they ideally complete the highest good.
For Kant the principle behind happiness made into a determining basis
of the power of choice is self-love and all material principles, which posit
the determining basis of the power of choice in the pleasure or displeasure
to be sensed from the actuality of some object, are entirely of the same kind
insofar as they belong, one and all, to the principle of self-love or ones own
happiness.89 But no matter how much understanding and reason may be
used with this principle, still it could not comprise a determining basis for
the will; the will must be determined by the mere form of the practical rule
without the presupposition of any feeling, the moral law.90
Except for the moral law, any other determining basis for the will is
precluded and labelled as personal happiness. Thus, identifying two elements
of the highest good would seem to confuse things for it seems now that there
are two determining factors of the will, namely, happiness and morality.
Does Kant change his view about the possibility that happiness can be a
determining basis for the will too? No. His patronage to the moral law as
the sole determining basis of the will holds strong, while recognizing the fact
that the result of virtuous conduct is happiness. Hence happiness should not
be seen as a determining basis of the will but only as a necessary consequence
of a virtuous life and in this sense not identical with the highest good.
Happiness is subordinate to virtue for the reason that the former is
conditioned by the latter. Thus, happiness is always proportionate to virtue,
such that the latter, which is not conditioned by anything else, is considered
as the supreme good, although together they constitute the ideal highest
good.91 This subordination has to be emphasized to avoid the mistake of
rendering virtue a sense of instrumentality, that is, as an instrument to
achieve happiness.
Thus, Kant sees virtue as the sole determining basis of the will.
Happiness could be considered a concept of freedom and a determinant
of the will only if it is conditioned by virtue. This would still amount to
virtue as the sole or primary concept of freedom. But if Kant is correct that
virtue constitutes our supreme or final end, then what becomes of happiness?
Having pointed out virtue to be the final end would seem to make happiness
as a supererogation. Kant claims that happiness is a necessary consequence,
but what is its relevance to virtue or to the virtuous person if it cannot be
89
Ibid., 34.
90
Ibid., 37.
91
the motivating basis of his or her will? We are actually dealing with the
problematic linkage between virtue and happiness.
Problematic Linkage between Happiness and Virtue

Kant examines two possible theories, analytic (logical, according to
the law of identity) and synthetic (real connection, according to the law of
causality), that may explain the relationship between the two.92 Following
the logical or the law of identity, virtue and happiness are to be construed
as identical so much so that attaining virtue is attaining happiness. This
is obviously the theory behind Aristotles account of them. Following the
synthetic or the law of causality, virtue and happiness are to be taken as
something distinct from the consciousness of virtue, as a cause that produces
an effect.93
According to Kant, there are only two ancient Greek schools, viz.
Epicureanism and Stoicism, that tackle this issue. Both construe the
relationship of virtue and happiness in a logical sense, maintaining the two
as identical and therefore understanding them not as two but as one and the
same element of the highest good. However, the two are divided in that the
Epicurean is inclined to believe that to be conscious of ones maxim leading
to happiness . . . is virtue while the Stoic thinks that to be conscious of ones
virtue is happiness.94
Kant somehow agrees that happiness is attainable through virtue but
differs in the sense that while the Stoics consider happiness as the primary
aim of a virtuous life, Kant sees virtue as the primary aim of the moral
law with happiness as a consequence. Hence Kant neither agrees with the
Epicureans nor the Stoics solutions to the problem for the reason that both
have happiness elevated above everything.95
This problem is difficult for two reasons. First, happiness and morality
are two elements of the highest good which are entirely different in kind,
and . . . therefore one cannot cognize their linkage analytically (that is to
say, someone who seeks his happiness will in this [very] conduct of his finds
himself virtuous by merely resolving his concepts; or someone who follows
virtue will in the very consciousness of such conduct ipso facto finds himself
happy).96 Second, it is difficult for the fact that there is in the moral law
92
Ibid., 142.
93
Ibid.
94
Ibid.
95
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason,147.
96
Ibid., 144.
26 Diwa 42 (2017): 1-28
not the slightest basis for a necessary connection between morality and the
happiness, proportionate thereto, of a being belonging to the world as a part
[thereof] and thus dependent on it, who precisely therefore cannot through
his will be the cause of this nature and, as far as his happiness is concerned,
cannot by his own powers make it harmonize throughout with his practical
principles.97
The heterogeneity of the two concepts lies in virtue as a concept of
freedom and happiness a concept of nature.98 In other words, their
difference in kind is understood in the sense that morality is a product of
practical reason while happiness is a product of nature. Happiness is a kind
of an affirming apparatus of nature so that, when human behaves in a certain
manner, moral for that matter, happiness ensues. But there is no way that
the fruition of happiness is due to reason. Human power in pure practical
reason is only in the area of legislating moral laws, but as to how happiness
ensues from it is beyond its range, that is, it is not a product of its legislative
power. Thus, if a logical relation is to be insisted on virtue and happiness,
there seems to appear an abysmal gap between them, making any analytical
effort to explain their relation or link in vain. Reason simply cannot provide
the connection as to why virtue produces happiness analytically, because the
latter is not logically contained in any way in the former and vice versa.
This leads Kant to think that the linkage must be a synthesis.99 Here
the harmony of virtue and happiness in the highest good is a synthesis of
morality and nature. In order is Kants argument of Gods existence as a
necessary postulate of pure practical reason whose aim is the highest good.
. . . in the practical problem of pure reason, i.e., [that of] working

necessarily for the highest good, such a connection is postulated
as necessary: we ought to seek to further the highest good (hence
this good must, after all, be possible). Therefore the existence of
a cause of nature as a whole, distinct from nature, which contains
the basis of this connection, namely the basis of the exact harmony
of [ones] happiness with [ones] morality, is also postulated.
This supreme cause, however, is to contain the basis of natures
harmony not merely with a law of the will of rational beings, but
also with the presentation of this law insofar as they posit this
law to themselves as the supreme determining basis of the will, and
hence not merely with morals according to their form but also
97
Ibid., 158.
98
Roe Fremstedal, The concept of the highest good in Kierkegaard and Kant,
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (2011): 163.
99
with their morality as their motive, i.e., with their moral attitude.
Therefore the highest good in the world is possible only insofar
as one assumes a supreme cause of nature that has a causality
conforming to the moral attitude.100
Pure practical reason never settles for less. It will always aim at what
is highest. Thus, we have the highest good as our moral aim. But since
we ought to seek to further the highest good as dictated by pure practical
reason, which always aims at what is highest, this highest good must not be
lacking of anything or, in other words, it must be complete. And for it to
be so, it must include not only virtue but also happiness. But since there is
in the moral law not the slightest basis for a necessary connection between
morality and the happiness, proportionate thereto, thus there is a need for
pure practical reason to postulate the basis of the exact harmony of [ones]
happiness with [ones] morality. This postulate is the existence of God.
We have to take note that, except for morality, external things exist
without us being directly responsible. His applies to nature and happiness
since they are not directly caused by our morality. Now since virtue indirectly
causes happiness, which is made practical in this sense, a practical Being has
to be postulated as the one directly responsible for the harmony of virtue
and happiness, and this Being is God. As far as pure practical reason in its
power to conceive the highest good as practical is concerned, God cannot not
exist. Our progress in the attainment of the highest good is ad infinitum and
for that matter necessitates the postulate of the immortality of the soul. So
it will be an immortal soul that will be victorious in the triumph of virtue,
which only God will be able to harmonize with happiness. So God is already
present on account of the moral law, which has the highest good as its final
end, as practical.
Conclusion
It is the luxury of non-rational beings to exist without bothering at all
how they must behave. Their way of being is a heteronomy to laws of which
they are not the author and to which they have no choice but to obey. One
can only wonder what or who ordained their manner of being. Could He
be God? With rational beings the opposite case is true and this is due to
their natural endowments of reason and free will. These endowments are
the necessary grounds of Kants moral philosophy. Reason, or pure practical
100
28 Diwa 42 (2017): 1-28
reason to be precise, is considered as the ordaining authority of morality. It

ordains human beings to goodness, the highest good for that matter. And for
the attainment of the highest good, it ordains the moral law, which contains
the categorical imperative founded on the principle of humanity by which it
achieves its universal character and because of which freedom has assumed
it as its duty. In this scheme there can be no wondering who ordains human
beings to live morally and how: all human beings themselves; all of us.
But Kant insists that even in his moral scheme wherein human beings are
obviously the main actors, there could be God as a necessary postulate.
This insistence goes as far as his resolve to deny knowledge in order to make
room for faith.101
But even in this resolve Kants moral arguments have made Gods role
to morality minimal or diminished, if not totally denied. This is true for
three reasons. First, God traditionally understood as the author of morality
or moral laws, e.g. the Ten Commandments, has practically no place in the
procurement of moral law as ones duty. The two elements in Kants concept of
morality, namely, good will and moral law, are achievable by humans through
their pure practical reason. Everything about morality originates in human
beings through pure practical reason. As long as we have already identified our
duty in terms of the moral law, then, regardless of the result, God would seem
irrelevant since what we only need to be moral is to do our duty for dutys sake.
Second, another way of taking the minimalized role of God in morality is to
say that human beings are actually doing more work than God. Legislating
moral laws, producing a good will, and aiming at the highest good are a lot of
work compared to Gods sole function of correlating proportionately happiness
to our virtuous act. Third, Kants resolve in subordinating happiness to virtue
ends up with God doing the lesser or subordinate job. Thus, Kants morality
evinces a very humanistic morality, which emphasizes in a grand manner the
moral autonomy of human beings. In saying this, we do not mean that Kant
has made man greater than God. We simply mean that humans are doing
more work than God in morality, which inevitably undermines Gods role in
morality and which makes possible the thought that human beings may be
able to be good alone.
Critique of Pure, 117.

101
The Digression on Mercy in the Book of
Wisdom (11:1712:22)
RANDOLF C. FLORES, SVD

Divine Word Seminary
Tagaytay City, Philippines
B
ecause of a hate-campaign against the Jews in Alexandria that was
turning almost to be a pogrom, a delegation representing the big
Jewish community there1 took pains to go to Rome to plead its case
before the emperor Gaius Caligula. That was in the Spring of 40 A.D. The
chosen head of the delegation was the well-known Hellenistic philosopher
of Jewish origin, Philo Judaeus (ca. 20 B.C. to ca. A.D. 50), once thought
to have authored the Book of Wisdom (cf. Jerome in Praef. in lib. Sol.). On
that meeting, Philo wrote a report on the frustration that they had. Caligula
appeared to have snubbed it (Legat. 361-67). After just less than a year,
by stroke of fate, Caligula was assassinated and Claudius became emperor.
Another Jewish delegation went again to Rome to appeal to the new Emperor.
It is at this time, so the historian Eusebius says and embellished by Jerome
80 years later, that Philo had conversations with Peter in Rome and they
even formed friendship and that when Philo was back in Alexandria, he was
all praise for Mark and the community that the evangelist had established, a
community founded on the Gospel which Mark wrote upon the approval of
Peter.2
The story is one for the movies. Nonetheless, it leads us to an important
background of this Hellenistic Diaspora literature that we are about to
study: the Alexandrian Jews and later on the early Christians did not have
a problem with the friendship between Hellenistic philosophy and the
1
Although Philo claimed that there were no less than a million Jews resident in
Alexandria and the country from the slope in Libya to the boundaries of Ethiopia
(In Flacc. 43), could have been an exaggeration, the Jewish population was easily
one third of the citys population. See Collins, Jewish Wisdom, 137; who cites
Modrzejewski, The Jews in Egypt, 73.
2
Cf. David T. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature: A Survey, 4-5.
30 Diwa 42 (2017): 29-46
Hebrew Scripture; between the former and the Christian faith.3 Without
falling into anachronism, we may consider the dynamics below as a lesson in
inculturation.4
The Sage in persona Salomonis

Writing in the persona of Solomon, the anonymous Alexandrian Jew,
the Sage,5 who was Philos contemporary could have lived around 100 BC
50 AD and wrote his treatise in the first half of the first century AD, some
decades after the beginning of the Roman period in Egypt (30 BC) with the
reign of Caligula (37-41 AD) as the likeliest setting for its composition.6
On the attribution of authorship to Solomon: it had permitted the Sage
to blend Jewish and Hellenistic traditions and this contributed in the
reconfiguration of Solomon into an exemplary, perfect and ideal sage thus
respectable before the Hellenistic literati of Alexandria who were passionate
in their quest for the Perfect Sage.7 Such strategy, a mark of the wise, made
the Sages work even more authoritative, worth taking a second look and
3
As a matter of fact, the Book of Wisdom was listed with the books of the New
Testament in the Muratorian Canon (ca. 200 AD) due to the tradition that Philo,
thought to be the author, had converted to Christianity. For this, see John J. Collins,
Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 178.
4
Cf. Maurice Gilbert, Le livre de la Sagesse et linculturation, in L inculturation
et la sagesse des nations (PBI: Rome 1984), 1-11; Luca Mazzinghi, Il libro della
Sapienza: elementi culturali, in Il confronto tra le diverse culture nella Bibbia da
Esdra a Paolo, 179-19. For examples of inculturation in the wisdom literature, see my
earlier essay R. C. Flores, Bible and mission: Never the twain shall meet?, Diwa:
Studies in Philosophy and Theology 36 (2011): 1-12. For the influence of Hellenistic
philosophy on the Book of Wisdom, see James M. Reese, Hellenistic Influence on the
Book of Wisdom and Its Consequences; also Maurice Gilbert, La Sagesse de Salomon
et lhellnisme, in idem, La Sagesse de Salomon / The Wisdom of Solomon, 30-32; C.
Larcher, Etudes sur le livre de la Sagesse; also the commentary of Wilson is rich on
Hellenistic thought.
5
Crysostom calls him the Sage (In Gen., homily 22), henceforth the title to
be used in this paper.
6
For the debate over the date of composition, see Winston, The Wisdom of
Solomon, 20-25.
7
See Nathalie LaCoste, Solomon the Exemplary Sage: The Convergence
of Hellenistic and Jewish Traditions in the Wisdom of Solomon, University of
Toronto Journal for Jewish Thought 1 (2010): 1-23 (online publication: http://tjjt.cjs.
utoronto.ca/articles-2/). See also Marie-Franoise Baslez, Lautore della Sapienza e
la ambiente colto di Alessandria, in Il Libro della Sapienza, 46-66.
R. Flores, Digression on Mercy 31
seriously and, above all, attractive to the young and idealistic Hellenistic Jews
in Alexandria.8
The Structure and Content of the Book of Wisdom9

There is a common agreement today on a tripartite division of the book, a
division that is followed by most modern translations (cf. NABRE, NRSV):10
Part I: Wisdoms Gift of Immortality (1:1-6:21)

Part II: Power of Wisdom and Solomons Quest for Her (6:22-10:21)
Part III: Divine Wisdom in Exodus (11-19)
Part I is the most carefully constructed section with five reflections

