Adkins v.
Childrens Hospital >The standard furnished by the statute for the
Act of September 19, 1918: board of 3 members
was created to investigate and fix a standard of
minimum wages for women and children in the
District of Columbia
o unlawful for employer to employ any woman
worker at lower wages than are thereby
permitted.Violation: FINE / IMPRISONMENT
>purposes: "to protect the women and minors of
the District from conditions detrimental to their health
and morals, resulting from wages which are inadequate
to maintain decent standards of living, and the Act in
each of its provisions and in its entirety shall be
interpreted to effectuate these purposes."
oStatute now under consideration is attacked
upon the ground that it authorizes an
unconstitutional interference with the freedom
of contract included within the guaranties of the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. JURIS:
right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the
liberty of the individual protected by this clause.
Appellee 1st case = corporation maintaining a hospital
for children which employs a large number of
women in various capacities (WOMEN of age),
with whom it had agreed upon rates of wages
and compensation satisfactory to such
employees, but were less than the minimum wage
fixed.
2nd appellee, a woman twenty-one years of age,
elevator operator in a hotel, salary of $35 per month
and two meals a day. Hotel Company was obliged
to dispense with her services by reason of the
order of the board and on account of the
penalties prescribed by the act.so deprived of
employment.
>>Adkins was a member of the wage board created
by the act.
Supreme Court of Columbia denied the petitioners by
two appellees; Court of Appeals upheld the
constitutionality of the law, but subsequently reversed
its own decision
Petitioner: Power of the government to regulate in the
interest of health and safety
Respondent: Interference with the Fifth Amendment
protected liberty of contract.
ISSUES
1.Whether or not the act violated the freedom to
contract, thus unconsti : YES
Gen. Rule: Freedom of Contract and it is
constitutionally protected but it is not absolute..
TEST: restraint is the exception, -- justified only by the
existence of exceptional circumstances must not be
arbitrary.
An interference with this liberty so serious as that now
under consideration, and so disturbing of equality of
right, must be deemed to be arbitrary unless it be
supportable as a reasonable exercise of the police
power of the State. JURIS: police power- more direct
conseq not remote.
> Looked at jurisprud regulating hours.. OT pay-unless
danger to health (mining 10 hrs OT), public int)
> JURISP: refrain from upholding fixing of wage (unlike
fixing of hours)
>court compared present case with jurisprud and
found: It is simply and exclusively a price-fixing
law, confined to adult women), who are legally as
capable of contracting for themselves as men. It
forbids two parties having lawful capacity
guidance of the board is so vague as to be
impossible of practical application with any
reasonable degree of accuracy. What is sufficient to
supply the necessary cost of living : good health
and protect her moral
> The relation between earnings and morals is
not capable of standardization. It cannot be shown
that well paid women safeguard their morals more
carefully than those who are poorly paid.
>Vague: Resol of Board: it is hard to understand how
the same woman working in a printing establishment
or in a laundry is to get on with an income lessened by
from $1 to $7.50 per week.
>ARBITRARY ung LAW= ON ER (UNFAIR): The law
takes account of the necessities of only one
party to the contract. It ignores the necessities
of the employer by compelling him to pay not less
than a certain sum- , puts upon it the stamp of
invalidity is that it exacts from the employer an
arbitrary payment for a purpose and upon a
basis having no causal connection with his
business, not to the value of service but to ees
circumstances
>On reports women are no earning more. Logical
relation lacking, other factors that may cause it.
>On RESTRICTION upon liberty of women
* Equality was not an issue in this case but the court
had the following to say about rights of women:
- The inequality of sexes is diminishing with great
intensity so woman are accorded with emancipation
from the old doctrine.
__
US v Toribio
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a
license from the municipal treasurer to have his
carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied
because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work.
He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without
the necessary license violation of Sections 30 and
33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the
registration, branding, and slaughter of Large
Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle
fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for
human consumption..
>He was found guilty by the trial court. His counsel in
one way or the other argued that the law mandating
that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his
carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.
>>The respondent counters by stating that what the
Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large
cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a
permit given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore,
he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no
slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in
his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of
property for public use in the exercise of the
right of eminent domain without providing for
the compensation of owners, and it is an undue
and unauthorized exercise of police power of the
state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their
private property.
Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating
the registration, branding and slaughter of large
cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of
police power. W/N Respo is true
Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state
and not eminent domain. The said law does not
constitute the taking of caraboes for public
purpose; it just serve as a mere regulation for
the consumption of these private properties for
the protection of general welfare and public
interest.
>>>Police power is the inherent power of the
state to legislate laws which may interfere with
personal liberties. To justify the state in the
exercise of its sovereign police power in behalf
of the public: it must appear (1) that the interest
of the general public requires it and (2) that the
means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
(1) The Supreme Court also said that if they will
follow the contention of Toribio it will defeat the
purpose of the law.
