Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute

ANDITVA OR BEGINNINGLESSNESS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Author(s): Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti
Source: Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. 61, No. 1/4 (1980), pp. 1-20
Published by: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
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 Annals of the

Bhandarkar Oriental

Research Institute

VOL. LXI 1980 PARTS I-IV

ANDITVA OR BEGNNINGLESSNESS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

BY
FERNANDO TOLA & CARMEN DRAGONETTI

One of themost importanttheoriesof Indian philosophy,in theHindu

as well as in the Buddhistarea, is withoutany doubt the theorythat many
entities,processes,facts,phenomenahave not had a temporalbeginning.
It seems to us that, although the anditva theory is referredto
frequently by the authorswho write about the differentsubjects of Indian
philosophy,it has not been properlystressed on the great importancethat
the anditvatheoryhas in the philosophicaland religious thought of India,
not onlybecause of its constantpresencein thevarioussystems,in whichthat
thoughtmanifestsitself,but also because of the primordialfunctionwhich
thattheoryhas in thesolutionof manytheoreticaldifficulties of thosesystems.
Besides that, all the cases, to which this theoryis applied, have not been
relatedamong themselves.
We indicatein thisarticle some cases to whichthe anditva theoryis
applied and some texts which referto it. Of course, many othercases and
manyothertextscould be added; they would only corroboratethe impor-
tance thatthistheorypossesses.
As it will be seen by the followingexposition,not only the Supreme
Principle1is conceivedbymanyphilosophicalschoolsof India as a beginning-

} SometimestheSupreme is conceived
Principle as an impersonal, indefinable
neutral,
sometimes
Absolute, as a personal
Being.

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2 Annals BORI , LA7 ( 1980)

less entity,but also theempiricalreality( samsra) in its totalityand in many

of its manifestations. It happens so that the Supreme Principle and the
empirical reality are opposed as two entitieswithouttemporalbeginning,
whichare different fundamentallyby the factthat the SupremePrinciplecan-
not be abolished, whilstthe empiricalrealitycan be abolished.

I
Brahmanand tman i
The Upanisads2 give a definitiveformin Indian thoughtto the thesis
that we can call substantialistas they postulate the existenceof two entities,
Brahmanand tman, who existin se et per se, withoutany elementin them
or conditionality,eternal,inalterable,whose essence is being,
of relativity
consciousness and happiness. Buddhism will oppose to this substantialist
position, a radically relativistand conditionalistposition: there are only
dharmas?factorsor elementsof all what exists,insubstantial,conditioned,
impermanent and painful,but thereis not eithera soul or a SupremeGod.

Among the epithetsattributedby the Upanisadsto Brahmanand tman

sometimeswe find the adjective andi. Cf. Kthaka III, 15; MaitrV. 1;
SvetsvataraIV, 4; Amrtabindu9. See also Bhagavad-GitX, 3; XI, 19,
XIII, 12 and 31, which speaks of the beginninglessness
of the supremeand
imperishabletman.

More frequentis the use of theepithetaja , whichwe can consideras

equivalentto andi, thoughwithsome anthropomorphicshade. Cf. BThad-
ranyakaIV, 4, 20, 22 and 24; Kthaka II, 18; Maitr II, 4, VI, 17, VII, 1;
Mundaka II, 1, 2; vetvataraI, 9, II, 15. See also Bhagavad-GitII, 21,
IV, 6, VII, 25, X, 3 and 13 etc.

We do not take into considerationthe adjectivenityaattributedmany

timesby the Upanisadsto Brahmanand tman, because it is probable thatin
thesetextsit is employed with the meaning of " constant", *permanent
thatis to say,it refersonlyto a permanencyor eternityin the future,without

2 GodsinRg. Vedahavebeenbornat a determined moment,thatmeansthatthey

havehada beginning intime. See A. A. Macdonell,TheVedic Mythology , Vara-
nasi1963( Indological BookHouse), pp.11-14.Nevertheless insomehymns ( I, 67,
ofa beingwhois depri-
5-6;I, 164,6; VIII, 41,10; X, 82,6 ) wefindtheconception
vedof birth( aja ), thatis to say without temporalbeginning, endowedwithan
exaltedhierarchicalpositionandcreator's functions.
3 See F. Tola andC. Dragonetti, " La doctrina de los dharmasen el Budismo 99in
Boletnde la AsociacinEspaolade Orientalistas , AoXIII, 1977,pp.105-132^

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 TOLA & DRAGONETTIs Anditvain IndianPhilosophy 3

takinginto account the past. Such is themeaningthatnityahas in Rgvedic

Sanskrit4and in Pali.5
The philosophical schools, which come forth in our era, several
centuriesafterthe constitutionof the Upanisadsin the formin whichwe have
themnow, and whichaccept the existenceof Brahmanand tman, maintain
forboth thecharacteristic of beginninglessness.Theyutilizeforboth,although
not frequently, the adjectivesandi and aja. Cf. Atmasvarpa,Prabodhapari-
odhin,p. 31 ( andi ); Bhartrhari,Vkyapadya I, 1 ( andi ); Gaudapda,
gama.istraI, 16, III, 19, 33, 47, IV, 95, 100 and Praknanda Sarasvat
Svmi, Mitksar and akara, Bhsya ad locum( aja ); akara, Viveka-
cdamani464 ( andi ), 512 ( dyantahina); akara, Upadeasahasrl II, IO,
1-3 (aja), 7 ( andi ); Surevara, Brhadranyakopanisadbhsyavrtika ,
Sambandhavrtika1 ( aja ).
More frequency has, in the commentariesand treatisesof theseschools,
the adjective nitya in relationto Brahmanand tman. In theseschoolsthe
word nityahas without any doubt the value of ' eternal', with referenceso
much to the past as to the future.8 And it is withthismeaningthatit is
applied to Brahmanand tman. Cf. Bdaryana, VedntastraII, 3, 17 (16)
and 18 (17) and Annambhatta,Brahmastravrtti, Mitksar, Braja Nth
Bhatta,Brahmastravrtti, Marcik, Nimbrka, Vedntaprijtasaurabha and
rinivsa, Vedntakaustubha,Rmnuja, Srbhsya, Vedntasra and
Vedntadipa( only at the second stra ), Rmnanda Sarasvati, Vednta-
dar&ana, akara, Bhsya, akarananda, Brhmasutrad pik, Vcaspati
Mira, Bhmat ad locum; Gautama, NyyastraIII ( 1 ), 19-27 ( andinidha-
naprakarana); Nryana, Mnameyodaya,p. 197, paragraph95; Sadnanda,
Vedntasra, p. 29; Sarvajatma,SamksepaSrrakaI, 173, akara, tma-
bodha 34, Bhsya of the Vedntastraadi, 1, 4, p. 42, ad II, 1, 14, p. 403;
rinivsadsa, Yatindramatadipik,p. 70, cf. p. 83, lines 9-11 ( infinitude
of
livara regardingtime, space etc. ).
Among these authors, Rmnuja, Vedntadipa,expresses that the
thesis which attributesa birthto tman is exposed, among others, to the
followingabsurd consequences: obtainmentby the tman of what has not
been done ( akrtbhygama) by him and partiality( vaisamya) and cruelty

