ANINDITA NIYOGI BALSLEV

AN APPRAISAL OF I-CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE

CONTEXT OF THE CONTROVERSIES CENTERING
AROUND THE NO-SELF DOCTRINE OF BUDDHISM

The History of Ideas in India and the West witnesses a perplexing

variety of views concerning the phenomenon of I-consciousness.
Nobody doubts its central place in our mental life, nobody questions
the indispensability of the word I as an essential component of our
conventional language yet the phenomenon remains the most puzzling
puzzle. 2 In other words, that there is such an awareness (prutiti) or
that there is such a word (&da) are not matters of any controversy.
Philosophical disagreements arise only when one attempts to account
for the phenomenon and investigates what forms the basis for this
awareness or what the word I really does point to. It is in this
process that the many inherent difficulties become explicit, different
views gradually emerge.
A survey of Indian thought leaves no doubt that the ancient Indian
thinkers were fully aware of the subtleties and complexities of the
issue in question. Rich in alternative conceptual models, the schools
of Indian philosophy put forward their views along distinctly different
lines.
Before we proceed to take an over-all view of the Buddhist under-
standing of the phenomenon of I-consciousness, it is important to
make the following observation. It is often said that soteriology is the
ultimate concern of Indian thought - Brahmanical, Buddhist and
Jaina alike. It is indeed essential to keep in mind that this by no means
has hindered an intense search in the conceptual exploration in the
Indian philosophical context. The variety of views concerning I-
consciousness, amongst other issues, that are present in the Indian
history of ideas, bears witness to this remarkable characteristic. This is
to be noted especially while reviewing the Buddhist position in the light
of the controversies centering around the no-self view (antitmavhdu)
as such. The issue of I-consciousness, being central to any soterio-
logical scheme, has received due attention in both the Atma- and
Aruitmavtidu traditions. The analytical approach in the different

Journal ofIndian PhiZosophy 16 (1988) 167-175.

0 1988 by Kluwer Academic Publishers.
168 ANINDITA NIYOGI BALSLEV

systems gives rise to distinct models. The rival theories work out
differently the psychological, epistemological, ethical and metaphysical
aspects of the question.
A consideration of the Buddhist philosophical analyses of I-con-
sciousness points to characteristics which distinguish the positions
from the traditional Brahmanical formulations. It is precisely this
essential difference that plays a crucial role in designating Buddhism
as Andmzv~du - the negative particle an being added to a term
which is the other name of Brahmanism.
It is therefore useful to be familiar with at least the basic philo-
sophical traits of the Brahmanical theories on the subject which set a
contrasting pattern and thereby put in relief the Buddhist conceptual
models that emerged in course of history. Since it is not possible at this
point to go into the details of the conceptual models that Brahmanical
preoccupation with the question has ,given rise to, let us make only a
few brief observations. This is essential in order to form an opinion
about the controversial issue of self or no-self in the Buddhist context.
Brahmanism is inspired by the central philosophical insights con-
tained in the exegetical texts of the Upanisads. The tradition has,
however, worked out gradually distinct philosophical positions with
regard to the phenomenon of I-consciousness. The disagreements
amongst the Brahmanical schools concerning the notion of I, its status
and its cognition are related to their respective understanding of the
idea of atman. However, despite the variations in their views it is
never to be lost sight of that there is no exception to the general
conceptual pattern, viz. the Ztman is ever-identical, unchanging, knows
of no beginning or end. &man is ontological and can never be
reduced to the changing states of consciousness. The pattern of
argument remains, generally speaking, as the famous Bhamati puts it:
Ye+ vyavartam5nesu yad anuvartate tat tebhya bhimram - that
which is constant in whatever is variable is different from the latter.3
Another important feature to take note of in this connection is the
relevance of the Brahmanical treatment of time for the notion of the
immutable &man, which is the prime concern of the tradition.
Time is a vast subject and a matter of separate study.4 However, its
impact on major issues of a given system can hardly be underplayed.
Despite the pronounced differences in their views, it may be observed,
 APPRAISAL OF I-CONSCIOUSNESS IN BUDDHISM 169