>>>purpose of the law is to stabilize the number
of carabaos in the country (to prevent the prev
disaster) as well as to redistribute them throughout
the entirearchipelago. It was also the same reason why
large cattles fit for farm work was prohibited to be
slaughtered for human consumption. Most importantly,
the respondents carabao was found to be fit for farm
work
>>>a public int: affects welfare of agri community.
>>>The act primarily seeks to protect large
cattle against theft to make it easy for the
recovery and return to owners, which encouraged
them to regulate the registration(branding) and
slaughter of large cattle.
> rampant theft result of an epidemic that wiped 70-
100% of the population of carabaos since it drove
the prices of carabaos up to four or five-fold,
Moreover, this greatly affected the food
production of the country which prompted the
government to import rice from its neighboring
countries. The Supreme Court also said that these
animals are vested with public interest for they are
fundamental use for the production of crops.
These reasons satisfy the requesites of a valid
exercise of police power.
AFFIRMED CONVICTION
_________________
Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty
In re: Police power of the State, Lawful Subject of police
power
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The case involves a dual question
one involving the power of the court to restrain by
injunction the collection of the tax in question and
the other relating to the power of the Collector of
Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard,
or billboard upon the ground that the same is
offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
Facts
Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait
are involved in the advertising business,
particularly in billboard advertising. Their
billboards located upon private lands in the
Province of Rizal were removed upon complaints
and by the orders of the defendant Collector of
Internal Revenue by virtue of the provisions of
subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339.
"If after due investigation the CIR shall decide that
any sign, signboard, or billboard displayed or exposed
to public view is offensive to the sight or is
otherwise a nuisance, he may by summary order
direct the removal of such sign, signboard, or
billboard, and if same is not removed within ten days
after he has issued such order he my himself cause
its remova- forfeited to the Government, and the
owner thereof charged with the expenses of the
removal. not comply with the provisions of the
general regulations of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, no rebate or refund shall be allowed for
any portion of a year for which the tax may have
been paid. Otherwise, the Collector of Internal
Revenue may in his discretion make a proportionate
refund of the tax for the portion of the year remaining
for which the taxes were paid. An appeal may be had
from the order of the Collector of Internal Revenue to
the Secretary of Finance and Justice whose decision
thereon shall be final."
Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge
the power of the of the Collector of Internal
Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or
billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive
to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and
maintain that the billboards in question in no sense
constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to
the health, morals, or general welfare of the
community, or of any persons. (Churchill that the
"billboards were quite a distance from the road and
that they were strongly built, not dangerous to the
safety of the people, and contained no advertising
matter which is filthy, indecent, or deleterious to the
morals of the community." )
>contend that that portion of section 100 of Act No.
2339 is unconstitutional, as constituting a
deprivation of property without due process of
law."
Issue
1. Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs
was a legitimate exercise
of the police power of the Government?
Held YES!
unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards,
or billboards which are offensive to the sight, are
not disassociated from the general welfare of
the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but
carrying a well- recognized principle to further
application. Moreover, if the police power may be
exercised to encourage a healthy social and
economic condition in the country, and if the
comfort and convenience of the people are
included within those subjects, everything which
encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the
police power. Judgment reversed.
___
ISSUE: Was there valid exercise of police power
in this case?
Held: Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of
the police power of the Philippine Government
belongs to the Legislature and that this power is
limited only by the Acts of Congress and those
fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of
all republican forms of government. An Act -
undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the
police power and interferes with the ordinary
enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to
be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within
a proper consideration of and care for the public
health, safety, or comfort, it should not be
disturbed by the courts.
"The power vested in the legislature : they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same
and enact measures"--- for the good order,
peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience
and morals of the community, which do not ...
violate any of the provisions of the organic law."
US:: "It [the police power] has for its object the
improvement of social and economic conditioned
affecting the community at large and collectively with
a view to bring about "he greatest good of the greatest
number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined
to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the
exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from
time to time as varying social conditions demand
correction."
"It may be said in a general way that the police
power extends to all the great public needs. It
may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by
usage, or held by the prevailing morality or
strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly
and immediately necessary to the public
welfare."
"It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence
and sources of this police power than to mark its
boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise."
>>>Annoyance in smell and noises so why not
sight (advertising mat compels attention)
>>> It is quite natural for people to protest
against this indiscriminate and wholesale use of
the landscape by advertisers and the intrusion of
tradesmen upon their hours of leisure and
relaxation from work. Outdoor life must lose
much of its charm and pleasure if this form of
advertising is permitted
>>its real dependency not upon the unrestricted
use of private property but upon the
unrestricted use of the public highways is at
once apparent., the real and sole value of the
billboard is its proximity to the public
thoroughfares
>>>TEST: by the prevailing morality or strong
and preponderant opinion to be greatly and
immediately necessary to the public welfare."
>> conflict when solely esthethic, BUT OPINION:
unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards,
or billboards which are offensive to the sight, are
not disassociated from the general welfare of
the public.
