China Looks to Thailand: Exporting Arms, Exporting Influence

Author(s): R. Bates Gill

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 6 (Jun., 1991), pp. 526-539
Published by: University of California Press
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CHINALOOKS TO THAILAND
Exporting
Arms,ExportingInfluence

- R. Bates Gill

During his November1978 trip to Thailand, Deng

Xiaoping,referring to the Soviet Union and Vietnam,told his hosts in
Bangkokthat"the hegemonists have steppedup theirexpansionist activi-
ties in Asia, particularly
in SoutheastAsia. It is only naturalthatsome
Asian and SoutheastAsian statesmenand menof visionshouldhave per-
ceived... theattemptsofthehegemonists to reachout towardsSoutheast
Asia and takenpositivemeasuresto counterthem."' A monthlaterafter
signinga friendship treatywithMoscow,VietnaminvadedCambodiaand
quicklyestablisheda puppet regimein Phnom Penh. It was time for
Deng's "statesmenand menofvision"to come forwardto counterSoviet-
backed Vietnameseexpansionin SoutheastAsia.
RelationsbetweenthePeople's Republicof China (PRC) and Thailand
rapidlyevolvedfromcontentionto cooperation,even developingto the
unofficialstatusofa Beijing-Bangkok axis in SoutheastAsia. These devel-
opmentscame about largelydue to the Cambodianconflict, whereinboth
Bangkok and Beijing recognizedtheirmutual interestin resistingex-
pandingVietnameseinfluencein Indochina. Withinthis framework of
anti-Vietnamese cooperation,Chinesearms exportsthroughThailand to
Cambodianresistanceforces(primarilythe KhmerRouge) and to Thai-
land's armedforcesgreatlyenhancedBeijing'ssecurityand politicalinter-
ests in the region,and todayraise importantquestionsas to futurePRC
influenceand aims in SoutheastAsia.

R. Bates Gill is AssistantProfessorin the Departmentof Political

Science,LynchburgCollege,Virginia.The authorwas a recentrecipientoftheAlbertGalla-
tinFellowshipin International
Affairs;forsupportduringthisstudy,theauthoris grateful to
the PacificCulturalFoundation,the Programmefor Strategicand InternationalSecurity
Studiesand the ModernAsia ResearchCentrebothin Geneva,Switzerland,and the Stock-
holm InternationalPeace ResearchInstitute.
? 1991 by The Regentsof the University
of California
1. "Vice-Premier
Teng VisitsThailand,"PekingReview,November10, 1978,pp. 3-4.

526
 R. BATESGILL 527
This articletracesthedevelopment ofSino-Thairelationssincetheearly
1980s,especiallywithintheframework ofburgeoning militarycooperation
betweenthe two countriesand particularly Chineseweaponstransfers to
Thailand. Withan understanding of thiscrucialaspectof PRC-Thailand
ties,we can proceedto analyze morecloselythe practice,patterns,and
prospectsofChinesearmsexportsand Beijing'sintentions and influencein
Thailand,in SoutheastAsia, and alongChina'sstrategicperiphery.In the
process,we can gaingreaterinsightintotheimportant PRC foreignpolicy
tool ofarmstransfers and intothebroaderpictureofPRC securitypolicy.

