[G.R. No. 149240.
July 11, 2002] COA asserts that the authority of the SSC to fix the compensation of its
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
THE FUNDS contributed to the Social Security System (SSS) are not only imbued
with public interest, they are part and parcel of the fruits of the workers labors
pooled into one enormous trust fund under the administration of the System
designed to insure against the vicissitudes and hazards of their working lives. In
a very real sense, the trust funds are the workers property which they could turn
to when necessity beckons and are thus more personal to them than the taxes
they pay. It is therefore only fair and proper that charges against the trust fund
be strictly scrutinized for every lawful and judicious opportunity to keep it intact
and viable in the interest of enhancing the welfare of their true and ultimate
beneficiaries.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure praying that this Court assess against the workers social security fund
the amount of P5,000.00 as contract signing bonus of each official and employee
of the SSS. The gratuity emanated from the collective negotiation agreement
(CNA) executed on 10 July 1996 between the Social Security Commission (SSC)
in behalf of the SSS and the Alert and Concerned Employees for Better SSS
(ACCESS), the sole and exclusive negotiating agent for employees of the SSS.
[1]
In particular, Art. XIII of the CNA provided -
As a gesture of good will and benevolence, the Management agrees that once
the Collective Negotiation Agreement is approved and signed by the parties,
Management shall grant each official and employee of the SYSTEM the amount
of P5,000.00 as contract signing bonus.[2]
To fund this undertaking, the SSC allocated P15,000,000.00 in the budgetary
appropriation of the SSS.[3]
On 18 February 1997 the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
declared as illegal the contract signing bonus which the CNA authorized to be
distributed among the personnel of the SSS.[4] On 1 July 1997 the SSS Corporate
Auditor disallowed fund releases for the signing bonus since it was an allowance
in the form of additional compensation prohibited by the Constitution. [5]
Two (2) years later, in a letter dated 29 September 1999, ACCESS appealed the
disallowance to the Commission on Audit (COA).[6] On 5 July 2001 despite the
delay in the filing of the appeal, a procedural matter which COA considered to be
inconsequential,[7] COA affirmed the disallowance and ruled that the grant of the
signing bonus was improper.[8] It held that the provision on the signing bonus in
the CNA had no legal basis since Sec. 16 of RA 7658 (1989)[9] had repealed the
authority of the SSC to fix the compensation of its personnel. [10] Hence the
instant petition which, curiously, was filed in the name of the Social Security
System (and not ACCESS) by authority of the officer-in-charge for the
SSS[11] through its legal staff.[12]
Petitioner SSS argues that a signing bonus may be granted upon the conclusion
of negotiations leading to the execution of a CNA where it is specifically
authorized by law and that in the case at bar such legal authority is found in
Sec. 3, par. (c), of RA 1161 as amended (Charter of the SSS) which allows the
SSC to fix the compensation of its personnel. On the other hand, respondent
personnel has been repealed by Secs. 12 and 16 of RA 6758 and is therefore no
longer effective.
We find no legitimate and compelling reason to reverse the COA. To begin with,
the instant petition is fatally defective. It was filed in the name of the SSS
although no directive from the SSC authorized the instant suit and only the
officer-in-charge in behalf of petitioner executed the purported directive. Clearly,
this is irregular since under Sec. 4, par. 10, in relation to par. 7, [13] RA 1161 as
amended by RA 8282 (The Social Security Act of 1997, which was already
effective[14] when the instant petition was filed), it is the SSC as a collegiate body
which has the power to approve, confirm, pass upon or review the action of the
SSS to sue in court. Moreover, the appearance of the internal legal staff of the
SSS as counsel in the present proceedings is similarly questionable because
under both RA 1161 and RA 8282 it is the Department of Justice (DoJ) that has
the authority to act as counsel of the SSS.[15] It is well settled that the legality of
the representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings[16] and that such illicit representation produces no legal effect.
[17]
Since nothing in the case at bar shows that the approval or ratification of the
SSC has been undertaken in the manner prescribed by law and that the DoJ has
not delegated the authority to act as counsel and appear herein, the instant
petition must necessarily fail. These procedural deficiencies are serious matters
which this Court cannot take lightly and simply ignore since the SSS is in reality
confessing judgment to charge expenditure against the trust fund under its
custodianship.
In Premium Marble Resources v. Court of Appeals[18] we held that no person, not
even its officers, could validly sue in behalf of a corporation in the absence of
any resolution from the governing body authorizing the filing of such suit.
Moreover, where the corporate officers power as an agent of the corporation did
not derive from such resolution, it would nonetheless be necessary to show a
clear source of authority from the charter, the by-laws or the implied acts of the
governing body.[19] Unfortunately there is no palpable evidence in the records to
show that the officer-in-charge could all by himself order the filing of the instant
petition without the intervention of the SSC, nor that the legal staff of SSS could
act as its counsel and appear therein without the intervention of the DoJ. The
power of attorney supposedly authorizing this suit as well as the signature of the
legal counsel appearing on the signing page of the instant petition is therefore
ineffectual.