arranged in a concentric pattern. 11 The focus of the Sages rumination,12
as indicated by an inclusio on the dikaios (3:1 and 5:1) is on the destiny
8
That the Sage has addressed his work not only to the young Jews in Alexandria
but also to the rest of the Greek intelligentsia, read the discussion of the social context
of the Sage in Michael J. Kolarcik, The Sage Behind the Wisdom of Solomon, in
Scribes, Sages, and Seers: The Sage in the Eastern Mediterranean World, 245-257.
9
For a review of critical studies done on the book in the last century, see
David Winston, Un secolo di ricerca sul libro della Sapienza, in Il libro della
Sapienza, 13-31. The publication of the critical edition of J. Ziegler (1962 and rev.
ed. 1981) stimulate a greater interest on the book especially in publishing scholarly
commentaries most of which come from the traditionally Catholic Latin countries:
Larcher (3 vols. 1983-85 France), Scarpat ( 3 vols. 1989-99 Italy), Vilches (1991
Spain) ; but also Engel (1998 Germany) and Winston (1979 North America). No
critical commentary has been published in English after Winston.
10
The classic division is:
I. Book of Eschatology (chaps. 1-5)
II. Book of Wisdom (chaps. 6-9)
III. Book of History (10-19)
Reese (Plan and Structure in the Book of Wisdom, 391-99) suggests a
tetrapartite division with the Digressions on Mercy and Idolatry (11:15 16:1) as
a separate book but this is a minor thing. For review of the literary structure, see
Michael Kolarcik, The Ambiguity of Death in the Book of Wisdom 1-6, 1-28; also
Maurice Gilbert, La struttura letteraria del libro della Sapienza: analisi di alcune
divergenze,in Il libro della Sapienza, 33-46.
11
Reese, Plan and Structure in the Book of Wisdom, 391-99..
12
Reese (Hellenistic Influence, 109-14) thinks of diatribe as the genre of this
section although monologue should be more apt, see Matthew Edwards, Pneuma
and Realized Eschatology in the Book of Wisdom, 40-51, esp. fn.15.
32 Diwa 42 (2017): 29-46
of the righteous and the wicked, a typical wisdom theme. True to the
Sages Jewish background in traditional wisdom, righteousness must be
rewarded and wickedness deserves punishment. The Sage, however, goes
even furthera breakthrough so to speakwhen his rumination leads him
to posit immortality (athanasia) as the reward of the righteous person
after death. The innovative teaching has its roots in Greek philosophy.13
The Sage teaches then that the righteous even if they die, their hope of
immortality is satisfied (3:4b).14 The Sage (1:6) also describes Wisdoms
spirit as philanthrps (kindly NRSV, NABRE; magaan ang loob sa lahat
MBB)its substantive, philanthrpia, is a concept dear to the Stoics, to Philo
and to Plutarch.15 This part then could end with an exhortation addressed
to earthly powers (cf. 1:1) to seek Wisdom and observe her lawsthis is
the basis of incorruption (aphtharsia, 6:18-19), another popular teaching in
Hellenistic Greek.
The opening section of Part II takes its cue from the ending of Part I: the
exhortation to seek Wisdom. In the course of doing a kind of philosophical
problem-solving or aporia,16 the Sage muses on the nature of Wisdom in
the voice of a Wisdom-seeker, presumably King Solomon as the name is
not explicit. Wisdom is Gods gift (8:21b); present at the moment of
creation (9:9b); and those who acquire it win the friendship (philia) of
God (7:14b). Wisdoms spirit possesses twenty-one attributes (7:22b-24) of
which philanthropos (humane NRSV kindly NABRE; mabait MBB) is
central. The secret of immortality lies in kinship (sygganeia) with Wisdom
(8:17b; cf. v. 13 also). Hearing all these Greek terms describing the nature
of Wisdom, again the young Hellenistic Jews to whom the Sage addresses
his philosophical musings, would have found the discussion interesting and
attractive. Kinship or sygganeia with the gods is a feature in Platos Timaeus
13
Cf. Randolf C. Flores, A Note on Hope and Immortality, Diwa: Studies in
Philosophy and Theology 37 (2012): 56-62.
14
For this translation, see Reese, The Book of Wisdom , Song of Songs, 47; the
usual is their hope is full of immortality (cf. NRSV) for the Greek h elpis autn
athanasias plrs.
15
There are, nevertheless, already intimations of afterlife in the Hebrew Bible
that could have laid the foundation for the Sages introduction of the idea of
immortality for the just: Job 19:25-27 for example. In the case of the Sage, the
idea of vindication of the just founded on traditional wisdom would be likewise a
factor, see Marco Nobile, The Hereafter in the Book of Wisdom (Wisdom 13),
in Wisdom for Life, 250-59.
16
Reese (Hellenistic Influence, 107-108) thinks the Sage here is indebted to the
Greeks in the use of aporia or a problem literature.
which is taken up in Philo and expresses the belief that the human beings
possess a natural kinship with God based on reason.17 The search for Sophia
and the enumeration of her attributes is akin, in Hellenistic Greek, to the
passion for and aretologies of the Egyptian goddess Isis so that the Sage
appears to be making a conscious effort to offset the appeal of the literature
of the revived Isis cult.18 This section concludes with a prayer (9:1-18) of the
king for God to give him Wisdom (v. 4a). The prayers invocation is unique:
God of my fathers, Lord of Mercy [kyrie tou eleous], who made all things by
your word [logos] (9:1).19 Divine power apropos divine mercy would be an
important theme in the third part of the book.
Part III is the Sages re-reading of Exodus vis--vis Wisdom (11-19)
betraying his familiarity and indebtedness to the Jewish interpretative
traditions of his day.20 The rhetorical style of his argument is reminiscent
of the Greek encomium (Latin, tribute, eulogy).21 This is accomplished
with the use of contrast (Gk. synkrisis) in five antithetical diptychs with
two digressions in the second diptych: on mercy and on idolatry. Following
the division suggested by Addison Wright (with slight changes based on
NABRE), the final part maybe outlined this way:22
17
See a discussion of this in Luca Mazzinghi, I loved [Wisdom] and sought
her from my youth; I desired to take her for my Counsellor (Wis 8:2a). Solomon
and Wisdom: An example of the Closest Intimacy, in Family and Kinship in the
Deuterocanonical and Cognate Literature, 236.
18
Reese, Hellenistic Influence, 40; see also John S. Kloppenborg, Isis and Sophia
in the Book of Wisdom, HTR 75 (1982): 57-84.
19
The vocative is rare, the first title God of my fathers is perfectly in tune
with the biblical tradition of the promises; the second one Lord of mercy is
hapaxlegomenon, not attested in the Hebrew canon, intertestamental Greek and
Latin literature. The invocation, nevertheless, joins three theological motifs:
promises, covenant, and creation. For this, see Roberto Vignolo, Sapienza,
preghiera e modello regale. teologia, antropologia, spiritualit di Sap 9, in Il Libro
della Sapienza, 263.
20
For this, see Peter Enns, Exodus Retold: Ancient Exegesis of the Departure from
Egypt in Wis 10:15-21 and 19:1-9).
21
For instances where the Sage uses encomium, the Greek rhetorical technique of
enumerating the good deeds of someone for the emulation of his or her virtue, see M.
Gilbert, Wisdom Literature, in Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period, 307-8.
22
Addison Wright, Wisdom, in NJBC, 513. See a more detailed explanation
in idem, The Structure of the Book of Wisdom, Biblica 48(1967): 165-184.
34 Diwa 42 (2017): 29-46
Divine Wisdom in Exodus (10 19)

A. Introduction: The Work of Wisdom in History
1. From Adam to Moses (10:1-21)
2. In the Desert (11:2-4)
B. Theme: Israel is Benefited by the Very Things That Punish Egypt (11:5)
C. Illustrations of the Them in Five Antithetical Diptychs (11:6 19:22)
1. First Diptych: Water from Rock Instead of the Plague of
the Nile (11:6-14)
2. Second Diptych: Quail Instead of the Plague of Little
Animals (11:15 16:15)
a. Digression on Mercy (11:17 12:22)
b. Digression on Idolatry (13:1 15:17)
3. Third Diptych: A Rain of Manna for Israel Instead of the
Plague of Storms (16:16-29)
4. Fourth Diptych: The Pillar of Fire Instead of the Plague
of Darkness (17:1 18:4)
5. Fifth Diptych: The Tenth Plague and the Exodus by
Which God Punished the Egyptians and Glorified
Israel (18:5 18:22).
The So-Called Digression on Mercy (11:17 12:22)

The title, Digression, one that NABRE continues to use, may be
inappropriate in view of its integrating function in Part III where it is
located and in the entire Book of Wisdom as well.23 It may give likewise the
impression that this section is an interruption of the progression of the five
diptychs. Without undermining its importance, it makes sense nonetheless
to entitle it this way, like an excursus, the rhetorical strategy common among
Hellenistic historiographers (e.g., Diodorus of Sicily), the purpose of which
is to pay more attention to a particular important concept one at a time.24
Maurice Gilbert once remarked that the digressions are an original reflection
of an Alexandrian Jew of the first century BC who was fervent to enlighten
the young generation of his time the way to the knowledge of the true God.25
23
To highlight the importance of this section, Reese (Plan and Structure, 392-
94) takes it as a separate part i.e., Part III of a tetrapartite structure.
24
For this, see Wright, The Structure of the Book of Wisdom, 178, fn. 1. M.
McGlynn prefers to call it The Mercy Dialogue (Divine Judgement and Divine
Benevolence in the Book of Wisdom, 25-53) but this may identify the Sages style with
the Dialogues of Plato which are not the same.
25
Maurice Gilbert, La critique des dieux dans le livre de la Sagesse (Sg 13-15),
paraphrased in Alexis Leproux, L e pv iei,keia divine ou le mesure de jugement selon
If there is an introduction of the Digression, it would the two-fold

meditation on the previous pericope: Work of Wisdom in History (10:1
11:4)which carries the theme of Gods sovereignty over creation through
the guidance of Wisdom. For example, the Sage states that when Adam was
created it was Wisdom that carefully guarded and delivered him from
his transgression (10:1). Divine sovereignty over creation and God showing
mercy on it is a leitmotif in this section. As the discussion moves on to the
Exodus event, the Sage begins the contrast (synkrisis)what God gave
as a punishment (kolaz) to the Egyptians became a benefit (euergete)
to Israel (11:5).26 The first example of the comparison is marked by the
preposition by anti instead of (cf. the First Diptych (11:6-14) and then
does a flashback27 to the time of the plague of the Nile when God turned
its water into blood and thus was not potable (cf. Exod 7:17-24). Instead
of this, God provided the Israelites in the desert abundant water from the
rock (cf. Exod 17:5-7). The Sage rereads Israels experience in a positive way
out of the negative narrative in the Torah. What is punishment (kolaz) for
the Egyptians is a test (peiraz) for the Israelites. The test is for them to be
disciplined in mercy (paideu en eleei). This theme persists throughout the
five diptychs in what is often called the Seven Antitheses:28
First Antithesis: Plague of blood makes the water of the Nile not potable versus
water is given in the desert (11:6-14)
Second Antithesis: Plague of animals brings hunger versus delicious animals in
the desert (16:1-4).
Third Antithesis: Plague of locusts and flies kill versus the bronze serpent saves
16:5-14).
Fourth Antithesis: Plague of thunderstorms brings hunger versus Israel fed by
rain of manna (16:15-29).
Fifth Antithesis: Egyptians terrified by darkness versus pillar of fire in darkness-
for Israel (17:1-18:4).
Sg 11,15 12,27, in Wisdom for Life, 272).

26
For the use of the motifantithetical pair kolaz/euergete punish/benefit
in the Book of Wisdom, in the literature of Hellenistic world (Hellenistic Judaism
included), see L. Mazzinghi, The Antithetical Pair to punish and to benefit
(kola z, w and eu vergete w, ) in the Book of Wisdom, in Wisdom for Life, 237-49.
27
Flashback is another rhetorical technique of the Sage, a short repetition
of a significant word or group of words or distinctive idea in two different parts of
Wis. Cf. Reese, Hellenistic Influence, 124.
28
Cf. Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 11.
36 Diwa 42 (2017): 29-46
Sixth Antithesis: Death of the firstborn versus a blameless one stops the destroy-
er (18:5-25).
Seventh Antithesis: Drowning in the Sea versus the righteous cross the Sea (19:1-9).
The Second Diptych is introduced in 11:15-16 and this will be punctuated

and sharpened by the two digressions. It resumes in 12:23-27 and 15:18-16:4.
In this short introduction (vv. 15-16), the Sage does again a flashback to
the time of the plague of irrational (alogos) animals sent to punish the
Egyptians who were animal worshippers (cf. Exod 8:1-15 for example). The
Sage sees the punishment as legitimate that they might recognize [ginsk]
that one is punished [kolaz]29 by the very things through which one sins
(11:16 NABRE).30 It is at this point that the Sage pauses and embarks into a
long rumination on the statement he just made.31
The Digression has two parts with the second part containing three
ruminations on the Lord of Mercy:
1. On the All-Powerful Lord of Mercy (11:17 12:2).

2. Three Ruminations on the Lord of Mercy (12:3-22).32
29
The Greek is indicative aorist kolazetai but can be read as theological passive,
cf. M. Gilbert, La Sagesse de Solomon / The Wisdom of Solomon, 231.
30
A similar idea is found in 12:23; the verse is said to be similar to the lex talionis
(cf. an eye for an eye cf. Deut 19:21) although what interests the Sage here is not
the equivalent physical punishment but the means proportionate to the one which
the perpetrator used to commit the crime, cf. Vilches, Sabiduria, p. 322. See also the
detailed study of this by M. Gilbert (La Sagesse de Solomon / The Wisdom of Solomon,
231-40) in which he distanced this verse from the lex talionis) and cites a related
Latin adage: Per quod quis peccat, per idem punitur et idem [one who commits a sin
is punished through it and in the same way].
31
Two studies have been done so far on the Digression of Mercy: (1) M. Gilbert,
La philanthropie de Dieu: Exgse de Sg 11,15-12,27 [Italian trans. La filantropia
di Dio (Sap 11,15-12,27)] (PIB: Rome, 1976) this is unpublished, part of the
class notes of Gilbert; and (2) Moyna McGlynn, Divine Judgement and Divine
Benevolence in the Book of Wisdom, WUNT 139 (Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001).
32
Wright (The Structure of the Book of Wisdom, 178-80) indicates the lack of
markers (e.g. the usual inclusio) in the Digression but suggests it has two divisions:
A. God is Omnipotent (11:17-22).
B. Because of his omnipotence God is merciful (11:23 12:22).
The second division has three delineations:
1. Gods mercy is prolongation of his creative power (11:23 12:8).
2. Gods mercy stems from his mastery over his might (12:9-18).
3. The Lesson to be derived (12:19-22).
a) Why God destroyed the Canaanites little by little (12:3-11).

b) How God uses his power with clemency and great forbearance
(12:12-18).
c) When divine mercy becomes humane (12:19-22).
On the All-Powerful Lord of Mercy (11:17 12:2)

The first part of the Digression begins with a reference to Gods creative
powerall-powerful [pantodynamos] hand that created [ktiz] the universe
out of a formless matter [amorphous hyls].33 The Sage re-reads creation using
a Greek category: God put a shape on matter and thereby it gained its form
thereby generating physical beings (cf. hylomorphism of Aristotle). God is
therefore the absolute creator and sovereign over creation. He possess the
spirit of power (pneuma dynames) to annihilate downright the Egyptians
in the name of avenging justice (dik, 11:20bc).34
After the strong statement, the Sage now moderates his position by using
the adversative conjunction alla but: But by measure and number and
weight you ordered all things (NETS 11:20d). The Sage is said to be in
line with the Neo-Pythagorean idea of the cosmos as governed by numbers
exemplified in the Platonic triad of measure, number and weight.35 Such
idea, however, is also present already in the Book of Job. In the Hymn to
Wisdom (Job 28), the poet there, in describing Gods creative power, states:
When he gave to the wind its weight, and apportioned out the waters by
measure (v. 25). The point is that disproportionate punishments such as
those described in vv. 17-19 are therefore inevitably ruled out.36 With the
mathematical understanding of Gods justice, the Sage further qualifies his
statement by stating God has mercy [eleos] on all and the reason for this
universal and encompassing gesture, Egyptians not exempted, is that of
33
The phrase amorphous hyls is a Greek philosophical concept (cf. Aristotle
Physica 191a, 10 cited in Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 233) used here to
interpret the chaos of Gen 1:2 (MT tohu wabohu; LXX aoratos kai akataskeuastos
invisible and unformed).
34
The Greek word is not the usual one for Gods justice in the LXX (cf.
dikaiosyn); dik implies avenging justice for the Greeks. (e.g. in Plato and Homer,
cf. Reese, The Book of Wisdom, Song of Songs,123).
35
Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 234-35. See also Larcher, Etudes sur le
Livre de la sagesse who thinks that the Sage might have acquired the inspiration
during the Roman period. For a critique of Larchers suggestion, see McGlynn,
Divine Judgement and Divine Benevolence, 39-40.
36
Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 234-35.
38 Diwa 42 (2017): 29-46
Gods creative power: misereris omnium quoniam omnia potes (Vulgate)

You have mercy on all because you can do all things (note the repetition of
panta all Wis 11:23).37 The concrete example of such mercy is when God
overlooks the sins of human beings for the sake of repentance (metanoia;
11:23). This is the first appearance of the word metanoia in the Bible. In later
Hellenistic thought, in Plutarch in particular, metanoia is a stage in a series
of processes for a sage who commits himself to a life of virtue.38 Similarly,
for Philo, repentance marks a man of wisdom.39 For the Sage, God does
not annihilate these people for two things: (1) because he simply loves all
his creatures: For you love [agapa]40 all things and loathe nothing that
you have made (11:24b); and (2) that they may enter into Gods plan for
creation that is, to spare all things because they are Gods own (11:26).
The Sage could then address God as Despots Ruler and Philopsichos Lover
of souls (NABRE). The latter originally meant cowardly in Greek but
the Sage here uses it in a positive way to express Gods benevolence and
Gods immortal spirit (aphtharton pneuma) present in all things (12:1).
Ben Sira has also pointed out a similar universality of the divine mercy
founded on Gods creative power: But the mercy [eleos] of the Lord is upon
all flesh [epi pasan sarka] (18:13). The Sage, in concluding this section, refers
back to his initial teaching on divine justice and mercy as regulated in a
mathematical way: for those who fall into error (parapipt), God will reprove
them katoligon little by little (12:2a). The purpose of this gradual rebuke is
to warn (hypomimnesk) and remind(nouthete) them of the divine plan
for the whole creation (cf. metanoia) which includes to put trust in [pisteu
epi] the Lord (12:2d). This is the first time that the Sage mentions this word
(pisteu).41 In the Hebrew Bible, trust is a human response to a personal and
more intimate relationship and, as Reese writes, The Sage never suggests
37
What is also noteworthy in this pericope is its spirit of universalism (note the
all panta) partly due to the diaspora spirit. Before the cosmopolitan outlook of the
Stoics, the Hellenistic Jews have even more profoundly enhanced their doctrine of
the universal goodness of God. For this, see Vilches, Sabiduria, 325; and Kolarcik,
Universalism and Justice in the Wisdom of Solomon, in Treasures of Wisdom, 288-301.
38
Cf. David A. Lambert, How Repentance Became Biblical, 157.
39
Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 235.
It is only in this verse, not even in the LXX, that the verb agapa carries
40
the nuance of universal love on the part of God (cf. John 3:16), cf. Gilbert,
La Sagesse de Solomon / The Wisdom of Solomon, 248-50.
41
The verb pisteu with prepositions is used in the LXX and NT but not in
Classical Greek, cf. Winston, The Book of Wisdom, 236).
that believers are exempt from sin, but views them as open to receive Gods
compassion and mercy.42
Three Ruminations on the Lord of Mercy (12:3-22)