A BuddingRelationship,
1978-84
Beforethe December 1978 Vietnameseinvasionof Cambodia,Thailand's
mostpressingthreatto stabilityand securitycame fromcommunistinsur-
gencies. FromBangkok,thesemovements werenotseenas indigenousbut
ratheras exports,mainlyby Beijing. In the 1950s the PRC had actively
participated in thecreationand supportoftheCommunistpartiesofThai-
land and Malaysia,bothofwhichcarriedout insurgency campaignsin the
Thai hinterlands, typicallyunderethnicChineseleadership.WhileBang-
kok withstoodthecommunist-led challenge,it was neverthelessa nagging
provocationthatseverelystrainedrelationsbetweenChina and Thailand.
Even aftertheestablishment of diplomaticrelationsin 1975,Beijingcon-
tinuedopenlyto encourage"revolutionary struggle"by communistinsur-
gentsfighting in Thailand. But in 1978thethreatening situationalongthe
Cambodia-Vietnamese border,cappedby theVietnameseinvasion,led to a
greatturnaboutin the Sino-Thairelationship.The exposureof China's
southernflankto Hanoi's expansionistdesignswas not seen in Beijingas
an isolatedincident,but a keystonein the larger"arc of encirclement"
constructedby Moscow around China. In February 1979 the PRC
launchedits short-lived "lesson" againstVietnam,whichprovedto be a
costlyblow to PRC lives,materiel,and prestige.This setbackforcedBei-
jing to seek alternative avenuesto achieveits strategicand politicalgoals
againstHanoi and in SoutheastAsia overall. One avenueled directlyto
Bangkok.
Strategically, Beijing wished to see the eclipse of Soviet and Soviet-
backedVietnamesestrength in theregion;politically,
it soughtto establish
a moreinfluential regionalpresenceby developingclosertieswithSouth-
east Asian countries.Openingup a cooperativerelationship withThailand
servedBeijingin both of theseobjectives.ThroughThailand,the PRC
could: (1) militarily supportCambodianresistancegroups,principally the
KhmerRouge,in theirstruggle"to bleed Vietnamwhite"and overthrow
the Hanoi-backedgovernment in Phnom Penh; and (2) see to it that a
favorablepoliticalatmosphere-a neutralor evenpro-Beijing leadershipin
 528 ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 6, JUNE1991
PhnomPenh-was establishedin Cambodia. By offering supportdirectly
to Thailand,Beijingstrengthened thefrontlineagainstfurther Vietnamese
militaryexpansion while politicallyenhancingChinese influenceon
Cambodianissuesin Thailandand, by extension,in theothercountriesof
SoutheastAsia. The supplyof arms,both throughand to Thailand,be-
came the principalmeans by whichthese severalstrategicand political
goals would be met.
In theimmediateaftermath of theVietnameseinvasionand occupation
of Cambodia,Deng requestedThai cooperationin supplyingCambodian
resistanceforceswith"materialaid." Deng hoped that"the Government
ofThailandwill permitChina to sendmaterialaid to Cambodiavia Thai-
land.... The relationship betweenCambodia and Thailand or between
Cambodia and SoutheastAsia is one of mutualdependence.If one falls,
theotherwillbe in danger.Therefore, it is impossibleforThailandto stay
aloof."2 A yearlaterthefirstvisiteverto China by a Thai parliamentary
delegationarrivedin Beijing along withthe Thai air marshal. During
thesemeetings, Deng made clearBeijing'swillingness to standon theside
of Thailand if Vietnamattackedit. People's LiberationArmyChief-of-
StaffYang Dezhi warned,duringhis January1983 visitto Thailand,that
"if Vietnamdaresto makean armedincursionintoThailand,theChinese
armywillnotstayidle. We willgivesupportto theThai peopleto defend
theircountry."3The questionofdirector indirectmilitary intervention
by
the PLA was neverruledout and was leftforthe authorities in Hanoi to
ponder. But in the early 1980s,Beiing providedlittlemorethan moral
supportto the Thais and the vague promiseof "sidingwithThailand" in
case of an attackfromVietnam. The firsthintsof moredirectand con-
cretemilitarycooperationbetweenBeijingand Bangkokdid not surface
untilthe middleof the decade.

Transfersof MajorWeapons,1985-87
From 1985, China offereda wide rangeof militaryexportsto Bangkok,
includingartillery,
munitions,armoredpersonalcarriers,aircraft,tanks,
missiles,and naval vessels. The firsttransferof major weapons4was a

2. SukhumbhandParibatra,From Enmityto Alignment:Thailand'sEvolvingRelations

withChina (Bangkok: Instituteof Securityand International Studies,1987),p. 56, quoting
R. K. Jain,ed., China and Thailand,1949-1983 (New Delhi: RadiantPublishers,1984),p.
234.
3. FromEnmityto Alignment, p. 25, quotingBangkok World,February5, 1983.
4. "Major conventionalweapons" typicallyrefersto the fourprevalentweapon typeson
theglobalarmsmarket:military aircraft, and armor,missiles,and naval craft.(See
artillery
Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson,eds.,ArmsProductionin the Third World[London:
Taylor and Francis,1986],p. 7.) Otherweaponssystems,such as guidanceand radarsys-
 R. BATESGILL 529
grant-in-aid package in late 1985, which includedheavy artilleryguns,
antiaircraftguns,antitankguns,and 24 T-59 main battletanks(MBT).
This procurementbeefed up Thailand's eastern border defensesand
counterattack strength against incursions from Vietnamese and
Vietnamese-backed forcesin Cambodia,and it openedthe door to much
widerPRC-Thailandmilitarycooperation,especiallyin theformof arms
transfers.In a pressinterview in March 1987,Thai ArmyDeputyChief-
of-StaffLieutenantGeneralSuchindaKhraprayundeclaredBangkok'sin-
tentionto concludea large arms deal withChina.5 This was confirmed
two monthslaterwhenGeneralChawalitYongchaiyut, thesupremecom-
manderof the Thai military, returnedfromBeijingwithan agreementto
acquire30 T-69s (withan optionto purchasean additional70), 10 antiair-
craftgun batteries,3,000 rocket-propelled grenades,and ammunition.
By year's end, reportssurfacedof actual sales or potentialsales in a
numberof otherweapons categories.Bangkokpurchased800 armored
personnelcarriers(APC) and approvedthefuturepurchaseofammunition
and explosivesfromthe PRC. The Thais expressedan interestin buying
Chinese HY-5 portableheat-seeking antiaircraft missilesand long-range
artilleryguns. In addition,Beijingmade low-pricedoffers to Bangkokfor
the transferof antiaircraft missiles,Romeo-classsubmarines,and F-7
fighterjets. These initialarms trade activitiesproceededlogicallyfrom
China's increaseddesireto arm Thailand againstVietnameseexpansion
and its interestin expandingPRC influencein Bangkokand Southeast
Asia. PRC-Thai armstransfers complemented the growingSino-Thaire-
lationshipmarkedby broad consensus on Cambodian issues,concernfor
Thai security,and frequenthigh-levelofficialexchangesover the period
1985-87.
Beijing'spoliticaland strategicintentionsare all themoreclearlyunder-
stood whenwe considerthe financialtermsof the arms deals. The first
knowntransfers, in late 1985,weregiftsto Bangkok,whilethe following
transactions in 1987 weresaid to borderon "give-aways,"withtheweap-
ons beingsold at verylow "friendship prices." Exact detailsof the deals
are notknown,but GeneralChawalitsaid thePRC sold armsto Bangkok
at onlyfourto fivepercentof theiractual value,and termsof repayment
weresaid to be similarlygenerous.6For theChinesethen,economicgain