that in all Brahmanical systems the atman remains outside the influence
of time (k~Zaprubh&umukta). In other words, whether a specific
Brahmanical school advocates the reality of absolute time or considers it
to be merely phenomenal, whether it maintains time to be discrete or
denies altogether the notion of an empty time, the different conceptual
structures without any exception make room for a category which is
not encompassed by time. Atman is unsublatable by time, no matter
whether the conceptual scheme is committed to non-dualism, dualism
or pluralism.
This idea of the abiding self - in and through all its variations -
received a severe challenge with the advent of Buddhism. Buddhism as
a tradition decried the notion as an unwarrantable assumption, which
is logically absurd, psychologically superfluous, ethically and soterio-
logically even a hindrance. Antitmavtida becomes the distinguishing
mark, nay the other name of Buddhism.
Now, let us note that Buddhism, like Brahmanism, is not just one but
a matrix of systems. It has been mentioned that there is no uniform
view of &nun, or of aham for that matter, in the Brahmanical
tradition and yet there is adherence to a common conceptual pattern.
Similarly it seems that various interpretations and understandings of
an&nuv&ia and consequently of I-consciousness can be found in the
different phases of the development of the Buddhist tradition, which
saw the rise of specific schools. But before examining these different
views it is necessary to add that whether a theory supports or rejects :i
the notion of an identical, abiding self, it has to account for the
phenomenon of I-consciousness which no one can doubt or deny. In
this paper references will be made to texts and views belonging to :
different phases of Buddhism in order to obtain an overall view of the
problem. The emphasis is on discerning a conceptual pattern which
the theories share while delving into the technicalities of the question.
We all know that it is not to any revealed text but to the sermons
of Gautama Buddha that Ancitmuvcida owes its origin.
It is especially the second sermon - the Antittdakkhana Sutta
which is considered to be providing the key idea. An analysis is
undertaken - of which we omit the details - which suggests that
there is nothing perdurable in the psychophysical complex (ntimu-
rz@a) that the individual is identical with. It shows the vain and
170 ANINDITA NIYOGI BALSLEV

illusory character of the idea of a permanent self, having no basis in

reality.
The idea sarve dharmtih amitmanah, i.e. all is without self, is said to
be one of the three characteristics (triZak?ana) of all existence. This
idea is intimately related to the other two characteristics, viz, all is
impermanent (sarvam unityam) and all is suffering (sarvam duhkham).
One could also refer to a number of sutras which carry out the
analysis in this manner.
The following is only a brief outline of some of the key ideas for
the purpose of showing how the question of I-consciousness acquires a
novel dimension in the Buddhist context. Note that in this conceptual
frame, no atman could be pointed to as the basis of such an awareness
like in the Nyaya-Vaisesika account. It can be seen that the idea of
the individual as nothing but an aggregate of momentary elements
gradually becomes commonplace. The doctrine of panGa-skandha
exerts a profound influence on Buddhist thought. The Buddhists took
the bold step to interpret mental life purely in terms of a process,
where the chain of conscious moments adheres to the law of dependent
origination (pratitya-samutptida). The well-known formula is that
being this is (asmin sati idam bhavati). In other words, no event is a
haphazard, arbitrary occurrence but is necessarily dependent on some
other factor. The Buddhist philosophers have repeatedly kept on
arguing that it is needless - logically or psychologically - to postulate
a permanent self as a substratum or as a unifying principle. The
identical self that I-consciousness is believed to point to is explained
as an erroneous belief due to the recurrence of similar conscious
moments (ati-sad+a ttidtitmya bhrama). There are many interesting
details which are to be omitted in this short sketch. What is significant
from the perspective of philosophy of language is the gradual emergence
of the idea that the term self /soul is a mere word and has no referent
in reality.
The ethical implications of the idea of amitman is evident from the
early as well as later texts. It is taken as a very effective moral tool in
order to cultivate detachment from all sense of I-ness and my-ness
(ahamktira, mamak&ra) - the chief obstacles for spiritual pursuit. The
I is a conceptual construction (vikalpa pratyaya). It is either one or a
combination of skandhas that is referred to as I. This philosophical
insight is worked out with power and skill in the well-known dialogue
 APPRAISAL OF I-CONSCIOUSNESS IN BUDDHISM 171

