Professional Documents
Culture Documents
160922 February 27, 2006 On July 1, 2002, the BID Prosecutor filed a Charge Sheet 7 against "Javed
Kiani alias Ahmad Singh" before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) for
JEANY-VI G. KIANI, Petitioner, violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, particularly
vs. Section 37(a)(7) and Section 45 thereof. The case was docketed as D.C. No.
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION (BID); EDGARDO ADD-02-080. The Charge Sheet reads:
CABRERA, ELISEO EXCONDE and JOSE VALE, JR., Respondents.
Records show that the above-named subject was arrested on June 27, 2002
DECISION by Bureaus Intelligence operatives at Felicidad Village, Montalban, Rizal,
pursuant to Mission Order No. ADD-02-203, dated June 20, 2002.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Records also show that subject national was positively identified by Indian
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari for the nullification of the nationals Balbir Singh and Iqbal Singh when they were arrested by the same
decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 74484, dismissing the operatives on June 18, 2002 as the person who gave them spurious
appeal of Jeany-Vi G. Kiani, which assailed the Order of the Regional Trial immigration documents and as their protector evidenced by copies of the
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 8, in Special Proceedings (Sp. Proc.) No. 02- ACRs and ICRs of Balbir and Iqbal Singh, which were certified by Mr.
103935, dismissing her Petition for Habeas Corpus. Reynaldo Joson as "fake." Additionally, Mr. Joson certified that the forms
used in the forgery/falsification are not official forms of this Bureau.
On June 19, 2002, Javed Kiani, a British national but a Pakistani by
birth2 reported to the Rodriguez, Rizal Police Station that his friends, Iqbal Contrary to law.8
Singh and Balbir Singh, had been forcibly taken by four (4) armed men from
their residence at Balita, Rodriguez, Rizal.3 A couple of days later, then On the same day, July 1, 2002, the Board of Commissioners (BOC)
Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo of the Bureau of Immigration and conducted a summary proceeding and issued a Summary Deportation Order
Deportation (BID) issued Mission Order No. ADD-02-203 based on Executive revoking the visa issued to Javed Kiani. The Order reads in part:
Order No. 287 of former President Joseph Estrada. In said Order,
appropriate officers of the Bureau were directed to conduct Considering the seriousness of the charge/s and the evidence in support
verification/validation of the admission status and activities of Javed Kiani, thereof, respondent, whose Temporary Residence Visa is hereby ordered
and, if found to have violated the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as cancelled and revoked, is hereby ordered summarily deported to his country
amended, to immediately place him under arrest. 4 Per records of the BID, of origin, subject to PNP, Court and NBI clearances and payment of an
Javed Kiani was married to a Filipina, Jeany-Vi Kiani, on July 27, 1988. He administrative fine in the amount of P50,000.00.9
was admitted as an immigrant and was issued a permanent resident visa on
March 17, 1993.5 The next day, July 2, 2002, Javed Kianis wife, Jeany-Vi, filed a Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus10 for and in behalf of her husband before the RTC of
A week later, on June 27, 2002, Javed Kiani was arrested at Felicidad Manila, naming the BID and its intelligence officers as Respondents. She
Village, Montalban, Rizal. The arresting officers, Eduardo Cabrera, Eliseo prayed that the court issue a writ of habeas corpus directing respondents to
Exconde and Jose Vale, Jr., operatives of the Bureau of Intelligence of the produce the person of Javed Kiani before it "in the soonest time possible and
BID, relied on information from Iqbal and Balbir Singh, who pointed to Javed to show the cause or legal justification for the latters detention and
Kiani as the one who had furnished them with fake Alien Certificate imprisonment, if any; and for such other or further reliefs as may be deemed
Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate Registration (ICR). Apparently, just and equitable under the premises." She further alleged that her husband
the forms used were not official BID forms.6 had intervened in the arrest of Iqbal and Balbir Singh, and that the arresting
officers resented such intervention. She insisted that the arrest and detention
of her husband were bereft of factual and legal basis, since at the time, no
deportation order had yet been issued against him. Citing the ruling of this
Court in Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa,11 she alleged that the A. WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST OF JAVED KIANI ON 27 JUNE 2002
Mission Order issued by the Immigration Commissioner was void. The case AND HIS SUBSEQUENT DETENTION BY THE RESPONDENTS-
was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 02-103935.12 Javed Kiani had been detained APPELLEES WERE VALID AND/OR LEGAL.
at the BID Detention Center, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila since
July 3, 2002.13 B. WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPPOSED ISSUANCE OF A SUMMARY
DEPORTATION ORDER AGAINST JAVED KIANI HAS THE EFFECT OF
On July 18, 2002, the RTC issued an Order14 granting bail for Javed Kiani on LEGALIZING AND/OR VALIDATING HIS CONTINUED DETENTION,
a bond of P50,000.00, and ordered respondent BID Intelligence Officers to THEREBY RENDERING THE HABEAS CORPUS PETITION
file their return on the writ. The respondents complied, and alleged in their DISMISSIBLE.18
return that Javed Kiani had already been charged before the BOC and
ordered deported; hence, the petition had become moot and academic. They On May 8, 2003 the CA rendered judgment dismissing the appeal. 19 The CA
refused to release Kiani although the bond had already been declared that a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus can no longer be
posted.15Instead, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General allowed since the party sought to be released had been charged before the
(OSG), filed an Omnibus Motion16 for the reconsideration of the Order on the BSI. Assuming that Javed Kianis detention or his arrest was illegal, any
following grounds: (1) under Section 37(9)(e) of Commonwealth Act 613, as incipient infirmity thereon was cured by the filing of the Charge Sheet against
amended, it is the Commissioner of Immigration, and not the court, who has him. The appellate court cited the ruling of this Court in Velasco v. Court of
authority to grant bail in a deportation proceeding; (2) the court has no Appeals.20 It likewise affirmed the ruling of the RTC that it had no jurisdiction
authority to grant the petition considering that Javed Kiani was lawfully to take cognizance of and reverse the Summary Deportation Order of the
charged with violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, BOC, that the remedy of petitioner from the Summary Deportation Order of
before the BSI; and (3) the BOC has subsequently issued a Summary the BOC was to file a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the
Deportation Order. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and that her failure to do so rendered said
Order final and executory.