tems,whichare not yet fullydevelopedand exportedby the PRC, are also consideredas
"major conventionalweapons"by some observers.
5. BangkokPost,7 March 1987.
6. Bangkokwas givena ten-yeargrace periodbeforerepayment, in installments,and it
could be made in agriculturalproducts. See "'Friendship' Arms Sales," Far EasternEco-
nomicReview[FEER] (March 19, 1987), pp. 15-16; "Thais to Pay 5% of Cost of China
Arms,"International Herald Tribune,May 12, 1987.
 530 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 6, JUNE1991
of potentialpolitical
took a back seat to more importantconsiderations
leverageand strategicmaneuvering.

ExpandingExportsand
Cooperation,1988-91
In March 1988 a second major purchasingwave by Thai defenseforces
began. General Chawalit reportedlyapprovedthe purchaseof 23 T-69
MBT, 360 APC, an antiaircraft radarguidancesystem,and 130mmam-
munition.Laterin theyear,theRoyal Thai Navyannounceditsintention
to acquire Jianghu-class frigatesfromthe PRC.7 In addition,Thailand
soughtto buya numberofmissilesfromChina,includingtheHY-5 porta-
missile,the HQ-2Jmobilesurface-to-air
ble surface-to-air missile,a truck
mobilemultiplerocketsystem,tacticalsurface-to-surface missiles,a ship-
to-airmissilesystem,and air-to-airmissiles.At thebeginningof 1989,a
thirdwave of purchaseswas in the worksinvolvinglargerand moreso-
phisticatedweapons. Afteran extremelyimportantSino-Thai military
consultationin late November1988,theThai militaryexpressedan inter-
estin acquiringa squadronofF-7 fighter jets (an upgradedPRC versionof
the Soviet MiG-21), threesubmarines,missiles,additionalMBTs, and
moreAPCs. By the end of 1989,however,afterconsiderabletesting,the
F-7 purchasewas put offand has notbeen renewedseriously.In August
1990, Bangkokapprovedthe purchaseof at least 50 C-801 ship-to-ship
missiles,one ofChina'slatestweaponsdevelopments.Capable ofsinkinga
destroyer-sizedvessel,thesemissilesare expectedto armtheJianghu-class
frigatesbeingdeliveredto Thailand.
In addition to increased contacts througharms transfers,Beijing-
Bangkokrelationsstrengthened throughothermilitary-related exchanges.
High-ranking of bothcountriesmeton a consistent
militaryofficials basis
to arrangethearmstransfers to Thailandwhiledeliberating on thestrate-
gic and politicalsituationtheyfaced in SoutheastAsia. In 1988 major
exchangesoccurredin whichperhapsas manyas 200 studentsand faculty
membersofThailand'sAir War Collegeand ArmyWar Collegemade two
separateobservation visitsto China in Apriland October. Severalongoing
trainingprograms theuse and maintenanceof Chinesemilitaryequip-
for
mentstrengthened PRC influence in Thailandas well. Anotherimportant
indicationof growingmilitarycooperationwas the developmentofjoint