Why God destroyed the Canaanites little by little (12:3-11)
This section (vv. 30-11) and the next (vv. 12-18) form another kind of
reflective flashback on Israels violent conquest of the Canaanites on Gods
command. With his understanding of punishment little by little katoligon
as an act of divine mercy, the Sage now illustrates via an examplethe
extermination of the Canaanites (e.g. Deut 2:17; 18:9-12). The description
he draws on the Canaanites, Israels traditional enemies, certainly provokes
disgust, anger, and the desire to destroy them (cf. apollymi in 12:6). They were
sorcerers (12:4b); merciless murderers of children, devourers of human flesh,
and initiates engaged in a blood ritual and parents who took with their own
hands defenseless lives (12:5NABRE).43 Nonetheless God spared the lives of
the Canaanites because they were mortals ( anthropos, 12:8a). To spare here
means they were punished but kata bracho little by little (12:8b) another
expression for katoligon (also kata mikron mikron in Exod 23:30LXX). How
was this accomplished? God simply sent wasps (sphx, cf. Deut 7:20LXX)
rather than an army of men. God had the power to vanquish the wicked
at one blow (NRSV) by stern word (12:9a NETS) but he preferred not
to do so. He did judge them but kata bracho little by little (12:10a), the
second time this is mentioned in this section. The reason for the gradual
punishment is to give them a place to repent (topos metanoias, 12:10a) even
if their wickedness was implanted (emphytos) and their way of thinking
[logismos] would never change (12:10c NETS). The Sage closes this section
by implying that Gods merciful gesture of giving an amnesty (adeia) for
their sins was out of divine freedom and prerogative (12:11).
The idea of God acting in measured moderation as essential part of the
nature of governance is not strange to other Jewish literature of this period
(cf. 1 Enoch 72-82; and 2 Esdr 4:36-37). A similar idea occurs in Platos Laws
(cf. to metrion due measure and sphrosun sobriety):44 The moderate
42
Cf. Reese, The Book of Wisdom, Song of Songs, 127.
43
The last accusation is most likely the Sages defense from the anti-Jewish
rhetoric that Jews practiced a yearly sacrifice of eating a Gentile (Perdue, Wisdom
Literature: A Theological History, p. 313).
44
Cf. Ulrich Luck, swfron, in TDNT 7:1097,1150.
40 Diwa 42 (2017): 29-46
person among us is dear to god, For he is alike, whereas the immoderate

person is unlike, And different, as is the unjust person. (Laws 716d1-3).
How God uses his power with clemency and great forbearance
(12:12-18)
The second rumination continues the reflection on the divine punishment
of the Canaanites but with a focus on the meaning of Gods power
dynamis (v. 15) and/or ischys (v. 16)executed but with clemency (en
epieikeia) and with great forbearance (meta polls pheidous) (v. 18).45
This section begins with four rhetorical questions all answerable in
the negative i.e., nobody should complain about Gods justice.46 Later on,
the Sage gives the reason why but in a form of a direct speech addressing
God: But as you are righteous [dikaios], you govern all things righteously
[dikais] (12:15aNABRE). This is explained further by stating that it is alien
(allotrios) to Gods power to condemn anyone who does not deserve to be
punished (kolazo in the aorist passive) (12:15b) and that the beginning
(arche) of Gods righteousness (dikaiosyn) is his own power (ischys)
(12:16a). The reason then why God can act with clemency and forbearance
is it is Gods prerogative. It is due to his power. The Sage affirms this idea
twice: (1) For your sovereignty [despozein] over all causes you to spare
[pheidomai] all (12:16b); and (2) For power, whenever you will, attends you
(12:18bNABRE). Although the link between power and mercy is rare in the
Old Testament, there are texts on this as in Ben Sira: he shows his power in
forgiveness dynasts eskilasmn (Sir 16:11LXX).47
Why God is humane (12:19-22)

The third rumination on divine mercy functions as its application
part, a double lesson for Israel: to practice philanthrpia and to trust in
Gods mercy.48 After this meditation, the Sage now moves his listeners
Hellenistic Jews and Greco-Roman literati aliketo apply such in their
45
Epeikeia is a forensic term in Greek and can refer to moderation or mildness
at law i.e., not insisting on the letter of the law; or clemency or leniency in the sense
of the mitigation of strict legal claims out of regard for special circumstances in
individual cases (Herbert Priesker, e pv iei,keia in TDNT 2:588-89). On its use in
the Book of Wisdom, see Alexis Leproux, L e pv iei,keia divine, 272-92.
46
Cf. the speech of the wicked in Job 22:17LXX).
47
Gilbert, La Sagesse de Solomon / The Wisdom of Solomon, 248.
48
M. Kolarcik, The Book of Wisdom, in NIB 5: 542-43.
dealings with their fellow human beings.49 The Sage states in 12:19a: You
have taught your people, by these works [erga], that those who are righteous
must [dei] be humane [philanthrps]. As we have seen earlier, the Sage
identifies philanthrps as an attribute of Wisdom (cf. 1:6; 7:23)50 and that
Wisdom, by these works manifest the divine plan: With you is wisdom,
she who knows your works [erga] and was present when you made the world
(9:9aNRSV; cf. 8:4). In v. 19a, moreover, the Sage re-describes the Lord of
Mercy in the language of the Stoicsof God as philanthrps and such virtue
must be imitated by his people.51 To be like God (cf. Platos homoiosis theou)
in the sense of doing what is good is foundational for Israel (cf. Lev 19:2 //
misericordes sicut et Pater in Luke 6:36).52 The sense of philantrophia then is
moderation in the punishment of the wickedfor purpose of giving them
good hope (euelpis) and, again, a chance to repent (metanoia) (12:19cd). This
is further heightened in the next verses (12:20-22a) when the Sage spoke of
divine punishment of the wicked but done with attention and indulgence
(prosoch and diesis) that is, with careful investigation (12:20)53 and with
measured deliberation (metriotti instead of LXX myriotti).54
49
The logos proptreptikos, or didactic exhortation, a rhetorical style common in
Greek, is evident here. In fact, some scholars argue for this as the genre of the Book
of Wisdom, cf. Reese, Hellenistic Influence, 119-21.
50
In Greek, the noun philanthrpia (Latin humanitas) has a wide range
of meaning: hospitality; mildness in punishment; help in time of need;
usefulness, in reference to things and animals; royal decrees conferring rights
and privileges; tip or present. The primary reference, however, are the gods who
are called philanthrpoi but later on was also applied to the kings and to the ordinary
person. See Ulrich Luck, filanqrwpi,a, in TDNT 9: 107-108. According to
Diogenes of Laertius (3.98), there are three kinds of philanthropia: (1) by way of
greeting courteously; (2) by conferring benefits like helping a needy person; and (3)
by way of exercising hospitality like inviting someone for meals.
51
Philo (cf. On Virtues) considers philanthropia as one of the leaders of virtues
and justice as the head. Roman Stoic philosopher Seneca (On Benefits) represents
the orthodox Stoic view that God is beneficial and he is supremely caring. For the
debate on the Stoic belief that God is uninvolved in human beings affairs, see Paola
Volpe Cacciatore, il dio degli Stoici filantropo? in Symposion nad Philanthropia
in Plutarch, 289-95.
52
In another Hellenistic work of this period, the Letter to Aristeas, it is
imperative for the kings to imitate God at all times and in all his characteristics.
53
Cf. Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 244.
54
Since LXX myriotti (ten thousand times more, NRSV; libong ibayo,
MBB) does not fit into the text, the reading must have been metriotti (measured
deliberation, NABRE) as gleaned from the context. Due to Gilberts study, this has
42 Diwa 42 (2017): 29-46
The Sage then closes the Digression with a protreptic, a double lesson:
so that we may think earnestly of your goodness when we judge, and, when
being judged, we may look for mercy [eleos] (12:22bc).
Conclusion
While it is true that Philo wrote most of his treatises as apologia against
the accusations of misanthrpia and misoxenia (i.e., hatred of foreigners)
formulated against the Jews at the dawn of Christianity, it may not be so to
our Sage who wrote the Book of Wisdom a little earlier than Philos. His was
not meant to be a defense for the philanthropia of Judaism but a theological
reflection on the tension between divine justice and divine mercy.55 The Sage,
typical of a Jewish sage whose wisdom must come from afar (cf. Job 36:3),
found Hellenistic philosophy as its ancilla theologiae.
The Sage, who knew his Sacred Scripture well and familiar with
traditional wisdom, did not deny that God is a punisher (some Stoics did
and Marcion, a century later would do that too). Punishment is the way for
the God of Israel to resist evil. Yet, he is also very merciful (polyeleos, cf.
Exod 34:6LXX). The key to elucidate this tension is the fact that God is the
creator of all. The source of the philanthropia of God is his omnipotence. He
is merciful because he is powerful (misereris omnium quoniam omnia potes,
11:23). Thus, God is merciful for a purpose; punishment is for a reason and
done in moderation.56 Because the human being is not the creator, he/she
must imitate God in his philanthropia so that judged we may hope for
mercy or as the Good Book in Tagalog says:
At pag kami naman ang hinatulan,

ay makaasa kami na kamiy kahahabagan (12:22c, MBB2005).
gained wide acceptance including by Ziegler himself, cf. Gilbert, La conjecture

metriotti en Sg 12, 22a , Biblica 57 (1976): 550-553) also published in idem, La
Sagesse de Solomon / The Wisdom of Solomon, 255-260. In any case, this remains
a speculation; even the LXX meaning does not alter the main point the Sages
rumination.
55
Katell Berthelot, Philanthropia Judaica, 228-32.
56
Note that the Sage would develop the theology of divine moderation
using the following Hellenistic terms: philanthrpia (humane), eleos (mercy),
katoligon (little by little), kata brachu (little by little), epieikeia (clemency),
pheidous (forebearance), dikaiosyn (righteousness), prosoch (attention), diesis
(indulgence), metriotti (for myriotti with measured deliberation).
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Wright, Addison Wisdom, in NJBC, 510-22.
__________. The Structure of the Book of Wisdom, Biblica 48 (1967): 165-84.
Ziegler, Joseph, Sapientia Iesu Filii Sirach. Septuaginta 12/2). Gttingen,Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht, 21980 (1965).
Abbreviations
In Flacc. Philo, In Flaccum
In Gen. John Crysostom, Homilies on Genesis
Legat. Philo, Le gatio ad Gaium
LXX Septuaginta: Id Est Vetus Testamentum Graece Iuxta LXX
Interpretes, 19th ed. 2 vols. Edited by Ralphs, A. The text of Job
is edited by J. Ziegler.
MBB Magandang Balita Biblia
NAB The New American Bible
NABRE The New American Bible Revised Edition
46 Diwa 42 (2017): 29-46
NETS A New English Translation of the Septuagint

NIB New Interpreters Bible
Praef. in lib.Sol. Jerome, Praefatio in libros Solomonis
TDNT Theological Dictionary of the New Testament
Vulgate Biblia Sacra iuxta Vulgatam versionem. 2 vols.
Mercy as Gospel according to the Book of Tobit1
FRANCIS M. MACATANGAY
UST School of Theology
Houston, Texas, USA
Introduction
I
n the popular imagination, mercy is often associated with sin. While
the sinner can certainly hope that God will deal with his sins from the
wideness of his mercy, to relegate mercy to the realm of sin and sinful
actions is limiting. In the deuterocanonical Book of Tobit, the notion of
mercy is, in fact, expansive and encompassing. Perhaps, Tobit is the only
book in the Roman Catholic canon of the Old Testament that makes mercy
central to its narrative. This motif of mercy is woven into the whole fabric
of Tobit. The Greek word evlehmosu,nh, which is often translated as charity,
acts of mercy, and almsgiving, along with its variant evleh,mwn and e;leoj,
appear more than thirty-two times in the long Greek text of Tobit.2 The
story also employs dikaiosu,nh , which, at the time Tobit was translated from
its Semitic original to Greek, conveys the sense of benevolent activity.3
When the grandson of Ben Sira translated his grandfathers work, hq"d"c. was
rendered as to refer to an ethical human behavior that manifests
righteousness while qd<c, was translated as dikaiosu,nh to mean the condition
1
This paper was presented at the 17th annual convention of the Catholic Biblical
Association of the Philippines held on July 9-10, 2016 in Tagaytay City, Philippines.
2
For the texts of the Book of Tobit, see C.J. Wagner, Polyglotte Tobit-Synopse:
Griechisch Lateinish Syrisch Hebrisch Aramisch: Mit einem Index zu
den Tobit-Fragmenten vom Toten Meer (Philologisch-Historische Klasse 258;
Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003) and S. Weeks, S. Gathercole and
L.T. Stuckenbruck, The Book of Tobit: Texts from the Principal Ancient and Medieval
Traditions With Synopsis, Concordances, and Annotated Texts in Aramaic, Hebrew,
Greek, Latin, and Syriac (FoSub 3; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004). See also J.A.
Fitzmyer, Tobit, in E. Tov (ed.), DJD 19 Qumran Cave 4, 14 Parabiblical Texts 2
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 1-75.
3
R. Bultmann, evlehmosu,nh, in G. Kittel and G. W. Bromiley (eds.), TDNT 2
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), p. 486.
48 Diwa 42 (2017): 47-66
of a person who performs such an act.4 This observation applies to the way
Tobit uses these two terms interchangeably in the story evlehmosu,nh is the
concrete and specific manifestation of dikaiosu,nh (cf. Tob 4: 5-11).5 As a
matter of fact, Tobit commands the doing of evlehmosu,nh, which refers to
works of mercy and charity in general (cf. 1:16-18; 4:16) and almsgiving in
particular (cf. 4:7-9).6 Of course, mercy is more than a recurrent motif in the
narrative. Tobit dramatizes and develops a theology of mercy. To engage in
acts of charity is good news because benevolent deeds confer a multitude of
benefits upon the doer. This essay explores the benefits of mercy according
to the Book of Tobit. The possible elimination of sin as a result of an act of
mercy is only one of them.
Acts of Mercy in the Narrative

The story begins with a description of Tobits religious piety. Tobit states
that he worshipped at the Temple as long as it was possible and declares that
he performed in the land of his exile many charitable works for his people
who had been deported with him (1:3). Immediately after describing the
many exemplary acts of Temple-related piety such as tithing, pilgrimages,
sacrificial offerings, and calendric observances that he accomplished while in
the land, Tobit once again insists on his acts of charity. They include giving
bread to the hungry, clothing the naked, and burying the dead (1:1618).
The story further identifies behavior that illustrates Tobit to be a
dedicated almsgiver. Despite his reduced means after losing his source of
4
See M. Rabenau, Studien zum Buch Tobit (BZAW 220; Berlin: de Gruyter,
1994), pp. 130-131.
5
See F. Macatangay, The Wisdom Instructions in the Book of Tobit, (DCLSt 12;
Berlin: de Gruyter, 2011), pp. 74-85.
6
See R. Heiligenthal, Werke der Barmherzigkeit oder Almosen? Zur Bedeutung
von evlehmosu,nh, NovT 25 (1983), pp. 290-291. In P. J. Griffin, A Study of Elemosyn
in the Bible with Emphasis upon its Meaning and Usage in the Theology of Tobit and
Ben Sira (MA diss: CUA, 1984), pp. 2-6; 20-63, the author evaluates the use
of evlehmosu,nhin Tobit and concludes that the word has four senses: a) an act of
charity (cf. 1:16-17; 2:10; 14:10), b) almsgiving towards the poor (cf. 4:8; 12:8), c) a
characteristic of a person (cf. 9:6; 7:7; 14:11), and d) a characteristic of God (cf. 3:2;
13:6). For a discussion of how hq'd"c. came to denote almsgiving, see F. Rosenthal,
Sedaka, Charity, HUCA 23 (1950-51), pp. 411-430; Fitzmyer, Tobit, pp.169-171,
and G. A. Anderson, Redeem Your Sins by the Giving of Alms: Sin, Debt and
the Treasury of Merit in Early Jewish and Christian Tradition, Letter & Spirit 3
(2007), pp. 45-57.
F. Macatangay, Mercy as Gospel 49
income from the royal court, Tobit still desires to feed his poor co-religionists
who are mindful of God with a festive meal to celebrate Pentecost. Despite
the kings decree against it, despite his neighbors mockery, and despite the
threat of contamination and ritual impurity, Tobit still continues to bury the
dead, which the story views as the paradigmatic act of mercy. The risk to his
life and freedom and the constraints on his resources have not stopped Tobit
from performing acts of charity. Burdensome though the costs may be, Tobit
does not blink an eye when it comes to charitable works. Tobit is truly a fool
for charity.7 No wonder then that in a discourse before entrusting Tobiah
with a mission to retrieve a sum of money deposited with a cousin, Tobit asks
his son to engage in acts of charity by giving alms out of his abundance, by
giving food to the hungry, and by clothing the naked (4:711, 1617). His
instructions, in fact, seem to reduce his general command to remember the
Lord and to practice righteousness through acts of mercy and almsgiving to
personae miserae.
After becoming blind, Tobit notes that all his kinsmen grieved at his
condition (2:10). He emphasizes, however, the benevolent care that his
nephew Ahiqar extended to him in a time of dire need. In fact, the verb
that Tobit employs to describe Ahiqars care for him connotes the supply
of the necessary nourishment and provision for Tobits physical needs for a
considerable period of time. The verb used to denote the action of Ahiqar
captures Tobits complete dependence and fragility since it paints the image
of one man feeding the other like a child.8 As he addresses his son and
grandchildren with a final will and testament on his deathbed at the end of
the story, Tobit cites the example of almsgiving that Ahiqar gave him. He
points out that Ahiqars act of kindness towards him prevented Ahiqar from
falling into a dark and deadly trap that his nephew Nadab had set for him.
He mentions Ahiqars compassionate care to drive home an important lesson
about the power of almsgiving to deliver one from death.
Raphael also gives a discourse as he reveals to Tobit and Tobiah the
whole truth behind the course of events in the story. In his speech, Raphael
7
S. Weeks, A Deuteronomic Heritage in Tobit, in Changes in Scripture:
Rewriting and Interpreting Authoritative Traditions in the Second Temple, edited
by Hanne von Weissenberg et al., (BZAW 419; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2011), p. 393,
underlines the negative aspect of Tobits almsgiving: Tobit is a pious man, to be
sure, but his piety comes close to the point of being obsessive and self-destructive,
while his sense of isolated righteousness neglects the price paid by others for his
behavior.
8
Anathea Portier-Young, Alleviation of Suffering in the Book of Tobit: Comedy,
Community, and Happy Endings, CBQ 63 (2001), 41.
50 Diwa 42 (2017): 47-66
points out that it is better to give alms than to store up gold (12:8b).
Raphael, in fact, presented a memorial of Tobits prayer and act of charity
before the throne of the Most High, moving God to charge the angel to heal
Tobits blindness (12:1114). Emphasizing the salvific power of almsgiving in
his speech, Raphael practically confers divine approval upon Tobits claims
regarding charity.9
In his discourse to his son, Tobit provides a number of reasons why
the performance of charity and almsgiving is deemed important. The first
motivation Tobit provides for Tobias to engage in almsgiving is that it merits
a similar action on Gods part. God will not turn his face away from anyone
who does not turn his or her face away from the poor (4:7). Tobit also claims
that giving in proportion to the gifts received or from whatever little one has is
a way to store up a good treasure for oneself against the day of necessity (4:8
9). Tobit further claims that almsgiving delivers from death and the darkness
(4:10). Tobit drives home this particular lesson about almsgiving when he cites
the example of his nephew Ahiqar in his farewell discourse (14:11). Finally,
Tobit declares that almsgiving is an excellent offering before God (4:11).
In his exhortation before ascending to heaven, Raphael also acknowledges
the purchasing power of almsgiving. After urging Tobit and Tobiah to
acknowledge always the deeds of God, Raphael assures them that almsgiving
is better than both prayer and fasting and that it is better to give alms than
to store up gold (4:89). He provides three reasons why almsgiving is the
better way: 1) it saves from death, 2) it purges away all sin, and 3) it leads to
an enjoyment of a full life (12:810).
If one compares the reasons for almsgiving that Tobit and Raphael provide
in their respective discourses, they both assert that almsgiving has the power
to save the almsgiver from death and darkness. It is equally likely that they
both see almsgiving to have a redemptive value. Raphael categorically asserts
it while Tobits claim regarding almsgiving as a worthy sacrifice before God
may be an oblique way to refer to the salvific value of almsgiving. One reason
for almsgiving that the angel provides but which Tobit does not explicitly
state is the claim that almsgiving leads to an enjoyment of a full life. Perhaps,
only an angel of God can make a promise of life on behalf of God. Certainly,
the narrative resolution that shows Tobit the avid almsgiver with restored
eyesight, a doubly enriched son, and a full lineage in view at his deathbed
proves the angelic statement that almsgiving leads to a satisfied and abundant
life. And so, Tobits claim that almsgiving keeps one from going into the
9
See F. Macatangay, The Wisdom Instructions in the Book of Tobit, 16971.
dark abode functions as the equivalent of Raphaels claim regarding the life-
satisfying value of almsgiving.
Almsgiving and the Journey of Tobiah