On October 28, 2002, the RTC issued an Order 17 granting the motion and
setting aside its July 18, 2002 Order. In dismissing the petition, it ruled that Jeany-Vi received a copy of the CA Decision on May 22, 2003, and filed a
Jeany-Vi was barred from questioning the legality of the arrest and detention Motion for Reconsideration thereof on June 6, 2003. She alleged that since
of her husband, following the filing of the Charge Sheet with the BSI; as the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC had not yet been promulgated
such, there was no justification for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. It by the BSI, the period to appeal was yet to commence, and as such, said
declared that, as gleaned from the return of the writ filed by the respondents, order could not become final and executory. Even assuming that such order
Javed Kiani was lawfully charged with violation of the Philippine Immigration had become final and executory, her husband was entitled to a writ of
Act of 1940, as amended; hence, the Summary Deportation Order issued by habeas corpus since he was deprived of his right to due process.
the BOC was valid.
On November 21, 2003, the appellate court resolved to deny the
The RTC also ruled that the proper remedy of Javed Kiani from the Summary motion.21 Jeany-Vi received a copy of the Resolution on December 1, 2003.
Deportation Order of the BOC was to file a petition for review with the CA
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court (and not a petition for a writ of habeas On January 15, 2004, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
corpus before it), as it had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and reverse certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, alleging that:
the Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC.
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO NULLIFY
Jeany-Vi appealed the RTCs Order of July 18, 2002 to the CA, in which she AND TO DECLARE AS ILLEGAL THE ACTUAL ARREST AND
raised the following issues: SUBSEQUENT DETENTION OF JAVED KIANI.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE The OSG also alleges that Javed Kiani had filed an Omnibus Motion Ad
AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO THE PUTATIVE SUMMARY Cautelam28 dated March 19, 2004 in the BID, presumably with the BOC,
DEPORTATION ORDER AGAINST JAVED KIANI. wherein he prayed that the Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC
against him be set aside, and that he be released in the meantime. The OSG
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE also asserts that in said motion, Javed Kiani alleged that his arrest and
SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER AGAINST JAVED KIANI HAS detention was illegal because there had been as yet no determination by the
ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. BOC of any ground for his deportation; in effect, he pursued the same reliefs
he seeks from this Court in his motion with the BOC, that is, to declare as
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT illegal his continued detention and order his release. The OSG avers that this
HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT THE CORRECT OR PROPER REMEDY is a classic example of forum shopping which is prohibited under the Rules.
AVAILABLE TO THE HEREIN PETITIONER.22
In reply, petitioner asserts that during the pendency of this case, Immigration
Petitioner avers that the Mission Order issued by the Immigration Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. granted her husbands Omnibus
Commissioner for the investigation and arrest of her husband, Javed Kiani, is Motion Ad Cautelam in an Order29 dated June 22, 2004, and ordered his
null and void. She points out that when said Order was issued, the BOC had provisional release on a cash bond of P50,000.00. The Commissioner also
not yet made a determination as to the existence of a lawful ground for his declared that the Summary Deportation Order against her husband had been
deportation. She further avers that the Immigration Commissioner has no improvidently issued, and ruled that there was no factual and legal basis for
power to issue a Mission Order or Warrant of Arrest solely for the purpose of his summary deportation. Moreover, Javed Kiani was deprived of his right to
investigation, and before a final order for deportation is issued by the BOC. due process when the Order was issued on the same day the Charge Sheet
She insists that an order of arrest is proper only if the BOC has already was filed with the BSI.
issued an Order of deportation. She cites the rulings of this Court in Qua
Chee Gan v. Deportation Board,23 Ang Ngo Chiong v. Galang,24 and Board of The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: (1) whether petitioner
Commissioners v. Dela Rosa.25 engaged in forum shopping; and (2) whether the CA erred in (a) holding that
the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC was not the proper
Petitioner further maintains that the filing of the Charge Sheet against Javed remedy of petitioner; (b) upholding the validity of the Summary Deportation
Kiani by the BOC did not render the issue of the illegality of arrest and Order issued by the BOC; and (c) declaring that such Order had become
detention moot and academic. She asserts that there is no factual and legal final and executory.