7. China deliveredthefirstof thesefrigatesin April 1991,to be followedby anothersev-

eral monthslater. Two moreare to be deliveredeach yearfora totalofsixby 1993. (Report
fromtheBeijing-basedChinaDaily,April4, 1991,in ForeignBroadcastInformation Service,
Daily Report,China [hereafterFBIS, DRICHJ], April 8, 1991,p. 16; see also "FirstThai
'Jianghu'Launched,"Jane'sDefenceWeekly,July21, 1990,p. 81.)
 R. BATESGILL 531
industrialventuresforthe productionof Chinesemilitaryhardwareand
sparepartsin Thailand,a logicaloutcomeofThailand'sincreasingreliance
on the PRC forweaponry.To meetthe maintenanceand resupplyneeds
ofitsforcesequippedwithChinesearmaments, an agreement betweenBei-
jing and Bangkokwas signedin January1989 forthe creationof a joint
repairand assemblyfacilityforAPCs suppliedby China. It was possible
that the facilitywould expand into maintainingand producingChinese
tanksas well.8 One particularly controversial area ofmilitarycooperation
involveddevelopinga Thailand-basedstockpileof Chineseweapons. The
stockpile,said to be a Thai initiative,
wouldbe thefirstsuch cache of Chi-
nese weaponsoutsidethe PRC; it could providethe PRC withan overt
militarypresencein the region,would identifyVietnamas Thailand's
numberone securitythreat,and accordingto one observer,"would also
symbolizeacceptanceofChina as a benevolentpower"in SoutheastAsia.9
Whetheror notthePRC wouldhave access to thestockpileremainsunde-
termined,withsome Thai officialswishingto downplaythe image of a
"Chinese stockpile,"preferring insteadto view the plan as a Thailand
spare parts depot. However,probablyowing to the improvingsecurity
situationalong Thailand'sborderwithLaos and Cambodia,the stockpile
is yetto materialize.
- Strategicand politicalexchangesat the highestlevelsalso increasedin
the late 1980s and early 1990s. The most significant visitsto Bangkok
duringthisperiodwerethoseof PRC PremierLi Peng in November1988
(his firsttripoverseasas China's premier)and in August 1990; Defense
MinisterQin Jiweiwentto Thailand in January1989,GeneralChawalit
visitedBeijing in November 1988 and Thai Prime MinisterChatichai
Chunhawantraveledto Chinain November1988,October1989,and again
in November1990. Throughoutthesehigh-levelexchanges,subjectsdis-
cussed includedarmstransfers as well as the mutualsecurityinterestsof
the two countries.During the Li visitin 1988, severalagreementswere
concludedto provideforcontinuedmilitarycooperationbetweenthe two
countries,includingarms transfers fromChina. In January1990, Deng
Xiaoping'sson-in-lawHe Ping,a high-ranking dealingin weapons
official
transfers, made an importanttripto Bangkokin orderto maintainthe
Sino-Thaiarms trade relationship.10Since mid-1990,instabilityin the
Chatichai government leading to the February1991 bloodless coup in
Bangkokhas apparentlycontributed to a slowdownin PRC-Thailandma-

8. " . . . and Sino-ThaiAPCs," International

DefenseReview,March 1989,p. 395; "Thai-
land," PacificDefenceReporter, June1989,p. 34.
9. "Chinese Stockpilefor Thailand Causes Concern,"PacificDefenceReporter,March
1989,p. 34.
10. "FirmingUp Sales," FEER, February15, 1990,p. 9.
 532 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 6,JUNE1991

jor armstransactions
relativeto theirweaponstradeactivitiesin the late
1980s.

Patternsin PRC ArmsTransfers

The politicaland strategicincentivesbehindPRC armstransfers to Thai-
land,as well as theweapons'quality,quantity,and low cost,are represen-
tativeofan emerging patternin Chinesearmstransfer policyoverthepast
decade, and are indicativeof a shifttoward"regionalpriorities"in PRC
foreignpolicy overall. PRC arms transfers have shiftedgeographically
overtimebut now focuson regionsmuchcloserto home,a shiftthatap-
pears designed(1) to countera hostile "arc of encirclement"around
China,perceivedin Beijingto be theworkofSovietstrategists in the 1970s
and early 1980s; (2) to counterpotentialthreatsfromsmaller,regional
powers(Vietnam,India); and (3) to assertthrougharmsexportsPRC in-
fluenceregionallywherethe superpowersonce held sway.
Whenthe Soviet-Vietnamese threatto China in SoutheastAsia intensi-
fiedat the end of the 1970sand intothe early1980s,the PRC movedto
includeThailandas one of its armsclients,whichit firmly accomplished
by 1986. Thus, Thailand represented a continuationof similarpolicyin
the late 1970sand 1980s-in Egypt,Syria,Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Paki-
stan,Bangladesh,North Korea-in whichBeijingsoughtthrougharms
transfers to counter,challenge,or directlyconfrontSovietinfluence.The
transfer of weaponsto Thailandis also consistentwithPRC securitypol-
icy meantto counterthe threatsposed by smaller,regionalpowersalong
the PRC periphery.ArmingThailand to deterVietnamresemblesPRC
arms transfers to Pakistanto deterChina's othernemesisto the south,
India. Finally,transfersof PRC weaponryto Thailandcame aboutin the
contextof diminishing militaryinterestin, and supporton thepartof the
UnitedStatesforBangkok'ssecurityneeds.11 In thepast,PRC armshave
breachedsimilargaps leftopen by the superpowersforPakistan,Bangla-
desh,and Egypt. The quality,quantity,and costofPRC armstransfers to
Thailandalso followsand strengthens emergingpatternsin Chinesearms
diplomacy. The patternof the Sino-Thaiarms trade relationshipmost
closely resemblesPRC ties with Pakistan and, to a lesser extent,with
NorthKorea, bothlong-time armsclientsofChina. AlongwithThailand,
onlythreeothercountries-Pakistan,NorthKorea, and Bangladesh-are