United States v. Salaveria,
Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro
Facts: The provincial board, by Resolution No. 25,
selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan
Lake for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro. Pursuant to the provisions of
section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, all the
Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan
and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River
including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubis
place in Calapan are directed to take up their
habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake.
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites
selected by provincial governor. With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up
their habitation on sites on unoccupied public
lands to be selected by him an approved by the
provincial board.
>>This is an application for habeas corpus in favor
of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Mangyanes are
being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his
companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will,
and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away from the
reservation.
Defining Non-Christians
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in
the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No.
2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as
equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the
Philippines, not only because this is the evident
intention of the law, but because to give it its lateral
meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional
as making distinctions base the religion of the
individual.
The Legislature and the Judiciary, "non-Christian"
refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to
geographical area, and, more directly, to natives
of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart
from settled communities.
Issue: Whether Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code deprives a person of his
liberty of abode and is therefore
unconstitutional
Held: No. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code
does not deprive a person of his liberty without
due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The
court further ruled that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power and thus constitutional.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
interfered with when the degree of civilization of
the. Manguianes is considered. They are
restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines (peaceful, timid,
primitive and semi-nomadic..shown no desire of
community life). Nor can one say that due process of
law has not been followed. To go back to our definition
of due process of law and equal protection of the laws,
there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a
class.
The public policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to
benefit the Filipino people as a whole.
JURIS: PP valid when:
>> when to advance the public welfare, the law
was found to be a legitimate exertion of the
police power
>> progress of the general prosperity.
Held:Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts
for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the
province; and (2) the only successfully method for
educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to
live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-
General adds the following; (3) The protection of
the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public
forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the
Manguianes.
Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual and for
the greater good of the peace and order of society and
the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he
pleases. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken
away except by due process of law.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue
>>>NO DISCRIM: measures public school public health
roads
ISSUE 2 Is the provision in question is an unlawful
designation of legislative power
No. The Legislature merely conferred upon the
provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial
board and the Department Head, discretionary
authority as to the execution of the law because
of necessity.
The general rule is that the Constitutional Law
forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be
zealously protected. There is, however, an exception
to the general rule. Sanctioned by immemorial
practice, this exception permits the central
legislative body to delegate legislative powers to
local authorities. --conferred authority upon the
Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the
provincial governor and the provincial board.
As officials charged with the administration of the
province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but
they are better fitted to select sites which have
the conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a
backward state?
>>The true distinction therefore is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring an authority or discretion as to
its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later
no valid objection can be made." The Legislature
may make decisions of executive departments of
subordinate official thereof, to whom t has
committed the execution of certain acts, final on
questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248
Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision
is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the
case.
Smith, Bell & Company (Ltd.), pet vs. Joaquin
Natividad, Collector of Customs of the port of
Cebu, resp.
This is a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the
petitioner to compel Natividad to issue a
certificate of Philippine registry in favor of the
former for its motor vessel Bato.
Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands. A
majority of its stockholders are British subjects.
It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the
Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of
more than fifteen tons gross The Bato was brought to
Cebu in the present year for the purpose of
transporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports
in the Islands.
>>Application was made at Cebu, the home port
of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a
certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector
refused to issue the certificate, giving as his
reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell &
Co., Ltd., were not citizens either of the United
States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant action is
the result. __
Counsel argues that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith,
Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the laws
because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from
owning vessels, and because classification of
corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of
their stockholders is capricious, and that Act No. 2761
deprives the corporation of its property without due
process of law because by the passage of the law
company was automatically deprived of every
beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left
with the naked title to a boat it could not use .
Issue: Whether the Government of the Philippine
Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the
registry of vessel in its coastwise trade to
corporations having alien stockholders
Ruling: Yes. Act No. 2761 provides:
Investigation into character of vessel. No
application for a certificate of Philippine register
shall be approved until the collector of customs
is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that it
is engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate
trade and that it is of domestic ownership as such
ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and
seventy-two of this Code.
Certificate of Philippine register. Upon registration of
a vessel of domestic ownership, and of more than
fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register
shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic
ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the
taking of the certificate of Philippine register shall be
optional with the owner.
Issue: Whether the legislature through Act no.
2761 can deny registry of vessel with foreign
stockholders.
Ruling: Yes. We are inclined to the view that while
Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien
stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by
the due-process of law and equal protection of the laws
clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act
No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to
corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right
to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise
trade, does not belong to that vicious species of
class legislation which must always be
condemned, but does fall within authorized
exceptions, notably, within the purview of the
police power, and so does not offend against the
constitutional provision.
The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of
the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights, are
universal in their application to all person within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences
of race, color, or nationality. The word "person"
includes aliens. Private corporations, likewise, are
"persons" within the scope of the guaranties in so far
as their property is concerned. Classification with the
end in view of providing diversity of treatment
may be made among corporations, but must be
based upon some reasonable ground and not be
a mere arbitrary selection.