After his prayer asking God to send him to his everlasting home, Tobit
believes that his death is on the horizon. Tobit calls his son Tobiah to inform
him about a sum of money that he previously entrusted to Gabael, a cousin
who resides at Rages in Media (5:2; 9:6). Before sending him, Tobit instructs
his son in the ways of righteousness and truth, specifically commanding him
to give alms and to perform charity (4:411). Despite glaring evidence to the
contrary, Tobit holds firm to his belief regarding almsgiving. As an ardent
practitioner of almsgiving, Tobit wants his son to continue in the same vein.
As the story later reveals, it is Tobits commitment to almsgiving that is in
fact the subject of his testing.10
Tobit is well aware that the roads to Media are unsafe. Tobit himself
admits that he is afraid to go there (1:15). That he asks his son to look for a
traveling companion is an acknowledgment of the great risks that the journey
poses to his sons life. The worries that Hannah expresses to Tobit speak to the
possibility that Tobiah might never return home; in a retort, she implies that
sending Tobiah away is sending him to his death (5:1819). After all, travel in
those days is a risky enterprise and a true adventure, the end of which is never
known.11 Indeed, the story develops the journey of Tobiah with menace and
danger constantly lurking on the horizon, with a fish anxious to devour him
and a demon ready to kill him. The night setting of the journey renders an ill-
omened ambiance (cf. 6:2).12 By sending him on this journey, Tobit is risking
the life of his only son, the staff of his hands in old age.
10
See G. Anderson, Charity: The Place of the Poor in the Biblical Tradition, (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), pp. 8588.
11
See J. Vilchez, Tobiah y Judit, (Narraciones 3, Estella: Verbo Divino, 2000), p.
41. On the dangers and hardships of ancient travel, see Casson, Travel in the Ancient
World, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 7276.
12
I. Nowell, The Book of Tobit: Narrative Technique and Theology, (PhD diss.,
Catholic University of America, 1983), p. 220, notes that while the word for day
dominates the first and last section of the story, the Greek word for night characterizes
the travels of Tobiah, the middle section of the narrative. W. Fields, The Motif
Night as Danger Associated with Three Biblical Destruction Narratives, in Shaarei
Talmon: Studies in the Bible, Qumran, and the Ancient Near East presented to
Shemaryahu Talmon, edited by Michael Fishbane et al., (Winona Lake: Eisenbaum,
1992), p. 22, observes that deep darkness tw<m'l.c; is a metaphor for things
52 Diwa 42 (2017): 47-66
Why is Tobit willing to risk everything including his son? Tobits

emphasis on and commitment to almsgiving is one possible reason why
he takes the chance and discounts the danger to his own sons life. His
specific instructions on performing charity and the giving of alms as a way
of remembering God suggests that Tobit wants his son to take on the role
of a generous almsgiver. Since Tobit has become poor and is no longer in
any position to give alms, the surest way for Tobiah to become an almsgiver
rather than an impecunious alms receiver after Tobits death is to happen
upon a substantial sum of money.13 The retrieval of the deposited pouches
containing a great sum of money would allow Tobiah to continue in his
fathers stead and practice.
Tobit instructs Tobias to be an avid almsgiver and then sends him
on a journey of retrieving the deposited money. To a great extent, Tobits
instructions and Tobiahs perilous journey are closely connected in that they
have a common lofty end in view: to place Tobiah in a position of almsgiver.
The journey and the instructions both contribute to the shaping of the
character and identity of Tobiah. Taking up the bulk of Tobits discourse, the
particular instructions on almsgiving and the mission to recover the money
are ways to equip Tobiah for almsgiving and to mold him in his fathers
image and likeness. These are the necessary conditions that will transform
the son into a living copy of his father. When the instructions are received
and the sum of money is retrieved, Tobit the almsgiver will continue to live
on in his son not only in the physical sense of blood and name but also
in a moral sense.14 With virtually identical names, Tobits identity survives,
reappears, and continues in an offspring who acts as he did.15
evil and feared, not for things that are good and loved. For the ancient reader the
evening/night setting would almost certainly have imbued each narrative from
the outset with an aura of foreboding and sinister premonition, of trepidation and
anxiety, for night and violence, danger and darkness were inseparably joined.
13
See Anderson, Charity, 8990.
14
See G. Priero, Tobiah, (Torino: Marietti, 1953), p. 77. The idea is also echoed
in Sir 30:25. See also Crenshaw, Education in Ancient Israel: Across the Deadening
Silence, (New York: Doubleday, 1998), p. 3.
15
J. Levenson, Resurrection and the Restoration of Israel: The Ultimate Victory of
the God of Life, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 109110, discusses
the importance of the idea of the survival of identity in a kin or descendant for
making sense of Ezekiels vision of Davids appointment as the shepherd over Israel,
for Davids identity was not restricted to the one man of that name but can reappear
to a large measure in kin who share it (p. 110).
Almsgiving as an Act of Solidarity

In theory, the Temple offers a system of assistance and provision for the
poor, the widow, and the orphan from the tithes offered for their sake. Deut
14:2829 and 26:12 stipulate that the tithes on the produce of the third year
are to be given to those who do not possess land: the Levite, the alien, the
poor, and the widow, so that they can eat their fill in the community. In
the absence of the temple, the structure for the care of the marginalized is
not in place. The situation in Tobits Diaspora must have been comparable,
with the poor kin of Tobit having no recourse for help. That Tobit seeks out
and invites the righteous poor to celebrate Pentecost with a meal points to
this possibility. In this case, to give as alms to the righteous poor the money
meant as tithes for the Temple, as Tobit envisions, has the social function of
helping the poor and the least in the Diaspora; they are, after all, strangers
in a foreign land. Almsgiving and other acts of charity are viewed as a form
of mutual and communal support. For without them, life in the Diaspora
could be a jungle.
Having lost the ground beneath his feet, Tobit reconstructs something to
stand on by way of social affinities. Every character in the narrative is related
to another, with the term brother or sister occurring with such high
frequency in the story that the network of relations among these characters
creates an extended family that threatens to take over all of Assyria.16 The
social affinities of family and kinship have become the source of constancy
and stability in a state of exile.17 To this end, the practice of giving alms
integrates and unites the dispersed members of the household of Israel. It
fosters internal cohesion in the community and it preserves the bonds of
kinship. Mutual assistance reinforces common ties in the dispersion.18 In
short, works of charity assist the materially destitute, build up the community,
16
L. Wills, The Jewish Novel in the Ancient World, (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1995), p. 78.
17
On kinship in Tobit, see V. Skemp, AVDELFOS and the Theme of
Kinship in Tobit, ETL 75 (1999) 92103; see also D. Dimant, The Family
of Tobit, in With Wisdom as a Robe: Qumran and other Jewish Studies in
Honor of Ida Frhlich, edited by Karoly Dobos and Miklos Koszeghy,
(Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2008), pp. 15762.
18
See for instance, B. Otzen, Tobit and Judith, (Guides to Apocrypha and
Pseudepigrapha, London: Sheffield Academic, 2002), pp. 35-37; C. Moore,
Tobit: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, (AB 40A, New
York: Doubleday, 1996), p. 176; Rabenau, Studien zum Buch Tobit, pp. 13234.
54 Diwa 42 (2017): 47-66
and enhance solidarity among kin.19 Such social significance and value of
almsgiving may have served as motive for why Tobit commands his son to
restrict his practice of almsgiving to fellow Israelites (2:2; 4:6).20 In this way,
Tobits household is preserved, ensuring the survival of kin and remnant.
The compassionate care that Ahiqar extends to his uncle Tobit in a period of
great distress (1:22; 2:10) is a prime example of almsgiving as an act of solidarity.
A non-Israelite figure popularly known for his wise counsels, the story ignores
Ahiqars pagan wisdom and portrays him instead as a nephew celebrated for
his charity.21 In his farewell discourse, Tobit sets Ahiqar up as a paragon of
almsgiving (cf. Tob 14:11). Ahiqars charity matters more than his sagacity.
Ahiqar fits the familial network of Tobit by virtue of his benevolent care; his
almsgiving is the essence of belonging to Tobits household. Since the figure of
Ahiqar is remembered in the narrative for his charity, his example shows that the
practice of almsgiving opens up the tight communal structure and facilitates the
incorporation of non-Israelites within the household of Israel.22 Charity has come
to define what it means to be in solidarity with Gods people.
19
See P. Deselaers, Das Buch Tobit, Studien zu seiner Entstehung, Komposition
und Theologie, (OBO 43. Freiburg: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), pp. 35154.
J. Craghan, Esther, Judith, Tobit, Jonah, Ruth, (OTM 16, Wilmington: Michael
Glazier, Inc., 1982), p. 134, notes that the stress on almsgiving is a show of concern
for fellow Jews in which Jewish commitment to God is measured by Jewish
commitment to the community of God.
20
J. Fitzmyer, Tobit, p. 169, claims that Tobits advice speaks of respect being
had among those who pursue righteousness.
21
According to J. Fitzmyer, Tobit, p. 32, there is good reason to consider
Ahiqar a historical person and a Gentile, but to imply that he was son of a Jewish
a dv elfo ,j goes too far. Fitzmyer, Tobit, p. 334, notes that Nadin, the villain
in the story of Ahiqar, epitomizes whats wrong with Nineveh. Following this
suggestion, I. Kottsieper, Look son, what Nadab did to Ahikaros : The Aramaic
Ahiqar Tradition and its Relationship to the Book of Tobit, in The Dynamics of
Language and Exegesis at Qumran, edited by Devorah Dimant and Reinhard G.
Kratz, (Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), pp. 145-167, maintains that the story is not
meant to provide another example to support the books doctrine that righteousness
saves. Rather, it is meant to illustrate the treachery or wickedness of Niniveh, which
can influence persons like Nadin, the nephew of Ahiqar, to act wickedly, bringing
righteous people such as his uncle Ahiqar into great peril.
22
See Weigl, Die rettende Macht der Barmherzigkeit: Die rettende Macht der
Barmherzigkeit. Achikar im Buch Tobit. BZ 50 (2006) 21243. See also Zappella,
Tobit: Introduzione, traduzione e commento, (Nuova versione della bibbia dai testi
antichi 30; Cinisello Balsamo: San Paolo, 2010), pp. 2224. Tobits universalistic
vision of the earths inhabitants ascending Jerusalem with gifts in their hands to
Almsgiving as an Act of Remembrance

Aside from social and humanitarian values, almsgiving has a strong
theological function. To offer material kindness to the poor is to remember
God. In the Diaspora, acts of charity are acts of remembering God. Tobit
notes that while in exile, his remembrance of God shows in abstaining from
eating Gentile food (1:11). Since Tobit mentions his performance of charitable
works such as feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, and burying the dead
immediately after referring to his dietary observance, they presumably reveal
likewise his mindfulness of God. In the Diaspora, his almsgiving and other
acts of charity have become substitutes for his pious observance of the divine
commands. In fact, the two parallel statements with which Tobit starts his
discourse show that performing good works is remembering God. Tobit
exhorts his son Tobiah:
Through all your days, son, remember the Lord our God and do
not desire to sin or transgress his precepts.
Perform righteousness all the days of your life and do not walk on
the paths of unrighteousness (4:5).
These parallel instructions both have an admonition and a prohibition.

The positive exhortations are to remember the Lord and to perform
righteousness. Do not transgress Gods commands and do not walk on the
paths of wrongdoing are the negative injunctions. Tobits general instruction
reflects the idiom of the two ways in sorting out the wise from the foolish,
typical of sapiential literature. The antithetical sentence structure instills the
lesson that the wise/righteous will succeed but the foolish/wicked will perish.
In this case, if Tobiah remembers the Lord and performs righteousness, he
will walk on the path of wisdom. On the other hand, if he transgresses
Gods commands, he is on the road of foolishness. The parallelism reveals
that to remember the Lord is to perform righteousness and to transgress
Gods commands is to walk on the path of wrongdoing.23 Remembrance is
observance of the Lords precepts.
Tobit specifies and clarifies what it means to perform righteousness.
He instructs Tobiah to do acts of charity by engaging in almsgiving to the
poverty-stricken, by giving to the hungry some of his food, and by clothing
worship the God of Israel in Tob 13:11 recalls the prophetic claims regarding the
nations (cf. Isa 2:2; Mic 4:12; Zech 8:2122).
23
See F. Macatangay, Acts of Charity as Acts of Remembrance in the Book of
Tobit, JSP 23 (2013) 6984.
56 Diwa 42 (2017): 47-66
the naked; he is not to turn his face away from the poor (4:78, 16). Tobits
instruction makes clear that acts of charity have become the practical
equivalent of practicing righteousness. In the short Greek version of Tob
4:10, in fact, Tobit claims that almsgiving saves while in Tob 14:11, Tobit says
that righteousness saves. This is another clear indication that the story views
righteousness and almsgiving to be interchangeable, if not synonymous.
Being righteous means more than proper behavior; to be righteous is to
observe the law, which for Tobit, means to engage personally in charitable
acts that benefit the poor.
Dan 4:24 makes a similar claim to be righteous is to extend material
kindness to the downtrodden. After Nebuchadnezzars fateful dream about
a gigantic tree that is cut down, the parallelism of the structure in Daniels
advice to the king to redeem his sins by good deeds and to be generous
to the poor bears this out.24 Thus, benevolent activities towards the poor
manifest and concretize righteousness such that to perform righteousness is
to do works for personae miserae that arise from a profound sense of mercy.
For Tobit, to remember God implies the concrete and practical acts of
mercy just as his command to Tobiah to remember the sorrows of his mother
entails the practical task of caring for her in widowhood and old age (4:4). In
this way, the very tangible action of extending charity to the poor is not only
an act of righteousness but also an act that points to faith in and remembrance
of God. Indeed, acts of mercy convey a social function in which cohesion and
solidarity of the members of the community are fostered. Primarily though,
they are religious acts that express mindfulness of God. In later Hebrew and
Aramaic textual traditions of the Book of Tobit and in rabbinic literature,
the religious dimension of almsgiving and tithing become more pronounced,
explicitly stating that almsgiving is a religious duty.25
Tobits emphasis on almsgiving as an act of remembering God is a vital
textual witness in Second Temple Judaism to the claim that the visible
expression of the elects relationship with God is not limited to the Temple
alone. The hands of the poor stretched out in supplication are as holy as
the altar of sacrifice such that placing coins in the hand of a beggar is like
24
See Rosenthal, Sedaka, 41130; G. Anderson, Sin: A History, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 13741; see also Rabenau, Studien zum Buch Tobit,
13031; F. Zanella, Between Righteousness and Alms: A Semantic Study of the
Lexeme hqdc in the Dead Sea Scrolls, in Hebrew in the Second Temple Period: The
Hebrew of the Dead Sea Scrolls and of Other Contemporary Sources, edited by Steven
E. Fassberg et al., (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 26987.
25
See Weeks et al., Texts from the Principal Ancient and Medieval Traditions,
39- 46.
putting sacrifice on the altar for both the hand and the altar provide
direct access to God.26 By emphasizing almsgiving as a religious duty that
manifests mindfulness of God, Tobit defines service to God in horizontal
and vertical terms. This does not mean, however, that acts of charity abrogate
or replace the Temple cult. As the story begins, Tobit juxtaposes the cultic
and the charitable as he claims that he has walked in the path of truth and
righteousness all his life. As the story ends, Tobit sings of his lively hopes for
the restoration of the Jerusalem Temple, implying the continuing relevance
and validity of ritual acts. What Tobit does is enfold acts of mercy into the
cult and the Temple in which service at the altar is harmonized with service
to the needy. The cultic and the charitable become two inseparable modes of
rendering worship and service to God.
Almsgiving as a Worthy Offering