11. Securityassistancefromthe UnitedStatesto Thailanddroppedfrom$92.2 millionin

FY1986 to $28.2 millionin FY1989 (Leszek Buszynski,"New Aspirationsand Old Con-
straintsin Thailand'sForeignPolicy,"AsianSurvey,November1989,p. 1,069. In thewake
of the February1991 coup, theU.S. immediatelyannounceda cut in economicand military
assistanceto Thailand. See reportfromBangkok-based Naeo Na, March 8, 1991,in FBIS,
DR/EA, March 8, 1991,p. 59.
 R. BATESGILL 533

TABLE 1 PRC ArmsTransfers

to Thailand,1985-90,by Year of Order

Year Armor/Artillery Missiles Naval Vessels Aircraft

1985 24 T-59 tanks

18 130mmtowedguns
37mmantiaircraft
guns
85mmantitankguns
1986 3 Romeo-class
submarines
1987 55 antiaircraft
guns
3,000 rocket-propelled
grenades
30 T-69 tanks
800 armoredpersonnelcarriers
1988 360 armoredpersonnelcarriers 12 HQ-2B 4 Jianghu-
surface-to-air class frigates
missiles
60(?) multiplerocketlaunchers 18 HY-5
23 T-69 tanks portablesurface-
to-airmissiles
1989 2 Jianghu- 3 F-7 for
class frigates inspection
1990 50 C-801
antishipmissiles
SOURCES: StockholmInternationalPeace Research Institute,WorldArmamentand
Disarmament(Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press,1986-1990);Jane'sDefenceWeekly(several
issues).

recipientsof armsfromthefourmajorcategoriesof Beijingweaponspro-

duction: militaryaircraft,artillery/armor,missiles,and naval vessels(see
Table 1).
Furthermore, China is willingto transferto Thailandweaponsthat,by
PRC standards,are of a technically nature. Typically,such
sophisticated
weaponshave been made availableonlyto China's closestclientsand al-
lies. For example,the T-69 sent to Thailand is Beijing'stop-of-the-line
MBT, designedafterthe SovietT-55. This tankis beingintegratedinto
thePakistaniarmy,but has notbeentransferred to someof Beijing'sclos-
estallies,includingNorthKorea.12 The F-7 fighter modified
aircraft, with
the additionof Westernavionics,has been offered to the Thais; currently
morethan100 F-7s are in servicein thePakistaniair force.China'sexport
of six guided-missile
Jianghu-class frigatesto Thailand is unprecedented;
Bangladeshand Egypthave receivedonly one and two such vessels,re-

12. On Sino-Pakistancooperationinvolvingthe transfer

and indigenousdevelopmentof
the ChineseT-69II MBT, see "Pakistan'sProcurement Chiefon New Programs,"Interna-
tionalDefenseReview,June1989,p. 764, and "PakistanReaches MBT 'Milestone',"Jane's
DefenceWeekly,August 11, 1990,p. 187.
 534 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 6, JUNE1991
spectively.The threeRomeo-classsubmarinesorderedby Bangkok in
1986 are the same typeBeijinghas deliveredto NorthKorea, Pakistan,
Bangladesh,and Egypt. The transferfromthe PRC to Thailand of 18
Hong Ying portable surface-to-air missiles (copies of the U.S.-made
Stinger)puts Thailand on a shortlist with othersnow possessingthis
weapon: Pakistan,Iran,themujahedinin Afghanistan, theKhmerRouge
in Cambodia,and possiblyNorthKorea. OnlyThailandand Iran are re-
cipientsofa recentChineseweaponsdevelopment, theC-801 antishipmis-
sile.
An agreementsignedin January1989 betweenChina NorthIndustries
Corporation(NORINCO) and theThai firm,Suco Engineering, createda
joint ventureinvolvingthe repairand possiblythe licensedproductionof
Beijing-supplied APCs, and places Thailandevenfurther withintheranks
of China's closestweaponsclients. The facilitymay also expandintore-
pair and maintenanceworkon the PRC T-69s now in the Thai arsenal,
and is expectedto influencefavorablyBeijing's attemptsto enterthe
SoutheastAsian arms market.Jointproduction,licensingarrangements,
or planttransfer agreementsare a relativelyundevelopedaspect of PRC
arms exports. There have been some joint arrangements, includingthe
agreement by Beijingto constructa munitionsfactoryin easternPakistan
in thelate 1960swhichwas notcarriedout,and China has helpeddevelop
throughlicensingagreements theindigenousweaponsproductioncapacity
of Iran,NorthKorea, and Pakistan. The PRC reportedly providedassist-
ance and technology to developPakistan'snuclearcapabilityas well. To-
day's Sino-Thai maintenanceand co-productionagreementresembles
thesepast arrangements extendedby the PRC to close armsclients.
The amountof weaponrytransferred by Beijingto Thailandalso ranks
highlyin some cases (see Table 2). Most prominent is the agreementby
Beijingto ship morethan 1,000APCs to Thailand,whichwill constitute
thelargestassemblageof Chinese-madeAPCs outsideof thePRC. These
largeunitsales of armorresemblethemajorsales of MBTs and APCs to
Iran and Iraq in the 1980s and the massivetransferof 1,000 MBTs to
Pakistanfrom1978to 1989. In termsofdollarvalue ofarmstransfers, we
also findThailand rankingamong China's major clients. Over the five-
yearperiod1985to 1989,Thailandrankedsixthoverall,withUS$283 mil-
lion dollarsin sales,followingWestAsian countriesand Pakistan(see Ta-
ble 2). However,thesefigures are formajorweapons,and theyalso do not
reflectthevalue ofarmstransferred via Thailandto theCambodianresist-
ance. Thus, the actual value of PRC weapons trasferred to Thailand is
possiblymuchhigher.
A finalpointon thenatureof Beijing'sarmsexportsto Thailandrelates
to theircost. These exportsare distinguished by theirlow pricetags and
 R. BATESGILL 535