4 See H. Grassman, Wrterbuch zum Rig Veda, Wiesbaden1955( OttoHarrasso-

witz), sub voce.
6 See ThePali TextSociety'sPali-EnglishDictionary , sub voce.
6 Thisis evidentfrom manyofthetextswe.quotein thisand the followingsections.
See in specialformAnnambhatta, Brahmastravrtti, Mitksarad II, 3, 17
( nityatvn notpattisambhava ityarthah) ; DharmarjaAdhvarndra, Vednta-
paribhs, p. 85 ( vedona nityah,utpattimattvt) ( ed. 1971,TheAdyarLibrary
andResearch Centre) ; Harivrsabha,
VrttitoI, 23 of Bhartrhari's Vkyapadya ,
p. 58.

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4 Annals BORI, LXI ( 1980 )

( nairghrnya)of the Creator. The idea expressedby Rmnuja is the following-

one : if tman be created in some moment by God, the happinessesand
sufferings, which he would happento experiencein the humanconditionin
whichhe may be born, would not have antecedentsor causes, which could
explainand justifythem; theywould be gratuitoushappinessesand sufferings
and, as all the tmansthuscreatedwould not receivethe same and identical
amountof happinesses and sufferings, but each one would have a different
fate,good or bad, this factwould mean an unequal treatmentby God, would
mean an injusticecommittedby Him; and the sufferings experiencedby the
tmansthuscreated would be a capricious manifestationof crueltyby God,
because those sufferings are not the consequenceof actions done before by
the tmans and deservingsuch a punishment. This same thoughtis deve-
loped not onlyby Rmnuja but also by otherauthors when they comment
strasIT, 1, 34-36 of Bdaryana. See the section referringto samsra in
thissame article.
Purusa and prakrti:
The Smkhyasystemis clearlydualistic. It maintainstheexistenceof
two autonomous and opposed principles,purusa ( or purusas) and prakrti .
Both have absolutely different natures: prakrti is the firstcause, purusais
neithercause nor effect;prakrti is active,purusa is inactive;prakrtiis un-
conscious,purusa is conscious; prakrti is in constant mutation,purusa is
immutable;prakrtiis the object of knowledge,purusais thejsubect of know-
ledge. Purusa incarnatedin an individual, comes into contact with the
materialworldthroughthe mind, which is also a product of prakrti. This
one produces the material empirical realitythroughan evolutiveprocess.
Purusa and prakrti, as well as Brahmanand tmanare beginningless entities.
Cf. Bhagavad-Gt XUI, 19 and Madhusdana Sarasvat, Vykhy , and
Rmnuja, Bhsya, ad locum; Ivarakrsna,Smkhyakrik3 and Gaudapda,
Bhsya, Vcaspati Mira, Tattvakaumudl , and Yuktidpik,ad locum; Kapila,
Smkhyasutra I, 67 and Aniruddha,Vrtti,and Vijnabhiksu,Bhsya, ad
locum. Besides thesetextsthe factthatassociationof purusawithprakrti,to
whichwe shall referlateron, is also withouta beginning,compelsus to the
conclusionthatbothare also beginningless.
II
Samsra :
The belief in the reincarnations{samsra)1 has existed in many
primitivesocietiesor in the firstperiods of their culturalevolution. In the
" Samsara, anaditvaandnirvana" which
* See F. Tola andC. Dragonetti, is going
to be published in Boletnde la Asociacin Espaola de OrientalistasAo
XIV, 1979.

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 TOLA & DRAGONETTI : nadtvain IndianPhilosophy 5

Rg Veda, themostancienttextof India, thisbeliefin reincarnations

does not
appear. So we can thinkthat the or
Indo-Europeans Aryans who invaded India
about 1500 B.C. did not bring with themselvesthis belief and thatthey
borrowed it from the aboriginal peoples of India. Anyhow,we findthis
belief firmlyestablished in the Brhmanas and in the Upanisadsand incor-
poratedintothe moral area. The reincarnations have becometheinstrument
formoral retribution of the humanactions: theman who behaveswell,willbe
rebornin good conditions,the man who behavesmischievously,in bad ones.
Since thenthe beliefin reincarnations
belongsnot only to the religious
doctrines, but also to all the philosophical,Buddhist or Hinduist, systems
whichbeginto appear India in theVlth centuryB.C. - depuratedof course
in
from its more coarse elementsand provided with argumentswhichtryto
provethe existenceof transmigration.Besides that it is postulatedthatthe
series of reincarnations,throughwhich every man has passed, has had no
temporalbeginning,is eternala parte ante.
The importanceof thisbeliefthus conceivedis of firstorderin Indian
thought. The religious,moral or philosophicalsystemsare builton the basis
of this belief,in the same way as, in other cultures,they are builton the
basis of the beliefin an immortalsoul or in God.
The word ' samsara ', whichoriginallymeansthe reincarnations'series,
designatesalso, enlarging its meaning, the empirical reality. This new
meaningis perfectly valid, because the empiricalrealitymanifestsitself not
underthe formof existence,but underthe formof re-existences. Therefrom
thesamsara''s anditvais the basis or conditionof the anditvaof theentities
9
processesetc., to which we shall referin the next sections, because those
entities,processesetc. are meremanifestations of samsara.
We have said thattmanis eternaland inalterable,and thathis essence
is being,consciousnessand happiness,in theirutmostdegree of purity. But
tman, by causes, to whichwe shall referafterwards,
can appear enchainedto
thereincarnations' cycle( samsara ), condemnedto transmigrate, submitted
consequentlyto errorand suffering.It is what can be called the samsricor
empiricalconditionof the tman.
The seriesof reincarnations,whichtmanhas suffered in the past, has
been eternal,has not had a temporalbeginning. And it would be eternalin
thefuture,ifone does not adopt the salvation's methods which Hinduism
offersto itsadepts and whichare theonlyable to putan end to it. This possi-
bilityattenuatesthe pessimistvisionwhichHinduismhas of humancondition.
About the samsara's anditvain Hinduisim cf. Aryabhata, AryabhatiyaIII,
11 and Bhfiskara,Bhsya ad locum; Bdaryana, VedntastraII 1,34-36