Tobit ties almsgiving to the ritual sacrifices of the Temple more clearly in
his discourse. He tells Tobiah that almsgiving, for all those who practice it, is
an excellent offering in the presence of God the Most High (4:11). Tobit here
employs the concept of dw/ron, which normally has a cultic connotation.
Found in Pentateuch texts like LXX Lev 1:23; 3:68 and Num 7:1213, this
term is sacrificial terminology that refers to the offerings in the prescriptions
for sacrifices. Tobit employs the term earlier in the narrative without any
cultic color. In a response to Tobits question regarding the source of the goat,
Anna claims that the animal is a dw/ron given to her on top of her wages as
a weaver (cf. GI Tob 2:14). As such, the term is not necessarily cultic but can
simply suggest the profane sense of a charitable gift given to a person.27 In
Tobits hymn of praise, however, Tobit predicts the rebuilding of Jerusalem
and describes the exodus of many nations drawn to the name of God, bearing
in their hands dw/ra or gifts for the King of Heaven (cf. Tob 13:13). Here
and in Tobits discourse, dw/ron is referred to God, conveying the vertical
or cultic aspect of the term. In Tobits discourse, the cultic overtone of the
word is confirmed when he claims that alms are a way to make deposits into
a goodly treasure. Almsgiving and sacrifice intersect, for alms as gifts before
26
Anderson, Sin, 148.
27
See E. Di Pede et al. Rvler les oeuvres de Dieu. Lecture narrative du livre de
Tobie, (Le livre et le rouleau 46; Namur: Lessius, 2014), n.56, p. 45, who suggests
that the term should be translated in the sense of a charitable gift given to others
and one that favors the giver.
58 Diwa 42 (2017): 47-66
God function in the same way as sacrifices they transport the goods to
God.28
By relating almsgiving to dw/ron, Tobit does not invalidate cultic
offerings; he merely expands the semantic range or content of this cultic
concept to include works of charity. Alms to the needy, like cereal offerings,
are acceptable gifts before God. Almsgiving and other works of charity
are now equally valid offerings comparable to the ritual offerings in the
Jerusalem Temple. By including alms as part of the cultic furniture, Tobit
presupposes the religious duty to offer sacrifices. This further points to the
strong likelihood that charity and cult have equal weight in terms of their
redemptive efficacy.
Tobits claim that almsgiving is an excellent gift before God finds approval
and legitimacy in Raphaels revelation that a memorial of Tobits prayer
and act of charity was presented before the throne of God, moving God to
commission his angel to heal him (12:1114).29 In Leviticus, a memorial has
cultic resonances as it is related to the ritual act of presenting and burning on
the altar part of the cereal offering which becomes a sweet-smelling oblation
before God (cf. Lev 2:2). In Tobits hands, the self-same memorial includes
his act of burying the dead. The cultic language of memorial then imagines
Tobits prayer and act of charity as a pleasing and fragrant oblation that rises
into the presence of God. Like the sacrifices on the altar in the Temple,
Tobits prayer and almsgiving bear him up before the throne of the Most
High, stirring God to remember him.
In Raphaels disclosure of the whole truth, the gift of alms can also be
viewed as part of the sacrificial reciprocity between Tobit and God. As alms
are excellent gifts, Tobit offers to God alms in proportion to what he has and
receives in return more than what he has offered. God gives the blessings of
sight, prosperity, and a restored household to Tobit in exchange for his gifts
of almsgiving and prayer. Of course, it is not much for God to grant these
blessings. For Tobit, the charitable acts that he offers to God are costly; to
give this little is to give much. And yet, Gods recompense in exchange for
Tobits little is abundant life, all because almsgiving has become a worthy gift
before God.30
Since Tobit is in exile, Tobit can only instruct his son to engage in
continual prayer and to bless God (4:19). He cannot exhort his son to
perform the ritual obligations he once kept in the land. He is unable to
28
Anderson, Sin, 165.
29
See Macatangay, Wisdom Instructions, 108.
30
See G. Anderson, Sacrifice and Sacrificial Offerings (OT), in ABD 5:872.
instruct his son to present sacrifices in the Temple or to offer tithes to orphans
and widows even in monetary form as the Mosaic Law prescribes (cf. Deut
14:2228) and as he once did. He can only translate the pecuniary offerings
to the Temple as alms and offer almsgiving and other acts of benevolence as
actions that satisfy the sacrificial requirements of the cult. And so, Tobit adds
an ethical and horizontal component into the ritual prescriptions regarding
sacrifices, specifying acts of charity to be excellent gifts before the heavenly
temple of God.
The narrative episode that describes Tobits celebration of Pentecost also
makes this clear. Pentecost, or the Feast of Weeks in celebration of the first
fruits of the wheat harvest, is one of the three solemn Jewish feasts that all
Jewish males are required to celebrate by making a pilgrimage to Jerusalem
and by offering sacrifices (cf. Exod 34:2223; Deut 16:1617; cf. also Num
28:26). As a harvest feast, Jews on Pentecost are to present an offering of new
grain and first fruits of the harvest to the Lord along with a burnt offering
of seven unblemished first-year lambs, a bull, and two rams (Lev 23:1521).
In addition to the specific offerings on Pentecost, Leviticus further decrees
that the gleanings of the harvest are to be left for the poor and the stranger
(Lev 23:22). Of course, Tobit observes and celebrates this important feast of
Pentecost in the Diaspora not by presenting such offerings but by feeding the
poor with a festive meal and by burying the dead (2:15). Instructed by the
law not to come empty-handed, Tobits acts of charity fill his hands before
the Lord on the Feast of Weeks; Tobit seems to consider them to be worthy
offerings to God on the solemn feast of Pentecost.
Almsgiving and Sin

In asserting that almsgiving is a worthy sacrifice, Tobit may also be
implying that works of charity have some salvific value. When Tobit tells
Tobiah that almsgiving delivers from death and keeps one from entering into
the dark abode (4:10), he intimates that almsgiving and other acts of charity
may be viewed as fulfilling the function of the atoning rituals of the temple.
The Book of Tobit is not quite precise in what death means or how to
envision the afterlife.31 As suggested earlier, however, death can be taken as
a metaphor that vividly captures the experience of exile and the resultant
31
See S. Beyerle, Release Me to Go to My Everlasting Home . . . (Tob 3:6):
A Belief in an Afterlife in Late Wisdom Literature, in The Book of Tobit: Text,
Tradition, Theology, edited by Geza G. Xeravits and Jozsef Zsengeller, (Leiden: Brill,
2005), pp. 7188.
60 Diwa 42 (2017): 47-66
debilitation and disintegration of the nation. It is likely that Tobit views death
as a type of punishment for sin that may be expiated or escaped through acts
of charity. Two episodes in the story hint at such a likelihood. First, in his
prayer after becoming blind and desolate, Tobit seems to identify with the
collective sins of his people. He implores God not to punish him for his sins
or for his oversights or for the sins of his ancestors who disobeyed God for
which they were given over to plunder, exile, and death (3:34).32 The prayer
creates the impression that death is a punishment for sin and disobedience
of the divine commands. It clearly conforms to the biblical view of the
diaspora as divine punishment for Israels sins. Certainly, the story portrays
Tobit as a righteous individual, one who has not committed any sins. And
yet, because he is in exile along with those deported to Nineveh, Tobit feels
implicated. If plunder, exile, and death are punishment for sin, then Tobits
exilic situation involves him in the collective guilt. With his blindness, Tobit
identifies with wayward Israel. When his eyes are opened, he learns from
Raphael that his prayer and charitable work of burying the dead have earned
some redemptive worth before God. The angelic revelation shows that Tobits
escape from death and darkness is somehow linked to his benevolent deed.
Second, the story of Ahiqar and Nadab in Tobits farewell speech illustrates
his point about the salvific value of almsgiving. Since Ahiqar had given alms,
he escaped the trap of death while his nephew Nadab fell into the eternal
darkness as a result of his sin, wickedness, and treachery.
The discourse of Raphael to Tobit and Tobiah in 12:810 underscores
even more distinctly the efficacious power of almsgiving.
Prayer with fasting is good, but better than both is almsgiving

with righteousness. A little given with righteousness is better than
wealth with wrongdoing. It is better to give alms than to lay up
gold. For almsgiving saves from death and purges away every sin.
The angelic speech endorses Tobits earlier dictum, affirming the

exceptional expiatory efficacy of almsgiving. As a way to remove sin, almsgiving
beats the usual expressions of repentance such as prayer and fasting. Raphael
could not have stated it more directly: almsgiving wipes out all sin and saves
from death (12:9).33 Since exile and death are the punishments for sin, efforts
32
Moore, Tobit, 32, claims that the author makes it clear that Israel brought its
painful exile upon itself (cf. 3:35; 13:36, 9).
33
Other Second Temple texts express similar sentiments. In Dan 4:24, Daniel
advises the king to atone for his sins by good deeds. Sir 3:30 agrees with Tobit and
Daniel, categorically stating that almsgiving propitiates sins while 2 Clem 16:4, a
need to be made to purge Israel of its sin and to pay off its debt. Tobit offers
almsgiving as a way to clear the exiled community of its sin.
In his revelatory speech, Raphael uses a pv okaqairw, a Greek verb which
the Greek-English Lexicon defines as to cleanse, to clear, to get rid of, or
to remove by purging or clearing. 34 The four times that the verb occurs in
the Septuagint (Tob 12:9; Prov 15:27; Job 7:9; 9:30) do not refer to expiation
of sin or atonement. Hence, the verb is usually taken to refer to mere moral
cleansing or purgation rather than an act of atonement. Since Tob 12:9
underscores prayer, fasting, and almsgiving as ways to repent or purge
every sin, with almsgiving given a more prominent role, the verse may indeed
be saying that such acts of charity can deliver a person from the negative
effects of sinful actions. The immediate context, which refers to the power
of almsgiving to save from death, may suggest that the cleansing refers to a
removal of guilt and punishment rather than mere moral transformation.35
More precisely, when sin is understood or imagined as debt, the verb conveys
a financial sense in terms of clearance or cancelation of an obligation. The
meaning of the verb then would bend toward the notion of clearing instead
of cleansing or purging. In this way, almsgiving and other acts of charity
fund a proper treasury that can help cancel, clear, eliminate or pay off the
debt accrued through sins.36
Almsgiving and the Full Life

Raphael further informs Tobit and Tobiah that those who give alms shall
enjoy a full life; they will be sated in life. Life here means the fullness of earthly
life in the here and now, not in the afterlife.37 The logic here seems to flow
from Deuteronomy but with a slight twist. If indeed almsgiving is a concrete
instance of remembering God and of observing the divine commandments,
and if to obey the commandments is to receive life and avoid death, it is not
surprising that almsgiving would lead to life. Tobit, however, has to learn this
lesson the hard way through a test. It is only retrospectively that the positive
later text, follows this teaching, asserting that almsgiving serves as atonement for
sins and lightens the burden of sins.
34
Liddell and Scott, a pv okaqairw, in the Greek-English Lexicon, 200.
35
C. Quarles, New Perspective and Atonement in Jewish Literature of
the Second Temple Period., Criswell Theological Review 2 (2005) 39-56.
36
See Anderson, Sin, 2455.
37
Fitzmyer, Tobit, 293. See also V. Skemp, The Vulgate of Tobit Compared with
Other Ancient Witnesses, (SBLDS 180; Atlanta: SBL, 2000), pp. 36566.
62 Diwa 42 (2017): 47-66
turn of events in Tobits life proves that those who give alms are divinely
rewarded with a blessed and full earthly existence. A full life, of course, is a
life favored by God.
The discourses of Tobit and Raphael both stress almsgiving and
righteousness. Between the instructions of Tobit in chapter 4 and the
proverbial counsels of Raphael in chapter 12, however, the central section
of the narrative refers neither to works of charity nor to righteousness. At
first glance, the discourses, which serve as literary bookends, do not seem
connected to the journey of Tobiah. And yet, the voyage of Tobiah details
the events that will lead to his marriage to Sarah and the discovery of the
cure for his fathers blindness. To a great extent, the providential events in the
adventures of Tobiah recounted in Tobit 511 are for the sake of Tobit the
devoted almsgiver; the course of events has Tobit in special view. When his
son returns, Tobit is cured of his blindness, his household is greatly enriched,
and his family line continues. And so, although the themes of almsgiving
and righteousness stressed in the discourses are nowhere referred to in the
journey of Tobiah, the dramatization of the divinely directed adventure
nonetheless indicates and affirms the claims of Tobit and Raphael regarding
charity. Essentially, Tobits risk-taking in the sending of his son has led not
only to the recovery of his money but also the restoration of his sight and
other blessings he could never have imagined before sending his son away.38
The story shows how Tobit the almsgiver is truly delivered from darkness and
death; he is restored to enjoy a full life, thanks to divine intervention in the
guise of Tobiahs adventure with an angel.
Earlier in his prayer, Tobit begs the Lord in his poverty. God responds
by showing him charity, delivering him from his misfortunes and granting
him life. Tobit, in fact, is given a long and prosperous life until a happy old
age, with an extended family and seven grandchildren gathered around him
as he is dying. His son obeys his instructions and gives him an honorable
burial. These are all indicative of a life lived with satisfaction and abundance,
of a temporal existence that radiates with fullness and light. Tobits life
proves that charity has such power that it can stir God to restore and raise
an individual from death back to life.39 Tobit has given alms and he receives
from God a bountiful life in return.
38
Anderson, Charity, 81.
39
See G. Anderson, Tobit as Righteous Sufferer, in A Teacher for All
Generations: Essays in Honor of James C. VanderKam, edited by Eric Mason et al.,
(Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 499501.
Almsgiving and the Goodly Treasure