TABLE 2 Valuesof Exportsof Major Weaponsby China, 1985-89, byHighest-

RankingCountries(in US$ millions,constant1985 prices)

Country Amount Country Amount

Iran 1,704 Thailand 283

Pakistan 1,205 NorthKorea 272
Saudi Arabia 1,200 Zimbabwe 252
Iraq 1,067 Bangladesh 107
Egypt 323 Sri Landa 88
SOURCE: StockholmInternational
Peace ResearchInstitutedatabase,1990.

thefavorablerepayment termsthataccompanytheagreements.These ar-

rangements accords Beijinghas made in the
are similarto arms-transfer
past withits mostfavoredclients. Beginningin the 1970s,forexample,
Beijing"took responsibilityforrehabilitating
Pakistan'sarmyand equip-
pingit withthemostmodemweaponssystemsit had available-all at no
cost to Pakistan"or "underthe mostconvenientterms."13As we have
noted,Thailandtoo has receivedweaponry"at no cost," withthebulk of
Beijing'sarmsexportsto Bangkokbeingmade "underthemostconvenient
terms." When asked about the low-costarrangements, some Beijingoffi-
cials impliedthattheseexportsare similarto arms transfers withother
"friends."Accordingto thisview,Beijingexpectspaymentat cost,or well
below cost from"friends"and a profitin its arms dealingsfromother
clients.14In thepastthese"friendly"arrangements havebeenextendedto
NorthKorea, Egypt,and Bangladesh,and certainlyto Pakistan,among
others. Today, Thailandenjoyssimilartreatment in importingweaponry
fromChina.

Incentivesand Arms Sales

In analyzingPRC armsexports,thequestionfrequently arises: Whydoes
Beijingengagein thistrade? The PRC is oftenunderstoodto be a "rogue
elephant,supplyingarms virtuallywithoutconsiderationforpoliticalor
that "arms sales are essentiallya businessdeci-
securityconsiderations,"

13. Yaacov Vertzberger, Relations,"AsianSur-

"The PoliticalEconomyofSino-Pakistani
vey,May 1983,p. 647.
14. These viewsemergedfromdiscussionsheld withmembersof the Chinesediplomatic
community in Geneva,includingthoseattachedto the UnitedNationsConferenceon Dis-
armament.Theydo notwishto have theiropinionsregardedas "official"and requestedthat
theiridentitiesnot be revealed.
 536 ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO.6, JUNE1991
sion" forBeijing,and it is suggestedthatPRC "armssales ofthe 1980s...
weredesignedpurelyforeconomicprofit."15This viewpointemphasizes
thegeneration offoreignexchangeearningsas thenumber-one motivation
drivingBeijingto sell itsweaponsabroad. In theseassessments, theother
two important incentives to exportarms-politicaland strategicconsider-
ations-are typicallyplayeddown. How well do such analysesapplyin
the case of PRC armstransfers to Thailand?
From a strategicstandpoint, Beijingbeganarmsexportsto Thailandin
earnestduringtheVietnameseoccupationofCambodiaand upondeciding
thatthenumber-one difficultybetweenChina and theSovietUnion rested
in theCambodianquestion.PRC armsexportsto Thailandshouldbe seen
as directlyrelatedto PRC concernswiththeSovietand Vietnamesepromi-
nencealongChina's southernperiphery.The PRC wishedto weakenthis
threatto its securityand to neutralizehostilitytowardBeijingin the re-
gion; it used arms transfers to furthertheseaims withChinesemilitary
supportto Thailand and throughThailand to anti-Vietnamese resistance
forcesin Cambodia (particularly the KhmerRouge).
Politically,the Chineseleadershipexpecteda close Sino-Thairelation-
ship to develop into one of quasi-allianceor alignment,therebyputting
China in the strongestpositionit has yetenjoyedin the postwarera to
exertitscenturies-old claimsto influence in SoutheastAsia. In theprocess
ofweakeningVietnamese,and by extension, Sovietinfluencein theregion,
Beijinghopedto improveitsdiplomaticstandingin SoutheastAsia, partic-
ularlyin Bangkok. A close relationship withThailand,a leadingmember
of ASEAN and the front-line stateagainstVietnameseexpansionin the
region,would allow the PRC a measureof politicalclout thatcould be
earnedalmostentirelythroughmilitaryaid to Bangkokand to theinsur-
gentKhmerRouge and otheranti-Vietnamese guerrillagroupsin Cambo-
dia. Beijing's stand in SoutheastAsia and its close ties to Thailand
contributed to the reestablishment in August 1990 of officialrelationsbe-
tweenChina and Indonesia,aftera bitterruptureof 25 years. Negotia-
tions regardingthe purchase of Chinese naval vessels by Jakarta
immediately precededand followedthe establishment of formalties be-
tweenthetwocountries.16 Elsewherein SoutheastAsia, China's imageas