basis for the deportation of her husband because he had been issued a
permanent visa and his passport is yet to expire. She avers that a warrant for On the first issue, we agree with the contention of the OSG that the petitioner
the arrest of her husband may be issued only after a Summary Deportation indulged in forum shopping. Forum shopping is the institution of two or more
Order shall have become final and executory. Considering that there was no actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that
showing in the records that said Order had already been promulgated by the one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Section 6, Rule 43
BSI, it could not have become final and executory. She avers that the ruling of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a petition for review on certiorari
of this Court in Velasco v. Court of Appeals26 is not applicable in this case. must contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the
last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42 of said Rules, to wit:
In its Comment on the petition filed on December 10, 2004, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) avers that it agrees with the ruling of the CA and The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under
prays that it be affirmed. Citing the ruling of this Court in Dwikarna v. oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the
Domingo,27 the OSG posits that the remedy of petitioner from the Summary same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions
Deportation Order of the BOC was to appeal to the CA via a petition for thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or
review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. It maintains that it was proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter
inappropriate for petitioner to assail the arrest and detention of her husband learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before
after the filing of the Charge Sheet with the BSI. the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or
any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid and granted the same, despite the pendency of the instant petition, thereby
courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days preempting the ruling of this Court.
therefrom.lawphil.net
The Immigration Commissioner and Atty. Marlon Alexandre C. Cruz ought to
Under Section 5, Rule 45 of said Rules, the failure of the petitioner to comply be reprimanded for their acts.
with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition. On the merits of the petition, we find and so rule that the CA acted in accord
with jurisprudence when it affirmed the assailed Order of the RTC dismissing
In Balite v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court held that there is forum shopping the Petition for Habeas Corpus. As the Court held in Caballes v. Court of
when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had Appeals,32
already been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other
tribunals. While a party may avail of the remedies prescribed by the Rules of Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as
Court, such party is not free to resort to them simultaneously or at his/her substitute for the trial courts function. It cannot take the place of appeal,
pleasure or caprice. A party should not be allowed to present simultaneous certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider
remedies in two different forums, for it degrades and wreaks havoc to the questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits.
rule on orderly procedure. A party must follow the sequence and hierarchical The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of
order in availing such remedies and not resort to shortcuts in procedure or whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and
playing fast and loose with the said rules. Forum shopping, an act of void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law
malpractice, is considered as trifling with the courts and abusing their
processes. It is improper conduct and degrades the administration of justice. provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted
In this case, petitioner seeks not only the reversal of the Order of the RTC in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual
dismissing her Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in behalf of her remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional
husband (where it was also declared that he had been legally deported), as circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus
well as the decision of the CA affirming the RTCs Order; she also prays that cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law
the Court render judgment nullifying the Summary Deportation Order of the and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during
BOC and order her husbands release from detention. However, Javed Kiani the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of
himself, during the pendency of this case, filed an Omnibus Motion Ad human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also
Cautelam with the BID, seeking the same reliefs, which his wife prayed for in been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and
this case. By filing said motion, Javed Kiani sought to preempt the decision of irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for
this Court. Petitioner and her husband even failed to inform the Court of the relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal. 33
filing of such motion, and did so only after the OSG had already informed the
Court of such petition, and after petitioner had been ordered to reply to the In this case, when petitioner filed her Petition for Habeas Corpus with the
Comment of the OSG. RTC in behalf of her husband, a Charge Sheet had already been filed
against him for violation of Section 37(a)(7) and Section 45 of the Philippine
Petitioner and her husband were represented by the same law firm, the Cruz Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The filing of the Charge Sheet before
Cruz and Neria Law Offices. The instant petition and said motion were signed the BSI cured whatever irregularities or infirmities were attendant to his
by the same lawyer, Atty. Marlon Alexandre C. Cruz. That the instant petition arrest. The remedy of petitioner was to file a motion for the dismissal of the
was filed by Jeany-Vi Kiani while the Omnibus Motion was filed by Javed Charge Sheet and the Mission Order of the Immigration Commissioner, not a
Kiani himself is of no moment; after all, the petition was filed for and in behalf petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the RTC. The RTC had no
of the latter, who is the real party-in-interest.31 In effect, the Petition for Writ of authority to nullify the Mission Order issued by the Immigration
Habeas Corpus was filed by him, as the beneficiary, through his wife as his Commissioner, much less set aside the arrest of Javed Kiani. As held by this
representative. Worse, the Immigration Commissioner took cognizance of Court in Commissioner Rodriguez v. Judge Bonifacio:34
Be that as it may, there was a valid judicial process justifying Ma Jings year from its issuance, or that the aggrieved party is barred from filing a
detention even before respondent judge rendered his decision as shown by motion for a reconsideration of any order or decision of the BOC." The Court,
the Return of the Writ which averred, among others, that a Charge Sheet likewise, declared that in deportation proceedings, the Rules of Court may be
was filed against Ma Jing. Even granting that the arrest of Ma Jing was applied in a suppletory manner and that the aggrieved party may file a
initially illegal, the filing of the Charge Sheet cured whatever incipient infirmity motion for reconsideration of a decision or final order under Rule 37 of said
there was in her arrest. Respondent judge therefore had no authority to Rules.37
release the party who was thus committed. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules
of Court provides: In case such motion for reconsideration is denied by the BOC, the aggrieved
party may appeal to the Secretary of Justice38 and, if the latter denies the
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that appeal, to the Office of the President of the Philippines. The party may also
the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under choose to file a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules
process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a of Court, on the ground that the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse
court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the appeal, the remedy of appeal not being adequate and speedy remedy.39 In
case the Secretary of Justice dismisses the appeal, the aggrieved party may
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be resort to filing a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or amended.40
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a In this case, the petitioner did not file any motion with the BOC for
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order or appeal therefrom;
neither did she appeal to the Secretary of Justice or to the Office of the
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question President or file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His
remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly We note that under Section 3, Rule XIII41 of the Rules of Procedure to
issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party Govern Deportation Proceedings, the decision of the BOC shall be returned
sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term "court" to the BSI for promulgation, and shall become final and executory after thirty
includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of (30) days from promulgation unless within such period, the President of the
Immigration.35 Philippines shall order the contrary.