A literal application of general principles to the facts
before us would, of course, cause the inevitable
deduction that Act No. 2761 is unconstitutional by
reason of its denial to a corporation, some of whole
members are foreigners, of the equal protection of the
laws.
To justify that portion of Act no. 2761 which
permits corporations or companies to obtain a
certificate of Philippine registry only on
condition that they be composed wholly of
citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United
States or both, as not infringing Philippine Organic Law,
it must be done under some one of the exceptions.
One of the exceptions to the general rule, most
persistent and far reaching in influence is, broad and
comprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment,
"was designed to interfere with the power of the
State, sometimes termed its `police power,' to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace,
morals, education, and good order of the people, and
legislate so as to increase the industries of the State,
develop its resources and add to its wealth and
prosperity. From the very necessities of society,
legislation of a special character, having these objects
in view, must often be had in certain districts. This is
the same police power which the United States
Supreme Court say "extends to so dealing with the
conditions which exist in the state as to bring out of
them the greatest welfare in of its people." For quite
similar reasons, none of the provision of the Philippine
Organic Law could could have had the effect of denying
to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting
through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the
sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general
welfare and the public interest.
>>>Without any subterfuge, the apparent
purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to
be to enact an anti-alien shipping act. The
ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to
encourage Philippine ship-building.
___
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs. JULIO POMAR,
The accused who was the manager and person in
charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco factory
pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de
Filipinas, employed a woman named Macaria Fajardo as
cigar-maker, whom he granted vacation leave for
the reason of her pregnancy. However the
accused unlawfully failed to pay the sum of
eighty pesos (P80) to which she was entitled as
her regular wages during her leave
corresponding to thirty days before and thirty
days after delivery and confinement as
mandated by Section 13 of Act. 3071. Sec 15 of
the same act punishes whoever violates the said
provisions to a fine or imprisonment. The said Act was
promulgated in the exercise of its supposed police
power to safeguard the health of pregnant women and
to ensure reasonable support before and after delivery.
POMAR alleges that the aforementioned
provisions of Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional.
>>Section 13, Act No. 3071 provides that, Every
person, firm or corporation owning or managing a
factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall
be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as
laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with
pay before and another thirty days after confinement:
Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such
laborer without just cause, under the penalty of being
required to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of
two months counting from the day of her discharge.
Section 15 of the same Act provides for the penalty of
any violation of section 13.
>The latter was enacted by the legislature in the
exercise of its supposed Police Power with the
purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant
women laborers in "factory, shop or place of
labor of any description," and of insuring to them,
to a certain extent, reasonable support for one
month before and one month after their delivery.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff,
sentencing the defendant to pay the fine of fifty pesos
and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment. Hence, the case was raised to the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the former decision.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of Section
13 and 15 of Act 3071 is a constitutionally valid
exercise of the police power of the state.
Ruling:
The provisions of section 13 of Act No. 3071
were held unconstitutional and void for it
violates the constitutional right to liberty of the
employer and employee in accordance to their
own terms. In section 13, it will be seen that no
person, firm or corporation owning or managing a
factory shop, or place of labor of any description, can
make a contract with a woman without incurring
the obligation, whatever the contract of
employment might be, unless he also promise to
pay such woman employed, who may become
pregnant, her wages for thirty days before and thirty
days after confinement.
>creates a term or condition in every contract
made by every person, firm, or corporation with
any woman who may, during the course of her
employment, become pregnant, and a failure to
include in said contract the terms fixed to a fine
and imprisonment. Clearly, therefore, the law has
deprived, every person, firm, or corporation owning or
managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any
description within the Philippine Islands, of his right to
enter into contracts of employment upon such terms as
he and the employee may agree upon. The law creates
a term in every such contract, without the consent of
the parties. Such persons are, therefore, deprived of
their liberty to contract. The constitution of the
Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his
liberty and one of his liberties is the liberty to contract.
Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby
revoked, the complaint is hereby dismissed, and the
defendant is hereby discharged from the custody of the
law.
____
ISSUE: Whether or not Act 3071 has been
adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise of
the police power of the state.
RULING: The police power of the state is a growing and
expanding power. As civilization develops and public
conscience becomes awakened, the police power may
be extended, as has been demonstrated in the growth
of public sentiment with reference to the manufacture
and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that power
cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of
the state, nor transcend or violate the express
inhibition of the peoples law the constitution.
If the people desire to have the police power extended
and applied to conditions and things prohibited by the
organic law, they must first amend that law.
It will also be noted from an examination of said
section 13, that it takes no account of contracts
for the employment of women by the day nor by
the piece. The law is equally applicable to each
case. It will hardly be contended that the person, firm
or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or
place of labor, who employs women by the day or by
the piece, could be compelled under the law to
pay for sixty days during which no services were
rendered.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded,
under the facts and the law, that the provisions of
section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine
Legislature, are unconstitutional and void.
Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby
revoked, the complaint is hereby dismissed.