15. These three assessmentsare offered,respectively, in StrategicSurvey,1988-1989

(London: InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,1989),p. 23; Wei-chinLee, "The Birth
of a Salesman: China as an Arms Supplier,"Journalof NortheastAsian Studies,Winder,
1987-88,p. 36; Anne Gilks and Gerald Segal, China and theArms Trade (New York: St.
Martin'sPress, 1985),p. 196.
16. "Indonesia,China FrigateTalks,"Jane'sDefenceWeekly,September15, 1990,p. 459.
a Chinese-language
Interestingly, newspaperin Bangkokeven reportedthatit was through
the good gracesand mediationof Thailand,particularly the foreignminister,Air Marshal
 R. BATE-SGILL 537
an arms patronto Thailand influencedBurma to purchaseas much as
US$1 billionin Chinesemilitary hardware,eventhoughin thepastBeijing
and Rangoonexperiencedless thancordialrelations.17
A clearcase foreconomicmotivations in PRC armsexportsto Thailand
is difficult
to establish,as the moststrikingaspectof the exportsis their
deliveryat drasticallyreducedpricesand withgenerousrepayment terms.
In assessingChina's incentives, it becomesclear thatthemainmotivation
is not the moneythat arms transfers mightearn,but the strategicand
politicalgoals theymighthelp Beijingto achieve. In sum,Chinesearms
exports-to Thailand, as well as to some others-formpart of China's
overallstrategicand politicalrelationships withits armsclientsand with
the regionsin whichtheyare situated.

InfluenceThroughArmsSales: Tenuousor
Tenacious?
The questionof how muchinfluence one countrycan projectthroughthe
vehicleof arms transfers is oftenansweredin two words: "not much."
But, in meetingthe goals thatmotivatedarms transfers to Thailand,the
PRC has had some success. Due in partto theweaponsexportedto Thai
armedforces,and throughThailandto theCambodiaresistance, Vietnam
expansionist policyis in retreat.Furthermore, China has strengthened the
positionof Thailand while improvingSino-Thairelations,developments
that would suggesta greaterChinesepresencein SoutheastAsia in the
yearsahead. Chinesearmstransfers also help to projecta favorablepolit-
ical outcomeforBeijingin the region. Any settlement on the futureof
Cambodia,an agreementthatwill have far-reaching consequencesforthe
futureof all of SoutheastAsia, cannotnow be concludedwithoutthepar-
ticipation,cooperation,and agreementof Beijing. Chineseleadersmust
recognizethesuccesstheyhave metwiththeirarmsexportsto theregion,
bothfroma strategicand a politicalpointof view. It wouldbe unrealistic
to assumethePRC willsoon foregothegainsmade in theregionthrough
armstransfers.
Of course, "influence"is a two-waystreet,and requirescooperation
fromthepartnerin any relationship.FromThailand'spointof view,it is
likelya continuedBeijing presencethrougharms transferswill be en-
couraged. The acquisitionof arms fromChina improvesThai defenses,
and ifit can continueto be doneat relativelylow cost,wouldmeetGeneral