The CA acted in accord with jurisprudence when it affirmed the ruling of the This rule, however, is not applicable in this case. What the petitioner assailed
RTC declaring that it had no jurisdiction over petitioners plea to set aside the before the RTC was a Summary Deportation Order of the BOC, not a BOC
Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC against her husband Javed decision based on the recommendation of the BSI after due hearing as
Kiani. Under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. mandated by Rule IX of the said Rules of Procedure.
292, the power to deport aliens is vested on the President of the Philippines,
subject to the requirements of due process. The Immigration Commissioner IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of
is vested with authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of the Philippine merit. Costs against the petitioner.
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. Thus, a party aggrieved by a
Deportation Order issued by the BOC is proscribed from assailing said Order SO ORDERED.
in the RTC even via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Conformably with
ruling of the Court in Domingo v. Scheer,36 such party may file a motion for
the reconsideration thereof before the BOC. The Court ruled therein that
"there is no law or rule which provides that a Summary Deportation Order
issued by the BOC in the exercise of its authority becomes final after one
The instant petition assails the Decision [1] dated November 10,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680, which dismissed the
petition for certiorari against the orders of the Regional Trial Court in Special
Proceedings No. 03-004. Likewise assailed is the Court of Appeals
Resolution[2] dated March 19, 2004 denying reconsideration.
Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the
minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the
minor in court and explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing
his child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9 [14] of A.M. 03-04-04-
SC[15] that within fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of
the period to file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the
respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This
was exactly what the court did.
Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial
adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of
custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for
private respondents petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing
the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a
father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.
In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders dated January
23, 2003 and February 24, 2003. Hence, the Court of Appeals properly
dismissed the petition for certiorari against the said orders of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED. The Decision dated November 10, 2003 and the
Resolution dated March 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
75680 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and
Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for
correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in
their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his
minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in
their birth certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the
citizenship of his mother to Filipino instead of Chinese, as well as the
deletion of the word married opposite the phrase Date of marriage of parents
because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were
allegedly not legally married.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 170340 The same request to delete the married status of their parents from
Petitioner, their respective birth certificates was made by Carlitos siblings Michael,
Present: Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
QUISUMBING,* J., Chairperson With respect to the birth certificates of Carlitos children, he prayed that the
- versus - CARPIO,** date of his and his wifes marriage be corrected from April 27,
CARPIO MORALES, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage certificate.
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ. The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as
respondent.
CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL KHO, MERCY
NONA KHO-FORTUN, HEDDY MOIRA PROMULGATED: On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition [3] in which it was
KHO-SERRANO, KEVIN DOGMOC KHO additionally prayed that Carlitos second name of John be deleted from his
(Minor), and KELLY DOGMOC KHO record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlitos father in his
(Minor), (Carlitos) marriage certificate be corrected from John Kho to Juan Kho and
Respondents. June 29, 2007 Filipino to Chinese, respectively.
In Republic v. Valencia,[13] however, this Court ruled, and has since When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus
repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect
corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108.[14] substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied. [18] The
pertinent provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court read:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a
petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality an entry in the civil registrar is sought, the civil registrar
or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the The essential requisite for allowing substantial
proceeding. corrections of entries in the civil registry is that the true facts
be established in an appropriate adversarial
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place Rules of Court, which states:
for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The Section 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction
court shall also cause the order to be published once in a of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
general circulation in the province. be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
There is no dispute that the trial courts Order [19] setting the petition Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the
for hearing and directing any person or entity having interest in the petition to petition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the
oppose it was posted[20] as well as published for the required period; that defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108,
notices of hearings were duly served on the Solicitor General, the city which requires notice by publication x x x.
prosecutor of Butuan and the local civil registrar; and that trial was conducted
on January 31, 2002 during which the public prosecutor, acting in behalf of xxxx
the OSG, actively participated by cross-examining Carlito and Epifania. The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to
bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the
What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure to implead Marivel petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties
and Carlitos parents rendered the trial short of the required adversary who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule
proceeding and the trial courts judgment void. 108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x
A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant at Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not
this point. We quote, thus: recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mothers surname,
and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by
known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he
is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers
which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method of acknowledged illegitimate child.
indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for
identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such
been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The
name is immaterial. registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child
thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper
name, and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his
which is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from middle name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate
other individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies the family himself into Singaporean society. In support, he cites Oshita v.
to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name Republic[23] and Calderon v. Republic,[24] which, however, are not apropos
may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to which both.
the child is entitled is fixed by law.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, mother, Buena Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought
intended to protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is to change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The
obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is Court granted her petition based on the following considerations: she had
fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other
only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the siblings who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using their
commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by mothers surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there
act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.[19] still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War; and
there was no showing that the change of name was motivated by a
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public interest.
does not mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance.