__
CASE DIGEST : Villacicencio Vs Lukban
Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the
City of Manila, ordered the deportation of 170
prostitutes to Davao. His reason for doing so was to
preserve the morals of the people of Manila. He
claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao,
purportedly, to work for an haciendero Feliciano
Ynigo. The prostitutes were confined in houses from
October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded, at
the dead of night, in two boats bound for Davao. The
women were under the assumption that they
were being transported to another police station
while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no
idea that the women being sent to work for him
were actually prostitutes.
The families of the prostitutes came forward to
file charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the
Chief of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of
Davao. They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to
be issued against the respondents to compel them to
bring back the 170 women who were deported to
Mindanao against their will.
During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women
were deported without their consent. In effect, Lukban
forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all,
there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's
deportation of the 170 prostitutes.
>Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women
left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case
is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the
police and the constabulary was deemed necessary
and that these officers of the law chose the shades of
night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed,
this is a fact impossible to refute and practically
admitted by the respondents.
ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to
deport women with ill repute.
HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter
how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a
grave abuse of discretion by deporting the
prostitutes to a new domicile against their will.
There is no law expressly authorizing his action.
On the contrary, there is a law punishing public
officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation,
who compels any person to change his residence
Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens
of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as
stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen.
Their choice of profession should not be a cause
for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban,
quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone
to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from
the rest of the human race. These women have been
deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao
without even being given the opportunity to collect
their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to
being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal
must be severely punished
___
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the respondents had authority to
deport the women to Davao; and NO AUTH
2) Whether or not the City of Manila has jurisdiction to
issue a writ of habeas corpus to Davao
HELD: The respondents had no authority to deport the
women. No official, no matter how high, is above the
law. The courts are the forum which function to
safeguard liberty and to punish official transgressors.
The essential object and purpose of writ of
habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. If the mayor
and the chief of police could deport the women, they
must have the means to return them from Davao to
Manila. The respondents may not be permitted to
restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to
change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity
in the courts. The great writ of liberty may not be
easily evaded. No one of the defense offered
constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ
of habeas corpus.
__
Whether or not the person be actually confined
for writ of Habeas Corpus to issue
No, there is no need for actual confinement. Any
restraint which precludes freedom of action is
sufficient. The forcible taking of women of ill-repute
from Manila to be brought to Davao, deprived them of
their freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if
they were imprisoned.
__
Meyer v. Nebraska
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching
a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed
the teaching of foreign languages to students that had
not yet completed the eighth grade.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from creating legislation that restricts
liberty interests when the legislation is not reasonably
related to an acceptable state objective.
Facts. >>Meyer, a teacher at Zion Parochial
School, used a German bible as a text for
reading. According to him, this served a double
purpose: teaching German and religious instruction.
Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child
German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed
the teaching of foreign languages to students
that had not yet completed the eighth grade. The
Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction.
In 1919, Nebraska passed a law prohibiting anyone in
any school from teaching any subject in any
language except English. In addition, foreign
languages could be taught only after the child
had passed the eighth grade. The law stated:
Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any
private, denominational, parochial or public school, teach any
subject to any person in any language than the English
language.
Section 2. Languages, other than the English language, may
be taught as languages only after a pupil shall have attained
and successfully passed the eighth grade as evidenced by a
certificate of graduation issued by the county superintendent
of the county in which the child resides.
Section 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of
this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-
five dollars ($25), nor more than one hundred dollars ($100),
or be confined in the county jail for any period not exceeding
thirty days for each offense.
Section 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in
force from and after its passage and approval.
After being charged with violating Nebraska's statute, he took
his case to the Supreme Court, claiming that his rights and
the rights of parents had been violated.
STATE: argues that the purpose of the statute is to
encourage the English language to be the native
tongue of all children raised in the state and to
foster unity
Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied
unreasonably infringe on the liberty guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment?
Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional
because it infringes on the liberty interests of the
plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end
within the competency of the state.
> Meyer's right to teach, and the right of
parents to hire him so to teach were within the
liberty of this Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more
than merely the freedom from bodily restraint..
Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends
to those who speak other languages. Education is a
fundamental liberty interest that must be protected,
and mere knowledge of the German language
cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful.
>>The means adopted exceed the limitations
upon the power of the state.
Proficiency is a foreign language seldom comes to one
not instructed at an early age, and experience shows
that it is not injurious to the health, morals, or
understanding of an ordinary child.
Discussion. Liberty interests may not be interfered with
by the states when the interference is arbitrary and not
reasonably related to a purpose which the state may
permissively regulate.
COURT DECISION
The question before the court was whether or not the
law violated people's liberty, as protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. In a 7 to 2 decision, the Court
held that it was indeed a violation of the Due Process
Clause.
No one disputed the fact that the Constitution
does not specifically grant parents the right to
teach their children anything at all, much less a
foreign language. Nevertheless, Justice McReynolds
stated in the majority opinion that:
The Court has never attempted to define, with
exactness, the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Without doubt, it denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men.