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 Annas BORI , LXl ( 1980 )

and Annambhatta,Brahmastravrtti , Mitksar, Braja Nth Bhatta, Brahma-

stravftti,Maricik, Nimbrka, Vedntaprijtasaurabha , and rnivasa,
Vedntakaustubha , Rmnuja, rbhsya, Vedntadipa and Vedniasra,
akara, Bhsya, ankarananda, Brahmasutradlpik,SUtrrthmrtalahari ,
Vcaspati Mira, Bhmat, ad locum ; Gautama III
Nyyastra ( ), 1 19-27;
Kapila, Smkhyastra II, 46 and Vijanabhiksu,Bhsya, locum,III, 62 and
Aniruddha, P7W and Vijnnabhiksu,Bhsya, ad locum; akara, Bhsya
of the Vedntastraad I, 3, 30, pp. 267-270, II, 2, 28, and 30, p. 499 and
p. 507; akara, Tattvopadea47, Upadesashasri I, 1, 12; rinivasadasa,
Yatndramatadpik, p. 76; Surevara, Taittryopanisadbhsyavrtika 1,33,
p. 93; Vcaspati Mira, Bhmat, p. 6, arfl, 3, 30, p. 334.

Bdaryana II, 1, 34-36 and the above quoted authors who comment
him utilize the principlethat samsra has had no beginningto absolve the
Creator from all accusation of partialityand cruelty. This accusation is
based, on one side, in the factthatthe worldpresents,among the beingswho
live in it, so manydifferences in relationto the happiness and the suffering
whichfallto each one's lot, and on theother side, based in the factof the
annihilationofall beingsin each of theperiodicaldestructionswhichbefallto
the world according to Indian thought. The Creator cannot be accused
eitherof partialityor of cruelty,because, in each of the periodicalcreations
which He performs,each being receives the destiny which he deserves
according to the good or bad actions which he carriedout in his previous
lives - that is to say : whichhe deservesaccordingto his karman. It is not
possible to argue that the beings, that were born in the firstcreation, did
not have karman, because, according to Indian thought,therewas not a
first creation; there has been an infinitenumberof creations that have
been followingone another in an eternal process withoutbeginning; and
also because, since samsra is equally eternaland without beginning,there
was nevera momentin whichany being could findhimselfwithoutkarman,
withoutactions performedin previous lives with deferred good or bad
consequencesto be realizedin new existences. Each time that God created
or, betterto say, re-createdthe world, he did it accordingto thekarmanof
the beingsthat wereto be rebornin thatworldin orderto receivethe reward
or the punishmentthey deserved. The world thus created once and again
was not the bestpossible world,but the onlypossible worldunderthe inflexi-
ble karmiccausality. Thus the theoryof a samsra withoutbeginninggave
the solutionto theeternalproblemof evil in the world.

Amongtheseauthorsakara and Annambhatta( ad II, 1, 36 ) explain

thattherecannot be a body without karman ( because the body is born
as 4 deferredeffectof the actiQnscarriedout in a previouslife) and that there

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 TOLA & DRAtONETTl: Anditvain IndianPhilosophy

is no karmanwithouta body ( because withouta body therecannotbe actions

which,accodingto their moral nature, requirenew reincarnationsin which
the deserved rewardsor punishmentswill be received). We should have
thelogical defectof itaretarsraya,if we accept that the samsrahas had a
beginning,because ifthe samsara began witha body, this would suppose a
karmanand if it began witha karman, thiswould suppose a body. But this
defectdoes not presentitself,if we accept thatthe samsara had no temporal
" "
beginningby application of the norm called the seed and the sprout
( bijnkura). According to this norm one cannotask whetherthe seed or
the sproutwas first,because the alternativerelation whichunitesthem( one
is born fromthe other and vice versa) has had no temporalbeginning. So
the questionsabout the firstcause and about whenand how was produced
the firstmanifestationof the karmanor the body areeliminated,because they
are irrelevantquestions. Cf. in ankara, Upadeasahasri II, 1, 3-4, the
descriptionof a similar cyclic mechanism: actions-body-pleasure and pain-
attractionand aversion-actions-meritand demerit-body.

The characterizationof purusaaccording to Smkhya, thatwe have

givenpreviously,offershis essential and authenticnature, but as tmancan
manifesthimselfenchained to the empirical reality( samsara), in the same
manner,by causes which we shall indicate afterwards,purusa can appear
enchainedto prakrtiand, consequently,obliged to transmigrate,under the
swayof errorand suffering, in thesamsric or empiricalsphere.