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado,
well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given an illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed the petition in
name and surname as he has. her behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the
surname of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mothers husband. The
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant should be granted
children shall principally use the surname of the father.[20] The Family Code where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court took into
consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to eliminate Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name
the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued to use the filed by a mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this
surname of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates case to buttress his argument that he does not have to reach the age of
that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social majority to petition for change of name. However, it is manifest
standing as long as doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the in Calderon that the Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave
interests of the State or of other people. paramount consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner therein.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,[25] in arguing that although Article 174 In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the
of the Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of
the father and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and
only one family name, even the family name of the mother. In Alfon, the convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle
petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and
Alfon, sought to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S.
Alfon (the name she had been using since childhood, in her school records In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous
and in her voters registration). The trial court denied her petition but this foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that
Court overturned the denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when
states that she, as a legitimate child, should principally use the surname of he reaches the age of majority.[26] As he is of tender age, he may not yet
her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting
herm other to which she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
was ample justification to grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on
Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name Certiorari is DENIED.
against the standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention
would show that his justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not SO ORDERED.
warrant favorable action on his petition.
DECISION
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
assailing the July 24, 2012 Decision1 and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406.
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the
custody of minors Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount
unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the Order; of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for
[Grande]. (Emphasis supplied.)
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed
minors outside of the country, without the written consent of the other In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the
and permission from the court. fathers recognition of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole
parental custody over them absent the most compelling of reasons. 10Since
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor children respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act
Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in the amount that adversely affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable
of P30,000 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over
[Grande].7(Emphasis supplied.) their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
clause, compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO." 11 illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order
considering that not only did Antonio express his willingness to give support, From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an
it is also a consequence of his acknowledging the paternity of the minor illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
children.12 Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by
Antonio of his visitorial right especially in view of the constitutionally inherent the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when
and natural right of parents over their children.13 an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made
by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial of the father.
motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar
as it decreed the change of the minors surname to "Antonio." When her In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of
motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition. In it, recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction
she posits that Article 176 of the Family Codeas amended by Republic Act or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a
No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive languagemay not be invoked public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule
by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname 132 of the Rules of Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of his
without the consent of their mother. children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority,
parental custody, and an official declaration of his childrens surname as
We find the present petition impressed with merit. Antonio.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother;
surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. hence, respondents prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is
Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the
originally phrased as follows: mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children.
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname
this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of to that of respondent?
the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other
provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the
force. explicit and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as
amended by RA 9255.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 14 which
now reads: Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in surname of their illegitimate children.
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its
literal meaning free from any interpretation.16 Respondents position that the in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification
court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis. of mother and son. (Emphasis supplied.)
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of
no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the the fathers surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing
provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255, 21 which states:
compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate children. Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies 7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
affecting children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of
childrens surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that 7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public
the use of the fathers surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In document is executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of
Alfon v. Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to Live Birth or in a separate document.
continue using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate
father as it serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child
her from using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in
shall use the surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by
Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of the child
the following documents:
concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the surnames
of the childs father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a childs
xxxx
surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the
best possible situation considering his circumstances.
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the
choice of an illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would 7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall
best serve his interest, thus: use the surname of the father upon the submission of the accomplished
AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the Father].
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons
name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional 7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child
rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not shall use the surname of the father upon submission of a public document or
be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the a private handwritten instrument supported by the documents listed in Rule
right to present evidence in favor of or against such change. 7.1.2.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed 7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if
of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the he/she has reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in a
Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After separate instrument duly notarized.
hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the
evidence presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently xxxx
established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to
change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the
impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best 8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no
in the Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded ambiguity in law and/or the construction is clearly erroneous. 23 What is more,
in the Register of Births. this Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and
declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and quasi- judicial
xxxx bodies24 when found contrary to statutes and/or the Constitution. 25 Section
5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate
of Live Birth or in a separate public document or in a private handwritten xxxx
document, the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of
Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows: (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
surname) pursuant to RA 9255." the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
and Register of Births shall not be changed or deleted. rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied.)
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the
public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal
Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live Birth Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the
and the Register of Births as follows: IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate
children of their fathers surname upon the latters recognition of his paternity.
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is
hereby changed from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255." To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no
(Emphasis supplied.) moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176
rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers surname discretionary controls,
and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot
will be known.
amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong
Corporation,22 We held:
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now
aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
opposition to have their names changed to "Antonio." 26 However, since these
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the
letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not
legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law
provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against
cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or
petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the
repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs
children's choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former
that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative
issuance an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24,
Congress. 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is
MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of which shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc.
Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL
and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF xxxx
NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of
the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien which would be affected thereby shall be made parties
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of to the proceeding.
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place
name would prejudice public interest.[17] Respondents reason for changing for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized thereof to be given to the persons named in the
grounds, however. petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of newspaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis,
the Philippines.[18] In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella italics and underscoring supplied)
Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to
avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely
sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil
childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be
use her mothers surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was cancelled or corrected that of Makati in the present case, and all persons
justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be
respondent denies his legitimacy. made parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not daughter Victoria as married on 1953 Bulan are erroneous because she was
in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And not married to Vicente Miclat who was the one who furnished the data in said
as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the birth certificate.
RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother
were made parties thereto. The trial court found merit in Emperatrizs petition and accordingly
directed the local civil registrar to change her name appearing in her
childrens birth certificates from Beatriz to Emperatriz; and to correct her civil
status in Victorias birth certificate from married to single and the date and
Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote[20] in support of place of marriage to no marriage.
his claim that his change of name was effected through an appropriate
adversary proceeding. On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the
order of the trial court involved a question of law, the Court nullified the trial
Republic v. Belmonte,[21] illuminates, however: courts order directing the change of Emperatriz civil status and the filiation of
her child Victoria in light of the following observations:
The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change
of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor
correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and General, all other indispensable parties should have
distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other been made respondents. They include not only
for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise the declared father of the child but the child as well,
would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their
allowing the change of ones name or the correction of hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All
entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. . . . other persons who may be affected by the change should
(emphasis, capitalization and underscoring supplied) be notified or represented. The truth is best ascertained
under an adversary system of justice.
Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her
availed of these two statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to parents would be substantially impaired if her status
have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside would be changed from legitimate to
from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar illegitimate. Moreover, she would be exposed to
of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case. humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma
of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The
Republic v. Labrador[22] mandates that a petition for fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was
a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should published in a newspaper of general circulation and
have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have notice thereof was served upon the State will not change
or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. It cannot be the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the
gainsaid that change of status of a child in relation to his parents is a other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated
substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry. by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making
authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973
Labayo-Rowe[23] highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable Constitution, which directs that such rules shall not
parties in a petition which involves substantial and controversial diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. If Rule
alterations. In that case, the therein petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless
(Emperatriz) filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the
of her children, Vicente Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat, in the Civil Registry of eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to
San Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz alleged that her name appearing in comprehend substantial and controversial alterations
the birth certificates is Beatriz, which is her nickname, but her full name is concerning citizenship, legitimacy of
Emperatriz; and her civil status appearing in the birth certificate of her paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without
observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, according to Nadina, her daughters real father. Gustilo in fact filed before the
said rule would thereby become trial court a CONSTANCIA wherein he acknowledged June as his
an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to daughter. The trial court granted the petition.
increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is
not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code. After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo filed with the Court of
[24]
(emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) Appeals a petition for annulment of the Order of the trial court granting the
change of Junes family name to Gustilo.
SEC. 5. Opposition.The civil registrar and any Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred
person having or claiming any interest under the to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, the petition for correction, as any judicial determination
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her
petition, or from the last date of publication of such wards share in the estate of her father. It cannot be
notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis and established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joys existence
underscoring supplied) at the time she filed the petition for
correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to
whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all
A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 the parties whose interests may be affected by the
clearly mandates two sets of notices to different potential granting of a petition.For example, a petitioner
oppositors. The first notice is that given to the persons named in the petition cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate
and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons or illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or
who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered paramour. x x x x.
interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are
mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent xxxx
Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two
types of potential oppositors) within which to file an opposition (15 days from The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is
notice or from the last date of publication). to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on
the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover
This is the overriding principle laid down in Barco v. Court of even parties who should have been impleaded under
Appeals.[25] In that case, Nadina Maravilla (Nadina) filed a petition for Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out. x x
correction of entries in the birth certificate of her daughter June from June x x.[26] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Salvacion Maravilla to June Salvacion Gustilo, Armando Gustilo being,
Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho,[27] Carlito Kho (Carlito) and his siblings named WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing
the civil registrar as the sole respondent in the petition they filed for the discussions, GRANTED. The January 8, 2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the
correction of entries in their respective birth certificates in the civil registry Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is
of Butuan City, and correction of entries in the birth certificates of Carlitos NULLIFIED.
minor children. Carlito and his siblings requested the correction in their birth
certificates of the citizenship of their mother Epifania to Filipino, instead of SO ORDERED.
Chinese, and the deletion of the word married opposite the phrase Date of
marriage of parents because their parents Juan and Epifania were not
married. And Carlito requested the correction in the birth certificates of their
children of his and his wifes date of marriage to reflect the actual date of their
marriage as appearing in their marriage certificate. In the course of the
hearing of the petition, Carlito also sought the correction of the name of his
wife from Maribel to Marivel.
The Khos mother Epifania took the witness stand where she
declared that she was not married to Juan who died before the filing of the
Khos petition.
On the issue of whether the failure to implead Marivel and the Khos
parents rendered the trial of the petition short of the required adversary
proceedings and the trial courts judgment void, this Court held that when all
the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are followed, the publication of
the notice of hearing cures the failure to implead an indispensable party. In
so ruling, the Court noted that the affected parties were already notified of
the proceedings in the case since the petitioner-siblings Khos were the ones
who initiated the petition respecting their prayer for correction of their
citizenship, and Carlito respecting the actual date of his marriage to his wife;
and, with respect to the Khos petition for change of their civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate, their mother Epifania herself took the witness stand
declaring that she was not married to their father.
What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under
Section 3 of Rule 108 to implead the civil registrar and the parties who would G.R. No. 157043 February 2, 2007
naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or
cancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-respondent of one
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
who is inadvertently left out or is not established to be known by the
petitioner to be affected by the grant of the petition or actually participates in vs.
the proceeding is notified through publication. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent.
IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals
civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those (CA) decision2 dated January 13, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128, which
on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23 of San
strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is Juan, Southern Leyte dated September 14, 1999 granting a petition for
mandated. change of name.
Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her 7. [Giovanni] is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and
ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores on September 9, he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mothers
1998. In Special Proceeding No. R-481,3 Capote as Giovannis guardian ad surname;
litem averred:
8. [Giovannis] mother might eventually petition [him] to join her in the
xxx xxx xxx United States and [his] continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the
surname of his natural father, may complicate [his] status as natural
1. [Respondent] is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, married, while child; and
minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO, is also a Filipino citizen, sixteen
(16) years old and both are residents of San Juan, Southern Leyte 9. The change of name [from] GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to
where they can be served with summons and other court processes; GIOVANNI NADORES will be for the benefit of the minor.