Indeed we find no merit in the claim that the employees and officers of SSS are
entitled to the signing bonus provided for in the CNA. In the first place, the
process of collective negotiations in the public sector does not encompass terms
and conditions of employment requiring the appropriation of public funds -
Sec. 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof, except
those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations between duly
recognized employees organizations and appropriate government authorities. [20]
More particularly -
Sec. 3. Those that require appropriation of funds, such as the following, are not
negotiable: (a) Increase in salary emoluments and other allowances not
presently provided for by law; (b) Facilities requiring capital outlays; (c) Car plan;
(d) Provident fund; (e) Special hospitalization, medical and dental services; (f)
Rice/sugar/other subsidies; (g) Travel expenses; (h) Increase in retirement
benefits.
Sec. 4. Matters that involve the exercise of management prerogatives, such as
the following, are likewise not subject to negotiation: (a) Appointment; (b)
Promotion; (c) Assignment/Detail; (d) Reclassification/ upgrading of position; (e)
Revision of compensation structure; (f) Penalties imposed as a result of
disciplinary actions; (g) Selection of personnel to attend seminar, trainings,
study grants; (h) Distribution of work load; (I) External communication linkages.
[21]
Petitioner however argues that the charter of SSS authorizes the SSC to fix the
compensation of its employees and officers so that in reality the signing bonus is
merely the fruit of the exercise of such fundamental power. On this issue, we
have to explain the relevant amendments to the SSS charter in relation to the
passage of RA 6758 (1989) entitled An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation
and Position Classification in the Government and for other Purposes.
When the signing bonus was bestowed upon each employee and officer of the
SSS on 10 July 1996, which was earlier approved by the SSC on 3 July 1996, the
governing charter of the SSS was RA 1161 as amended by Sec. 1, RA 2658, and
Sec. 1, PD 735. Under this amended statute, the SSC was empowered to appoint
an actuary, and such other personnel as may be deemed necessary and to fix
their compensation.[22]The law also provided that the personnel of the SSS shall
be selected only from civil service eligibles and be subject to civil service rules
and regulations.[23]
On 9 August 1989 Congress passed RA 6758 which took effect on 1 July 1989.
[24]
Its goal was to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base
differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities,
and qualification requirements of the positions.[25] Towards this end, RA
6758 provided for the consolidation of allowances and compensation in the
prescribed standardized salary rates except certain specified allowances [26] and
such other additional compensation as may be determined by the Department of
Budget and Management.[27] The law also repealed [a]ll laws, decrees, executive
orders, corporate charters, and other issuances or parts thereof, that exempt
agencies from the coverage of the System, or that authorize and fix position
classification, salaries, pay rates or allowances of specified positions, or groups
of officials and employees or of agencies, which are inconsistent with the
System, including the proviso under Section 2 and Section 16 of Presidential
Decree No. 985.[28]
Although it was the clear policy intent of RA 6758 to standardize salary rates
among government personnel, the Legislature under Secs. 12 [29] and 17[30] of the
law nonetheless saw the need for equity and justice in adopting the policy of
non-diminution of pay when it authorized incumbents as of 1 July 1989 to
receive salaries and/or allowances over and above those authorized by RA
6758. In Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on Audit [31] we held that no
financial or non-financial incentive could be awarded to employees of
government owned and controlled corporations aside from benefits which were
being received by incumbent officials and employees as of 1 July 1989. This
Court also observed -
The consequential outcome, under sections 12 and 17, is that if the incumbent
resigns or is promoted to a higher position, his successor is no longer entitled to
his predecessors RATA privilege x x x or to the transition allowance x x x x [A]fter
July 1, 1989, additional financial incentives such as RATA may no longer be given
by GOCCs with the exception of those which were authorized to be continued
under Section 12 of RA 6758.
Evidently, while RA 6758 intended to do away with multiple allowances and
other incentive packages and the resulting differences in compensation among
government personnel, the statute clearly did not revoke existing benefits being
enjoyed by incumbents of government positions at the time of the passage
of RA 6758 by virtue of Secs. 12 and 17 thereof. In previous rulings of this Court,
among the financial and non-financial incentives which we allowed certain
government employees to enjoy after the effectivity of RA 6758 were car plan
benefits[32] and educational funding assistance[33] for incumbents of existing
positions as of 1 July 1989 until such gratuity packages were gradually phased
out.