This conditionof purusa has had no beginning. Since a beginningless

eternity purusahas always been enchainedto prakfti. Cf. forthe beginning-
lessnessof this relation betweenpurusa and prakfti Kapila, Smkhyasutra
III, 62, VI, 67-69 and Aniruddha, Vrttiand VijSnabhiksu, Bhsya, ad
locum; Mallisena, Sydvdamanjari, p. 99, lines 17-20; Rmnuja, Bhsya
of theBhagavad-GtXIII, 19; akara, Bhsya of the Vedntastraaniel ,
1, 5, p. 69.8

Buddhismdoes not accept, as we have already said, the existenceof

an individualsoul, the tman. For Buddhism man is onlyan aggregateof
insubstantialand impermanentdharmas , a series of consciousnesseswhich
followone anotherin a constantand swiftflowing; it does not existbehind
thedharmas , as a nucleuswhichagglutinatesthem,anyeternaland inalterable
principle. But neverthelessBuddhismemphaticallyaffirms that the reincar-

8 We understand '
the word4nityanumeya employedby Sakarainthesenseof "
:
" inferable
as eternal " thatitis eternal.
whichitis possibleto infer
", regarding

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8 Annals BORI , LXI ( 1980 )

nationsexist. Buddhismpresentsus the paradox of a transmigration without

a transmigrator.9
As Hinduism, Buddhism affirmsalso that the reincarnations'cycle
( samsara) has had no beginning,but one can put an end to it by means of
the salvific doctrinesand practices which it affords. Cf. regardingthe
anditvaof samsara in Buddhism10Buddhaghosa, Atthaslini, p. 10 ( 25)
( = pp. 10-11 ed. P. T. S. ), p. 177 ( 471 ) ( = p. 216 ed. P. T. S. ), p. 191
(515) (= p. 235 ed. P. T. S.)9 p. 192 ( 519 ) ( = p. 236 ed. P. T. S.),
p. 285 (34) ( = p. 357 ed. P. T. S. ) ; Divyvadna, p. 122, lines 18-20
( = p. 197 ed. Cowell-Neil) ; LakvatrasutraII, verse 151; MahvastuII,
p. 264 ( strophe45 ), III, p. 34 ( strophe4 ), p. 396 ( strophe2 ) and p. 499
(strophe 3) ; Samyutta Nikya II, pp. 178-182, III, pp. 149, 151 ( quoted
in Kathvatthu, p. 29 ), V, pp. 226, 441 ; ntideva, BodhicaryvatraII, 28
and Prajakaramati, Panjik ad IX, 12, 32, 33, 84, 118, 124; antideva,
ikssamuccaya , p. 170, line 2 ; Vasubandhu,Abhidharmakoa III, 19, p, 435.
See also Ngrjuna, Mulamadhyamakakriks XI, 1 and 8 and Candrakrti,
Prasannapadad locum.
The Pratityasamutpda:
The Pratityasamutpda is one of the fundamental theories of
Buddhismin the different epochs of its history,but thistermhas not always
expressedthe same conception.
' 9
The word pratityasamutpda signifiedoriginallya lineal series of
twelvemembers,each of whichis cause or condition of the followingone.
These twelvemembersare avidy, samskra, vijnana, nmarpa, sadyataa,
spara, vedan, trsn, upadna, bhava, jti , jarmarana. This series tried
onlyto explainhow birth,death and suffering are produced.
Afterwards thepratityasamutpda experiencesa profoundtransforma-
tion. It is representedas a wheel divided in twelve segments,which corres-
pond to each of the twelvemembersmentionedbefore. The pratityasamut-
pda in its new formulationcontinuesexplaining,throughthe causal conca-
tenationof its members,the originof birth,death and suffering.Developing
the wheel's image, underwhich the pratityasamutpdais now represented,
Buddhistmastersteach now also that the pratityasamutpda , as any wheel,
turnsround,and thisturningroundis the symbolof thereincarnationswhich
conformhumanexistence,followingone another( samsra).

9 Cf.ourarticle" Samsara anaditva and nirvana. "

i We havebeenunabletofindinthe oldestUpanisadsreferences to thesamsara*
s
thattheidea of the samsara's beginningless-
anaditva. So itis possibletothink
nessis ofBuddhistorigin.

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 TOLA & DRAGONETTI: Anditvain Indian Philosophy 9

Accordingto the Hindu as well as Buddhist belief that the samsara

has had no beginning,they teach also that the pratityasamutpda^wheel
has turnedroundsince a beginningless eternityand will go on turninground
as long as it is not stopped throughthe help of Buddhistteachings. The
pratityasamutpdahas transformeditselffroma simple explanation of the
productionof birthetc. intoa symbolof humanexistence.Now thepratitya-
samutpda is also designated by another word which expresses clearly the
new conception: ' bhavacakra' Pratityasamutpdaand bhavacakraare now
synonymsof samsara. About the beginninglessness of thepratityasamutpda
and the constantturninground of thebhavacakracf.Buddhaghosa,Visuddhi -
magga,p. 494 ( 273 ), p. 495 ( 280 ), p. 496 ( 288 ) and p. 498 ( 298 );
Milindapaha, pp. 50-52; SlistambasTitra , p. 83 ( andiklapravrtto , tib.
.
thog.ma med. pahi dus nas zugspa); Vasubandhu, AbhidharmakosaIII,
19, pp. 434-435.

III
Adhysa,ropa or samropa:
"
Adhysa( ropa, samropa), literally: superimposition is a basic
notionin the philosophicalschool of the Advaita Vednta. It is an erroneous
act of the mind,whichgrasps an object under a form different from that
whichit reallyis, perceives that object as another one, attributesto it a
natureand qualitieswhichit does not possess. The example given by the
treatisesof theschool is well known: we see in the darknessa rope and we
thinkit is a serpent. The serpenthas been superimposedon the rope. The
mechanismis the same in the methaphysicallevel : tman- consciousness,
supremehappiness,freefromtime,space and causality,eternallyliberated -
is graspedundera formwhichis not his own one, as an empirical entity,as
the physicaland psychologicalego, dominated by nescience and suffering
limited,enchainedto the reincarnations'cycle; the empiricalego has been
takenfor tman; the natureand the qualitiesof theempiricalego have been
attributedto tman; the empirical ego has been superimposedon tman.
As a consequenceof the adhysa men thinkthattheyare theirempiricalego,
composedby the body and the mental and emotional life ; they identify
themselveswiththatego and performactions whichare inspiredbythatfalse
conceptionand which, as a consequence, maintain them enchained to the
reincarnations' cycle. The adhysa can take place also regardingBrahman ,
who is perceivedundera form differentfromthat which he truly is, as a
personalgod, as the world; the image of somethingthatBrahmanis not has
been superimposedon him. The adhysa is a congenitalactivityof themind
9
an essentialcharacteristicof man, an inevitablesequel of humancondition.
2 [ Annals, BORI J

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10 Annals BORI , LXI ( 1980 )