2. [Respondent] was appointed guardian [ad litem] of minor Giovanni xxx xxx xxx4
N. Gallamaso by virtue of a court order in Special [Proc.] No. R-459,
dated [August 18, 1998] xxx xxx authorizing her to file in court a Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the
petition for change of name of said minor in accordance with the change of name on Giovannis birth certificate. Having found respondents
desire of his mother [who is residing and working abroad]; petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to
the petition.5 Publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation
3. Both [respondent] and minor have permanently resided in San in the province of Southern Leyte once a week for three consecutive weeks
Juan, Southern Leyte, Philippines for more than fifteen (15) years was likewise ordered.6 The trial court also directed that the local civil registrar
prior to the filing of this instant petition, the former since 1970 while be notified and that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) be sent a copy
the latter since his birth [in 1982]; of the petition and order.7
4. The minor was left under the care of [respondent] since he was yet Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of
nine (9) years old up to the present; court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed
commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not
5. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child object; hence, the lower court granted the motion.
of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. [He] was born on
July 9, 1982 [,] prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering
such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. 8
absence of marriage between them; and [Giovanni] has been known
by that name since birth [as per his birth certificate registered at the From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG,
Local Civil Register of San Juan, Southern Leyte]; filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in
granting the petition in a summary proceeding.
6. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was
born and up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as
him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name. 9
concerns. [Giovannis pleas] for attention along that line [fell] on deaf
ears xxx xxx xxx; In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial
courts decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the
non-joinder of indispensable parties.10 Petitioner cites Republic of the
Philippines v. Labrador11 and claims that the purported parents and all other
persons who may be adversely affected by the childs change of name Giovannis putative father to actually recognize him. Meanwhile, according to
should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial. 12 the Family Code which repealed, among others, Article 366 of the Civil Code:
We deny the petition. Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
"The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which conformity with this Code. xxx xxx xxx (emphasis ours)
serves to distinguish him from all others; this symbol is his
name."13 Understandably, therefore, no person can change his name or Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or
surname without judicial authority.14 This is a reasonable requirement for Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan
those seeking such change because a persons name necessarily affects his Wang20 is enlightening:
identity, interests and interactions. The State must be involved in the process
and decision to change the name of any of its citizens. Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code
The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
name. Here, the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103, 15 a separate mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother,
and distinct proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correction of unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the
entries in the civil registry (usually dealing only with innocuous or clerical fathers surname.
errors thereon).16
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not
The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the action before recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother
the court a quo is intertwined with the nature of the proceedings there. The surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
point is whether the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial. unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only
when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his
Summary proceedings do not extensively address the issues of a case since parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private
the reason for their conduct is expediency. This, according to petitioner, is not handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his
sufficient to deal with substantial or contentious issues allegedly resulting middle name and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status
from a change of name, meaning, legitimacy as well as successional as a legitimated child or an acknowledged child.1awphi1.net21
rights.17 Such issues are ventilated only in adversarial proceedings wherein
all interested parties are impleaded and due process is observed. 18 The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons
name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional
When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not
the Family Code of the Philippines),19the pertinent provision of the Civil Code be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the
then as regards his use of a surname, read: right to present evidence in favor of or against such change.
Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed
the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the
child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent. (emphasis Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After
ours) hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the
evidence presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently
Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mothers surname established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to
from birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother
has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the
impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best
interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial
in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it.
of mother and son. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied
when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG,
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the cases cited by petitioner22 in support of its were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.
position deal with cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, a
proceeding separate and distinct from the special proceedings for change of WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the January 13, 2003
name. Those cases deal with the application and interpretation of Rule 108 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128 AFFIRMED.
of the Rules of Court while this case was correctly filed under Rule 103.
Thus, the cases cited by petitioner are irrelevant and have no bearing on SO ORDERED.
respondents case. While the OSG is correct in its stance that the
proceedings for change of name should be adversarial, the OSG cannot void RENATO C. CORONA
the proceedings in the trial court on account of its own failure to participate Associate Justice
therein. As the CA correctly ruled:
The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be
heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or
correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 cannot be
decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition
does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil
registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought clearly
goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by
granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in
the entry is also required to reflect the change in name. In this regard,
[appellee] Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial
proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of
the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy
thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition
including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not
deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make
the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected
to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or
not and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering
that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its
evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now
complain that the proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial
enough.23 (emphasis supplied)
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest
it.24 Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by
the rules.25 With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the
Graciano alleged that he was born in 1952 to Apolinario Uyguangco and
Anastacia Bacjao and that at the age of 15 he moved to his father's
hometown at Medina, Misamis Oriental, at the latter's urging and also of
Dorotea and his half-brothers. Here he received support from his father while
he was studying at the Medina High School, where he eventually graduated.