We have no doubt that RA 6758 modified, if not repealed, Sec. 3, par. (c), of RA
1161 as amended, at least insofar as it concerned the authority of SSC to fix the
compensation of SSS employees and officers. This means that whatever salaries
and other financial and non-financial inducements that the SSC was minded to
fix for them, the compensation must comply with the terms of RA
6758. Consequently, only the remuneration which was being offered as of 1 July
1989, and which was then being enjoyed by incumbent SSS employees and
officers, could be availed of exclusively by the same employees and officers
separate from and independent of the prescribed standardized salary rates.
Unfortunately, however, the signing bonus in question did not qualify under
Secs. 12 and 17 of RA 6758. It was non-existent as of 1 July 1989 as it accrued
only in 1996 when the CNA was entered into by and between SSC and ACCESS.
The signing bonus therefore could not have been included in the salutary
provisions of the statute nor would it be legal to disburse to the intended
recipients.
Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit [34] is
instructive on this point. Like the SSS, the Philippine International Trading
Corporation (PITC) is a government-owned and controlled corporation which was
created under PD 252 (1973) primarily for the purpose of promoting and
developing Philippine trade in pursuance of national economic development. In
the same judgment which affirmed the car financing program and allied
incentives being implemented prior to 1 July 1989 we held that the charter of
PITC was impliedly repealed by RA 6758 -
We deem it necessary though to resolve the third issue as to whether PITC is
exempt from PD 985 as subsequently amended by RA 6758. According to
petitioner, PITCs Revised Charter, PD 1071 dated January 25, 1977, as amended
by EO 756 dated December 29, 1981, and further amended by EO 1067 dated
November 25, 1985, expressly exempted PITC from the Office of the
Compensation and Position Classification (OCPC) rules and regulations. Petitioner
cites Section 28 of P.D. 1071; Section 6 of EO 756; and Section 3 of EO 1067.
According to the COA in its Decision No. 98-048 dated January 27, 1998, the
exemption granted to the PITC has been repealed and revoked by the repealing
provisions of RA 6758, particularly Section 16 thereof which provides:
Sec. 16. Repeal of Special Salary Laws and Regulations. - All laws, decrees,
executive orders, corporate charters, and other issuances or parts thereof, that
exempt agencies from the coverage of the System, or that authorize and fix
position classifications, salaries, pay rates or allowances of specified positions,
or groups of officials, and employees or of agencies, which are inconsistent with
the System, including the proviso under Section 2 and Section 16 of PD No. 985
are hereby repealed.
To this, [PITC] argues that RA 6758 which is a law of general application cannot
repeal provisions of the Revised Charter of PITC and its amendatory laws
expressly exempting PITC from OCPC coverage being special laws x x x x In the
case at bar, the repeal by Section 16 of RA 6758 of all corporate charters that
exempt agencies from the coverage of the System was clear and expressed
necessarily to achieve the purposes for which the law was enacted, that is, the
standardization of salaries of all employees in government owned and / or
controlled corporations to achieve equal pay for substantially equal work.
Henceforth, PITC should now be considered as covered by laws prescribing a
compensation and position classification system in the government including RA
6758. This is without prejudice, however, as discussed above, to the non-
diminution of pay of incumbents as of July 1, 1989 as provided in Sections 12
and 17 of said law.
So we also rule in the instant case involving the charter of the SSS or RA 1161 as
amended.
The enactment of RA 8282 entitled The Social Security Act of 1997 does not
change our holding. While it is true that Sec. 3, par. (c), of RA 8282 expressly
exempted the SSS from the provisions of RA 6758 and RA 7430 (The Attrition
Law of 1992) thus -
The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint
an actuary and such other personnel as may be deemed necessary; fix their
reasonable compensation, allowances and other benefits x x x x [t]hat the
personnel of the SSS shall be selected only from civil service eligibles and be
subject to civil service rules and regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall
be exempt from the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758 and Republic Act No.
7430,
it bears emphasis that RA 8282 took effect only on 23 May 1997, i.e., fifteen (15)
days after its complete publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation
on 7 May 1997[35] and 8 May 1997.[36] It holds to reason that the prospective
application of the statute renders irrelevant to the case at bar whatever effects
this exemption may have on the power of the SSC to fix the compensation of
SSS personnel. Ironically, RA 8282 in fact buttresses our ruling that the signing
bonus cannot escape the provisions of RA 6758. The need to expressly stipulate
the exemption of the SSS can only mean that prior to the effectivity of RA
8282, the SSS was subject to RA 6758 and even RA 7430 for, otherwise, there
would have been no reason to rope in such provision in RA 8282.
This Court has been very consistent in characterizing the funds being
administered by SSS as a trust fund for the welfare and benefit of workers and
employees in the private sector.[37] In United Christian Missionary v. Social
Security Commission[38] we were unequivocal in declaring the funds contributed
to the Social Security System by compulsion of law as funds belonging to the
members which were merely held in trust by the government, and resolutely
imposed the duty upon the trustee to desist from any and all acts which would
diminish the property rights of owners and beneficiaries of the trust fund.