The aclhysahas had no beginning; it has existed in all the infinite

reincarnations of the past and it will existin the reincarnationsof the future
till the definitiveliberationtakes place. Cf. Akhandnanda Muni, Tatua -
dipana, p. 52; Madhusdana Sarasvat, Siddhntabindu , p. 41 ; Padmapda,
,
Parlcapdik pp. 159-160; and tmasvarpa,Prabodhapariodhini , p. 27;
Prakaatman,Paucapdikvivaranapp. 61-62 and Citsukhcrya,Ttparya-
dpik, p. 61 and Nrsimharama, Bhvapraksik , p. 61 ; Rmnanda
Sarasvat, Vivaranopanysa , p. 11 ; ankara, Bhasya of the Vedntastra ,
p. 18; Vcaspati Mira, Bhmat, p. 17; Vidyranya,Vivaranaprameyasam -
graha, pp. 43-44.
Each adhysa leaves in the individualsome latentimpressions( sams-
kara ), whichactualize themselvesand provokenew adhysas,whichat their
turnproducenew impressionsand so on in an alternatingprocess whichhas
had no beginning. Cf. Nrsimharama,Bhvaprakik,p. 61; Rmnanda
Sarasvat, Vivaranopanysa, p. 11, Vidyranya, Vivaranaprameyasamgraha ,
pp. 43-44. See also Madhusdana Sarasvat,Siddhntabindu , p. 41.
Vcaspati Mira, p. 17, and Vidyranya,pp. 43-44, think that, in
orderthatan adhysa be produced,it is necessarythatthe idea or representa-
tion {pratiti) of what is to be superimposedexists previouslyin the mind;
and that,in orderthattheidea or representation of whatis to be superimposed
existin themind,itis necessarythatan adhysa has been previouslyproduced.
If we apply thisreasoningto tmanand theempiricalego, we mustunderstand
that,in orderthattheempiricalego be superimposedon tman, it is necessary
that the idea or representation of the empiricalego existspreviouslyin the
mind; and that,in order that the idea or representation of the empirical ego
it
existin themind is necessary that an adhysa has been previouslyproduced,
because, iftherehas not been previouslyan adhysa, we should have only
tmanin his absolute oneness, withoutanythingdifferent fromhim, and the
or
idea representation of the empiricalego could not exist. Vcaspati Mira
and Vidyranyaexpressthatthisreasoningcannotbe accused of incurring in
the logical defectof paraspariraya, because the processthat unitesthe idea
of theempiricalego, whichis superimposed,and theadhsyaon tman, which
is the^support forthatsuperimposition, has been beginningless - as happens
in thecase of the seed and the sprout,as Vcaspati Mira comments.

Prakaatman,pp. 61-62, expressesthat the superimposition

on tman
of the conditionof enjoyeror experiencerdepends on the superimposition
of the agent's condition, because the person who does not act cannot
have [the condition of enjoyer; that the superimpositionon tman of the
agent'sconditiondepends on the superimposition on himof the union with
desire and hate,because a personwho js free fromdesire and hate cannot

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 Tola & DRAGONETTI : Anaditvain IndianPhilosophy 11

have the agent'scondition; thatthe union withdesire and hate dependson

the enjoyer'scondition, because desireand hate cannot appear in relationto
anythingwhichhas not been experiencedor enjoyedor which cannot be so.
Praktmanaffirms thatwe have herea succession of causes ( hetuparam-
par ) which is beginningless,similarto thecase of the seed and the sprout
Cf. Vidyranya,p. 43.
The adhysa is the formunder which the avidy, to which we shall
refernow, manifestsitself.11

Avidy, mithyjnna,my, aviveka:

In akara, avidy,mithy jnna and my can be consideredas syno-
nyms.12 From the philosophical point of view, theysignifyessentiallythe
same thing: the ignoranceof Brahmanor tman,the erroneousknowledgeof
theirtruebeing, theact of perceivingthem falsely,not as they really are.
As we have alreadysaid, the avidy expresses itself fundamentallythrough
theadhysa, throughthementalprocess whichsuperimposeson them some--
thing that they are not. When the adhysa is not produced regarding
Brahmanor tman,both are perceivedas theytrulyare and, therefore, there
is no avidyor it comes to its end. The effectsof avidyare many. Among
themit is necessary to mention specially tman''s samsra. Cf. akara,
Bhsya of the VedntstraI, 1, 1, p. 25, 1, 1, 4, p. 51 and p. 60, I, 2, 11,
p. 162, II, 3, 50, p. 613; akara, Upadeasuhasr I, 2, 110; Surevara,
Brhadranyakopanisadbhsyavrtika, Sambandhavrtika,17, p. 13, 1087,
p. 336.
The Vedntathinksthat theavidy, which enchains tman and does
not allow himto see the truereality,has had no beginning.On thispointsee
tmasvarupa, Prabodhapariodhin, p. 27; Gaudapda, gamastra1, 16
and akara, Bhsya ad locum-, Madhusdana Sarasvat!, Advaitasiddhi,
p. 544, Siddhntabinbu,p. 18; akara, tmabodha 14 ( andyavidy);
akara, Svtmaprakik 33; Surevara, Taittiriyopanisadbhsyavrtika

11 Sometimes it is thoughtthatadhysa is caused by avidy. See Padmapda,

Pancapdik, pp. 29-30; Sakara, Bhsya of the Vedntasutra,p. 12 ;
avivekena. . . mithyjnnanimittah
... lokavyavahrah ; VcaspatiMis'ra,Bh-
matt,p. 16: mithyjrinam adhysahtannimittah ; Vidyranya,Vivaranapra -
meyas amgraha, p. 48. ButSakara,BhsyaoftheVedntasutra, p. 14, expres-
sesthatinthepandits* opinionadhysais avidy. Cf.Sakara Upadesashasrl
1,2,51.
12 Someauthors, whocomeafterSankaraand belongto hisschool,establish several
between
distinctions avidy and my, attribute specialfunctionsto each other
andareinclined totransformmy intoan autonomous toan evil's
entity,similar
principle, which thenon-duality
endangers affirmed
bythe schooland whoserela-
tionwithBrahmanproposes theoreticaldifficulties.