Certainly education and the pursuit of
knowledge should be encouraged. Mere
knowledge of the German language cannot be
looked upon as harmful. Meyer's right to teach,
and the right of parents to hire him so to teach
were within the liberty of this Amendment.
Although the Court accepted that the state may have
justification in fostering unity among the populace,
which was how the state of Nebraska justified the law,
they ruled that this particular attempt reached too
far into the liberty of parents to decide what
they wanted to their children learn in school.
SIGNIFICANCE
This was one of the very first cases in which the Court
found that people had liberty rights not specifically
listed in the Constitution. It was later used as a basis
for the decision, which held that parents cannot be
compelled to send children to public rather than
private schools, but it was generally ignored after that
until the Griswold decision which legalized birth
control.
Today it's common to see political and religious
conservatives decry decisions like Griswold,
complaining that the courts are undermining American
liberty by inventing "rights" which don't exist in the
Constitution.
At no point, though, do any of those same
conservatives complain about the invented "rights" of
parents to send their children to private schools or of
parents to determine what their children will learn at
those schools. No, they only complain about "rights"
that involve behavior (like using contraception or
obtaining abortions) which they disapprove of, even if
it's behavior they secretly engage in as well.
It's clear, then, that it's not so much the principle of
"invented rights" which they object to, but rather when
that principle is applied to things they don't think
people - especially other people - should be doing.
___
PIERCE v Society of Sisters
Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public schools,
were protected by a preliminary restraining order
prohibiting appellants from enforcing an Oregon Act
that required parents and guardians to send their
children to public school. Appellants appealed the
order.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment provides
a liberty interest in a parents or guardians right to
decide the mode in which their children are educated.
States may not usurp this right when the questioned
legislation does not reasonably relate to a viable state
interest.
Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation
with the power to establish and maintain academies or
schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private
organization conducting an elementary, college
preparatory, and military training school, obtained
preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants
from enforcing Oregons Compulsory Education Act.
The Act required all parents and guardians to send
children between 8 and 16 years to a public school.
The appellants appealed the granting of the
preliminary restraining orders.
Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their
control?
Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it
interferes with protected liberty interests and has no
reasonable relationship to any purpose within the
competency of the state.
The Appellees have standing because the result of
enforcing the Act would be destruction of the
appellees schools. The state has the power to regulate
all schools, but parents and guardians have the right
and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for
their children.
Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that
children receive a proper education, the 14th
Amendment provides parents and guardians with a
liberty interest in their choice in the mode in which
their children are educated.
__
Facts of the case
The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required
parents or guardians to send children between the
ages of eight and sixteen to public school in the district
where the children resided. The Society of Sisters was
an Oregon corporation which facilitated care for
orphans, educated youths, and established and
maintained academies or schools. This case was
decided together with Pierce v. Hill Military Academy.

Question
Did the Act violate the liberty of parents to direct the
education of their children? Yes. The unanimous Court
held that "the fundamental liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public teachers only."
__ Pierce v. Society of Sisters involved a challenge by a
religiously affiliated school to an Oregon law requiring
that all children between the ages of eight and 16
attend public school. Specifically, the Society of Sisters
claimed that the law interfered with parents right to
send their children to a school where they would
receive religious training. The Supreme Court struck
down the compulsory education law on the grounds
that it did unconstitutionally interfere with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of their children. While the Court noted that
states may reasonably regulate their schools, set
standards for teachers and pupils, and require that all
children of a certain age attend some school, the
government may not force children to attend public
schools. Short of some evidence that a religious school
is not fit to educate children, the government may not
prevent parents from choosing a religious school for
their children.t
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co
Brief Fact Summary. An Oklahoma law that prevented
persons who were not licensed optometrists or
ophthalmologists from fitting lenses for eyeglasses was
unsuccessfully challenged under the Due Process
Clause because it prevented opticians (artisans
qualified to grind lenses, fill prescriptions and fit
frames) from doing much of the work that they used to
do. The law also banned advertising eyeglasses
frames.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state law must be
reasonably and rationally related to the health and
welfare of the public to fall under a states Police
Powers. It must also not be an arbitrary or
discriminatory law.
Facts. An Oklahoma law prevented persons who were
not licensed optometrists or ophthalmologists from
fitting lenses for eyeglasses. Non-licensed individuals
were also prohibited from duplicating optical
instruments without written prescriptions from licensed
ophthalmologists. The Lee Optical Company challenged
the law. The District Court struck down the law holding
that the law was violative of the Due Process Clause
because [A]lthough [the legislature] was dealing with
a matter of public interest, the particular means
chosen are neither reasonably necessary nor
reasonably related to the end sought to be achieved.
Issue. Whether the Oklahoma law violates the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution.