Consistent with this declaration, it would indeed be very reasonable to construe
the authority of the SSC to provide for the compensation of SSS personnel in
accordance with the established rules governing the remuneration of trustees -
x x x x the modern rule is to give the trustee a reasonable remuneration for his
skill and industry x x x x In deciding what is a reasonable compensation for a
trustee the court will consider the amount of income and capital received and
disbursed, the pay customarily given to agents or servants for similar work, the
success or failure of the work of the trustee, any unusual skill which the trustee
had and used, the amount of risk and responsibility, the time consumed, the
character of the work done (whether routine or of unusual difficulty) and any
other factors which prove the worth of the trustees services to the cestuis x x x
x The court has power to make extraordinary compensation allowances, but will
not do so unless the trustee can prove that he has performed work beyond the
ordinary duties of his office and has engaged in especially arduous work. [39]
On the basis of the foregoing pronouncement, we do not find the signing bonus
to be a truly reasonable compensation. The gratuity was of course the SSCs
gesture of good will and benevolence for the conclusion of collective
negotiations between SSC and ACCESS, as the CNA would itself state, but for
what objective? Agitation and propaganda which are so commonly practiced in
private sector labor-management relations have no place in the bureaucracy and
that only a peaceful collective negotiation which is concluded within a
reasonable time must be the standard for interaction in the public sector. This
desired conduct among civil servants should not come, we must stress, with a
price tag which is what the signing bonus appears to be.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, is DISMISSED. The Decision No. 2001-123 of the Commission on
Audit and the Notice of Disallowance No. 97-002-0101 (96) of the Social Security
System Corporate Auditor prohibiting the payment of P5,000.00 signing bonus to
each employee and officer of the Social Security System as stipulated in Art. XIII
of the Collective Negotiation Agreement and as approved in Resolution No. 593
of the Social Security Commission are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 163108. February 23, 2005]
GLENN CABALLES y CHUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
EMMANUEL D. LAUREA, HON. BENJAMIN T. ANTONIO, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
filed by the petitioner for the nullification of the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals[1] which dismissed his petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus for his release from detention despite the pendency of People of the
Philippines v. Glenn Caballes[2] for rape, and its resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration thereof.
The antecedents are as follows:
On November 19, 2001, petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape
of a minor in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 25756-MN and raffled to Branch 169, presided by
Judge Emmanuel D. Laurea. Because the petitioner was charged with a non-
bailable offense, he was detained.
The petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002 and pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Venice
Vera Pio, the private complainant, and her mother. The petitioner, through
counsel, commenced his cross-examination of Pio, but failed to complete the
same. In January 2003, the petitioner engaged the services of a new counsel,
Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, who entered his appearance as defense counsel. [3]
During the trial of February 26, 2003, the petitioner continued his cross-
examination of Pio but still failed to terminate the same. The trial was set on
March 6, 2003 for the petitioner to terminate his cross-examination of Pio.
However, due to the illness of the private prosecutor, the trial on the said date
did not proceed. The trial was further reset to March 17, 2003 during which the
petitioner continued with his cross-examination of the private complainant.
Thereafter, the continuation of trial was set on April 3, 21, and 30, 2003. On April
3, 2003, the petitioner concluded his cross-examination of Pio. The prosecution
declared that its next witness would be Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, the Medico-Legal
Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, who had
conducted a medico-legal examination of the private complainant, but stated
that he had not been subpoenad. The prosecution prayed for the cancellation of
the trial scheduled on April 21, 2003 to give the prosecution time to secure and
cause the service of a subpoena duces tecum on him. The petitioner conformed
to the motion of the prosecution.
On April 28, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for bail. [4]
The trial of April 30, 2003 did not proceed because the petitioners counsel filed a
Manifestation[5] that his presence was required in an execution sale in Cavite.
The said counsel manifested that he reserved his right to cross-examine any
witness the prosecution would present in case trial would proceed on that date;
on the other hand, in the event that the trial court would cancel the trial, he
would be available in May 2003 and during the first half of June 2003.
The trial court reset the hearing of the case to 8:30 a.m. of June 19, 2003 and
gave the prosecution ten (10) days to file its opposition [6] to the petitioners
petition for bail. It likewise ordered the issuance of a subpoenato Dr. Jose Arnel
Marquez to require him to attend the trial on the said date.
On May 5, 2003, the petitioner filed a motion[7] seeking an earlier trial date,
invoking his right to speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1998. He also filed
a motion for the urgent resolution of his petition for bail. [8]
On May 12, 2003, the petitioner filed another motion[9] praying that the hearing
scheduled on June 19, 2003 be moved to an earlier date, preferably on May 26,
28 or 29, 2003. In the meantime, the prosecution filed its
comment/opposition[10] to the petitioners petition for bail.