between the monk Nagasena and the king Milinda.5 As a matter

of fact, it is scattered through many texts in Samyutta Nikaya.
Dhammapada could also be cited.
In other words, the rejection of the idea of a non-temporal self, as
standing apart from the conscious states, induces the setting up of
alternative theories concerning I-consciousness. The impact of this
philosophical event on such areas as epistemology and psychology
alone makes it an important subject of study. Especially interesting
are the later Buddhist philosophical works which demonstrate that
phenomena like consciousness of consciousness, memory, recognition,
as well as ethical and soteriological ventures can be accounted for on
the Buddhist premise, which demands a thorough rejection of the idea
of a permanent self. There are many documents of the refutation of
this idea throughout the different phases of the development of
Buddhism.
Mention must be made of the SautrrIntika school which rendered an
invaluable service to the cause of no-self theory. It provided a logical
device for rejecting any claim to the reality of the permanent.
Employing the idea of causal efficiency as the criterion of reality, the
so-called permanent entity is shown to be fictitious. The idea of the
permanent self meets with the same fate. It is also interesting to note
the novel way time as instant and being as instantaneous are made
to coincide ontologically, in which case their so-called separation is
attributed only to an arbitrary linguistic convention. This idea at one
stroke annuls any idea of a static or a substance-view of reality.
The Brahmanical philosophers were fully conscious that no concep-
tion of atman, of which there are several versions in the Brahmanical
systems, was compatible with this Buddhist theory of kpmabhangavtidu.
The attempts to repudiate the idea are well-known.
On the other hand, the Buddhist philosophers were no less conscious
of the challenges that the idea offered to its opponents. In this connec-
tion attention may be drawn to the comment made by the respected
Buddhist philosopher Kamalasila. In his Tattva-samgraha paiijik5, he
pointedly remarks that the Buddhists did not need to reject the meta-
physical entities posited by their opponents one by one; the idea that
they disappear immediately after their appearance without leaving any
trace (ahetuku-nirunvayu-vinier) alone could demolish those views.
Nevertheless, that the rejection of the idea of an abiding self is no
172 ANINDITA NIYOGI BALSLEV

easy and simple intellectual enterprise can be seen documented within

the frame of the Buddhist tradition itself. A review of the Pudgalavada
and Sunyavada discussions is especially significant.
In the Abhidharmakosa and Kathavastu we find reference to the
W3siputriyas.S Their theory - pudgalawida - merits attention as it
represents a view which sought a compromising stand. They thought
that without a unifying principle our mental life will be reduced into a
plurality of psychical factors and therefore to a chaos. Pudgalawida
was the result of an attempt to do without the postulation of a per-
manent subject outside the aggregates and was based on an awareness
conscious of the difficulties inherent in a position which accepted
the reality of the skandhas alone. The idea never got assimilated in
the mainstream of Buddhism. Various objections were raised by the
different Buddhist schools. Some even considered them as pseudo-
Buddhists.7 The idea of pudgala was mainly opposed, because it could
not be categorically taken to be momentary in so far as it is consid-
ered to be distinct from the aggregates.
Again, the Madhyamika dialectical analysis represents an awareness
of the limitations not only of Atmawida but also of the Abhidhtirmika
understanding of the teachings of the Buddha, viz, the radical no-self
view. The Pudgalavtida compromise is also criticized. A thorough
scrutiny of the views of self as well as of the views of time are under-
taken only to demonstrate their untenability.8 The emphasis is to
focus on the idea that the Real as $tinya is free from conceptual
construction.
Special mention must be made of the remarkable attempt to bridge
the conceptual opposition of the &ma- and Amitmavcida by
Candrakirti. The teachings concerning the self and the no-self are
unravelled as nothing but conceptual devices (upc.iya-kauSalya)g with a
definite spiritual aim. To those who are inclined towards nihilism the
Buddha taught the existence of self in order to point out that Karma
continues. On the other hand, the no-self view is taught to those who
are dogmatically attached to the self.
The idealistic phase of Indian Buddhism saw the rise of the school
of Yoga&a-VijiEnavada. An elaborate study of consciousness was
attempted which brought deep insights into various aspects of the
problem. The question of I-consciousness obtains a new significance in
 APPRAISAL OF I-CONSCIOUSNESS IN BUDDHISM 173

the context of the notions of manovijfitina, prav?ti-vij&ina and tilaya-

..- -
vynana. lo Omitting the details, let us note that the operation of manas
is invariably connected with the imposition of an ego. This itself is
satktiya or &ma-drsti which projects a pudgala on the upcId&a-
skandha and genders thereby &ma-moha, &ma-m&a and &ma-
prema.
All these ideas with which the principal schools were concerned
when worked out fully will amply disclose the important contribution
of Indian Buddhism to the issue of I-consciousness. The controversies
amongst the Buddhist philosophers themselves is a fascinating
study.
In this connection, a few words may be added to another genre of
controversy concerning Aruitmawida. A few scholars have raised
objections against the traditional understanding. They maintain that
either it is a misunderstanding or a later interpolation by Buddhist
scholars who cherished hostility against the Brahmanical tradition.ll
Again, there are others who attempted to read directly some form
of titmavada into the Nikaya literature12 and came to the conclusion
that the early s&-as were intended to mean what the sel$ is not and
not that there is no self.
We are however inclined to believe that such a reading is unwar-
ranted. If Antitmavtidu were not already ingrained in the very begin-
ning of Buddhist thought its subsequent development would remain
unaccounted for. The Sarvastivada formulation of the idea and its
more conscious Sautrarrtika version cannot be passed only to be a
later development, as not being really justified by the early texts, the
basic sources of Buddhism.
It is noteworthy that the difficulties, of which the subsequent
Buddhist philosophers were aware, were never sought to be resolved
on the premise of Atmavida. For example, the dissension of the
Vatsiputriyas is not made in the line of any form of etemalism
(&&&zvtidu). It is not Atmavtida but Pudguluwidu that they advanced
as a theory. The Vatsiputriya and the Madhyamika reviews of the
Abhidhlrmika analysis of the individual are full of significance. These
bear witness not only to the sharp and critical observations of these
Buddhist philosophers on the issue in question but also demonstrate
that they were equally aware of the philosophical implications and
174 ANINDITA NIYOGI BALSLEV