Raphael assures Tobit that it is better to give alms than to store up gold.
Why is this so? Tobits previous assertion that almsgiving allows one to store
up a goodly treasure for oneself against the day of adversity can illuminate
Raphaels proverbial statement. Prov 19:17, in turn, can elucidate Tobits
reason for almsgiving.
The Book of Proverbs has sayings that recommend openness of heart and
hand to the poor (cf. Prov 21:13; 14:21, 31). Prov 19:17, however, is unique
in that it states that he who is generous to the poor lends to the Lord; he
will repay him for his charity. The saying views financial gifts to the poor
as a type of loan made to God; the money given to the poor is conveyed
directly to God. Since God is the borrower and the guarantor of the loan,
it is secure.40 Providing a loan is normally a risky undertaking, but when
God stands behind a loan, worries of non-payment can be shelved aside. The
almsgiver is a creditor who believes in Gods creditworthiness. God, in fact,
repays the loan in his own time with unimaginable interests that accrue to the
principal in the debtors celestial treasure. Giving alms to the poor can fund
ones heavenly treasure. In this view, the outstretched hand of a needy person
can be imagined as an ancient automatic teller machine through which one
could make a deposit directly to ones heavenly account.41 In this way, giving
alms to the needy and the downtrodden is a better investment than hoarding
gold because it is safer and the divine return is assured, earning the greatest of
dividends for the loaner. Hence, almsgiving and charity to the poor benefits
not just the recipient of the alms but the donor as well; the needy are aided
and enriched while the donor retains both the principal and the interest.42
In the case of Tobit, his prayer and alms are like loans to God, a record
of which is presented to God. His good deeds are securely kept in the
heavenly coffers, from which they could be taken out in a time of necessity.
His almsgiving has funded his heavenly account to the accrual of interests
and dividends. They are later returned to him with the greatest of interests
translated as a full and sated life. No wonder that Tobit can claim that such
a heavenly treasure will come in handy on the day of need even when, at the
40
Anderson, Sin, 165: The almsgiver becomes a holder of a bond that has been
signed by God himself. If ordinary investors are partial to the United States treasury
notes because the government stands behind them, what about the security one ought to
feel if the Holy One of Israel is the borrower? See also Idem, Charity, 3552.
41
Anderson, Redeem Your Sins, 49; idem, Sin, 14251.
42
Anderson, Sin, 17476.
64 Diwa 42 (2017): 47-66
time he told his son about it, his situation of darkness seemed to point out
the bankruptcy of his celestial funds.
In this understanding, sin is envisaged as debt that can be repaid or wiped
out by a withdrawal from the heavenly treasury. No doubt for this reason,
Raphael can declare that almsgiving can cleanse sin and can deliver one from
death and darkness. In the end, it is indeed better to give alms than to store
up gold because alms are secure, with returns guaranteed from God. Unlike
storing up gold, alms are a gift that keeps on giving even beyond ones lifetime.
Concluding Reflections
The story defines the relationship between God and his people in terms
of mercy and almsgiving. God shows mercy to those who show mercy. The
New Testament clearly accepts that reciprocity of mercy plays a pivotal role
in being delivered from death and darkness. In the Beatitudes, Jesus declares
that the merciful will be granted mercy (Matt 5:7). In the Lords Prayer, Gods
forgiveness of ones debts is bound up with ones forgiveness of a neighbors
debts (Matt 6:12). In the Last Judgment scene in Matthew 25, acts of mercy
given to those in need are acts of mercy given to the Sovereign King who,
surprisingly identifying himself with the needy, renders the final judgment
based on such merciful acts. Clearly, such acts of mercy would reverberate in
and determine the individuals final destiny.
Would the salvific benefits of almsgiving and other acts of mercy be
conferred upon a morally corrupt individual who gives alms?43 Would
a person with ill-gotten wealth fund a heavenly treasury with alms to
the poor? Would his alms help clear him of his sins? While almsgiving
provides a hopeful way for the redemption of individuals who may seem
damned, there are at least three considerations from the Book of Tobit
that would help respond to such concerns. First, Tobit does not presume
a mechanical or automatic connection between merciful acts and the
benefits they confer. In other words, Tobit assumes that God is free to grant
or withhold the benefits of mercy and almsgiving. As he tells the Israelites
in his hymn after encouraging them to do what is right and true, perhaps
God may look with favor and show mercy upon them (cf. Tob 13:6).
A persons act of mercy and almsgiving does not necessarily tie or force Gods
43
I wish to thank Sr. Anicia Co, RVM, the president of the Catholic
Biblical Association of the Philippines, for raising this issue after the paper
was presented at the 17th Annual CBAP Convention in Tagaytay on July
910, 2016. I hope that the response given here stimulates further discussions.
hand to show mercy. Second, Tobit seems to emphasize that the giving of
alms is to be done in proportion to what one has (cf. Tob 4:8). Alms are
given not as excess but in accordance with what one has. This implies that
almsgiving entails certain self-sacrifice on the part of the giver. To engage in
acts of mercy is to invest, even risk the self. Third, kinship is so vital in the
narrative world of Tobit that it can be stated that the giving of alms comes
from the donors recognition of this intimate kinship with the recipient. The
donor cannot stand aloof from the recipient. And so, while it is true that the
motives of the heart lie beyond the visible and that only God has access to
the deepest recesses of the human mind, it is nonetheless clear that authentic
almsgiving happens when the almsgiver stands in solidarity with the poor.
True almsgiving does not dismiss the poor with alms in order to ease ones
guilty conscience; alms are not necessarily handouts. Rather, to give alms is
to look the poor in the eye to see and feel the profound poverty there, the
alleviation of which comes from a strong sense of kinship. Deeds of mercy
arise from a profound awareness of solidarity with persons in dire need,
especially the poor and the marginalized of the world. To be merciful is to be
one with the poor, to stand in their own shoes and, moved from the gut, to
perform acts of compassion.
Almsgiving and other acts of mercy are efforts that will expectantly elicit
Gods response of same, if not greater charity. The story envisions a dynamic
of exchange in terms of mercy. In other words, God reciprocates various
acts of mercy with mercy. Gods mercy is the divine response to those who
engage in acts of mercy. Gods mercy is not necessarily circumscribed or
motivated by waywardness and sin. Rather, God rewards merciful acts with
his very own mercy because the merciful Father will not be outdone when
it comes to mercy and charity. Of course, Gods greatest act of mercy lies in
the incarnation of his son Jesus Christ when he lovingly united the divine
self with humanity. To be merciful like the Father is to imitate this divine
act of mercy for humanity. Such imitation becomes concrete and particular
in almsgiving, in welcoming the stranger, in clothing the naked, in feeding
the hungry, in giving drink to the thirsty, in visiting the imprisoned, and in
burying the dead. The good news is that God reciprocates such merciful acts
with his own mercy that leads to the abundance of life.
The Book of Tobit makes pivotal claims regarding almsgiving and
works of charity. In his exile, Tobit views almsgiving as enjoying a social
and humanitarian value. The horizontal dimension of almsgiving emphasizes
the fact that it fosters solidarity among kin and provides mutual aid. More
importantly, almsgiving has a theological function because it is a way to
remember God. As a vertical act that is referred to God, almsgiving is a
66 Diwa 42 (2017): 47-66
worthy offering before the presence of God. The re-consideration of the

sacrificial aspect of the cult in terms of almsgiving leads Tobit to claim that
almsgiving delivers from darkness and death, that it clears sin, that it is a sure
way to fund a heavenly account chargeable on the day of necessity, and that
it leads to a sated and full life. Indeed, Tobits almsgiving has delivered him
from the darkness. God has rewarded Tobits works of charity with a blessed
life. It is precisely for these reasons that in the Book of Tobit, mercy is gospel.
Admission to the Seminary:
Notes and Comments on Canon 241
A. N. DACANY, S.J.
Ateneo de Manila University
Quezon City, Philippines
T
he relatively complex and sensitive matter of admission to the
seminary is governed by one canon in the Code [C.241]. The canon
is composed of three paragraphs. The first paragraph makes two
points: first, it enumerates the general requirements (human, moral, spiritual,
intellectual gifts, physical and psychological health, and right intention);
and second, that these gifts and health and intention show that they are
capable of dedicating themselves permanently to the sacred ministries. The
second paragraph requires proof of baptism and confirmation, and other
documents that the national priestly program may require. It is worth noting
that the present Code does not anymore require proof of the legitimacy of
the candidate to the seminary; the Code of 1917 required such a proof of
legitimacy [C. 1363]. The third paragraph deals with the specific question of
the admission of those who may have been dismissed from another seminary
or religious institute.
This short essay will focus on five questions, some rather sensitive, that
may arise related to the matter of admission to the seminary: [a] the general
requirements; [b] the needed documents; [c] the re-admission of those
dismissed from another religious institute or seminary; [d] the admission
of those whose marriage has been declared null; and [e] the admission of
homosexual persons.
1. The General Requirements. The first paragraph refers to several

qualities: the human (pleasant, likeable, responsible, reliable, constant),
moral, spiritual, and intellectual, physical and psychological health, and right
intention. And the question to be asked is: do these qualities show that they
are capable of dedicating themselves permanently to the sacred ministries.
The point does not only concern the existence of these qualities; rather the
point is do these qualities reveal a capacity for permanent commitment to the
68 Diwa 42 (2017): 67-79
service of the Church. In some religious traditions, Buddhism for example,

one can become a monk for a set number of years. But in the Catholic
tradition, service to the Church by priests, deacons, and consecrated persons,
is for life, and it is this capacity for permanent commitment to the sacred
ministries that the bishop is to determine. The diocesan bishop, more often
than not, delegates this function to the major seminarythe rector, or the
admissions committee, the vocation director, and the like. Questions may arise
with respect to two issues: the medical certificate and the psychological tests.
1.1 Concerning the medical certificate, W. Woestman proffers the

opinion that because of the professional secrecy that governs the relationship
between the medical practitioner and his patient, the physician can give the
report only to the person himself, and only with the latters permission can
the former give that to anyone else. If the candidate declines to submit the
medical certificate, that must be respected, but as a rule he should not be
accepted to the seminary.1
Something must also be said about HIV tests which may be required
by the seminary. The following important points have been raised in
American seminaries which have had more exposure to the question
than the Philippines.2 It would be instructive to attend to the concerns
surfaced by them. On the one hand, there is a school which holds that a
candidate to the seminary should not be rejected solely on the basis of his
HIV status.3 As a matter of fact, the opinion of Calvo is that the need of a
1
W. Woestman, The Sacrament of Orders and the Clerical State, p. 116.
2
Approximately 65 dioceses in the US require HIV testing for seminary
applicants and 73 do not; 12 dioceses are in the process of establishing a policy.
Among the dioceses that do not require mandatory testing, some have not perceived
the need to establish a policy; others have grappled with the question and have
chosen not to make HIV testing part of seminary admission requirement. Jack
Anderson, in P. Cogan, ed., CLSA Advisory Opinions (1984-1993), 44.
3
For example, Jack Anderson, in P. Cogan, ed., CLSA Advisory Opinions (1984-
1993), 45-46. He raises these points. (a) Many individuals infected with HIV are
not physically impaired and they meet the established health requirements for
admission. Statistics about the latency period of the disease are not conclusive but
there is concern that the HIV infected candidates will not be able to fulfill the duties
of ministry and will eventually pose a significant financial strain on the recourses of
the diocese. (b) Sexual transmission of the HIV infection should not be concluded
when sere positivity is evidenced as there are other means of transmission like
blood transfusion and intravenous drug use. (c) The right to privacy demands that
a candidate should not be forced to divulge prior sexual history because of his HIV
status. It would also be inaccurate to use HIV-testing to determine a persons sexual
A. N. Dacanay, Admission to the Seminary 69
seminary to screen out HIV infected persons is not compelling enough to

outweigh the established right of a person to protection against potentially
damaging intrusion to privacy.4 On the other hand, R. Gibbons offers a more
balanced evaluation of the question, in our opinion.5 (i) The finding should be
a factor to be carefully considered in discerning the candidates present health
situation, future health prospects, and over-all capacity to carry out ministerial
responsibilities. (ii) Those who favor testing stress the need for careful stewardship
of financial and personnel resources and the financial and emotional burden
that a diocese or religious community is unknowingly assuming if there is no
required testing. Other factors also affect the conversation: concepts of vocation
and ministry, concerns about homosexuality, worries about potential liability in
the event that others are infected by the applicant and anxiety about charges of
discrimination. Gibbons is right that such a medical condition is a relevant factor
that should be taken into account, and that the persons right to privacy does not
seem to override these other concerns.
1.2 As to the question of psychological report, the provisions of Cc. 642

and 220 must be taken into account and can also be applied to the situation of
applicants to the seminary for the diocesan priesthood. Although it is surprising
that the Code does not contain a similar provision in respect of the candidates
for the diocesan clergy because the Code makes a provision for the candidates to
religious institutes. C. 642 reminds religious superiors that the health, disposition
and maturity are to be established by experts if necessary, without prejudice to C.
220 which protects the right to privacy of the candidate.
Three things must be kept in mind regarding this matter of psychological
tests. First, it is true that the Holy Office had issued a monitum to the effect that
the opinion of those who hold that candidates for the priesthood should undergo
orientation. It is not difficult to concede these points except that at a certain point, one
must make a prudential judgment about the risks (the communicability of the disease,
when will the health of the person deteriorate, the expenses to be involved).
4
R. Calvo, in P. Cogan, ed., CLSA Advisory Opinions (1984-1993), 50. The
argument as formulated by Calvo (the need of the seminary to screen out HIV positive
persons from the seminary as against the established right of a person to protection
against potentially damaging intrusion to privacy seems to have left out of the equation
important points, namely the physical health of the person, the contagiousness of the
infection, the effects that the presence of such a person in the seminary community
will have. The information about his condition will have to be kept from the others; the
others could be more careful had they been aware of the condition.
5
R. Gibbons, in P. Cogan, ed., CLSA Advisory Opinions (1984-1993), 51-52.
70 Diwa 42 (2017): 67-79
examinations and tests of a strictly psychoanalytic character is to be rejected.6

But, and secondly, Versaldi explains why, according to the Holy Office, tests
of this type (psychoanalytic) are to be rejected. The anthropology underlying
this psychological approach presupposes a certain determinism which
ultimately denies personal freedom.7 Such tests are immoral; the results
of such tests cannot be licitly used in ecclesiastical governance, whether
administrative or judicial. Third, tests are only part of the admission process
that is broader and which involves many other elements. The Program of
Priestly Formation of the Canadian Catholic Bishops, for example, provides
a balanced articulation of the role of psychological testing, and their policy
would be a good model to follow.8
[i] Such psychological tests can be very helpful in identifying the

strengths, values, and problems of candidates who can therefore
benefit from timely and appropriate interventions.
6
Improbanda est opinio eorum quivel proprie dicta psychoanalytica examina
et investigationes subeunda esse candidatis sacerdotii et professionis religiosae.
Similiter sacerdotes et utriusque sexus religiosi psychoanalystas ne adeant nisi
ordinario suo gravi de causa permittente. Holy Office (15 July 1961) in Leges Ecclesiae
III, col 4223, doc. no. 2999.
7
Psychopathology according to the Freudian theory arises when the defenses
do not function and when anxiety and guilt provoke a breakdown creating a
distortion or a substitution of reality. In this anthropological context, the human
being cannot really be free; the human being cannot transcend himself/herself to
implement ideals or goals different from the individual or social forces which he/she
is condemned to obey. G. Versaldi, The Dialogue between Psychological Science
and Canon Law, in Robert M. Sable, ed., Incapacity for Marriage: Jurisprudence
and Interpretation (Rome: Pontifical Gregorian University, 1987), p. 35. Along the
same lines, V. Marcozzi makes a helpful distinction between two categories of tests
to help us understand the nature of psychological tests: the structured or objective
tests such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory and projective tests
such as the Rorschach test and other similar tests; in the second category are such
techniques which provide response to questions and stimuli in which the subject has
little or no control over the responses given (for example, the use of polygraph and
the use of drugs which produce a semiconscious state similar to hypnosis reducing
the inhibitions of the subject and elicit responses of the most intimate and personal
nature of his private psyche. V. Marcozzi, Indagini psichologiche e diritte della
persona, Civilta Cattolica, 127/2 (1976), 541-551. Cited by Woestman in Pedone
and Donlon, eds., Roman Replies and CLSA Advisory Opinions (2002), 81.
8
The Canadian Catholic Bishops, The Program of Priestly Formation, no. 26.
[ii] Due care must be taken to safeguard the personal dignity and
liberty of the candidates, and to protect the confidential character
of the findings.9 In the concrete, the Guidelines make the following
practical dispositions.10
(a) The candidates psychological consultation can only

proceed with his previous, explicit, informed and free
consent.
(b) The formators should avoid giving the impression that

such a suggestion is a prelude to the candidates inevitable
dismissal from the seminary or the house of formation.
(c) The candidate should be able to freely approach the

expert who is either chosen from among those indicated
by the formators, or chosen by the candidate himself and
accepted by the formators. According to the possibilities, the
candidates should be guaranteed a free choice from among
the various experts who possess the requisite qualifications.
(d) Should a candidate refuse to undergo a psychological

consultation, the person is not to be forced in any way; the
formators will proceed in the work of discernment with the
knowledge they already have, bearing in mind C.1052.1.
(e) In the spirit of reciprocal trust and in cooperation

with his own formation, the candidate is invited freely to
give his written consent so that the expert who is bound
by confidentiality can communicate the results of the
consultation to the formators indicated by the candidate
himself.
9
The Congregation for Catholic Education repeats the insistence of the Code
to respect the privacy and protect the good name of the person. The formational
institute has the right and the duty to acquire the knowledge necessary for a
prudentially certain judgement regarding the candidates suitability. But this must
not harm the candidates right to a good reputation nor his right to defend his privacy
as prescribed by C.220. Guidelines for the Use of Psychology in the Admission and
Formation of Candidates for the Priesthood (Congregation for Catholic Education,
29 June 2008), no. 12.
10
Guidelines for the Use of Psychology in the Admission and Formation of Candidates
for the Priesthood (Congregation for Catholic Education, 29 June 2008), nos. 12-14.
72 Diwa 42 (2017): 67-79
(f) Particular care is to be taken so that the professional

opinion expressed by the expert be exclusively accessible to
those responsible for his formation, with the precise and
binding proscription against using it in any way other than
for the discernment of a vocation and for the candidates
formation.
[iii] The priestly vocation itself can never be definitively discerned

by such testing nor can the decision about ordination be delegated
to the psychological expert. Although important and perhaps
even necessary, all such tests are at best one phase in the more
comprehensive process of discernment.11
While the Code has no explicit legal norm to govern the intervention of
a psychologist in the process of discernment by which someone is admitted
to the seminary or sacred orders, the references to psychological health,
human maturity and requisite psychological qualities in Cc. 241 and
244, and in analogy with C. 642, the health and maturity of candidates may
be established with the assistance of experts. Such an intervention by experts
can be helpful only if it takes place within very clearly defined parameters,
and with the greatest respect for the freedom and internal forum of the
individual candidate. A vocation to the ministry is a supernatural call and
the intervention of the psychologist does not constitute the judgement of
those appointed to discern the vocation.12
2. The Documents and other Requirements [C.241.2]. Besides the proof