On May 13, 2003, the court issued an Order[11] declaring that the petition for bail
was submitted for its resolution and denying the petitioners motion for an earlier
trial date. On June 16, 2003, the trial court issued its Order [12] denying the
petition for bail, on its finding that the evidence of guilt against the petitioner
was strong.
During the trial of June 19, 2003, Dr. Marquez failed to appear before the court
because, in the meantime, he had been assigned to the Eastern Police District
and failed to receive the subpoena issued to him by the court. The prosecution
prayed for continuance, but the petitioner objected and invoked his right to
speedy trial. The court, nevertheless, granted the motion and reset the trial to
July 17, 2003.
On June 27, 2003, the court issued a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to
Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez requiring him to appear for the trial set on July 17, 2003.
[13]
On July 4, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the courts
Order dated June 16, 2003 denying his petition for bail. His motion was set for
hearing, also on July 17, 2003. However, the petitioner preempted the resolution
of his motion for reconsideration and filed a Motion to Dismiss [14] the case on July
11, 2003 on the ground that his right to speedy trial had been violated. He made
the following allegations:
1. The hearings in the instant case have more often than not been scheduled
more than one month apart;
2. In the hearing on April 30, 2003, in particular, the day before undersigned
counsel had filed a Manifestation stating inter alia that his available dates for the
next hearing may be any Monday, Wednesday or Thursday for the whole of May
2003 and the first half of June 2003, except on May 14 and 21 yet Atty.
Manalaysay asked for the next hearing on June 19 which is already outside or
beyond the dates mentioned in the manifestation, and which was more than 1-
1/2 months away, but which the Honorable Court nonetheless granted;
3. Atty. Manalaysay has never been able to present any good cause as to how
come he was not able to present Dr. Marquez on April 30, 2003, and then again
on June 19, 2003; and as aforesaid, his absence on March 6, 2003 has not been
supported by any medical certificate;
4. The first hearing in the instant case was held on June 13, 2002, thus it has
now been more than one year, or close to 400 days ago since trial started;
neither has there been any authorization from the Supreme Court that the trial
period may exceed 180 days;
5. There has been no statement by the Honorable Court in any of its orders
granting continuance that the ends of justice served by taking such action
outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial;
6. As above stated, it appears that the prosecution made a false statement
before the Honorable Court in claiming they had asked Dr. Marquez to testify in
the June 19, 2003 hearing, when in fact they had not. [15]
Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez had apparently still not received the subpoena issued by
the trial court, because of which the prosecution again failed to present him as a
witness during the trial of July 17, 2003. The prosecution prayed for continuance,
to which the petitioner vigorously objected. The court, however, granted the
motion and reset the trial to August 11, 2003.[16]
On July 24, 2003, Judge Laurea issued an Order[17] inhibiting himself from hearing
the case to avoid being misunderstood, to preserve his reputation for probity
and objectivity and to live up to the ideal impartial administration of justice. The
case was re-raffled to Branch 170, presided by Judge Benjamin T. Antonio, who
calendared the case for trial on September 8, 2003. Nevertheless, on August 11,
2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration [18] of Judge Laureas Order
dated July 24, 2003, which the latter denied, on the finding that no cogent
reason was presented to reconsider the same.[19]
During the hearing on September 8, 2003, Judge Antonio granted the private
prosecutors motion to be given five (5) days within which to oppose the
petitioners motion to dismiss. Judge Antonio also set the trial on September 18,
2003.[20] On the latter date, the trial court issued an Omnibus Order [21] denying
the petitioners motion to dismiss. The trial court reasoned that there was no
violation of the petitioners right to speedy trial, considering that the apparent
delays could not be attributed to the fault of the prosecution alone. The trial
court noted that the petitioner also sought Postponements of the trials.
Anent the motion for reconsideration of the courts Order dated June 16, 2003
which denied the petition for bail, the trial court considered the same as having
been abandoned by the petitioner upon the filing of his motion to dismiss the
case without waiting for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration on his
petition for bail.
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Habeas
Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition.[22] On October 2, 2003, the CA issued a
Resolution requiring the petitioner to inform the court of his choice of remedy
within five (5) days from notice thereof. In compliance therewith, the petitioner
filed a manifestation with the appellate court that he had chosen his petition to
be treated as a petition for habeas corpus without prejudice to the concomitant
application of certiorari if the court considered the same necessary or
appropriate to give effect to the writ of habeas corpus.
The petitioner averred that (a) he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and
his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case; (b) Judge Laurea
erred in inhibiting himself from the case; (c) the trial court committed grave
abuse of its discretion in denying his petition for bail; and (d) Judge Antonio had
prejudged the case against him.