He was also assigned by his father, without objection from the rest of the
G.R. No. 76873 October 26, 1989 family, as storekeeper at the Uyguangco store in Mananom from 1967 to
1973. 4
DOROTEA, VIRGILIO, APOLINARIO, JR., SULPICIO & DOMINADOR, all
surnamed UYGUANGCO, petitioners, In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the petitioners
vs. elicited an admission from Graciano that he had none of the documents
COURT OF APPEALS, Judge SENEN PENARANDA and GRACIANO mentioned in Article 278 to show that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario
BACJAO UYGUANGCO, respondents. Uyguangco. 5 These are "the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or (in) any authentic writing." The petitioners thereupon moved for
Constantino G. Jaraula for petitioners. the dismissal of the case on the ground that the private respondent could no
longer prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of the Civil
Anthony Santos for respondents. Code. 6
Specifically, the petitioners argued that the only evidence allowed under
Article 278 to prove the private respondent's claim was not available to him
as he himself had admitted. Neither could he now resort to the provisions of
CRUZ, J.:
Article 285 because he was already an adult when his alleged father died in
1975, and his claim did not come under the exceptions. The said article
The issue before the Court is not the status of the private respondent, who provides as follows:
has been excluded from the family and inheritance of the petitioners. What
we are asked to decide is whether he should be allowed to prove that he is
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children
an illegitimate child of his claimed father, who is already dead, in the absence
may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
of the documentary evidence required by the Civil Code.
parents, except in the following cases:
The trial court said he could and was sustained by the respondent Court of
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the
Appeals. 1 The latter court held that the trial judge had not committed any
child, in which case the latter may file the action before the
grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in allowing the private
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
respondent to prove his filiation. Moreover, the proper remedy was an
ordinary appeal and not a petition for prohibition. The petitioners ask for a
reversal of these rulings on the ground that they are not in accordance with (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a
law and jurisprudence. document should appear of which nothing had been heard
and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four
legitimate children (her co-petitioners herein), and considerable properties In this case, the action must be commenced within four
which they divided among themselves. 2 Claiming to be an illegitimate son of years from the finding of the document.
the deceased Apolinario, and having been left out in the extrajudicial
settlement of his estate, Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco filed a complaint for As earlier related, the motion to dismiss was denied, prompting the
partition against all the petitioners. 3 petitioners to seek relief in vain from the respondent court. In the case now
before us, the petitioners reiterate and emphasize their position that allowing
the trial to proceed would only be a waste of time and effort. They argue that While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the
the complaint for partition is actually an action for recognition as an documents mentioned in the first paragraph (which are practically the same
illegitimate child, which, being already barred, is a clear attempt to documents mentioned in Article 278 of the Civil Code except for the "private
circumvent the said provisions. The private respondent insists, on the other handwritten instrument signed by the parent himself'''), he insists that he has
hand, that he has a right to show under Article 283 that he is "in continuous nevertheless been "in open and continuous possession of the status of an
possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts of illegitimate child," which is now also admissible as evidence of filiation.
the latter or of his family."
Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, receiving
We find that this case must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar support from him during that time; that he has been using the surname
set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by events, to use the Uyguangco without objection from his father and the petitioners as shown in
popular phrase. The Civil Code provisions they invoke have been his high school diploma, a special power of attorney executed in his favor by
superseded, or at least modified, by the corresponding articles in the Family Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he has
Code, which became effective on August 3,1988. shared in the profits of the copra business of the Uyguangcos, which is a
strictly family business; that he was a director, together with the petitioners,
Under the Family Code, it is provided that: of the Alu and Sons Development Corporation, a family corporation; and that
in the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate petitioners he was given a share in his deceased father's estate. 7
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children. It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his
claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
The following provision is therefore also available to the private respondent in special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible
proving his illegitimate filiation: in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds
of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 8
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following:
The problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since he seeks to
prove his filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975.
register or a final judgment; or
The second paragraph of this Article 175 reads as follows:
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
The action must be brought within the same period specified
public document or a private handwritten
in Article 173, except when the action is based on the
instrument and signed by the parent
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action
concerned.
may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent. (Italics supplied.)
In the absence of the foregoing evidence,
the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to
introduce evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an
(1) The open and continuous possession of
illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation through any of the means
the status of a legitimate child; or
allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple reason is that
Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of claim of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation.
Court and special laws.
In her Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, Justice Alicia Graciano's complaint is based on his contention that he is the illegitimate
Sempio-Diy explains the rationale of the rule, thus: "It is a truism that unlike child of Apolinario Uyguangco, whose estate is the subject of the partition
legitimate children who are publicly recognized, illegitimate children are sought. If this claim can no longer be proved in an action for recognition, with
usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family more reason should it be rejected in the said complaint, where the issue of
being aware of their existence. Who then can be sure of their filiation but the Graciano's filiation is being raised only collaterally. The complaint is indeed a
parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to be the illegitimate circumvention of Article 172, which allows proof of the illegitimate child's
child of a certain person is not really the child of the latter? The putative filiation under the second paragraph thereof only during the lifetime of the
parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child's alleged parent.
filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead." 9
Considering that the private respondent has, as we see it, established at
Finally, it must be observed that the provisions invoked by the parties are least prima facie proof of his alleged filiation, we find it regrettable that his
among those affected by the following articles in the Family Code: action should be barred under the said article. But that is the law and we
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of have no choice but to apply it. Even so, the Court expresses the hope that
Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the parties will arrive at some kind of rapprochement, based on fraternal and
the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17,18,19, 27, 28, moral ties if not the strict language of the law, that will allow the private
29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, respondent an equitable share in the disputed estate. Blood should tell.
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as
amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and Civil Case No. 9067 in the
proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, is hereby DISMISSED.
inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed. It is so ordered.