of their baptism and confirmation, the law remits to the program of priestly
formation such other requirements as may be demanded. It has become
standard practice that psychological tests are taken by applicants prior to
11
This is consistent with the guidelines from the Holy See for the use of
psychology in formation. The assistance offered by the psychological sciences
must be integrated within the context of the candidates entire formation. It must
not obstruct but rather ensure in a particular way that the irreplaceable value of
spiritual accompaniment is guaranteed; for the spiritual accompaniment has the
duty of keeping the candidate facing the truth of the ordained ministry according
to the vision of the Church. Guidelines for the Use of Psychology in the Admission and
Formation of Candidates for the Priesthood (Congregation for Catholic Education,
29 June 2008), no. 6.
12
G. Ghirlanda, Utilizzo delle competenze psichologiche nellammissione e
nella formazione dei candidate al sacerdozio, Periodica 98 (2009), 581-618.
the admission to the seminary or novitiate. This matter was already treated
lengthily above under 1. 2.
3. Concerning the admission of those who may have left or have been
dismissed from another seminary or religious institute, the Code requires
the testimony of the respective superior, especially concerning the reason
for their dismissal or departure [C.241.3].13 Although the canon seems to
speak directly only of those who have been dismissed, this canon should also
be understood to refer even to those who may have left of their own accord.
This is required of candidates to institutes of consecrated life [C.645.2]. It is
entirely possible, as Woestman notes, that a person left the seminary or the
religious institute to avoid being dismissed.14
Although the canon speaks only of religious institutes, this term is to be
understood in the broad sense to include any institute of consecrated life or
society of apostolic life.15 The discipline following shortly after the publication
of the previous Code has been unduly strict and overly centralized. Recourse
to the Holy See was required before the bishop can accept an ex-religious to
the seminary or a major superior an ex-seminarian to a religious institute.16
Superiors on the ground did not have the authority to deal with these cases.
The present discipline returns to the provisions of the old Code
[C.1363.3] which observes better the principle of subsidiarity. It requires the
testimony of the respective superior, especially concerning the reason for their
dismissal or departure in order to make an equitable and just decision about
the application of such persons. Recourse to the Holy See is not anymore
required. This present discipline has been confirmed and clarified by a recent
instruction from the Congregation for Catholic Education which raises the
following important points.17
13
Cf. the commentary of G. Read on the instruction of the Congregation for
Catholic Education The Readmission to Formation of Former Seminarians and
Religious, Canon Law Society of Great Britain and Ireland News 109/97, 50-55.
14
Woestman, The Sacrament or Orders and the Clerical State, p. 119.
15
Cf. the response of the Congregation of Seminaries dated 8 March 1945 and
12 Jan 1950 in Ochoa, Leges Ecclesiae II, no. 1819, col. 2270 and no.2110, col. 2727.
16
The joint decree of the Congregations for Religious and for Seminaries and
Universities dated 25 July 1941 in Ochoa, Leges Ecclesiae I, col. 2082, no.1635; this
is repeated in a decree of the Congregation for Universities dated 12 July 1957 in
Ochoa, Leges Ecclesiae II, cols. 3722-3723, no. 2677; this stand of the Holy See was
confirmed by the Congregation for Universities in its response to a Spanish bishop
in Ochoa, Leges Ecclesiae III, col.5145, no. 3549.
17
Inst. Par la presente instruction [8 March 1996] from the Congregation for
74 Diwa 42 (2017): 67-79
(a) The too easy acceptance of ex-religious and ex-seminarians, made

without thorough investigation is usually the cause of unpleasant
surprises and disappointments for indulgent bishops and a cause
of discomfort for those local ordinaries who are rightly rigorous in
their selection of candidates. Disparity of criteria in this matter can
affect the climate of collegiality and trust between bishops and those
charged with priestly formation.
(b) As a result of lax practices as regards this matter, there have

even been requests for a return to the old discipline established by
Consiliis initis [25 July 1941] and Sollemne habet [12 July 1957] which
reserved to the Holy See the jurisdiction to admit to the seminary
ex-religious and ex-seminarians.
(c) These requests have not been accepted by the Holy See in order to
respect the inherent rights of the bishops and to avoid departing on
this point from the recently promulgated Code. Instead, the Holy
See proposes to emphasize the relevant responsibilities by means
of a stronger and more explicit formulation of them in the Ratio
Fundamentalis Institutionis Sacerdotalis.18 The episcopal conferences
were also urged to establish in this material more detailed norms
and procedures adapted to local circumstances, inserting them into
the chapter concerning the candidates, in the respective national
rationes.19
(d) In particular, the episcopal conferences themselves should

assume this task. They are given a special mandate in conformity
with C.455.1 and are authorized, in conformity with paragraphs 2
and 3 of the same canon to publish the necessary general decrees.
In the present case, it would be a matter of publishing appropriate
procedural norms suitable for promoting collaboration in this
area among the bishops and among the seminaries to promote the
common good. In accord with C.455.2, for these decrees to be
Catholic Education, in Canona Law Digest 14, pp. 226-230.

18
Ratio Fundamentalis Institutionis Sacrerdotalis [19 March 1985], especially
in no. 39: Gravis incumbit episcopis obligatio investigandi praesertim de causis
dimissionis eorum qui ex aliebo seminario vel instituto religiosi dimissi fierint. In
Enchiridion Vaticanum S1, no. 986, pp. 900-9002.
19
Circular letter to nunciatures from the Congregation for Catholic Education
dated 9 Oct 1986, in Enchiridion Vaticanum 10, no. 952, p. 695.
validly enacted at a plenary meeting, they must receive two thirds

of the votes of those who belong to the episcopal conference with
deliberative votes. In conformity with the provisions of the same
canon, these decrees will need the recognition of the Holy See to
have a binding force on all the bishops of the country.
(e) Finally, the Dicastery suggests the following to be included in the

decree:
[i] It should specify more clearly some of the more delicate

aspects of vocational discernment which are often the
cause of disagreement, uncertainty, and hesitation (e.g., the
presence of hereditary defects, problem concerning human
and affective maturity, psychological and sexual anomalies,
the recourse to psychology in certain cases, ideological and
doctrinal differences, etc.).
[ii] It must determine the information provided on

candidates to which all must conform. The information
must take into account the reserved nature of the internal
forum, the subjects right to their good reputation and
the protection of their privacy, but at the same time the
information must not hide or mask the true state of affairs.
[iii] It must guarantee a discreet and prudent use of the

information received to avoid possible abuses.
4. Concerning the admission to the seminary of one whose marriage

has been declared null, the following need to be adverted to. First, the
Congregation for the Sacraments and Divine Worship has clarified that
a man whose marriage has been found null and void is not bound by
the impediment of C.978.2 (of the Code of 1917), and consequently no
dispensation is required. Second, the Congregation for Catholic Education
has established that in all such cases, copies of the definitive sentences of
the second instance tribunals be forwarded to the congregation, to assist
the Congregation in its responsibility to determine that there would be no
scandal should the man in question be advanced to ordination.20 This prior
20
However, in view of the modifications introduced by Mitis Judex where the
obligatory review by an appellate court has been abrogated, only the definitive
sentence of the first instance tribunal need to be submitted and, perhaps, a decree of
finality issued by the same tribunal indicating that no appeal was lodged within the
76 Diwa 42 (2017): 67-79
procedure then is merely a precautionary measure which the Congregation

insists it has the right to require.21
If a vetitum was attached to the sentence of nullity, the following must
be taken into account.22 (a) The primary intent of the restrictive clause in a
marriage case is to insure the readiness of the person in question to enter a
new marital commitment. It is attached to the sentence of nullity because
the problems which would render this difficult have been revealed during
the investigation of the putative marriage. A persons capacity for religious
or priestly life may or may not be affected by such problems. (b) While it is
possible that the discernment process will reveal similar or other difficulties
which would affect a potential candidates suitability for religious life or the
ordained ministry, the judicial vicar should recommend that the process
of discernment continue, as opposed to lifting the vetitum. The tribunals
prohibition should remain in place because it specifically pertains to issues
surrounding remarriage obligations, not to religious life or to the ordained
ministry. There is no need to lift the restrictive clause when a person enters
the seminary or the religious life.
5. Regarding the admission of those with homosexual tendencies.23 The

Congregation for Catholic Education (which has jurisdiction over seminaries)
deadlines established by the Code [Cc. 1630-1633].

21
Schumacher, ed., Roman Replies 1982, 41. In view of these instructions, it would
seem then that the Congregation for Catholic Education must be consulted before
a person whose marriage has been declared null can be accepted to the seminary.
Although the apost. cons. Pator Bonus does not specifically determine this in its
enumeration of the functions of this congregation, it could possibly be derived from
the first two articles of the section. Art. 112: The Congregations of Seminaries and
Educational Institutions gives practical expression to the concern of the Apostolic
See for the training of those who are called to holy orders, and for the promotion
and organization of Catholic education. Art. 113: (1) It is available to the bishops
so that in their churches vocations to the sacred ministry may be cultivated to the
highest degree, and seminaries may be established and conducted in accordance
with the law, where the students may be trained, receiving solid formation that is
human and spiritual, doctrinal and pastoral. (2) It gives great attention that the way
of life and government of the seminaries be in full harmony with the program
of priestly education (emphases added).
22
L. Naughton in Vann and Donlon, eds., Roman Replies and CLSA Advisory
Opinions (1995), 43.
23
Other documents from the Holy See pertinent to this question: Potissimum
institutioni (12 Feb 1990) from the Congregation for the Institute of Consecrated
Life and Societies of Apostolic Life, especially no. 39, in Enchiridion Vaticanum
in its instruction dated 4 Nov 2005 deals specifically with the question:
whether to admit to the seminary and to holy orders candidates who have
deep-seated homosexual tendencies. The Instruction prescinds from the
questions in the area of affectivity and sexuality that should be attended to
during the whole period of formation, and proposes these important points.
(a) There is a distinction between homosexual acts and the

homosexual orientation or tendencies. This has always been the
moral stand of the Church. The homosexual orientation is not a
choice but engaging in homosexual acts involves a degree of freedom
and therefore responsibility.
(b) The instruction also differentiates between deep-seated

homosexual tendencies and homosexual tendencies which may only
be the expression of a transitory problem, perhaps out of curiosity
but one which a person will eventually overcome and outgrow.24
The former is difficult to overcome, if at all possible. The latter can
presumably be overcome more easily. It is also possible to understand
the homosexual tendency that is not deep-seated to mean that
it is not such a powerful irresistible impulse that it completely
overwhelms the freedom of the person, that is not irresistible.
(c) From this distinction, the Instruction derives two diverse

canonical conclusions: the Church can admit to the seminary
those with transitory or reversible tendencies, but not those who
are practicing homosexuals, those with deep-seated homosexual
tendencies, or those who support the so-called gay culture, even if
they may not be homosexuals themselves.25 The distinction which is
12, p. 58; instructions from the same congregation [Instructio de candidatis ad

statum perfectionis et ad sacros ordines sedulo diligendis et instituendis. Moderatoribus
reservata. cited by G. Marchesi, Omosessualit e sacerdozio, La Civilta Cattolica
157/1 (2006), 169; the response of the prefect of the Congregation for the Divine
Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments dated 16 May 2002, in Notitiae
(Nov-Dec 2002), 586.
24
Versaldi seems to understand persons with deep-seated homosexual tendencies
as those who are practicing sexually active homosexuals. G. Versaldi, Implicazioni
psichologgiche dell instruzione In continuit del 4 Novembre 2005, Periodica 95
(2006), 460.
25
The Instruction refers to: [i] a memorandum from the Congregation for
Catholic Education addressed to a bishop seeking guidance regarding this matter (9
July 1985); [ii] a letter from the Congregation for Divine Worship (16 May 2002).
78 Diwa 42 (2017): 67-79
the fulcrum on which the decision hinges may be conceptually clear

but it is certainly not the decision that could be made with certainty
and facility.
Versaldi suggests that the therapy be undertaken before admission into

the seminary, so that the formation in the seminary will be the period for the
person to show that he has overcome the tendency and the three-year period
to test that a relapse has not taken place. 26
(d) Such transitory tendencies must be overcome at least three

years before ordination to the diaconate.27 This admittedly is
difficult to establish and it look to neat from the outside. It demands
much openness and trust on the part of the seminarian and even
more perceptiveness on the part of the spiritual director/confessor in
particular and the seminary formators in general.
(e) If a candidate is a practicing homosexual or presents deep-seated

homosexual tendencies, his spiritual director as well as his confessor
have the duty to dissuade him in conscience from proceeding
towards ordination.
The point of view of the Congregation seems to be that homosexuality

is a form of affective immaturity, that it is some form of an incomplete
development or mal-development which will prejudice a persons capacity to
relate appropriately and fruitfully to both men and women.28 The formation
26
Versaldi also underscores the fact that persons suffering from deep-seated
homosexuality should not only be approved for ordination but should not even
be admitted to the seminary. Certainly there is substantial difference between the
two criteria but the instruction takes account of the fact that the seminary as an
exclusive male community is not the most helpful situation adapted for a therapeutic
intervention meant to overcome the homosexual tendency. As a matter of fact it
would transform the seminary into a therapeutic community, which is not good for
the subject and certainly not for the others. G. Versaldi, Implicazioni psichologiche
dell instruzione In continuit del 4 Novembre 2005, Periodica 95 (2006), 462.
27
The deadline of three years must be understood in terms of ascertaining that
the person has not suffered a relapse and/or the success or failure of the therapeutic
intervention so that a distinction is established that what the persons suffers from
is a transitory or reversible tendency and not a deep-seated homosexuality. G.
Versaldi, Implicazioni psichologiche dell instruzione In continuit del 4 Novembre
2005, Periodica 95 (2006), 461.
28
The document considers people with deeply rooted homosexual tendencies to
be drawn towards acts which are intrinsically disordered and morally unacceptable.
of the future priest must articulate the four dimensions of formation:

human, spiritual, intellectual, and pastoral, and the human formation is the
foundation of all formation.29
6. Conclusion. We have presented the present discipline of the Code of

Canon Law regarding this question. There were of course disputed points
and we attempted to put before the reader both sides of the question and
what we think the law means and why we think that is what the law means.
The hope is that the practice in the Philippines will be more in accord with
the prescriptions of church law and that it will be more uniform and even.
This constitutes a species of affective immaturity which would render extremely

difficult a genuinely celibate life. Versaldi for example says:si puo continuare a
ritenere lomosessualita una anomalia in quanto lopinione contraria non viene da
una scoperta provata col metodo scientifico, ma frutto di una pressa posizione
antropologica pregiudiziale alla visione cristinana, derivante dale pressioni
politiche e culturali. G. Versaldi, Implicazioni psichologgiche dell instruzione In
continuit del 4 Novembre 2005, Periodica 95 (2006), 455-456. Cf. also A. Busso,
La homosexualidad y el Orden sagrado, Annuario Argentino de Derecho Canonico
12 (2005), 331.-346.
29
Ghirlanda adds a complementary theological argument. Affective maturity
is required; it is the basis of a persons capacity to represent adequately Christ the
spouse of the Church. A person with deep-seated homosexual tendencies cannot
really develop the spiritual paternity and is thus unable to discharge the ministry.
Ghirlanda, Aspetti canonici dellistr, In continuita del 4 Nov 2005, Periodica 95
(2006), 401.
Theses Abstracts
Summaries of theses in M.A. in Theology defended at the Divine Word Seminary
in the Academic Year 2016-2017
Hernandez, Rene. New Evangelization as Mission: Challenges and

Prospects in the Apostolic Vicariate of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro,
Philippines. Thesis adviser: Fr. Edgar Javier, SVD, SThD.
Introduction
The Churchs call for new evangelization is one with urgency. It is
necessary that the new evangelizer understands the being of the Church:
its mision, nature, and identity.1 It is equally important, however, that we
find new ways to proclaim the Good News in our present context. One of
the main tasks of the Church today is geared towards the contextualization
of mission and evangelization. The local church plays a pivotal role in this
task. Christianization of Mindoro was started by the Spanish missionaries.
They were the Augustinians (1572-1577), Franciscans (1578-1588), Jesuits
(1626-1666), and Augustinian Recollects (1677-1776; 1806-1896). The
Divine Word Missionaries (SVD) started their mission in the small island of
Lubang on March 20, 1922.2 The said society is known to be a builder, i.e.,
not only in building many parishes and rectories but also in being catalysts
for community spirit of participation, communion and independence. In
their mission in Mindoro, there were three steps or approaches that they
basically employed. i.e., building the local Church, building the local clergy
and establishing collaboration.
Pastoral Activity at Present through Table-Fellowship

At present, mission in Calapan is intimately linked to the pastoral core
program Hapag ng Pamilyang Mindoreo (HPM). The catchword is table-
fellowship which is the pastoral priority of the local Church. Table-fellowship
acknowledges and responds to the call of the Second Plenary Council of the
1
Vatican II, Decree on the Mission Activity of the Church, Ad Gentes (December
7, 1965), no. 2.
2
See Antoon Postma, Ang SVD at ang Isla ng Mindoro, Bigkis 2, no. 3
(January 1988): 1.
Theses Abstracts 81
Philippines for a renewed integral evangelization3 and a revitalized Church

that is priestly, prophetic, and kingly for all.
Why New Evangelization?