On December 9, 2003, the CA issued its assailed Resolution dismissing the
petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, for being the wrong or improper remedy, the PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[23]
According to the appellate court, while the petitioner manifested his preference
that his petition be treated as a petition for habeas corpus, the same was not
the proper remedy to review and examine the proceedings before the trial court
and as a relief from the petitioners perceived oppressive situation in the trial
court. The CA further emphasized that a writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of
error; that it could not exercise its certiorari jurisdiction over the acts or omission
of the respondent judge as a concomitant remedy; and that the remedy
for habeas corpus and certiorari are different in nature, scope and purpose. The
appellate court declared that the petitioner failed to present any evidence to
prove that there was any intentional or deliberate delay caused to prejudice him;
nor was there any malice in the failure of the prosecution to promptly serve
the subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to its witnesses. The court also
noted that the resetting of petitioners case may also be attributed to the
voluminous work of the RTC involved.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision contending
that (a) the congestion of the trial courts calendar is not a valid ground for
continuance of the trial; (b) the trial court failed to secure an extension of time
of the trial period from the Supreme Court; (c) the trial court should have given a
precedence to the case, the charge therein being a heinous crime; (d) his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus was proper because his continued detention
had become illegal, following the prosecutor and the trial courts violation of his
right to a speedy trial, and the trial courts denial of his motion to dismiss the
case and his petition for bail which was tainted with grave abuse of discretion;
and (e) a writ of habeas corpus may be issued with the writ of certiorari for the
purpose of review. However, the CA denied the petitioners motion for lack of
merit.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in this Court under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court reiterating the grounds contained in his motion for
reconsideration of the CA decision. The petitioner averred that the appellate
court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in rendering its resolution, as well as the resolution denying his
motion for reconsideration thereof.
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial
courts order denying his petition for bail, motion to dismiss the case, and Judge
Laureas order of inhibition. The OSG posits that the petitioner was not deprived
of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case as well as under the
Speedy Trial Act.
The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not the decision of the
CA is already final and executory; (b) whether the proper remedy from the
appellate courts denial of a petitioner for a writ if habeas corpus is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and (c) if in the affirmative,
whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writ.
On the first issue, we find and so rule that the petitioners recourse to this
Court via a petition for certiorari from the decision of the CA dismissing his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is inappropriate. Section 39 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the period for appeal from the judgment of any
court in habeas corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the
judgment appealed from. While the said provision was not incorporated in the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court approved Administrative Matter No. 01-
1-03-SC amending Section 3, Rule 41of the said Rules, which took effect on July
15, 2001, thus:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal; appeal in habeas corpus cases.The appeal
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be
taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
Following the rule, the petitioner should have appealed to this Court from the CA
decision denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as the denial of
his motion for reconsideration thereof; instead, the petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The well-settled rule
is that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved partys remedy of appeal is
plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that
certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The
existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment
of the special civil action for certiorari. These two remedies are mutually
exclusive.[24] An appeal in this case would still have been a speedy and adequate
remedy. Consequently, when the petitioner filed his petition in this Court, the
decision of the CA was already final and executory.
It bears stressing that a decision in a habeas corpus action stands in no different
position than with any other proceeding and if the appealed decision is to be
reviewed by an appellate court, the remedy is by writ of error because the error
committed by the court is an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction. [25]
Besides, as correctly held by the CA, a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper
remedy to assail the trial courts denial of the petitioners motion to dismiss the
case, the denial of the petition for bail, as well as the voluntary inhibition of
Judge Laurea.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding
governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings,
[26]
it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It
seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into
the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty,
notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from
illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal
prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas
corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court. [27]
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute
for the trial courts function.[28] It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or
writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of
error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in
a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the
proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. [29] The writ
is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular
course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas
corpus should not be granted in advance of trial.[30] The orderly course of trial
must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ
where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held
that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of
reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions of
jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that
constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not
destroyed.[31] It has also been held that where restraint is under legal process,
mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not
grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not
illegal.[32]
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in
rem when instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of restraint
presented before the judge in order that the cause of his detention may be
inquired into and his statements final.[33] The writ of habeas corpus does not act
upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what
is alleged to be the unlawful authority.[34] Hence, the only parties before the
court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in
custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has
authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty.[35] The writ may be denied if the
petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.[36]
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a palladium of liberty is a
prerogative writ which does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound
discretion of the court or judge. It, is, however, a writ of right on proper
formalities being made by proof.[37] Resort to the writ is to inquire into the
criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty,
notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from
illegal restraint.[38] The primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas
corpus ad subjuciendum is to determine the legality of the restraint under which
a person is held.[39]
Our review of the petitioners material averments in his petition before the CA
reveals that it was a petition for habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a petition
for a writ of certiorari The petitioner assailed therein the orders of the trial court
denying his petition for bail and his motion to dismiss on the ground that he was
deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case against him, and
questioned Judge Laureas order of inhibition. We agree with the CA that a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be joined with the special civil action
for certiorari because the two remedies are governed by a different set of rules.
Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court mandates that the joinder of causes of
action shall not include special actions or actions governed by special rules, thus
proscribing the joinder of a special proceeding with a special civil action.
We also agree with the ruling of the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is a remedy different from the special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral
attack on the processes, orders, or judgment of the trial court, while certiorari is
a direct attack of said processes, orders, or judgment on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches only jurisdictional errors. It has no other
use, except to bring before the court a record material to be considered in
exercising jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches the record. On the other hand,
a writ of habeas corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also reaches
jurisdictional matters but does not reach the record. However, when jurisdiction
is obtained by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, to bring the body of the
person whose liberty is involved into court, and if it is necessary, to provide the
record upon which the detention is based, that may be accomplished by using a
writ of certiorari as an ancillary proceeding, i.e., it is subordinate to or in aid of
the primary action for the purpose of impeaching the record. When a writ of
certiorari is issued as the foundation of jurisdiction to bring it and direct upon
the validity of a judicial determination by any body or officer, jurisdictional
questions only are reached, and such questions pertaining to the detention
made by the officer or body particularly complained of.[40]
The petitioner manifested to the appellate court that his petition should be
treated as a petition for habeas corpus. Even then, the CA rightly dismissed the
petition because the petitioner failed to establish his right to the writ. The
records show that the petitioner was charged with rape punishable by reclusion
perpetua and was detained based on the said charge; hence, if the evidence of
his guilt is strong, he shall not be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.[41] There is no question that the trial court had jurisdiction
over the offense charged and over the person of the petitioner. The jail warden
has the authority and, in fact, is mandated to detain the petitioner until granted
bail by the court, or the case against him dismissed, or until he is acquitted after
trial. The petitioner failed to establish that his incarceration pendente lite was
illegal, and likewise failed to establish exceptional circumstances warranting the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the appellate court.
In Galvez v. Court of Appeals,[42] the Court ruled that a petition for habeas
corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the denial thereof:
The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The
correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to
be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of
the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court
should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then,
not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there.[43]
The remedy of the petitioner from the Order of the trial court denying his
petition for bail was to file a petition for certiorari in the CA if the trial court
committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the said order. [44] If the petitioner had done so, his petition
would have been granted because as gleaned from the assailed order of the trial
court, it failed to summarize the testimonies of the private complainant and that
of her mother. Hence, such order is invalid.[45] The trial court would have had to
issue another order containing the summary of the testimonies of the private
complainant and her mother, including its findings and conclusions. However,
the petitioner would still not be entitled to be released from detention in the
meantime.
It bears stressing that under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 [46] of
the Rules of Court, the voluntary inhibition of a Judge is addressed to his sound
discretion for just or valid reasons, the primary consideration being that the
peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. [47] The petitioner should
have thus filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition in the CA, instead of a
petition for habeas corpus.
In cases where the right of the accused to a speedy trial is violated by the
prosecution, the remedy lies in the procedure provided for under Republic Act
No. 8493, as implemented by Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 8 of the said Rule provides:
SEC. 8. Sanctions. In any case in which private counsel for the accused, the
public attorney, or the prosecutor:
(a) Knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing that a
necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;
(b) Files a motion solely for delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without
merit;
(c) Makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he knows
to be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or
(d) Willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the
provisions hereof, the court may punish such counsel, attorney, or prosecutor, as
follows:
(1) By imposing on a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense
of an accused, a fine not exceeding twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00);
(2) By imposing on any appointed counsel de oficio, public attorney, or
prosecutor a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); and
(3) By denying any defense counsel or prosecutor the right to practice before
the court trying the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days. The
punishment provided for by this section shall be without prejudice to any
appropriate criminal action or other sanction authorized under these Rules.
If the trial court acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of
lack of jurisdiction in granting the prosecutions motion for the resetting of the
trial over the petitioners objections, the more appropriate remedy would have
been to file a petition for certiorari and/or a petition for mandamus to compel
the trial court to comply with the timeline provided for by the said Rule for trial
and termination of the case.
It was inappropriate for the petitioner to file a petition for habeas
corpus assailing the trial courts order denying his motion to dismiss the case for
failure to comply with the timeline provided for by the said Rules. Reading and
evaluating the assailed Order of the trial court dated September 18, 2000, it
cannot be gainsaid that the court violated the right of the petitioner to speedy
trial. Thus:
The instant motion is anchored on the alleged violation of and/or to enforce the
right of the accused to speedy trial. In invoking such right, the accused contends
that the failure of the prosecution to present the medico-legal officer who
examined the victim on two (2) occasions, and the non-appearance of the
private prosecutor on one occasion caused undue delay in the proceedings of
this case.