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12 Annals BORI , LXI ( 1980 )

I, 49, p. 76 ; Surevara,Brhadranyakopanisadbhsyavrtika -
, Sambandhav
1091,p. 337; Vidyranya, Vivaranaprameyasamgraha, p. 48.
We have said beforethatfor the Smkhya systempurusa is united,
enchainedto prakrtisince a beginninglesseternity. The cause, which pro-
duced thisunion or enchainment, according to the SmkhyastraI, 55 and
VI, 68 and Vijnnabhiksu,Smkhyapravacanabhsyaad locum, is aviveka,
which consists in not differentiatingwhat purusa is fromwhat prakrtiis.
This conceptis verysimilarto the avidy.

, as avidy, has had no temporal beginning. Cf. Kapila,

Aviveka
SmkhyastraVI, 12, 68 and Aniruddha, Vrtti and Vijanabhiksu,Bhsya
ad locum.
For Buddhism,avidy, which, as the firstelement of the pratitya-
samutpda,produces the eternalturning round of the bhavacakra, is also
beginningless.See AguttaraNikya V, p. 113; Buddhaghosa, Visuddhi-
magga, p. 447 (37); Milindapaha, p.51, lines 32-33; Nettipakaranay
pp. 86, 109, 112. Cf. also Ratnakirti,Sthirasiddhidsana
, p. 127, line 25,
If it is asked why, how and when, tman, pure etc. fellunder the
avidya'ssway, was pushed into the samsric conditionand was enchainedto
the transmigrations' cycle- or why, how and when purusa, pure etc. was
subjugatedby the aviveka9unitedto prakrtiand draggedalong the reincarna-
tions- or why,how and whenthe bhavacakra began to turnround - the
anditvaof avidyand avivekaallows us to discard these questions as irre-
levant. It is absurd to ask why, how and when starteda processwhichhas
had no beginning,whichhas always existed,as it would be an absurdityto
ask why, how and whenwas born God or the tman or purusa or prakrti
whichdid not have a temporalbeginning.
IV
The Veda :
Excepting some schools, as those of the materialistsand Buddhists,
who deny the supernaturalorigin and value and the eternityof the Vedic
texts,the philosophicaland religiousschools of India agree in the fact that
thosetextspossess a supernaturalcharacterbecause of their origin,because
of theirunshakablevalidityas absolute norm of truth,and because of the
eternitythatin some way or otheris attributedto them.
For the old Mimms, the Veda is eternal,has always existed,has
had no initial moment and will last for ever. It has not been createdby
some being, eithergod or man ( apauruseya). It has been transmitted from
ge to age, from teachersto disciples, in a continuous and not interrupted

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 TOLA & DRAGONETTI : Anditvain IndianPhilosophy 13

traditionwhichcomes froman eternity withoutbeginningand will last foran

eternitywithout end, in a world thathas always existed and will existfor
ever. The Veda is inalterable,always the same in its absoluteand total per-
fection,withouterror,confusion,contradictionor fraud. It constitutesthe
onlyand exclusivecriterionof truth. In relationto theVeda's eternityin the
Mimms see Apadeva, Mimmsnyyapraksa , pp. 7-8 with the commen-
taryof Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar; Jaimini, Mimmsstra 1,1,27-32
and Bhsya of abara ad locum ; Kumrila, Mmms&lokavrtika ,
Vkydhikarana , verses 365-369 and Vedanityatdhikarana ; Laugksi
Bhskara, Arthasamgraha, p. 15; Nryana, Mnameyodaya, p. 107, para-
graph 17; Mdhava, Sarvadaranaamgraha , pp. 119-123; Mallisena,
,
Sydvdamarijaripp. 69-70 ; Prthasrathi
Mira, Sstradipik( Tarkapda)
eighth Adhikarana especially pp. 468-470 ; akara, Sarvasiddhnta -
samgraha, pp. 32-33, strophes15-23. See also the expositionand criticism
of the thesis of the Veda's eternityand the arguments for the opposite
doctrinein Bhsarvajna, Nyyasra,2nd part,pp. 7-16 and Aparrkadeva,
Nyyamuktvali, pp. 8-16; Jayanta Bhatta, NyyamafijarU PP- 213-220.
The Advaita Vedntaagrees withthe Mimms in the fact thatthe
Veda is eternal13
and beginninglessand has not been createdby any being,
but affirmsthatthe world's creations have followed and will follow one
anotherin a continuoussuccessionwithoutbeginningand withoutend. At
thefirstmomentof each creationthe Veda is rememberedbyGod or by some
god. There is not any differenceamong the successivemanifestationsof the
Veda. The Veda remainsin a latent and potentialstatebetweena creation
and the followingone. The Veda is the model or archetypeaccording
to whichthe creatorrealizeshis demiurgicwork, because the Veda indicates
in a moreor less explicit form,which are the social structures,the moral
norms,thegods, the ritesetc. whichmustexistin the world to be created.
The Veda at the beginningof each creation is revealed by the Supreme
Principle,God or some god to the firstrsis and then is transmittedfrom
tradition. The relationbetweenthe
teachersto disciplesin an uninterrupted
Veda thusconceivedand God presents difficultproblemsregardingGod's
autonomy,independenceand omnipotence,to whicheach school givesdiffer
rentanswersand to whichwe cannot refernow. In relation to the Veda's

13 Nevertheless
Dharmarja Adhvarndra,Vedntaparibhas , pp.85-88( quotededi-
a Vedntist
tion), though thatinhisopinion
author,expresses theVeda is noteter-
nalandhashada temporal beginning,becauseit has been createdbyGod, buthe
addsthatGodcreatesthe Veda, at thebeginningofcaclicreation,exactlyidentical
to theVeda oftheformer creations.Accordingto Dharmarja.thepauruseyatva
consistsinhaving formulations
as contents independent fromotherformulations of
thesamenature.