Held. No. Judgment reversed. The Oklahoma law may
exact a needless, wasteful requirement, but it is for the
legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages
and disadvantages of the new requirement. It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction and
that this particular measure is a rational way to correct
it. The day is gone when the Court uses the Due
Process Clause to strike down state laws, regulatory of
business and industrial conditions, because they may
be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a
particular school of thought. The provision banning
advertisements of frames does not violate the
substantive due process because a state may treat all
who deal with the human eye as members of a
profession who should use no merchandizing methods
for obtaining customers.
Discussion. The unanimous Court withdraws from
review of economic legislation thereby limiting the
right of individuals to practice their profession.
____
Calalang vs. Williams et. al.
G.R. No. 47800 | Dec 2, 1940
Topic: A Just and Dynamic Social Order - Promotion of
Social Justice
Petitioner: Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a
private citizen and taxpayer
Respondent: A.D. Williams, as chairman of the National
Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, Director of Public
Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public
Works and Communications; Eulegio Rodriguez, as
Mayor of Manila; Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of
Police of Manila
Ponente: Laurel, J.
Rule of Law/ Doctrine Involved:
Commonwealth Act. No. 548 An Act to Regulate and Control
the Use of Traffic on National Roads as well as Construction
along the same, Prescribing Penalties for the Violation thereof.
Section 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders
of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public
Works, 1 with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, 2 shall promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic
on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with
the approval of the President, may contain provisions
controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other
structures within a reasonable distance from and along
national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any
or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works 3 or his
duly authorized representative whenever the condition of the
road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or
advisable in the public interest, or for a specified period, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. 4
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made
to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slaveryThe paradox lies in the fact that the apparent
curtailment [by the governments authority] is precisely the
very means of insuring its preservation.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all
people, the adoption by the government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability to all the competent
elements of society, though the maintenance of a proper
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time honed principle of sales populi est
supremo, lex. [the health of the people should be the supreme
law]
Greatest Happiness Principle greatest happiness for the
greatest number of people.
Public welfare must lie at the bottom of each law, no matter
how restrictive of liberty they might seem.
Laws expand as human possibilities expand; proportionately,
police power expands as well.
Facts:
Petitioner Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a
private citizen and as a taxpayer, prays that a writ of
prohibition be issued to invalidate the National Traffic
Commissions resolution (July 17, 1940) recommending
to the Department of Public Works and to the Secretary
of Public Works and communications that animal-drawn
vehicles [kalesa] be restricted from using the road in
this manner:
- No passing along Plaza Calderon de la Borca to
Dasmarinas St. from 7:30am-12:30pm; 1:30pm-5:30pm
for one year.
- No passing along Rizal Avenue extending from
the railroad crossing at Antipolo St. to Echague St. from
7:00am-11:00pm for one year.
Petitioner contends that Commonwealth Act
No. 548, Sec. 1 does not give the DPW & SPWC do not
have the power to create traffic laws; legislature
merely delegated them the power to temporarily close
roads to traffic when necessary for public interest or
convenience.
Moreover, petitioner contends that disallowing
the animal-drawn vehicles from operating would
interfere with legitimate business & trade, prejudiced
against the kalesa drivers.
Issues and Holding:
W/N defendants can implement the proposed
resolution restricting the flow of animal-drawn vehicles
pursuant to CWA No. 548.
YES.
The delegation of power to restrain traffic
accordingly by the legislature to the DPW is an exercise
of police power and it is meant to promote safe,
convenient and fast transit.
The act was done in the interest of public
welfare as the main intention was to relieve the
congestion of traffic.
W/N the proposed resolution impinges the
constitutional precepts regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all people.
NO.
The legitimate business of those using animal-
drawn vehicles would be restricted, but the
convenience in exchange for the same is of greater
significance than the loss of their liberties.
Ruling:
- Restrictions are constitutional and within the
DPWs power delegated by the legislature. Petition
dismissed.
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by
the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful
inference with legitimate business or trade and
abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of
infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people?
Held: 1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the
public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve
congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public
safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the
promulgation of the said law and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subject to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty
because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment
of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption
by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic
and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through
the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of
the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as
a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and
quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the
greatest good to the greatest number.
___
Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Director of Public Works infringes upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice
Held: The promotion of social justice is to be achieved
not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given
group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all people. It
is neither communism, despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the state
so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated.
____
ACCFA v CUGCO G.R. No. L-21484. November 29, 1969.
(ACCFA) was a government agency created under
Republic Act No. 821, as amended. Its administrative
machinery was reorganized and its name changed to
Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under the Land
Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844). On the other
hand, the ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and
the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA), referred to as
the Unions, are labor organizations composed of the
supervisors and the rank-and-file employees,
respectively, in the ACCFA (now ACA).
On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its
mother union, the Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a
complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations against
the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of
unfair labor practice, namely: violation of the collective
bargaining agreement in order to discourage the
members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to
self-organization, discrimination against said members
in the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain.
The ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down
in a resolution dated April 25, 1963 of the CIR en banc.
Hence this appeal.