of officialSino-Indonesianrelations(XingXian
SitthiSawetsila,that led to the restoration
Ribao, July5, 1990,in FBIS, DR/EA, July10, 1990,p. 51).
17. "Alliesin Isolation: Burmaand China Move Closer,"Jane'sDefenceWeekly, Septem-
ber 15, 1990,p. 475.
 538 ASIANSURVEY,VOL. XXXI,NO. 6, JUNE1991
Chawalit'srequirement that "we need to make our armedforcesstrong
witha limitedbudget."18DevelopingclosertieswithBeijingalso provides
Bangkokwithcertainassurancesand confidencein the face of Hanoi's
powerfulmilitary.As Thai poweris advancedin bothmilitaryand polit-
ical aspects,so too is Bangkok'sstandingwithinASEAN and withinthe
regionas a whole. As a practicalpoint,relianceon PRC weaponry,espe-
cially"big-ticket"itemssuch as the frigateand the APCs and tanks,will
lead to furtherdependenceas indicatedby the plans forrepairand co-
productionfacilities.China's politicalclout in Thailand was certainly
strengthened when Beijingacted quicklyto be the firstto recognizethe
new Thai government installedafterthe February1991 coup. Withthe
Thai militaryin controlunderthe leadershipof General Suchinda and
with the political fortunesof General Chawalit appearingever more
favorable,the interestsof Sino-Thaimilitarycooperation,includingarms
exports,maybe givenan evenfurther boost. Both Suchindaand Chawalit
havebeeninstrumental in developingThailand'sarmsexporttiesand close
militaryalignmentwiththe PRC.
FutureProspects
A numberoffactorscan weighagainstgainsin influence soughtby China
througharms transfers, both in SoutheastAsia and elsewhere.Overall,
Chinesearmstransfers will no doubtbe affected by eventsleadingup to
and duringthe 1991 GulfWar: majorarmsexportersmaybe waryabout
providingwithoutquestionlargeamountsofweaponsto potentially expan-
sionistregionalpowersforfearof causingnegativeinternational repercus-
sions. Also, at a worldwidelevel,as theSino-Sovietnormalization process
progresses,China's use of arms transfers to combatSoviet-led"socialist
hegemony"maylose itslegitimacy.Regionally,diminished Sovietinterest
in SoutheastAsia overall,and in supportingVietnamparticularly, could
reduceBeijing'surgeto armThailandand theCambodianresistance.Per-
haps most importantly, as the commonanti-Vietnamese frontloses its
urgency-eitherthroughgenuineVietnameseconcessionsor theestablish-
mentof a more "friendly"government in Phnom Penh or Hanoi-this
principalraisond'etreofclose Beijing-Bangkok relationscould also dimin-
ish and withit the foundationforexpandedPRC influencein Thailand
and the region.
In 1990 a divergenceof views emergedbetweenThailand and China
concerningthefutureroleoftheKhmerRouge and Bangkok'sopeningto
Hanoi. Thailandwishedto see moreflexibility in China's SoutheastAsia
policy,therebyallowinga more substantivepeace processto move for-

18. "New Aspirationsand Old Constraints,"

p. 1,068,quotingStraitsTimes,January13,
1988.
 R. BATES GILL 539
ward. Yet, Sino-Thaisupportforthe KhmerRouge continues.In sum-
mer 1990 a shipmentvia Thailandof 24 PRC T-59 tankswas reportedly
made to the KhmerRouge resistanceforces,the firstheavyarmortrans-
ferredto anyoftheCambodianguerrillafactions.And following theFeb-
ruary 1991 coup, Thai Foreign Ministryofficialsstated that the
conciliatory policieswithinthedeposedChatichaigovernment of "turning
battlefieldsintomarketplaces"wereover,perhapssignifying a harderline
towardHanoi underthe new militaryleadershipin Bangkok.19Yet, the
severalstatesin theregion,includingThailand,are notnecessarily in favor
of an overlydominantpresenceforthe PRC, whichpotentiallyposes a
considerablethreatto thesmallercountriesofSoutheastAsia. Beijinghas
demonstrated its willingnessto use forceforits irredentist claims in the
area, as signaledin the China-Vietnam clashes over the Paracel Islands.
Farthersouth,theSpratlyIslands are claimedby China,Vietnam,Malay-
sia, and thePhilippines, and standas a sourceofpotentialregionalconflict
betweenBeijingand its neighbors.Questionsof internalsubversiondi-
rectedby Beijing-a legacyof China's formerrevolutionary outlook-also
remainin the mindsof regionalleaders.
But in sum,PRC armssales to Thailand have been initiallysuccessful
and have made significant stridestowardbroadeningChineseinfluence in
the region,particularly withregardto settlement of issues in Cambodia
and regionalpolicies towardVietnam. Furthermore, in the contextof
forming commoncause againstexpansionist designsin theregion,Beijing
throughits arms transfers has strengthened its portfolioas a patronof
Thailandand theCambodianresistance, leavingthedooropenforpossibly
even greaterinfluencefollowinga Cambodian settlement.The gains
achievedthrougharmstransfers to Thailand,whileindicatinga rapidrise
in the regionalfortunes of Beijing,will ultimately be measuredovertime,
and themanyobstaclesnotedas wellas othersyetunforeseen remainto be
overcome.But an acceptancein Bangkokofa strongPRC presence,espe-
ciallywithinthe traditionally influential Thai military, coupled withBei-
jing's readinessto extend its influencein the region,bodes well for
sustainedarmsexportsand increasedinfluenceforthe PRC in Southeast
Asia. Time-honoredChinesewisdomhas it thateven an extremely long
journeymustbeginwithone step. In China'snever-ending questforsecur-
ityand regionalinfluence, armstransfers are significantstridestowardthis
elusivegoal.

19. BangkokPost,March 15, 1991.