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14 Annals BORI, LXI ( 1980 )

eternityin the Advaita Vednta see nandnubhava, Nyyaratnadipvali,

pp. 13-33 ; Padmapda, Pancapdik, p. 315 ; Praktman, Paficapdik-
vivarana,pp. 677-692 ; akara, Bhsya of the Vedntastraad I, 3, 28,
p. 259, ad I, 3, 29, adii , 1, 11, p. 390; rnivsadsa, Yatndramatadipik,
p. 25 ; Vcaspati Mira, Bhmati ad I, 1, 3, p. 99, ad I, 3, 29-30; Vidy-
ranya, Vivaranaprameyasamgraha, pp. 715-733, speciallyp. 729.
Commenting VedntastraII, 2, 38, ankara, referringto some
schools14which, in opposition to his own, sustainthatthe Veda has been
created by an omniscientbeing, expressesthat, for theseschools, God's
omniscienceis established by means of the Veda ( because the knowledge
regardingGod's naturecan only be obtained throughthe Veda ) and thatthe
Veda's authorityderivesfromits author'somniscience,and so theyincurin
the logical defect of itaretarsraya. Cf. Jayanta Bhatta, Nyayamajari,
p. 215 ( the last two verses) ; Aparrkadeva, NyyamuktvalfII, p. 14,
lines 17-19 ; Vidyranya, Vivaranaprameyasamgraha, p. 719, lines 9-10 ;
Praktman,Pancapdikvivarana,pp. 678-679, lines 22-2.
Vcaspati Mira, Bhmati, commentingalso Vedntastra II, 2, 38 in
fine, declaresthat this logical defect does not exist in the Vednta school,
whichaffirms thatboth,the Lord and the Veda, are beginningless,although-
-
he observes the Lord is the originof the Veda.
The Veda's eternityand, as a consequence of it, its absolute and
inalterableidentitythroughthe infinitecreations,its independenceand auto-
nomyare theguaranteeof the absolute characterof the moral laws thatfind
theirexpressionin the Veda : good has been always good in itself,bad has
been always bad in itselfand not as the product of the decision of some
omniscientand omnipotentbeing : the moral law has in itselfits fundament
and justification.Cf. Jayanta Bhatta, Nyyamanjar, p. 188, line 22;
Vcaspati Mira, Bhmati adi, 1, 3, p. 99, ad I, 3, 50 infine,p. 336.

The wordand its relationwiththeobjectit designates:

One of the most discussedthemesin the philosophicalschoolsof India
was the eternityor non-eternity of the word and of the relation betweenthe
word and the object it indicates.15 If some of these schools, as the Nyya
and Vaiesika, sustain thatthe word is not eternal,for other ones, like the
Mimms and theAdvaita Vednta,the word is eternal,has always existed
and has not been created by any being, and, moreover,the relation that

14 Samkara is referring to theSUmkhya,

specially ( theist
) Yoga,aiva andVaisesika
schoolsmentioned inhiscommentary of the previoussutra. The Nyya postula-
tedalsotheexistence authorfortheVeda.
ofan omniscient
is Thispointis treatedingeneraltogether
withthewords eternity.

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 TOLA & DRAGONETTI : Anditvain IndianPhilosophy 15

unitestheword withthe object is also eternal,non-conventional, not decided

by any person. The eternityof the word and of its relation with the object
was for these schools the5fundamentof the Veds eternity. In fact,it is
impossible to affirmthat the Veda, an aggregateof words arrangedin a
certainway, is eternal,if we do not admitfirstthatthese wordsare eternal;
and, in orderthatthfVeda does not become an aggregateof sounds without
meaning or with variable meaning( which would endangerits archetypal
functionand the moral law's immutability ) it is equally necessarythat the
word's relationwiththe object be eternaland immutable. When we consider
thesespeculationsabout the word, we mustthinkthat they understandthat
it representsan universalconceptand not an individualobject. In thisway
thesespeculationsget in Indian philosophy the same hierarchythat has in
Westernphilosophythe realismand nominalismproblem.

About the eternity of the word and of its relation with the object it
designates see Bhartrhari, Vkyapadya I, 23 and Harivrsabha, Vrtti ad
locumspeciallypp. 56 and 58 and III, 29; nandnubhava,Nyyaratnadp-
vali, pp. 13-15, 17-25, and 26-27; Jaimini,Prvamlmmsstra1,1, 5-23
and abarasvamin, Bhsya ad locum; Kumrila, Mimmslokavrtika ,
abdanityatadhikarana ; Mdhava, Sarvadaranasamgraha , p. 121, line 20,
p. 123, line 11; PrthasrathiMira, Sstradpik, ( Tarkapda), pp.
379-430 ; ankara, Bhsya of Bdarayana's VedntasUtraI, 3, 28 ; Vidy-
ranya, Vivaranaprameyasamgraha , p. 724. See also, foran exposition and
criticismof the theoryof the word's eternityand a fundamentationof the
opposite doctrine, Bhsatvajna, Nyyasra, 2nd Part, pp. 16-32 and
Aparrkadeva, Nyyamuktval , pp. 16-32; ; Gautama, NyyastraII, 2,
13-39 and the commentary of Vatsyyana; JayantaBhatta, Nyyamanjarl,
pp. 188-213 and pp. 220-225; Kanada, VaiesikamtraII, 2, 26-37.

V
The experienceof diversity:
The primitiveand Hnayna Buddhismadopted a naive realistic posi-
:
tion dharmas , the factorsor elementsof existence,are real, although they
are unsubstantialand impermanent ; the world,produced by the union of
thesedharmas, is also real and our senses and our reason can give us a true
and exact knowledgeof the world. Mahyna Buddhism,in general,and
speciallyits two principalschools, the Mdhyamikaand the Yogcra, adop-
ted an idealisticand criticalposition: the dharmasand the worldare unreal,
illusory, mere creations of the human mind, conditioned by the mind's
peculiarformof being,and our senses and our reason cannot give us a valid
knowledgeof the world. Besides these common postulates, both schools

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16 Annals BORI , LXl ( 1980 )

presentfundamentaldifferences : the Mdhyamika considersthat conscious-

ness participatesof unreality,of the illusorynature of everything, whilst
the Yogcra affirms the real and ultimateexistenceof consciousness. The
latterschool conceivesconsciousnessundertwo forms,aspects or states: in
its absolute form- pure, limpid, withoutcontents,one and alone ; and in
its empiricalstate- divided into the illusorydualityof a knowingillusory
subjectand of an illusoryworld, opposed to him as the knowledge'sobject;
thisworldis characterizedby the pluralityand variety,whichof course are
also illusory.