consequences of Atmavtida. Buddhist soteriology at no stage sought a

reassertion of this model. It is undoubtedly a distinct tradition -
Amitmavtida is no arbitrary designation. The later phases of Buddhist
thought can be seen interpreting and re-interpreting the early Buddhist
documents, drawing support from various teachings of the Buddha
himself. Their respective versions of Buddhist philosophy vary con-
siderably but none of them has endorsed the idea of a static self
(sthira-titmavada). The variations in the interpretations of Aruitmav6da
within the frame of Buddhist tradition speak for the analytical skill
and the vigorous intellectual effort of the Buddhist thinkers. They
show the important steps in the development of the theoretical
approach to the question of I-consciousness.
It is tempting to observe that the designations of Atma- and
Antitmavtida can be seen as providing the hollow forms into which
ideas are cast to bring out a variety of views, which know of no
monotony. The world of Indian philosophy is not monolithic. These
labels, so to speak, help us to identify the fundamental philosophical
paradigms which operate in a set of conceptual models. The designa-
tion of Antitmawida indicates precisely the departure from a
substance-oriented view. The expression almost has a polemical
vehemence which asserts its distinction from Atmavtida. It does not
seem justified to imply that the term is merely a linguistic trick to
camouflage one form or other of &navtida. It can be seen, on the
contrary, as overthrowing a paradigm in an attempt to understand,
analyze and reconceptualize diverse aspects of the problem afresh. It
provides an alternative perspective to the question by challenging the
conventional theories of self. Any attempt to read Atmavtida in any
phase of Buddhism fails to appreciate that soteriology can be worked
out on a philosophical premise which does not make use of the &ma-
paradigm.
The point that this paper seeks to make is not an assertion of any
eventual triumph or defeat of one paradigm alone but to stress that
there is no reason to underplay the an&ma-model. It is evident that
the no-self view has been a source of several conceptual systems,
providing inspiration not only to its advocates but also to its adver-
saries to rethink and reformulate their stands. A consideration of the
variety of views concerning the crucial issue of I-consciousness in
 APPRAISAL OF I-CONSCIOUSNESS IN BUDDHISM 175

Indian thought makes one aware of the usefulness of the nomencla-

tures of &navtida and Aruitmav~da for schematizations of philo-
sophical strategies.

REFERENCES

I Cp. J. P. Sartre, La Transcendance de LEgo, Paris, 1966. Also Vacaspati, Bhamati

on Sankara Bhasya, Introduction: Na hi jatu kascidatra sandigdhe-Aham va naham
veti . . .
2 W. James, The Principles of Psychology 2 ~01s.New York, 1950.
3 E. tr. taken from T. M. P. Mahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita, London: Luzac,
1938.
4 Cp. A. N. Balsiev, A Study of Time in Zndian Philosophy, Wiesbaden: Otto
Harrassowitz, 1983.
5 Abhidharmakosa and Bhasya of Vasubandhu with Sphutartha commentary of
Acharya Yasomitra, I-II, Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi,
1971.
6 Mihnda Panha, Les questions de M&da, traduit de PaIi par Louis Finot, Paris-
Bossard, 1923.
AbhidharmakoSavytikhyti of Yaiomitra. Vol. I-III. Ed. N. N. Law, 1949.
8 Cf. Atmapariksa and Kalapariksa in Madhyamakasastra of Nagarjuna, with the
commentary Prasannapada by Chandrakirti, ed. by P. L. Vaidya, Dharbanga, 1960.
) Prasamrapada.
lo Vijnaptimatratasiddhi par Vasubandhu, Vimsatika et Trimsika, Publies et traduits
,
par Sylvain Levi, Paris 1925-32.
I Such as Mrs. Rhys Davids.
I2 Perez-Remon: Self and No-Self in Early Buddhism, The Hague, 1980.

Department of Philosophy
Temple Univer$ty
Philadelphia, PA, U.S.A.