The prosecution vigorously opposed the Motion to Dismiss and claimed that
since the prosecution has not yet rested its case, the Court may not be able to
appreciate the merits of the instant motion in the light of the unfinished
presentation of evidence for the prosecution and that the grounds relied by the
defense do not touch on the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but rather on the alleged
delay and failure to present Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
After due consideration, the Court finds the instant motion untenable. The
alleged delay and failure to present the medico-legal officer cannot be attributed
to the fault of the prosecution and/or the Court. The prosecution and the Court
cannot encroach on the right of the medico-legal officer to appear inasmuch as
his schedule conflicted with the hearings set for his appearance. Moreover,
delays assailed by defense counsel that violated accused right to speedy trial
are not all at the instance of the prosecution. In fact, the defense, contributed to
the delay since the former defense counsel and even the present defense
counsel sought postponements of the hearings.
Be that as it may, despite the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer, the
Court (Branch 169) proceeded in resolving the Petition for Bail of the accused
(albeit unfavorable to the cause of the accused) on the basis of the sole
testimony of the complainant, which is backed up by several jurisprudence to
this effect. The defense, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said denial after he
has filed a Motion to Dismiss. The filing of these pleadings adds to the delay
until the Presiding Judge who denied the Petition for Bail voluntarily inhibited
himself from this case. Then when the Motion to Dismiss was set for hearing, the
Court, in an attempt to expedite the proceedings, suggested for the parties to
stipulate on the medical findings of the medico-legal officer so as to dispense
with his presentation. Defense counsel, however, would not want to enter into
such a stipulation. Hence, another delay.[48]
We agree with the petitioner that a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus may be filed if one is deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case under Article IV, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution and of his right to due
process.[49] However, the petitioner never invoked in the trial court his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case against him. What he
invoked was his right to a speedy trial under Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. He invoked his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of
the case against him, for the first time, only in the Court of Appeals when he
filed his petition for habeas corpus.
Even then, the petitioner failed to establish his claim that he was deprived of his
right to a speedy disposition of the case. In Marilyn Corpuz, et al., v.
Sandiganbayan,[50] the Court had the occasion to state
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case
against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding
criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent
delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with
reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and
a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not
an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise
qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly,
expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long
in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent
with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused,
but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in
mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of
Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.
The Court emphasized in the same case that:
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused
necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a)
length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his
right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in the
light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to
protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize
anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the Possibility that his
defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the
inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the
entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to
recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not
imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and
by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial
resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to
public obloquy.
Delay is a two-edged sword. It is the government that bears the burden of
proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it
difficult or impossible for the government to carry its burden. The Constitution
and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or
exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall
deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As
held in Williams v. United States, for the government to sustain its right to try
the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the accused
suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and
inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably
attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for
such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or
justifications invoked by the State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay
the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily
against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to
gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him.
On the other hand, the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness
should be weighted less heavily against the State.
In this case, the petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002. In the meantime,
he was able to present only two witnesses. The petitioner failed to terminate the
cross-examination of the private complainant by the year 2002. The Court
cannot determine the reason for the delay because the records of the RTC are
not before it. Neither of the parties made any explanation for the delay; nor is
there any showing that the counsel of the petitioner complained about the delay.
Aside from the petitioners claim that the private prosecutor failed to give good
cause for his failure to present Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez during the trial dates April
30, 2003 and June 19, 2003, as well as to substantiate his absence during the
trial of March 6, 2003 with a medical certificate, the petitioner failed to support
his claim in his pleadings before the CA and in this Court. On the other hand, the
counsel of the petitioner was absent during the trial on April 30, 2003 because
he had to attend an execution sale in Cavite. The petitioners counsel gave
priority to the execution sale and asked for a resetting despite the fact that his
client, the petitioner, was detained for a quasi-heinous crime. While it is true
that the trial was reset to June 19, 2003, or more than one month from April 30,
2003, the petitioners counsel himself manifested that he was available for trial
during the first half of June 2003. There was a difference of only four (4) days
from the trial date set by the court and the available dates suggested by the
petitioners counsel. It bears stressing that trial dates cannot be set solely at the
convenience of the petitioners counsel. The trial dates available in the calendar
of the court and of the prosecutor must also be taken into account.
Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case simply because the private prosecutor failed to submit a
medical certificate for his absence during the trial of March 6, 2003. The
petitioner could have asked the court to cite the private prosecutor in contempt
of court for his failure to submit the said certificate; he failed to do so. Moreover,
the petitioner failed to establish any serious prejudice by the delay of the trial,
and that the State deliberately delayed the trial to prejudice him.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.