During the pendency of the case, the union filed a
petition for certification election with the Court of
Industrial Relations praying that they be certified as
the exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors and
rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACA.Trial
court agreed with this move.
However, the ACA filed for a stay of execution which
the trial court granted.
Issue: WON the CIR has jurisdiction to entertain
the petition of the Unions for certification
election given that the mother company (ACA) is
engaged in governmental functions
Held: The Unions are not entitled. Decision modified
Ratio: Under Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform
Code the ACA was established, among other
governmental agencies, to extend credit and similar
assistance to agriculture.
According to the Land Reform Code, the administrative
machinery of the ACCFA shall be reorganized to enable
it to align its activities with the requirements and
objective of this Code and shall be known as the
Agricultural Credit Administration. These include
powers non really accorded to non-government entities
such as tax exemptions, registration of deeds, notarial
services, and prosecution of officials.
The power to audit the operations of farmers'
cooperatives and otherwise inquire into their affairs, as
given by Section 113, is in the nature of the visitorial
power of the sovereign, which only a government
agency specially delegated to do so by the Congress
may legally exercise.
Moreover, the ACA was delegated under the Land
Reform Project Administration , a government agency
tasked t implement land reform.
Moreover, the appointing authority for officials was the
President himself.
The considerations set forth above militate quite
strongly against the recognition of collective bargaining
powers in the respondent Unions within the context of
Republic Act No. 875, and hence against the grant of
their basic petition for certification election as proper
bargaining units. The ACA is a government office or
agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary
functions.
These functions may not be strictly what President
Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished
from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the
maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime,
those regulating property and property rights, those
relating to the administration of justice and the
determination of political duties of citizens, and those
relating to national defense and foreign relations.
Under this traditional classification, such constituent
functions are exercised by the State as attributes of
sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare,
progress and prosperity of the people these letter
functions being ministrant, he exercise of which is
optional on the part of the government.
The growing complexities of modern society, however,
have rendered this traditional classification of the
functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say
obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private
enterprise and initiative and which the government
was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because
it was better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals." continue to lose their well-defined
boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that
the government must undertake in its sovereign
capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges
of the times.
It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land
Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies,
the ACA among them, established to carry out its
purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that
the land reform program contemplated in the said
Code is beyond the capabilities of any private
enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely
governmental function, no less than, say, the
establishment and maintenance of public schools and
public hospitals.
Given these, the respondent Unions are not entitled to
the certification election sought in the Court below.
Such certification is admittedly for purposes of
bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to
terms and conditions of employment, including the
right to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in
fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the
ACCFA.
This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875,
which provides:
"SEC. 11. Prohibition Against Strike in the
Government. The terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by
law and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that
employees therein shall not strike for the purposes of
securing changes or modification in their terms and
conditions of employment. Such employees may
belong to any labor organization which does not
impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike:
Provided, However, that this section shall apply only to
employees employed in governmental functions of the
Government including but not limited to governmental
corporations."
___
ISSUE: W/N ACA is a government entity
YES.
It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land
Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies,
the ACA among them, established to carry out its
purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that
the land reform program contemplated in the said
Code is beyond the capabilities of any private
enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely
governmental function, no less than, the establishment
and maintenance of public schools and public
hospitals. And when, aside from the governmental
objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the
implementation of the land reform program of the
State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a
government office, with the formulation of policies,
plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of
Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the
National Land Reform Council, itself a government
instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to
Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with
respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt
as to the governmental character of its functions
disappears.
The growing complexities of modern society, however,
have rendered this traditional classification of the
functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say
obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private
enterprise and initiative and which the government
was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because
it was better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals,"5continue to lose their well-defined
boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that
the government must undertake in its sovereign
capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges
of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the
tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater
socialization of economic forces. Here of course this
development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a
national policy, by the Constitution itself in its
declaration of principle concerning the promotion of
social justice.
The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75
placed ACA under the LRPA and by virtue of RA 3844
the implementation of the Land Reform Program of the
government is a governmental function NOT a
proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer
step down to deal privately with said unions as it may
have been doing when it was still ACCFA. However, the
growing complexities of modern society have rendered
the classification of the governmental functions as
unrealistic, if not obsolete. Ministerial and
governmental functions continue to lose their well-
defined boundaries and are absorbed within the
activities that the government must undertake in its
sovereign capacity if it to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times and move towards a greater
socialization of economic forces.
__
ISSUE: Is ACCFA (ACA) performing governmental
functions?
RULING:
Yes, Under Section 3 of Agricultural Land Reform
Code. ACA established among other governmental
agencies to extend credit and similar assistance to
agriculture, in pursuance under Section 2.
Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA E.O 75
placed ACA under Land Reform Program Administration
and by virtue of R.A. 3844. The implementation of Land
Reform Program of government is a governmental
function not a proprietary function.
ACA cant step down to deal privately. It is
ministerial and government functions are exercised by
the state as attributes of sovereignty and not merely to
promote welfare, progress, and prosperity.