One of the objectionsadduced frequentlyagainst the Yogcras by

the Hinduistauthors, who criticizeand contradictthem,refersto the duality
and the pluralityand variety: consciousness,theyaffirm,cannot create the
illusionof a knowingsubjectand of a plural and diversifiedworld, if it has
not had beforethe experienceof thedualityof the knowing subject and of
multipleworld, because any one who imaginessomethingillusorymusthave
had previouslythe experience of the illusory thing or of the elements
that constituteit. Cf. Mdhava, Sarvadaranasamgraha , p. 121, line 12;
Sthiramati, Tk , p. 15, lines 16-17; Vasubandhu ad Vimatika 16. These
authors thinkthat they establish in this way the real and true existence
of knowledge,its subjectand its object. See the followingHinduistauthors
among others,forthe indicatedcriticism: Aniruddha,Vrttiof Smkhyasutra
ad I, 42 ; JayantaBhatta, NyyamaijarII, p. 112, line 28 -p. 114, line 10,
cf. p. 106, lines 6-11 ; Kumrila, Mmmsslokavrika, Nirlambana
vda, verses178-201 and Snyavda,verses 15-17 and PrthasrathiMira,
commentaryof the quoted passage of section Snyavada; Mdhava,
Sarvadaranasamgraha , pp. 14-15; akara, Bhsya of the Vedntastraad
II, 2, 28, p. 499.

The Yogcras answeredtheobjection by means of the vsans' and

anaditva* s theories. Accordingto the vsans' theoryeach act leaves in the
minda sign, an impression,a mark,whichin certain conditionsis reactuali-
zed givingbirthto a new similaract. The illusion, the imaginationof the
subject-objectdualityand of the multiplicity and varietyof the worldare due
to the reactualizationof the vsans leftby previousacts, which consistedin
the perceptionby the mind of the illusion( createdby the same mind) of a
subject-objectdualityand of the multiplicity and variety.And at theirturn,
the acts the
whichoriginated vsans which are actuallyreactualized,are due
to the vsans leftby otherpreviousacts, and so on successivelyin an alter-
nating backwards process, experience-vsw-experience-v.saA etc., which
has no temporalbeginning.About thisprocesssee Avaghosa, Ta tcKengk'i
sin louen(Mahynasraddhotpda), Taisho XXXII, 1667> p. 584, c, lines

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 TOLA & DRAGONETTI: Anditvain Indian Philosophy 17

8-9 and p. 586, a, lines 11-14 ( =T. Suzuki, The Awakeningof Faith, pp. 56
and 78 ) ; Dignga, lambanaparlks6-8 ; Hiuan Tsang, Tceng wei che
louen( Vijfaptimtratsiddhi ), Taisho XXXI, 1585, p. 2. a, lines 9-11, p. 6
c, lines26-29, p. 8, b, line 6 up to p. 8, c, line 3 ( = L. de la Vallee Poussin,
La Siddhide Hiuan Tsang, p. 16 ( tmagrhavibhanga ), p. 80, ( Dharmagr-
havibhaga) and pp. 105-107 ( Nanda et Srisena, Dharmapla) ; Lankva-
trastra, p. 18, lines 9-10, p. 20, lines4 and 14-15, pp. 38-39 ; Prajaka-
ramati,Panjik ad IX, 32, 33, 84 ; Sthiramati,Tk of the Bhsya of Vasu-
bandhu to theKriks of Maitreyaad I, 2, p. 10, lines 14-17 ; ad I, 4, p. 15,
lines 15-16 and p. 16, lines 13-14 ; ad I, 7, p. 20, lines 10-12, and ad III, 13,
p. 100, lines 21-29 ; Sthiramati, Bhsya of the Trimsik of Vasubandhu
ad, p. 98. See also the exposition of this doctrine in the above quoted
Hinduistauthors.
VI
Othercases of anditva:
Withoutenteringinto details, we indicateother cases of anditva :
Citta and caittas. See Sthiramati,Tk of the Bhsya of Vasubandhu
of theKriks of Maitreya ad I, 2, p. 11 ; Kambala, Navalok, 7(11), in
G. Tucci, MinorBuddhistTexts I, p. 217.
layavijnna. See Hiuan Tsang, TcKeng wei che louen ( Vijnaptim -
tratsiddhi), Taisho XXXI, 1585, p. 12, b, line 28-p. 12, c, line 15 ( = L. de
la Vallee Poussin, La Siddhide Hiuan Tsang, pp. 156-157).
The union of the soul withpassion. See Vtsyyana, Bhsya of the
Nyyastraof Gautama III, 1, 24 (in fine ).
The seriesof creations and destructionsof the world. See akara,
Bhsya of the Vedntasutra
of Bdaryana ad II, 1, 36.
The seriesof masterswho have taughtthe Veda. See Vcaspati Mira,
Bhmat, p. 99 ; Anandnubhava, Nyyaratnadpvali
, p. 32, line 2.
Dosasambandha. See LankvatrasutraII, verse 156.
The seriesof diverseeffectsand of theirdiversecauses, in whicheach
effectis cause and each cause is effect. See Prajnkaramati,Panjik ad
IX, 118.
The seriesof knowledge's" seed " and knowledge'sact, in whicheach
" seed " has been
producedby a previous knowledge's act and each know-
"
ledge's act by a previous seed See Dignga, lambanaparlks6-8.
f _ _
Snyata. See Mahavyutpatti 943 ; Dharmasamgraha41.
Bijas . See Hiuan Tsang, op. cit., p. 8, a, line 20-p. 8, b, line 6 ( = L.
de la Vallee Poussin,op. cit.,pp. 102-104 ( Candrapla ).
3 [ Annah, BORI ]

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18 Annals BORI , LXI ( 1980 )

III, 11 and Bhskara, Bhsya ad

Time. See ryabhata,^ryabhatya
locum.
, p. 46, verse 73, p. 177, verse
Ivara ( Acyua).- See Jaykhyasamhit
275.

We hope thatthe quoted textsand the annotationswe have done are

sufficientto show the importanceof the anditva theory in Indian thought.
We thinkthattheanditvais a most necessarypostulatein thegreat majority
of the Indian philosophicalsystems; it allows giving a rational answer to
manyof the difficultiesthatpresentthemselvesin these systems.
If togetherwiththe anditvatheorywe thinkthatfor Indian thought
the numberof universes,scatteredin an unlimitedspace, is infinite,thenwe
can affirm thatone of the mostcharacteristicfeaturesof Indian cultureis its
desireof infinitude.

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