New evangelization, as a pastoral program and a theological concept, is
a response of the Church to the new and pressing challenges that the world
faces today. It is characterized by newness in ardour, method, and expression.4
New evangelization is deeply theological. It is based on the participation
on the life of the Trinity. The purpose, content, and the process of the
new evangelization are fundamentally Trinitarian.5 The goal of new
evangelization is the proclamation of Gods plan of salvation, centred on
Christ and is realized by dialogue with new situations that beset humanity.
The new ecclesiological dimension of new evangelization calls the
Church to participate in the missio Dei. The agent for transmitting the faith
is the entire Church6 In communion with the universal Church, the local
Church plays a pivotal role in the new evangelization. It is in the context of
each local Church that the evangelizing mission is actuated.
Promoting and Fostering New Evangelization in the

Apostolic Vicariate of Calapan
This paper proposes three ways in order to promote new evangelization,
namely, dialogue, collaboration, and spirituality.
Dialogue with cultures pertains to the new method of evangelization.
The Gospel cannot be communicated now in just a unilateral and monologic
way. The new evangelizer has to consider dialogue and inculturation of the
Good News as essential strategies of Christian proclamation.
The rich indigenous culture of the Mangyans, the ethnic tribes of
Mindoro, is offering new way of understanding our reality and is a fertile
ground for dialogue. The lowland cultures, characterized by diversity and
plurality due to migration and urbanization, should also be acknowledged by
the Church as an avenue for dialogue. Moreover, the recent natural calamities
3
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, Acts and Decrees of the Second
Plenary Council of the Philippines (Pasay City: Paulines Publishing House, 1992), 59.
4
John Paul II, Homily at the Sanctuary of the Holy Cross, Mogila, Poland (June
9, 1979).
5
Samuel H. Canilang, The New Evangelization: The Development of the Concept
and its Comprehensive Meaning (Quezon City: ICLA Publications, 2013), 98.
6
Synod of Bishops, The New Evangelization for the Transmission of Faith,
Lineamenta (October 11, 2011), no. 15.
82 Diwa 42 (2017): 80-88
and continued forest denudation due to illegal logging and mining threaten
the rich agricultural lands of Mindoro and calls the Church to dialogue with
ecology.
The new expression of evangelization is a kind of shift from individualism
to collaboration.7 It is best expressed in communion and co-responsibility
while acknowledging the giftedness of one another. Collaboration in mission
must be expressed around the table of the Word (Hapag ng Salita) which
invites everyone to an evangelical discernment.8 Furthermore, it must be
always nourished around the table of the Eucharist (Hapag ng Eukaristiya),
a sacrament of mission. It entails a movement from koinonia (communion)
to diakonia (service). Lastly, collaboration is expressed around the meal table
(Hapag Kainan). In this regard, evangelization is seen in a holistic manner.
Integral evangelization has always a social dimension9 as express in upholding
justice, peace, and integrity of creation.
In order to have new vigor in evangelization the Church needs to cultivate
missionary spirituality. The spirituality of the stranger, as modelled by Jesus
in the Lucan account of the two disciples journeying to Emaus, is Eucharist-
oriented. This spirituality encourages the Church to encounter the strangers
in the peripheries and fringes of society. Secondly, the Church in order to be
a genuine evangelizer must evangelize herself by encountering Jesus and His
Word through silence and contemplation. Thus, there is a need for a conversion
from activism to contemplation10 in order to be an effective missionary and
evangelizer today. Finally, ecological spirituality entails a loving awareness
that we are not detached with the whole creation. This kind of spirituality is
necessary in the context of meal table wherein everything that is shared and
partaken is a fruit of the bountiful blessings of creation.
These three are necessary in order to promote new evangelization in the
Apostolic Vicariate of Calapan. Dialogue and collaboration are the active
dimensions of evangelization while missionary spirituality is its contemplative
dimension. These three support our vision of the local Church, that is, a
vibrant community of disciples of Christ, united in living the Word of God,
and wherein reign justice, freedom, peace, and love.
Antonio M. Pernia, The State of Mission Today, Diwa 39 (2014): 89.

7
8
Francis, Apostolic Exhortation on the Proclamation of the Gospel in Todays
World, Evangelii Gaudium (24 November 2014), no. 50.
9
Ibid., nos. 176-258.
10
Pernia, The State of Mission Today, 87-88.
Theses Abstracts 83
Beltran, Dennis. Doing Mission in Context: Case in

Point, Migration in Cavite Today. Thesis Adviser: Fr. Andrew
Recepcion, SThD.
This study is about doing mission in the context of todays migrations in

the province of Cavite, Philippines. In recent years, migrations have changed
the provinces landscape. Problems in work places, for instance, such as
discrimination and acts of injustice experienced by the migrants, have created
complex religious and socio-political problems. Reaching out to them can
be a new way of doing mission. Such personal encounter would involve
simple strategies like house to house visitations. On the part of the receiving
community, hospitality would the prime value to cultivate. An experience
of a foreigner being warmly welcomed can be an impetus for the migrant to
be a witness to the Gospel and become a partner in the new evangelization
undertaking of the Church.
Thomas Aquino Nuwa Wele, SVD, A Study of a Jewish

Scribal Sage in the Hellenistic Period and Sirach 38:34cd
39:11
Introduction
Without the book of Sirach, the historical reconstruction of the Jewish
scribal tradition in Second Temple Period would miss an important source.
Sirach provides us texts attesting the existence of a class of scribes and the
influence they exerted on the Jewish community.1 Thee thesis seeks to study
Ben Siras understanding of the scribal sage in Sir 38:34cd-39:11.
The Jewish Scribe and the Sage in the Hellenistic Period

The spread of Hellenism has increased the demand for professional
writing expertise and a higher interest in books. It is during this period,
an abundance of Jewish literature appeared as a strategy of scribal sage in
preserving and transmitting the Jewish sapiential traditions.
1
Christine Schams, Jewish Scribes in the Second-Temple Period (Sheffield, England:
Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 98-99.
84 Diwa 42 (2017): 80-88
The Scribe in Jewish Historical Literature
a. Seleucid Charter (Josephus, Ant. 12.138-144)

The letter by Antiochus III granted the Jews the privilege to have a
government in accordance with their own laws and tax exemption for the
senate and the temple personnel. Exemption from taxation was enjoyed by
the personnel of the Jerusalem temple: let the elders, and the priests, and
the scribes of the temple [grammateis tou hierou], and the sacred singers, be
discharged from poll money and the crown tax and other taxes also (Ant.
12.142). These scribes of the temple derived at least some status and prestige
from their position. They would have included interpreting commandments
and the Torah, writing compositions for the liturgical services, maintaining
the archive, keeping financial records of gifts, and administering the various
operations.2
b. First Maccabees
Scribes are mentioned twice in First Maccabees. It is said that When
Judas approached the stream of water, he stationed the officers [grammatei j/ ]
of the army at the stream and gave them this command, Permit no one
to encamp, but make them all enter the battle (1 Macc 5:42). This role
suggests that the scribes were army officials of a higher rank.3
The other reference to scribes is in the account of the scribes trust of
Alcimus:
Then a group of scribes [grammate w , n] appeared in a body before

Alcimus and Bacchides to ask for just terms. The Hasideans were
first among the Israelites to seek peace from them, for they said, A
priest of the line of Aaron has come with the army, and he will not
harm us (1 Macc 7:12-16).
The scribes are associated with the pietists and with defense of the Jewish
way of life. It is also open to the interpretation that scribes were identical with
or part of these Hasideans.4 On this basis, we can associate the characteristics
of the Hasideans with scribes, that is, influence and power to act on a political
2
Leo G. Perdue, Wisdom Literature (Louisville, London: Westminster John
Knox Press, 2007), 187.
3
Schams, Jewish Scribes, 115.
4
Victor Tcherikover, Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews (Philadelphia: Jewish
Publ. Soc., 1959), 124-126.
Theses Abstracts 85
level, zeal for the law in the sense that they fought for religious freedom and a
connection with Judass army.
The Sage in Wisdom Literature
a. The Book of Proverbs

The kind of education in Proverbs includes some practical advice, but
its central concern is the shaping of character. It begins with fear of the
Lord (1:7), with an emphasis on righteousness, and with warnings about
associating with unsuitable companions.5 Fear of the Lord is a repeated
concept in Proverbs (1:7, 29; 2:5; 8:13; 9:10; 10:27; 14:26-27; 15:16, 33; 16:6;
19:23; 22:4; 23:17). It is equated with the beginning of both knowledge (1:7)
and wisdom (9:10), and it is a prerequisite for wisdom.
b. The Book of Wisdom (Wisdom of Solomon)

The book of Wisdom represents a powerful example of the Jewish
peoples struggle to resist the almost crushing and economic domination of
Hellenistic and Roman rule in the closing years of the first century BCE and
first century CE.6 The book concludes with the destruction of the Egyptians
at the Red Sea (Wisdom 19). The Exodus represents the model or paradigm
for the way in which God intervenes to save the persecuted and the oppressed.
We find a liberative dimension in the book. The sage played the important
role for his community in such context by defending the Jewish traditional
teachings/cultures and his faith.7 The sage appeals to the past (the events of
Exodus) to assure his readers that the same God who has not neglected to
help them at all times and in all places (19:22), is still with them, to rescue
them from persecution and to lead them into communion of life with her
that is everlasting.
5
The New Interpreters Study Bible: New Revised Standard Version with the
Apocrypha (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2003), 893.
6
Anthony R. Ceresko, Introduction to Old Testament Wisdom: A Spiritual for
Liberation (Quezon City, Philippines: Claretian Publications, 2000), 139; John
J. Collins, Introduction to the Hebrew Bible and Deuteronocanonical Books, 2nd
ed. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2014), 590; also Ben Witherington III, Jesus the
Sage: the Pilgrimage of Wisdom (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 100; and also
Dictionary of the Old Testament, s.v. Wisdom of Solomon.
7
Ceresko, Introduction to Old Testament Wisdom, 141-142.
86 Diwa 42 (2017): 80-88
Ben Sira and His Profile of Jewish Scribe in Sirach 38:34cd-39:11
There are clues throughout Sirach that Ben Sira is a sage and a scribe who
led a life of having time or devote himself for learning: The wisdom of the
scribe depends on the opportunity of leisure [scolh ], ; only the one who has
little business can become wise (Sir 38:24).
a. God-Fearer and Student of the Law (Sir 38:34cd).

The first characteristic of Jewish scribe is the fear of the Lord and study of
the Law of the Most High. Di Lella considered the Syriac for this translation
of verse 34c: How different the one who devotes himself In the Syriac
text, the devotion is interpreted as fear the Lord. The expression of the fear
of the Lord occurs fifty-five to sixty times in the book of Sirach.8 The fear
of the Lord is a paramount concern of Ben Sira. Ben Sira establishes close
internal references between wisdom, the fear of the Lord and Law: The
whole of wisdom is fear of the Lord, and in all wisdom there is the fulfillment
of the Law (19:20).
b. Educated Person (Sir 39:1-3)

The second characteristic of the Jewish scribe is an educated person. The
scribe not only devotes himself to the fear of the Lord and to the study of
the Law of the Most High, but also:
. . . seeks out the wisdom of all the ancients, and is concerned with
prophecies;
he preserves the sayings of the famous and penetrates the
subtleties of parables;
he seeks out the hidden meanings of proverbs and is at home with
the obscurities of parables.
The verses above are the scribes description of education. The scribes
education combines both Jewish and international knowledge (Cf. v. 1: all
the ancient wisdom). The reference to the wisdom of all the ancients, and
perhaps also that to the sayings of the famous, indicates the interest of the
Jewish scribe in the range of wisdom available to him from Israels neighbors,
as well as traditional Jewish wisdom.9
8
Patrick W. Skehan and Alexander A. Di Lella, The Wisdom of Ben Sira (New
York: Doubleday, 1987), 76.
9
Pamela A. Foulkes, To Expound Discipline or Judgement: the Portrait of the
Scribe in Ben Sira, Pacifica 7 (1994): 78.
Theses Abstracts 87
c. Traveler and Prophet (Sir 39:4)

This characteristic is based on he travels in foreign lands and learns
what is good and evil in the human lot (v. 4cd). The scribe, because of his
extensive travels and his devotion to the pursuit of wisdom, is in attendance
on the great, and has entrance to the ruler (39:4ab; cf. 38:33).10 Ben Sira
uses a prophetic form on this verse test the good and the bad among men
(RSV). As person with authority, the scribes gave counsel because they were
intelligent, and who spoke in prophetic oracles (Sir. 44:3cd). We find
another characteristic of the Jewish scribe, that is, his prophetic activity in
testing the good and the bad among men.11 As a prophet, the scribe even
has traveled and learned from other cultures, keeps on showing the
wisdom of what he has learned and will glory in the law of the Lords
covenant (39:8).
d. Person of Prayer (Sir 39:5-8)

The fourth characteristic of the Jewish scribe is that he is a person of
prayer. He sets his heart to rise early to seek the Lord who made him, and
to petition the Most High; He opens his mouth in prayer and asks pardon
for his sins (v. 5). As a result of his prayer, if the great Lord is willing,
the scribe will be filled with a spirit of understanding; he will pour forth
words of wisdom of his own (v. 6). Prayer is an integral part of scribes
training and the exercise of their skills, and their success in carrying out their
responsibilities is due not to their own efforts, but to the grace of God.12
e. Professional Writer (Sir 39:9-11)

The fifth characteristic of the Jewish scribe is a professional writer:
Many will praise his understanding; it will never be blotted out.

His memory will not disappear, and his name will live through
all generations. Nations will speak of his wisdom, and the
congregation will proclaim his praise. If he lives long, he will leave
a name greater than a thousand, and if he goes to rest, it is enough
for him (vv. 9-11).
Ben Sira must be one of the professional writers: I have written in this
book, Jesus son of Eleazar son of Sirach of Jerusalem, whose mind poured
forth wisdom (50:27). Because of what in his wisdom the scribe has done
10
Skehan and Di Lella, The Wisdom of Ben Sira, 452.
11
A. P. Jassen, Mediating the Divine (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2007), 310-311.
12
Foulkes, To Expound Discipline or Judgement, 78.
88 Diwa 42 (2017): 80-88
for the community, many will praise him, and he will enjoy a blessed and
unfading memory and lasting fame.13
Conclusion
We found that the scribes were required for intensified bureaucratic
activities. Scribes seemed to be politically influential leaders. During that
time some of the scribes have a reputation as sages. We learned that the
teachings and instructions of the wisdom begin by Fear the Lord. They
were concerned with passing on the knowledge to younger generation. They
played the prophetic roles in guiding people. With these characteristics, the
wisdom literature is the tangible legacy of the scribes. Based on Ben Siras
language (Sir 38:34cd-39:11), we discerned the profile of a Jewish scribe. We
judged and identified five characteristics of a Jewish scribe. The characteristics
are fear of the Lord and study of the Law, educated person, as traveler and a
prophet, person of prayer and professional writer.
13
Schams, Jewish Scribes, 452.

Diwa: Studies in Philosophy and Theology 42 No. 1 (2017)

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Volume 42, No.

v-vi In Memoriam: Fr. Martin Mandin, SVD (1955-2017)

1-28 The Necessity of the Postulate of God in Kants Moral

Editor Randolf Flores, SVD, SThD, PhD

Managing Editor Antolin Uy, SVD, PhD

Manuscripts for publication, books for review

E-mail: diwasvd@yahoo.com and/or rrandy33@yahoo.com

ISSN 0115 592X

Payment may be made via check issued to:

v-vi In Memoriam: Fr. Martin Mandin, SVD (1955-2017)

1-28 The Necessity of the Postulate of God in Kants Moral

29-46 The Digression on Mercy in the Book of Wisdom

47-66 Mercy as Gospel according to the Book of Tobit

67-79 Admission to the Seminary: Notes and Comments on

80-88 Theses Abstracts

1. FR. JEROME S. MONTESCLAROS, SVD obtained his M.A. in

2. FR. FRANCIS M. MACATANGAY is adjunct professor of Sacred

3. FR. RANDOLF C. FLORES, SVD is Dean of Studies of the Divine

4. FR. ADOLFO N. DACANAY, SJ holds a doctorate in Canon Law

Fr. Martin I. Mandin, SVD

Theology. He also acted as the Prefect of Apostolate. In 2008, he asked for

[Source: Obituary of the Philippine Central Province]

of God. But this is a mistake. Kant believes in a God who is perfect,

The Moral Act

Kant, Lectures on Philosophical Theology, 41.

Michael Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 200.

an imperative that commands categorically or absolutely. And it commands

The practical law issuing from the motive of happiness I call

We usually ask the question: what should I do to be happy? This question

But suppose that someone performs a morally fine action: say, he

As a postulate, freedom figures in reasons moral consideration. Human

Pure Practical Reason

in his first and second Critiques respectively, an indication that he disagrees

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 745.

moral categorical imperative, which cannot be established by experience or

qualification? This law is called: categorical imperative. It will be easier for us

Example 2 is about one who plans to borrow money promising to pay it

his maxim of action would go as follows: when I believe myself

Kant, The Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, 32.

Rawls considers social cooperation as crucial for the stability of any

Categorical Imperative: Universalized Maxims

he identifies it as the nature of human beings as ends and never as means,64

and whose durable or absolute obedience to it constitutes its holiness. At this

Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 10.

When you give a luncheon or a dinner, do not invite your friends

Kants Notion of the Highest Good

Two Elements of the Highest Good:

Happiness Cannot be a Determining Basis of the Will

Problematic Linkage between Happiness and Virtue

. . . in the practical problem of pure reason, i.e., [that of] working

reason to be precise, is considered as the ordaining authority of morality. It

Critique of Pure, 117.

RANDOLF C. FLORES, SVD

The Sage in persona Salomonis

The Structure and Content of the Book of Wisdom9

Part I: Wisdoms Gift of Immortality (1:1-6:21)

Part I is the most carefully constructed section with five reflections

Divine Wisdom in Exodus (10 19)

The So-Called Digression on Mercy (11:17 12:22)

If there is an introduction of the Digression, it would the two-fold

Sg 11,15 12,27, in Wisdom for Life, 272).

The Second Diptych is introduced in 11:15-16 and this will be punctuated

1. On the All-Powerful Lord of Mercy (11:17 12:2).